General Division of the High Court · Decided 31 July 2026
Not asking an intoxicated complainant for consent defeated a mistaken-belief defence
Public Prosecutor v DYF
Feedback & support[2026] SGHC 160 · Case no. Criminal Case No 54 of 2025
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Not asking an intoxicated complainant for consent defeated a mistaken-belief defence
Summary by laws.sg·Paragraphs [287], [288]
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] The accused, [DYF], (the “Accused”), claimed trial to one charge of rape under s 375(1)(a), punishable under s 375(2), of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”). The charge read as follows:
- [2]
[2] At the conclusion of the trial, I convicted the Accused of the charge and sentenced him to imprisonment for a term of 14 years and six months and caning of 12 strokes. As the Accused has appealed against his conviction and sentence, I set out below the full grounds of my decision.
- [3]
[3] I begin by outlining the undisputed facts.
The undisputed facts
Background
- [4]
[4] At the time of the alleged offence, the Accused was 36 years old. At the material time, he was working as managing director of [Company X].
- [5]
[5] The complainant (“Complainant”), who was working at [Company Y] as a customer service officer, came to be acquainted with the Accused through work, as he was a client of [Company Y]. The Complainant left [Company Y] after working there for over four years, but subsequently rejoined the company in February 2020. As the Accused was still a client of [Company Y] at that time, he and the Complainant would occasionally contact each other.
The alleged incident
- [6]
[6] As the Accused and the Complainant coincidentally shared the same birthday, they agreed to meet for dinner on 15 September 2021 to celebrate both their birthdays. They arranged to meet at 5.30pm at The Queen & Mangosteen (“Restaurant”), a restaurant located at Vivocity shopping mall (“Vivocity”). This was the first time they were meeting in person.
- [7]
[7] On 15 September 2021, the Accused arrived at the Restaurant at about 5.40pm, followed by the Complainant who arrived at about 5.45pm. The Complainant ordered fish and chips while the Accused ordered a lamb T-bone, and they also shared a portion of calamari. They each had a glass of red wine (Merlot house pour) as there was a one-for-one promotion for happy hour. The Accused subsequently ordered two bottles of Marrenon Orca red wine. Together, the Accused and the Complainant finished both bottles of this wine. As the Complainant was feeling quite drunk, she told the Accused that she wanted to go home, and he offered to send her home. The Complainant was then living at [address redacted] (“Unit”).
- [8]
[8] At about 8.35pm, the Accused and the Complainant left the Restaurant. They made their way, first to the toilet, and then to the carpark of Vivocity. At about 8.43pm, the Accused drove the Complainant home from Vivocity in his car. The drive from Vivocity to the Complainant’s home took about 35 minutes. The Complainant sat in the front passenger seat. The Accused’s car was equipped with a front-facing dashboard camera, which captured the route taken by the car, as well as audio facilities which captured the conversation inside the car during the journey from Vivocity to the Complainant’s home. The audio-recording was admitted in evidence at trial; and a transcript prepared by the police of the conversation captured on the audio recording was also admitted. It should be noted that at trial, the Accused disagreed with various portions of the transcript prepared by the police; and in the course of re-examination, defence counsel applied for (and was granted) leave to put into evidence the Accused’s own transcription of the audio-recording (which contained the Accused’s notes and comments).
- [9]
[9] On arriving at the Complainant’s block of flats, the Accused parked his car in the open-air carpark. The Complainant and the Accused then walked from the carpark to the lift. Part of their journey on foot from the carpark to the lift was captured on CCTV video footage which was admitted in evidence at trial. CCTV video footage showed the Accused and the Complainant entering the lift at about 9.23pm and taking the lift up to the 8th floor.
- [10]
[10] At the 8th floor, the Accused followed the Complainant into the Unit. They went to the toilet, where the Complainant started trying to vomit into the toilet bowl, while the Accused patted her back. Thereafter, the Accused remained in the Unit, where he engaged in penile-vaginal intercourse with the Complainant on the bed in her bedroom.
The aftermath of the incident
- [11]
[11] CCTV video footage from police cameras (“POLCAM) showed the Accused leaving the Complainant’s Unit at about 9.50pm. At about 9.52pm, the Complainant made a “999” call to the police. The First Information Report (“FIR”) logged by the police of this “999” call noted that “Caller was crying throughout the call and did not speak up … Only managed to get her location address briefly, and the line was cut off”. At about 9.54pm, the Complainant also sent a text message to the Accused which stated: “You are too much”.
- [12]
[12] Following the Complainant’s “999” call, police officers from Yishun North Neighbourhood Police Centre were dispatched to the Unit and arrived at about 10.05pm. The Complainant was completely naked when the two police officers arrived at the Unit. She told these police officers that she had been raped. The officers’ body-worn camera footage of their interaction with the Complainant was admitted into evidence at trial. A transcript of this interaction was also prepared by the police and admitted at trial.
- [13]
[13] The Complainant was escorted to KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital (“KK Hospital”) for a medical examination. This was at about 4am on 16 September 2021. The examining doctor, Dr Han Youxiang Jonathan (“Dr Han”), reported finding old tears in the Complainant’s hymen at the 3 and 9 o’clock position, as well as a fresh 1cm laceration at her posterior fourchette that was tender on palpation with no active bleeding.
- [14]
[14] On 16 September 2021, the Complainant provided her urine and blood specimens at 4am and 4.58am respectively for toxicological analysis. Analysis showed that her urine and blood specimens contained 178mg/100ml and 82mg/100ml of ethanol respectively.
The Accused’s arrest
- [15]
[15] At about 2.00am on the same day, the Accused was placed under arrest by officers from the Serious Sexual Crime Branch (“SSCB”) of the Criminal Investigation Department.
- [16]
[16] On 16 September 2021 at around 9.15am to 9.20am, the Accused’s blood was drawn for toxicological analysis. There was no ethanol detected in the Accused’s blood specimen.
- [17]
[17] The police subsequently recorded two statements from the Accused. His first statement, under section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), was recorded at 5.49pm on 16 September 2021 in a video-recorded interview (“VRI”); while his second statement, under s 23 of the CPC, was recorded on 30 January 2024. At trial, the Defence acknowledged that these two statements were voluntarily given, and that no threat, inducement or promise was made to the Accused before or during the recording of these statements. The Defence also confirmed that the Accused did not suffer from erectile dysfunction at the material time.
The parties’ cases
The Prosecution’s case
- [18]
[18] The Prosecution’s case was that the Complainant lacked capacity to consent to the sexual intercourse due to alcohol intoxication at the material time. This was based not only on the Complainant’s testimony, but also on evidence as to how much alcohol she had consumed, as well as the signs and symptoms of intoxication that she exhibited both before and after the sexual intercourse. In this connection, the Prosecution adduced evidence, inter alia, from two expert witnesses, Associate Professor Teo Eng Swee (“Prof Teo”) of the Health Sciences Authority (“HSA”) and Dr Charles Mak Chia Meng (“Dr Mak”) of the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”).
- [19]
[19] In any event, even assuming the Complainant had the capacity to consent at the material time, she did not in fact consent to the sexual intercourse. In this respect, the Prosecution relied on the Complainant’s testimony, which was corroborated by the laceration on her vagina, her behaviour following the incident, as well as her contemporaneous accounts to the police and her boss at [Company Y] (whom she called at the first available opportunity). Additionally, according to the Prosecution, the Accused’s evidence was plagued with grave inconsistencies, which justified a finding that his credit had been impeached.
- [20]
[20] Lastly, the Prosecution submitted that the Accused could not avail himself of the defence of mistake under s 79 of the Penal Code. This was because he was aware at the material time that the Complainant was severely intoxicated. In fact, his subsequent behaviour betrayed his guilty mind.
The Accused’s defence
- [21]
[21] The Accused, on the other hand, claimed that the sexual intercourse was consensual. First, the Accused disagreed with the Prosecution on the issue of the Complainant’s capacity to consent to the sexual intercourse. The Accused argued that the Complainant’s own testimony about the events of the night of 15 September 2021 was both internally and externally inconsistent, and could not be believed. According to the Accused, the Complainant’s observed behaviour did not show her to be lacking the capacity to consent; and no weight should be given to the opinion evidence of the Prosecution’s expert witness Dr Mak.
- [22]
[22] Further, the Accused argued that the Prosecution was unable to prove the factual lack of consent from the Complainant beyond a reasonable doubt. According to the Accused, not only was the Complainant’s account of events internally and externally inconsistent, there was objective evidence corroborating the Accused’s account of consensual sexual intercourse.
- [23]
[23] In the alternative, the Accused relied on the defence of mistake, claiming that he had believed in good faith, having exercised due care and attention, that the Complainant did not lack the capacity to consent and that she consented to the sexual intercourse. In respect of the inconsistencies highlighted by the Prosecution in his evidence, the Accused argued that these inconsistencies were not of such scale and nature as to affect his credibility, and that he had moreover given cogent explanations for these inconsistencies.
The evidence adduced
The evidence led by the Prosecution
- [24]
[24] In support of its case, the Prosecution called 14 witnesses to testify at trial, with an additional 17 witnesses providing evidence through conditional statements. I summarise below the evidence of the key Prosecution witnesses.
The evidence of the key factual witnesses for the Prosecution
(1) Evidence of the events leading up to the incident of 15 September 2021
- [25]
[25] The Complainant testified that the Accused was a customer of [Company Y], with whom she had become acquainted during the first period of her employment with [Company Y]. During this period, she communicated with the Accused via email and telephone calls on the office line. Her communications with the Accused were for work-related purposes, and she never met the Accused in person during this period.
- [26]
[26] After leaving [Company Y] and then rejoining it in February 2020 for a second period of employment, the Complainant had to work from home due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and had to use her personal phone to make calls. The Accused was able to obtain her phone number after one occasion on which she forgot to privatise her phone number when calling him to finalise a shipment. Subsequently, the Complainant and the Accused would contact each other via WhatsApp and phone calls. Their conversations were mainly about work-related matters. In the course of their interaction, she came to know that she and the Accused shared the same birthday.
- [27]
[27] Sometime in September 2021, about two weeks prior to their birthdays, the Accused suggested to the Complainant that they should meet up for a meal to celebrate their birthdays. This was to be the first time that they met in person. On 14 September 2021, the Complainant and the Accused exchanged text messages in which they arranged to meet for dinner the following day at the Restaurant. In cross-examination, the Complainant was taken through some of the other messages between her and the Accused, which included her sending him two songs – one of which, she agreed, “would be described as a romantic ballad” – and “cartoon character” emojis. The Complainant agreed with defence counsel’s suggestion that some of these messages with the Accused were “friendly exchanges between two individuals who [had] a certain personal rapport” and that these “friendly exchanges” had “nothing” to do with “business or work”. However, she disagreed with the suggestion that she had a “friendly personal relationship” with the Accused or that she was “looking forward to meeting him” on the day of the incident.
(2) Evidence of the events at the Restaurant and at Vivocity
- [28]
[28] On 15 September 2021, the Complainant arrived at the Restaurant at about 5.45pm for dinner with the Accused. During the dinner, she and the Accused talked about work. At trial, the Complainant testified that at one point, the Accused asked her if she was keen to join his company and suggested that he could “[settle]” her mother’s nursing home fees. At trial, the Complainant testified that this suggestion had caused her to wonder if he was proposing a “transaction” in the sense of “having an affair outside”, since “no bosses will be willing to … settle … anybody nursing home fees …at that kind of figure”. She clarified, however, that there was no verbal “request” to that effect from the Accused, and it was her “own assumption”. In any event, she responded by telling the Accused that since he knew her boss well, he should know better than to ask her such a question.
- [29]
[29] As to the food and drinks consumed in the course of dinner, the Complainant recalled ordering fish and chips for herself. She also recalled drinking a considerable amount of wine. This started with her and the Accused having a glass of red wine each, as there was a one-for-one “Happy Hour” promotion. The Accused then suggested drinking more red wine and proceeded to order a bottle of red wine despite the Complainant telling him that she did not want to drink so much.
- [30]
[30] According to the Complainant, there were two reasons why she did not want to drink so much. As she was living alone at the time, she wanted to be able to go home sober. Moreover, she had already stopped drinking alcohol for a period of time. When she was living overseas between December 2016 and December 2019, she had hardly drunk any alcohol; and since returning to Singapore in December 2019, she had drunk alcohol on fewer than five occasions, and even then, had drunk only around two glasses of red wine on each occasion. In fact, on the occasions when she did drink, she would feel tired after around two glasses of alcohol. She felt, therefore, that her tolerance for alcohol had “dropped quite a fair bit”.
- [31]
[31] Despite the Complainant saying that she did not want to drink so much, the Accused ordered a second bottle of red wine while they were drinking from the first bottle. In all, the Complainant and the Accused finished two bottles of red wine. According to the Complainant’s estimation, she herself drank at least one bottle of red wine in total. She recalled “feeling quite drunk” and telling the Accused that she “wanted to go home”. In response, the Accused stated that he would “call a valet” to send her home. The Complainant understood this to mean that he would call “a private driver” to drive his car and to send both of them back to their respective homes.
- [32]
[32] In cross-examination, the Complainant was referred to CCTV footage from the Restaurant, which showed the interaction between her and the Accused during the dinner. The Complainant agreed that at certain points in the CCTV footage, she could be seen feeding the Accused some food and snatching his wine glass; and at one point, he could be seen holding her hand for several seconds. Based on the CCTV footage, she accepted defence counsel’s suggestion that the mood appeared “quite flirty and playful as the night progressed”. However, she asserted that this was “[u]nder the alcohol influence”; and she disagreed that there was “chemistry” between her and the Accused. In fact, she had no recollection of doing things such as feeding the Accused and snatching his wine glass. According to the Complainant, insofar as events in the Restaurant were concerned, she could only remember what happened up to 7.01pm, when she was shown following the Accused out of the restaurant as he wanted to smoke. She could also remember smoking “a few puffs” when asked to do so by the Accused and then walking back to the Restaurant after he finished smoking, but was unable to recall much of what happened thereafter. While she was able to recall “some of the images thereafter” when shown the CCTV footage, she could not recall exact details.
- [33]
[33] The Complainant could not remember how she left the Restaurant, what she did after leaving the Restaurant, or how she got into the Accused’s car. At trial, the Complainant was shown CCTV footage of her leaving the Restaurant, entering and then exiting a toilet in Vivocity, walking with the Accused around Vivocity, and going down an escalator with him. Her evidence was that she had no recollection of any of these events. It was also pointed out to her that the footage showed the Accused putting his hand on her shoulder and holding on to her hand at various points: she noted that from the footage, she appeared to be “try[ing] to shake him off” and/or to “pull [herself] away” at these points but stated that she could not actually remember doing these things.
(3) Evidence of the journey from Vivocity to the Unit
- [34]
[34] The next thing that the Complainant could remember was being “half awake” and finding herself in the Accused’s car. She recalled opening her eyes because she “wanted to vomit”. It was then that she saw the Accused driving the car; and she felt “shocked” because he had been drinking as well and should not have driven. When she was referred to the police transcript of the in-car audio-recording, the Complainant was unable to recall most of the conversation shown in the transcript. She could recall, however, asking for a plastic bag because she “wanted to vomit”; and she also recalled grabbing and vomiting into a tissue box which was in the Accused’s car. In her conditioned statement and in examination-in-chief, she also gave evidence that at some point during the car journey, the Accused wanted her to give him a blowjob: she “[could not] remember the exact details” but she thought the Accused might have conveyed this request for a blowjob through some “hand sign”. In cross-examination, however, she acknowledged that she was “not sure” about this as she was “under the alcohol influence” at the time.
- [35]
[35] Next, according to the Complainant, she remembered the Accused saying “[a]rrived already” when they were downstairs from her house, at which point she brought the tissue box out of the car and left it on the road “behind the car”. She did not have any recollection of how she got from the carpark to the lift lobby. When referred to the CCTV footage showing her waiting for the lift together with the Accused, the Complainant was able to recall that she felt “very weak” at the time and noted that the footage showed her needing “someone to hold” on to her.
- [36]
[36] Upon entering her flat, the Complainant removed her shoes and placed them on the shoe rack. She did not realise that the Accused had also entered her flat until she turned and saw his shoes. She was “shocked”, but as she was feeling tired and intoxicated, she went into her bedroom to lie on her bed.
(4) Evidence of the incident in the Unit
- [37]
[37] Per the Complainant’s conditioned statement, the next thing she remembered was lying on her bed and feeling “like vomiting”. She recalled the Accused being on top of her and trying to remove her clothes. She could not remember exactly which item of clothing he was trying to remove, but she was aware of “someone … touching [her] clothing”. She tried to push the Accused away but did not have the strength. When she told the Accused that she wanted to vomit, he got off her, and she went to the kitchen toilet to vomit into the toilet bowl. She could not remember whether the Accused supported her as she walked to the toilet, but was certain that the Accused was beside her when she was “squatting down” in the toilet and “try[ing] to vomit”. After she vomited, she returned to her bedroom with the Accused supporting her.
- [38]
[38] The Complainant next remembered “feeling something pushing against [her] vagina with force”. When she opened her eyes, she found herself naked: she knew that it was the Accused’s penis that was pushing against her vagina because “when [she] was awake for that few moments”, she could see that he was on top of her naked body. She did not know what had happened to her clothes and had no recollection of removing them.
- [39]
[39] As the Complainant had not consented to sexual intercourse with the Accused, she was “really shocked and felt lost”. At the same time, she felt that she had no control over her body and no energy to fight back. She described herself as “drifting in and out” at this juncture. She remembered asking the Accused to stop; and when asked in cross-examination to describe how she asked the Accused to stop, she recalled using her hand to touch his head or forehead, “like trying to push him away”, but could not remember if she said anything. She could recall that when she pushed at the Accused with her hand, he “did pause and [stopped] and got off [her]”. She did not know if he stopped “for good” as she could not remember the “exact details” thereafter. All she knew was that “the next moment, [she] fell unconscious again”. She described this as being a state in which she was “totally black[ed] out and totally unconscious”, “not aware what is going on”.
(5) Evidence of the post-incident events on the night of 15 September 2021
- [40]
[40] Sometime later, the Complainant became aware that she was totally naked. She jumped off her bed to look for the Accused “around [her] home” but could not find him. She also searched for her phone as she wanted to call for help. Upon finding her phone, she tried to make an emergency “999” call, but mistakenly placed a call to her friend before eventually making an emergency “999” call at 9.49pm. At trial, after listening to the playback of the audio recording of this “999” call, the Complainant described her emotions during this phone call as having been “unstable”. The transcript prepared by the police of this “999” call showed that it lasted less than two minutes and that the Complainant was crying for the entire duration of the call. She did not state the nature of her emergency, but in response to a question from the “999” operator as to whether she was “okay”, she stated that she was “not okay”. The operator managed to elicit information from her about her address and told her to “calm down” as officers were on the way.
- [41]
[41] Following her “999” call, the Complainant made four calls to the Accused as she wanted to confront him about why he had sexually assaulted her. The Accused did not answer these calls. The Complainant then sent the Accused a text message at 9.55pm which stated, “You are too much”. At trial, her evidence was that she meant that the Accused was “too much as in he did not get [her] consent”, and what he had done to her was sexual assault.
- [42]
[42] At 9.56pm, the Complainant called her boss, [C]. At trial, she was unable to remember what she told [C] during this phone call. However, she recalled that she had called [C] because the Accused was one of [Company Y]’s customers and [C] knew the Accused; and she needed “someone” to know what she was “facing at that point of time”. She also wanted [C] to know that she would not be able “to fully concentrate on [her] work during that period”.
- [43]
[43] On [C]’s part, he gave evidence in his conditioned statement that he was unable to hear what the Complainant was saying in this phone call at 9.56 pm because she was “crying very loudly”. He did hear the Complainant uttering the Mandarin words “侵犯” and saying that the police had arrived before she hung up. On checking the meaning of the Mandarin words “侵犯”, [C] “understood it to be like someone invading her or attacking her in close contact”. He then realised that “something bad had happened to [the Complainant]”; and from the manner in which she had “reacted during the phone call with the words … she used”, he suspected that it was “sexual related”. [C] subsequently received two more phone calls from the Complainant at 10.09pm and 10.24pm respectively, during which the latter was still “crying, crying, non stop”. She told him that she was “scared about her reputation” and “afraid” that her colleagues would “find out … this thing”. She did not explain to [C] what she was afraid of her colleagues finding out. At some point during these two phone calls, [C] also spoke to a female police officer on the Complainant’s phone and told the officer that he “could not hear [the Complainant] properly as she was crying throughout”. Eventually, at about 11.03pm, he had a fourth phone conversation with the Complainant when he called her back after noticing that he had several missed calls from her. It was then that she told him “that the person involved was [the Accused]”. According to [C], it was during this phone conversation that the Complainant stated that she “felt like asking the police to give her a knife so that she could kill herself” and “asked why it had to be her”. She also sent him a number of text messages later, between 1.44am and 2.05am, stating that she did not want to handle the account of [Company X] (the Accused’s company) or to see the Accused again.
- [44]
[44] In the meantime, after having failed to pick up the Complainant’s calls, the Accused called her mobile number at 9.57pm. She did not pick up his call. At 10.05pm, two police officers – Sgt Vernis Chua Xin Ni (“Sgt Vernis”) and SI Lim Kai Shen Lucius (“SI Lucius”) – arrived at the Unit. At this point, Sgt Vernis’ body-worn camera (“BWC”) was switched on. Part of the interaction between the Complainant and the two police officers was captured on the BWC footage, which was played at trial. According to Sgt Vernis, the time reflected on her BWC footage was “about [seven] minutes slower than real time”.
- [45]
[45] The Complainant testified that when the police officers arrived at the Unit, she was “behind the main door crying”. She felt “very frightened” and “very lost”, and remembered thinking that she needed “a female police officer … to come and rescue [her] and help [her]”.
- [46]
[46] The Complainant was unable to remember what she told the police officers who arrived at the Unit after the incident. The BWC footage showed that at some point following the police officers’ arrival, the Complainant told Sgt Vernis that she needed to speak to her “boss”, before calling [C] and telling him, inter alia, “Boss … you don’t tell others”. When referred to the transcript of this BWC footage at trial, the Complainant recalled that what she had meant was that she did not want “others” to know about the sexual assault she had experienced because she did not know “how others would see [her] at that point of time”.
- [47]
[47] On their part, both Sgt Vernis and SI Lucius gave evidence that when they arrived at the Unit, they heard a female voice – which they later established to be the Complainant’s – “wailing while requesting for a female officer” and “claim[ing] that she had been raped”. Upon the door being opened, Sgt Vernis entered the Unit and found the Complainant “completely naked and crying hysterically”. When Sgt Vernis asked the Complainant if she wanted to get dressed, the latter replied that she was “very scared [she] get pregnant”. After covering the Complainant with a towel, Sgt Vernis sought to gather the facts of the case from her and was able to ascertain the Accused’s name and contact number. At some point, the Complainant stated that she needed to call her boss and did so (see [46] above). The Complainant also went to the toilet after stating that she “wanted to vomit”. At trial, Sgt Vernis testified that she believed the Complainant to be drunk at the time because she was “crying non-stop”, “dragging out her sentences” when she spoke, and appeared “a little bit unsteady” when walking. She also recalled – with reference to part of the BWC footage – that the Complainant did not vomit in the toilet but vomited on her return to the bedroom, and that she handed the Complainant some tissue because of the vomiting.
- [48]
[48] At about 10.26pm, two other police officers – Sgt Nur Raudha binte Sheikh Abdul Nazir (“Sgt Raudha”) and SC/Sgt R Sabarish (“Sgt Sabarish”) – arrived at the Unit. Sgt Raudha’s evidence was that the Complainant was covered by a “piece of cloth” but otherwise naked when she and Sgt Sabarish arrived. At this juncture, according to Sgt Raudha, the Complainant was “in distress” and “crying uncontrollably”; and they had “a bit of difficulty calming her down”. As Sgt Raudha was rubbing the Complainant’s back and consoling her, she could smell “alcohol smell” on the latter’s breath. The two female officers then spoke to the Complainant together, in the course of which she informed them that she had met her client at the Queen and Mangosteen earlier that day to celebrate their birthdays; that she had become drunk after they both drank wine; that the client had offered to send her home; that she had subsequently declined his offer to accompany her to her unit; and that he had followed her into the flat anyway and eventually sexually assaulted her in her bedroom. Sgt Raudha’s evidence was that the Complainant was still crying while answering questions from the officers, and that she “only managed to make out short sentences” in answer to their questions.
- [49]
[49] At about 11.30pm on 15 September 2021, ASP See Kwee Tan Maybelin (“ASP Maybelin”) – one of the investigation officers (“IOs”) in charge of the case – arrived at the Unit together with DSP Muhammad Fadzridin Fadzil Amir (“DSP Fadzridin”). Upon approaching the Complainant’s bedroom, ASP Maybelin found that the bedroom smelled strongly of alcohol and vomit. The Complainant was then on the bed, “continuously crying”, “not in a very good emotional state”, and “not really responding to the questions” being asked of her by the police. At some point, the Complainant was asked to show ASP Maybelin the clothing and footwear which she had worn earlier in the evening. ASP Maybelin also spoke to her about what had happened that evening, but was unable to recall at trial the details of the Complainant’s responses.
- [50]
[50] DSP Mohammad Amin s/o Majid (“DSP Amin”), who was the officer in charge of the SSCB at the time of the incident, arrived at the Unit at about 1.10am on 16 September 2021. He found ASP Maybelin “trying to calm [the Complainant] down” as the latter was then “shrieking”. Both he and ASP Maybelin sat on the floor to speak to the Complainant, who was then seated either on a chair or on the armrest of a chair. At this point, he could tell that the Complainant had been consuming alcohol because while she was speaking to them, he smelled alcohol from her breath. At trial, DSP Amin recalled that the Complainant informed them about having gone for dinner and drinks with a “client who shared the same birthday” and having had “a bit too much to drink”. The Complainant told them that the client had sent her home; that upon entering the Unit, she had gone to the toilet to vomit before going to her bedroom; and that penile-vaginal rape had then allegedly taken place in the bedroom.
(6) Evidence arising from the Complainant’s medical examination on 16 September 2021
- [51]
[51] The Complainant was subsequently brought to KK Hospital, where she was examined by Dr Han at about 4am on 16 September 2021. The Complainant described her state of mind at that juncture as being “tired, emotional, unstable” and “very lost”. At trial, Dr Han testified that the medical examination would have started with his asking the Complainant for her bio-data and past medical history before asking her about the incident. According to Dr Han’s report, the Complainant recounted having dinner with the Accused (“her client”), during which “they ordered two bottles of red wine as well as a few additional glasses of red wine”. She then gave him the following account of events:
- [52]
[52] At trial, Dr Han explained that for the history-taking, he asked open-ended questions and jotted down the information provided by the Complainant before organising his notes and typing up the eventual medical report. The phrases indicated in open inverted commas in his report represented the Complainant’s exact words, while “[e]verything else” would have been paraphrased by him. Dr Han recalled that the history-taking in this case was “more challenging than normal” because the Complainant was “distressed”, “in tears”, and “wanted to even give up the [medical] examination” at one point, saying that she “just wanted to sleep and rest”. He observed that she was intoxicated, as he could “smell her alcohol breath” while seated about one metre away from her, and he saw her retching during the interview and even vomiting into a plastic bag. In addition, as she was walking to the examination couch, he saw that “her gait was not steady”, and she “was swaying to … some extent”.
- [53]
[53] In respect of the physical findings from the examination, Dr Han’s report noted, inter alia, a “fresh 1cm laceration” at the Complainant’s posterior fourchette (the lower end of the opening of the vagina) which was “tender on palpation but there was no active bleeding”. He observed that “the edges of the wound looked raw” and that healing of the wound did not appear to have started yet. At trial, Dr Han’s evidence was that a laceration on the posterior fourchette would potentially be caused by “trauma from straddle injury, sexual penetration, foreign body insertion or violence”. When asked to explain the circumstances in which sexual penetration could cause such an injury, Dr Han testified that “[a] posterior fourchette laceration is usually the … most common occurrence of genitalia injury following sexual assault”. He explained that “for sexual penetration, usually pain would be a limiting factor”, in that the “person receiving penetration may tell the person giving penetration to stop or to change position”; further, that in consensual sexual intercourse “where both parties are stimulated accordingly”, there would usually be “natural lubrication from arousal” which would “help with entry” and “thus reduce the chances of laceration at the external genitalia”. In response to defence counsel’s questions in cross-examination, Dr Han agreed that a laceration of the posterior fourchette could occur even in the absence of any “resistance” during sexual penetration, although he noted that this was “less likely”. He also agreed that such an injury might “even not be related to any sexual activity”, and that at the point of examining the Complainant, he would not be able to determine whether the laceration seen on her posterior fourchette was “due to consensual or non-consensual intercourse”.
- [54]
[54] In the course of the medical examination, Dr Han also took, inter alia, a vulva swab, a low vaginal swab, a high vaginal swab, an endocervical swab, an urethral swab, a low anal swab and a high anal swab. At trial, Dr Han was informed that semen was found on the vulva swab, the low vaginal swab and the urethral swab, and that tests were also indicative of the presence of semen on the high vaginal swab. When asked by the Prosecution whether, if the Accused had ejaculated externally (ie, on the Complainant’s stomach), he would expect there to be semen on the swabs taken from the low and high vaginal areas, Dr Han testified that he would not expect semen to be found in those areas. Dr Han explained that if the Complainant had wiped herself down (ie, wiped off the semen from her stomach), and then proceeded to wipe her external genital area, that could potentially bring semen downwards and contaminate the swabs taken. However, even if the Complainant had done this (ie, wiped herself down by wiping off the semen from the stomach and then wiped her genitalia), Dr Han still would not expect to find semen in the high vaginal swab because he would assume that if the Complainant were to wipe herself down, she “would not wipe … all the way into her vagina because that is usually very uncomfortable”. Further, as Dr Han explained, the high vaginal swab was taken using a speculum that would usually extend about 6 to 7cm into the vagina: as such, for a substance to be found on the high vaginal swab, the penetration had to be about 6 to 7cm into the vagina.
(7) Evidence of the amount of alcohol consumed by the Complainant on 15 September 2021
- [55]
[55] The Prosecution also led evidence at trial of the amount of alcohol consumed by the Complainant on the night of 15 September 2021. ASP Ong Lee Peng (“ASP Ong”) testified that her review of the CCTV footage from the Restaurant showed the Complainant to have consumed one glass of Merlot house pour and about nine glasses (including one tasting portion) of Marrenon Orca wine. In the course of investigations, ASP Ong was able to establish that a standard portion of wine – as poured by the Restaurant staff – was about 100ml–125ml, while a tasting portion “would be lesser than a standard portion”. Having reviewed the CCTV footage from the Restaurant, ASP Ong’s observation was that the Complainant “either finished or almost finished her glass” before it was refilled. Through her investigations, ASP Ong was also able to establish that the alcohol concentration of the Merlot house pour was 14%, while the alcohol concentration of the Marrenon Orca was 15%.
- [56]
[56] Based on the above evidence, ASP Ong also calculated the pure ethanol content in the following drinks:
(a) One glass of Merlot house pour of 125ml: 17.5ml of pure ethanol.
(b) One glass of 100ml of Marrenon Orca wine: 15ml of pure ethanol.
(c) Eight glasses of 100ml of Marrenon Orca wine: 120ml of pure ethanol.
(d) One bottle of 750ml of Marrenon Orca wine: 112.5ml of pure ethanol.
Evidence from the Prosecution’s first expert witness: Associate Professor Teo Eng Swee
- [57]
[57] As noted above at [14], analysis of the blood specimen provided by the Complainant at 4.58am on 16 September 2021 showed her blood alcohol concentration at that time to be 82 mg/100ml. Prof Teo of the Forensic Medicine Division at the HSA was called as an expert witness to opine on the Complainant’s likely blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident on 15 September 2021.
(1) Five key points about Prof Teo’s evidence
- [58]
[58] In the interests of clarity, I highlight five points about Prof Teo’s evidence. First, it should be noted that Prof Teo’s evidence was that the terms “blood alcohol concentration”, “blood alcohol level” and “blood ethanol level” were used interchangeably. The Defence did not dispute this. For consistency and ease of reference, the term “blood alcohol concentration” (“BAC”) is used in these written grounds.
- [59]
[59] Second, in calculating the various likely BAC values, Prof Teo employed – in the alternative – the “backward calculation” method and the “forward calculation” method. In examination-in-chief, Prof Teo explained that the backward calculation method involved “trying to calculate … a BAC in the past” using a known BAC at a specific point in time. In the present case, this would mean taking, as a starting point, the Complainant’s BAC of 82 mg/100ml as at 4.58am on 16 September 2021 and then, assuming a certain hourly rate of elimination of alcohol from the bloodstream, working backwards to derive an estimated value for the Complainant’s BAC at a point in time prior to 4.58am on 16 September 2021. The “forward calculation” method, on the other hand, involved taking, as a starting point, the number of drinks ingested by the individual in question, and applying an algorithm (the “Widmark equation”) to derive an estimated BAC at a later point in time after the consumption of the last drink. In the present case, Prof Teo was initially asked by the Prosecution to assume that the Complainant had consumed seven standard drinks. In this connection, as Prof Teo explained in his second report dated 19 June 2023, a “standard drink” is a “hypothetical alcoholic beverage which contains a defined fixed amount of alcohol”. Generally speaking, a standard drink “can be said to contain about 8g to 10g of ethanol”; and roughly, “1ml of pure ethanol is about 0.79g of ethanol”, which would mean that “10g of ethanol is equivalent to about 12.66 ml of ethanol”. In the context of the forward calculation method, one standard drink would thus contain 12.7ml of pure ethanol (rounding up from 12.66 ml); and an assumed quantity of seven standard drinks would translate into 88.9ml of pure ethanol.
- [60]
[60] Third, it should be noted that Prof Teo prepared several reports. His first report, dated 13 November 2021, used the “backward calculation method” to derive the Complainant’s likely BAC at certain points in time on the night of 15 September 2021. His second report, dated 19 June 2023, used the “forward calculation” method to derive the Complainant’s likely BAC at certain points in time on 15 September 2021. Shortly thereafter, he prepared a corrigendum of the second report dated 21 July 2023 to correct some errors in that report. Subsequently, on 6 September 2025, he also prepared a corrigendum of his first report to correct errors in that report. The final, corrected versions of his first and second reports are found in exhibit P5 at P5-4 to P5-12 and at P5-13 to P5-17 respectively.
- [61]
[61] Fourth, it should also be noted that although Prof Teo was initially asked to assume (for the purposes of the “forward calculation” method in his second report) that the Complainant had consumed seven standard drinks (and thus 88.9ml of pure ethanol), he was asked in examination-in-chief to perform additional “forward calculations” in two other alternative scenarios: one in which the total amount of pure ethanol consumed was 137.5ml and another in which the total amount of pure ethanol consumed was 130ml. The Prosecution explained that while there was no “absolutely reliable evidence as to how much was drunk” by the Complainant, these two other alternative scenarios were based on “a more accurate estimate” of the amount of wine consumed by the Complainant, based on what could be observed from the CCTV footage as well as the Complainant’s own testimony. The scenario involving 137.5ml of pure ethanol took into account ASP Ong’s evidence that in her review of the CCTV footage from the Restaurant, she observed the Complainant consuming one glass of Merlot house pour with an alcohol concentration of 14% and nine glasses (including one tasting portion) of wine with an alcohol concentration of 15% (see [55] above). The scenario involving 130ml of pure ethanol, on the other hand, was based on the Complainant’s unchallenged testimony that of the two bottles of Marrenon Orca wine ordered on the night of 15 September 2021, she estimated that she herself had consumed “at least one bottle”. In this connection, I was satisfied that there was no prejudice to the Accused, as the Defence had nearly a month in which to review the additional calculations prior to cross-examining Prof Teo.
- [62]
[62] Fifth, on the issue of how quickly alcohol might be eliminated from an individual’s bloodstream, Prof Teo testified that various studies had shown “a wide range” of elimination rates which could vary from 10mg/100ml per hour to 35 mg/100ml per hour. Prof Teo cited medical literature in which it was stated that “[a]s a generalisation, it has traditionally been assumed that blood alcohol declines after the peak is reached at the rate of around 15 milligrams per hour” (“peak BAC” being defined as “the highest level” that one’s BAC would reach if one drank alcohol and then stopped drinking). Prof Teo explained that “two different persons may have two different elimination rates” and that even the elimination rate of “the same person” may vary “from time to time”, but that the elimination rate of 15 mg/100ml per hour was an “average” rate which usually applied to “naïve drinkers … [who] have never drunk alcohol” or “social drinkers, that means they drink small amounts of alcohol, maybe in the region of one to two glasses of wine in a social situation in each event”. Compared to “naïve” drinkers and social drinkers, regular drinkers who drank alcohol every day or heavy drinkers who drank the equivalent of five to seven standard drinks daily would have higher elimination rates.
(2) Prof Teo’s calculations estimating the Complainant’s BAC upon arriving at her block of flats at 9.23pm on 15 September 2021
- [63]
[63] In the course of his testimony at trial, Prof Teo produced calculations estimating the Complainant’s BAC at 9.23pm on 15 September 2021 (the undisputed time of arrival at her block of flats) based alternatively on the backward calculation method and the forward calculation method, and using three different assumed alcohol elimination rates (10mg/100ml per hour, 15mg/100ml per hour, and 35mg/100ml per hour). A table setting out Prof Teo’s calculations was admitted in evidence as exhibit P5B. I reproduce this table below:
Table of Blood Alcohol Concentration Calculations at 9.23pm on 15 September 2021 (time of arrival at victim’s block)
- [64]
[64] Having produced the above calculations, Prof Teo testified that there were two factors which could affect the BAC figures derived from these calculations. First, his calculations assumed that the Complainant had consumed the alcohol on an empty stomach. On the other hand, if she had eaten food while drinking the alcohol, then the BAC values in the above table would “probably be an overestimate of the true BAC”. This was because if an individual ate food while drinking the alcohol, his or her body would take a longer time to absorb the ethanol from the stomach, particularly if the food in question was “very high in protein and fat” – as compared to an individual drinking alcohol on an empty stomach. This meant that an individual who ate food while drinking alcohol would take a longer time to reach peak BAC, and his or her peak BAC would also be lower – as compared to an individual drinking alcohol on an empty stomach. Prof Teo cautioned, however, that it was “not possible to really quantify exactly … how much later and how much lower”. At one point, he suggested that there might be a difference of “50 to 100mg/100ml” between the calculated BAC of an individual assumed to be drinking on an empty stomach and the actual BAC if the same individual ate while drinking the same amount of alcohol. However, he cautioned that these suggested figures were simply “an assumption”, and that there was no scientific basis for them.
- [65]
[65] The second assumption underlying the calculation of the BAC values in the table above related to the length of time taken for the consumption of the alcohol. In calculating the above BAC values, Prof Teo assumed that the alcohol was “ingested over a relatively short period of time, in the region of 15, 30 minutes”. If, on the other hand, the alcohol in question was consumed over a period of around three hours (as per the facts of the present case), this “would also lead to a lower peak in the BAC”. Prof Teo was unable to say exactly how much lower the peak BAC would be in a scenario where the Complainant consumed the alcohol over three hours.
- [66]
[66] Having made the above qualifications to his evidence, Prof Teo did proceed to suggest that one way to obtain a “very conservative estimate” as to how much lower an individual’s true peak BAC could be in a scenario where the alcohol was consumed in a three-hour period might be to “minus 45” from the calculated peak BAC figure, on the basis that the individual in question would be eliminating the alcohol at the “traditional elimination rate” of 15 mg/100ml per hour. Noting that the calculated peak BAC figure would have been derived on the assumption that the individual drank the alcohol over a short period of time (eg, half an hour), Prof Teo stated that his suggestion was a “proxy method” for estimating what the peak BAC might be if the same individual drank the same amount of alcohol over three hours. In cross-examination, Prof Teo was asked for his comments on an article, John Searle, “Alcohol calculations and their uncertainty” (2015) 55(1) Medicine, Science and the Law 58, which – according to the Defence – posited a “dilution model” for “calculat[ing] a BAC level where [one would] have to take into consideration the time at which the drinking session begins”. Prof Teo’s evidence was that the “dilution model” was an attempt to account “for how many hours the alcohol has been drunk and then factor in the elimination”, but that there was “no scientific basis to say that this is a correct way of doing it”.
- [67]
[67] In re-examination, Prof Teo also clarified that the suggested subtraction of 45mg (based on an elimination rate of 15mg/100ml per hour) assumed that most of the alcohol was consumed at “the beginning of the drinking session”. He posited that if, instead, the alcohol were consumed steadily over three hours, “a midpoint would probably be a reasonable estimate”. Using the BAC figure of 146mg/100ml in the table above (derived from the forward calculation method and premised on seven standard drinks having been consumed) as an example, the “midpoint” BAC would be the midpoint of the range of figures between 146 and 101 – the latter being derived by subtracting 45mg from the figure of 146 mg/100ml. In other words, assuming the Complainant had steadily consumed seven standard drinks of 12.7ml of pure ethanol each over three hours, Prof Teo’s estimation was that her BAC would be “roughly in the range of 120-plus” mg/100ml.
(3) Other evidence from Prof Teo
- [68]
[68] Finally, Prof Teo also provided three extracts from medical literature showing the general spectrum of behaviour expected from persons at various BAC levels. The information set out in these extracts was not disputed by the Defence at trial; and for ease of reference, copies of the three extracts are attached to these written grounds as Annex 1, Annex 2 and Annex 3 respectively.
- [69]
[69] In his testimony, Prof Teo went through the range of behaviour to be expected at certain BAC levels. For example, referring to the extract at Annex 1 from Pekka Saukko & Bernard Knight, Knight’s Forensic Pathology (CRC Press, 4th Ed, 2013) (“Knight’s Forensic Pathology”) at p 584, and taking the BAC value of 195.7mg/100ml (derived from the backward calculation method and premised on an elimination rate of 15mg/100ml per hour) from the above table, Prof Teo noted that an individual with such a BAC would be expected to exhibit the range of behaviour applicable at a BAC range of 150 to 200 mg/100ml, ie, “obvious drunkenness, nausea, staggering gait”. This was explained by Prof Teo as:
Evidence from the Prosecution’s second expert witness: Dr Charles Mak Chia Meng
- [70]
[70] Dr Mak, a psychiatrist with the IMH, was called as the Prosecution’s second expert witness. He produced two reports: a first report dated 25 October 2023, and a supplementary report dated 3 October 2025. The first report was prepared after an interview which Dr Mak conducted with the Complainant on 23 October 2023 and contained, inter alia, information provided by the Complainant about her personal background, drinking history, relationship with the Accused, and the incident of alleged rape on 15 September 2021. The supplementary report contained, inter alia, responses by Dr Mak to the opinions expressed by the Defence’s expert witness, Dr Jacob Rajesh, in the latter’s report dated 4 September 2025. In preparing his reports, Dr Mak had access not only to the information provided by the Complainant, but also to the CCTV footage from the Restaurant, Vivocity and the Complainant’s HDB block; the audio recording from the Accused’s in-car dashboard camera; Dr Han’s medical report; Dr Teo’s expert reports; and the various reports from the HSA Forensic Medical Division. Dr Mak’s evidence dealt with three main areas: the effects of alcohol – generally speaking – on the behaviour of individuals; his opinion as to the Complainant’s likely BAC level at the time of the incident and his observations as to the effects of alcohol on the Complainant; his analysis of the framework to be used for assessing an individual’s capacity to consent to an activity and his comments on how this would apply in the Complainant’s case in terms of her capacity to consent to sexual activity at the material time.
(1) Behavioural effects of alcohol
- [71]
[71] Using the table from Knight’s Forensic Pathology (Annex 1) for illustration purposes, Dr Mak explained that the expected behavioural effects of alcohol set out in this table were premised on the individual in question being a “casual” or “social” drinker, ie, “a person who drinks on social basis … with his or her friends, but not on a habitual and heavy basis”. Such an individual would “expect to see a larger degree of … symptoms within a specific range”, whereas a “heavy and habitual drinker” (ie, a person who drinks alcohol on a daily basis and may fulfil the diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorder) “may not exhibit the large degree of symptoms” set out for the various BAC ranges in Annex 1.
- [72]
[72] Elaborating on the general behavioural effects of alcohol, Dr Mak noted that alcohol had “a global effect on the brain”, which included “impairment of the cerebellum which is involved in coordination and balance”, as well as effects on other parts of the brain, such as “in the frontal and parietal lobes which are involved in attention, memory and executive functioning”. In respect of executive functioning, this related to decision-making and involved the prefrontal cortex. When an individual consumed alcohol, the prefrontal cortex would be impaired, which would in turn affect the individual’s capacity to weigh the benefits and potential consequences before coming to a decision. At the same time, Dr Mak highlighted that the threshold for whether an individual had mental capacity to make a decision would differ, depending on the type of decision that needed to be made and its potential impact and consequences. In other words, at a certain BAC level, an individual might be said to have the mental capacity to make simple decisions – eg, whether to drink a cup of water – whereas at the same BAC level, the same individual might not have the mental capacity to make complex decisions such as legal or financial decisions.
- [73]
[73] Specifically in respect of alcoholic blackouts, Dr Mak testified that this was a phenomenon observed in “people who have been intoxicated to a significant level … [who] may have difficulty remembering certain details, certain events that may have occurred during the period of intoxication”. Per Dr Mak’s evidence, alcoholic blackouts “occur at higher levels of intoxication”: in terms of BAC levels, scientific literature “tends to point to” alcoholic blackouts occurring at BAC levels of 140mg/100ml to 200mg/100ml.
- [74]
[74] Dr Mak explained that there were two types of alcoholic blackouts. The first – fragmentary blackouts – referred to the affected individual being able only to remember certain details and events which might have occurred. The second – en bloc blackouts – referred to a complete loss of memory of events which might have occurred over a discrete time period. Further, as Dr Mak noted, “alcoholic memory blackout” was a “separate phenomenon” which “[did] not relate to the matter of mental capacity”, as the “mechanism” behind alcoholic blackouts was “an impairment in encoding of long-term memory”. An affected individual might appear to be functioning normally at the material time – eg, walking unsupported, making telephone calls, carrying on an apparently lucid conversation – and yet such an individual might at the same time have an alcoholic memory blackout in terms of not being able to encode long-term memories. There were generally no external signs of an alcoholic blackout that other persons would be able to observe: as Dr Mak put it:
(2) The effect of alcohol on the Complainant and her likely BAC level at the time of the incident
- [75]
[75] As to the Complainant’s likely BAC level at the time of the incident, Dr Mak opined in his first report that her BAC at the material time would likely have been “close to the level of 0.2% (200mg/100ml)”. At trial, Dr Mak explained that he formed this view on the basis, firstly, of Prof Teo’s BAC calculations. Specifically, he noted that using the backward calculation method and applying an elimination rate of 15mg/100ml, Prof Teo had estimated the Complainant’s BAC to be 195.7mg/100ml as at 9.23pm on 15 September 2021 (ie, at the time of arriving at her block of flats) (see above at [63]). In Dr Mak’s view, the backward calculation method was “the most appropriate to be used in this matter” because it involved “an objective measure which [was] in the form of a blood ethanol level which had been obtained from the [Complainant]”. Like Prof Teo, Dr Mak also referenced medical literature which indicated that generally, where food was ingested with alcohol, peak BAC “may be expected to occur at a later point of time” due to the ability of the food to “act as a sponge of sorts” for the alcohol. In the Complainant’s case, Dr Mak opined that her behaviour as seen on CCTV footage suggested that her BAC would likely have approached peak level at around the time she was outside the lift lobby. This was because the footage showed that she was generally able to walk unsupported after leaving the Restaurant at around 8.30pm, whereas by the time she reached her lift lobby around 53 minutes later, she had “developed features in keeping with a staggering gait, with swaying of her torso, toppling forward and requiring assistance from the Accused to be physically stabilised”.
- [76]
[76] Second, according to Dr Mak, other sources of information apart from Prof Teo’s calculations supported the view that the Complainant’s BAC at the material time was likely close to 200mg/100ml. The Complainant’s own account of the incident described features such as “alcoholic memory blackout phenomenon and also the impairment in her consciousness … that she had been drifting in and out of consciousness” – these being features “consistent with significant level of intoxication”. In cross-examination, Dr Mak explained that it was not the role of a psychiatrist to determine whether an alleged victim’s account of events was true, and that he had to “note whether [the Complainant’s] reported symptoms [were] … in keeping with other sources of information” such as “observed” or “objective” findings. In particular, there was evidence that the Complainant had “vomited in the car” and that CCTV footage from her lift lobby showed her exhibiting “a staggering gait” – both these things being features of “a BAC range at around the level of 0.2%”.
- [77]
[77] In examination-in-chief, Dr Mak also testified that the Complainant’s account of her condition at the time of the incident – including her description of having suddenly realised she was being raped and of “drifting in and out of consciousness” – was indicative of her having been in a state of stupor at the material time. Dr Mak described “stupor” as being “a state of near unconsciousness where an individual is poorly responsive and may be only roused briefly by strong stimuli (such as loud noises or pain) with a tendency for the individual to drift back into near-unconsciousness”. Elaborating on this in cross-examination, Dr Mak stated that when it came to “impaired consciousness or what we know generally as drowsiness”, there was “a continuum”, with stupor being “towards the end of this continuum before a person progresses into a comatose state … known as ‘coma’ when a person is not rousable”.
- [78]
[78] Further, according to Dr Mak, it was medically possible for someone who was in a state of stupor as a result of alcohol intoxication – such as the Complainant – to regain consciousness and not fall back into unconsciousness. Asked whether the Complainant could have been able to “not just wake up, but also call the police, text the accused, [call] her boss” if she had indeed been at “the higher end of the continuum” of impaired consciousness, Dr Mak’s evidence was that she “may have been able to perform these actions”, but that there “would still have been some evidence of impairment in terms of the quality that she carrie[d] out these actions with [sic]”. In this connection, he noted that there appeared to be a degree of impairment in the quality of some of the Complainant’s actions. For example, in respect of the “999” emergency call, Dr Mak noted that the audio-recording of the call showed that it was “very difficult” for the “999” operator to obtain the Complainant’s address despite this being a “relatively straightforward piece of information”. Dr Mak also observed that the BWC footage of the Complainant’s interaction with the first responder police officers and her actions in subsequently calling her boss showed “some degree of impairment” in the quality of these actions: inter alia, she was “unclothed and also in a very emotionally labile state”. As for the text message sent by the Complainant to the Accused in which she stated “You are too much”, Dr Mak noted that it appeared to show “an understanding that she had felt wronged and she had vented anger towards the accused”, but added that he could not glean much from this message since it “only involve[d] four words”, and that actions such as getting hold of her mobile phone and locating the Accused’s contact number would have been “fairly simple and routine” actions.
(3) Framework for assessing capacity to consent and its application to the Complainant
- [79]
[79] Having assessed the Complainant’s likely BAC at the time of the incident to have been close to 200mg/100ml and having considered the evidence available of her behaviour, Dr Mak opined that she would likely not have had the mental capacity to consent to sexual intercourse at the material time. He explained his position by first setting out in his second expert report an analytical framework for assessing mental capacity for consent (“Analytical Framework”). There were two main stages to this analytical framework:
(a) The first stage – the diagnostic test – would be to assess “if an impairment of the mind exist[ed]” in respect of the individual in question. Impairment of the mind could be caused by a number of conditions – including, for example, psychiatric disorders and neurocognitive disorders (dementia), or temporary conditions such as alcohol or substance intoxication, or delirium from acute mental illnesses.
(b) The second stage – the functional test – would involve consideration of the individual’s ability to:
(i) Understand the information relevant to the decision.
(ii) Retain that information.
(iii) Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making a decision.
(iv) Communicate his or her decision.
- [80]
[80] In setting out the second stage of the Analytical Framework, Dr Mak stated in his report that the four limbs of the functional test which he had outlined were those set out “as per the Mental Capacity Act 2008”; and that while he “acknowledge[d] that this [was] a criminal case … the principles of Mental Capacity [were] widely applied across broad contexts when psychiatrists [were] called upon to comment on the matter of consent”. Dr Mak also stressed that mental capacity was dynamic (ie, time-specific), in that an individual could change his or her decision about a matter at any point of time; further, that “the threshold for mental capacity to be met [would] differ according to potential for impact and consequences as a result of the action” (see [72] above). In his evidence-in-chief, he elaborated that in his opinion, the threshold for mental capacity to consent to sexual intercourse would be “at a higher level” than that required for “a decision with regard to a very simple matter, such as asking for a glass of water”. He explained that this was because sexual intercourse was “not a simple decision” but a “deeply intimate act” with “potential consequences, such as the possibility of unwanted pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, to name just a few”.
- [81]
[81] Applying the first stage of the Analytical Framework, Dr Mak opined that at the time of the incident on 15 September 2021, the Complainant’s mental capacity would have been impaired due to a state of alcohol intoxication. In forming this opinion, he was guided, firstly, by Prof Teo’s “backward calculation” estimate of the Complainant’s BAC as having been close to 200mg/100ml – specifically, 195.7mg/100ml – as at the time of arrival at her lift lobby on 15 September 2021 (see [75] above). That her “alcohol intoxication was severe and that she was likely to have been within a BAC range of 0.15 (150mg/100ml) to 0.2 (200mg/100ml)” was further attested to by the evidence of her having vomited, her staggering gait at the lift lobby, and her own account of events (which indicated that she had suffered from an alcoholic blackout and that she had been “[d]rifting in and out of consciousness”). Specifically, Dr Mak noted that the vomiting was “a feature within the BAC range of 0.2 to 0.3 [200 to 300mg/100ml]”; that the staggering gait was “a feature within the BAC range of 0.15 (150mg/100ml) to 0.2 (200mg/100ml)”; that alcoholic blackouts typically occurred “at a BAC level of around 0.2 [200mg/100ml]”; and that her account of “drifting in and out of consciousness” indicated “at the very least, drowsiness, which is a feature known to occur as individuals approach a BAC level of 0.2 [200mg/100ml]”.
- [82]
[82] In his evidence-in-chief, Dr Mak testified that an individual who was experiencing a BAC of around 200mg/100ml would be “significantly impaired” in “multiple domains” of the brain involved in matters relating to attention, memory and executive functioning – ie, matters relating to decision-making. Significant impairment in these areas would give rise to concerns about the individual’s “ability to understand and retain information, and to weigh up this information in order to come to a decision”.
- [83]
[83] Following from the conclusions drawn at the first stage of the Analytical Framework, Dr Mak opined that on applying the functional test at the second stage, the Complainant’s severe intoxication would have led to substantial impairment of her mental faculties in multiple cognitive domains such as attention, memory and executive functioning. These were the cognitive domains relevant to an individual’s ability to understand and retain information and to weigh this information in order to come to a decision. In addition, the Complainant’s account of “drifting in and out of consciousness” at the material time indicated that her ability to communicate changes to a decision she had made would have been affected. Significant impairment to these domains would raise “serious concerns” about the Complainant’s ability to fulfil the limbs of the functional test. In short, bearing in mind the higher threshold for the mental capacity required to decide to engage in sexual intercourse, an individual who was experiencing a BAC close to 200mg/100ml (such as the Complainant) was not likely to have the mental capacity to consent to sexual intercourse.
Close of the Prosecution’s case
- [84]
[84] At the close of the Prosecution’s case, I found that there was sufficient evidence, which was not inherently incredible, to satisfy each element of the charge of rape. The Defence elected not to make any submissions at that juncture; and I therefore called on the Accused for his defence. He elected to give evidence and also called a factual witness (his wife) as well as an expert witness (Dr Jacob Rajesh).
The evidence led by the Defence
- [85]
[85] I first summarise the Accused’s account of events at trial.
The Accused’s account of events at trial
- [86]
[86] By way of background, the Accused testified that he had first come to know the Complainant “more than 10 years ago” when he was with his former company, [Company Z]. [Company Z] was a customer of [Company Y] where the Complainant was then working as a customer service staff tasked with accepting bookings. It was in the course of a work-related conversation during this period of time that the two of them discovered that they shared the same birthday.
- [87]
[87] The Accused came into contact with the Complainant again sometime around end July 2021, when he emailed her to place a booking on behalf of his current company, [Company X]. The Complainant called him on her own mobile phone to clarify his booking. This was how he got her mobile number.
- [88]
[88] Subsequently, the Accused did not have much contact with the Complainant between early August and September 2021. He claimed, however, that the Complainant would “occasionally” text him, “asking [him] what [he] was doing and things unrelated to business”; and that she was the one who “proposed coming out to celebrate [their] birthday” – a proposal to which the Accused agreed. This happened sometime around end-August to early September 2021.
- [89]
[89] According to the Accused, the Complainant was the one who decided that they should meet at a venue in Capital Tower. On 15 September 2021, she suggested changing the venue to Vivocity, in view of the rising number of COVID-19 cases; and they agreed to meet at 5.30pm at the Restaurant. On the same day, the Complainant also sent the Accused a “Daruma” toy figurine as a gift.
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