Public Prosecutor v Kamrul Hasan Abdul Quddus

Kan Ting Chiu J:

[1] The accused Kamrul Hasan Abdul Quddus faced a charge of murder that he:

[2] The accused, a Bangladeshi, is a man of many names. He acknowledged that he is known as “Raju”, “Ray” and “Raydoe”, and according to some prosecution witnesses he is also known as “Ray Faldo” and “Raju Ray Faldo”. The deceased was an Indonesian domestic maid, who was also known as “Lia”.

[3] The prosecution presented evidence on the relationship between the accused and the deceased, the discovery of the deceased’s body, the pathological findings and findings from the crime scene investigations, items recovered from the accused and his locker, the call records of the accused’s and the deceased’s mobile phones, the trip record from the accused’s bus pass and the statements made by the accused after his arrest which were admitted in evidence with his consent.

[4] At the close of the prosecution’s case, counsel for the accused submitted that there was no case for the accused to answer. However, I found that a sufficient case was established for me to call on the accused to enter his defence.

[5] After he was advised of his rights, the accused elected not to give evidence himself or call any witnesses to give evidence on his behalf.

[6] The accused met the deceased at a social gathering two years before her death. They maintained contact thereafter and by January 2007, they had, in the accused’s words “became boy and girl friend, and started a relationship” and they would check into hotels for sex.

[7] They reached the stage where they planned to marry in October 2007. The plans were abandoned because the accused went back to Bangladesh in September 2007 and did not return for the wedding, and because the deceased found out that the accused was married and had two children. They broke up, but subsequently resumed their relationship and made renewed plans to marry in December 2008.

[8] The deceased’s mother Yulismawati and sister Leni Apriyana gave evidence that the deceased called them on 15 December 2007 and told them that she would be going to the airport with the accused on the next day to meet his mother who was coming to Singapore to discuss their wedding plans and to consent to their engagement.

[9] On the night of 15 December 2007, the deceased had also informed Joseph Guerzon Corpuz (“Corpuz”, who was referred to at the trial as “Joseph”), a Filipino worker who courted her during the period when the accused had returned to Bangladesh in September/October 2007, that she and the accused were going to the airport the following day to meet the accused’s mother and brother.

[10] The deceased had also sent a text message to her friend Nausatur Rodiyah on 15 December 2007, that “ray’s” mother and younger sibling were coming to Singapore on the next day, and that she and “ray” would be picking them up at the airport.

[11] Defence counsel did not dispute the prosecution witnesses’ evidence that the deceased had informed them of the forthcoming marriage. In fact, counsel had put to Corpuz that the accused told him that he was going to marry the deceased, and the witness confirmed that. Defence counsel further stated in closing submissions that:

The accused, however, took the opposite position and claimed in his investigation statement of 1 January 2008 that they had never thought of getting married.

[12] At about 9.50 am on 16 December 2007, the deceased’s body was discovered in a room described as a storeroom or bomb shelter of unit #03-10, Block 3 of a development named Viz@Holland along Queensway Road which was under construction (the “construction site”). The accused was working as a construction worker at this construction site.

[13] The deceased’s body was naked and was placed facing downward in a crouching position in a large cardboard box. Pathologist Assoc Prof Gilbert Lau examined the body at the scene and noted that there were blood stains at the nostrils, mouth, left leg, right thigh, left arm and left forearm. There was also a bruise on the left eye, bruises and abrasions on the chin, lower jaw, neck and upper chest wall. He placed the time of death at approximately 4.16 am, 16 December 2007.

[14] Assoc Prof Lau also conducted a post-mortem examination on the deceased and certified that death was caused by asphyxia due to strangulation. Injuries to the head and neck, trunk, upper limbs, lower limbs and the external genitalia and anus were noted during the examination.

[15] Many swabs were taken from the body for examination. Of particular significance was a rectal swab which tested positive for seminal fluid and the DNA thereon matched the DNA of the accused.

[16] Swabs were also taken from the scene of the recovery of the body. Two swabs taken from the entrance to the storeroom/bomb shelter were found to contain DNA which matched the DNA of the accused. A piece of chewing gum recovered from the floor of the master bedroom was found to have DNA which matched the DNA of the accused. This evidence and the accused’s finger prints found on the premises must be viewed in the context that the accused had access to the unit in the course of his work on the construction site, and that he admitted that he was at the scene, albeit after the deceased was killed and put into the box.

[17] The accused was arrested at the construction site on 19 December 2007. After his arrest, he was taken to the room at the workers’ dormitory which he shared with other boarders. He had his personal locker there, and after it was unlocked, some of the contents including a lady’s watch, two bracelets, one ring and one chain with pendant were seized. The deceased’s lady employer, Gonzalez Munoz Ruth Josefina, identified the watch to be one that she had bought and given to the deceased, and confirmed that the deceased had worn the chain and pendant. Listiyana, a friend of the deceased, identified the watch and one of the bracelets as items that the deceased had worn. Another friend, Suparti, identified a bracelet (the same one identified by Listiyana) to have been worn by the deceased. When the items were examined, DNA on the two bracelets and the ring was found to match the deceased’s DNA.

[18] All the items were also inspected by a forensic scientist, and it was found that:

(i) the strap of the watch was damaged in that two of the ornamental stones set in the strap were missing;

(ii) a strap of one bracelet was partially broken from pulling or tugging, and

(iii) three ornamental stones were missing from the ring,

indicating that they had been used, and were not new.

[19] Three mobile telephones were also recovered from the locker. They were marked by the investigating officer as AC1, AC2 and AC3 and later became court exhibits P348(a), P352, and P348(b) respectively. At the trial, a List of Relevant Telephone Numbers was admitted in evidence by consent. This list collated information on the telephones–

(Telephone 914XXXXX was the deceased’s old telephone. This telephone did not work. The List also recorded that the accused was using another mobile telephone marked AC4/P394, number 902XXXXX.)

[20] In the course of the trial, the deceased’s friend Nausatur Rodiyah testified that the accused’s telephone number was 826XXXXX, and that was not disputed by the defence.

[21] When the accused was brought to the police lockup on 20 December 2007, he was searched for property registration. A plastic bag was recovered from his trouser pocket. Inside the plastic bag were two pieces of a torn work permit. The work permit was subsequently established to have been issued to the deceased.

[22] In the course of investigations, two EZ-Link cards were recovered from the accused. On examination, one card was found to have been used up to 24 July 2007 and was not used thereafter. The other card, which the Defence stated was found in the accused’s wallet, was used on 15 December and 16 December 2007. On 15 December, it was used on a journey on SBS bus service No 93 at 11.35 pm, starting from Eunos Link, and ending at 12.05 am on 16 December, either at a bus stop along Farrer Road opposite Tulip Garden or a bus stop along Queensway opposite Holland Hill Lodge, both of which are a short distance to the construction site.

[23] After he was arrested on 19 December 2007, the accused made one cautioned statement, followed by ten investigation statements. All the statements were tendered in evidence by the prosecution and were admitted without objection from the accused.

[24] The cautioned statement was recorded on 20 December 2007. This statement merits to be set out in full:

[25] There were ten investigation statements, but only some of them refer to the events of 15 and 16 December 2007.

[26] The first investigation statement was recorded on 22 December 2007. In this statement, the accused was asked to state what he knew about the body in the box and he stated:

and he went on to explain that the male Filipino was called “Joseph” and he had been dating the deceased.

[27] The accused then continued:

[28] In his second investigation statement recorded on 24 December 2007, the accused expanded on the first call he received from the deceased early in the morning on 16 December 2007. He narrated:

[29] In his fourth investigation statement of 26 December 2007, the accused recounted his last meeting with the deceased on 15 December 2007:

[30] In his sixth investigation statement of 31 December 2007, the accused referred to the last meeting again:

and he also expanded on his movements at the construction site on the morning of 16 December 2007 when he looked for the deceased:

[31] In his eighth investigation statement of 1 January 2008, the accused was asked why he did not report the finding of the box and the body to his supervisors or the police, and his explanation was:

[32] In the same statement, the accused answered questions about the articles recovered from his personal locker. His explanation for the watch was:

[33] The accused also referred to the torn work permit recovered from him:

without explaining why he would pick up a plastic bag and keep it without knowing its contents.

[34] Corpuz who was suspected by the accused to be with the deceased on the morning of 16 December 2007 was a witness at the trial. He confirmed that he had spoken with the deceased over the telephone on the night of 15 December 2007 when she told him that she was going to the airport with the accused the next day to meet his mother and brother. He testified that he was at his lodging during the night of 15 December 2007 and the morning of 16 December 2007. This was corroborated by four of his roommates, and I accept the evidence as truthful.

[35] When the prosecution closed its case, counsel for the accused submitted that there was no case for the accused to answer.

[36] Had the prosecution established a sufficient case? The test is set out by the Court of Appeal in Tan Siew Chay v PP [1993] 2 SLR 14 (“Tan Siew Chay”) at 38 that at this stage of the case:

[37] The relevant primary facts in this case are:

(i) the deceased’s death on 16 December 2007 was caused by asphyxia due to strangulation,

(ii) the deceased had informed her family and friends on 15 December 2007 that she would be going with the accused to the airport to meet his mother,

(iii) the accused was at the construction site where the deceased’s body was discovered on 16 December 2007,

(iv) the accused’s EZ Link card shows that a trip was made on SBS bus service No 93 to a bus stop near the construction site at 12.05 am on 16 December 2007,

(v) although the accused knew of the body in the box and suspected that it was the deceased, he kept silent about the deceased, Joseph and the box until after his arrest,

(vi) swabs taken from the deceased’s groin, vagina and external genitalia yielded DNA that matched the accused’s DNA. (Of particular significance is that DNA from a swab of the deceased’s rectum which tested positive for semen under the presumptive acid phosphatase test matched the accused’s DNA),

(vii) items belonging to the deceased were recovered from the accused’s locker,

(viii) the deceased’s torn work permit was in his possession, and

(ix) the accused lied

(a) that he and the deceased had never thought of marriage,

(b) that the deceased was planning to go to the airport with Joseph on 16 December 2007 (see [24] & [28]),

(c) that he had bought the watch recovered from his locker for his wife (see [32]),

(d) that he had possession of the deceased’s mobile phone when they parted company on the night of 15 December 2007. (The call tracing records of his telephone number 826XXXXX record calls between this telephone number and the deceased’s telephone number between 10.50 pm on 15 December 2007 and 2.10 am on 16 December 2007). This shows that he was not in possession of both phones at the same time), and

(e) that he received a call from the deceased on 16 December 2007 at about 4.30 am on his telephone 902XXXXX while he was in his room in the dormitory. (The call tracing records of telephone number 902XXXXX have no record of such a call.)

[38] There should be a note to fact (vi). The accused had, in his sixth statement of 31 December 2007, stated that on the evening of 15 December 2007, he met the deceased at the SingTel building near her work place, and they had sexual intercourse. He did not use a condom and ejaculated into her vagina. The prosecution cast doubts over this disclosure because the accused had referred to the events of 15 December 2007 in his second and fourth statements of 24 and 26 December 2007 with no mention of any sexual activity. Moreover, the late disclosure of vagina intercourse did not account for the presence of DNA in the deceased’s rectum which matched his DNA.

[39] From the primary facts it can be inferred that the accused had arranged to meet the deceased on the night of 15 December 2007 on the pretext that they were going to the airport to pick up his mother and brother, and the falsehood would be exposed because his mother and brother were not coming. Instead of going to the airport, however, the accused strangled and had sex with the deceased (in either order), removed and kept her watch, bracelet, chain and pendant, and ring and tore and kept her work permit. He then placed her naked body into the box and left the scene.

[40] On that basis, there was a case for the accused to answer, and he was called on to enter his defence.

[41] The accused elected not to enter his defence. He remained silent, and did not call any witnesses to give evidence on his behalf. In these circumstances, the case was to be determined on the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

[42] Although the evidence remains the same, it has to be dealt with more stringently. The Court of Appeal ruled in Tan Siew Chay at 37 that at the close of the trial:

[43] At this stage, I have to revaluate the evidence without the two assumptions, (a) that the evidence on the primary facts is true and (b) that there is nothing which displace inferences as to further facts or the state of mind of the accused which would reasonably be drawn from the primary facts.

[44] The primary facts (except facts (iv) and (ix)) are not disputed. For fact (iv) it was not disputed that the EZ Link card was recovered from the accused and that it was used for the trip. However, the defence did not admit, and the prosecution had no direct proof that the accused made that trip. The fact that the card was in the accused’s possession is circumstantial evidence that he made that trip. For fact (ix), I have already set out the basis for my conclusion that the accused was lying when he made those statements.

[45] When the accused remained silent and did not call any witnesses, there was nothing to disprove the primary facts or to displace the inferences that were drawn from them.

[46] There was no direct evidence that the accused strangled the deceased. But there was circumstantial evidence of that. He claimed that he found a body which he believed or suspected to be the deceased, his girlfriend and lover, but he did not report that to his supervisor or the police. His DNA was found on her body, and her belongings and work permit were in his possession.

[47] In addition to that, the lies listed in [37] may also be taken into consideration. The applicable rules were set out by the English Court of Appeal in Regina v Lucas (Ruth) [1981] QB 720 (“Lucas”) where Lord Lane CJ ruled at p 724 that:

For convenience, I will refer to a lie which satisfies the four conditions as a Lucas lie.

[48] In PP v Yeo Choon Poh [1994] 2 SLR 867 (“Yeo Choon Poh”), our Court of Appeal endorsed and applied those rules (substituting “the judge” for “the jury”) and explained at 876 that:

[49] In Lucas, the court was dealing with a case where the prosecution had relied on the evidence of an accomplice. In England an accomplice’s evidence requires corroboration, and the Court of Appeal held that the accused’s lies can constitute corroboration.

[50] Corroboration is required or is considered desirable for some forms of evidence, e.g. evidence of victims of sexual offences and children, and evidence on identification. However, any form of evidence can be strengthened by corroboration.

[51] For any lie to be taken as corroborative evidence, the four conditions in Lucas must be met, whether or not corroboration is required. However, there is a statement in PP v Lau Boon Huat [1997] SGHC 148 at [53] that:

This should not be taken to mean that the tests only apply in situations where there is a special requirement for corroboration. The tests have been applied in cases where there were no special requirements for corroboration eg, Yeo Choon Poh. Lies which satisfy the tests may amount to corroboration in any sort of case.

[52] When a lie offers corroboration, it does that by corroborating some existing evidence, as was made clear in PP v Chee Cheong Hin Constance [2006] 2 SLR 24 at [92] that:

[53] Statements appear in some judgments that lies can corroborate guilt. In PP v Manogaran s/o R Ramu (No.2) [1997] SGHC 121 at [62], the court held that person’s lie “can amount to corroboration of his guilt”. In Bala Murugan a/l Krishnan v PP [2002] 4 SLR 289, it was ruled at [22] that an accused person’s lies “could be relied on as corroborating evidence of his guilt”. In Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v PP [2006] 4 SLR 45 at [83], it was stated that a “lie may very well be used by the Prosecution as corroboration of the [accused] witness’s guilt”.

[54] These statements were not intended to be extensions of or departures from Lucas, which was cited as authority in each case. In all three cases, the court acted on evidence (other than the lies) that the lies corroborated. Lucas is not to be construed to mean that an accused person can be convicted because he had lied. The true effect of Lucas is that a person’s lies may corroborate other evidence against him, and the corroborated evidence may establish his guilt. Lies are not evidence of guilt.

[55] Reverting to the present case, the question remains whether the accused’s lies are Lucas lies. The five lies identified in [37] satisfied the four conditions in Lucas. All five lies were deliberate. They have been contradicted by clear evidence. They related to material issues in the investigation, ie, his relationship with the deceased, whether they were in each other’s company on the morning of 16 December 2007, how the deceased’s belongings came to be in his possession, and his whereabouts at about 4.30 am on 16 December 2007. When he told these lies, he must have realised that if he told the truth, it would link him to the deceased’s death.

[56] The result is then that the lies corroborated the circumstantial evidence that the accused had killed the deceased.

[57] In addition to that, the accused’s election not to enter his defence is to be taken into consideration. Section 196(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68 1985 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) provides that:

[58] When the accused was called on to enter his defence, he must have known that if he gave evidence he would be asked to explain the presence of his DNA in the deceased’s rectum, vagina and external genitalia, his actions (eg the taking of the deceased’s possessions) and his inaction (eg not reporting his discovery of the body). It can be inferred that he chose not to give evidence, not even to confirm, explain or expand on the contents of his cautioned statement and investigation statements, because he could not offer any explanation.

[59] While he did not provide answers, he asked in the closing submissions why he would kill someone he was intending to marry. That intention is probably as real as his mother’s visit to Singapore. He could have killed the deceased to avoid having to confess that he had lied about his mother coming to Singapore, or he may have done it after the deceased found out about the lie, and became angry at him.

[60] The case against the accused rests on circumstantial evidence. It is strong circumstantial evidence, and that is corroborated by his Lucas lies and reinforced by the inference drawn from his election to remain silent. All this leads inevitably and inexorably to the conclusion that the accused had strangled the deceased.

[61] The prosecution has proved its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is found guilty and convicted on the charge against him, and shall suffer the mandatory death sentence.