Re Eder Henry Bernard QC

Tan Lee Meng J:

[1] This Originating Motion concerns an application under s 21 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2001 Rev Ed) for the admission of Mr Henry Bernard Eder, a Queen’s Counsel, on an ad hoc basis to enable him to appear as counsel for Credit Lyonnais (“CL”) in Civil Appeals Nos 57 and 73 of 2004 (the “appeals”). I dismissed the application and now give the reasons for my decision.

[2] The appeals, which were filed by CL, relate to Suit No 1175 of 2002, which was commenced by RBG Resources plc (“RBG”), an English company that was placed in compulsory liquidation. That suit was instituted pursuant to orders made in earlier interpleader proceedings for the resolution of competing proprietary and possessory claims between RBG and seven other companies, including CL, with respect to a cargo of metal in a warehouse in Singapore (the “warehouse”). Before the trial commenced, RBG reached a settlement with all defendants except the fourth defendant, who did not file a defence, and CL. As judgment in default of defence was entered against the fourth defendant, CL was the only defendant with whom RBG had to contend at the trial.

[3] CL’s case was that a large quantity of nickel cathodes, copper cathodes and tin ingots that it purchased from RBG in a series of transactions, formed part of the bulk of metal goods lying in the warehouse. However, RBG denied that the goods in the warehouse included any of the goods sold to CL. RBG also complained that CL had wrongfully removed 300mt of nickel briquettes from the warehouse on 9 May 2002. As such, a question arose as to whether any part of the metal goods in the warehouse could be ascertained as CL’s goods. For this purpose, CL relied on, inter alia, s 20A of the Sale of Goods Act (Cap 393, 1999 Rev Ed), a relatively new statutory provision that concerns undivided shares in goods that form part of a bulk.

[5] Section 21(1) of the Legal Profession Act, which governs the admission of a Queen’s Counsel, provides as follows:

[6] In Re Caplan Jonathan Michael QC (No 2) [1998] 1 SLR 440, Yong Pung How CJ explained the ambit of s 21 of the Legal Profession Act in the following succinct terms, at [11]:

[7] According to CL, the issues arising in their appeals are “difficult and complex and potentially far-reaching”. It was pointed out that the case involved the concept of ascertainment of goods and the operation of s 20A of the Sale of Goods Act and that these issues, as well as collateral issues of fraud and insolvency, are sufficiently difficult and complex to warrant the admission of a Queen’s Counsel to assist the Court of Appeal in considering the formulation of principles that would provide commercial certainty to the local and international banking and commercial community.

[8] The Attorney-General objected to the application for the ad hoc admission of Mr Eder QC “for the reason that the case is not one of sufficient difficulty and complexity such as to require the assistance of a Queen’s Counsel to elucidate on and argue it before the Court of Appeal or that local counsel have any less expertise in”. It was pointed out that the issues raised in the appeals were canvassed during a long trial by local counsel and there has been no suggestion that any of them, and especially counsel for the appellant, lacked expertise during the trial or is inadequate for the purpose of arguing the appeals before the Court of Appeal.

[9] The Law Society of Singapore agreed with the Attorney-General that the case was not of sufficient difficulty and complexity to require the admission of a Queen’s Counsel. This view was echoed by Mr Sarjit Singh SC, the respondent’s counsel in the appeals in question. He said that he had been instructed very late in the day to take charge of his client’s case in the trial before Woo J, and that it had only taken him less than a week to prepare for the trial. This, he declared, showed that the case was not very difficult or complex.

[10] A judge who is exercising his discretion to admit or deny the admission of a Queen’s Counsel will find the following elucidation of the applicable principles by Yong Pung How CJ in Price Arthur Leolin v AG [1992] 2 SLR 972 at 976–977, [11] to be very useful:

[11] I agree that the issues in the appeals are not sufficiently difficult or complex to warrant the admission of a Queen’s Counsel. There is nothing to prevent CL’s local counsel from seeking the views and assistance of a Queen’s Counsel for the preparation of the papers and arguments for the appeal. Mr Lawrence Teh, who argued the case for the admission of Mr Eder QC, said that with his experience and knowledge, the latter would be able to put his client’s case more eloquently and forcefully to the Court of Appeal. However, eloquence is, by itself, not a criteria envisaged in s 21 of the Legal Profession Act and it is worth noting that in Re Flint Charles John Raffles QC [2001] 2 SLR 276 at [9], Lai Kew Chai J issued a timely reminder that the local Bar has matured and that there

[12] As for CL’s assertion that a Queen’s Counsel ought to be admitted to explain to the Court of Appeal the ramifications of s 20A of the Sale of Goods Act, which is a relatively new provision that has not been interpreted by the High Court or the Court of Appeal, in Re Howe Martin Russell Thomas QC [2001] 3 SLR 575, Yong Pung How CJ put the matter in its proper perspective when he said as follows, at [14]: