Eqita Insurance Bhd v Lim Teong Thye David

Lee Kim Shin JC:

[2] This question arose because an appeal from a decision of the District Court lies as of right (that is, leave is not required) under s 21(1)(a) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”) if the amount in dispute or the value of the subject-matter at the hearing before that District Court exceeds $50,000.

[3] As far as I am aware, there is no clear authority on this point. I therefore provide the written grounds for my decision.

(a) the first was the Respondent’s application to strike out the appellant’s Statement of Claim (“the striking out application”); and

(b) the second was the Appellant’s application to amend its Statement of Claim (“the amendment application”).

Both applications were heard in the State Courts at first instance by a Deputy Registrar in Chambers.

[10] I heard the appeal on 25 September 2014. As a preliminary issue, the Respondent submitted that there was a defect in the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal in that the Appellant was required to, but had not, obtained leave to appeal to the High Court. On that basis, the appeal should be dismissed without a hearing on the substantive merits, that is, the appeal against the District Judge’s decision (see [7] above). The Appellant submitted that it did not require leave to appeal to the High Court.

[12] Before I address the preliminary issue proper, I set out the relevant statutory provisions concerning the regime for appeals from a District Judge in Chambers to a Judge of the High Court in Chambers.

[13] As a starting point, civil appeals from the District Court to the High Court are dealt with under s 47 of the State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCA”). Section 47 reads as follows:

[14] Section 47 of the SCA is subject to the SCJA. The SCJA in turn sets out specific rules concerning appeals from the District Court to the High Court which can be taken up as of right, appeals which require leave, and matters for which there is no right of appeal at all:

[15] The procedure for bringing an appeal from the District Judge in Chambers to the High Court in Chambers is in turn set out in O 55C rr 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2014 Rev Ed), which read as follows:

[16] On the basis of the foregoing, the question of whether leave was required for the Appellant to appeal to the High Court depended on whether the case fell within s 21(1)(a) (leave not required) or s 21(1)(b) (leave required) of the SCJA. The main point of contention between the parties was whether “the amount in dispute, or the value of the subject-matter” in this case crossed the monetary threshold of $50,000, upon which an appeal to the High Court would lie as of right.

[18] The Appellant submitted that “the amount in dispute, or the value of the subject-matter” was the value of the Appellant’s substantive claim, which was $167,620.15, being the damages claimed by the Appellant against the Respondent for the negligence of subcontractors who had allegedly caused a fire to break out during construction works (the “Appellant’s substantive claim”). This exceeded the monetary threshold of $50,000 under s 21(1)(a) and leave was therefore not required.

[19] In support of its submission, the appellant sought to rely on the High Court decision in Ong Wah Chuan v Seow Hwa Chuan [2011] 3 SLR 1150, where the portions of the parliamentary debates concerning the 2010 amendments to s 21 of the SCJA (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 October 2010) vol 87 at col 1371) were cited by the court (at [41]):

[22] The Respondent relied principally on the Court of Appeal decision in Fong Khim Ling v Tan Teck Ann [2014] 2 SLR 659 (“Fong Khim Ling”). The court held (at [21] and [26]) that:

[24] According to the Respondent, the determination of “the amount in dispute, or the value of the subject-matter” ought not to refer back to the proceedings before the Deputy Registrar. Implicit in this submission is the acknowledgment that if the determination of the amount in dispute or the value of the subject-matter ought to refer to the proceedings before the Deputy Registrar, the amount would be $167,620.15 based on the Appellant’s substantive claim.

[25] The Respondent also submitted that because the substantive order made by the Deputy Registrar in relation to the striking out application was not appealed to the District Judge, the Appellant’s substantive claim no longer exists. Therefore, it could not be said that the “amount in dispute” concerned the Appellant’s substantive claim.

How should the monetary threshold for an appeal solely on costs be calculated for the purposes of s 21(1)(a) of the SCJA?

[30] I found indirect support for this view from the parallel provision in the SCJA concerning appeals from the High Court to the Court of Appeal at s 34(2)(b) which provides that:

[34] The basis for the recommendation was to give legislative effect to the High Court decision of Abdul Rahman bin Sharif v Abdul Salim bin Syed [1999] 3 SLR(R) 138, where Tay Yong Kwang JC (as he then was) held (at [24]–[25]) that:

[36] For completeness, I have two further observations in relation to the submissions made by the Respondent.

[37] As regards the Respondent’s first submission (see above at [23]–[24]), his approach in interpreting the phrase “at the hearing before [the lower court]” as meaning the hearing before the District Judge (and not the hearing before the Deputy Registrar) was incorrect.

[41] The Appellant should therefore have obtained leave from the District Judge within seven days from the date of the order made on 30 July 2014 (see O 55C r 2 cited at [15] above). It did not do so. Neither did the Appellant seek leave from the High Court. Therefore, I found that the Notice to Appeal filed on 11 August 2014 was defective, and consequently, the appeal was not properly before the court.