Qwik Built-Tech International Pte Ltd v Acmes-Kings Corp Pte Ltd

Lionel Yee JC:

[1] This case involves various claims for monies due and payable arising from a building construction project at Kuda Huraa Island, Male’ Atoll, the Republic of the Maldives (“the Project”).

[2] The plaintiff company (“the Plaintiff”) is in the business of designing and fabricating lightweight steel framing systems to be used in building structures. The Plaintiff is run by a husband and wife duo, namely Mr Eng Chua Rong-Di (also known as “Ero Chua”) and Ms Khoo Kooi Lean (also known as “Amanda Khoo”). Ero Chua is the Plaintiff’s manager whereas Amanda Khoo is the Plaintiff’s managing director.

[3] The defendant company (“the Defendant”) is in the business of providing plumbing, heating and other related services. The Defendant has a subsidiary company called Acmes-Power Building Services Pte Ltd (“APBS”); it holds 99% of the shares in APBS. Mr Wong Khio Kong (also known as “Joe Wong”) is a director of both the Defendant and APBS. Mr Yeo Kuei Ping (also known as “Randy Yeo”) is the project manager of APBS who was in charge of the Project.

[4] In or around August 2010, Joe Wong and Ero Chua were introduced to each other by a mutual friend and Joe Wong came to know of the Plaintiff. Subsequently, when Joe Wong learnt that a company called HPL Resorts (Maldives) Pte Ltd (“HPL”) was seeking tenders for a building works project in the Maldives (ie, the Project), he approached the Plaintiff to ask whether the Plaintiff was interested to participate in the Project. The Plaintiff was interested and from about September 2010 to October 2010, the Plaintiff, HPL and HPL’s quantitative surveyors for the Project, KPK Quantity Surveyors Pte Ltd (“KPK”), discussed the possibility of using the Plaintiff’s lightweight steel framing system for the Project. However, the Plaintiff did not have enough finances to undertake the Project as a main contractor and so it was agreed that APBS would submit a tender for the Project instead and the Plaintiff would submit its design proposal for the steel framing system through APBS.

[5] HPL awarded the Project to APBS on 2 December 2010 for a fixed sum of US$2,184,950.00. On 14 February 2011, the Plaintiff forwarded a quotation addressed to Joe Wong and APBS dated 8 February 2011 and with the reference no. APBS/BOH/ML/080211 (the “First Quotation”) via e-mail to Randy Yeo, copied to Joe Wong and Ero Chua. The First Quotation set out the Plaintiff’s quote of S$1,143,400.00 (excluding goods and services tax (“GST”)) for fabrication of the steel framing systems for the Project and the supply of a number of other items, as well as other terms and conditions. The First Quotation was not signed or returned to the Plaintiff.

[7] Until early March 2011, the Plaintiff had issued its quotation and invoices to APBS. Amanda Khoo’s e-mail of 1 March 2011 forwarded a pro-forma invoice dated 28 February 2011 (with reference no. PI-0001-20110228) for S$300,000 addressed to Joe Wong of APBS. But shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff received instructions from Joe Wong and the Defendant’s staff to re-issue the delivery orders, tax invoice and pro-forma invoice under the name of the Defendant instead of APBS. Apparently, this was because payment of the S$300,000 was to be made to the Plaintiff by way of a letter of credit; as APBS did not have a letter of credit facility, the Defendant’s letter of credit facility was to be used instead, which meant that the relevant documentation had to be changed to reflect the name of the Defendant instead of APBS. Accordingly, in early March 2011, the Plaintiff reissued its delivery orders, tax invoice and pro-forma invoice for S$300,000 to the Defendant instead of APBS. The Plaintiff also issued a new quotation which had the same form and content as the First Quotation save that it was addressed to the Defendant instead of APBS. For ease of reference, I shall refer to this new quotation that was addressed to the Defendant as the “Main Contract”. On or around 11 March 2011, Joe Wong signed the Main Contract on behalf of the Defendant. Thereafter, the Plaintiff continued to issue commercial invoices, delivery orders and packing lists to the Defendant or under the Defendant’s name instead of APBS. However, the Defendant argues that it is not the proper party to the present suit as only APBS had a contractual relationship with the Plaintiff.

[9] Further, during the course of the Project, the parties entered into further agreements whereby the Plaintiff would procure tools and equipment, additional building materials and technical support staff to assist with and supervise the installation of the steel framing system. The Plaintiff says that it is entitled to a total sum of S$413,496.35 pursuant to these further contracts. In contrast the Defendant says that the Plaintiff is only entitled to S$178,281.75 under the further contracts and thus counterclaims (assuming that it is the proper party to the present suit) the sum of S$34,583.75, being the monies allegedly paid in excess to the Plaintiff.

[10] The Defendant’s first line of defence was that APBS and not the Defendant was the proper defendant in the present proceedings. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff was aware at all times that the Defendant was not involved in the Project, given that:

(a) the tender for the Project was awarded to APBS and not the Defendant;

(b) while the Defendant made four payments to the Plaintiff up to 4 March 2011 and another payment of S$100,000 on 13 May 2011, the payment vouchers for those payments made by the Defendant contained the words “APBS a/c” and the rest of the payments were made by APBS;

(c) up to March 2011, the Plaintiff’s invoices were all addressed to APBS;

(d) Joe Wong had signed the Main Contract on behalf of the Defendant purely for the purposes of obtaining a letter of credit to make the payment of S$300,000 to the Plaintiff;

(e) while the Defendant’s name and letterhead was used on commercial invoices and packing lists after the Main Contract was signed, this was done only because APBS did not have an export permit which was required to ship the building materials and tools to the Maldives; and

(f) after the Main Contract was signed, e-mail communications exchanged between Amanda Khoo, Joe Wong and Randy Yeo continued to refer to APBS as the party involved in the Project.

[11] I do not find these arguments convincing. It is correct that at the beginning, when the Project was awarded to APBS in December 2010, the Plaintiff was working together with APBS and not the Defendant. As the Defendant pointed out, the Plaintiff had, at KPK’s request, sent a formal letter to HPL and KPK backdated to 16 October 2010 confirming that the Plaintiff was “interested to participate in this tender and are cooperating with M&E specialist” and would be submitting a tender “under the company of [APBS]”. It is also the case that the Plaintiff’s First Quotation was addressed to APBS and up to March 2011, the Plaintiff had looked to APBS for payment. However, the position changed in March 2011 when the Plaintiff received instructions to amend the invoices and other documents to reflect the name of the Defendant instead of APBS. The Main Contract was duly addressed to the Defendant and it set out the terms and conditions of the Plaintiff’s quotation for the Project. On 11 March 2011, Joe Wong signed the acknowledgement slip on the second page of the Main Contract, confirming the Defendant’s “acceptance of the contents of this letter” on behalf of the Defendant. The Main Contract was thus a formal written agreement entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendant; prima facie the Defendant is bound by its terms: see L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394 at 404.

[12] Even if the First Quotation was amended to reflect the name of the Defendant instead of APBS for the purposes of using the Defendant’s letter of credit facility, this does not necessarily displace the Defendant’s obligations under the Main Contract. In other words, the reason why the Defendant’s name was used in the Main Contract is not dispositive of the status (or lack thereof) of the Defendant as a contracting party. Similarly, there is little to the Defendant’s point that the commercial invoices and other documents were only addressed to the Defendant so that the Defendant’s export permit facility could be used to ship the building materials and tools to the Maldives.

[13] The Defendant submitted that neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant had any intention to create any legal relations with each other because the Plaintiff knew that the Defendant was only an “accessory” used to obtain a letter of credit. But where there is an express agreement, the burden of proving that there is nevertheless no intention to create legal relations is on the party who asserts it, and this burden is a heavy one: see Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 349 at 355. It has not been discharged in this case. There is no evidence of any statement made to the Plaintiff or of an understanding between the parties that the Defendant should not be contractually bound by the Main Contract, either solely or in conjunction with APBS, despite the new wording of the Main Contract and despite the fact that the commercial invoices and other documents were all addressed to the Defendant. The Defendant cannot now rely on its uncommunicated belief that the Main Contract would not be binding on it.

[14] While the Defendant is correct to say that APBS continued to be involved with the Plaintiff after the Main Contract was signed, this does not detract from the Defendant’s status as a contracting party. None of the documents cited by the Defendant showing dealings between the Plaintiff and APBS after March 2011 indicate otherwise. I note that while there were e-mail communications after the Main Contract referring to APBS as the party involved in the Project (see [10(f)] above), there were also communications between the parties which were premised on the Defendant being a party to the Project. In fact, the evidence as a whole suggests that the parties had simply proceeded on the basis that the Defendant and APBS were interchangeable as far as the Plaintiff was concerned. But whether the Defendant was in a contractual relationship with the Plaintiff solely or in a manner which was co-extensive with APBS, the Defendant is still a proper party to the present suit.

[15] Another of the Defendant’s main arguments was that the Defendant and the Plaintiff were in a partnership where they would jointly tender for the Project, with the Defendant handling the mechanical and electrical works and the Plaintiff handling the building works with their lightweight steel framing system, and any profits at the end of the Project would be equally distributed between the parties (the “partnership argument”). Conversely, the Plaintiff maintained that it was engaged by the Defendant as a contractor for the Project.

Similarly, all that the Defendant has to establish in this case is that there was an agreement between the parties to share the profits from the Project and that the Plaintiff would only charge the Defendant for items provided at cost. The existence or otherwise of a true partnership between the parties is largely irrelevant in this context.

[19] The evidence from the Plaintiff’s witnesses, however, suggested otherwise. Shortly after the minutes were sent out by Randy Yeo, Amanda Khoo said in an e-mail dated 1 March 2011: “In regards of the minute received, I will highlight points to you shortly, that I was not sure of your phrase.” Amanda Khoo, whom I observed to have a limited command of English, testified that what she had meant in her e-mail was that the minutes recorded certain things as having been agreed upon during the 28 February 2011 Meeting when in fact they had not and that she did not understand some phrases used in the minutes, including the part about profit-sharing. However one interprets Amanda Khoo’s e-mail of 1 March 2011, it is clear from this document that there was no unequivocal concurrence by the Plaintiff to the contents of the minutes of the 28 February 2011 meeting. Moreover, Amanda Khoo testified that after her e-mail of 1 March 2011, she had followed up on these issues with Joe Wong or Randy Yeo during subsequent meetings in the Plaintiff’s factory although she could not remember what they had talked about. This was not contradicted by the Defendant. Ero Chua similarly testified that while the issue of profit-sharing was discussed at the 28 February 2011 Meeting, the parties had never reached an agreement on this issue.

[21] The terms of the Main Contract are binding on the Defendant, contrary to its submissions. I have already rejected the Defendant’s argument that the Main Contract was not legally binding because it was only signed for the purposes of utilising the Defendant’s letter of credit facility. The Defendant’s argument that the Main Contract was not binding on the parties as it was only for budgetary purposes since the parties were in a profit-sharing partnership is also untenable.

[22] The Defendant raised two other points in support of its argument that the Main Contract should not be binding on the parties. First, the Defendant highlighted that there was no requirement that the Plaintiff provide a performance bond whereas HPL had imposed the need for a performance bond on APBS. I am however unable to see how the presence or absence of a requirement to furnish a performance bond has a bearing on the issue of whether the Main Contract is binding on the Defendant.

[23] Second, the Defendant pointed out that the Main Contract did not contain any unit rates which rendered the terms of the Main Contract “unbelievable” because the Plaintiff would potentially be “contractually obliged to supply infinite amounts of steel” to the Defendant. The Main Contract was not lengthy or detailed; it was drafted in the form of a quotation addressed to Joe Wong and the Defendant and contained a simple table itemising the materials, parts and labour to be provided. The Defendant contended that there was a degree of uncertainty as to the scope of work to be carried out by the Plaintiff because while a price was stated for each item in the table, no unit rates were stated and for certain items, no quantities were stated; it was thus difficult to ascertain what constituted extra work regarding those items for which neither the unit rate nor the quantity was stipulated.

[28] It is not disputed that the parties also entered into further agreements for the Plaintiff to supply tools and equipment (“the Tools Contract”), additional building materials (“the Materials Contract”), and technical support staff to assist with the installation of the steel framing system (“the Technical Support Contract”) for the Project. I refer to these agreements collectively as the “Further Contracts”.

[32] Since I have found that the amount of payment had not been agreed upon although the Plaintiff was entitled to payment by the Defendant for the tools and additional building materials provided, the Defendant’s argument that contractual quantum meruit should not apply in the present case because parties did expressly agree on a rate of remuneration, relying on the case of Rabiah Bee bte Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 2 SLR(R) 655, fails. This is not a case where the rate of remuneration was covered by an express contract or agreement between the parties. Therefore a term that the Plaintiff would be remunerated at a reasonable rate for these items is to be implied into the Tools Contract and the Materials Contract.

[34] I come to those tools and additional building materials which the Defendant says were already to be provided by the Plaintiff under the Main Contract. If such items are a necessary part of the items which were to be provided under the Main Contract, they are included in the relevant lump sum amount and the Plaintiff is not entitled to additional payment for them.

[35] I start with the Tools Contract. The Defendant tendered exhibit “D2” which was a spread-sheet summarizing the items claimed by the Plaintiff under the Tools Contract as well as the Defendant’s position on the various items. In D2, items 38–41, 57–58, 76–78, and 83 were alleged by the Defendant to be part of the steel structural system to be provided under the Main Contract.

(a) Item 38 referred to an ‘“L” steel bracket’. According to Amanda Khoo, this was an additional “stiffener” for areas where heavy equipment (eg, a plasma television) would be hung. However, Joe Wong disagreed with this description by Amanda Khoo and stated that an “L” steel bracket was used to join two elements together or used in anything that required a 90-degree joint. Patricia Hong similarly stated that an “L” steel bracket was used to hold two pieces of metal together and was thus part of the Plaintiff’s “steel structure system material”. On all accounts, this bracket is affixed to the steel structure and should prima facie be regarded as forming part of it. I also find the descriptions of item 38 by Joe Wong and Patricia Hong more convincing than Amanda Khoo’s. Item 38 is therefore to be regarded as falling under the Main Contract.

(b) Amanda Khoo explained that items 39–41 were either tools or used in scaffolding and thus were not included in the Main Contract. This was not contradicted by the Defendant and I therefore accept that the Plaintiff is entitled to claim additional payment for these items.

(c) As for items 57–58, 76–78, and 83, these referred to items such as bolts and washers which Amanda Khoo explained were used (i) to hold the steel structure together; or (ii) to fix it to the ground; or (iii) to secure the staircase. These items should therefore be regarded as part of the “Steel Structure” and/or “Staircase” for which the Plaintiff quoted a lump sum in the Main Contract and I am unable to allow a separate claim for them.

[36] As for the Materials Contract which was similarly summarised in a spread-sheet in exhibit “D3”, it was conceded by Amanda Khoo in cross-examination that items 4, 5, 15–18, and 29–33 of D3 were included in the quotation under the Main Contract. These items therefore cannot be the subject of a separate claim for payment by the Plaintiff.

[37] Counsel for the Defendant questioned Amanda Khoo on item 42 which concerned “heat shield rolls”. Amanda Khoo explained that this was additional insulation material for roofing and walls and was not the same as “rockwool” which was provided for in the Main Contract. There was no evidence adduced to the contrary and thus I accept that Plaintiff is entitled to additional payment for item 42.

[38] The Defendant claims that the Plaintiff should not be able to claim for certain items which were not in fact sent to the Maldives. The Defendant’s position and Patricia Hong’s evidence was that each and every item which was shipped over to the Maldives would have been recorded in a goods declaration form by the Maldives customs service officer who inspected the containers containing the items upon their arrival at the port for the purposes of determining the amount of customs duties to be paid; thus any item that was not stated in the declaration form, although it might have been stated in the commercial invoice prepared by the Plaintiff, should be considered as not having been sent. On the other hand, the Plaintiff took the position that all the contested items had been sent to the Defendant, relying upon the fact that the contested items were stated in packing lists, commercial invoices and other documents prepared by the Plaintiff.

[39] I note at the outset that one of the contested items, viz, “welding rod” (item 15 in D2), could be found in a goods declaration form generated by the Maldives customs authorities as stated in para 30(d) of the Plaintiff’s written submissions; the Plaintiff is thus entitled to payment for this item in any event.

[40] For the items which are listed in documents prepared by the Plaintiff but which are not listed in the goods declaration forms, I find the goods declaration forms to be more reliable as evidence of which items were actually sent (or not sent) to the Maldives and received by the Defendant. The accuracy of the documents prepared by the Plaintiff that recorded the items it sent over was undermined by the fact that Amanda Khoo herself conceded to discrepancies between the packing list and the delivery order in relation to the wall cam set claimed under the Tools Contract. In contrast, there was no evidence which cast doubt on the reliability of the goods declaration forms generated by the Maldivian authorities during their inspection upon the arrival of the goods. I therefore exclude items 2, 27–29, 75, 80 (in part) and 81 in D2 from the Tools Contract as well as items 20, 25 (in part), 26 (in part), 29 (in part), 30 (in part), and 42 (in part) in D3 from the Materials Contract.

[41] The Defendant submitted that they should not be charged for items which they did not order, which were not working or which were previously used. A list of these items was set out in Patricia Hong’s affidavit.

[42] Of the items that the Defendant alleges were not ordered, only item 94 of D2 should be excluded from the Tools Contract. Amanda Khoo accepted in cross-examination that item 94 in D2 was not her item and the Plaintiff would not be charging for it. Items 17 and 19 of D2 related to safety helmets and safety vests respectively and while the Defendant claims that these items were not specifically ordered, there was no evidence that any protest had been raised when they were delivered to the Maldives or that any attempt had been made to return them. In fact, Joe Wong, when questioned as to what had become of the safety helmets and safety vests, said that some had in fact been used on site and that all had probably been thrown away when they vacated the site. As for item 3 of D3, Amanda Khoo explained and Randy Yeo agreed that this related to tiles for vanity tops which were initially rejected by HPL but eventually approved and used in the Project. The Plaintiff is thus entitled to claim payment for items 17 and 19 of D2 as well as item 3 of D3.

[43] A somewhat anomalous item is item 87 of D2 which relates to a “labour for stuffing charge” of $1,500 based on a rate of $500 per container. This related to payments which the Plaintiff claimed for supplying labour to help the Defendant load the items supplied by the Plaintiff on to containers. The only evidence that the parties had agreed on this came from Amanda Khoo and Ero Chua but it is not clear from their accounts that the parties had agreed on a rate of $500 per container. However, given that: (a) the Plaintiff was not responsible for loading and packing the items that it supplied into the containers for shipment because the Main Contract expressly provided that the items were sold “ex-factory”; (b) it is not disputed that the Plaintiff did help with such packing; and (c) while Ero Chua appeared to suggest that the Plaintiff had assisted the Defendant in loading or stuffing the containers on a “goodwill” basis, this was in the context of assistance given by Amanda Khoo and primarily in relation to her preparation of documents rather than a reference to the other labourers engaged by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is, in my judgment, entitled to be paid a reasonable sum for the assistance it provided to the Defendant. As there was no evidence that the charge of $500 per container was unreasonable, I find the Plaintiff entitled to be paid the $1,500 it claims.

[44] As for items which the Defendant alleges were not working, viz, items 3, 9, 11 and 12 of D2, the burden of proving this is on the Defendant and the Defendant has not adduced sufficient evidence to show that any of these items were not working during the course of the Project. While Patricia Hong stated in her AEIC that she had made a record of materials and tools which were reported not to be working when received on site, she did not have personal knowledge of this fact and the record she made, if it exists, was not exhibited. Moreover, Amanda Khoo testified that she was never informed that any of these items were not working until after this action was commenced. I find, therefore, that the Plaintiff is entitled to claim payment for items 3, 9, 11 and 12 of D2.

[46] As regards the Defendant’s claim for unnecessary customs taxes it had to pay for items which were not working, not ordered or not needed, I have only excluded item 94 of D2 for the reasons set out above. The taxes paid in respect of this item were US$44.32 and, using a conversion rate of S$1.23 to US$1, this would amount to S$54.51. This amount is to be deducted from the payments owing by the Defendant.

[49] This computation methodology above does not apply to item 87 of D2 (“labour for stuffing charge”) since this item was not a tool procured by the Plaintiff from its suppliers.

[50] The Plaintiff is therefore entitled to claim the sum of $4,901.58 under the Tools Contract (see Annex A), subject to a deduction of $54.51 for customs taxes paid as indicated in [46] above, and the sum of S$155,516.53 under the Materials Contract (see Annex B).

[51] Under the Technical Support Contract, the Plaintiff agreed to provide technical support staff to assist, inspect and supervise the installation of the steel framing system on site for the Project. The Plaintiff says that the terms of this agreement were that the Defendant would pay the Plaintiff for the technical support staff provided based on a rate of S$80 per day (for the period between 8.00am and 5.00pm) and would also reimburse the Plaintiff for all travelling and accommodation expenses of the technical support staff. The Plaintiff therefore claims payment for the salaries and travelling and accommodation expenses of seven workers, as set out in exhibits “D4” and “D5”. The Plaintiff also claims overtime rates of S$15 per hour for each worker, S$400 per day for Ero Chua’s work on site as well as travelling and accommodation expenses for Ero Chua, Amanda Khoo and Kevin Burrows, the professional engineer engaged by the Plaintiff for the Project. The Defendant’s position was that there was only an agreement for the Defendant to pay for three workers at S$80 per day. Overtime rates were not agreed upon and moreover, the overtime hours were not verified by the Defendant. The Defendant agrees that the Plaintiff should be reimbursed for the travelling and accommodation expenses of the workers save for those expenses which were incurred for reasons unrelated to the Project (eg, the worker was going on home leave).

[52] First, the Defendant’s argument that it is only obliged to pay for three out of the seven workers (ie, Mr Kaliappan Ramesh (“Ramesh”), Mr Yu Wei Jun and Mr Mola Suwit) is without merit. The remaining 4 workers whose wages the Plaintiff is claiming (ie, Mr Sumranchit Vichai, Mr Saleeroop Phaiwan, Mr Khin Zaw and Mr Khotjan Senee) were specifically identified in e-mails from Amanda Khoo to Joe Wong and Randy Yeo around the end of May 2011, confirming that these workers were to be sent over to the Maldives to assist the Defendant with the erection of the steel works. It is not disputed that they were deployed for the Project and there is no evidence that either Joe Wong or Randy Yeo had objected to their deployment. In fact the Defendant, in response to the above e-mails, proceeded to make travel arrangements for two of the workers. Moreover, the Defendant’s argument did not make sense since it appeared from exhibit “D5”, the Defendant’s spread-sheet itemising the travel and accommodation expenses claimed for the technical support staff, that the Defendant had in fact paid for the travel expenses of Mr Sumranchit Vichai and Mr Saleeroop Phaiwan and had agreed to pay the travel expenses of Mr Khin Zaw and Mr Khotjan Senee. The Defendant must be taken to have agreed to the deployment of all four workers by the Plaintiff for the Project and to pay a reasonable rate to the Plaintiff in respect of them. It follows that the Plaintiff is entitled to claim payment for the seven workers set out in P3. As for the rate at which they should be paid, the rate of S$80 per day for each worker was recorded in the minutes of the 28 February 2011 Meeting and although only three workers were contemplated in those minutes, it would be reasonable for this rate to apply to the four additional workers since there was no evidence that these additional workers were deployed to do significantly different work from that of the first three workers.

[53] Second, I am not satisfied that there was an agreement between the parties for the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff an overtime rate of S$15 per hour per worker. There was neither evidence of any such agreement nor evidence of any industry practice or market standard to this effect. There was also no provision for overtime rates in the minutes of the 28 February 2011 Meeting which stated that “[t]he rate for each worker shall be S$80/- per day”. It appears that the overtime rate of S$15 per hour was arrived at by Amanda Khoo by taking the normal rate of S$10 per hour (S$80 divided by 8 hours) and multiplying that by 1.5 times, which she said was the “standard rate of Singapore”. Amanda Khoo also claimed that she had informed Joe Wong in an e-mail around January 2011 that she would be charging an overtime rate of S$15 per hour for each worker but this document was not located. During oral submissions, I sought further clarification from counsel on this issue and in particular whether there was any authority for implying payment for overtime in this case. There was however no response from counsel by the deadline I stipulated. While I am aware of provisions in Part IV of the Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) mandating overtime payments in certain cases, the claims in this case pertain to work done in the Maldives and the Plaintiff did not contend that these provisions of the Employment Act applied to the workers in question, nor was there any evidence to that effect. I am therefore unable to find that the Plaintiff is entitled to any overtime payment. The rate of $80 per day would accordingly apply for each day which the relevant workers worked on the Project.

[54] Third, with regard to the claim for reimbursement of all travelling and accommodation expenses of the workers, the Defendant disputed a number of items in D5 for various reasons. I shall deal with the disputed items in turn.

(a) The Defendant says that it is not liable for the travel expenses for Ramesh’s trip from the Maldives to India and back (part of item 1 of D5) because he was going for his own annual leave. However Amanda Khoo’s explanation was that Ramesh did not go on leave but had to leave the Maldives in order to renew his visa and that Ramesh had to return to the Maldives to finish the job since the Plaintiff had no other supervisors in Singapore. Her testimony was not contradicted by the Defendant. There were also e-mails showing that Joe Wong and Randy Yeo were aware of and had assisted the Plaintiff in facilitating Ramesh’s departure from the Maldives and subsequent return. I thus allow the Plaintiff’s claim in item 1 of D5.

(b) Item 3 of D5 related to travel expenses for one of the Plaintiff’s workers who allegedly did not turn up for work. Amanda Khoo explained that this supervisor had reported for work for only three days before he had to return to Singapore because he could not get used to the weather in the Maldives. I note, however, that no wages were claimed for this individual and there were no log cards exhibited to show that he attended work. The Plaintiff is therefore not allowed to claim for this item since it is doubtful whether this worker did any work on site at all for the Defendant.

(c) Parts of items 9, 10 and 11 of D5, which related to travel and accommodation expenses for Amanda Khoo, Ero Chua and Kevin Burrows respectively, were also disputed. The Defendant first disputed travel expenses of S$736 for a trip by Amanda Khoo to the Maldives in June 2011 on the ground that no invoice for this sum was provided. However, the documentary evidence indicates that Amanda Khoo did travel to the Maldives for the purposes of the Project and that the Defendant knew and/or consented to this. The lack of an invoice does not, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, invalidate the Plaintiff’s claim and the Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable sum for the cost of a return air ticket from Singapore to Male. The sum of S$736 claimed for Amanda Khoo’s air ticket is, in my judgment, reasonable since it is in fact significantly lower than the cost of other similar trips which the Defendant has accepted that it would pay for. For the same reasons, I will allow the Plaintiff’s claim for travel expenses for Ero Chua’s trip to the Maldives in August 2011 and for Kevin Burrows’ two trips to the Maldives but in the absence of an invoice showing that a higher cost of the air tickets had in fact been incurred, the Plaintiff may only claim a reasonable cost pegged at the lower sum of S$736 for Amanda Khoo’s air ticket. Finally, I also allow the travel and accommodation expenses for Ero Chua’s trip to Bangkok around the end of May 2011. The Defendant in D5 disputed this on the ground that Ero Chua made this trip for personal business purposes but Amanda Khoo’s testimony, which was supported by the documentary evidence, was that this trip was for the purposes of recruiting more workers for the Project.

[55] Fourth, I am not satisfied that there was an agreement for the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff S$400 per day in respect of Ero Chua’s work on site. Ero Chua and Amanda Khoo accepted that there was no such agreement as to his salary. However, I accept that the parties did agree that Ero Chua should be deployed to assist with and supervise the Project. The minutes of the 28 February 2011 Meeting stated that the Plaintiff was “confirmed to have three workers and Ero” for the Project. There is also no dispute that Ero Chua was on site doing work for the Project for the 67 days claimed by the Plaintiff. As with the Tools Contract and the Materials Contract, I therefore find that there is an implied term that the Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable remuneration for Ero Chua’s work done on site. As for what constitutes reasonable remuneration, the best basis available would be Ero Chua’s salary around the time of the Project, which Amanda Khoo testified was S$2,000 a month. Pro-rating this sum of S$2,000 according to a 22-workday month, the Plaintiff is thus entitled to the sum of S$6,090.91 (67 x S$2,000/22) in respect of Ero Chua’s work on site for the Project.

[56] The total amount due to the Plaintiff under the Technical Support Contract is thus S$72,609.71 (see Annex C below).

[57] To summarize the discussion above, I find that the following sums, totalling S$1,447,273.51, are due to the Plaintiff:

[58] It was not disputed that the Defendant had already paid to the Plaintiff the sum of S$1,010,017.00 for the Project. Therefore, the Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff the balance of S$437,256.51.