[2026] SGMC 44

District Judge Sharmila Sripathy-Shanaz:

[6] The following facts are admitted.

[7] At the material time in 2023, Ms N was the principal of the preschool in question. Ms M served as the vice-principal, while Ms T was the executive director responsible for overseeing the preschool’s operations and reporting to the school management committee (“the SMC”). For convenience, I refer to Ms N, Ms M and Ms T collectively as the ‘accused persons’ where appropriate. Ms SC was the chairperson of the SMC, which oversaw the preschool.

[8] Teo was employed as a cook at the preschool. In October 2025, he pleaded guilty to three charges of outrage of modesty involving a person below the age of 14 years and was sentenced to 112 months’ and seven weeks’ imprisonment.

[9] Between May to November 2023, Teo committed outrage of modesty offences against three children, each aged about two, who were enrolled at the preschool. The offences took place during the children’s nap time. Under the pretext of patting the children to sleep, Teo would touch their vaginas with direct skin-on-skin contact. Such interactions with the children were outside the scope of Teo’s duties as a cook at the preschool.

[10] One such incident occurred on 9 November 2023, when Teo, who was assisting during nap time, inserted his hand into the diaper of a two-year-old child on at least nine occasions, and rubbed her vagina skin-on-skin.

[11] On 16 November 2023, while reviewing the preschool’s CCTV footage in connection with an unrelated matter, Ms M discovered footage capturing some of Teo’s acts on 9 November 2023, as described at [10] above. The footage showed Teo inserting his fingers into the victim’s diapers and making a rubbing motion before bringing his fingers to his face (“the Video Clip”).

[12] At the material time, Ms N, Ms T and Ms SC were overseas attending a safeguarding course on protecting children from abuse. Ms M informed Ms T of her discovery via WhatsApp and sent her the Video Clip. Ms T informed Ms N, who likewise viewed the Video Clip. The accused persons then convened a video call in which they discussed Teo’s actions.

[13] Ms M had been scheduled to fly overseas on 17 November 2023 to join Ms N and Ms T. On Ms T’s instructions, she delayed her departure so that she could instruct Teo not to go near any children, monitor him while he carried out his duties at the preschool, and inform other staff that he was not permitted to enter any classrooms. While still in Singapore, Ms M and Ms T conspired to delete the Video Clip from their WhatsApp chat.

[14] Ms M subsequently joined Ms N and Ms T overseas. While there, they discussed how to deal with Teo’s offending. Although the trip had initially been planned until 21 November 2023, they returned to Singapore a day earlier on 20 November 2023 in light of the situation. On 21 November 2023, the accused persons met to discuss the situation again, and decided to bring the matter to Ms SC’s attention.

[15] On 22 November 2023, a meeting was convened between Ms SC and the accused persons. Ms SC was informed of Teo’s acts for the first time and shown CCTV footage capturing part of the incident described at [10]. Upon viewing the footage, Ms SC remarked that Teo appeared to be “masturbating” the victim.

[16] During the discussion, Ms T sought Ms SC’s decision on whether the matter should be reported to the police. She highlighted that doing so would have implications for the preschool, including the need to inform parents, notify the Early Childhood Development Agency (“ECDA”), and the likelihood that the police would interview staff regarding the duration of Teo’s offending. Ms T also expressed the view that the victim, who had been half-asleep, might not have been aware of the incident and therefore may not have been affected by it. She suggested that the issue could be handled quietly by asking Teo to resign, instead of reporting the matter to the police.

[17] When Ms SC asked whether the victim’s parents ought to be informed, Ms T raised concerns about the potential reaction from the victim’s parents and other parents, and the reputational consequences this might have for the preschool, including the risk that parents might withdraw their children and that the preschool might ultimately have to close. She reiterated her view that the victim had not been significantly affected. Ms SC, however, questioned whether the matter should be covered up and expressed concern that terminating Teo’s employment would not prevent him, as a Permanent Resident, from continuing to work in Singapore and committing similar offences in the future.

[18] Ms M raised that reporting the offence might have a greater impact on the victim and her parents than resolving the matter quietly. Ms M also opined that if she were the victim’s mother, she would prefer not to be informed of what had occurred. Ms SC remarked that Teo’s acts could be registered in the victim’s memory and that, if there were adverse effects, early intervention would be preferable.

[19] During the meeting, Ms N became distressed. She raised that if the matter were reported, they would have to face questioning by parents and expressed that she did not wish for all the children to be withdrawn from the preschool. Nevertheless, she acknowledged that there had been a lapse on their part.

[20] Towards the end of the meeting, Ms SC informed the group that she would need time to consider the matter. In the meantime, it was agreed that Teo would be monitored while a decision was being made.

[21] After the meeting, Ms M remarked that Ms SC appeared concerned about her responsibility to the congregation. Ms M and Ms T also acknowledged that the preschool had been negligent in allowing Teo, a cook, to access the napping classroom. The accused persons further discussed resigning if Ms SC decided to report the matter to the police.

[22] On 23 November 2023, another meeting was convened between Ms SC and the accused persons. At this meeting, Ms SC conveyed her decision not to lodge a police report, to dismiss Teo, and to treat the matter as closed. The accused persons agreed. Ms T also asked whether a non-disclosure agreement was necessary in light of that decision, but Ms SC demurred.

[23] Shortly after the meeting, Ms T gave Teo the option of resigning or being terminated by the preschool. Teo chose to resign and submitted his resignation letter on the same day. The accused persons thereafter treated the matter closed.

[24] At the material time, the preschool’s safeguarding policy required individual staff members to inform the relevant authorities, including the police, if there was abuse by a staff member. While the Congregational Safeguarding Policy set out internal reporting lines, it also made clear that staff could report the matter directly to the police without management’s approval where the law required such abuse to be reported.

[25] On 24 November 2023, Ms SC informed Ms T that she had reconsidered her position and wanted to report the matter to the police. Ms T relayed this decision to Ms N and Ms M.

[26] Ms T also instructed Ms N and Ms M to prepare their resignation letters. The accused persons agreed to tender their resignations at the upcoming meeting convened by Ms SC, as they felt unable to cope with the fallout that would arise from the reporting.

[27] On 26 November 2023, the accused persons met in Ms N’s office before their meeting with Ms SC. They again discussed resigning together and printed a resignation letter to present to Ms SC.

[28] At this meeting, Ms T pressured Ms N into agreeing to overwrite or delete the preschool’s CCTV footage, including the footage from 9 November 2023.

[29] On Ms T’s instructions, Ms M reformatted the CCTV hard disks, thereby deleting all footage recorded prior to that date. This forms the subject matter of the Ms N’s Obstruction Offence, which has been taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing.

[30] After reformatting the hard disks, the accused persons proceeded to their meeting with Ms SC, where she confirmed her intention to report the matter to the police. Upon hearing this, Ms N began crying and hyperventilating, while Ms T and Ms M indicated that they might resign if the matter were reported. The meeting ended when Ms N was conveyed to hospital.

[31] Following the meeting, Ms SC vacillated on whether to report the matter. After consulting the Congregational Safeguarding Advisor, she decided that the matter had to be reported, and on 30 November 2023, notified the accused persons of this.

[32] On 2 December 2023, Ms SC reported the matter to the SMC and lodged a police report. Pursuant to this, Teo was arrested on 4 December 2023.

[33] The police conducted a raid at the preschool on the same day. A check of the CCTV system revealed that all three hard disks had been reformatted and that no footage of Teo’s offending remained on the system.

[34] The CCTV vendor was unable to recover any footage recorded before 26 November 2023. However, the police forensic team subsequently managed to recover footage of the incident on 9 November 2023.

[35] Pursuant to s 424 of the CPC, every person who is aware of the commission of an arrestable offence under Chapter 16 of the Penal Code must, in the absence of a reasonable excuse, immediately give information of the commission of that offence to a police officer. Teo’s outrage of modesty of a person under 14 years of age (supra at [10]), punishable under s 354(2) of the Penal Code, is such an offence.

[36] An offence under s 202 of the Penal Code is punishable with a fine, imprisonment of up to six months, or both.

[37] In the absence of judicial guidance on sentencing for this offence, I approach sentencing by reference to: (a) the maximum prescribed punishment; (b) the harm occasioned by the offence and the offender’s culpability; and (c) other aggravating or mitigating factors. This accords with the High Court’s recognition that the two principal parameters a sentencing court generally considers in assessing the seriousness of an offence are the harm caused and the offender’s culpability: Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat [2017] 4 SLR 1099, endorsed in Newton, David Christopher v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGHC 266 (“Newton Christopher”) at [62].

[38] The gravamen of an offence under s 202 of the Penal Code lies in the deliberate suppression of information relating to the commission of an offence which the offender is legally bound to report. The provision reflects the fundamental premise that the effective administration of criminal justice depends on offences being promptly brought to the attention of the authorities so that investigations may be undertaken while evidence remains available and reliable. A person who intentionally withholds such information, impedes the detection and investigation of criminal wrongdoing, jeopardises the timely preservation of evidence and thereby undermines the integrity and efficacy of the criminal justice process.

[39] Given the object of s 202 of the Penal Code in safeguarding the effective administration of criminal justice, general deterrence assumes primacy in sentencing. This accords with the courts’ recognition that it is the dominant sentencing consideration for offences involving public institutions or those which strike at the administration of justice: Public Prosecutor v Law Aik Meng at [2007] SGHC 33 at [24(b)] and Parthiban a/l Kanapathy v Public Prosecutor [2021] 2 SLR 847 at [27(a)] cited with approval in Public Prosecutor v CHJ [2024] SGHC 240 at [146], for the latter broader proposition.

[40] In my view, the following non-exhaustive factors, drawn from well-developed jurisprudence, would bear on sentence:

(a) Harm-related factors. These include the nature and gravity of the predicate offence that was not reported. The more serious the underlying offence, the greater the actual or potential harm arising from the failure to report it. Consideration should also be given to the consequences of the non-reporting, including whether the omission delayed intervention by the authorities, allowed further offending to occur, contributed to the destruction or loss of evidence or enabled the primary offender to evade investigation and accountability.

(b) Culpability-related factors. These include the offender’s state of mind, in particular whether the offender knew or had reason to believe that the predicate offence had been committed. The court may also consider the offender’s motivation in failing to report the matter, the extent to which the offender abused a position of trust or responsibility and the degree of persistence in maintaining the omission.

[41] The parties are aligned in submitting that a fine is appropriate. The Prosecution seeks a fine of at least $8,000, while the Defence submits that a fine in the range of $6,000 to $8,000 should be imposed. Their respective positions are summarised below.

[42] The Prosecution relies on the following factors:

(a) The predicate offence of aggravated outrage of modesty is a serious offence for which Teo was sentenced to 37 months’ and three weeks’ imprisonment.

(b) Although Teo was eventually apprehended, CCTV footage capturing the offences against vulnerable victims was deleted in the intervening period.

(c) Ms N cooperated during investigations and has pleaded guilty.

[43] Given the paucity of reported decisions on offences under s 202 of the Penal Code, the court invited parties at the hearing on 19 January 2026 to identify and extract relevant precedents from the Sentencing Information and Research Repository (“SIR”).

[44] In response, the Prosecution cites four unreported cases. In two, fines of $2,000 were imposed. In the remaining two, custodial sentences of four and six months’ imprisonment were imposed. The Prosecution submits that its proposed sentence is consistent with these precedents, noting that fines are not without precedent and that the cases attracting custodial terms involved greater harm and culpability.

[45] The Defence relies on the following factors:

(a) Ms N did not report the incident as she was acting on the instructions of her superior.

(b) She cooperated fully with the authorities, was forthcoming during investigations and has demonstrated remorse by pleading guilty at the earliest opportunity.

(c) The offence arose from a lapse in judgment during a period of stress, anxiety and fear.

(d) Ms N has worked in early childhood education for over 25 years. The testimonials tendered attest to her longstanding dedication and strong sense of responsibility towards the children, parents, staff of the preschool and the wider community.

(e) The revocation of Ms N’s ECDA licence has deprived her of her livelihood. She is responsible for the household expenses and supports her elderly mother.

(f) The custodial threshold has not been crossed, as Ms N did not take active steps to conceal the offence and had “acted according to the orders of her superiors”.

[46] The harm arising from Ms N’s offending must be assessed with reference to both the actual consequences of her failure to report and the risks engendered by her inaction.

[47] The seriousness of the predicate offence necessarily bears on the gravity of the failure to report it, since the latter cannot be assessed independently of the nature of the crime that was not reported. The more serious the concealed wrongdoing, the greater the harm flowing from the omission.

[48] This principle assumes particular force where the predicate offence involves sexual misconduct against minors. Such offences are treated with especial gravity because they entail an egregious violation of the bodily autonomy and dignity of children, who by reason of their age are exceedingly vulnerable (a point I return to at [53] below).

[49] The present case is a stark illustration of this. The predicate offence committed by Teo on 9 November 2023 was one of aggravated outrage of modesty involving a two-year-old child, punishable under s 354(2) of the Penal Code with imprisonment of up to five years, or a fine, or caning, or any combination of these punishments. The sentence of 40 months and three weeks’ imprisonment ultimately imposed on Teo for that offence – well within the upper range of the prescribed punishment – underscores the gravity of the wrongdoing that Ms N sought to conceal by failing to report it. This forms the backdrop against which the implications of her non-reporting must be evaluated. It is to this that I now turn.

[50] The consequences of Ms N’s inaction are significant and several. First, her failure to report Teo’s offence created the window within which critical evidence was destroyed. In the intervening period between Ms N’s discovery of the offence and Ms SC’s subsequent lodging of a police report, the accused persons reformatted the preschool’s CCTV hard disks, erasing all footage recorded prior to 26 November 2023 (supra at [28] and [29]). This did not merely result in the loss of footage capturing the incident on 9 November 2023, which formed but a substratum of Teo’s offending. It also resulted in the deletion of footage documenting multiple other incidents of sexual assault committed by Teo against no fewer than three toddlers over four days, which ultimately formed the basis for five distinct charges of aggravated outrage of modesty. This is not in dispute.

[51] As I observed in JEM (at [12]), the Defence’s submission that Ms N only knew of the 9 November 2023 incident when the hard disks were reformatted, does not assist her. To confine the assessment of harm to that single incident would be artificially narrow. In assessing harm, the court is entitled to consider the real nature and consequences of the conduct, including surrounding facts that are relevant and proved even if they do not form part of the charge: Newton Christopher at [54], [63] to [64], citing Public Prosecutor v Bong Sim Swan Suzanna [2020] 2 SLR 1001 at [78]. It would also be perverse for Ms N to rely on her own failure to ascertain whether the footage being deleted contained evidence of further offending, as a means of circumscribing the court’s assessment of harm.

[52] Although the deleted footage was eventually recovered by the police forensic team (supra at [34]), thereby attenuating the actual harm occasioned, this was a matter of pure fortuity. In reality, the administration of justice had come perilously close to being permanently and irrevocably deprived of the only objective and contemporaneous evidence of Teo’s sexual assaults against victims who could neither articulate their experiences nor provide testimony – a situation birthed by Ms N’s deliberate failure to report Teo’s offending from the outset.

[53] Second, Ms N’s silence carried a very real risk that Teo’s wrongdoing would have remained undetected and unpunished, thereby depriving the criminal justice system of the opportunity to hold him accountable. This risk was particularly acute in the present context, where the victims were toddlers who were plainly incapable of reporting the abuse themselves. The detection of such offending therefore depended entirely on the vigilance and integrity of the adults entrusted with their care (a point I return to at [60] and [61] below).

[54] The magnitude of this risk becomes apparent when one considers the scale of Teo’s offending that was eventually uncovered. He was convicted of multiple offences of aggravated outrage of modesty and sentenced to an aggregate term of more than nine years’ imprisonment (supra at [8]). This starkly underscores the gravity of the criminal conduct that would have remained concealed but for Ms SC’s decision to report the matter.

[55] Third, Ms N’s inaction gave rise to a real and continuing risk that Teo might offend against other children. His resignation from the preschool neither curtailed his liberty nor meaningfully limited his access to young children elsewhere. He remained at large in Singapore (supra at [17]); free to move about the community and free to seek employment or other opportunities that could place him in positions of proximity to other unsuspecting children. The risk he posed to children was therefore not extinguished by his departure from the preschool; absent a report to the authorities, it was simply (and blithely) displaced into the wider community.

[56] I recognise that the aforementioned risks were ultimately averted or attenuated because the offending was eventually reported to the authorities by Ms SC, thereby enabling investigations to commence and Teo to be brought to justice. However, that outcome cannot be attributed to Ms N who stands before this court for her failure to report the matter. The gravity of her wrongdoing lies in the appreciable potential harm to the course of justice arising from her wilful inaction, viz. serious sexual offences against vulnerable children might have remained concealed, critical evidence could have been irreparably destroyed, and a sexual predator might have remained at liberty to offend again. These are precisely the harms that reporting obligations – particularly within the child protection framework – are designed to guard against.

[57] The assessment of culpability is informed by several key factors.

[58] Foremost, the culpability of an offender who deliberately fails to provide information of an offence must be assessed with careful regard to his state of mind. A distinction must be drawn between an offender who withholds reporting an offence he knows has been committed, and one who has reason to believe that an offence has been committed. It is well established that a person having “grounds to believe” possesses a lesser degree of conviction than certainty, though more than mere speculation, whereas a person with actual knowledge is certain or almost certain of the fact: Ang Jeanette v Public Prosecutor [2011] 4 SLR 1 at [70]; Tan Kim Peng v Public Prosecutor [2008] 1 SLR(R) 1 at [103]. This distinction has direct implications for culpability and must be recognised in sentencing: Huang Ying-Chun v Public Prosecutor [2018] SGHC 279 at [74].

[59] In the context of an offence under s 202 of the Penal Code, this distinction is material because the gravity of the omission depends, in part, on the offender’s level of certainty that a reportable offence has been committed. An offender who fails to report despite knowing that an offence has been committed, acts with a higher degree of culpability than one who merely has reason to believe that an offence may have occurred. In the present case, Ms N deliberately refrained from reporting a sexual offence she knew Teo had committed. Her omission was therefore not the product of uncertainty or doubt as to whether a reportable offence had occurred. Rather, it was a conscious decision taken in full knowledge of the underlying wrongdoing.

[60] Second, like the co-accused, Ms N occupied a senior leadership position within the preschool. As its principal, hers was neither a peripheral nor junior role. As I observed in JEM (at [17]), this was a position entrusted with setting the standards, tone and culture of the institution, and with safeguarding the welfare of the young children placed in its care. By virtue of her appointment, Ms N stood in a position of trust vis-à-vis both the children and their parents. Parents entrust schools with what they value most, often without any real visibility into daily operations. In the context of preschools, where children are often too young to recognise, articulate or report abuse themselves, parents necessarily rely heavily on the vigilance and integrity of those entrusted with their children’s care. The leadership of such institutions thus serves as a critical first line of protection. Central to that trust is the expectation that abuse will be reported promptly so that the appropriate authorities may intervene.

[61] Ms N did not honour that trust. Instead, she betrayed it by failing to report a sexual assault committed against a child under her care. In so doing, she undermined both the legitimate expectation of parents that the preschool’s leadership would act as vigilant custodians of their children’s safety and well-being, and the very mechanism by which abuse is detected and perpetrators are held to account. This was a fundamental abdication of the responsibility at the heart of her role as principal, and constitutes a grave abuse of the trust reposed in her.

[62] Third, Ms N’s conduct was plainly influenced by considerations of self-interest. During the discussion on 23 November 2023, Ms SC expressed discomfort with concealing the incident, noting that terminating Teo’s employment would not prevent him from continuing to work in Singapore and committing similar offences in the future. She also raised concerns about the harm to the victim in the absence of early intervention (supra at [17] and [18]). Ms N’s concerns, by contrast, centred on the repercussions that disclosure would have for the preschool and for herself. She remarked that reporting the matter would invite scrutiny from parents and expressed concern that parents might withdraw their children from the school (supra at [19]). From the very outset, the tenor of her remarks reveal a preoccupation with the institutional and personal fallout that disclosure would bring, and formed part of a broader concerted effort by the accused persons to dissuade Ms SC from reporting Teo’s offending and to have the matter dealt with quietly – no doubt motivated by an awareness that the preschool had been negligent in permitting Teo to interact with the children beyond his role as a cook (supra at [16] to [18] and [21]).

[63] I reject the Defence’s contention that Ms N merely deferred to Ms SC’s decision not to report the matter (supra at [45(a)] and [45(f)]). That submission seeks to whitewash her conduct and recast it in a more benign light than the evidence permits.

[64] There was nothing preventing Ms N from reporting the matter herself. The preschool’s safeguarding policy required staff members to inform the relevant authorities, including the police, if there was abuse by a staff member. While the policy set out internal reporting lines, it also made patently clear that staff could report such matters directly to the police, without management’s approval, where the law so required (supra at [24]). Ms N therefore remained under an independent obligation to report the offence and was in no way bound or hampered by Ms SC’s initial decision not to report the matter – a fact ultimately accepted by Defence Counsel.

[65] More importantly, the evidence does not support the suggestion that Ms N was merely following instructions. Three points bear emphasis:

(a) Even after Ms SC indicated her intention to report the matter, Ms N did not support that course. Instead, she sought to stymie it. Apprehensive about the potential fallout, she and the co-accused agreed to jointly tender their resignations if a report was lodged (supra at [26] and [27]).

(b) It was also in this context – with full knowledge of Ms SC’s intention to lodge a report – that Ms N agreed to reformat the CCTV system’s hard disks. I accept that she was subject to pressure to overwrite and delete the footage (supra at [28]). However, there is nothing to suggest that this rose to the level of compulsion that deprived her of independent judgment. While the pressure brought to bear on her may be taken into account as a contextual factor, it does not materially diminish her culpability. If anything, Ms N’s agreement to reformat the CCTV system reflects a persistence in – and indeed an entrenchment and active reinforcement of – her earlier decision not to report Teo’s offending, as it served to suppress the very evidence that would have exposed it.

(c) Between 30 November 2023 and 2 December 2023, after Ms SC confirmed her intention to report the matter to the authorities, Ms N took no steps of her own to ensure that the offence was reported; a fact ultimately conceded by Defence Counsel.

[66] In these circumstances, Ms N’s inaction cannot be characterised as mere deference to authority. Rather, the evidence reveals that concerns about the repercussions for the preschool and for herself as its principal, were allowed to outweigh the imperative of reporting a serious sexual offence against a child. Her conduct was directed not only at concealing Teo’s criminal wrongdoing but also at suppressing evidence of her own failings as principal. Significantly, her failure to report endured well beyond Ms SC’s initial hesitation to report the matter, reflecting a sustained course of conduct rather than a momentary lapse in judgment.

[67] As I observed in JEM (at [21]), such selfish and self-preserving motives are highly aggravating. Offences committed to shield oneself from scrutiny and accountability will rarely attract any sympathy. When those in leadership positions choose concealment over disclosure in the face of sexual abuse of children, it sends a deeply troubling signal that perceived personal or institutional interests are prioritised over child protection. This inversion of priorities strikes at the very heart of the protective role that society expects of educational institutions, their leaders and educators, and public interest demands that it markedly heighten culpability.

[68] I now turn to the offender-specific factors. It is an established principle of law that similar charges taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing constitute an aggravating factor, as they reflect a broader pattern of offending: Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 449 at [64] and Public Prosecutor v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500 at [37] to [38]. In the present case, Ms N’s commission of the Obstruction Offence (supra at [4]) would ordinarily attract independent aggravating weight at this stage as an offender-specific factor. However, as I have taken this into account in my assessment of Ms N’s culpability for the primary offence under consideration (supra at [65(b)]), I refrain from ascribing additional weight to it at this stage, to avoid double counting.

[69] Apart from the plea of guilt, which I address at [73] below, I find no other offender-specific mitigating factors. Ms N’s good character and past contributions to the preschool, however commendable they may have been, remain at best a neutral factor in sentencing. Such considerations are most relevant where rehabilitation is the dominant sentencing principle and there is no countervailing need for retribution, deterrence or prevention to feature prominently: Stansilas Fabian Kester v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 755 (“Stansilas”) at [99] and [102], Tan Sai Tiang v Public Prosecutor [2000] 1 SLR(R) 33; Kow Keng Siong, Sentencing Principles in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2019) at para 21.008, cited with approval in Niranjan s/o Muthupalani v Public Prosecutor [2023] SGHC 181 at [78]. As deterrence remains the central sentencing consideration for offences under s 202 of the Penal Code, and given that Ms N’s conduct falls far short of the standards expected of a senior and experienced educator, her good character and prior contributions to the preschool, do not operate to mitigate sentence.

[70] The allusion to family hardship (supra at [45(e)]) is also neither exceptional nor extreme to warrant any mitigating weight: Chua Ya Zi Sandy v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGHC 204 at [11] to [12], citing Lai Oei Mui Jenny v Public Prosecutor [1993] 2 SLR(R) 406 at [10] to [11]. Similarly, I accord no weight to the assertion that the revocation of Ms N’s ECDA licence has deprived her of her livelihood. These are the natural collateral consequences that follow when an individual commits an offence and the law does not countenance such forms of social accounting in the sentencing of offenders: M Raveendran v Public Prosecutor [2022] 3 SLR 1183 at [39], [47] and Stansilas at [110] to [111].

[71] The chief issue before me is whether the custodial threshold is crossed. In my judgment, it is. Ms N’s failure to report Teo’s offending gave rise to serious consequences, including the destruction of critical evidence and appreciable potential harm to the course of justice. This was compounded by an egregious abuse of trust and a decision to prioritise self-preservation over the welfare of children under her care. The fact that several facets of harm did not ultimately materialise – because Teo’s offending was eventually reported by Ms SC – or were fortuitously mitigated by police efforts, does not detract from the justifiability of a custodial sentence, though it would bear on the length of the term.

[72] Drawing the various threads together, and bearing in mind the prescribed punishment for the offence, I consider a sentence of two weeks’ imprisonment appropriate had Ms N claimed trial. I emphasise that a materially higher starting point would have been warranted had Ms N’s inaction resulted in permanent and/or more enduring harm beyond that identified above.

[73] I turn finally to the weight to be accorded to Ms N’s plea of guilt. As I had observed in JEM (at [33]), credit is often accorded to an early plea of guilt for two principal reasons. First, it allows victims to attain closure at an earlier stage, and spares victims and other witnesses the need to prepare for and testify at trial. Second, it conserves public resources which would otherwise have been expended by law enforcement agencies, the Prosecution and the Judiciary. In this regard, the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas (“PG Guidelines”), recommend that the earlier the accused indicates an intention to plead guilty, the greater the reduction in sentence ought to be: Public Prosecutor v S Iswaran [2024] SGHC 259 at [135] to [136].

[74] I find that Ms N’s plea of guilt, though formally indicated at Stage 2 of the PG Guidelines, warrants a 30% reduction in sentence, having regard to the sequence of events leading up to the plea indication. The Defence made representations on 20 March 2025, within one month of Ms N being charged. The Prosecution’s revised plea offer, made pursuant to those representations, was only conveyed on 29 June 2025 – more than three months later – and thus fell well within Stage 2. Ms N accepted the offer shortly thereafter.

[75] While the PG Guidelines provide that a change in plea offer not involving an amendment of the charge does not ordinarily affect the applicable stage or corresponding reduction, this remains subject to the court’s discretion. In the present case, it would be artificial to confine Ms N to a lower reduction solely by reason of the time taken for the Prosecution to convey the revised offer. Illustration 3 of the PG Guidelines is broadly analogous in principle, in that it recognises that where the timing of a guilty plea indication is objectively assessed to have been influenced by factors extraneous to the accused, the court may nonetheless accord the maximum reduction even if the plea is formally entered at Stage 2. The underlying rationale is that the PG Guidelines should not operate mechanistically where doing so would fail to reflect the realities of the case. That rationale applies with equal force here.

[76] Accordingly, I apply the maximum reduction of 30%, and sentence Ms N to 10 days’ imprisonment.

[77] I recognise that the sentence imposed on Ms N is lower than those imposed on Ms T and Ms M. This necessarily reflects the fact that Ms N has pleaded guilty to an offence carrying a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment, which is substantially lower than the prescribed punishment of up to seven years’ imprisonment for the s 204A Penal Code offence to which the co-accused had pleaded guilty. In these circumstances, there is little value in looking at the sentences imposed on Ms T and Ms M, as the principle of parity does not apply where co-offenders are convicted of different offences and there is therefore no common basis for comparison: Phua Song Hua v Public Prosecutor [2004] SGHC 33 at [38], cited with approval in Koh Lian Kok v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGHC 132 at [92]. This is particularly so given that the roles played by each accused person, and the gravity of the specific breaches under consideration, also differ.

[78] I do not find the sentence imposed to be inconsistent with existing sentencing practice. Foremost, sentencing is inherently fact-specific, and while precedents may provide useful guidance, care must be taken not to be unthinkingly bound by sentences imposed in cases with facts that are not analogous. Ultimately, the value of a particular sentencing precedent depends on the degree of factual similarity between the cases: Toh Suat Leng Jennifer v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGHC 146 at [34]. In this regard, individualised justice requires a nuanced assessment of the amalgam of factors engaged in each case so that each assessment of criminality rests on its own facts: Dinesh Singh Bhatia s/o Amarjeet Singh v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGHC 64 at [24]. It follows that, in assessing the gravity of an offence, the court carefully examine and assess the nature of the harm occasioned in order to gain a proper appreciation of the true severity of the offence: Newton Christopher at [54] and [55], referring to Wong Tian Jun De Beers v Public Prosecutor [2022] 4 SLR 805.

[79] Second, absent a reasoned judgment explaining the basis for a sentence imposed, bare reference to outcomes in other cases will seldom be useful: Abdul Mutalib Bin Aziman v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGHC 102 at [99]. Even where the charge sheets, sentencing submissions and statement of facts are available, such unreported cases remain inherently deficient as precedents because they provide no insight into the court’s assessment of the evidence, the weight accorded to the relevant factors, or the reasons underlying the sentence imposed: Public Prosecutor v Lim Pengli Barrie [2025] SGHC 133 at [29].

[80] Six precedents have been placed before the court. In Public Prosecutor v Chen Xiang Bao [2003] SGDC 177 (“Chen Xiang Bao”), the offender was sentenced to the maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment for failing to report an offence of murder which he had reason to believe had been committed. His omission enabled the primary offender, who subsequently left Singapore, to evade the consequences of his act. The offender also faced a separate offence under s 201 of the Penal Code for causing the disappearance of evidence of the commission of murder.

[81] The remaining unreported cases involve first offenders who pleaded guilty:

(a) Case A (SC-908000-2021): the offender was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment for failing to report an offence under s 354(2) of the Penal Code which she knew her son had committed against her five-year-old daughter. Her omission persisted for more than seven years and allowed further sexual offending against the victim, including statutory rape which resulted in the victim becoming pregnant. Two additional offences under s 202 of the Penal Code, relating to other instances of failing to report sexual offending against the same victim, were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing.

(b) Case B (SC-910604-2018): the offender received the maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment for failing to report an offence of rape which she had reason to believe her boyfriend had committed against her minor daughter. As a result of the offender’s failure to report the matter, the victim was subjected to sexual abuse over several years.

(c) Case C (SC-905605-2016): the offender was sentenced to a fine of $2000 for failing to report an offence of rash act endangering life, which he had reason to believe had been committed by his colleague who had discharged a bullet from his revolver whilst playing a game akin to Russian roulette. He also faced a separate charge of obstructing the course of justice arising from the same incident.

(d) Case D (SC-901067-2017): the offender was sentenced to a fine of $2000 for failing to report an offence of causing hurt, which he had reason to believe had been committed by a friend.

(e) Case E: the offender was placed on probation for failing to report an offence of rape which she had reason to believe had been committed.

[82] I agree with parties that Chen Xiang Bao, Case A and Case B are materially more serious, having regard to both the nature of the predicate offences that went unreported and the grave consequences that followed, which include the evasion of criminal liability for murder and continued sexual offending. The sentence imposed in the present case must therefore be correspondingly lower. Conversely, on the available facts before the court, the present case reflects significantly greater harm and culpability than Case C and Case D which involve predicate offences that are qualitatively different. I also agree with Defence Counsel that Case E is not an appropriate comparator, as probation is plainly unsuitable here.

[83] In my view, the sentence imposed on Ms N appropriately falls between the more serious cases warranting sterner punishment and the less serious cases in which only modest fines were imposed.

[84] Reporting obligations are quintessential to the child protection regime, given the unique vulnerability and immaturity of young children which may cripple their ability to recognise inappropriate conduct, articulate what has occurred or seek help when abuse is inflicted.

[85] The irony of Ms N’s conduct is striking. That she came to learn of the sexual abuse while attending a child safeguarding course on protecting children from abuse, yet chose the path of silence in spite of the clear and confronting evidence in her hands, serves as a sobering reminder that child protection cannot be reduced to the mere completion of courses or formal training. Educators and personnel who are entrusted with the care of children must internalise and faithfully discharge the responsibilities that accompany the profound trust reposed in them. Only then can the protection owed to some of the most vulnerable members of our society be meaningfully realised.

[86] The welfare of children and the integrity of the administration of justice must never be placed in jeopardy, nor subordinated to self-interest or expediency.