JKT v JKU

Tribunal Magistrate Joel Tan:

[1] On 2 May 2026, the claimant boarded a flight operated by the respondent company from Denpasar, bound for Singapore. Before departure, her luggage was checked in at the respondent’s check-in counter at the airport in Denpasar. Among the bags so checked was a Rimowa Salsa, a hard-shell suitcase.

[2] She arrived in Singapore later that day. When she collected her luggage from the baggage carousel at Changi Airport, she noticed that one of the wheels of the Rimowa luggage was missing entirely. The wheel housing had been completely sheared off, and the hard-shell casing that encased and supported the wheel had cracked and broken away. The claimant promptly lodged a damaged baggage report through the respondent’s online portal on the same day.

[3] The respondent arranged for the luggage to be collected by its vendor for assessment, and the bag was picked up from the claimant’s residence on 5 May. The very next day, on 6 May, the respondent informed the claimant that, following its vendor’s assessment, the damage sustained was irreparable. The respondent said that in accordance with its repair policy guidelines and after considering prior usage and depreciation, it was of the view that the luggage “no longer [held] any residual value”. This was because the model of the luggage was manufactured in 2016—and, indeed, the claimant had purchased the luggage that year on 31 May from the Rimowa store at Mandarin Gallery in Singapore. Nonetheless, the claimant made its first offer of compensation: $90. The claimant rejected the offer. The day after that, on 7 May, the respondent revised its offer upward to $218. This was again rejected by the claimant.

[4] The claimant then requested that the luggage be assessed not by the respondent’s own vendor, but by Rimowa itself, and that the official assessment be shared with her. The respondent agreed to this, and on 22 May 2026, Rimowa issued a damage certificate letter. That letter made three things clear: first, that the damage consisted of cracks and missing material at the wheel housing mounting; second, that the damage was caused by rough or improper handling; and third, that the luggage was damaged beyond repair and could not be restored to its original condition. Rimowa also stated that the retail price of a comparable replacement luggage of the same brand was $1,630.

[5] On 3 June, the respondent maintained its earlier offer of $218. The claimant insisted that the respondent compensate her in the full sum of $1,630. On 5 June, the respondent increased its offer to $327. The claimant declined. By the time of the hearing before this tribunal, the respondent had raised its offer to $652. That offer, too, was declined, the claimant preferring instead to have her claim determined by this tribunal.

[7] The respondent, for its part, argued that the $1630 sought by the claimant “is the current retail price of a comparable new product, rather than the valuation of [her] Bag immediately before it was damaged. Replacing a ten-year-old, heavily used Rimowa with a brand-new retail model is considered a betterment”. It further asserted that the damaged luggage, being ten years old, must be regarded as having fully depreciated and therefore as having no residual value. On this basis, it argued that there was no recoverabl any actual loss. Accordingly, notwithstanding its numerous settlement offers, the claim ought to be dismissed.

[8] The claimant’s rejoinder to the betterment argument was as follows:

[9] The claimant also contended that the respondent’s depreciation argument was impermissible under Article 26 of the Schedule to the Carriage by Air (Montreal Convention, 1999) Act 2007 (the “Montreal Convention”), on the ground that such a policy produces a compensation figure below the actual proven loss and therefore operates as a provision tending to fix a lower limit of liability than that which the Convention permits.

[10] I address first the claimant’s argument concerning Article 26 of the Montreal Convention. Put simply, Article 26 renders null and void any contractual provision between the parties that purport to absolve the carrier of liability altogether, or to limit compensation at a level inconsistent with the Convention’s own prescribed limits.

[11] The respondent was doing neither of those things. It accepted liability to compensate the claimant for her losses arising from the damage to the luggage. The Montreal Convention does not, however, prescribe what rights to compensation are applicable in respect of such damage: see Article 29 of the Montreal Convention. That question fell to be answered by reference to the applicable principles of domestic law of the contracting state: see Zicherman v Korean Air Lines Co (1996) 516 US 217; 116 U.S. 217; applied in Evans v Air Canada [2023] NSWSC 1535 at [108]-[109], which was not raised on appeal in [2024] NSWCA 153 (see [16]) and (2025) 423 ALR 155; [2025] HCA 22 (see [3]). The respondent’s position—that the claimant’s actual loss is nil because the luggage has fully depreciated—was an argument about the quantum of recoverable loss to be determined by reference to the applicable principles under domestic law. It was not a provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit of compensation within the meaning of Article 26.

[12] The dispute being one of quantum, the appropriate starting point is the compensatory principle that damages are intended to place the successful claimant “as far as money can do it, in as good a situation” as she would have occupied had the wrong not been committed: see British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v Underground Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd. [1912] AC 673 at 689 per Viscount Haldane LC. The question, then, is what sum of money would place the claimant, as far as money can do, in as good a situation as she would have been in had her luggage not been damaged beyond repair.

[18] I observe in closing that the claimant would have fared considerably better in terms of outcome had she accepted the respondent’s latest offer of $652—or, for that matter, any of its earlier offers. Whether the respondent’s offer remains open despite this judgment is a matter for the respondent’s goodwill, particularly given that it has been put to the trouble and expense of these proceedings.

The claimant in person;

The respondent in person.