High Court · Decided 16 November 2026
Liew Chiap Kong v Lim Soo Seng (Pte) Ltd and another
Feedback & support[2026] SGHCR 43 · Case no. Originating Claim No 116 of 2026 (Summons No 2779 of 2026)
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Official text from eLitigation
AR Chong Ee Hsiun:
Introduction
- [1]
[1] Since 1 April 2022, the Rules of Court 2021 required every amendment to a pleading to have either the other side’s written agreement or the court’s permission (see O 9 r 14 of the Rules of Court 2021). By contrast, under the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“Rules of Court 2014”), a party could amend a pleading once, without the leave of court, at any time before the pleadings were deemed to be closed (O 20 r 3(1) of the Rules of Court 2014). The Rules of Court 2021 therefore gave the non-amending party greater practical leverage, in that by withholding agreement, it could oblige the amending party to apply to court. This application involved consideration of how a non-amending party’s power to withhold consent to amendments should be exercised.
- [2]
[2] In HC/SUM 2779/2026 (“SUM 2779”), the first defendant in HC/OC 116/2026 (“OC 116”) (the “First Defendant”) applied for permission to amend its defence and counterclaim, and the second defendant (the “Second Defendant”) applied for permission to make similar amendments to his defence. The amendments sought to be made are reproduced in the annexes to these grounds. There were three sets of amendments relevant to SUM 2779. The first set of amendments, set out in Annex A, were amendments which the claimant (the “Claimant”) agreed to (the “Agreed-upon Amendments”). The second set of amendments, set out in Annex B, were amendments that the Claimant objected to on the basis that they were allegedly devoid of adequate particulars (the “Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments”). The third set of amendments, set out in Annex C, were amendments that the Claimant objected to on the basis that they were allegedly immaterial to the real questions and issues in controversy between the parties (the “Allegedly Immaterial Amendments”).
- [3]
[3] SUM 2779 was significant for three reasons.
(a) First, it engaged the issue of whether a non-amending party that regarded proposed amendments to pleadings as deficient in particulars could insist on those particulars before agreeing to the amendments, or whether it should instead agree to the amendments and seek particulars once the amended pleadings had been filed. The answer affected the number and order of interlocutory applications that would be expected to be filed in an action, and whether the Ideals in O 3 r 1 of the Rules of Court 2021 were achieved.
(b) Second, it brought to the fore an important point that proposed amendments could be imperfect in terms of their degree of particularisation and yet pass muster under the framework for allowing amendments to pleadings set out in Wang Piao v Lee Wee Ching [2024] 4 SLR 540 (“Wang Piao”). The question was not whether the amendments were as fully particularised as they could have been, but whether, in context, the other side could understand and respond to them.
(c) Third, it considered how the principles governing applications to strike out or order amendments to pleadings under O 9 r 16(1) of the Rules of Court 2021, in particular the approach to irrelevant or scandalous matter, applied where the objection to a proposed amendment was that the amendment introduced immaterial facts. Those principles had to be transposed to the context of amendments to pleadings, which was ultimately governed by the Wang Piao framework.
Background Facts
- [4]
[4] The claimant in OC 116 was Mr Liew Chiap Kong, a Singaporean businessman. The first defendant, Lim Soo Seng (Pte) Ltd, was a Singapore-incorporated family-owned holding company. The second defendant, Mr Lim Kai Ling, was formerly a director and shareholder of the First Defendant. The Second Defendant’s two siblings and father were the three directors of the First Defendant as at 19 January 2026.
- [5]
[5] In August 2017, the Claimant’s nephew, Mr Loh Zhi Peng (“Mr Loh”) introduced the Claimant to the Second Defendant as the Claimant had wanted the Second Defendant’s advice on a business venture that was unrelated to OC 116. According to the Claimant, in December 2017, the Second Defendant approached the Claimant about a hotel development project in Cambodia and the possibility of the Claimant making an investment of US$1.5m. The Claimant pleaded that he then entered into an agreement with the First Defendant dated 2 February 2018 (the “2018 Agreement”), under which he provided S$1,971,750 (the “Amount”), equivalent to US$1.5m, to the First Defendant. According to the Claimant’s pleadings, the 2018 Agreement obliged the First Defendant to, on 1 February 2021, pay the Claimant an amount equivalent to the sum of the Amount plus an additional 1.5 times of the Amount. According to the Claimant’s pleadings, if this 1 February 2021 payment was not made, the 2018 Agreement obliged the First Defendant to pay a larger sum by 1 February 2023. In the event that this larger sum was not paid by 1 February 2023, the Claimant pleaded that the default interest would continue to accrue. The Claimant further pleaded that the Second Defendant signed a personal guarantee on 2 February 2018 (the “Personal Guarantee”), under which the Second Defendant agreed to be liable for the payment of all sums which might become due from the First Defendant to the Claimant arising from the 2018 Agreement. Parties disagreed as to the characterisation of the 2018 Agreement. Whereas the Claimant characterised it as an investment agreement, the Defendants characterised it as a loan agreement.
- [6]
[6] It was undisputed that, between 17 May 2023 and 23 May 2023, the Claimant received S$190,000 from the First Defendant. It was also undisputed that the First Defendant paid S$1,971,750 to the Claimant on 4 January 2024, and S$1m on 14 March 2024. Thus, the Claimant received S$3,161,750 in total from the First Defendant. The Claimant pleaded that these payments were part-payments of sums owing under the 2018 Agreement, and that S$2,176,997.37 remained outstanding. The Defendants contended that the subsequent payments formed part of a compromise, with the parties reaching an unwritten compromise and settlement in March 2024 (the “Alleged Settlement Agreement”), such that no further sums remained outstanding to the Claimant. The parties’ pleadings appeared to agree that at a meeting in March 2024, a hardcopy document allegedly detailing the terms of a settlement was handed by the Second Defendant to the Claimant. There was no dispute that the Claimant did not sign the document at that meeting. The Claimant denied any full and final settlement, but the Defendants took the view that the circumstances showed that parties had reached an unwritten compromise and settlement at the March 2024 meeting. The Claimant’s case was that the sums received from the Defendants were only accepted as part payment of the Defendants’ outstanding obligations under the 2018 Agreement.
- [7]
[7] Independently of the asserted compromise, the Defendants also pleaded in the alternative that the Claimant committed inordinate and inexcusable delay in bringing this action almost two years after the parties met in March 2024 to discuss the 2018 Agreement, such that the Claimant was barred by the doctrine of laches from claiming relief arising out of the 2018 Agreement.
- [8]
[8] The Defendants pleaded, in the further alternative, that the 2018 Agreement was a loan made by the Claimant acting as an unlicensed moneylender, and was thus void and unenforceable.
- [9]
[9] The Defendants pleaded, in the further alternative, that the interest terms in the 2018 Agreement were not a genuine pre-estimate of the Claimant’s loss and was an unenforceable penalty.
- [10]
[10] In its counterclaim, the First Defendant sought declarations and damages for breach of the alleged settlement between the parties entered into in March 2024, and, alternatively, declaratory and restitutionary relief including repayment of S$3,161,750.
Procedural history
- [11]
[11] OC 116 was commenced on 3 February 2026. The parties’ affidavits of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) were filed on 8 July 2026, comprising AEICs from the Claimant, Mr Loh, and the Second Defendant (filed on behalf of both Defendants). The trial of OC 116 had been fixed for 27–30 April 2027. At the time when I heard SUM 2779, the single application pending trial had not yet been filed.
- [12]
[12] The Defendants’ solicitors first provided the proposed amendments to the Claimant’s solicitors on 14 July 2026. Letters dated 24 and 27 July 2026 identified amendments to which the Claimant was willing to agree, other amendments for which he sought further and better particulars, and amendments objected to outright. Correspondence dated 4, 14 and 18 August 2026 between the parties’ solicitors recorded the disagreement over when further and better particulars should be provided. The Defendants maintained that any justified request for further and better particulars could be addressed after permission to amend was granted and the amended pleadings were filed; the Claimant was unwilling to consent to amendments that, in his view, did not presently disclose adequate particulars.
- [13]
[13] At a case conference on 20 August 2026, the Defendants were permitted to file an application to amend the defence and counterclaim (for the First Defendant) and the defence (for the Second Defendant), to be dealt with outside the single application pending trial. SUM 2779 was filed on 3 September 2026.
- [14]
[14] I heard SUM 2779 on 28 September 2026 and delivered my oral judgment on 20 October 2026. I now issue my full grounds of decision.
Parties’ cases
Defendants’ case
- [15]
[15] The Defendants submitted that permission to amend their pleadings ought to be granted as the proposed amendments would allow the real question and/or issue in controversy between the parties to be determined, and it would be just to do so.
- [16]
[16] The Defendants’ position was that the amendments they sought to make in SUM 2779 were for the purpose of including material facts relating to:
(a) how the Second Defendant was first introduced to the Claimant through Mr Loh;
(b) Mr Loh’s role in the execution of the 2018 Agreement, including preparing the necessary drafts;
(c) how Mr Loh acted as an intermediary, and point of liaison between parties in relation to matters arising from the 2018 Agreement;
(d) Mr Loh’s role as a mediator between parties, in which he had conveyed that the Defendants should try to “appease” the Claimant, and later assisted in facilitating a settlement between parties; and
(e) losses sustained by the First Defendant and the Claimant (following Mr Loh’s management of their respective moneys), and hence, parties’ motivations behind reaching a settlement of the dispute.
- [17]
[17] The Defendants argued that, by virtue of the Claimant’s consent to the Agreed-upon Amendments, the Claimant had accepted that the following matters were material and relevant to OC 116:
(a) how Mr Loh acted as the point of liaison between parties in relation to the matters arising from the 2018 Agreement;
(b) Mr Loh’s role as a mediator between parties, and how Mr Loh had conveyed that the Defendants should try to “appease” the Claimant;
(c) Mr Loh’s role in the signing of the 2018 Agreement, including preparing drafts; and
(d) how the Second Defendant was first introduced to the Claimant through Mr Loh.
- [18]
[18] To bolster this argument relating to the importance of Mr Loh’s role in the dispute in OC 116, the Defendants noted that even before the Defendants had sought to amend their pleadings, the Claimant had voluntarily chosen to call Mr Loh as a witness, and Mr Loh had already filed his AEIC for OC 116.
- [19]
[19] Hence, the Defendants argued that the Claimant had no valid ground to object to the Defendants’ proposed amendments, which, in the Defendants’ view, related to Mr Loh’s role as an intermediary, point of liaison between the Claimant and the Defendants in relation to the matters arising from the 2018 Agreement, and mediator between the Defendants and the Claimant. The Defendants contended that Mr Loh’s role as an intermediary and, subsequently, as a mediator between the parties, went to the heart of the Defendants’ defence that parties had entered into the Alleged Settlement Agreement (see [6] above), and would enable the real question and/or issue in controversy between the parties to be determined. According to the Defendants, the circumstances surrounding how and why Mr Loh had come to assume his role as an intermediary and mediator may strengthen that defence (viz, that the Alleged Settlement Agreement existed such that no further sums remained outstanding to the Claimant).
Claimant’s case
- [23]
[23] The Claimant criticised the Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments as being devoid of adequate particulars in that they fail to set out when, where, and how the events alleged therein occurred, thereby preventing the Claimant from being able to reasonably know the case he was required to meet. The Claimant had invited the Defendants to provide further particulars in relation to these amendments, but the Defendants had refused.
- [24]
[24] In relation to the Defendants’ proposed amendments to plead that Mr Loh “reached out” to the Second Defendant, the Claimant asserted that this proposed amendment failed to particularise: (a) when Mr Loh reached out to the Second Defendant, (b) how Mr Loh reached out; and (c) who else was present at the time.
- [25]
[25] In relation to the Defendants’ proposed amendments to plead that Mr Loh had “tried to mediate” the dispute between the Claimant and the Second Defendant, and “suggested [a] transfer of monies”, the Claimant took the position that these amendments failed to particularise: (a) how Mr Loh tried to mediate; (b) how and in what manner Mr Loh suggested the transfer of moneys; and (c) the precise terms or substance of any such suggestion.
- [26]
[26] In relation to the Defendants’ proposed amendments to plead that the Second Defendant “asked Mr Loh to assist”, the Claimant took the position that these amendments failed to particularise: (a) when the Second Defendant asked Mr Loh to assist; (b) how the request was communicated; and (c) who else was present at the time.
- [27]
[27] In relation to the Defendants’ proposed amendments to plead facts concerning communications to the Claimant regarding Mr Loh’s alleged mismanagement and “personal investments”, the Claimant took the position that these amendments failed to specify: (a) when and how this was communicated to the Claimant; and (b) what “personal investments” were being referred to.
- [28]
[28] In relation to the Defendants’ proposed amendments to plead that the Second Defendant stated that he would only be able to repay about $1,000+ each month, the Claimant took the position that this amendment failed to particularise: (a) how this was communicated by the Second Defendant; and (b) who else was present at the time.
- [29]
[29] The Claimant read the Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments as insinuating that Mr Loh exercised some form of influence over the Claimant and the Second Defendant which led to the alleged settlement of debts between the parties. On such a footing, the Claimant contended that the Defendants must plead with particularity the nature and extent of that influence and the manner in which it was exercised in order to enable the Claimant to know the case he must meet. The Claimant said that, if the Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments were allowed, the Claimant would need to request further and better particulars so as to understand and respond to the Defendants’ case. The Claimant asserted that it gave adequate opportunity to the Defendants to remedy this deficiency by way of a request for particulars dated 24 July 2026, but the Defendants refused to provide the requested particulars.
- [30]
[30] Secondly, the Claimant criticised the Allegedly Immaterial Amendments on the basis that they were immaterial to the real questions and issues in controversy between the parties in OC 116.
- [31]
[31] In relation to the Defendants’ proposed amendments to plead facts concerning Mr Loh being allegedly entrusted to manage the First Defendant’s moneys, the Claimant took the position that Mr Loh was only a witness of fact and not a party to the 2018 Agreement or the Personal Guarantee, and thus his alleged role in managing the First Defendant’s moneys was wholly irrelevant to whether the Defendants’ obligations under the 2018 Agreement and Personal Guarantee have been discharged.
- [32]
[32] In relation to the Defendants’ proposed amendments to plead facts concerning the alleged discovery of losses due to alleged mismanagement by Mr Loh, the Claimant took the view that any dispute regarding Mr Loh’s management of the First Defendant’s moneys was collateral to the issues in OC 116 as, according to the Claimant, the central question in OC 116 was whether the debt under the 2018 Agreement was compromised or discharged, and this turned on the terms and effect of the contracts themselves, not on the First Defendant’s internal dealings with Mr Loh.
- [33]
[33] In relation to the Defendants’ proposed amendments to plead that Mr Loh managed/invested moneys on behalf of the Claimant, the Claimant took the position that this allegation, even if true, did not establish the existence, terms, or legal effect of the Alleged Settlement Agreement between the Claimant and the Defendants, and did not constitute a material amendment to the pleadings.
- [34]
[34] In relation to the Defendants’ proposed amendments to plead facts relating to Mr Loh’s alleged mismanagement, the Claimant took the position that these facts related to events involving a third party and did not advance any defence to the Claimant’s claims under the 2018 Agreement and the Personal Guarantee.
- [35]
[35] The Claimant submitted that, at their highest, the Allegedly Immaterial Amendments provided only background or alleged motive for the Defendants’ entry into a purported settlement, and did not provide proof of the settlement’s existence, terms, and legal effect. Hence, in the Claimant’s view, the Allegedly Immaterial Amendments did not go to any real question or issue in controversy between the parties.
- [36]
[36] Furthermore, the Claimant argued that the Allegedly Immaterial Amendments did not disclose any reasonable defence to the Claimant’s claims as they did not establish that the debt was compromised or discharged. The Claimant asserted that these amendments, if allowed, would be plainly or obviously unsustainable as a defence and would be liable to be struck out.
- [38]
[38] Furthermore, the Claimant submitted that the Allegedly Immaterial Amendments casted aspersions on Mr Loh, advancing allegations of impropriety which were, in the Claimant’s view, unrelated to the actual dispute between the Claimant and the Defendants. Hence, the Claimant submitted that the Allegedly Immaterial Amendments were liable to be struck out as scandalous allegations and should not be allowed.
Issues raised in SUM 2779
- [39]
[39] There were two main issues that I had to determine in SUM 2779:
(a) whether the Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments should be disallowed on the basis that they were devoid of adequate particulars; and
(b) whether the Allegedly Immaterial Amendments should be disallowed on the basis that they were immaterial to the real questions and issues in controversy between the parties.
The law
General principles on amendment of pleadings
- [40]
[40] The starting point was O 9 r 14 of the Rules of Court 2021, which addressed the amendment of pleadings. It provided as follows:
- [41]
[41] Thus, O 9 r 14(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 set out the general rule that the court can allow parties to amend their pleadings. This general rule was subject to several limitations, including where pleadings were sought to be amended less than 14 days before the commencement of trial (see O 9 r 14(3)) and where an application for permission to amend was made after the relevant limitation period had expired (see O 9 r 14(4)). It was not contended that any of these limitations applied in the present case. Order 9 r 14(5) also allowed pleadings to be amended by written agreement between the parties (without needing the permission of the court) not less than 14 days before the commencement of trial.
- [43]
[43] Where permission is sought from the court for amendments to pleadings, the principles governing the exercise of the court’s discretion to allow amendments under O 9 r 14(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 were crystallised in Wang Piao at [40], where the court set out a three-stage analytical framework, as follows:
- [44]
[44] Underlying this framework was the need to reconcile two important considerations. On the one hand, amendments should generally be permitted where they would enable the real issues in controversy between the parties to be determined. On the other hand, the amendment process should not undermine the purposes served by pleadings or occasion injustice to the opposing party. As to what purposes were served by pleadings, the Court of Appeal had provided illuminating guidance in V Nithia (co-administratrix of the estate of Ponnusamy Sivapakiam, deceased) v Buthmanaban s/o Vaithilingam and another [2015] 5 SLR 1422 at [36]–[37], as follows:
- [45]
[45] In essence, pleadings served both case management and procedural fairness objectives. They delineated the parameters of the dispute, defined the issues for determination and gave parties fair notice of the case that they must meet. In doing so, they promoted the efficient conduct of litigation while safeguarding the rules of natural justice. These purposes provided the context in which the court must assess the propriety of a proposed amendment.
Principles relating to particularising pleadings
- [47]
[47] The adequacy of what was pleaded was to be measured by the specific claim made in a particular case: Hyflux Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) and others v KPMG LLP [2024] SGHC 176 at [10]. Moreover, the adequacy of particulars must be measured against the circumstances: Beckkett Pte Ltd v Deutsche Bank AG and Another [2006] SGHC 243 (“Beckkett”) at [13]. The touchstone of this need to particularise pleadings was the idea that the pleadings must have sufficient detail such that the counterparty could understand them and be able to respond to them effectively: Beckkett at [13]. This touchstone existed in service of the foundational principle that pleadings provided notice to the counterparty about the causes of action (or, in the present context, defences) that would be mounted in the action, and thus allowed the counterparty an opportunity to cross-examine the relevant witnesses on the points raised by the cause of action or defence: Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737 at [54].
- [48]
[48] The context-specific nature of the particularisation requirement in pleadings meant that the degree of particulars required existed on a continuum. Closer to the most exacting end of the continuum were pleadings governed by the well-established principle that whenever a party was imputing fraud, negligence, or misconduct to the opponent, the facts must be pleaded with especial particularity and care: Singapore Civil Procedure at para 9/13/1. Another instance of when greater particulars were required to be pleaded was in the context of breach of confidence claims. This was the holding of the court in Titan Wealth Services Ltd v Tavistock Investments Plc [2026] EWCA Civ 500 (“Titan Wealth”). In Titan Wealth, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that proper particularisation was especially important in breach of confidence claims, given their potential to generate wide-ranging and expensive disclosure and be used as instruments of harassment against competitors (Titan Wealth at [19]–[23]). The court endorsed the principles articulated in England and Wales precedents requiring a claimant to identify the confidential information relied upon with reasonable particularity and to explain how it was communicated to the defendant (Titan Wealth at [21]–[22]). Applying these principles to the facts, the Titan Wealth court held that the proposed amendments at issue were neither coherent nor sufficiently particularised to enable the counterparty to understand the case against them, and thus the amendments should not have been allowed by the lower court (Titan Wealth at [1]).
- [49]
[49] Amendments to pleadings that raise a new cause of action were also subject to more exacting requirements for particularisation. This was reflected in the court’s remarks in W Power Group EOOD v Ming Yang Wind Power (International) Co Ltd [2024] SGHC(I) 29 (“W Power”) at [151]. The court held that “amendments, particularly if they raise a new cause of action, should clearly articulate the material facts said to give rise to the cause of action, the cause of action relied upon and the damages said to result”. The court in W Power further guided at [151] that in “the case of an alleged breach of contract, it is necessary to plead the material facts said to give rise to the agreement and, if an oral agreement is alleged, the date or range of dates on which the agreement was made, the parties to the agreement, the substance of the discussions said to give rise to the agreement and particulars of breach including in cases where limitation defences are in issue, the date the breach is said to have occurred and the damages said to have flowed from the breach”.
- [50]
[50] The court in Niprose Investments Ltd and others v Vincents Solicitors Ltd [2025] EWHC 14 (Ch) (“Niprose”) was similarly cognisant of the need for a higher level of specificity in pleadings that raise a new cause of action. In Niprose, the High Court of England and Wales allowed a claimant to make an amendment to their claim and stated that the amendment “[did] not seek to introduce any new cause of action” and that the amendment “merely provide[d] particulars of an existing cause of action”: Niprose at [85]. Niprose was a case that arose from an application by the tenth defendant, Vincents Solicitors Limited (“Vincents”), to strike out the claims of 35 claimants or to obtain summary judgment in its favour: Niprose at [1]. The claimants were purchasers of residential units in a buyer-funded, off-plan development scheme who had lost substantial up-front payments upon the failure of the development: Niprose at [1]. They sued Vincents, which had acted as their conveyancing solicitors, for professional negligence: Niprose at [1]. The comments made by the court in Niprose at [85] were made in relation to amendments sought to be made by the claimants to plead that Vincents’ duty to advise the claimants of the risks to which they were exposed “included a duty to ensure (alternatively, to take reasonable steps to ensure) that the claimants fully understood the advice …”: Niprose at [85]. I did not consider Niprose to be entirely relevant to SUM 2779 because the issue that that court had to grapple with at [84] and [85] of Niprose was one of jurisdiction (see Niprose at [20] and [83], and the header above [84]). The Niprose court was faced with a situation where the claimants had sought to amend their pleadings after the expiry of the relevant limitation period: Niprose at [22]. Under the civil procedure rules applicable in Niprose, where a proposed amendment sought to add a new cause of action after the expiry of the relevant limitation period, the court could only allow the new claim if it “arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as are already in issue on a claim in respect of which the party applying for permission has already claimed a remedy in the proceedings”: Niprose at [20]. Given that SUM 2779 did not involve an attempt to amend pleadings after the elapsing of the relevant limitation period, Niprose’s guidance might not be immediately and wholly applicable to the present matter. However, I did appreciate the broader point made, which was that an amendment to introduce a new cause of action was a more significant amendment, and might require more circumspection, than an amendment to introduce details to a cause of action that was already pleaded.
- [51]
[51] Implicit in the guidance set out in the preceding paragraphs was the notion that the degree of specificity or particularity required in proposed amendments to pleadings was context-dependent, and, crucially, that not every amendment must meet the high level of particularity required of, for example, a pleading imputing fraud. This explained why in Beckkett at [13], the court opined that while it could “be said that there could have been greater particulars” in the amendments sought to be made to the pleadings in that case, nonetheless, the proposed amendments to pleadings were allowed in Beckkett as they were not found to be “so wanting that the second defendant can say that it cannot understand them, or was unable to respond to them effectively”. The point here was that, because the degree of particularity required was context-specific, proposed amendments could, in some contexts, pass muster even if they were imperfect in terms of their degree of particularisation.
- [52]
[52] However, even on the least exacting end of the continuum relating to the degree of particularisation required in pleadings, there was a minimum level of particularisation required, below which proposed amendments to pleadings would be so woefully deficient such that they must be disallowed. As observed by the court in Maag, Daniel and another v Lalit Kumar Modi [2025] 3 SLR 1093 (“Maag”) at [136], the “absence of, or defects in, particulars in pleadings, can be a basis for striking out when the error is major and cannot be made good by an amendment providing those particulars”. Referring to Antariksa Logistics Pte Ltd and others v Nurdian Cuaca and others [2018] 3 SLR 117 at [145], the court in Maag went on further, at [136], to opine that the relevant question was “whether the defendants would know what the case they are supposed to meet” was.
- [54]
[54] Maag provided an illustration of the converse situation, where a court found that sufficient particulars were in fact provided in a revised version of the statement of claim. The Maag court was faced with claims relating to libel and malicious falsehood. The claimants sought to amend their statement of claim to plead, inter alia, that publication of certain posts by the defendant on social media in Singapore and/or India and/or the United Kingdom was calculated to and did cause pecuniary damage to the claimants in respect of each of their trades or businesses in Singapore (Maag at [25(a)]). The defendant in Maag had complained that the claimants had failed to sufficiently particularise, in these amendments, the nature of the pecuniary loss which the falsehoods were said to have caused, and the mechanism by which the loss was likely to be sustained (Maag at [135]). The court held that the claimants had sufficiently particularised the nature of the special damage caused by the malicious falsehoods and the mechanism by which the loss was likely sustained (Maag at [137]). Specifically, the claimants had averred that several prospective investors decided not to invest in their budding e-commerce platform after accessing the relevant posts online, and said investors raised concerns about the fact that the defendant had purportedly written the posts. The claimants had averred that they suffered the loss of various opportunities such as: (a) the opportunity to benefit from an increase in the value of their respective shares of an e-commerce platform as a result of various investments being aborted; and (b) the opportunity to earn dividends on said shares (Maag at [137]).
- [55]
[55] These authorities showed that not every complaint about alleged deficiencies in particularisation necessarily rendered a proposed amendment impermissible. The inquiry remained whether the deficiency was of such a nature or extent that the amended pleading would fail to define an intelligible and legally sustainable case, and whether the defect was capable of being remedied. What amounted to adequate particularisation must be assessed by reference to the substance of the particular allegation and the purpose which the particulars were intended to serve.
Interaction between the law on amendment of pleadings and the law on further and better particulars
- [56]
[56] SUM 2779 raised an interesting issue relating to the interaction between the law on amendment of pleadings and the law on further and better particulars. The Rules of Court 2021 gave the non-amending party a somewhat greater practical leverage over amendments to pleadings as compared to the Rules of Court 2014 (see [42] above). In this present case, the Claimant sought to use its right to withhold agreement to condition the making of the Defendants’ Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments on provision by the Defendants of further and better particulars of said amendments. Was such a use of that right appropriate? Should it be encouraged? Did such an exercise of that right advance or detract from the achievement of the Ideals in civil procedure enshrined in O 3 r 1 of the Rules of Court 2021?
- [57]
[57] I first set out O 3 r 1 and O 9 r 13 of the Rules of Court 2021, which would be considered in this section of these grounds. Order 3 r 1 provided:
Order 9 r 13 of the Rules of Court 2021 provided:
- [58]
[58] Where a proposed amendment to pleadings was otherwise permissible, the need for consequential procedural steps to furnish further and better particulars to those pleadings did not, of itself, necessarily establish that the amendment should be refused. This principle was made evident in Wee Soon Kim Anthony v UBS AG [2003] 2 SLR(R) 554 (“Wee Soon Kim Anthony”). Wee Soon Kim Anthony was a case involving amendments made late in the day, after the completion of the first tranche of trial, to delete large portions of the existing statement of claim and bring in substantial new portions relating to changes to existing pleaded facts, new facts not raised before, and new breaches of fiduciary duties (Wee Soon Kim Anthony at [4], [8] and [9]). The court did not allow for these late amendments to be made, but, relevantly for SUM 2779, the court opined at [13] that if the application to amend was allowed, the counterparty in that action would be entitled to amend its pleadings, and it could seek further and better particulars to the new allegations pleaded and seek further discovery if necessary. This dictum served to clarify that, as a matter of law, a court could allow an application to amend pleadings, and yet order further and better particulars to supplement those amended pleadings or allow for further discovery thereafter. The logical implication here was that proposed amendments to pleadings need not be perfect in terms of their degree of particularisation before the amendments were allowed by the court.
- [59]
[59] However, the power of the court to order further and better particulars did not mean that the court should permit an amendment with deficiencies that were so fundamental that the opposing party could not properly understand the case it must meet. This was illustrated by Pacific Healthcare Holdings Ltd and another v Precious Surgery Centre Pte Ltd and another and another suit [2026] SGHCR 25 (“Pacific Healthcare”). Pacific Healthcare addressed an application by the plaintiffs in HC/S 12/2022 (“Suit 12”) to amend their statement of claim (Pacific Healthcare at [7]). The first and second plaintiffs in Suit 12 were Pacific Healthcare Holdings Ltd (“PHH”) and Pacific Healthcare Specialist Services Pte Ltd (“PHSS”) respectively (collectively, the “S 12 Plaintiffs”). The first and second defendants were Precious Surgery Centre Pte Ltd (“PSEC”) and Precious Specialist Centre Pte Ltd (“Precious Specialist”) respectively (collectively, the “S 12 Defendants”) (Pacific Healthcare at [3]). In the Statement of Claim (Amendment No 2) (“SOC 2”), the S 12 Plaintiffs alleged that PHH and PSEC had entered into a leasing arrangement around 2014 under which various equipment was leased to PSEC at rates set out in a series of invoices (the “Leasing Agreement” and the “Invoices” respectively). PHSS and PHH respectively claimed sums of $107,347.69 and $256,292.60 from the S 12 Defendants under the Invoices (Pacific Healthcare at [6]). By way of HC/SUM 2053/2025 (“SUM 2053”), the S 12 Plaintiffs sought to amend SOC 2 by deleting all references to the Leasing Agreement and replacing them with averments that the equipment-leasing agreements were “evidenced or comprised in” the Invoices themselves. The proposed amendments reformulated the claims as three separate agreements — between PHSS and Precious Specialist, between PHH and Precious Specialist, and between PHSS and PSEC — with the amounts claimed revised to $45,522.32, $261,374.89 and $56,743.08 respectively (Pacific Healthcare at [7]). The court in Pacific Healthcare applied the Wang Piao framework to the amendments sought in SUM 2053 (see Pacific Healthcare at [11]). Applying the first stage of the Wang Piao framework, the court held that even though the amendments were sought nearly four years after the commencement of the suit, the parties were at a relatively early stage of the proceedings, as trial dates had not been fixed, there were still outstanding issues relating to discovery and parties had yet to exchange AEICs (Pacific Healthcare at [14]). Applying the second stage of the Wang Piao framework, the court took the view that the draft statement of claim, after incorporating the amendments, was bereft of the material facts and necessary particulars to support the S 12 Plaintiffs’ claims based on the alleged agreements between the parties for the lease of equipment (Pacific Healthcare at [27]). No particulars on the alleged agreements to lease equipment (such as whether the alleged agreements were written or oral, when the alleged agreements were concluded or what the key terms of the agreements were) were provided (Pacific Healthcare at [27]). The court observed that while the S 12 Plaintiffs had annexed the Invoices to the draft amended statement of claim, the Invoices were evidence, not material facts, and pleadings ought to contain material facts (Pacific Healthcare at [27]). Hence, the court found that the S 12 Plaintiffs’ claims based on the alleged agreements were legally unsustainable and liable to be struck out, and it followed that the proposed amendments would not enable the real question or issue in controversy to be determined between the parties (Pacific Healthcare at [27]). The court stated that, in view of this conclusion, it was unnecessary to consider the third stage of the Wang Piao framework, but, for completeness, the court opined that it would not be just to allow amendments which were deficient and where the party applying for the amendments would have to make further amendments to put its pleading in order or the opposing party would have to request further and better particulars so as to clarify the applying party’s case, and that it would not be just in all the circumstances of the case, where the proposed amendments were too deficient and there was no basis to assume that the S 12 Plaintiffs could salvage their case by way of further and better particulars, to allow the amendments (Pacific Healthcare at [29]–[30]).
- [60]
[60] Hence, a distinction must be drawn between further particulars that were properly consequential upon an otherwise sufficiently articulated pleading, and particulars that were needed to supply an essential factual foundation which the proposed pleading lacked. The mere possibility of requesting further and better particulars was not invariably an answer to an objection that a proposed amendment was fundamentally defective. At the same time, proposed amended pleadings that were not fundamentally defective, but which contained imperfections in particulars, might still be allowed under the multifactorial analysis in Wang Piao if the court was satisfied, inter alia, that the proposed amendments would enable the real question and/or issue in controversy to be determined, and that allowing them would be just in the circumstances, consistent with procedural justice as an important aspect of the holistic ideal of justice itself (see Pacific Healthcare at [29]–[30] and Wang Piao at [18]). It was possible for amendments to pleadings to be allowed by the court, and, for the non-amending party to thereafter succeed in getting further and better particulars for those pleadings by making the appropriate request to the amending party or taking out the appropriate application.
Principles relating to allegedly immaterial amendments to pleadings
- [62]
[62] A related but distinct question arose where the objection was not that the proposed pleading lacked necessary particulars, but that it contained allegations or particulars which were irrelevant to the issues in dispute. In addressing this question, regard may be had to O 9 r 16(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 which empowered a court to strike out or order amendments to pleadings on several grounds, as follows:
- [63]
[63] Order 9 r 16(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 was considered in Asian Eco Technology Pte Ltd v Deng Yiming [2023] SGHC 260 (“Asian Eco Technology”). The court in Asian Eco Technology stated at [15] that “[p]leadings (or parts thereof) which are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or which may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action, may be struck off as being either an abuse of process or against the interests of justice”. The court, at [16], summarised the Court of Appeal’s holdings in Iskandar bin Rahmat and others v Attorney-General and another [2022] 2 SLR 1018 (“Iskandar bin Rahmat”) regarding the “abuse of process” and “interests of justice” grounds under O 9 rr 16(1)(b) and 16(1)(c) of the Rules of Court 2021, as follows:
- [64]
[64] The court in Asian Eco Technology at [18] cautioned that the grounds of “abuse of process” and “interests of justice” under O 9 r 16 of the Rules of Court 2021 should not be construed too widely, since an overly liberal interpretation of the grounds under O 9 r 16 might invite a deluge of striking out applications and appeals arising out of these applications. Furthermore, the court opined at [36], referring to Re X Diamond Capital Pte Ltd (Metech International Ltd, non-party) [2023] SGHC 201 at [14] and Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin and others [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649 at [18], that striking out of pleadings had more serious consequences than the striking out of affidavits and it was only in plain and obvious cases that this power should be invoked.
- [66]
[66] The application of these principles in Asian Eco Technology was instructive. The court in Asian Eco Technology expunged various pleadings, affidavits, exhibits and written submissions which was not only irrelevant to the dispute, but which were offensive and scandalous and had been included for the collateral purpose of attacking or embarrassing the opposing parties and other individuals: Asian Eco Technology at [23]–[35]. At the same time, the court declined to strike out a paragraph of the defence which merely pleaded certain background facts, notwithstanding the objections raised to its inclusion: Asian Eco Technology at [36]–[37]. The distinction illustrated that the court’s power to strike out irrelevant material should be exercised with regard to the nature of the offending allegations and the practical purpose that their removal would serve.
- [67]
[67] Asian Eco Technology provided illuminating guidance, but it was important to transpose its teachings to the context of amendments to pleadings, which was ultimately governed by the Wang Piao framework.
- [68]
[68] In my view, the principles distilled from Asian Eco Technology were relevant especially at the second stage and, potentially, at the third stage of the Wang Piao three-stage analytical framework. As noted in Wang Piao at [17], when discussing precedents relevant to the second stage of the Wang Piao framework, the court “cannot be expected to adjudicate on a bad pleading that is likely to be struck out in any event” (see also Wang Piao at [14], referring to the Court of Appeal decision of Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan and another [2012] 1 SLR 457 (“Ng Chee Weng”) at [106] where the court opined that “[e]ven if an amendment is in order, the court will not allow the amendment if it is obvious that the amended claim would be struck out at trial”). Hence, to the extent that, under O 9 r 16(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 and the principles distilled from Asian Eco Technology, proposed amendments to pleadings would be likely to be struck out in any event, the court ought to disallow said amendments at the second stage of the Wang Piao framework.
- [70]
[70] I observed, at this juncture, that pleadings vulnerable to striking out under O 9 r 16(1) of the Rules of Court 2021 might also be prejudicial to the non-amending party and there might be other reasons why amendments to introduce such pleadings were unjust. In such cases, the third stage of the Wang Piao framework might also be engaged.
- [71]
[71] I applied these principles to SUM 2779.
Analysis and Decision
- [72]
[72] I began with three observations which framed the application of the principles set out above. First, the Defendants had already pleaded that the 2018 Agreement was a loan rather than an investment, that the parties reached the Alleged Settlement Agreement in March 2024, and that certain alternative defences arose if there was no effective settlement (see [5]–[9] above). SUM 2779 was thus principally concerned with amplifying the factual narrative in support of existing defences, rather than introducing an entirely new defence. This consideration favoured allowing amendments which genuinely clarified the existing issues (in contrast to amendments that raised totally different issues at a late stage in proceedings): Wang Piao at [14].
- [73]
[73] Second, the timing of SUM 2779 was significant. Although the AEICs of the Claimant, Mr Loh and the Second Defendant were filed on 8 July 2026, the trial of OC 116 had been fixed for 27–30 April 2027, and the single application pending trial had not yet been filed as at the time when SUM 2779 was heard before me (see [11] above). SUM 2779 was not an application made on the eve of trial (or, worse, during or even after trial), and this consideration weighed in favour of allowing amendments under the first stage of the Wang Piao framework. I flag, at this juncture, that my identification in this paragraph of the stage of proceedings at which the present amendment application was filed applied across all the amendments which were the subject of SUM 2779; in the interests of concision, I would not separately discuss the analysis for stage one of the Wang Piao framework for each set of amendments canvassed below.
- [74]
[74] Third, the real questions and issues in controversy in OC 116 included: (a) whether the Alleged Settlement Agreement existed; (b) if yes, what its terms were; and (c) whether the Second Defendant remained liable under the Personal Guarantee. These questions and controversies explained why communications concerning repayment and compromise might be material to the resolution of OC 116.
- [75]
[75] The Claimant’s agreement in principle to the Agreed-upon Amendments was relevant, but must not be overstated. I was conscious that such agreement in principle did not amount to consent to all proposed amendments concerning Mr Loh merely because said amendments touched upon the same general subject matter. I was unable to agree with the Defendants that the Claimant’s request for further and better particulars amounted to a concession that the Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments, as set out in Annex B, ought to be allowed purely on the basis that these amendments related to material facts. Materiality and the adequacy of particulars were matters requiring distinct analysis under the second and possibly the third stages of the Wang Piao framework. To put this in another way, I was of the view that a proposed amendment could be material, but yet be so ill-particularised as to warrant exclusion (see [46] and [59]–[61] above).
The Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments
- [76]
[76] The Claimant’s principal objections to the Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments were that the Defendants had not specified when and how particular communications occurred, who participated in them, or the precise substance of what was said. He submitted that, without those particulars, he could not reasonably know the case he had to meet. Those complaints must be examined with attention paid to context. The court’s concern was not whether every potentially useful evidential detail had been included in the proposed amendments, but whether the proposed amendments communicated the material facts with sufficient clarity, when the amendments were read in context.
- [77]
[77] Where a party relied on an oral agreement in mounting the party’s claim or defence, the guidance provided by W Power at [151] (see [49] above) indicated that it might be “necessary to plead the material facts said to give rise to the agreement and, if an oral agreement is alleged, the date or range of dates on which the agreement was made, the parties to the agreement, the substance of the discussions said to give rise to the agreement and particulars of breach including in cases where limitation defences are in issue, the date the breach is said to have occurred and the damages said to have flowed from the breach”. But not every alleged conversation forming part of the history of the pleaded oral agreement constituted a separate oral agreement requiring the full particularisation to the extent stipulated at W Power at [151]. The existing defence already identified the parties to the Alleged Settlement Agreement, its approximate conclusion in March 2024, the further sums paid by the Defendants said to have been accepted by the Claimant in full and final settlement, and the circumstances concerning the purported draft written settlement agreement presented by the Second Defendant at the March 2024 meeting between the parties. The impugned amendments relating to Mr Loh must be assessed in that context.
- [78]
[78] I turned first to the subset of the Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments set out in serial numbers 1 and 2 in Annex B. These amendments stated that, after the Claimant expressed reservations about a direct investment in a project in Cambodia, Mr Loh contacted the Second Defendant and conveyed that the Claimant was prepared instead to consider extending a loan to the First Defendant so the First Defendant could itself invest. These proposed amendments identified the intermediary, the recipient of the communication and, importantly, the substance of the communication. Read with the pleaded sequence of events leading to the execution of the 2018 Agreement on 2 February 2018, the communication was also temporally located within a definite period which could be discerned from the pleadings as a whole, even if no particular day was supplied.
- [79]
[79] I did not consider the absence of the mode of communication, its exact date, or the names of other persons present to be fatal. The proposed pleading left no real doubt that the Defendants wished to say that Mr Loh conveyed a change in the Claimant’s contemplated transaction from an investment to a loan. The Claimant could admit or deny that proposition and, at trial, challenge the reliability of the Second Defendant’s account or the inference sought to be drawn from it. Precisely when the communication occurred, whether other persons were present, or how Mr Loh reached out to the Second Defendant were not indispensable, at this stage, to enabling the real questions or issues in controversy between the parties to be determined. And neither did the absence of these precise details render it unjust to allow these amendments. I allowed the amendments set out in serial numbers 1 and 2 in Annex B. I pause to expressly state here that my decision to allow these amendments said nothing about whether a court would look favourably or unfavourably on a further application for further and better particulars, because the tests applied in that application were different from the framework laid down in Wang Piao concerning amendments to pleadings. This same observation applied to the rest of the amendments considered and allowed in SUM 2779.
- [80]
[80] The second group comprised the subset of the Allegedly Ill-Particularised Amendments set out in serial number 3 in Annex B. They alleged that Mr Loh sought to mediate the repayment dispute as between the Claimant and the Second Defendant; that, in or around May 2023, Mr Loh suggested that the Second Defendant transfer some money to the Claimant to appease him; and that Mr Loh arranged a transfer of S$190,000 from the First Defendant’s DBS bank account to the Second Defendant’s personal bank account on 15 May 2023. These allegations explained the asserted purpose of an identified payment. Their relevance was apparent when read with the undisputed payment of S$190,000 to the Claimant between 17 and 23 May 2023.
- [81]
[81] The words “sought to mediate” were a general characterisation of Mr Loh’s conduct. Had this been the only fact stated, the objection as to vagueness would have carried more weight. But the allegation was followed by the time period, participants, proposed course of action and purpose of the suggested transfer. The phrase “to appease him for a while” also supplied the gist of the suggested communication, without purporting to reproduce the precise words used. In my judgment, the proposed pleading gave sufficient notice of the case that the Claimant had to meet. I considered that sufficient particulars had been provided to enable the real questions and issues in controversy between the parties to be determined, and that it was just to allow the amendments.
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