Ong Jane Rebecca v Pricewaterhousecoopers and Others

[1] The plaintiff, Jane Rebecca Ong, is a British National and her place of residence is the United Kingdom. The plaintiff commenced litigation proceedings in 1991 by Originating Summons No 939 of 1991 (“OS 939”) against, inter alia, her ex-husband’s mother in respect of her claim to a share in the Estate of Ong Seng King, deceased (the “Estate”).

[2] By way of a Judgement dated 16 July 2006, the High Court directed that an inquiry be held to determine the assets of the Estate and the plaintiff’s rights, share and/or entitlement in the Estate (the “Inquiry”).

[3] The first defendant, PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”), is a firm of Certified Public Accountants practicing in Singapore. PwC was engaged by the plaintiff as an expert to assist in ascertaining her rights, share and/or entitlement in the Estate and to respond to the reports prepared by the Estate’s accountants, Messrs Arthur Andersen.

[4] The second defendant, PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC UK”), is a limited liability partnership registered in the United Kingdom and is a firm of Chartered Accountants practicing in the United Kingdom.

[5] According to the plaintiff, both PwC and PwC UK were engaged by her as an expert in or around April 1999 for the purposes of the Inquiry. The plaintiff claims that PwC UK recommended PwC, their Singapore counterpart, and in particular, Mr Chan Kek Teck. PwC UK represented to the plaintiff that Mr Chan Kek Teck was well known to the Singapore Courts as an expert and was experienced in Estate matters and the administration thereof.

[6] The third defendants were, from time to time between 1996 and 2006, the plaintiff’s solicitors in respect of, inter alia, OS No. 939 of 1991.

[7] In March 2006, the plaintiff commenced an action against the three defendants under Suit No 156 of 2006/W. With respect to PwC and PwC UK, the plaintiff claims damages for breach of contract and/or breach of their duty of care when they negligently failed or neglected to act with reasonable skill or care in carrying out their duties.

[8] With respect to PwC, the plaintiff’s main allegation is that PwC had erred in the methodology adopted in its report. Although the scope of the Inquiry as directed by the Court did not allow the plaintiff to recover damages for breaches of trust committed by the personal representative of the Estate, the report prepared by PwC purported to deal with the Estate on the basis that there were breaches of trust committed by the personal representative of the Estate. This caused the number and value of the assets of the Estate to be inflated.

[9] PwC’s defence is that it had prepared its report and proceeded with the Inquiry in accordance with the express instructions of the plaintiff, as well as of her solicitors. The plaintiff is the author of her own misfortune if the instructions from the plaintiff had proceeded on an erroneous legal basis. She should therefore be precluded from claiming her loss (if any) from PwC.

[10] PwC has made a counterclaim against the plaintiff for the fees due to them in respect of their professional services rendered in connection with the Inquiry.

[11] With respect to PwC UK, the plaintiff avers that they should be liable to her to the same extent as PwC. This is because they allegedly failed to supervise the work performed by PwC. Alternatively, they should also be liable for failing to recommend a competent expert to the plaintiff.

[12] PwC UK agrees that they had recommended PwC to the plaintiff since the Inquiry was to be conducted in the Singapore Courts. PwC UK claims that the plaintiff subsequently appointed PwC and it was PwC who liaised with the plaintiff and/or her solicitor in the drafting and preparation of the report. There was no contractual relationship between PwC UK and the plaintiff, and PwC UK played no part in preparing the report. According to PwC UK, they did not owe any duty to the plaintiff to supervise the work performed by PwC and there is no evidence that PwC UK had agreed to supervise the work done by PwC.

[13] The plaintiff’s cause of action against the third defendants is primarily based on breach of retainers and the tort of negligence. The crux of the plaintiff’s claim against the third defendants is their alleged negligence in failing to plead breaches of trust in OS 939. The third defendants deny that there was any breach of retainer or negligence on their part. Their main defence is that the Statement of Claim filed in OS 939 was not prepared by them. The third defendants say they were only retained by the plaintiff to draft the written submissions and reply submissions in OS 939 after the conclusion of the trial.

[14] The third defendants have also made a counterclaim against the plaintiff for the professional fees due to them in return for the professional services they have rendered to the plaintiff.

[18] On 10 October 2008, having heard all the appeals, I made the following decisions:

(a) I dismissed RA 206, RA 207 and RA 226.

(b) I allowed RA 204 in part in that I reduced the security to be provided by the plaintiff to $70,000.

(c) I allowed RA 218 in part in that I reduced the security to be provided by the plaintiff to $40,000.

(d) I allowed RA 203 of 2008 in part in that I reduced the security to be provided by the plaintiff to $70,000.

I now give my reasons for making the above decisions.

[19] The applications by all the defendants were made pursuant to O 23 r 1(1) (a) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, 2006 Rev. Ed.). This rule provides as follows:

[22] The strength or weakness of the plaintiff’s claim is one of the relevant factors. The Court considers whether the plaintiff has a bona fide claim with a reasonable prospect of success. The decision as to whether the plaintiff’s claim is a bona fide one with a reasonable prospect of success is made without a detailed examination of the merits of the case. In Porzelack K.G. v. Porzelack (UK) Ltd [1987] 1 W.L.R. 420 at 423, Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V.C stated that:

[24] On the facts of this case, I found (and the plaintiff and third defendants have conceded) that the strength of the case is a neutral factor in the determination of whether security should be granted. I agreed with the Assistant Registrar that each of the parties has an arguable case on the face of it. The probability of success or failure cannot be clearly demonstrated without a trial.

[30] In Ho Wing On Christopher and Others v ECRC Land Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2006] 4 SLR 817 [“ECRC”], the Court of Appeal observed:

It is plain from the above passage that where the litigant is a natural person, public policy leans much more towards encouraging access to the courts.