Mohit Singh v Sim Han Khoon and Another

Philip Pillai JC:

[1] This is an appeal by the first defendant (also the “appellant”) against the decision of the district judge issued on 26 June 2009 in which the district judge adjudged the first defendant to be 100% liable for the accident where the first defendant’s car hit the second defendant’s taxi causing it to hit the plaintiff’s car in front of the taxi.

[2] It is conceded by all counsel as trite law that the duty of an appellate court is simply as stated in Aircharter World Pte Ltd v Kontena Nasional Bhd [1999] 3 SLR 1 at [19] (which cited with approval Lord Shaw in Clarke v Edinburgh and District Tramsways Co 1919 SC (HL) 35 at p 36):

Also at [19] (which cited with approval Lord Thankerton in Watt v Thomas [1947] AC 484 at p 487–488):

[3] The grounds of this appeal are that first, the judgment of the district judge is improbable and against the weight of the evidence; second, that it is wrong in light of established documents, contemporaneous reports and photographs; and third, it disregards material facts.

[4] In support of his case, the appellant submits the following factors as justifying an appellate court to reverse the trial judge’s decision:

(a) firstly, that nowhere in the relevant contemporaneous Singapore Accident Statement or the Police Report of a Traffic Accident did any of the parties indicate that the plaintiff stopped for what the plaintiff stated in his evidence under cross examination that he stopped for 7-8 seconds before impact;

(b) secondly, that the plaintiff had failed to call his wife who had been with him in his car as a witness; and

(c) thirdly, that the trial judge had wrongly rejected the appellant’s version of first collision and accepted the plaintiff’s version of the prior collision.

[5] Having considered the submissions carefully, I am not satisfied that these constitute sufficient grounds for me to alter the district judge’s decision on liability. All these submissions have, in fact, already been canvassed before the district judge.

[6] It was further argued before me by the appellant’s counsel that some apportionment should have been appropriately ordered by the district judge to the second defendant based on the following factors:

[7] Again, all these were fully canvassed before the district judge and nothing has been submitted before me which leads me to be satisfied to vary the district judge’s decision that the appellant be held 100% liable to the plaintiff.

[8] I would dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.