Rosaline Singh v Jayabalan Samidurai (alias Jerome Jayabalan)

1. The appellant, Madam Rosaline Singh, who divorced the respondent, Mr Jayabalan Samidurai, appealed against the decision of District Judge Tan Peck Cheng regarding the division of their matrimonial assets. I dismissed the appeal and now give the reasons for my decision.

2. The appellant married the respondent on 11 July 1968. She was then 32 years old while the respondent was then 23 years of age. The couple have two children. Their daughter, aged 34 years, and their son, aged 30 years, are married and are living in the United States.

3. After being married for 32 years, the respondent, who was then the Personnel and Administrative Manager of Cathay Pacific Singapore, left the matrimonial home in November 2000. He claimed that he did so because he “feared for his own safety”. On 26 April 2001, he retired and has been unemployed since then. On 20 June 2001, the appellant instituted proceedings to divorce the respondent. She cited the respondent’s unreasonable behaviour as a ground for ending the marriage. Her petition for a divorce was not contested and the parties were divorced on 28 August 2001.

4. The District Judge made the following orders in relation to ancillary matters:

5. The appellant appealed against paragraphs (b) and (c) of the District Judge’s orders, which relate to the division of matrimonial assets other than the matrimonial home and maintenance respectively.

6. The appellant was satisfied with having a 50% share of the matrimonial home, which was valued at $350,000. What she was dissatisfied about was that the District Judge awarded her only 35% of the other matrimonial assets. When considering the division of matrimonial assets, one should first refer to s 112 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353). S 112(1) of the said Charter provides as follows:

7. S 112(2) of the Women’s Charter adds as follows:

8. S 112 of the Women’s Charter has been considered in innumerable cases. In Lim Choon Lai v Chew Kim Heng [2001] 3 SLR 225, the Court of Appeal reiterated that the division of matrimonial assets is not an exact science and each judge would have his own view as to what would be a just and equitable division in a particular case. In that case, LP Thean JA, who delivered the judgment of the court, likened the process of division of matrimonial assets to that of assessment of damages or losses. He summed up the principles to be borne in mind for the purpose of division of matrimonial property in the following terms at p 231:

9. If the above-mentioned principles are borne in mind in relation to the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets excluding the matrimonial home (the “other matrimonial assets”), the District Judge’s decision cannot be faulted. After a thorough consideration of the allegations made by both parties against each other, she ruled that the other matrimonial assets were worth $654,003. She noted that the appellant, who has been a housewife since 1971, had not contributed financially towards the acquisition of the other matrimonial assets and that her contribution related to caring for the children and looking after the home. After making it clear that she had considered all the relevant circumstances under s 112 of the Women’s Charter, including the length of the marriage and the financial and non-financial contributions of the parties, she held that the appellant was entitled to 35% of the other matrimonial assets.

10. It ought to be noted that when the other matrimonial assets were divided by the District Judge, the respondent owed the Inland Revenue Department and credit card companies a large amount of money. These debts were not taken into account when the District Judge calculated the amount which the respondent might still have in his hands for the purpose of dividing the other matrimonial assets. It should also be noted that while the District Judge had no sympathy for the respondent, who claimed to be living on an overdraft because he had lost a large sum of money by gambling, she accepted that there is no evidence that he had hidden some of his assets, as had been alleged by the appellant. After taking all circumstances into account and bearing in mind that two judges can come to different conclusions on the division of matrimonial assets in a particular case, I saw no reason to overturn District Judge’s decision on the division of the other matrimonial assets. As such, I affirmed her decision.

11. The appellant’s claim for monthly maintenance will next be considered. She claimed that she was entitled to $1,000 per month as maintenance and she sought an order for lump sum maintenance. However, as has been mentioned, the District Judge made no order for maintenance.

12. As far as maintenance is concerned, the relevant part of s 114 (1) of the Women’s Charter provides as follows:

13. In Lee Yong Chuan Edwin v Tan Soan Lian [2001] 1 SLR 377, the Court of Appeal noted that for the purpose of determining the appropriate amount of maintenance, the division of the parties’ matrimonial assets and the financial resources which the parties have or are likely to have in the foreseeable future could be taken into account. The District Judge noted that after the division of matrimonial assets, the appellant had $402,709. This amount was much more than what her former husband, who is heavily indebted to the Inland Revenue Authority and a number of banks, had in his hands. The District Judge accepted that in view of the respondent’s age and circumstances, it would not be easy for him to find employment in the future. Apart from the fact that the appellant was very much better off than the respondent after the division of matrimonial assets, it should not be overlooked that the appellant is already over 67 years of age. While arguing that the appellant was entitled to lump sum maintenance, her counsel referred to Ong Chen Leng v Tan Sau Poo [1993] 3 SLR 137 and Yow Mee Leng v Chen Kai Buan [2000] 4 SLR 466. However, in both those two cases, the lump sum maintenance was computed on the basis that maintenance was payable until the former wife was 67 years old. The 67 years was arrived at as a compromise between the average life expectancy of a Singaporean woman, namely 70 years, and the usual retirement age of a Singaporean male worker, namely 65 years. While this does not mean that the appellant in this case, who is already over 67 years of age, is, without more, barred from claiming maintenance, her age should be taken into account with all other facts when determining whether any maintenance order ought to be made.

14. If all the facts in this case are closely examined, it is understandable why the District Judge did not order the respondent to pay the appellant any maintenance. As no strong argument was advanced to show that the District Judge had erred, I affirmed her decision on this matter.

15. As for costs, although the appellant’s appeal was dismissed, the parties agreed that no order for costs should be made.