Ng Siam Khui and another v Ang Meng Lee

Woo Bih Li J:

[1] The plaintiffs, Ng Siam Khui and See Tji Kiong, have the benefit of an order from the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in an action for payment to them of an aggregate sum of $1,740,755.87 (“the Debt”) but the CA also directed an inquiry for accounts to be taken on certain other matters as between the parties. The plaintiffs’ position was that the payment of the Debt had to be made first but the position of the defendant, Ang Meng Lee (“AML”), was that the amount payable to the plaintiffs was disputed because the Debt was subject to the inquiry on accounts as directed in the other parts of the order from the CA.

[2] The issue as to whether AML had to pay the Debt first was resolved in various proceedings in lower courts in favour of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the plaintiffs presented an Originating Summons No B2488/2009 which was a bankruptcy application against AML based on the Debt. AML applied to set aside the bankruptcy application in Summons No 183 of 2010 on the basis that the Debt need not be paid first. The application was dismissed by an Assistant Registrar. AML appealed and I dismissed the appeal. AML is appealing against my decision.

[3] The background was set out in the written submission for the plaintiffs which I reiterate below.

[4] I agreed that there was issue estoppel against AML. Justice Chan Seng Onn (“Chan J”) had already ruled against her contentions when he dismissed her application for a stay. If AML was not satisfied with that decision, she should have appealed against it. She did not.

[5] Moreover, the issue was canvassed again in her application to set aside the plaintiffs’ statutory demand. The latest ruling in respect of the statutory demand was the decision of Judicial Commissioner Quentin Loh (“JC Loh”) on 1 October 2009. Even if she was not bound by the decision of Chan J, she would have been bound by the decision of JC Loh. However, there was again no appeal by her.

[6] It was therefore too late for her to resurrect this issue this time in the context of the bankruptcy application.

[7] It was not open to me to reach a different decision from that of Chan J or of JC Loh.

[8] In fact, if there was a genuine dispute as to the interpretation of the order of the CA, ie, whether AML must first pay the Debt without waiting for the inquiry to be concluded, then what either side should have done was to write to the CA in CA 209/2008/Z for clarification instead of taking the point by way of argument in the courts below. The approach the parties have taken has resulted in a waste of time and money. If either party still insisted on their/her interpretation, notwithstanding the clarification, then at least the lower courts would have had the benefit of the clarification without having to consider what the CA’s order meant.

[9] AML raised one other point. She asserted that based on an affidavit filed by the plaintiffs themselves for the accounting, the eventual amount to be paid to them (after taking into account the Debt) would be no more than $1,545,129.24, which was less than $1,740,755.87. The amount claimed by the plaintiffs was therefore erroneous. However, AML was not offering to pay the $1,545,179.24.

[10] It is a well-established principle that a creditor may initiate or continue with bankruptcy proceedings, even if the sum demanded is excessive, so long as there is a sum due to the creditor which exceeds the minimum sum requirement to proceed with such proceedings (see Tan Siew Ling v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2010] SGHC 43 and Goh Chin Soon and anor v Vickers Capital Ltd [2000] 3 SLR(R) 977).

[11] In the circumstances, I dismissed AML’s appeal.