Court of Appeal · Decided 16 July 2026
An auditor was not liable for a company's later trading losses; they were too remote
Deloitte & Touche LLP v Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd (in compulsory liquidation)
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An auditor was not liable for a company's later trading losses; they were too remote
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [170], [171]
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Grounds of decision
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Ang Cheng Hock JCA (delivering the judgment of the court):
Introduction
- [1]
[1] This appeal concerns another matter which arose in the aftermath of the collapse of Hin Leong Trading (Pte) Ltd (“HLT”) amidst widespread allegations of fraud by its controllers, comprising Mr Lim Oon Kuin (“OK Lim”) and his family members (collectively, “Lim Family”), in their conduct of HLT’s affairs. The fraudulent conduct included, among other things, material misstatements in HLT’s financial statements that had the effect of concealing HLT’s true financial position, in particular its deepening insolvency, for some years before the truth came to light in April 2020.
- [2]
[2] It is to be expected when a company suffers a collapse in such circumstances that those left to pick up the pieces would begin to investigate how and why things came to be, as well as to identify those persons who ought to bear responsibility for the catastrophe. In many cases, the focus will turn to the acts and omissions of the auditor of the company who, while not a primary wrongdoer, is often sought to be visited with legal responsibility to make good the losses caused by the primary wrongdoers, on the basis that it could and should have discovered the wrongdoing and blown the whistle. This brings to the fore questions as to the scope of an auditor’s duty and the proper extent of its liability.
- [3]
[3] These issues arise before us in the context of proceedings that have been brought by HLT, acting through its liquidators, against HLT’s former auditor for many years, Deloitte & Touche LLP (“Deloitte”). In essence, HLT accuses Deloitte of professional negligence in failing to detect and report the irregularities in HLT’s financial statements and affairs for a period of around six years prior to HLT’s entry into insolvency proceedings in April 2020. In the court below, Deloitte applied to strike out HLT’s claims on a variety of grounds but was largely unsuccessful. Deloitte now appeals to this court.
- [4]
[4] For the purposes of the appeal, the areas of dispute have been narrowed to two of the grounds for striking out HLT’s claims which Deloitte had raised below. The first concerns the significance of the fact that the Lim Family, as HLT’s sole directors and shareholders, had full knowledge of the true state of affairs. According to Deloitte, this is a complete answer to HLT’s claims against it because “no loss could have resulted from any failure by Deloitte to inform HLT of matters that it already knew of”, such that all the losses suffered by HLT are irrecoverable from Deloitte “for want of legal causation and/or for falling outside Deloitte’s scope of duty”. HLT disputes this. It submits that, owing to its insolvency at the time of the audits, Deloitte’s duty was not limited to providing the Lim Family with accurate information, but also extended to “hav[ing] regard to the interests of [HLT’s] creditors”. This has been referred to by the parties as the “Creditor Duty” but, as will be explained below, the usage of this convenient shorthand appears to have obscured from view the true issues that should be asked and answered.
- [5]
[5] The second point in this appeal is whether, assuming Deloitte as having been negligent, Deloitte ought to be liable for the losses that HLT incurred from its trading activities in the period between November 2015 and mid-April 2020 (“Trading Losses”). This head of loss is by far the most significant of the losses that HLT seeks to recover from Deloitte as it has been quantified by HLT in the sum of US$2.6 billion. HLT alleges that, if not for Deloitte’s negligence, it would have been put into liquidation earlier and would not have continued to incur further losses that deepened its insolvency. Deloitte submits that a steady line of authority establishes that negligent auditors cannot be made liable for such losses as they are either not “legally caused” by the auditors’ negligence or fall outside the auditors’ “scope of duty”. Although Deloitte has identified authorities which support the conclusion it urges on the court, its case does not go further than bare analogy in the result and it has not identified a principled justification for its desired outcome.
Background facts
- [7]
[7] It is common ground that, for this appeal, the parties and the court should proceed on the basis that all the facts pleaded by HLT in its Statement of Claim (Amendment No. 2) are true. A short summary of HLT’s pleaded case so far as it is necessary to understand the parties’ arguments and the issues before us follows.
- [8]
[8] Deloitte was engaged as HLT’s external auditor from at least 2003 until it resigned on 17 September 2020. In performance of its duties, Deloitte audited HLT’s financial statements and issued unqualified opinions for each of the financial years ended (“FY”) 31 October 2014 through 31 October 2019.
- [9]
[9] At all material times, control of HLT was concentrated in the hands of the Lim Family. Sometime in April 2020, Mr OK Lim affirmed an affidavit admitting to an array of irregularities in HLT’s affairs, including material misstatements in HLT’s financial statements that had concealed the fact that HLT had made staggering losses over the years.
- [10]
[10] Shortly after, HLT was placed under judicial management and later into compulsory liquidation. The liquidators’ ensuing investigation revealed fraud and irregularities in HLT’s affairs since 2010, none of which were reflected in HLT’s audited financial statements or highlighted by Deloitte in the audit opinions it had issued. In particular, HLT’s audited financial statements from FY2014 to FY2019 contained material misstatements, such as the inclusion of fictitious profits and overstatement of accounts receivable and inventory, which meant that the value of HLT’s assets was inflated and that the audited financial statements did not present a true and fair view of HLT’s financial position. By the liquidators’ estimate, HLT was insolvent from as early as 2012. However, as this was never reflected in HLT’s audited financial statements, a vastly misleading picture of HLT’s financial health was presented to third parties, which enabled HLT to continue trading and incurring further losses until it entered insolvency proceedings in 2020.
HLT’s action against Deloitte
- [11]
[11] In HC/S 237/2021 (“Suit 237”), HLT claims damages from Deloitte for the losses it has suffered. We summarise the case that HLT has advanced in this section. We emphasise that, at this juncture, we confine ourselves to setting out HLT’s claim as it has pleaded it and described it in its submissions. We caveat ourselves in this way because, as we will explain, the way in which HLT’s (and Deloitte’s) case has been presented is rather problematic. Indeed, the difficulties reach down to even the type and number of causes of action which HLT has advanced. This has had implications on the approach that we have taken in the appeal. The summary in this section is thus mainly for the purpose of contextualising the discussion to follow, although we will signpost issues that we will come back to later.
- [12]
[12] According to HLT, it has currently advanced two different causes of action against Deloitte:
(a) First, professional negligence when carrying out the audits of HLT’s financial statements for FY2014 to FY2019, which it has termed the “Negligence Claim”.
(b) Second, a breach of a duty to report to government authorities and/or third parties any fraud and/or irregularities that were likely to result in material loss to HLT (“Reporting Duty”), which it has termed the “Reporting Duty Claim”.
It is useful to note that the Negligence Claim is based on a duty of care arising in contract, as an implied term of the engagement letters between HLT and Deloitte, as well as in tort. Given this, it may be more accurate to say that HLT has advanced three causes of action, as the Negligence Claim consists of both a contractual and tortious variant. We highlight this here because the fact that HLT has advanced the Negligence Claim in both contract and tort is a point of considerable significance which has been overlooked by the parties. We will elaborate on this below.
- [13]
[13] A number of sub-duties which collectively make up Deloitte’s duty of care have also been pleaded. These include: (a) a duty to exercise professional judgment and maintain professional scepticism throughout the audit; (b) a duty to identify risks of material misstatement in HLT’s financial statements; (c) a duty to act in accordance with the relevant auditing standards set out in, among other sources, the Singapore Standards on Auditing issued by the Institute of Singapore Chartered Accountants and the companies legislation; and (d) a duty to report fraud or irregularities that are likely to result in material loss to HLT. At this juncture, we highlight the last of these sub-duties as it appears to be HLT’s pleading of what it has called the “Reporting Duty”, which is the basis of its Reporting Duty Claim that has been presented in the course of arguments as a distinct cause of action from its Negligence Claim. It is odd, to say the least, that the Reporting Duty Claim is advanced as a separate cause of action given that the Reporting Duty is pleaded as a part of Deloitte’s duty of care which is the basis of the Negligence Claim.
- [14]
[14] In Suit 237, HLT charges Deloitte with failing to exercise reasonable skill and care in the conduct of the audit. As a result, Deloitte failed to detect material misstatements in HLT’s financial statements which concealed HLT’s insolvency over many years. This forms the nub of HLT’s case in respect of the Negligence Claim. The Reporting Duty Claim, on the other hand, focuses on Deloitte’s failure to report fraud or irregularities in HLT’s affairs which HLT says Deloitte ought to have detected if it had performed its duties as an auditor with reasonable skill and care. It is apparent from this that the Reporting Duty Claim as pleaded by HLT is intertwined with the Negligence Claim. This is because the Reporting Duty Claim is not confined to Deloitte’s failure to report matters that were in its knowledge but extends to matters that would or should have come to its knowledge if it had not been negligent.
- [15]
[15] In terms of remedies, HLT seeks to recover damages from Deloitte in respect of three heads of loss:
(a) First, the Trading Losses incurred by HLT in the period of November 2015 to mid-April 2020, totalling US$2.6 billion.
(b) Second, dividends that were wrongfully declared by the Lim Family, being the only shareholders of HLT, for FY2017 and FY2018, totalling US$90m.
(c) Third, audit engagement fees paid to Deloitte from FY2015 to FY2019, totalling $612,000, which HLT claims it would not have paid to Deloitte if it had ceased trading earlier, which would have happened if Deloitte had discharged its duties properly.
Proceedings below leading up to this appeal
- [16]
[16] Although HLT’s case currently centres around the Negligence Claim and the Reporting Duty Claim, this was not how its case was always pleaded but was the result of developments in the proceedings below. Moreover, while this appeal centres around the alleged Creditor Duty and the recoverability of HLT’s Trading Losses specifically, this framing of the issues is the result of the narrowing of broader areas of dispute between the parties in the courts below. It is thus useful to situate these issues in the wider context of the proceedings below as it assists in understanding the relevance of the issues and the possible thinking behind the parties’ respective positions.
- [17]
[17] In its initial Statement of Claim, HLT had only pleaded the Negligence Claim. No reference was made to the Reporting Duty Claim at that juncture. The Reporting Duty Claim first surfaced in HC/SUM 68/2024 (“SUM 68”), which was an application by HLT for leave to amend its Statement of Claim. Apart from those pleadings relating to the Reporting Duty Claim, HLT also sought to introduce pleadings relating to another cause of action, namely a claim against Deloitte for breach of a statutory duty to report the Lim Family’s breaches of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“CA”) to the Registrar of Companies pursuant to s 207 of the CA (“Breach of Statutory Duty Claim”).
- [18]
[18] Subsequently, Deloitte applied in HC/SUM 474/2024 (“SUM 474”) seeking to strike out HLT’s pleadings in Suit 237 in their entirety. SUM 68 was heard together with SUM 474 by an assistant registrar (“AR”). However, as Deloitte resisted SUM 68 on the ground that the amendments relating to the Reporting Duty Claim and the Breach of Statutory Duty Claim were themselves liable to be struck out, the matter was essentially heard by the AR as a single striking-out application on HLT’s pleadings, inclusive of the amendments sought to be introduced in SUM 68.
HLT’s Negligence Claim and the alleged Creditor Duty
- [19]
[19] Deloitte’s primary case was that the Negligence Claim should be struck out as none of the losses which HLT sought to recover were caused by Deloitte’s alleged negligence or were within the scope of Deloitte’s duty of care. The crux of this argument was that, since the Lim Family had been aware of the true state of affairs, they, and by extension HLT itself, had not relied on the audited financial statements which contained the misstatements that Deloitte failed to detect. In the circumstances, any negligence on Deloitte’s part did not cause HLT’s losses. Moreover, as Deloitte’s duty as an auditor was to report to HLT’s shareholders (the Lim Family) on whether HLT’s accounts gave a true and fair view of its financial position, any losses suffered by HLT in circumstances where the Lim Family was aware of the true position did not fall within the scope of Deloitte’s duty of care.
- [20]
[20] In response, HLT submitted that, owing to its insolvency at the time of the audits, Deloitte’s duty was “not restricted to the provision of accurate information to [HLT’s] shareholders” but extended to “protecting the company from undetected errors or wrongdoing”. Given that the creditors were the main economic stakeholders of a company while the company was insolvent, an auditor should be required to have regard to the interests of the creditors where the company was insolvent at the time of the audit (ie, the Creditor Duty). The existence of the Creditor Duty was also consistent with HLT’s case (in SUM 68) on: (a) the Reporting Duty (which formed the basis of the Reporting Duty Claim); and (b) the statutory duty of reporting to the Registrar of Companies under s 207 of the CA (which formed the basis of the Breach of Statutory Duty Claim). We pause here to mention that this pairing by HLT of the Creditor Duty with the Reporting Duty confirms our earlier observations at [13]–[14] above of the two being closely interrelated.
- [21]
[21] In reply, Deloitte argued that there was no basis for the Creditor Duty. There was no authority for such a novel proposition. And, to the extent that the Creditor Duty was based on an analogy to directors’ duties, such an analogy was misplaced as: (a) an auditor was not a fiduciary vis-à-vis the company; and (b) the roles of a director and an auditor were different. Taking a step back, the Creditor Duty was essentially a backdoor attempt at imposing on an auditor a duty to the creditors of the company when it was well-established that no such duty existed at law.
HLT’s claim for its Trading Losses
- [22]
[22] Apart from attacking HLT’s claim as a whole above, Deloitte also mounted a specific attack against HLT’s claim for its Trading Losses which, as mentioned earlier (at [5]), is the largest of the heads of loss which HLT seeks to recover in Suit 237. In this regard, Deloitte argued that this head of loss was not caused by any negligence on its part, or within the scope of its duty, because the losses arose from legitimate but loss-making trading activities. According to Deloitte, it was consistent with both principle and precedent that an auditor should not be liable for the losses suffered by a company arising from its legitimate trading activities as trading decisions were not a matter which an auditor had any involvement in.
- [23]
[23] On the other hand, HLT submitted that its Trading Losses were within the scope of Deloitte’s duty as Deloitte’s duty included protecting HLT against the risks of its audited accounts being inaccurate. Since Deloitte’s failure to detect the misstatements in HLT’s audited financial statements created the risk of HLT continuing to trade and incurring further losses, the Trading Losses were the eventuation of a risk that was within the scope of Deloitte’s duty of care. In this connection, HLT emphasised that its accounts had been deliberately prepared by the Lim Family on a “wholly false basis” as they concealed that HLT had been making massive losses and was deeply insolvent, and that its operations were “inherently loss-making” seeing as it had suffered losses in five out of the six years between FY2014 and FY2019. Relatedly, HLT also disputed Deloitte’s characterisation of HLT’s trading activities as “legitimate” on the basis that its continued trading which gave rise to the Trading Losses was conducted in a “fundamentally dishonest manner” due to HLT obtaining credit and financing which the Lim Family knew could not be repaid.
HLT’s Reporting Duty Claim and Breach of Statutory Duty Claim
- [24]
[24] Turning to the Reporting Duty Claim and Breach of Statutory Duty Claim, which HLT sought to introduce by amending its pleadings in SUM 68, Deloitte submitted that both claims were unsustainable.
- [25]
[25] First, on the Reporting Duty Claim, Deloitte argued that it would be contrary to the purpose of its duty as an auditor – to report information to HLT’s shareholders – for it to be under the Reporting Duty, which contemplated a wider obligation to report information to persons other than the Lim Family such as government authorities. In any event, even if there was a Reporting Duty, it could only have been breached if the irregularities in HLT’s affairs had in fact been detected by Deloitte and were known to it. Since it was HLT’s own case that Deloitte had failed to detect the irregularities, Deloitte could not have breached the Reporting Duty by failing to report matters which it did not know of.
- [26]
[26] Second, on the Breach of Statutory Duty Claim, Deloitte submitted that: (a) the statutory duty of reporting breaches of the provisions of the CA to the Registrar of Companies under s 207(9) of the CA was not actionable by HLT as s 207(9) did not give rise to any private right of action; and (b) in any event, Deloitte did not breach its duty under s 207(9) for the same reason as it did not breach the alleged Reporting Duty, ie, Deloitte could not have failed to report the Lim Family’s breaches of the CA as it did not know of them.
- [27]
[27] HLT argued that it had a viable case on the Reporting Duty Claim. Similar to the Creditor Duty, HLT submitted that it was incorrect to limit the scope of Deloitte’s duty to the reporting of accurate information to HLT’s shareholders (see [20] above). In some cases, an auditor’s duty would extend to reporting any fraud or irregularity that was likely to result in material loss to the company to either the directors of the company or to a third party directly, especially where the auditor suspected that the management of the company was involved in the fraud or irregularity. The existence of the Reporting Duty was also supported by the relevant statutory framework which contained provisions that imposed on auditors an obligation in certain circumstances to report fraud or irregularities in the company’s affairs to persons outside of the company. These included: (a) s 207(9) of the CA; and (b) s 39(1) of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap 65A, 2000 Rev Ed) (which made it mandatory for a person to lodge a suspicious transaction report if information or matters came to his attention in the course of his trade, profession, business or employment gave him reason to suspect that certain property was linked to criminal conduct).
- [28]
[28] Moreover, the content of the Reporting Duty was not limited to matters within Deloitte’s actual knowledge but also included matters which would have come to its knowledge had it acted with reasonable skill and competence. This is because, HLT argued, the Reporting Duty was “founded on a claim for breach of [a] duty of care”. We pause here to make the observation again that, seeing as HLT’s own submission located the Reporting Duty within Deloitte’s “duty of care”, it is far from clear how the Reporting Duty Claim is distinct from the Negligence Claim and why the parties have continued to proceed on this basis.
- [29]
[29] Finally, in relation to the Breach of Statutory Duty Claim, HLT argued that s 207 of the CA did confer on HLT a private right of action in respect of Deloitte’s breach of its duty under s 207(9) of the CA. Moreover, as the issue of whether an auditor had breached s 207(9) should be assessed objectively based on the standard of a reasonably competent auditor rather than based on the auditor’s own subjective perception, the fact that Deloitte was not aware of HLT and the Lim Family’s breaches of the CA did not mean that Deloitte could not have breached its duty under s 207(9).
Decisions below
- [30]
[30] At first instance, the AR allowed SUM 68 in part in relation to the Reporting Duty Claim and dismissed SUM 474 in its entirety. Save for the Breach of Statutory Duty Claim, the AR did not think that any of HLT’s causes of action should be struck out or disallowed from being introduced into HLT’s pleadings by amendment.
- [31]
[31] First, the AR considered that the Creditor Duty was not foreclosed by the statutory framework or by the case law. In this regard, he saw force in an analogy to directors’ duties where it had been held, most prominently in this court’s decision in Foo Kian Beng v OP3 International Pte Ltd [2024] 1 SLR 361 (“Foo Kian Beng”), that the content of a director’s duty to act in the best interests of the company should be sensitive to the company’s financial health. We observe that the usage of “Creditor Duty” as a reference to HLT’s submission that Deloitte’s duty was not limited to providing HLT’s shareholders with accurate information appears to have originated here in the AR’s decision, as it does not appear to have been used by the parties in their submissions (at least not in their written submissions).
- [32]
[32] Second, the AR considered that the existence of the Reporting Duty was “not plainly unarguable”. The AR also did not agree with Deloitte that the Reporting Duty would be limited to matters that were in fact known to Deloitte, as he considered that the protection that the Reporting Duty afforded would be hollow if it was so confined.
- [33]
[33] Third, the AR rejected the Breach of Statutory Duty Claim as “plainly and obviously unsustainable” on the basis that nothing in s 207(9) of the CA conferred on HLT a private right of action for any breach of it by Deloitte. Accordingly, SUM 68 was only allowed in part in relation to the Reporting Duty Claim and not the Breach of Statutory Duty Claim.
- [34]
[34] Fourth, the AR held that HLT’s claim for its Trading Losses was not legally unsustainable. The AR considered the issue to be one of causation. He observed that neither Deloitte’s submission – which focused on how the Trading Losses had stemmed from legitimate but loss-making trades – nor HLT’s submission – that HLT’s trading was “inherently loss-making” – was attractive because the focal point of each of their arguments rested on the “protean” terminology of whether HLT’s continued trading should be seen as “legitimate” or “inherently loss-making”. However, the AR decided not to strike out HLT’s claim for its Trading Losses as causation was a “complex, fact-sensitive, policy-sensitive inquiry, on which reasonable persons can reasonably disagree”.
- [35]
[35] The parties filed three cross-appeals against the AR’s decision, which were heard by a Judge of the High Court (“Judge”): (a) in HC/RA 141/2024 (“RA 141”), Deloitte appealed against the AR’s decision to dismiss its striking-out application in SUM 474; (b) in HC/RA 142/2024, HLT appealed against the AR’s decision to refuse leave to amend its pleadings to include the Breach of Statutory Duty Claim in SUM 68; and (c) in HC/RA 143/2024, Deloitte appealed against the AR’s decision to allow HLT to amend its pleadings to include the Reporting Duty Claim in SUM 68. The Judge dismissed all three appeals for reasons which were generally similar to those given by the AR.
Deloitte’s applications for permission to appeal
- [36]
[36] Following the Judge’s dismissal of its appeals against the AR’s decision, Deloitte brought two applications for permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision: (a) in AD/OA 17/2025 (“AD 17”), Deloitte applied to the Appellate Division of the High Court (“Appellate Division”) for permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision affirming the grant of leave to HLT to amend its pleadings to include the Reporting Duty Claim; and (b) in CA/OA 17/2025 (“CA 17”), Deloitte applied to this court for permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision refusing to strike out the Negligence Claim due to the plausible existence of the Creditor Duty, as well as HLT’s claim for its Trading Losses.
- [37]
[37] AD 17 was dismissed on the ground that a decision of a Judge of the High Court giving a party permission to amend its pleadings was a decision that could not be subject to a further appeal to either the Appellate Division or this court pursuant to s 29(b) read with para 1(i) of the Fourth Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (2020 Rev Ed), save for two exceptions which were not applicable to the amendments pertaining to the Reporting Duty Claim. On the other hand, CA 17 was allowed based on Deloitte’s agreement to have all the facts alleged by HLT in its pleadings assumed true for the appeal, as well as HLT’s confirmation that it would not seek to file any further amendments or further particulars relating to the Creditor Duty and its claim for its Trading Losses after the appeal. In granting Deloitte permission to appeal in CA 17, this court also directed that the appeal should proceed as a summary determination of two questions of law pertaining to the existence of the Creditor Duty and the recoverability of HLT’s Trading Losses.
Issues arising in this appeal
- [38]
[38] The parties have agreed that this appeal raises two issues:
(a) First, on the basis of the facts pleaded, whether Deloitte’s duty of care includes a duty to have regard to the interests of HLT’s creditors assuming HLT was insolvent at the time of the audits (“Creditor Duty Question”).
(b) Second, whether HLT’s Trading Losses are recoverable in law from Deloitte in the event that breach of duty is established (“Trading Losses Question”).
- [39]
[39] The parties’ cases on the Creditor Duty Question and the Trading Losses Question are essentially the same as the arguments made at first instance before the AR and also before the Judge. We thus do not propose to repeat them here and refer to our summary of their submissions at [19]–[23] above.
The conceptual structure of negligence liability
- [40]
[40] We begin with examining the general structure of liability for negligence. We do so because, as already mentioned above, and which will become clearer as we develop our analysis below, we consider that the way in which the parties have approached the matter has been plagued with some conceptual problems that have obscured what the true issues in dispute are.
- [41]
[41] It is perhaps surprising, given how ubiquitous tortious claims of negligence are, that the issue of its constituent building blocks is not a straightforward matter. As James Goudkamp & Donal Nolan, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st Ed, 2025) (“Winfield & Jolowicz”) comments, “[j]udges and commentators describe these in a surprising diversity of ways” (at para 3-004). A striking example of this can be seen in the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Meadows v Khan [2022] AC 852 (“Meadows”) where much, if not most, of the discussion across the three different judgments delivered did not concern the specific issue arising on the facts of that case, but concerned the conceptual structure of the tort of negligence. Indeed, the uncertainty on this front is apparent from how no consensus was reached: a majority of the court, comprising Lord Hodge DPSC and Lord Sales JSC (with whom Lord Reed PSC, Lord Kitchin JSC and Lady Black agreed), came up with a six-question framework (at [28]), one judge (Lord Burrows JSC) preferred what he considered was a more “conventional approach” made up of a series of seven questions (at [79]), while the last member of the court (Lord Leggatt JSC) opined that it was “undesirable as well as unnecessary to engage in such an exercise” (at [96]).
- [42]
[42] While we understand Lord Leggatt JSC’s reluctance to impose a structure for the tort of negligence by judicial pronouncement rather than developing the law incrementally, we are cognisant of what the majority of the court sought to do in terms of promoting analytical coherence. The risk of incoherence is especially acute in the context of liability for negligence. It is, in the first place, liability of an entirely judge-made origin, even if modifications have been made by statute: see, for example, the Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Act 1953 (2020 Rev Ed). This means that, unlike statutory causes of action where the relevant statutory language provides an anchor from which the ingredients of liability can be discerned through a process of exegesis, the conditions for and limits of liability for negligence are left entirely to the courts to develop. The difficulty in this area is that liability for negligence may potentially expand unchecked over time because any unexpected damage suffered by persons in the course of their lives can often be traced back to some form of negligent conduct by other persons. Thus, in Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100 (“Spandeck”), this court noted that the perennial challenge for the courts in the tort of negligence was to identify “legal control mechanisms” for liability in a way that struck an appropriate balance between “a fair and just result for the parties and the imposition of indeterminate liability on an indeterminate class of tortfeasors” (at [29]–[30]). This echoes Professor John Fleming’s observation that “[t]he basic problem in connection with the ‘tort’ of negligence is … that of limitation of liability”, and “[t]he mechanisms associated with liability for negligence, such as the duty and causation concepts, are nothing more or less than the control devices fashioned by the courts to achieve that purpose”: see J G Fleming, “Remoteness and Duty: The Control Devices in Liability for Negligence” (1953) 31 Canadian Bar Review 471 at 474.
- [43]
[43] In view of this, we consider that there is no objection to a court setting out what the elements of the tort of negligence are, especially if this is done at a relatively general and uncontroversial level. Frameworks like those which some of the members of the court in Meadows sought to devise provide broad headers that assist in identifying the relevant issues and imposing some sort of order and structure in analysis. This conduces to clarity of thought and transparency in the reasoning for and against imposing liability on a given set of facts. In contrast, as Professor James Goudkamp explains, “[d]ispensing with formal prerequisites to liability risks creating a legal vacuum in which judges would impose or withhold liability based on an instinctive sense of whether a wrong had been committed”: James Goudkamp, “Elements of Torts” in Taking Law Seriously: Essays in Honour of Peter Cane (James Goudkamp, Mark Lunney & Leighton McDonald eds) (Hart Publishing, 2022) at p 44. We agree. There are of course grey areas that involve finer and more technical distinctions and which are thus prone to more pronounced differences in opinion. But, in our view, these do not detract from the core utility of identifying, in broad terms, what the elements of a claim in negligence are, and in turn, what issues the parties should direct their minds to. As will be seen below, the present case demonstrates in more than one way how this essential step can sometimes be overlooked.
The elements of negligence
- [44]
[44] In this regard, we find the following five broad requirements that Professor Jane Stapleton has identified to be quite useful; her approach is generally consistent with the way courts in this jurisdiction have conceived of the elements of liability for negligence (see Jane Stapleton, “Conceptual Interplay between Elements of the Tort of Negligence” in Jane Stapleton, Three Essays on Torts (Oxford University Press, 2021) at pp 65–66):
To these five headers, we may add a sixth requirement, which is the absence of any operative defences, for instance, illegality or contributory negligence: see Winfield & Jolowicz at para 3-004.
Actionable damage
- [45]
[45] The first element is that the claimant must have suffered some sort of damage which is legally recognised in the tort of negligence. It is, after all, trite that damage is the “gist of the action” of negligence in that negligence is only actionable upon proof of damage: see ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 918 (“ACB”) at [47]–[51]. In this regard, “damage” is generally understood as “an abstract concept of being worse off, physically or economically, so that compensation is an appropriate remedy” [emphasis added]: Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2008] 1 AC 281 at [7]. The qualifier of “actionable” damage, as opposed to damage simpliciter, contemplates that there must be an “interference with a right or interest recognised as capable of protection by law” [emphasis added]: Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1 at [23].
- [46]
[46] The present case concerns a straightforward claim by HLT for economic loss. That is a well-established form of actionable damage.
Duty of care
- [47]
[47] The second element is that the defendant must have owed the claimant a duty of care. The modern root of the juristic device of a “duty of care” is the decision of the House of Lords in M’alister (Or Donoghue) (Pauper) v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, in which Lord Atkin famously articulated the “neighbour principle” (at 580), but in Singapore, the framework applied by our courts to determine the existence of a duty of care is that set out in this court’s decision in Spandeck. The Spandeck framework, in broad terms, contemplates the court considering: (a) first, as a threshold matter, whether it was factually foreseeable that the claimant would suffer damage from the defendant’s carelessness (at [75]–[76]); (b) second, whether there is sufficient legal proximity between the parties for a prima facie duty of care to arise (at [77]–[82]); and (c) third, whether there are any policy considerations which negate the imposition of a duty of care (at [83]–[85]).
- [48]
[48] In most cases, however, the existence of a duty of care would not be disputed or open to any real dispute. Indeed, the present case, involving an auditor and the audited company, is a category of case where a duty of care is essentially beyond question: JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v Teofoongwonglcloong [2007] 4 SLR(R) 460 (“JSI Shipping”) at [30]. In such cases, it is in our view preferable for the court to resolve the issue of duty of care in the affirmative and move on to other stages of the analysis. Questions as to what the defendant should or should not have done, or whether the defendant should be responsible for a certain loss suffered by the claimant, should not be subsumed into the duty of care inquiry.
- [49]
[49] But, as we expand on at [70]–[89] below, it appears that there is a common tendency for parties and courts to frame issues which are not properly issues of a duty of care in these terms. To use the present case as an example, Deloitte has framed both of its grounds for striking out HLT’s claim on the basis that HLT’s losses, or its Trading Losses specifically, are not within the scope of its duty of care (see [19] and [22] above). As we explain below, however, Deloitte appears not to appreciate that it has used the phrase “scope of duty” in no less than three different senses and across three different elements of the tort of negligence, none of which is properly a question of whether it owes HLT a duty of care (which it quite obviously does) (see [102] below). Likewise, in its submission that Deloitte’s duty of care includes a duty to “have regard to the interests of [its] creditors”, HLT’s focus is on what Deloitte should have done in the discharge of its duty of care, and not whether Deloitte owed a duty of care to it.
Breach of duty
- [50]
[50] The third element is that the defendant must have acted in breach of his duty of care. This is invariably a question of fact. It is worth emphasising, as a point of some importance in the present case, that the content of a “duty of care” is exactly what is described by that phrase. It is a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care so that injury or loss is not caused to the claimant, and not a duty to do any specific act or acts. Reasonable skill and care may require a defendant to take a certain course of action in the circumstances at hand, but the need to take such action is incidental to the duty of care rather than a duty in and of itself. Thus, when a claimant frames an allegation of breach of duty, the ultimate question that has to be decided is not whether the defendant failed to do any specific thing but whether the failure to do a certain thing constituted a failure to act with due skill and care: Go Dante Yap v Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG [2011] 4 SLR 559 (“Go Dante Yap”) at [19].
- [51]
[51] The decision of the English Court of Appeal in N v Agrawal [1999] PNLR 939 is instructive. In that case, Stuart-Smith LJ rejected the lower court’s finding that a prosecution expert had breached a duty to attend court to give evidence and was liable for psychiatric injury suffered by the alleged victim of the crime as follows (at 943):
As Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (Andrew Tettenborn gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 24th Ed, 2023) (“Clerk & Lindsell on Torts”) explains with reference to this dictum, expressing a standard of care in terms of a duty “confuse[s] two distinct questions”, one as to whether there was a duty of care (“whether the nature of the relationship [between the parties] reasonably requires that care be taken”) and another as to what the duty of care required the defendant to do (“what conduct is reasonably required in the particular circumstances”) (at para 7-162).
Causation and legal responsibility
- [52]
[52] It is useful to take the fourth and fifth elements (factual causation and the extent of legal responsibility) together because they are not always clearly defined. We thus begin with disentangling the two before elaborating on them individually.
(1) Disaggregating “causation”
- [53]
[53] On a somewhat reductionist view, any question of whether a given defendant who has acted in breach of duty should be liable to compensate the claimant for certain damage suffered by the latter can be put as an overarching question of “causation”. In JSI Shipping, we noted the multi-faceted usage of “causation” in the law with an observation that “[c]ausation is often a thicket of complex factual, legal and policy issues” (at [140]). A survey of case law across multiple jurisdictions will bear out that courts do not always use “causation” in a uniform sense, as Professor Stapleton has noted (see Jane Stapleton, “Occam’s Razor Reveals An Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar” (2006) 122 LQR 426 at 426):
- [54]
[54] However, it would be preferable, in our view, if care was taken in the use of the language of causation, even if it may not be possible to clearly demarcate the boundaries of where it is appropriate. In this regard, a useful starting point is the exposition of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in the decision of the House of Lords in Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] 2 AC 883 (“Kuwait Airways”), which this court cited with approval in JSI Shipping (at [142]). Drawing on the writings of Professor Stapleton, Lord Nicholls opined that the courts should approach the causation inquiry in two stages (at [69]–[70]):
- [55]
[55] A number of important points are made in this extract. They can be unpacked as follows:
(a) The identification of the defendant’s liability for the claimant’s loss comprises two stages: (i) the causal relevance of the defendant’s wrongful conduct to the claimant’s loss; and (ii) the extent of the loss for which the defendant ought to be liable.
(b) The first stage is a question of fact that is typically expressed in terms of a test of “but for” causation.
(c) Mere factual causation between the defendant’s breach and the claimant’s loss is a necessary but insufficient condition for the defendant to bear legal responsibility for it. The second stage limits the over-inclusiveness of the first stage by requiring the court to make a “value judgment” as to the appropriate scope of the defendant’s legal responsibility.
(d) The second stage may require consideration of different legal rules and doctrines. These include remoteness, mitigation, and novus actus interveniens (intervening cause). But the common thread running through them is that they are devices developed by the common law to limit the defendant’s responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.
- [56]
[56] We note that Lord Nicholls’ approach finds resonance with the current approach in Australia, where legislation has been enacted in terms that expressly draw a distinction between the question of “factual causation” – which asks if “the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm” – and the question of “scope of liability” – which asks if “it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person’s liability to extend to the harm so caused”: see, for example, s 5D(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). In the unanimous decision of the High Court of Australia in Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, the court began by observing that the “familiar elements” of the cause of action of negligence were “duty, breach and causation of damage” (at [7]), but went on to unpack the element of “causation” as consisting of two questions which have often been conflated: (a) first, “a question of historical fact as to how a particular harm occurred”; and (b) second, “a normative question as to whether legal responsibility for that particular harm occurring in that way should be attributed to a particular person” (at [11]). We agree with this dichotomy and elaborate on each question below.
(2) Factual causation
- [57]
[57] The element of factual causation, as defined by this court in Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 3 SLR(R) 782 (“Sunny Metal (CA)”), is “concerned with the question of whether the relation between the defendant’s breach of duty and the claimant’s damage is one of cause and effect in accordance with scientific or objective notions of physical sequence” (at [52]). In short, the defendant’s breach of duty must be historically involved in producing the outcome of the claimant’s damage.
- [58]
[58] In law, the ordinary standard of causal relevance that is required is that of necessity. This finds expression in what has been termed the “but for” test: but for the defendant’s wrongdoing, would the claimant have suffered the damage that he complains of? There might be circumstances in which the court will apply a different test of factual causation, but it is unnecessary for us to consider those exceptional cases for the purposes of the general overview in this judgment.
(3) Legal responsibility
- [59]
[59] It would, however, be overinclusive for the defendant to be legally responsible for all the consequences created by his conduct as “the consequences of an act theoretically … stretch into infinity”: Sunny Metal (CA) at [56]. In this regard, the question of legal responsibility, as alluded to by Lord Nicholls in Kuwait Airways above, and as observed by Lord Hodge DPSC and Lord Sales JSC in Meadows, is not a monolithic one but “in reality a number of separate questions which must be addressed because the law does not impose responsibility on a defendant for everything that follows from his or her act or omission, even if it is wrongful” (at [55]). In our view, the doctrines which come under the collective umbrella of the legal responsibility question can broadly be placed into two categories which are distinguished by what they focus on:
(a) The first concerns the attribution of responsibility as between two or more causes of the claimant’s damage (including the defendant’s wrongdoing), each of which are “but for” causes in the sense of being necessary conditions for creating that damage. This has been referred to variously in terms of whether the defendant’s wrongdoing is a “legal cause” or whether there is some other factor which constitutes a “novus actus interveniens”. The principles of mitigation, as explained by this court in POP Holdings Pte Ltd v Teo Ban Lim [2025] 2 SLR 90 and Kupetz, Jonathan v Terraform Labs Pte Ltd [2026] 1 SLR 355, also fall within this category in so far as avoidable loss that is incurred due to the claimant’s failure to mitigate is attributable to that failure rather than the defendant’s wrongdoing.
(b) The second category concerns the foreseeability of the damage suffered by the claimant. Different approaches have been applied in this category based on whether the cause of action rests on contract or tort (see [67]–[68] below).
- [60]
[60] Before turning to outline the two categories above, we make three preliminary comments. First, as a matter of design, it is possible, if one seeks to formulate the conceptual structure of negligence in finer terms, to use each of the doctrines that attenuate legal responsibility as individual elements of the cause of action. Thus, one could, for example, as is not infrequently done, refer to “legal causation” and “remoteness” as separate constituents of the tort of negligence. But for present purposes, we have considered it useful to classify them under the broad header of “legal responsibility” as that is really the common thread running through them even if they each have a different focus. Our main concern in the present case is drawing up a broad structure that allows parties to identify and focus on the real issue based on the relevant stage or element of the negligence framework that is in play.
- [61]
[61] The second point is that, in line with our earlier observation that some care ought to be exercised in the use of the language of causation, it would be preferable to confine the use of causal language (if it is to be used at all) to cases in the first category identified at [59] above, that is, where the parties have identified more than one cause for the claimant’s damage and seek to attribute legal responsibility as between them. In that scenario, it is meaningful, to some extent, to speak of causation in relative terms as between the multiple causes, even if what is really being considered is not so much a question of breaking the chain of causation but the chain of legal responsibility. This is because, if the defendant’s wrongdoing is a necessary condition for the claimant’s damage, there is ex hypothesi an unbroken chain of causation.
- [62]
[62] The final point is that, while we accept that the two categories we have set out at [59] above may not be a closed list of the legal concepts that regulate the extent of legal responsibility, the courts should be careful to avoid a proliferation of novel doctrines and principles beyond what is necessary. Such proliferation will create uncertainty in the law and undermine consistency in reasoning and outcomes. What this means in practice is that, if it is possible for an outcome to be rationalised in terms of an established doctrine, that explanation ought to be preferred.
- [63]
[63] The present case is a good example of this. In support of its claim that it should not be made liable for HLT’s Trading Losses, Deloitte cites case law that has variously reasoned in terms of the audited company’s trading losses being “not caused” by the auditor’s negligence, or in terms of such losses falling “outside the scope of duty” of auditors based on a principle apparently established in the decision of the House of Lords in South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191 (“SAAMCo”) as a limit on legal responsibility that is distinct from causation and remoteness. The decision in SAAMCo has generated confusion as to when this “scope of duty” principle applies and how it fits within the general structure of negligence; indeed, this was the issue at the heart of Meadows and the case of Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2022] AC 783 (“Manchester Building Society”) which was decided in parallel with Meadows. The consensus that has been reached by the English courts appears to be that the so-called “SAAMCo principle” is a doctrine with a distinct identity and which applies in the specific context of professional negligence or situations analogous to it. But, as we explain below, we consider that the SAAMCo principle is an application of, and can be explained through, orthodox principles of contractual remoteness. This avoids having to define a principle by reference to a specific case – which, as this court remarked in Natixis, Singapore Branch v Seshadri Rajagopalan [2025] 1 SLR 1020, is often “a sign of difficulty in understanding its rationale” (at [126]) – and limiting its application in a somewhat arbitrary fashion to a specific type or context of negligence claims.
(A) Legal causation
- [64]
[64] The concept of “legal causation” is usually invoked where it is alleged that there is some necessary condition other than the defendant’s breach – a novus actus interveniens – that absolves the defendant of legal responsibility for the claimant’s damage. As mentioned, this is often expressed in the familiar language of a breakage in the chain of causation, but what is broken is not so much the chain of causation but the chain of responsibility for the consequences of the defendant’s breach.
- [65]
[65] The types of events which can constitute a novus actus interveniens are usually expressed in three categories: (a) a natural event independent of any human agency; (b) an act or omission of a third party; or (c) the conduct of the claimant himself: Clerk & Lindsell on Torts at para 2-107; Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Torts, Breach of Contract and Equitable Wrongs (Oxford University Press, 4th Ed, 2019) at pp 107–117. We propose to only address the last of these briefly in so far as it will be relevant to our analysis below. The legal position is that it will generally take rather exceptional or abnormal conduct by the claimant to break the chain of responsibility as between the defendant’s breach and the claimant’s damage. Thus, earlier decisions of this court have set the benchmark of the claimant’s conduct having to be “wholly unreasonable”: ACB at [84]; TV Media Pte Ltd v De Cruz Andrea Heidi [2004] 3 SLR(R) 543 at [76].
- [66]
[66] Finally, even when a different cause is not treated as so significant as to completely sever the chain of responsibility between the defendant’s wrong and the claimant’s damage, that is not necessarily the end of the matter as attribution of responsibility does not only occur on an all-or-nothing basis at the liability stage. Instead, it may also take place in the quantification of damages through the application of the principles of contributory negligence: see, for example, PlanAssure PAC v Gaelic Inns Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 513 at [99] and [117]–[120] (in the context of a claim for auditor negligence).
(B) Remoteness
- [67]
[67] Apart from attribution of responsibility as between multiple causes, the law also recognises that foreseeability of damage may be a different reason for attenuating the defendant’s legal responsibility. The leading case in the context of tort law is the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) [1961] AC 388 (“Wagon Mound”), which establishes that loss is too remote to be recoverable if it is of a type that was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant’s breach of duty. The test in Wagon Mound has been affirmed and applied by our courts: see, for example, Ho Soo Fong v Standard Chartered Bank [2007] 2 SLR(R) 181 at [39]; Sunny Metal (CA) at [56].
- [68]
[68] In this case, an important dimension that the parties have tended to overlook in their submissions is that HLT has mounted a claim for negligence not only in tort but also in contract based on an implied term that Deloitte would exercise reasonable skill and care in the conduct of the audit (see [12] above). This is important because the contractual remoteness rules established in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 (“Hadley v Baxendale”) are narrower than the Wagon Mound test, and it is generally accepted that the contractual rules would apply in a case where the defendant owes the claimant concurrent duties of care in contract and tort: Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 1 SLR(R) 853 (“Sunny Metal (HC)”) at [139]–[140]; BDW Trading Ltd v URS Corporation Ltd [2025] 2 WLR 1095 at [33]. The rule in Hadley v Baxendale, in brief, contemplates that a defendant should be liable for such damage that he is taken to have assumed responsibility for based on it having been in his contemplation at the time of contracting (see [149] below). In this regard, the defendant’s horizon of contemplation is made up of: (a) “ordinary” or “natural” damage arising from the breach of contract which the defendant as a reasonable person would be imputed with knowledge of; and (b) “extraordinary” or “non-natural” damage not arising in the usual course of things but from special circumstances which the defendant has actual knowledge of: Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 623 (“Robertson Quay”) at [81]–[82]. The rationale behind the narrower scope of recoverable damage under the Hadley v Baxendale test as compared to the Wagon Mound test is that contracting parties are not strangers and would therefore have had an opportunity before the defendant’s breach to make arrangements to allocate the risk of damage as between them through the contract: Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd [1969] 1 AC 350 (“The Heron II”) at 385G–386C; Sunny Metal (HC) at [138]; Robertson Quay at [75]–[76].
Defences
- [69]
[69] Finally, upon the claimant establishing the five elements above, the defendant may nonetheless escape liability either in full or in part through certain defences. We have already noted contributory negligence at [66] above as one example. It suffices for us to make mention of another, the defence of illegality, which denies a claim on public policy grounds and which, as we will briefly note below, is of some relevance to Suit 237 even if it does not strictly arise in this appeal.
Avoiding conflation of the different elements
- [70]
[70] The purpose of the exercise above of identifying the different elements of a negligence claim is to promote clarity in identifying what the true issue in dispute is in any given case. Each element raises specific issues and it does not assist for parties to attempt to frame what are in substance arguments on breach of duty or causation as a question of duty of care. Unfortunately, conflation of this kind has proved rather pervasive in the parties’ pleadings and submissions in this case.
- [71]
[71] Before turning to the case at hand, it would be useful to consider some examples of cases in which the wrong question has been asked and answered. We highlight two types of cases which reflect similar errors as those committed by the parties before us. The first is where what is really a question of breach is framed as a question of duty of care. This is typically done by defining the duty of care not as a general duty to take care but in terms of the specific conduct that the defendant (allegedly) should or should not have done. The second is where what is in truth an issue of remoteness is brought forward to the issue of duty of care by defining the duty not in terms of damage generally but as a duty in relation to a specific risk of damage.
Conflating breach of duty with the duty of care
- [72]
[72] An example of the first type of case is the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2018] QB 783 (“Darnley”). The claimant there had received a serious blow to his head in an assault. He attended at a hospital managed by the defendant, where he was told that he would not be seen for up to four or five hours. This information was incorrect as the hospital’s protocol required a person with a head injury to be seen by a triage nurse within 30 minutes. After waiting for about 19 minutes, the claimant elected to go home. His condition subsequently deteriorated and he was reconveyed to hospital for surgery. By then, however, the claimant had unfortunately suffered serious and permanent brain damage.
- [73]
[73] The defendant admitted that, if the claimant had remained present when called for triage, his treatment would have been prioritised, and he would have made a full recovery (at [18]). At first instance, the claim was dismissed on the basis, among others, that the defendant did not owe the claimant a duty of care to give accurate information about waiting times. A majority of the English Court of Appeal upheld this decision. Jackson LJ, as part of the majority, said that it would not be “fair, just and reasonable to impose upon [the defendant] a duty not to provide inaccurate information about waiting times” as this would “add a new layer of responsibility to clerical staff and a new head of liability for NHS health trusts” (at [53]).
- [74]
[74] The majority’s approach was criticised by Professor Goudkamp as an “erosion of the customary divide between the duty of care and breach elements of the action in negligence”: James Goudkamp, “Breach of Duty: A Disappearing Element of the Action in Negligence?” (2017) 76 CLJ 480 (“Breach of Duty”) at 481. The majority’s focus on the defendant’s duty of care was “surprising given that it is, of course, trite law that hospitals owe a duty to their patients”. In his view, the real issue was not whether the defendant owed a specific duty of care to give accurate information but whether the defendant had breached its duty of care by giving inaccurate information (see Breach of Duty at 482):
- [75]
[75] The UK Supreme Court later allowed an appeal against the English Court of Appeal’s decision: see Darnley v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2019] AC 831. Lord Lloyd-Jones JSC, delivering the judgment of the court, explained that “[t]his [was] a distinct and recognisable situation in which the law imposes a duty of care” (at [16]), and agreed with Professor Goudkamp that the majority of the English Court of Appeal had “elide[d] issues of the existence of a duty of care and negligent breach of duty” (at [21]–[23]).
- [76]
[76] In our view, Darnley illustrates that the duty of care inquiry is concerned with the existence of a duty of care, that is, whether there is a need on the facts for the defendant to take care to avoid causing harm to the claimant. The duty of care inquiry is not concerned with what steps would or would not amount to sufficient care on the facts of the case. If the duty of care is defined in terms of specific acts which the defendant should or should not have done, the questions of duty and breach merge entirely into one another. This is essentially the same caution made by this court in Go Dante Yap which we have referred to at [50] above.
- [77]
[77] Keeping duty and breach distinct is not merely a matter of conceptual tidiness. Asking the wrong question can sometimes lead the parties and the court into error. We highlight two potential pitfalls. First, while the issue of whether the defendant owes the claimant a duty of care is a question of law, the issue of whether the defendant has breached his duty of care is a question of fact: JSI Shipping at [32], [47] and [65]; Gary Chan Kok Yew, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2015) at para 06.003. The fact-law distinction was historically of especial importance when the arbiter of fact was a jury rather than the judge as it would have been an error on the part of the judge to usurp the fact-finding role of the jury. While the judge in our legal system is both arbiter of fact and law, the division of issues as between judge and jury remains a useful reminder of the true nature of the issue(s). In this regard, it is well-established that “[w]hat is reasonable care in a particular circumstance is a jury question”: Wooldridge v Sumner [1962] 2 All ER 978 at 988G. Consequently, a finding in one case that the defendant was liable due to a failure to do a certain act is, strictly speaking, a finding of fact and does not establish any precedent of law: Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] AC 743 (“Qualcast”) at 757–758. It would thus be fallacious to treat such a finding as authority for a legal proposition that a failure to do the same act necessarily constitutes a breach of duty on the facts of a different case. As Lord Denning explained in Qualcast, while the Highway Code “contains many propositions of good sense which may be taken into account in considering whether reasonable care has been taken … it would be a mistake to elevate them into propositions of law” (at 759). More recently, the same point was made by McHugh J in the High Court of Australia’s decision in Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422 (at [29]):
- [78]
[78] The different natures of the duty and breach inquiries can have consequences in practice. One is that, as a question of fact, the applicable standard of care and whether the defendant failed to act in accordance with that standard would rarely be appropriate for determination on a summary basis. Another is that an appellate court would be slow to intervene in a trial judge’s findings on breach of duty as the usual restraints on appellate intervention in matters of fact would apply, whereas an appellate court is at greater liberty to intervene in a lower court’s decision on duty of care as it is an issue of law: James Plunkett, The Duty of Care in Negligence (Hart Publishing, 2018) (“Plunkett”) at p 127.
- [79]
[79] Second, framing the duty of care in the binary terms of a duty to do or refrain from doing a certain act can create the misleading impression that the defendant’s liability is strict as opposed to being tested on a standard of reasonableness. The formulation that A owes B a duty to do a certain thing when used in the context of a claim for negligence contains an a priori assumption that a failure to do that thing is invariably a failure to act with reasonable care: Plunkett at p 126. But as Lord Somervell of Harrow warned in the House of Lords’ decision in A C Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden [1958] AC 240, an ossified definition of the content of A’s duty of care should be avoided as the dictates of reasonable care are necessarily specific to the facts of each case (at 264):
In the final analysis, one should not lose sight of the point that the duty of care is “a broad duty to take such care as is reasonable in the circumstances”, and not a specific obligation to do or not do any specific acts: Go Dante Yap at [19].
Conflating remoteness with the duty of care
- [80]
[80] The second category of case involves the framing of duties of care in relation to specific forms of damage or the risk of such damage. An oft-cited basis for such an approach is the following statement of Lord Bridge of Harwich in the famous decision of the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (“Caparo”) (at 627D):
As will be seen below, this statement in Caparo is the bedrock of the “SAAMCo principle”, which is a principle that purports to limit the defendant’s liability by defining his duty of care as excluding the specific loss that the claimant has suffered. Our observations here on the difficulties with such an approach would therefore telegraph the reasons for our view that the SAAMCo principle is no more than an application of the principles of remoteness of damage.
- [81]
[81] In our judgment, framing a duty of care in relation to a specific type of damage confuses the question of duty of care and the question of remoteness. Whether the defendant should be responsible for a certain type of damage or loss is properly the territory of the latter. The duty of care as formulated by our courts is a wide concept that is focused on the need to take care to avoid causing harm generally. Correctly understood, the concept of a duty of care to avoid a specific type of harm is not consistent with the way our courts have approached the matter. This stands to reason as the purpose of laying down a universal framework for determining the existence of a duty of care in Spandeck was to do away with traditional distinctions based on the kind of loss that the claimant had suffered.
- [82]
[82] This can be seen from Spandeck itself. In that case, we held that the threshold requirement of factual foreseeability only required that “the defendant ought to have known that the claimant would suffer damage from his (the defendant’s) carelessness”, and it was because of this that “it would be fulfilled in almost all cases” [emphasis added] (at [75]). Indeed, we went on to expressly reject the respondent’s submission that the requirement was not met on the facts because the respondent had approached the issue at too granular a level in a manner that was more suited to the issue of remoteness (at [89]):
More recently, in NTUC Foodfare Co-operative Ltd v SIA Engineering Co Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 588 (“NTUC Foodfare”), we reiterated that the Spandeck test had made it “no longer necessary to characterise the nature of the plaintiff’s loss before examining whether a duty of care arises in tort” (at [4]).
- [83]
[83] It might be argued that it is unduly pedantic to draw a clear separation between the duty of care and remoteness inquiries, and that there is nothing wrong with framing the duty of care in relation to a specific kind of damage that the claimant has suffered. We disagree. If the defendant wishes to defend the claim against it by conceding the issue of duty of care and focusing instead on arguing that the claimant’s damage is too remote, there is nothing wrong in this. But what is not correct is to distort the concept of a duty of care by building notions of remoteness into it:
(a) Fundamentally, the duty of care and remoteness elements serve different purposes. While both are concerned with the general problem of indeterminacy of negligence liability, the duty element is specifically concerned with indeterminacy in the persons to whom the defendant may be liable, whereas remoteness is concerned with indeterminacy in the extent of loss suffered by the determinate class of persons to whom the defendant is liable: NTUC Foodfare at [42]–[43]. The issue of duty is thus a logical antecedent to the issue of remoteness. Thus, in a case like the present where the parties are in a contractual relationship and the duty of care arises in both contract and tort, there is plainly no question of the defendant being liable to an indeterminate class of persons. The question is the extent of the claimant’s damage that the defendant should be legally responsible for.
(b) Moreover, a failure to correctly approach an attempt to limit the extent of the defendant’s liability through the lens of remoteness can cause the parties and the court to lose sight of the relevant considerations in the analysis. We have said at [62] above that the law should avoid an unnecessary proliferation of novel doctrines and principles which bear on the question of the extent of the defendant’s legal responsibility for the claimant’s damage as this would create uncertainty and potential inconsistency. As prefaced there, we consider that the law took a wrong turn in developing the “SAAMCo principle” as a result of attempting to resolve an issue of remoteness at the duty of care level. If no such conflation had occurred and the issue was approached as one of remoteness, it would have been apparent that the orthodox principles on remoteness of damage were an adequate solution.
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