Ong Chai Hong (sole executrix of the estate of Chiang Chia Liang, deceased) v Chiang Shirley and others

Edmund Leow JC:

[1] Disputes erupted amongst the siblings of a wealthy family over the estates of their late parents. The case before me involved the estate of their late father, Chiang Chia Liang (“the Chiang estate”). It was an action brought by the executrix, who had been appointed under Chiang’s will, for various court orders and declarations in respect of the administration of his estate. All the defendants were beneficiaries of his will. The first three defendants were his children. The fourth defendant was the estate of his wife, who died after her husband. The fifth defendant was his mistress. The main players were the first and second defendants, whose dispute over the administration over their late mother’s estate had also been played out in the courts. That dispute was recently adjudicated in Chiang Shirley v Chiang Dong Pheng [2015] SGHC 98, which provides some background to the family history. As there may be more legal proceedings in relation to the case that I heard, I make no further comment except on what is necessary to resolve a narrow issue.

[3] As can be seen, the third term of the consent judgment required the second defendant to give to the first defendant a share of the balance in a bank account within six months of the order (“the Distribution Term”).

[12] Even if my confirmation had the effect of being a consequential order or further direction pursuant to the “liberty to apply” proviso in the Consent Judgment, I would not have responded differently on hearing the parties. Even if specifying the payment sequence was construed as a further direction (and I realise that the letter from the Registry on 10 February 2015 did use the term “previous direction”), I did not think that that affected the substance of the Consent Judgment. As Choo JC (as he then was) said in Koh Ewe Chee v Koh Hua Leong [2002] 1 SLR(R) 943 at [5], the “liberty to apply” order “is intended to supplement the main orders in form and convenience only so that the main orders may be carried out” (see also Tan Yeow Khoon & Anor v Tan Yeow Tat & Anor (No 2) [1999] 3 SLR(R) 717 at [10] and Anwar Siraj and another v Teo Hee Lai Building Construction Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 52 at [47]).

[13] To conclude, I was of the view that my confirmation was purely administrative in nature. I did not think that I had varied the Consent Judgment in my letter to the parties.