Ministry of Rural Development, Fishery, Craft Industry and Environment of the Union of Comoros v Chan Leng Leng and another

Choo Han Teck J:

Mr Nair’s argument turned on the interpretation of the phrase “any process for the enforcement of a judgment” in s 15(2)(b) of the Act. He submitted that an order for the provision of security for costs was akin to a process for the enforcement of a judgment as the very purpose of ordering security was to compel the plaintiff to bring property within the jurisdiction of the court for the subsequent enforcement of a judgment for costs. Counsel for the defendants, Mr Christopher Woo (“Mr Woo”), submitted that the Act was largely based on the United Kingdom’s State Immunity Act (c 33) (“the UK Act”), and brought my attention to the amendments to what is now s 13 of the UK Act – the corresponding provision to s 15 of the Act – in the House of Lords moved by the Lord Chancellor Sir Elwyn Jones during the passage of the United Kingdom State Immunity Bill (see United Kingdom, House of Lords, Parliamentary Debates (16 March 1978) vol 389 at col 1520):

Mr Woo argued that while the Parliament of Singapore had modified certain aspects of the UK Act to suit the particular needs and circumstances of Singapore, it had been silent on the enactment of s 15(2) of the Act and must be taken to have agreed with the underlying intent of the United Kingdom Parliament in relation to the corresponding provision. Accordingly, s 15(2) should not be construed as granting immunity to a foreign state from furnishing security for costs, and this was consistent with the common law position. Mr Woo also submitted that as the plaintiff had instituted proceedings in Singapore to seek relief, it was “subject to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts”.

[3] Mr Woo’s broad argument that the plaintiff had “submitted” to the jurisdiction of this court suppresses the distinction between what has been described as the “adjucative jurisdiction” of the court (which is defined by s 3 of the Act) and the “enforcement jurisdiction” of the court (which is limited by s 15), discussed in Lord Diplock’s speech in Alcom Ltd v Republic of Columbia [1984] AC 580 at 600C–D. A state is not deemed to consent to the jurisdiction of a foreign court to levy execution on its property or to enforce in personam orders merely because she has consented to being made party to an action. The applicability of s 15 of the Act, and the grant of procedural privileges, is therefore independent of the plaintiff’s submission to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts to hear the claim.

Neither the Explanatory Statement nor the relevant parliamentary debates specifically addresses the issue of security for costs, and I was not directed to any authority on the interpretation of s 15(2)(b). It is nevertheless clear that the purpose of enacting the Act was to move from the common law doctrine of absolute state immunity to a clearly defined legislative framework of restrictive state immunity: see the comments of Mr E.W. Barker (“Mr Barker”), the then Minister for Law and Science and Technology at the Second Reading of the State Immunity Bill in Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (7 September 1979) vol 39 at col 408.