Grays LLC v Law Society of Singapore

[1] This is an application by the plaintiff, Grays LLC (“the plaintiff” or “GLLC”) under s 96 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1985 Ed) (“the Act”) that the defendant, the Law Society of Singapore apply to the Chief Justice for the appointment of a Disciplinary Committee to investigate a complaint made by the plaintiff.

[2] The complaint was made against two members of another law corporation, Tan Peng Chin LLC (“TPC”), namely, Mr Mark Lim Fung Chian (“ML”) and Ms Leong Kit Wan (“LKW”) (collectively “the respondents”), under s 85(1) of the Act alleging that they had breached Rules 47 and 53A of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules.

[3] An inquiry committee was set up under the Act to inquire into the complaint. The inquiry committee ordered the respondents to submit their written explanation. The committee held a hearing on 11 October 2006 before concluding that the complaint did not warrant further consideration, and recommended its dismissal, and the recommendation was accepted by the Council of the Law Society.

[4] The plaintiff’s complaint arose out of two letters of the respondents to the plaintiff dated 10 February 2006 and 14 February 2006 in connection with an action before the High Court in which GLLC acted for the plaintiff and TPC acted for the defendants.

[5] The plaintiff’s letter of complaint dated 20 March 2006 came with an accompanying chronology. The letter read:

Neither the “subsequent correspondence” nor the “misleading and highly questionable statements” were identified in the letter or in the submissions tendered in these proceedings.[note: 1]

[8] Although two letters were the subject matter of the complaint, it is necessary to refer to some other letters to understand the events. In the letter of 10 February 2006 (the first letter complained of), the respondents stated:

The attached letter of 8 February 2006 from WW stated:

[9] This letter brought a response from GLLC dated 13 February 2006. In the letter, GLLC referred to a telephone conversation between SDJ and ML:

Going backwards in time, GLLC recounted that:

[10] It is to be noted that although GLLC did not act for the plaintiff in the action in October 2005, SDJ was involved in the case at that stage as he was a member of Wee Swee Teow & Co at that time.[note: 2]

[11] The respondents replied to this letter in its 14 February 2006 letter (the first of two letters of the respondents of that date and not the subject of the complaint) that:

[12] When GLLC responded on the same day stating:

The respondents then wrote their second letter of 14 February 2006 (the subject of the complaint) to say that:

[13] The plaintiff’s reasons for its application fell into two heads, (i) that the inquiry committee did not act fairly in the conduct of the proceedings, and (ii) that the finding of the inquiry committee was against the weight of the evidence.

[14] The first head, that the inquiry committee did not act fairly, was divided into three sub-heads, (i) that the inquiry committee criticised the plaintiff, (ii) the inquiry committee failed to inform SDJ of the respondents’ written explanation, and (iii) the hearing was not conducted fairly.

[15] The plaintiff submitted:

[16] The inquiry committee’s duty was to consider the complaint and the respondents’ response, and to decide if the complaint should be formally investigated by a Disciplinary Committee. In discharging that duty, the inquiry committee had to consider and evaluate the evidence presented and the conduct of the parties involved. In that process, the inquiry committee may accept one party’s account of the disputed issues over the other party’s. The rejection of the unsuccessful party’s version per se cannot be regarded as unfairness.

[17] The plaintiff’s grievance was not limited to the rejection of the complaint, but to some highly critical findings it alleged the inquiry committee made against SDJ and GLLC. The criticisms by themselves cannot be a ground for applying for the appointment of a Disciplinary Committee to investigate the complaint. The primary question was whether the inquiry committee was right in its finding that no action be taken on the complaint. If the finding was wrong, then the plaintiff’s application will be granted, whether or not the criticisms were made. If the finding was correct, the criticisms cannot be a ground for allowing the application.

[18] The plaintiff acknowledged that a complainant has no right to an oral hearing before an inquiry committee and that it is within the inquiry committee’s discretion whether to hear a complainant. Nevertheless, the plaintiff argued that :

[19] This argument revealed a failure to distinguish the rights of a party complained against from the rights of a complainant. It is axiomatic that a party complained against has the right to know the complaint against him, and the right to defend himself, and these rights are incorporated in s 86(6) of the Act.

[20] The plaintiff and SDJ were not parties complained against, and their rights and interests before the inquiry committee were fundamentally different from that of the respondents. It is telling that the plaintiff did not contend that the rules of natural justice or the Act and the rules made thereunder required that a respondent’s written explanation should be supplied to the complainant, because they do not. The inquiry committee has the discretion to disclose the whole or a portion of the written explanation to a complainant, but that is discretionary, and a complainant has no entitlement to it.

[21] The plaintiff relied on SDJ’s status as an advocate and solicitor as a reason for him to be supplied with the respondents’ written explanation to enable him to rebut personal allegations against him. If there is such a right of rebuttal, that right should extend to all complainants. The plaintiff acknowledged that such a right does not extend to all complainants. The fact that SDJ is an advocate and solicitor cannot give him any additional entitlement that is not available to other complainants. In any event, there were no personal allegations made against SDJ in the written explanation. The respondents presented their account of the events, which differed in parts from the plaintiff’s account, but nothing in the explanation can be said to be a personal attack of SDJ.

[22] The plaintiff submitted:

[23] SDJ deposed in his affidavit filed in support of the plaintiff’s application that Mr Peter Madhavan (“PM”), the chairman of the inquiry committee was:

He elaborated that:

[24] Two other members of GLLC also filed affidavits referring to the hearing before the inquiry committee. They were Mr Jayagobi Jayaram (“JJ”), an associate director of GLLC, and Ms Helen Ho (“HH”), the office manager of GLLC.

[28] There was another grievance about the conduct of the hearing of 2 February 2006. SDJ also deposed in his affidavit of 3 April 2007 that:

This indicated that PM spoke directly to HH. This account is at variance with the account in SDJ’s subsequent affidavit of 14 August 2007 that:

indicating that PM was replying to a question from SDJ, and this later account was repeated by JJ and HH in their affidavits filed in support of this application. While nothing turns on whether the alleged remark was made to HH or to SDJ, the discrepancy showed that recollection of the events was inexact.

[29] PM, in his affidavit filed in these proceedings on 25 June 2007 described the hearing thus:

[30] There is no significant difference between the accounts of SDJ and PM. It is evidence that PM and the other members of the inquiry committee did not question HH and JJ. By either account, PM indicated that it was not necessary to question them. The question is whether the plaintiff has reason to feel aggrieved that the inquiry committee did not question JJ and HH. JJ was not mentioned in the letter of complaint and the chronology. In the circumstances, the inquiry committee would not know if he had any role in the events in question. As for HH, it was mentioned in the chronology that she had dealt with WW in the acquisition of the transcripts. There was no mention that she had any dealings with TPC or the respondents, as indeed, she had not. SDJ, on the other hand, was shown to have been actively engaged with TPC and WW over obtaining the transcripts.

[31] It is well established that the inquiry committee was not obliged to hear JJ or HH or anyone from GLLC. The Court of Appeal has made clear in Seet Melvin v The Law Society of Singapore [1995] 2 SLR 323 at 341 that:

endorsing an earlier finding by Chan Sek Keong JC in Yusuf Jumabhoy v The Law Society of Singapore [1988] SLR 236 to that effect.

[32] When an inquiry committee feels that there is a need to seek clarification on a complaint or a written explanation, it can seek the clarification. In this case, PM had raised with SDJ matters relating to the purchase of the transcripts. SDJ felt that PM was hostile towards him. He complained that PM made “bare statements of fact, without explaining the context within which his questions were framed.”

[33] When SDJ was questioned by counsel for the Law Society during the hearing before me, he elaborated:

and

and

[34] SDJ’s account of the exchanges does not give the sense that PM made accusations against him or forced him to make admissions against his will. While he found PM’s manner brusque, SDJ did not complain that he was not allowed to respond to the issues raised. It is evident that while SDJ was surprised and upset by the tone and pace of the questioning, PM’s intention was to clarify some issues with him.

[35] It must be kept in mind that the inquiry committee’s duty was to consider the plaintiff’s complaint against the respondents in connection with the two letters. The focus of the inquiry committee was to look into the circumstances in which the two letters were written, and decide whether to transfer the matter to a Disciplinary Committee for a formal investigation. In those two letters, the respondents were referring to information they received from WW in the letter of 8 February from WW to TPC, and they did not make any allegations of their own regarding the communications between SDJ, JJ, HH or any other member of GLLC and WW on the request for the transcripts.

[36] Seen from this standpoint, there was no strict necessity to question SDJ, JJ or HH on their dealings with WW, because the respondents had written to the plaintiff solely on the basis of WW’s account of the events between WW and the plaintiff. The respondents had no direct knowledge of the communications between the plaintiff and WW.

[37] The plaintiff evidently had a different perception of the hearing of the inquiry committee. It was anxious to justify and defend its dealings with WW and to put forward its case on the complaint. If it had attended the hearing with the understanding that the inquiry committee was not investigating into WW’s letter, or GLLC’s dealings with WW, but was inquiring into the respondents’ two letters, it would see that evidence from JJ and HH with regard to the application to WW had little or no bearing on the issue.

[38] The plaintiff took objection to the respondents’ letter of 10 February 2006 which stated “Wordwave has also indicated that they feel they were misled by you into providing a copy of the transcripts at the “additional copy rate”. The respondents had forwarded a copy of WW’s letter to them dated 8 February 2006 where WW had stated, “we feel that we were misled by [the plaintiff] on this issue.”

[39] Factually, the respondents’ letter was quite unobjectionable insofar as it was only conveying WW’s account of the events relating to GLLC’s application for the transcripts. When the inquiry committee concluded that there was no necessity to send this complaint to the Disciplinary Committee for formal investigation, there is no basis for the plaintiff to complain that the inquiry committee’s finding was made against the weight of the evidence.

[41] The letter did not add to the earlier letter of 10 February except that in the earlier letter, the allegation of misleading came from WW and in the letter of 14 February 2006, the respondents alleged that the transcripts were surreptitiously obtained at the lower rate.

[42] The plaintiff in its letter of complaint laid emphasis on the fact that:

[43] This calls for a reference to the “detailed explanation” in GLLC’s letter of 13 February 2006, portions of which have been set out at [9] hereof. In the letter, the plaintiff enclosed copies of emails exchanged between it and WW over the period 2 February to 6 February 2006 relating to GLLC’s request for the transcripts from WW. The exchange enclosed to GLLC’s letter ended with an email from WW to the plaintiff dated 6 February 2006:

[44] When WW supplies transcripts, it charges rates between $8.50 per page to $13, depending on the turnaround time for their production, and it charges a standard rate of $1 per page for additional copies. In this case, it charged TPC $8.50 a page for the first three sets of transcripts (two for the parties and one for the judge), which is the rate for a turnaround of five working days.

[48] In fact, WW had written again to the plaintiff and the respondents on 16 February 2006 that “(w)e … stand by our comment that we feel that we were misled by Grays …”. While this letter came after the respondents wrote their letter of 14 February 2006, it was received by the plaintiff before it made its complaint against the respondents, and this letter is relevant in the evaluation of the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint against the respondents.

[49] Was the plaintiff justified in complaining that the respondents had contravened Rules 47 and 53A when they wrote the letters? The inquiry committee came to the conclusion that it was not. I find that the plaintiff has not shown that the conclusion was made against the weight of the evidence.

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[note: 1]see Plaintiff’s Submissions, para 4

[note: 2]Chronology/Comments of the Plaintiff, para 7

[note: 3]Plaintiffs’ Submissions, paras 26 and 27

[note: 4]Plaintiffs’ Submissions, para 46

[note: 5]Notes of Evidence page 41

[note: 6]Notes of Evidence page 43

[note: 7]Notes of Evidence page 44