Public Prosecutor v Chua Xun’An

District Judge Ong Chin Rhu:

[1] The Accused, Mr Chua Xun’An, pleaded guilty to one charge under section 55A(1)(a)(i) read with section 55A(1)(b)(ii) and punishable under section 55A(5) of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (“CDSA”) for entering into an arrangement with an unknown person under which the control by the said person of that person’s benefits from criminal conduct was facilitated by enabling the unknown person to operate the Accused’s bank account.

[2] The Accused was 20 years old at the time of his conviction.

[3] I called for both pre-sentence probation as well as reformative training reports on the Accused. The Accused was assessed to be unsuitable for probation. He was found to be physically and mentally fit and suitable to undergo reformative training.

[4] On 15 January 2026, I sentenced the Accused to undergo reformative training for a minimum of 6 months’ detention. I allowed the Accused’s application to defer the commencement of his sentence to 22 January 2026. Hence the Accused remained on bail after he was sentenced.

[5] The Accused, being dissatisfied with the sentence, filed an appeal on 20 January 2026. He is currently on bail pending the hearing of his appeal.

[6] The details of the charge which the Accused pleaded guilty to were as follows:

[7] The Accused admitted to the facts as set out in the Statement of Facts (“SOF”) without qualification :

[8] The Accused admitted and consented to have the following two charges be taken into consideration (“TIC”) for the purpose of sentencing:

[9] The Accused was untraced.

[10] The prosecution urged the court to order the Accused to undergo reformative training and objected to the calling of a probation suitability report.

[11] In their written address on sentence, the prosecution highlighted that the Accused was 18 years old at the time of the offences and was 20 years old when he was convicted. Applying the sentencing principles for youthful offenders set out in Public Prosecutor v Mohammad Al-Ansari bin Basri [2008] 1 SLR(R) 449 (“Al-Ansari”) and Public Prosecutor v Koh Wen Jie Boaz [2016] 1 SLR 334 (“Boaz Koh”) the prosecution submitted that the focus on rehabilitation was diminished by the need for deterrence in the present case and therefore reformative training was the better option.

[12] In support of this, the prosecution referred to the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s Guidelines for Scams-Related Offences issued on 21 August 2024 (“Scams Guidelines”) which noted that scams-related offences were typically committed by sophisticated organised criminal groups based outside Singapore. A critical component of such groups were offenders based in Singapore who handed over control of their bank accounts to the members of the syndicate, who in turn used the accounts to commit scams.

[13] The prosecution highlighted that the Guidelines recommended that the sentence for scams-related offences must be punitive enough and commensurate with the harm suffered by the victims of scams-related offences. Hence, the Guidelines stated that probation and community sentences were generally not appropriate, and that imprisonment or reformative training should be considered given the need for deterrence and the public interest in suppressing scams.

[14] The prosecution pointed out the offence-specific aggravating factors in the present case and urged the Court to consider reformative training as the appropriate sentence.

[15] In mitigation, the Accused asked to be given one more chance. The Accused shared that he was the sole income earner of the family. His parents were divorced and his mother had been certified to be unfit to work by IMH as she was suffering from depression.

[16] The Accused was 18 years old at the time of the offence and 20 years of age at the time of his conviction. Hence, in considering sentence, I was guided by the two-stage approach to sentencing of young offenders set out in Al-Ansari (at [77]), which was elaborated upon in Boaz Koh and affirmed and clarified by the Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v ASR [2019] 1 SLR 941:

(a) At the first step, the court considers whether rehabilitation remains a predominant sentencing consideration, having regard to all the circumstances of the case;

(b) At the second step, the court selects the appropriate sentencing option to give effect to the dominant sentencing consideration identified.

[17] Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the age of the Accused (both at the times of his offence and conviction) and his prior clean record, I was of the view that rehabilitation remained the dominant sentencing consideration. Therefore, the sentencing options would be, in the main, probation and reformative training: Al Ansari at [66]. Whilst I agreed with the prosecution that deterrence was also an important consideration in this case in view of the gravity of the Accused’s offences and the need to deter scams-related offences, I was not minded to exclude probation as a viable option at the outset. Hence, I proceeded to call for both pre-sentence probation and reformative training suitability reports.

[18] The pre-sentence report for reformative training dated 12 January 2026 (“RT report”) found the Accused to be suitable for reformative training. The report concluded that the Accused “presented with minimal needs that require intervention” and recommended that he undergo “Level 1 intensity of rehabilitation” if he were sentenced to reformative training .

[19] The pre-sentence probation report dated 13 January 2026 (“probation report”) assessed probation to be unsuitable for the Accused. His risk of re-offending was found to be “high” compared to other male offenders on probation orders. A number of risk factors were identified by the probation officer. These included :

[20] During the sentencing hearing following the submission of both pre-sentence reports to the Court, the prosecution observed that the probation report found the Accused unsuitable for probation and reiterated their position that reformative training was the better option for a young offender for whom rehabilitation was the primary sentencing consideration but who also required a measure of deterrence. On the other hand, after the reports were read to the Accused and his mother, the Accused urged the Court to grant him probation and/or allow him to be placed on “tagging” as he was the sole-breadwinner for the family.

[21] In deliberating the appropriate sentencing option in this case, I was guided by the considerations enunciated in Al-Ansari in determining the balance to be struck between the dominant consideration of rehabilitation and the need for deterrence. The relevant factors that the Court should consider included (Al-Ansari at [67]):

[22] I began with the seriousness of the offence. In this regard, the Scams Guidelines, which were directly applicable to the offence for which the Accused had been convicted , underscored the gravity of the Accused’s criminal acts. The Scams Guidelines highlighted that scams were a major and fast-growing concern and they were typically committed by sophisticated organised criminal groups based outside Singapore. A major cog in the scammers’ modus operandi were local bank accounts handed over by offenders based in Singapore, which were used to facilitate scams. Hence, preventing scammers from using these accounts was an essential part in the fight against scams. To this end, the Guidelines emphasised that “[t]he sentences for scams-related offences must be punitive enough” and that fines, probation and community sentences were generally not appropriate. Instead, imprisonment or reformative training, whichever was more appropriate, should be considered given the need for deterrence and the public interest in suppressing scams. The Guidelines added that this applied to all offenders, even those below the age of 21, except juvenile offenders dealt with in the Youth Court.

[23] In the present case, the gravity of the Accused’s offending conduct was also informed by the harm caused. The facts admitted by the Accused showed that within a four-day period from 3 to 6 April 2024, a total of about $47,671 flowed through the Accused’s bank account (which was the subject matter of the three charges against him), out of which $27,138 were linked to six scam reports. Additionally, it was aggravating that a significant portion of these scams-related funds (amounting to $20,538) were linked to two scam victims who were vulnerable persons aged 69 and 75 years respectively .

[24] As for the Accused’s culpability, he had opened a new bank account to be handed over and was motivated to commit the offence for personal gain . These were specifically recognised at [13(a)] and [13(d)] of the Scams Guidelines to be offence-specific aggravating factors, which, in cases where the offender was sentenced to imprisonment, would warrant an uplift in sentence.

[25] With respect to the existence of antecedents, whilst the Accused did not have any prior convictions, the probation report revealed that this was not the first time the Accused was involved in criminal activities. The probation report set out the Accused’s history of conflict with the law, which included stern warnings issued by the police in 2022 for offences of cheating, theft and criminal breach of trust.

[26] I next turn to the nature of rehabilitation best suited for the Accused. To recapitulate, the Accused was assessed to be not suitable for probation. In reviewing the findings of the probation officer, I was mindful of the principle that whilst the court was not bound to accept a probation officer’s recommendations, such recommendations generally ought to carry considerable weight: A Karthick v Public Prosecutor [2018] 5 SLR 1289 (“A Karthick”) at [78]. This was because it was the probation officer who was usually best apprised of the offender’s circumstances, and, hence, of his suitability for the probation regime. Therefore, the court should be slow to depart from the recommendations of a probation officer, unless it was clear that the circumstances upon which the probation officer’s recommendations were based were factually incorrect or had since changed materially, or there was no proper basis for the probation officer’s recommendations: A Karthick at [79]. In the present case, having perused the probation report carefully, I found no reason to depart from the recommendations in the report that probation was not a suitable option in this case.

[27] As regards the availability or adequacy of familial support in the rehabilitative efforts, the probation report highlighted concerns with the Accused’s mother’s ability to provide adequate and effective supervision of the Accused in the community and raised questions about whether there was a suitable guardian to support the Accused’s rehabilitation.

[28] In calibrating sentence, I also considered the Accused’s plea to be placed on probation as he was the sole breadwinner for the family. Whilst the Accused’s period of detention in reformative training would likely bring about hardship for his family, and in particular, his mother, the Accused must recognise that this was the consequence of his conviction for the offences he had committed. To my mind, this should not detract from the Court imposing the appropriate sentencing option for the Accused’s rehabilitation.

[29] Having carefully considered the full facts and circumstances of the case as well as those personal to the Accused, I was of the view that probation (as well as other forms of community-based sentence) would not be suitable for the Accused. Instead, reformative training was the most appropriate sentence to achieve the ends of rehabilitation in this case.

[30] The Accused was sentenced to undergo reformative training for a minimum of 6 months’ detention.

Erfendi Dhahlan (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the Public Prosecutor;

Accused in person.