General Division of the High Court · Decided 10 September 2026

Probation was more suitable than reformative training for an offender in a scam case

Mohamed Erzan Taib Zohri v Public Prosecutor and other appeals

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[2026] SGHC 183Case no. Magistrate’s Appeal No 9012 of 2025/01

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Probation was more suitable than reformative training for an offender in a scam case

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Ang Cheng Hock JCA (delivering the judgment of the court):
Introduction
[1] The sharp rise in scam cases in Singapore in recent years has prompted the introduction of a range of legislative measures directed at combatting this growing problem. Among these are amendments to the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CDSA”) and the Computer Misuse Act 1993 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CMA”) enacted in 2023 (“2023 Amendments”), which introduced provisions specifically criminalising the relinquishment of bank accounts and the disclosure of Singpass credentials by money mules to scammers.
[2] Money mules play a critical role in the scam syndicate ecosystem by relinquishing their bank accounts for use by scammers to receive and transfer criminal proceeds. Some syndicates also recruit Singpass holders to hand over their credentials so that multiple bank accounts can be opened in their names for the same purpose. By relinquishing or facilitating the creation of these accounts, often in exchange for monetary gain, money mules enable scam syndicates to layer criminal proceeds through multiple accounts before moving the funds out of Singapore. Larger sums are broken up into smaller amounts so as not to trigger any automated alerts that the account holders are moving large sums through their accounts. This frustrates efforts to detect and prevent scams. The 2023 Amendments were directed precisely at this conduct, targeting money mules at the source with the aim of disrupting the scam syndicates’ mode of operation.
[3] It is against this backdrop that the present seven Magistrate’s Appeals (“Appeals”) fall to be considered. These are HC/MA 9012/2025/01 (“MA 9012”), HC/MA 9024/2025/01 (“MA 9024”), HC/MA 9041/2025/01 (“MA 9041”), HC/MA 9049/2025/01 (“MA 9049”), HC/MA 9069/2025/01 (“MA 9069”), HC/MA 9082/2025/01 (“MA 9082”) and HC/MA 9101/2025/01 (“MA 9101”). In the main, the offenders were convicted of various scams-related offences under the CMA and CDSA, which involved the opening of bank accounts and handing over of electronic banking details to persons who used these accounts in the perpetration of scams on members of the public. In one case, the offender handed over his Singpass credentials which allowed several bank accounts to be opened in his name, which were then subsequently used in connection with the laundering of scam proceeds. In six of these Appeals, the offender in question was below the age of 21 when the relevant scams-related offences were committed. Six of the seven offenders were sentenced to either reformative training (“RT”) or imprisonment, while a combination of community-based sentences (“CBS”) was imposed on the remaining offender. The six offenders now appeal on the ground that their sentences are manifestly excessive, while the Prosecution appeals in the remaining case on the ground that the CBS imposed are manifestly inadequate.
[4] The present Appeals present an opportunity for this court to set out the appropriate sentencing approach for young offenders who commit scams-related offences, and to set out an appropriate sentencing framework for offences involving the relinquishment of bank accounts to scammers under s 55A(1)(a) read with s 55A(1)(b)(ii) and punishable under s 55A(5) of the CDSA (“s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offence”).
Background
The previous regime
[5] Prior to the 2023 Amendments, the conduct of relinquishing bank accounts or disclosing Singpass credentials was typically prosecuted under more general provisions. For offences committed prior to 8 February 2024 (ie, before the 2023 Amendments came into effect), the Prosecution adopted the following general approach, which we will refer to in this judgment as the previous regime.
[6] For offences involving bank account relinquishment, the offences were prosecuted under s 3(1) (read with s 12(1)) of the CMA. Where the offender had opened a new bank account for the purpose of relinquishing it (as opposed to relinquishing a pre-existing account), an additional charge under s 417 of the Penal Code 1871 (2020 Rev Ed) (“PC”) would also be brought for deceiving the bank into believing that the offender intended to be the sole operator of the account, when in fact the offender had no such intention and had opened the account for the purpose of relinquishing it to a third party. Sections 3(1) and 12(1) of the CMA provide:
[7] Section 417 of the PC provides:
[8] For offences involving the disclosure of Singpass credentials, the offences were prosecuted under s 8(1) of the CMA. Section 8 of the CMA provides:
[9] For clarity, when we refer to:
[10] While these provisions are broadly worded and capable of applying to a variety of conduct beyond the specific acts described above, references to these provisions in this judgment are confined to those specific acts relating to the facilitation of the dissipation of scam proceeds, and nothing else. These will be referred to collectively as the “legacy offences”.
The new regime
[11] The previous regime provisions dealt with general offences involving unauthorised computer access, cheating and the unauthorised disclosure of access codes such as passwords. They were not targeted specifically at the relinquishment of bank accounts or disclosure of Singpass credentials. At the second reading of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) (Amendment) Bill (Bill No 12/2023) and Computer Misuse (Amendment) Bill (Bill No 13/2023), the then-Second Minister for Home Affairs, Mrs Josephine Teo (“Second Minister Teo”), explained as follows (Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 95, Sitting No 102; [8 May 2023] (Josephine Teo, Second Minister for Home Affairs)) (“2023 Parl Debates”):
[12] The 2023 Amendments were introduced to address these deficiencies and the escalating threat posed by the prevalence of scams. As part of the amendments, the relinquishment of bank accounts and disclosure of Singpass credentials were specifically criminalised with the introduction of new provisions in the CDSA and CMA. For the purposes of these appeals, three of these new provisions are relevant.
[13] First, s 55A of the CDSA introduced a new offence of assisting another person to retain benefits from criminal conduct. Section 55A provides, in relevant part:
[14] This new section specifically criminalises the act of the account holder handing over control of a bank account to another person and the subsequent use of that account to facilitate the laundering of the proceeds of crime. As can be seen, the maximum imprisonment term for bank account relinquishment offences has been increased from two years’ imprisonment (in respect of a first conviction under s 3(1)(a) (read with s 12(1)) of the CMA) under the previous regime to three years’ imprisonment.
[15] Next, s 8A of the CMA was introduced to address the conduct of individuals who disclose their Singpass credentials to other persons in certain circumstances, and such credentials are then used to facilitate criminal activities. At the same time, s 8B of the CMA was introduced to criminalise acts of obtaining, retaining or dealing in another person’s Singpass credentials (2023 Parl Debates). We set out the key portions of these provisions as currently in force:
[16] In effect, the 2023 Amendments recalibrated the threshold for liability and enhanced the punishment for certain scams-related offences. It is no longer necessary to prove actual knowledge on the part of the offender; speaking generally, it would typically suffice to establish that the offender failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the purpose for which his bank account was being relinquished, or that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the purpose of disclosing his Singpass credentials was for the commission of an offence. The prescribed penalties were also enhanced to better reflect the severity of such conduct and to serve as a more meaningful deterrent (2023 Parl Debates). For completeness, pursuant to the 2023 Amendments, the prescribed punishment for s 8B CMA offences was the same as that for s 8A CMA offences.
[17] The 2023 Amendments came into force on 8 February 2024.
[18] On 21 August 2024, the Sentencing Advisory Panel (“SAP”) published the Guidelines for Scams-Related Offences (“Guidelines”). By way of context, the SAP was established in June 2022 to formulate sentencing guidelines with the aim of promoting greater consistency and transparency in sentencing, and to increase public awareness of the sentences that may be imposed by the court and the factors that are relevant to sentencing decisions. In particular, the Guidelines set out a sentencing approach for scams-related offences which also applies to young offenders, as well as sentencing frameworks for various scams-related offences, including those under s 55A(1) of the CDSA and ss 8A(1) and 8B(1) of the CMA.
[19] For clarity, when we refer to:
(a) offences under s 55A(1) of the CDSA, we mean the offences of relinquishing one’s bank account to another without taking reasonable steps to ascertain the purpose of that person being able to access, operate or control the account;
(b) offences under s 8A(1) of the CMA, we mean the offences of disclosing one’s Singpass credentials with the knowledge, or having reasonable grounds to believe, that the purpose of the disclosure was for the commission of an offence; and
(c) offences under s 8B(1) of the CMA, we mean the offences of disclosing another person’s Singpass credentials with the knowledge, or having reason to believe, that the credentials will be or is likely to be used for the commission of an offence.
[20] These are referred to collectively as offences under the new regime.
Broad issues raised in the Appeals
[21] The Appeals raise several broad issues pertaining to the appropriateness of the sentencing approaches set out in the Guidelines, particularly in relation to young offenders. In our view, three key issues arise.
[22] The first issue is whether the courts should, in cases involving scams-related offences committed by young offenders, adopt the sentencing approach set out in paragraph 7(c) of the Guidelines (“Issue 1”).
[23] Paragraph 7(c) of the Guidelines suggests that, in cases involving young offenders, the sentence to be imposed should usually be RT or imprisonment, even if the offender would otherwise be suitable for CBS or probation. Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines reads:
[24] The second issue concerns whether the sentencing framework set out in the Guidelines for s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences (“SAP’s s 55A(1) CDSA Sentencing Framework”), which we set out in more detail below (at [69]–[76]), is an appropriate one for the courts to adopt (“Issue 2”).
[25] The third issue is whether the sentencing approach applicable to offences involving the relinquishment of bank accounts and the disclosure of Singpass credentials prosecuted under the new regime should equally apply to offences involving the same type of criminal conduct prosecuted under the previous regime, which we have referred to as “legacy offences” (“Issue 3”).
[26] Given that these issues are novel, a Young Independent Counsel (“YIC”), Ms Iris Ng, was appointed to assist the court. Both the YIC and the parties to the appeal were asked to address the following questions:
(a) Question 1: Does paragraph 7(c) of the Guidelines provide an appropriate approach for sentencing young offenders below the age of 21 for scams-related offences? If not, what would an appropriate sentencing approach be?
(b) Question 2: When might it be appropriate to impose probation or CBS on a young offender who commits a scams-related offence?
(c) Question 3: Should the same sentencing approach apply to legacy offences if the nature of the offending conduct is similar to the offending conduct involved in a scams-related offence under the new regime?
(d) Question 4: Is the SAP’s s 55A(1) CDSA Sentencing Framework appropriate? If not, what would an appropriate sentencing framework be?
(e) Question 5: Can the SAP’s s 55A(1) CDSA Sentencing Framework be adapted to apply to legacy offences if the nature of the offending conduct is similar?
[27] Questions 1 and 2 pertain to the sentencing approach to be adopted in respect of young offenders (Issue 1), Question 4 pertains to the appropriateness of the SAP’s s 55A(1) CDSA Sentencing Framework (Issue 2), and Questions 3 and 5 pertain to the application of existing sentencing approaches to legacy offences (Issue 3).
[28] We turn now to the parties’ respective submissions on the aforesaid issues, and our determination of these issues.
Issue 1: The appropriate sentencing approach for young offenders
[29] Issue 1 is concerned with whether the courts should adopt the approach set out in paragraph 7(c) of the Guidelines when sentencing young offenders for scams-related offences, namely, that a custodial sentence or RT is the default, with CBS or probation reserved for exceptional circumstances (see [23] above). In other words, should probation and CBS be presumptively excluded as sentencing options in scams-related cases involving young offenders?
[30] We begin by setting out the prevailing approach for sentencing young offenders as set out in Public Prosecutor v Mohammad Al-Ansari bin Basri [2008] 1 SLR(R) 449 (“Al-Ansari”), followed in Public Prosecutor v Koh Wen Jie Boaz [2016] 1 SLR 334 (“Boaz”) and explained in Public Prosecutor v ASR [2019] 1 SLR 941 (“ASR”) (“Al-Ansari/Boaz framework”).
[31] In Boaz, Sundaresh Menon CJ held that a court sentencing a young offender must approach the inquiry in two distinct but related stages (Boaz at [28]). At the first stage, the court must identify and prioritise the primary sentencing considerations appropriate to the young offender in question having regard to all the circumstances. The primary sentencing consideration for young offenders will generally, or presumptively, be rehabilitation (Boaz at [29]). However, the focus on rehabilitation can be diminished or even eclipsed by considerations such as deterrence or retribution where the circumstances warrant (Boaz at [30]). At the second stage, the court selects the appropriate sentence that would best meet the sentencing considerations and the priority that had been determined at the first stage.
[32] Quite rightly, the parties are in agreement that the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework remains applicable in determining the appropriate sentence for young offenders in scams-related offences; accordingly, a relevant consideration is whether paragraph 7(c) of the Guidelines is consistent with the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework.
The parties’ positions
(1) YIC’s case
[33] The YIC submits that the sentencing approach in paragraph 7(c) of the Guidelines is appropriate to give effect to the deterrent purpose intended by Parliament. The YIC further submits that the Guidelines can be reconciled with the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework for sentencing young offenders:
(a) Where deterrence is the dominant sentencing consideration for a young offender, imprisonment is appropriate. However, rehabilitation should not be presumptively displaced as the dominant sentencing consideration since, whilst deterrence is relevant for scams-related offences, these offences span a range of culpability.
(b) Where rehabilitation is the dominant sentencing consideration for a young offender, the choice should ordinarily be between RT and a short detention order (“SDO”) (with other CBS where appropriate), as deterrence remains relevant given the seriousness of the offending conduct:
(i) The threshold question is whether SDOs are legally available. The option should remain available so long as Parliament has not prohibited the imposition of CBS for the offence in question.
(ii) Assuming both RT and SDO are available options, the choice depends on whether extended rehabilitation in a structured environment is needed given the severity and pattern of offending.
(c) Probation should only be ordered exceptionally where specific deterrence is irrelevant or less relevant, such as where mental disability has a causal link to offending or in circumstances of coercion or exploitation.
[34] In essence, the YIC submits that the approach suggested in the Guidelines is generally appropriate, with one qualification: that SDOs should be recognised as an appropriate sentencing option alongside RT and imprisonment. This is because imprisonment is unsuitable for young offenders where rehabilitation remains the dominant sentencing consideration. Further, RT is not always suitable as offenders may not require structured institutional intervention for the following reasons: (a) the offences may be committed negligently/unthinkingly or involve lower-level conduct in the scam hierarchy; (b) physical incapacitation is less relevant given the nature of scam offending; and (c) the compulsory minimum RT duration may be disproportionate given the range of culpability in scams-related offences. Thus, SDOs, combined with other CBS, complement RT by: (a) serving as a wake-up call responsive to young offenders’ failure to consider consequences, carrying punitive and deterrent elements; (b) dispelling impressions that offenders cause no harm by sensitising them through community work; and (c) allowing courts to deliver the appropriate mix of rehabilitation and deterrence.
(2) Prosecution’s case
[35] Mr Hui Choon Kuen, the Third Chief Prosecutor, made submissions for the Prosecution on this issue. He contends that the Guidelines provide an appropriate approach for sentencing young offenders and cohere with the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework.
[36] At the first stage of the framework, the Prosecution acknowledges that rehabilitation largely remains the dominant sentencing consideration for young offenders in scams-related cases. That said, the Prosecution contends that deterrence must be incorporated into the sentence given the seriousness of scams-related offences. Accordingly, at the second stage of the framework, the Prosecution submits that RT would generally be an appropriate sentencing option, as it strikes the right balance between rehabilitation and deterrence. While acknowledging that individual young offenders may commit scams-related offences with varying degrees of culpability, the Prosecution submits that the court’s sentencing approach cannot be limited to considering the specific circumstances of each offender’s conduct and the need for specific deterrence as general deterrence requires the court to consider the wider ramifications and systemic harms caused by such offences. Departing from the YIC’s position, the Prosecution further contends that SDOs are generally unsuitable because the maximum two-week detention period is insufficient to achieve the significant measure of deterrence required.
[37] Finally, the Prosecution contends that probation is similarly unsuitable as a general option, given that it lacks any meaningful deterrent component. Probation or CBS should therefore only be imposed in exceptional cases where the interest in rehabilitation is unusually high. These may include cases where the young offender is 16 years or below at the time of the offence with no previous brushes with the law, or where the young offender suffers from a mental disorder which has a contributory link to the offence.
(3) PDO’s case
[38] The Public Defender’s Office (“PDO”) acts for the appellants in MA 9012, MA 9024, MA 9049 and MA 9069. The Chief Public Defender, Mr Wong Kok Weng (“Mr Wong”), appeared in these proceedings and made submissions on the three broad issues raised in these appeals. We refer to his submissions on these broad issues as the PDO’s submissions, as the other PDO officers representing the individual appellants aligned themselves with his submissions in their respective individual appeals.
[39] Turning back to the present issue, namely, how the Guidelines should be regarded and interpreted by the courts in sentencing young offenders in scams-related offences, the PDO submits that the Guidelines should not be read to presumptively exclude probation and CBS in all scams-related cases involving young offenders. Instead, they should guide courts to give weight to deterrence whilst considering all other relevant factors. A blanket prohibition against probation and CBS would overturn established jurisprudence on sentencing young offenders and fail to account for the vast spectrum of culpability, circumstances and rehabilitative needs among young offenders in scams-related cases.
[40] Following the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework, the PDO contends that the Guidelines have not displaced rehabilitation as the dominant sentencing consideration at the first stage. Where rehabilitation remains the dominant sentencing consideration at the first stage, the full suite of rehabilitative options (including probation and CBS) should remain available at the second stage. The choice among those options should be determined by a holistic and fact-sensitive assessment of each case, taking into account, among other things, the pre-sentencing reports on the young offender’s character as well as his rehabilitative potential and needs.
[41] In this regard, the PDO argues that properly calibrated probation orders and CBS can achieve the ends of both deterrence and rehabilitation, and RT should not be seen as the only viable option. Probation and CBS are appropriate where young offenders have minimal intervention needs that do not warrant RT’s rigorous environment. Where culpability is high despite minimal intervention needs, SDOs may be suitable. On the other hand, RT should be reserved for young offenders requiring a “rigorous and structured environment” for rehabilitation.
(4) Other defence counsel
[42] Counsel for the remaining accused persons aligned themselves with the PDO’s case.
Our decision
[43] As the Court of Appeal observed in Iskandar bin Jinan v Public Prosecutor [2024] 2 SLR 673 (“Iskandar bin Jinan”) at [3], sentencing guidelines suggested by the SAP are not binding on the court but are intended to offer some assistance in the sentencing process. As such, the court’s mandate in sentencing is to calibrate the appropriate sentence having regard to all relevant considerations, including but not limited to the guidelines (Iskandar bin Jinan at [6]).
[44] In our view, paragraph 7(c) of the Guidelines may be interpreted as being both consistent and inconsistent with the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework. This is reflected in the different readings of paragraph 7(c) and its import adopted by the YIC, Prosecution and PDO. We explain.
[45] The Guidelines could be said to align with the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework in so far as they simply emphasise deterrence as a relevant sentencing consideration. At the first stage, where deterrence is the primary sentencing consideration, imprisonment is warranted. Where rehabilitation is the primary consideration instead, the default option would be RT, which is an option that is rehabilitative in nature, although it also incorporates a strong measure of deterrence. However, the Guidelines could also be read as departing from the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework in so far as it seeks to constrain judicial discretion at the second stage. Under the established framework, the second stage requires a fact-sensitive assessment of the most suitable option based on multiple factors, including the offender’s capacity for reform and risk of reoffending, as determined through a review of the probation and RT reports (see [48] below). In so far as the Guidelines universally ascribe greater weight to deterrence in all scams-related cases involving young offenders and seek to suggest that a custodial sentence or RT should be the default, the Guidelines undermine this individualised, fact-sensitive approach that is central to the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework.
[46] Having regard to the considerations above, we do not agree that, in scams-related cases involving young offenders, where rehabilitation is determined to be the primary sentencing consideration at the first stage of the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework, RT or SDOs should be the default sentence at the second stage as suggested by the Prosecution or the YIC. Instead, we agree with the PDO that the Guidelines should be interpreted as highlighting the seriousness of scams-related offences and the weight to be accorded to general deterrence as a sentencing principle. But, they should not be read as creating a default position, as this would depart from the fact-sensitive and holistic approach of the Al-Ansari/Boaz framework.
[47] In our judgment, a default approach assuming a custodial sentence or RT save in exceptional cases is too blunt, bearing in mind the courts’ longstanding recognition of young offenders’ lack of maturity, the prospects of a long and productive life ahead of them, and the importance of securing their rehabilitation wherever possible. This is evident from the guidance in A Karthik v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 1289 (“A Karthik”) at [37] that the presumptive primacy of rehabilitation in relation to youthful offenders rests on two rationales. The first is the retrospective rationale, which justifies rehabilitation on account of the young offender’s youthful folly and inexperience. The second is the prospective rationale, which justifies rehabilitation on the grounds of a young offender’s greater receptiveness to a rehabilitative sentencing regime, the broader benefit to society from the young offender’s rehabilitation, and the disproportionate hardship that a young offender typically suffers from punitive sentencing options as compared to an adult (see also Public Prosecutor v Lim Cheng Ji Alvin [2017] 5 SLR 671 at [6]). With respect to the retrospective rationale in particular, it must be recognised that, as a general principle, young offenders have reduced culpability because: (a) they have less capacity to assess and appreciate the harmful consequences of their actions; and (b) they have had fewer opportunities to develop impulse control and resist peer pressure to offend (A Karthik at [41(a)]; see also Public Prosecutor v Mok Ping Wuen Maurice [1998] 3 SLR(R) 439 at [21]). As noted by the YIC, in cases involving scams-related offences, many young offenders are lured by the prospect of easy money without considering the longer-term consequences, particularly as they often cannot appreciate the harm they are causing.
[48] As such, courts have always recognised that sentencing young offenders involves a delicate balancing exercise. In determining the balance to be struck between the dominant consideration of rehabilitation and the need for deterrence, the assessment depends on a range of factors including: (a) the seriousness of the offence; (b) the culpability of the offender; (c) the existence of antecedents; (d) the nature of rehabilitation best suited for the offender; (e) the availability of familial support in the rehabilitative efforts; and (f) any other special reasons or need for rehabilitation (Al-Ansari at [67], affirmed in Ahmad Syafiq bin Azmi v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 837 (“Ahmad Syafiq”) at [25]). In determining the young offender’s capacity for rehabilitation and the appropriate sentence, the following considerations are relevant: (a) the strength of familial support and the degree of supervision provided by the offender’s family for his rehabilitation; (b) the frequency and intensity of the offender’s criminal activities; (c) the genuineness of remorse demonstrated by the offender; and (d) the presence of risk factors such as negative peer influences or bad habits (Praveen s/o Krishnan v Public Prosecutor [2018] 3 SLR 1300 (“Praveen”) at [30], affirming Leon Russel Francis v Public Prosecutor [2014] 4 SLR 651 at [15]).
[49] While the Prosecution accepts that rehabilitation generally remains the dominant sentencing consideration for young offenders who have committed scams-related offences, it maintains that RT would generally be the appropriate sentence given the need for general deterrence. This is so notwithstanding the Prosecution’s recognition that scams-related offences may be committed with “varying degrees of premeditation”. The Prosecution’s position is that the court’s sentencing approach “cannot be limited only to considering the specific circumstances of each offender’s conduct and the considerations of specific deterrence”. We disagree with this approach for the following reasons.
[50] First, scams-related offences can be committed in multifarious ways which result in clear differences in the culpability of offenders. This was noted by the YIC and PDO. Indeed, the legislative scheme for offences involving the relinquishment of bank accounts under the CDSA establishes four distinct culpability levels (ie, without taking reasonable steps, negligently, rashly, and knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe) with escalating penalties. In introducing the amendments to the CDSA, Second Minister Teo noted that the offences of rash and negligent money laundering would “allow a money laundering offence to be made out against an individual at a lower level of culpability, compared with the current laws” [emphasis added] (2023 Parl Debates).
[51] In fact, the Guidelines themselves acknowledge different levels of culpability through the identification of various offence-specific and offender-specific aggravating factors (see paragraphs 13–15 of the Guidelines). The Guidelines also prescribe double the starting sentence for s 8B(1) offences compared to s 8A(1) offences under the CMA, recognising that an offender who discloses another person’s Singpass credentials has greater culpability than one who discloses his own (see paragraph 35 of the Guidelines).
[52] This gradated approach is further evident in Parliament’s decision to impose mandatory caning for scammers and members or recruiters of scam syndicates, whilst providing only discretionary caning for those who facilitate scams, such as money mules who relinquish SIM cards, Singpass credentials, and bank accounts. The then-Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs, Ms Sim Ann (“Senior Minister of State Sim”), explained the specific circumstances in which discretionary caning would apply (Singapore Parl Debates; Vol 96, Sitting No 9; [4 November 2025] (Sim Ann, Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs) (“2025 Parl Debates”)):
[53] When asked whether caning should be made mandatory for scam mules as well, Senior Minister of State Sim further explained (2025 Parl Debates): “Notwithstanding the need to deter scam mules, MHA recognises the need to be calibrated in our approach. In reality, scam mules have a range of culpability. Therefore, we have proposed for caning to be discretionary to allow the Courts to decide if the facts of the case warrant the application of caning.”
[54] What is significant from the foregoing is that the approach taken by the Prosecution ignores the possible differences in culpability among young offenders which may have a bearing on the appropriate sentence. To take a simple example, a young offender who commits a scams-related offence for the first time because he or she misjudged the situation is clearly different from another who is recalcitrant and has a few similar antecedents. Yet, according to the Prosecution, the default position is that a custodial sentence or RT must be ordered. If so, the debate on the sentence for the first offender would be confined to the appropriate length of incarceration or intensity of RT rather than whether the sentence is suitable, appropriate and proportionate at all. Such an approach would be wrong as a matter of principle.
[55] Second, different rehabilitative sentencing options may be appropriate for different young offenders. Although one young offender may have committed a more serious scams-related offence than another, an option such as probation may be a more suitable rehabilitative option for him than RT. This may depend on a variety of factors, such as the supportiveness of his social environment, the strength of his family ties, and his record and receptivity to guidance at school. Conversely, a young offender who committed a less serious scams-related offence may present with more entrenched risk factors that diminish his rehabilitative prospects. This comparison illustrates that the severity of the offence and the offender’s rehabilitative potential are distinct considerations that do not necessarily move in tandem. To disregard these differences in rehabilitative potential in favour of an approach that emphasises general deterrence above all other relevant factors would be inconsistent with the sentencing philosophy for young offenders, which requires that the court look beyond the nature of the offence and consider carefully the attributes and circumstances of the individual before it.
[56] Third, we find it unprincipled that young offenders in scams-related cases should presumptively face imprisonment or RT, when young offenders in other serious cases, including those involving property offences or personal harm, may be considered for CBS and/or probation. For instance, in A Karthik, the 17-year-old offender who pleaded guilty to two counts of abetting, by conspiracy, the cheating of two motor insurance companies was sentenced to probation. Similarly, in Praveen, the 17-year-old offender who pleaded guilty to one charge of consumption of a specified drug and another charge of possession of a controlled drug for the purpose of trafficking, with a further possession charge taken into consideration, was also sentenced to probation. Further, in Public Prosecutor v Abdul Qayyum bin Abdul Razak [2020] SGHC 57, the 20-year-old offender pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful assembly in committing a group attack against a victim, who sustained a cut below his eye, and was sentenced to CBS comprising a day reporting order (“DRO”), a community service order (“CSO”) and an SDO. Relatedly, in Ahmad Syafiq, the 20-year-old offender who pleaded guilty to one charge of rioting, with one other charge of rioting and one charge of being a member of an unlawful society taken into consideration, was sentenced to probation. In all these cases, notwithstanding the seriousness of the offences and the need to give weight to general deterrence or retribution, the court arrived at the appropriate sentence for the young offender based on a consideration of all the facts and circumstances.
[57] Lastly, we do not agree with the YIC’s position that the choice of sentence for young offenders who have committed scams-related offences should typically lie between a SDO or RT. While we accept that deterrence is an important consideration, the appropriate sentence for young offenders that furthers the main sentencing consideration of rehabilitation still depends very much on the particular circumstances of the offender and the offence in each case.
[58] In this regard, we agree with Mr Wong that the appropriate way to account for deterrence – which is a key consideration for these offences – is to treat it as one relevant consideration alongside all other relevant considerations (see [48] above). As he rightly pointed out, any other approach would overlook the very significant range of differences among young offenders.
[59] Where a court, having considered all relevant factors including pre-sentencing reports and the particular circumstances of the young offender, concludes that the structured and more intensive intervention characteristic of RT is not warranted (Fahd Siddiqui v Public Prosecutor [2024] SGHC 66 (“Fahd Siddiqui”) at [17]), it should actively consider CBS and probation as available sentencing options. Since Parliament has already drawn the line by way of s 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) to filter out offences which are not eligible for CBS, it cannot be said that all scams-related offences are so serious that CBS should not be available by default. If this were the case, Parliament would have increased the prescribed punishments to exclude the possibility of CBS as a sentencing option for all scams-related offences. Where it is Parliament’s intention to take away certain sentencing options in relation to a particular offence, then this intention must be made clear (Nur Azilah bte Ithnin v Public Prosecutor [2010] 4 SLR 731 at [20]). The fact that the maximum punishment for some scams-related offences do not trigger the disqualification of CBS as a sentencing option indicates that they are not so serious that CBS should not be available or considered (Keeping Mark John v Public Prosecutor [2017] 5 SLR 627 at [28]). Further, we agree with the sentiments of See Kee Oon J (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v Teo Chang Heng [2018] 3 SLR 1163 where disapproval was expressed at the proposition that general deterrence dictated that an imprisonment term must be imposed, trumping any CBS (at [15]). Accordingly, we disagree with the Prosecution’s argument that CBS, including SDOs, and probation “cannot provide the significant measure of deterrence required for offences that Parliament has recognised as among the most serious criminal threats facing Singapore”. It is trite that both probation and CBS contain punitive elements, albeit to different extents, and cannot be regarded as “soft options”.
[60] While RT is a rehabilitative option (see Boaz at [36], citing Al-Ansari at [47]), it remains more structured and rigid than other rehabilitative options, as it removes the young offender from his home and schooling or working environment for either six months or 12 months. It is therefore more onerous for the young offender. In fact, the minimum duration of RT can even be longer than a typical term of imprisonment for the same offence. Although the stakeholders may understand that this is so for a reason, namely, to enable the rehabilitative effects to take hold, it is often difficult for a young offender to appreciate this fact. The court’s approach to sentencing should not be seen as unfair, and in circumstances where there is no evident need for interventionist approaches, we should not default to RT or incarceration. We reiterate that an approach which suggests that there is a default position of RT for young offenders will tend to obscure the differences in the culpabilities and rehabilitative potential of the offenders.
[61] Ultimately, we caution that the options of RT, CBS and probation should not be viewed as points along a continuum (see Public Prosecutor v Ong Jack Hong [2016] 5 SLR 166 (“Ong Jack Hong”) at [12]–[13]). The overarching question in the analysis is, as we mentioned at the hearing, what the appropriate type of sentence should be, and whether such a sentence is called for in the circumstances. The inquiry does not simply begin with the length or severity of the sentence.
[62] We summarise below the sentencing approach the court should take in sentencing young offenders who commit scams-related offences.
[63] Preliminarily, it must be determined whether the offender is a young offender. This is especially crucial in cases where the offender committed the offence whilst at or below the age of 21 but is above that age by the time of sentencing. In determining whether it is appropriate to treat the offender as a young offender such that the presumption of rehabilitation applies, the court should consider all the facts of the case, including the following relevant factors: (a) the offender’s age at each of these two points in time; (b) the length of the delay between the commission of the offence and sentencing; and (c) the available evidence of the trajectory of the offender’s rehabilitative progress in the intervening period (A Karthik at [58]).
[64] At the first stage, the court must identify and prioritise the primary sentencing considerations (Boaz at [28]). There is a presumption that rehabilitation is the primary sentencing consideration for young offenders (Boaz at [29]). However, rehabilitation may be diminished or displaced by considerations such as deterrence or even retribution where: (a) the offence is serious; (b) the harm caused is severe; and (c) the offender is hardened and recalcitrant (Boaz at [30]; see also ASR at [101] and See Li Quan Mendel v Public Prosecutor [2020] 2 SLR 630 (“Mendel”) at [12] where the Court of Appeal explained that the court should consider the factor of whether conditions existed to make rehabilitative sentencing options viable at the second stage and not the first stage). As all parties have submitted, and with which we agree, the commission of a scams-related offence is generally not in itself sufficient to displace rehabilitation as the primary sentencing consideration for young offenders.
[65] At the second stage, the court should choose the appropriate sentencing option in light of the answer at the first stage. Where rehabilitation is displaced by deterrence as the primary sentencing consideration at the first stage, the sentence imposed would ordinarily be imprisonment. However, where rehabilitation is the primary consideration at the first stage, a suite of rehabilitative options remains available for the court to choose from – each vindicating one or more principles of sentencing to varying degrees and extents, with an overarching emphasis on the rehabilitation of the young offender. While it bears emphasis that the court should take a fact-sensitive approach in determining the appropriate sentencing option, we set out below several factors which may guide the court in selecting the appropriate option:
(a) First, the offender’s eligibility for the various sentencing options:
(i) Eligibility requirements for CBS: A young offender may be ineligible for CBS if one of the disqualifiers set out under s 337 of the CPC applies. One such disqualifier is where the offence which the young offender is charged with is punishable with a term of imprisonment which exceeds three years. Accordingly, CBS may not be available for young offenders charged with certain offences under the CDSA.
(ii) Eligibility requirements for RT: A young offender may be ineligible for RT if he or she does not meet the following requirements under s 305 of the CPC: (a) above the age of 16 but below the age of 21 on the day of conviction; and (b) above the age of 14 but below the age of 16 on the day of conviction and, before this conviction, been dealt with by a court in connection with another offence, and had for that offence been ordered to be sent to a juvenile rehabilitation centre.
(b) Second, RT should be ordered where there is a stronger need for a measure of (specific) deterrence (see Mendel at [13]). This might include young offenders who committed the offence knowingly or repeatedly. Consequently, RT may not be suitable for those who commit offences negligently or unthinkingly, as there is no need to physically remove such young offenders from the community to prevent further harm. Additionally, RT is suitable for offenders who require a rigorous and structured environment to rehabilitate and reform due to the presence of risk factors. The court may exercise its discretion to impose a minimum detention period of either six months (Level 1) or 12 months (Level 2), having regard to the offender’s rehabilitative needs and the need to prevent reoffending (see s 305(6) of the CPC).
(c) Third, probation and CBS should be ordered where there is minimal need for intervention. We emphasise that there can be different forms and combinations of probation and CBS which all vary in intensity and can accordingly be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the offence and the offender. For instance:
(i) CBS could entail one or more community orders under Part 17 of the CPC, which comprise a mandatory treatment order (“MTO”), DRO, community work order (“CWO”), CSO, and SDO. A combination of CBS allows courts to tailor interventions through targeted programmes, counselling or community service. Further, the risk of re-sentencing for any breach of CBS provides ongoing deterrence. In particular, SDOs may be ordered where the culpability of the young offender or the harm caused is high despite minimal needs for intervention. In Kalaiarasi d/o Marimuthu Innasimuthu v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 774 at [37], it was recognised that SDOs are a “short sharp shock” in the form of a taste of what incarceration would entail, in the hope that it would bring young offenders to their senses.
(ii) Probation with additional conditions (such as electronic monitoring, regular reporting, curfews and residential requirements) may be ordered where a young offender does not require removal from his home and educational or work environment but would benefit from a degree of structured oversight to support his rehabilitation. This may be particularly relevant where the young offender has committed the offence out of youthful folly or ignorance. In Praveen, the High Court recognised that probation with the additional condition of hostel residence served both rehabilitative and deterrent functions by removing the young offender from an undesirable social environment and integrating him into society by allowing him to participate in daily activities without having the blemish of a permanent record (at [34]). Further, probation can fulfil the consideration of specific deterrence as there is a risk of being re-sentenced for breach of conditions under probation.
[66] In assessing the suitability of the above sentencing options, the court should generally call for a pre-sentencing report before imposing the sentence and should not embark on an assessment of the young offender’s suitability for probation, CBS or RT without the benefit of such a report (A Karthik at [20]). However, the court may decline to do so where the basic criteria for probation, CBS and/or RT are not met, or where such options should be altogether excluded as a viable or realistic sentencing option (A Karthik at [21]). In line with the analysis above, the court should not decline to call a probation or CBS suitability report for a young offender at the pre-sentencing stage, solely on the basis that the commission of a scams-related offence is, in itself, so serious as to rule out the viability of probation or CBS altogether such that only RT may be considered.
[67] Having considered the appropriate sentencing approach for young offenders, we now turn to Issue 2 which is the appropriateness of the SAP’s s 55A(1) CDSA Sentencing Framework.
Issue 2: The appropriate sentencing framework for s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences
The sentencing framework prescribed by the Guidelines
[68] As is clear from s 55A(5) of the CDSA (see [13] above), a person who commits an offence under s 55A(1) of the CDSA shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $50,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both. We outline the sentencing framework prescribed by the Guidelines before considering the parties’ submissions on the same.
[69] Paragraph 8(a) of the Guidelines describes a s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offence as follows:
[70] Paragraph 9 of the Guidelines outlines a three-step sentencing framework to be adopted for an archetypal bank account relinquishment offence under the CDSA:
[71] The Guidelines provide the following guidance in respect of each step.
[72] Step 1: The Guidelines (at paragraph 10) peg the starting sentences to an archetypal case with the following characteristics:
[73] For such an archetypal case charged under s 55A(1) of the CDSA, the Guidelines (at paragraph 11) recommend the starting sentence for a first-time offender convicted after trial be six months’ imprisonment. The Guidelines derive this starting sentence based on the following considerations (at paragraph 12):
[74] Step 2: Certain offence-specific aggravating factors have been identified by the Guidelines (at paragraph 13). The table below provides a non-exhaustive list, along with the corresponding uplifts in sentence where the same has been indicated by the Guidelines.
[75] Offender-specific factors should also be taken into account, such as (at paragraph 15): (a) charges taken into consideration for the purposes of sentencing (“TIC charges”); (b) relevant antecedents; (c) presence or lack of remorse; (d) restitution; and (e) cooperation with the authorities. Where the offender pleads guilty, the court may grant a reduction in sentence based on the SAP’s Guidelines on Reduction in Sentences for Guilty Pleas (“PG Guidelines”) (at paragraph 17).
[76] Step 3: The Guidelines prescribe that where the offender has received a financial gain from his offence, the court should consider imposing a disgorgement fine in addition to the sentence otherwise imposed (at paragraph 18).
[77] We turn to summarise the parties’ arguments on this issue before deciding whether this court should adopt the SAP’s s 55A(1) CDSA Sentencing Framework. This entails considering, first, whether a benchmark sentencing approach should be adopted, and second, if so, whether any modifications should be made to the approach set out in the Guidelines.
The parties’ cases
(1) YIC’s case
[78] The YIC submits that the benchmark approach adopted in the SAP’s s 55A(1) CDSA Sentencing Framework is appropriate because: (a) s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences overwhelmingly manifest in a particular way; (b) the range of sentencing considerations tends to be circumscribed; and (c) the offence is a strict-liability one. However, the YIC notes that it would be helpful to validate the archetypal case as set out in the Guidelines empirically.
[79] The YIC also submits that other types of sentencing frameworks are not suitable. These include the “multiple starting points” approach, the “sentencing matrix” approach, or the approach in Logachev Vladislav v Public Prosecutor [2018] 4 SLR 609 (ie, the “sentencing bands” approach).
(2) Prosecution’s case
[80] The Prosecution submits that it is appropriate for the courts to adopt or endorse a sentencing framework for s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences because: (a) there is a “pipeline” of pending prosecutions; (b) such offences are not committed in diverse scenarios but rather overwhelmingly manifest in a particular way; and (c) there is no danger of prematurely ossifying the law.
[81] In particular, endorsing the SAP’s s 55A(1) CDSA Sentencing Framework is appropriate because it has helped resolve uncertainty, and has been applied in numerous cases without obvious issues. It achieves all the goals of a good sentencing framework: (a) it is instructive without being prescriptive; (b) it is communicative and encourages transparency in reasoning; (c) it delivers consistent outcomes; and (d) it creates a coherent picture of sentencing for a particular offence, respecting the statutory context by taking into account the whole range of penalties prescribed.
[82] The Prosecution similarly submits that other approaches to sentencing frameworks are unsuitable for s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences. These include the “multiple starting points” approach, the “sentencing matrix” approach, and the “sentencing bands” approach.
(3) PDO’s case
[83] The PDO submits that the SAP’s s 55A(1) CDSA Sentencing Framework is appropriate for s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences.
[84] The PDO submits that the benchmark approach is appropriate as the s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offence targets a narrow scope of offences with limited factual variability. This is also supported by the strict liability nature of the offence.
(4) Other defence counsel
[85] Counsel for the remaining accused persons aligned themselves with the PDO’s case.
Our decision
[86] In our view, it is appropriate to set out a benchmark sentence for s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences. As noted by all the parties, the benchmark approach is suitable because the offence is narrowly scoped and “overwhelmingly manifest[s] in a particular way” (Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 449 (“Terence Ng”) at [32]). The relinquishment of a bank account is a common manifestation of a specific type of offending conduct under s 55A(1) of the CDSA. Moreover, Parliament has created a statutory scheme that contains different offences with different mens rea requirements and thus captures different levels of culpability (see Galvez Mary Joe Blanco v Public Prosecutor [2026] 3 SLR 1427 (“Galvez”) at [45]). Differences in the accused person’s culpability will generally be reflected in the particular offence the accused person is charged with. It is thus appropriate to set out benchmark sentences for different bank account relinquishment offences bearing different levels of culpability.
[87] The benchmark approach calls for the identification of an archetypal case (or multiple archetypal cases), which should be defined with some specificity so as to provide guidance as to what falls within the scope of the classic situation, and what exceptional circumstances justify departure from the typical sentence (Terence Ng at [31]). The archetypal case is, by definition, the particular variant or manner of offending in which the offence typically manifests, and which is therefore singled out for special attention (Terence Ng at [32]).
[88] In our judgment, the “archetypal” case envisaged by the Guidelines (see [72] above) is not such a case. This is because the offence overwhelmingly manifests as one committed for gain. This is reflected in the series of seven appeals heard before us, all of which involved accused persons who acted for gain. It is also reflected in the series of ten cases involving s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences, for which written grounds had been issued, that the Prosecution helpfully compiled. All offenders in those cases were similarly motivated by gain. This is also to be expected in future cases, since it is natural that individuals would typically relinquish their bank accounts only when provided with an inducement to do so. Thus, as the Prosecution rightly suggests, what the Guidelines at paragraph 10 identifies as the “archetypal case” may be better described as the “baseline case”. The true archetypal case is similar to the baseline case, except that the offender is motivated by gain (whether or not such a gain actually materialises). The benchmark sentence of six months’ imprisonment for a first-time offender convicted after trial should be applied to this archetypal case, and not the kind of case suggested by the Guidelines.
[89] The benchmark sentence may be adjusted depending on the aggravating and mitigating factors present in a particular case. Many of these factors are well-established. The Guidelines at paragraphs 13–14 have outlined a non-exhaustive list of offence-specific aggravating factors. We find these factors to be generally relevant, although we leave the precise quantum of the uplift for each aggravating factor to be decided in an appropriate case where such an issue is live before us.
[90] In relation to the quantum of funds involved, this court observed recently in Galvez at [58] that the receipt or transfer of significant funds (the Guidelines use $100,000 as a benchmark) warrants an uplift in sentence. This is so because it is generally foreseeable that a bank account that is relinquished would be used to receive or transfer criminal proceeds, such that it is justified to consider the amount of funds that flowed through the bank account as an aggravating factor. In principle, only funds representing the proceeds of criminal conduct are relevant. If the person obtaining control of the account had used it to transfer their own moneys for personal expenses or other innocent reasons, the transfer of such funds would not constitute the laundering of criminal proceeds that the relinquishing party can be said to have facilitated. However, as noted in footnote 8 to paragraph 13(f) of the Guidelines, the court may consider the full amount received or transferred out of the offender’s bank account (and not just the amounts traceable to reports about scams) unless the offender is able to satisfy the court that any of the receipts or transfers were made for innocent reasons. This is because it may be clear from the circumstances, such as the nature, timing and amount of the transfers, that they are made for the purpose of laundering criminal proceeds, notwithstanding that some of those proceeds cannot be traced to an identifiable scam victim. In such cases, it would be unrealistic for the court to ignore the total amount received or transferred out of the offender’s bank account, unless it is shown that certain transfers were made for innocent reasons such that they should be disregarded. Additionally, we highlight that the court must pay close attention to the factual circumstances of each case to determine whether the amount of funds that flowed through the bank account was indeed foreseeable. For instance, we explain at [194] below that, on the facts of one of the cases on appeal before us, it was not foreseeable that the relinquishment of a first bank account would lead to a second bank account being opened, and therefore the amount of money flowing through the second bank account should not be considered as one of the aggravating factors in that case.
[91] Likewise, in respect of the vulnerability of the victims involved, while this would generally be relevant in assessing the level of harm caused (see Public Prosecutor v Tan Shay Howe [2026] 3 SLR 1304 at [50] and [52]), its relevance to the culpability of the offender depends on how foreseeable it was that vulnerable victims would be affected. There is a significant difference between an offender who knew or had reason to believe that vulnerable victims were or would be targeted, and one who does not, a difference recognised by this court in Galvez at [56]. In the case of a young offender, the court should also bear in mind that a young person, who lacks full maturity and is less worldly-wise, may not fully appreciate that scammers are likely to use his bank account or Singpass credentials to specifically target vulnerable victims, such as the elderly, a likelihood which an adult offender must normally be taken to know. Needless to say, in assessing culpability, the court will be sensitive to whether the offender specifically targeted or abused the trust of any of the victims (Huang Ying-Chun v Public Prosecutor [2019] 3 SLR 606 at [122]). As mentioned, elderly persons are presumptively treated as vulnerable to scams, being generally less able to recover from the pecuniary loss they have suffered (Tan Shay Howe at [51]; Galvez at [54]), although they are of course neither universally nor exclusively the type of persons who may be vulnerable victims.
[92] We also add the following caveat: the fact that the offender was motivated by gain (as opposed to obtaining such a gain) should not be regarded as an aggravating factor. Rather, as explained above at [88], this is part of the archetypal case. In almost all cases, there is some element of gain or attempt to obtain some benefit which induces the offender to commit the offence. Treating this as an aggravating factor would result in an uplift in the vast majority of cases, when the benchmark sentence should in fact be applicable.
[93] Having considered the appropriate sentencing framework for s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences, we turn to the appropriate sentencing framework for legacy offences.
Issue 3: The appropriate sentencing framework for legacy offences
The parties’ cases
(1) YIC’s case
[94] The YIC submits that the Guidelines can be adapted to apply to legacy offences under s 3(1) (read with s 12(1)) of the CMA, s 417 of the PC, and s 8(1) of the CMA. The benchmark approach is equally appropriate for the legacy offences. However, the starting sentence in the Guidelines should not simply apply to legacy offences but must be calibrated specifically for each offence.
[95] For s 417 PC and s 3(1) CMA offences (ie, legacy offences dealing with bank account relinquishment), the YIC submits that the starting sentence should not be derived by applying a downward calibration from the starting sentences in the Guidelines, given that the legacy offences address different facets of criminality and are situated in a different legislative context. Considered afresh, and having regard to the precedents, the starting sentence for first-time offenders convicted after trial under these provisions should be three to four months’ imprisonment.
[96] For s 8(1) CMA offences (ie, legacy offences dealing with the disclosure of Singpass credentials), the YIC submits that the indicative starting sentence for a first time offender convicted after trial should be seven to eight months’ imprisonment, which is higher than the indicative starting sentence of six months’ imprisonment for archetypal s 8A(1) CMA offences as prescribed in the Guidelines. This is because an offender convicted under s 8(1) of the CMA would be on the higher end of the range of culpability contemplated under s 8A(1) of the CMA. The former would have knowingly disclosed his Singpass credentials without authority for, inter alia, any unlawful purpose. The latter merely needs to have had reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure would facilitate the commission of an offence.
[97] The YIC also submits that the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in the Guidelines are also generally helpful and can apply to legacy offences, save where a putative aggravating factor is already a constituent element of a legacy offence, eg, the opening of a bank account for the purposes of a legacy offence under s 417 of the PC.
(2) Prosecution’s case
[98] The Prosecution submits that the Guidelines can be adapted to previous regime offences because: (a) the mischief targeted by offences under both the previous regime and the new regime is the same; (b) both sets of offences involve substantially similar patterns of offending conduct; (c) the legislative history demonstrates Parliament’s intent to address enforcement gaps and not to create fundamentally different approaches to sentencing; and (d) the practical administration of justice calls for a consistent sentencing approach for substantially similar conduct that is prosecuted under the previous and new regimes. The Prosecution agrees with the YIC that the benchmark approach is appropriate for offences under the previous regime.
[99] Contrary to the YIC’s view, the Prosecution submits that the starting sentences for the legacy offences can be derived by extrapolating from the starting sentences for new regime offences set out in the Guidelines, given that the offences under both regimes target the same mischief. In conducting this extrapolation, the Prosecution agrees that a downward calibration of the indicative starting sentences is warranted to account for the differences in prescribed maximum punishments between the new and previous regimes.
[100] For s 417 PC and s 3(1) CMA offences, the Prosecution submits that a starting sentence of four months’ imprisonment is appropriate, representing a downward calibration from six months’ imprisonment for s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences.
[101] For s 8(1) CMA offences, the Prosecution submits that a starting sentence of four months’ imprisonment is appropriate. This is primarily to strike an appropriate balance between recognising the increased seriousness of such offences and avoiding retrospective harshness from a dramatic increase from the sentences imposed prior to the release of the Guidelines.
(3) PDO’s case
[102] The PDO agrees that the Guidelines can be adapted to legacy offences, in particular to s 3(1) CMA offences, because the offences target the same mischief. The PDO submits that the YIC’s conceptual distinctions between the offences under s 3(1) of the CMA and offences under s 55A(1) of the CDSA do not reflect the practical reality, which is that these offences involve an identical factual matrix.
[103] The PDO submits that the appropriate starting sentence for an archetypal s 3(1) CMA offence should be three to four months’ imprisonment. This is based on a comprehensive review of the precedents. Steps 2 and 3 of the SAP’s sentencing framework for bank account relinquishment offences can be adapted to legacy offences, ie, the same offence-specific and offender-specific factors can be applied, and the court can then consider whether to impose a disgorgement fine.
[104] The PDO did not make specific submissions on the appropriate starting sentences for the s 417 PC and s 8(1) CMA offences.
(4) Other defence counsel
[105] Counsel for the remaining accused persons aligned themselves with the PDO’s case.
Our decision
[106] All parties, including the YIC, agree that the sentencing approach that the courts apply for offences under the newly enacted provisions can be adapted to offences prosecuted under the previous regime. We see no reason in principle to disagree with this. The conduct that was the subject of charges under the previous regime is the same as that targeted under the new regime. Both the previous regime offences and new regime offences tackle the same social menace of scams, and its enablement by bank account relinquishment or the disclosure of Singpass credentials. As we explained at [5]–[8] above, such conduct was previously tackled under the previous regime with s 3(1) (read with s 12(1)) and s 8(1) of the CMA and s 417 of the PC because there were no specific provisions targeting the relinquishment of bank accounts or Singpass credentials. Such offending conduct was therefore shoehorned into the legacy provisions. There is no longer any need to do so, as reflected by the new charging positions adopted by the Prosecution. Since the mischief targeted by the previous and new regime offences is the same, and the latter offences are brought under provisions specifically intended to replace the ad hoc reliance on the former provisions, the same sentencing philosophy should apply regardless of whether we are dealing with the new offences or the legacy offences.
[107] We agree with the YIC and the Prosecution that there is no obstacle in this context to applying the new sentencing framework to past offending conduct. A new sentencing framework ordinarily applies to all offenders who are sentenced at the time of and after the promulgation of the framework, regardless of when they had committed the offence (Adri Anton Kalangie v Public Prosecutor [2018] 2 SLR 557 (“Adri”) at [46]). An individual cannot be said to have a legitimate expectation, at the time of the commission of the offence, of the sentence that he will receive if he is subsequently convicted of that offence, save that the sentence must fall within the relevant statutorily-prescribed range (Adri at [57]).
[108] We turn next to the appropriate benchmark sentences to be imposed in respect of each of the legacy offences.
[109] For bank account relinquishment offences under s 3(1) (read with s 12(1)) of the CMA, the parties have converged on the benchmark sentence of three to four months’ imprisonment, even if they arrive at this position through different reasoning. We agree with this position, which is in line with the lower statutory maximum of two years’ imprisonment under s 3(1)(a) of the CMA compared to the maximum of three years’ imprisonment under s 55A(5) of the CDSA. It is also broadly in line with the precedents referred to by the parties.
[110] Where a bank account is opened specifically for the purpose of relinquishment (as opposed to the relinquishment of a pre-existing account), an offender may additionally be charged under s 417 of the PC for deceiving the bank (see [6] above). For such offences under s 417 of the PC, we agree with the Prosecution and the YIC that a similar benchmark sentence of three to four months’ imprisonment should apply. Although the statutory maximum for offences under s 417 of the PC is three years’ imprisonment, that provision deals with a wide range of cheating offences. For the particular subset of cheating offences that involve bank account relinquishment offences, it is appropriate to align the benchmark sentence with that under s 3(1) (read with s 12(1)) of the CMA. However, since a charge under s 417 of the PC will generally be brought alongside a charge under s 3(1) (read with s 12(1)) of the CMA, there would generally be an uplift from the benchmark sentence of three to four months’ imprisonment, to reflect the fact that the offender both induced the bank to open a bank account for the use of an unauthorised person and relinquished the bank account to that unauthorised person, which is an offence-specific aggravating factor.
[111] Turning to s 8(1) of the CMA, we agree with the Prosecution’s submission that a benchmark sentence of four months’ imprisonment is appropriate, where an individual, knowingly and without authority, discloses their Singpass credentials to a third party unlawfully (ie, for wrongful gain, for an unlawful purpose, or knowing it is likely to cause wrongful loss to any person), and the Singpass credentials are then used to create bank accounts through which criminal proceeds are laundered. This reflects a downward calibration from the starting sentence of six months’ imprisonment for s 8A(1) CMA offences recommended by the Guidelines (at paragraph 26). This is similar in proportion to the downward calibration applied for legacy bank account relinquishment offences.

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Probation was more suitable than reformative training for an offender in a scam case

Laws this judgment relies on

Grounds of decision

Introduction

Background

The previous regime

The new regime

Broad issues raised in the Appeals

Issue 1: The appropriate sentencing approach for young offenders

The parties’ positions

(1) YIC’s case

(2) Prosecution’s case

(3) PDO’s case

(4) Other defence counsel

Our decision

Issue 2: The appropriate sentencing framework for s 55A(1) CDSA Bank Account Relinquishment Offences

The sentencing framework prescribed by the Guidelines

The parties’ cases

(1) YIC’s case

(2) Prosecution’s case

(3) PDO’s case

(4) Other defence counsel

Our decision

Issue 3: The appropriate sentencing framework for legacy offences

The parties’ cases

(1) YIC’s case

(2) Prosecution’s case

(3) PDO’s case

(4) Other defence counsel

Our decision