High Court · Decided 30 April 2025
Tan Tse Haw v Peh Tian Swee and another
Feedback & support[2025] SGHCR 9 · Case no. Originating Claim No 158 of 2024 (Summons No 299 of 2025) · 29 paragraphs
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] Unless orders have been described as a “potent tool for the efficient and prompt administration of justice”: see Mitora Pte Ltd v Agritrade International (Pte) Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 1179 (“Mitora”) at [42]. Indeed, they are usually made to secure compliance in the face of serious and persistent defaults, while still giving the defaulting party a final opportunity to abide by the rules amidst the cut and thrust of litigation. Yet, due to the potentially heavy sanctions that usually follow from breaching those orders, they are made with circumspection and invariably involve the balancing of different interests.
Facts
The parties
- [3]
[3] The Applicant is Mr Peh Tian Swee, who is the first defendant in HC/OC 158/2024 (“OC 158”). The Respondent, Mr Tan Tse Haw, is the claimant in OC 158. The second defendant in OC 158 is Vfix Auto Private Limited (“VAPL”). The Applicant is a shareholder and the sole director of VAPL, and the Respondent was an ex-employee of VAPL. He was also previously a director of VAPL until on or around 17 June 2021.
- [4]
[4] On 10 July 2023, the Respondent’s employment with VAPL was terminated. Thereafter, on 11 March 2024, the Respondent commenced OC 158 against the Applicant and VAPL for minority oppression. The Respondent alleged among other things that the Applicant had excluded the claimant from the management of VAPL, and that the Applicant had mismanaged VAPL in a manner that had been oppressive and commercially unfair to the Respondent.
- [5]
[5] In the Applicant’s Defence and Counterclaim, he pleaded that Applicant’s claim in minority oppression was unmeritorious and alleged among other things that VAPL had lost its entire substratum because the Respondent had poached the employees of VAPL and had diverted business away from VAPL to SG Truck Automotive Private Limited (“STAPL”), a company that the Respondent had set up on or around 20 March 2023.
The Production Order and RA 193
(a) The first category was in respect of “[a]ny letter issued by [STAPL] to the ex-employees of [VAPL] to engage their services” (the “Category 1 Documents”). In so ordering, the Assistant Registrar broadened the original request for “[a]ll letters of employment issued by STAPL to the ex-employees of VAPL”.
(b) The second category related to “[a]ll quotations, job orders, invoices and/or statement of accounts issued by STAPL to the ex-customers and debtors of VAPL … from March 2023 to end-2023” (the “Category 2 Documents”).
I will collectively refer to the Category 1 Documents and the Category 2 Documents as the “Documents”.
The Respondent’s failure to comply with the Production Order
- [8]
[8] On the evening of 6 January 2025, the Respondent’s solicitors informed the solicitors for the Applicant that the Respondent was “still in the process of retrieving the relevant documents from [STAPL]”, and that they would “be in a position to file [the Respondent’s] supplementary list of documents by tomorrow, if not latest by Wednesday, 8 January 2025”.
- [9]
[9] Yet, on 8 January 2025, the Respondent’s solicitors informed the Applicant’s solicitors that the Respondent was “facing some difficulty in procuring the relevant documents from [STAPL]”. The Respondent’s solicitors “expect[ed] to be in a position to receive the documents by tomorrow, 9 January 2025”, and to “provide the same to [the Applicant’s solicitors] by Friday, 10 January 2025 along with [the Respondent’s] supplementary list of documents”.
- [10]
[10] Such documents were, again, not forthcoming. On 10 January 2025, the Respondent filed his 2nd Supplementary List of Documents and his solicitors communicated by way of letter stating that they were “instructed that the [Respondent] d[id] not have any documents responsive to [the] Category 1 [Documents] in his possession, custody or control”. The letter also stated, with respect to the Category 2 Documents, that there were “limitations to [STAPL’s] internal systems that ma[d]e it unduly burdensome to print out copies of all the invoices and/or statement of accounts”. Therefore, the Respondent had only produced a “compiled sales list” instead of the underlying documents.
- [12]
[12] On 3 February 2025, two days before this application was due to be filed, the Respondent filed his 3rd Supplementary List of Documents and produced some of the Category 2 Documents. Those were invoices issued by STAPL, and statement of accounts showing the transactions between STAPL and the ex-customers of VAPL, between May 2023 and December 2023. This was contrary to the Applicant’s statement in his 3rd Supplementary List of Documents that invoices and statement of accounts from March 2023 to December 2023 were produced. It was also noteworthy that each invoice referred to another document termed a “job card”, but these “job cards” were not disclosed (the Applicant would subsequently take issue with this). Further, the Respondent deposed by way of his Affidavit verifying his 2nd and 3rd Supplementary List of Documents that a search on STAPL’s accounting software returned “zero results” for job orders and quotations responsive to the description of the Category 2 Documents. There were no further documents produced thereafter.
- [13]
[13] On 5 February 2025, the Applicant filed this application. At the time of the hearing on 4 April 2025, the following documents remained outstanding:
Parties’ positions
The Applicant
- [14]
[14] In respect of the Category 1 Documents, the Applicant argued that it was incontrovertible that the Respondent had failed to provide full discovery of those, and that the Respondent’s deliberate and persistent refusal to disclose those amounted to suppression. The Applicant contended that it was inconceivable that the Category 1 Documents did not exist given that the Respondent had admitted that STAPL had employed two ex-employees of VAPL, Mr Ong Wee Sieong (“Mr Ong”) and Mr Chew Kean Guan (“Mr Chew”), who commenced employment with STAPL on or around 27 September 2023 and 17 October 2023 respectively. Mr Ong and Mr Chew are Malaysian, and the Ministry of Manpower (the “MOM”) would have required STAPL to provide them with written employment letters or contracts, which was the case with VAPL. Given that the documents were material to the Applicant’s case that the Respondent poached the ex-employees of VAPL, the Applicant submitted that he would be severely prejudiced in running his case at trial if such documents were suppressed and withheld by the Respondent.
(a) In respect of the quotations, the Respondent appeared to have carried out minimal effort in trying to produce the documents. Moreover, the Respondent had never asserted in SUM 2480 and RA 193 that he did not have possession or control over the Category 2 Documents, or that those documents did not exist, and he could not resile from his earlier position to avoid compliance.
(b) Similarly, in respect of the job orders, the Respondent could not be allowed to resile from his earlier position by asserting that those did not exist. The job orders were explicitly referred to in the invoices that were disclosed, notwithstanding that they were termed “job cards” in the invoices. Those documents essentially contained a record of the work done on the vehicles, and there could no misunderstanding on the Respondent’s part as the same practice had been in place in VAPL.
(c) Lastly, the Applicant argued that the invoices and statement of accounts for March and April 2023 were “conspicuously missing” and no explanation was provided by the Respondent.
The Respondent
- [18]
[18] Regarding the Category 1 Documents, the Respondent averred that he had in SUM 2480 taken the express position that there were no “letters of employment” issued by STAPL to the ex-employees of VAPL and had consistently submitted as such. As for Mr Ong and Mr Chew (see [14] above), STAPL did not issue any letters or written employment contracts to them to engage their services as it was a small company which did not have detailed and formal processes and procedures. Therefore, the employment agreements that Mr Ong and Mr Chew had entered into with STAPL were oral in nature.
Issues
- [21]
[21] There were several issues which arose for determination, which I directed counsel to address at the hearing. Those specific to the facts of this present application were:
(a) Whether there was evidence of suppression of the Category 1 Documents, contrary to the Respondent’s contention that STAPL did not issue any letters to the ex-employees of VAPL to engage their services; and
- [22]
[22] Apart from those issues, I also directed counsel to address me on questions that are of general relevance in applications for unless orders, as follows:
Principles governing the making of unless orders
- [23]
[23] The provision in the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) governing non-compliance with production orders is O 11 r 7, which provides as follows:
- [26]
[26] In Grande Corp Pte Ltd v Cubix International Pte Ltd and others [2018] SGHC 13 (at [80]), Lee Sieu Kin J summarised the following factors that have been considered in the context of O 24 r 16(1) of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed), the predecessor provision to O 11 r 7 of the present ROC 2021:
(a) Whether a fair trial remains possible, which may include an inquiry into whether the defaulting party’s conduct shows that they are unlikely to pursue their claim honestly and fairly if the action is not struck out (Lee Chang-Rung and others v Standard Chartered Bank [2011] 1 SLR 337 (“Lee Chang-Rung”) at [34]).
(b) Whether the defaulting party’s delay has caused any “irremediable prejudice” to the other parties to the litigation (Mitora at [41]).
(c) Whether there has been any deliberate suppression of highly relevant documents (Lee Chang-Rung at [35]).
Ensuring that the non-defaulting party is not unjustly prevented from pursuing its claim or defence
Safeguarding the integrity of the administration of justice
- [31]
[31] Apart from ensuring that the non-defaulting party is not unduly prevented from pursuing its claim or defence, a related but distinct concern is the court’s interest in upholding the integrity of the administration of justice by deterring further breaches of its rules and/or orders. It would make a mockery of the seriousness of court orders and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice if litigants can routinely disregard court orders without consequence. The principle that there is a public interest dimension to the making of unless orders is well established and has been recognised by the Court of Appeal in Mitora (at [46]) and Syed Mohamed Abdul Muthaliff and another v Arjan Bhisham Chotrani [1999] 1 SLR(R) 361 (“Syed Mohamed”) (at [15]).
- [33]
[33] In my view, the weight to be given to the public interest in the administration of justice should be influenced (at least in part) by the nature of the defaulting party’s conduct. It is axiomatic that there are degrees of non-compliance, and cases sit on a spectrum between procedural defaults of a technical complexion on one hand, and persistent defaults or contumelious conduct on the other: see Saxo Bank A/S v Innopac Holdings Ltd [2022] 3 SLR 964 (at [94(b)]) and Kraze Entertainment (S) Pte Ltd v Marina Bay Sands Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 78 (at [43]).
- [34]
[34] As for what amounts to persistent default or contumelious conduct, I regard the concluding remarks by Auld LJ in Hytec (at 1677) as instructive:
These statements were cited by the Court of Appeal with approval in Syed Mohamed, and the court encapsulated the overarching principle as follows (at [14]):
Assessing the proportionality of the sanctions that would follow from breaching an unless order
Summary
(a) First, to ensure that the non-defaulting party is not unjustly prevented from pursuing its case. Where production orders are not complied with, the prejudice caused to the non-defaulting party may be assessed in light of the degree of materiality of the documents not produced (see [28]–[30] above).
(b) Second, to safeguard the integrity of the administration of justice. The weight to be given to this consideration should be influenced at least in part by the nature of the defaulting party’s conduct, with cases sitting on a spectrum between procedural defaults of a technical complexion on one hand, and persistent defaults or contumelious conduct on the other. In determining the nature of defaulting party’s breach, it is relevant to consider if the defaulting party had made reasonable positive efforts to comply, and the extent of such efforts (see [31]–[35] above).
It was appropriate to make an unless order with the sanction of striking out
The Documents formed a central plank of the Applicant’s case
- [44]
[44] From the Applicant’s Defence and Counterclaim, it was clear that the Documents formed a central plank of the Applicant’s case that there was poaching of VAPL’s ex-employees by the Respondent, and that this was a key factual assertion in support of both the Applicant’s defence and his counterclaim. For ease of reference, I will term this as the “Key Assertion”.
- [45]
[45] As a defence, the Applicant made the Key Assertion in response to the Respondent’s claim for minority oppression. In essence, the Respondent had pleaded, among other things, that the Applicant had kept the Respondent locked in VAPL against his will and that the relationship between the parties had broken down. The Applicant, on the other hand, contended that it was the Respondent who had acted unreasonably by setting up STAPL, diverting the business of VAPL, and poaching its employees, thereby “causing the operations of VAPL to ground to a halt”.
- [46]
[46] The Applicant similarly pleaded the Key Assertion in his counterclaim. In this regard, I can do no better than to quote the concluding words of the counterclaim:
This quoted paragraph encapsulates the Key Assertion as being the central basis of the Applicant’s counterclaim, grounded on the loss of VAPL’s substratum.
Category 1 Documents
- [47]
[47] The Category 1 Documents, which related to “any letter[s] issued by [STAPL] to the ex-employees of [VAPL] to engage their services” (see [6(a)] above), were directly material to the Key Assertion. Indeed, in ordering the production of the Category 1 Documents, the Assistant Registrar found that those documents were “material as to whether the [Respondent] poached the [Applicant’s] employees” [emphasis added], and that “the [Respondent] in his Reply and Defence to Counterclaim [had] suggest[ed] that such employees may have provided services to STAPL”. There was no challenge to this finding.
- [49]
[49] I was unpersuaded by that explanation, at least based on what was available on the record. While there was no dispute that STAPL was a small company, it was difficult to believe that Mr Ong and Mr Chew, being Malaysian citizens, would have been content to work for STAPL for over a year (since around September 2023 and October 2023 respectively) solely on the basis of an oral agreement. When I queried counsel for the Respondent, Mr Thaddeus Oh (“Mr Oh”) on what the terms of the oral agreements were, he referred me to the MOM’s work permit approval for Mr Ong, which only listed the monthly salary, the working hours and number of workdays every week, and the rate of overtime pay. As I observed at the hearing, the purported terms of that oral agreement appeared to be very bare, and it was questionable why they would be content to work for STAPL on such bare terms, without any indication of the leave benefits, medical benefits, or other rights which they were entitled to under their previous employment contracts with VAPL. When asked if there was any explanation for this, Mr Oh candidly conceded that there was none on the record. Further, when applying for a work permit for Mr Ong and Mr Chew, the MOM would have required STAPL to send Mr Ong and Mr Chew a copy of their employment contract. While I did not regard this as determinative in and of itself as there was no evidence that the MOM policed compliance in that regard, it contributed to the inherent implausibility of the Respondent’s position that there were no letters or indeed any written record of Mr Ong’s and Mr Chew’s employment contracts with STAPL.
Category 2 Documents
- [51]
[51] Turning to the Category 2 Documents (see [6(b)] above), the main documents in focus at the time of the hearing of this application were the quotations and the job orders issued by STAPL to the ex-customers and debtors of VAPL from March 2023 to the end of 2023, which were not produced. Additionally, the Applicant also took issue with the non-disclosure of the invoices and the statement of accounts issued in March 2023 and April 2023 (see [13] above).
- [52]
[52] It was perhaps telling that some of the Category 2 Documents which had the closest bearing on the Key Assertion were not disclosed. As counsel for the Applicant, Mr Goh Jia Jie, cogently argued at the hearing, the issuance of quotations by STAPL when the Respondent was concurrently employed at VAPL would reveal that the Respondent was actively poaching customers of VAPL before his termination on 10 July 2023. Likewise, any invoices or statements of accounts in March 2023 and April 2024, when the Respondent was still employed at VAPL, were conspicuously missing.
- [54]
[54] However, by the time of the hearing, it was clear that the position which the Respondent took was factually unsustainable. It was flatly contradicted by the evidence of one Mdm Leng See Yong (“Mdm Leng”), a director of STAPL and the wife of the Respondent, who deposed on affidavit that the practice of STAPL was for those job cards to be attached to the invoices, and issued together to STAPL’s customers. This completely undermined the Respondent’s position that the job cards were purely internal and administrative in nature. It was also significant that Mr Oh did not challenge the veracity of Mdm Leng’s evidence when a direct question was posed to him at the hearing. Likewise, it was not in doubt that the same practice applied in VAPL, and the Respondent would have been aware of this practice.
- [56]
[56] The job orders were central to the Applicant’s Key Assertion as those would show, beyond what the invoices would contain, the time when a vehicle entered and left the workshop, and the mechanic who worked on the vehicle (as mentioned in the preceding paragraph). This would have a direct bearing on the question of whether there had been diversion of business and the poaching of employees when the Respondent was employed at VAPL. I also agreed with Mr Goh’s argument that the job orders were all the more important given that the Respondent had only disclosed invoices from May 2023 onwards. If there were invoices issued in May 2023, it would in high likelihood suggest that there was work done prior to that date, particularly when the Respondent was still employed at VAPL. The job orders would go precisely towards proving that critical fact.
The Respondent persistently disregarded his production obligations
- [60]
[60] Moreover, by the time of this application was heard, the Respondent had claimed that many of the Documents did not exist. However, this was not raised at the time of SUM 2480 and/or RA 193, despite the Respondent being in a position where he could have been reasonably expected to be readily apprised of whether those documents existed or not. For instance, if the Category 1 Documents did not exist, the Respondent could have easily raised this point at RA 193, but he did not do so (see [7] above). Much in the same way, it was only after SUM 2480 and RA 193 that the Respondent contended that the “job orders” did not exist, and that they were different from the “job cards” which he was not obliged to produce (see [12] and [19] above). The change in the Respondent’s position in this present application suggested either an unwillingness to comply or his acquiescence in or indifference to leading the Applicant (and the court) on a wild goose chase.
An unless order was made while giving more time for the Respondent to comply
Conclusion
- [69]
[69] Finally, it leaves me to record my gratitude to Mr Goh and Mr Oh for their helpful submissions, which were fairly and forcefully put forth.