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Grounds publishedDecided 27 May 2010
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High Court

Segar Ashok v Koh Fonn Lyn Veronica and another suit

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[2010] SGHC 168Case no. Suit Nos 310 and 562 of 2007

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  1. Belinda Ang Saw Ean J:

  2. Introduction

  3. [2] In Suit 310, Dr Segar claims against Veronica damages for libel in respect of three emails she had circulated on 31 March 2007 and 5 April 2007. Veronica denies that the emails contained the defamatory allegations complained of. She has pleaded lesser meanings to the alleged defamatory statements and has raised the defence of justification. Veronica is counter suing Dr Segar for defaming her in three SMS messages and an undated letter. There is also a separate claim for slander. In addition to damages for libel and slander, Veronica is seeking recovery of a sum of $209,137.44 paid to Dr Segar and to third parties on behalf of Dr Segar in their private dealings with each other.

  4. [3] In Suit 562, Veronica is suing Dr Segar in his capacity as her former business partner of a small jewellery business. It is common ground that the partnership terminated but the date of termination is disputed. It is also common ground that the business expenses and assets were to be shared equally, but the parties cannot agree on exactly how much each party had contributed to the business, and how much of the jewellery were sold and how much of the jewellery and gemstones were left to be divided between the parties. Veronica wants Dr Segar to give, inter alia, an account of various matters pertaining to the jewellery business. In short, Veronica wants this court to order a taking of accounts of all sums due as between the partners consequent on the termination of the partnership.

  5. [4] Dr Segar has a counterclaim for an account of 32 pieces of blue sapphires and all jewellery and gemstones belonging to the business which he claims are or were in the possession and custody of Veronica, and he seeks a declaration that he is entitled to his half share in the disputed sapphires, jewellery and gemstones. Furthermore, Dr Segar claims his half share of the value of the disputed sapphires, jewellery and gemstones with the result that he wants payment of the value of his half share.

  6. History of the relationship and the discord

  7. Dr Segar’s version

  8. [5] Dr Segar is a medical doctor by profession and owns a medical clinic at 184 East Coast Road, Singapore. According to him, he first met Veronica at his clinic in or about 1996 when she consulted him as a medical doctor. Over time, Dr Segar became Veronica’s family doctor. Her parents-in-law also consulted him in his professional capacity. Dr Segar, Veronica and her husband, Ang Teann Meng (“ATM”), became good and close friends. In happier times, Dr Segar likened Veronica’s family to being as “close to me as my own family”. Dr Segar is also the godfather of Veronica’s son. They would often vacation together and there were overseas trips to Australia, Japan, India, Sri Lanka, Norway and Argentina.

  9. [6] The close relationship between the parties led to collaborations in business ventures. The most important of these was a business involving the design and marketing of custom-made jewellery. According to Dr Segar, he has an interest in designing jewellery and Veronica liked his designs and jewellery so much that after his mother’s funeral in June 2001, Veronica proposed to Dr Segar that they start a business in designing and marketing jewellery. Although the details of negotiations leading up to the establishment of the business were sketchy, Dr Segar testified that it was understood that the expenses of the jewellery business were to be shared equally. He was also to be responsible for the design of the jewellery whilst Veronica would engage her family’s jewellery craftsman to produce the jewellery. Both parties were then to market the jewellery to their friends and acquaintances.

  10. [7] According to Dr Segar, there were at least three other businesses which he and Veronica and, at times, her husband, ATM, had participated in. In brief, in 2004, Dr Segar, Veronica and ATM decided to venture into the trading of scrap metal. The intention was to purchase scrap metal from Argentina for sale to manufacturing companies in Indonesia. That venture failed due to the difficulties encountered with the suppliers in Argentina. Next, Dr Segar and Veronica “dabbled” in the computer hardware business under the name of Stracom Technology. In relation to that business, Dr Segar and Veronica travelled to Taiwan to purchase laptop computers and they arranged for 100 units to be delivered to Singapore in batches of 20 units. However, both parties experienced difficulties in selling the computer laptops and decided to terminate the business prematurely. Next, a proposal to set up a Mediterranean fast food business came up. To that end, a company called Pitta Hut (S) Pte Ltd (“Pitta Hut”) was incorporated by Dr Segar. However, as with the earlier two businesses, that venture stalled in the planning stage and the company was eventually wound up. Finally, they also invested in Sachris Enterprises Pty Ltd (“Sachris”), an Australian seafood business, but that business also failed.

  11. [8] In early 2003 (by Dr Segar’s recollection), Veronica approached Dr Segar for a loan. Veronica and ATM were involved in ATM’s family companies, Skatool Industries Pte Ltd (“Skatool Industries”) and Skatool Marine. To further their businesses, Veronica and ATM bought a new factory at No 7A Tech Park Crescent, Tuas Tech Park, Singapore but ran into financial difficulties in completing the purchase. Initially, Veronica requested a loan of $200,000 from Dr Segar who offered to refinance his property at 6 Merryn Road, Singapore to raise the necessary funds (“the Merryn Road property”). However, Dr Segar warned Veronica that the Merryn Road property was, at that point in time, mortgaged to Overseas Union Trust and the mortgage contained a penalty clause for early redemption. By remortgaging the property, he would have to incur a penalty. Furthermore, he also told Veronica that he had intended in the future to purchase a shophouse to serve as his medical clinic and private residence. Dr Segar had planned to use the Merryn Road property to finance the renovations of this shophouse, and a refinancing of the Merryn Road property at an early stage could foil his future plans.

  12. [9] In order to assuage his concerns, Veronica allegedly made four promises. First, Veronica promised to absorb the bank penalty that Dr Segar would have to suffer in the remortgage of the Merryn Road property. The bank penalty eventually turned out to be $41,127.87. However, in order to absorb the bank penalty as well as to have some extra cash for her own renovation works after completing the purchase of the Tuas factory, Veronica requested a bigger loan of $300,000 instead of $200,000. Dr Segar’s understanding was that with payment of the bank penalty, Veronica would receive a sum of $258,872.13 (comprising of $300,000 - $41,127.87) but would repay the entire sum of $300,000. Secondly, Veronica also promised to pay the bank interest charges payable on the loan of $300,000. Similarly, Veronica also agreed to pay the legal fees involved in the refinancing. Finally, Dr Segar’s impression was that if he were to purchase a shophouse in the future and did not have adequate funds to renovate it, “the Defendant [would] provide [the plaintiff] with the financial assistance to complete the works.” On the basis of those promises, Dr Segar went ahead with the refinancing. On 12 April 2003 and 14 April 2003, a total sum of $258,872.13 was disbursed to Veronica. According to Dr Segar, the loan of $300,000 was fully repaid by January 2006.

  13. [10] In August 2003, Dr Segar bought a shophouse at 184 East Coast Road, Singapore, and was in need of funds to renovate the property. He informed Veronica that he would like his loan to be repaid. Veronica and ATM agreed to make repayment of the loan by contributing to the progress payments owing by Dr Segar to his renovation contractors and suppliers.

  14. [11] Another facet to the relationship between Dr Segar and Veronica that is in dispute was Dr Segar’s appointment as a consultant of Skatool Industries. By Dr Segar’s reckoning, he had since 2001 provided services as a consultant to Skatool Industries, and they are listed in his written testimony as follows:

  15. [12] In 2003, Veronica offered to remunerate Dr Segar for his consultancy services to the tune of $6,000 a month. Dr Segar accepted this offer and duly invoiced Skatool Industries each month. Skatool Industries would then make payment on the invoice. There was, according to Dr Segar, no specific scope of the nature of the consultancy services which Dr Segar was to render. In March 2004, Veronica instructed Dr Segar to render all invoices for the consultancy fee to Skatool Marine. Accordingly, from April to June 2004, Dr Segar rendered the invoices to Skatool Marine and they were duly paid. The consultancy fees stopped thereafter. Dr Segar’s explanation for the stoppage was that he had, at that point of time, asked for the $300,000 loan to be repaid by having Veronica pay off all renovation liabilities due on his shophouse. Veronica then requested the consultancy fee to be held in abeyance. Dr Segar agreed to suspend the consultancy fee until after the loan had been repaid.

  16. [13] By 2005, the relationship between the parties began to show signs of strain. In March 2005, Dr Segar travelled with Veronica and her family to Sydney, Australia for a holiday. During this trip, Veronica got into an altercation with Dr Segar’s maid which caused unhappiness on the part of both parties. Another big argument between Dr Segar and Veronica took place in or about January or February 2006 when Veronica allegedly reneged on her intention to help out Dr Segar with the payment of the renovations works at his shophouse. The parties then mutually agreed to end their collaboration in the jewellery business. Dr Segar said he enquired what they should do about all the unsold jewellery and gemstones that were in his possession. Veronica then told Dr Segar that he could keep all of the unsold jewellery and gemstones. From that point onwards, Dr Segar regarded their friendship as having ended.

  17. [14] The relationship between the parties worsened after a New Year’s Eve dinner that was held at the home of a mutual friend on 31 December 2006. During that dinner, ATM approached Dr Segar and offered his hand in greeting. Not only did Dr Segar refuse to take his hand, Dr Segar followed up with an SMS message to ATM in the early hours of 1 January 2007 (the “1 January SMS”). This SMS message was also sent to Marlene Gwee (“Marlene”), a friend of Veronica and Dr Segar’s former clinic assistant. The contents of this SMS message are the subject matter of Veronica’s counterclaim against Dr Segar for libel. It is convenient at this juncture to explain that in the 1 January SMS, Dr Segar alluded to Veronica’s broken promises to him. Counsel for Dr Segar, Mr Devinder K Rai (“Mr Rai”), identified four promises: (a) to assist Dr Segar when he required financial assistance in renovating his shophouse; (b) Dr Segar could keep all the gemstones and jewellery; (c) the resumption of the monthly consultancy fee of $6,000; and (d) to continue to pay Veronica’s father-in-law after his retirement the same remuneration and benefits previously received from Skatool Industries.

  18. [15] On 30 March 2007, Dr Segar received an email from Marlene (the “30th March Email”). The 30th March Email was sent to Dr Segar and copied to Dr Segar’s friends and acquaintances, including Veronica. In that email, Marlene had accused Dr Segar of breaking up her marriage, and also rebuked him for grouping her husband, Henry Cheng (“Henry”), with Veronica. In examination-in-chief, Marlene explained that Dr Segar had made negative comments about Veronica and Dr Segar had commented that both Henry and Veronica had the same traits. In her opinion, Dr Segar was wrong to “lump Henry with Veron because Henry didn’t do anything to him”. In reply, Veronica on 31 March 2007 sent an email entitled “THE TRUE COLOURS OF A SINGAPORE DOCTOR” (the “31 March Email”). This email, along with another two emails mentioned below, formed the subject matter of Dr Segar’s claims in libel. The 31 March Email was copied to Dr Segar’s friends and acquaintances.

  19. [16] Upon receiving the 31 March Email, Dr Segar said he was very upset. He immediately sent ATM an SMS on his mobile phone wherein he sarcastically thanked Veronica for her email to Marlene (the “31 March SMS to ATM”). Later that same day, he also sent an SMS message to Marlene where he chastised her for working with Veronica to destroy his reputation (the “31 March SMS to Marlene”).

  20. [17] On 5 April 2007, Veronica sent two further emails (“the “first 5 April Email” and “the second 5 April Email” respectively). Dr Segar alleges that Veronica made further defamatory and disparaging statements against him in these emails, including the allegation that he had kept the “good stuff” from their jewellery business for himself. Aggrieved, Dr Segar decided to hand over the gemstones that he considered most valuable to Veronica. In doing so, Dr Segar also sent an undated handwritten letter to ATM on 3 April 2008 (“the Letter”). The Letter is also a part of Veronica’s counterclaim.

  21. Veronica’s version

  22. [18] Veronica’s recollection of the facts was in parts slightly different from Dr Segar’s in terms of emphasis than substance; in other areas, admittedly, the evidence conflict. According to Veronica, she first got to know Dr Segar sometime in 1994 to 1995 when ATM brought her to Dr Segar’s clinic. Thereafter, Dr Segar became Veronica’s family doctor. Veronica confirmed the couple’s close friendship with Dr Segar and that they made many overseas trips together. Veronica described Dr Segar’s relationship with her and her family as a one in which there was no clear demarcation of debts owed to one another, but each party regularly offered, and did, pay for items on behalf of the other. However, more often than not, she and her husband ended up with the bill, and she produced at the trial a slew of bills and receipts to prove her claim.

  23. [20] As for the loan from Dr Segar, Veronica explained that towards the end of 2002, she and ATM wanted to purchase a factory in Tuas. According to Veronica, it was Dr Segar who, upon hearing of Veronica’s financial constraints, offered to help with a loan. Dr Segar did not mention how he intended to raise the loan. Veronica, who was grateful for the offer, promptly accepted and agreed to repay the loan within three years. Veronica received from Dr Segar, a cashier’s order dated 12 April 2003 for $167,003.22 and Dr Segar’s cheque dated 14 April for $91,868.91. Veronica was surprised to receive $258,872.13 and not $300,000. Dr Segar orally explained that he had deducted the sum of $41,127.87 from the loan amount of $300,000 as bank penalty for refinancing the mortgage of his Merryn Road property. Dr Segar also requested that Veronica pay the legal fees of $3,640.66 to his solicitors for professional services rendered in the refinancing. At that time, Dr Segar had explicitly stated that the property had been refinanced solely for Veronica’s benefit. Veronica was also asked to pay interest of 6% on the loan. Even though Veronica did not like the terms of the loan, she nonetheless accepted the cashier’s order and Dr Segar’s cheque as she urgently needed the money. To Veronica, this was the first sign of unpleasantness in their friendship.

  24. [21] Veronica testified that she subsequently found out that Dr Segar also benefited from the refinancing of the Merryn Road property by enjoying a lower interest rate (from 5% to 2%). Furthermore, Dr Segar had, in spite of what he told Veronica, obtained from the refinancing, a loan of more than $300,000 such that he was able to withdraw an additional $205,180.89 for himself.

  25. [22] Veronica agreed that from June 2003 to June 2004, she had repaid, in part, the loan by causing Skatool Industries to pay Dr Segar’s clinic, Segar Medical Services Pte Ltd (“Segar Medical Services”), a sum of $6,000 a month. However, Veronica asserted that payment to his clinic was at Dr Segar’s request and his instructions were that he wanted those payments reflected as his monthly income for consultancy services. Dr Segar even instructed Veronica, on two different occasions, to write letters to Hong Leong Finance, to whom the Merryn Road property was re-mortgaged, to confirm his appointment as a consultant. Although no such consultancy services were provided, Veronica and her husband agreed to help Dr Segar in this respect.

  26. [24] By 2005, Veronica was beginning to feel that she had paid in excess of the amount she owed to Dr Segar. His request for financial assistance continued and did not seem like abating. In the first half of that year, Dr Segar asked Veronica and ATM to pay for the installation of an elevator for the shophouse. Although Veronica felt that the elevator was somewhat unnecessary, she nevertheless made the payment. Later, Dr Segar requested that Veronica pay for the installation of a Jacuzzi and a fish pond. He also orally asked for a monthly payment of $10,000 for the rest of his life. Veronica declined to make these payments and the relationship between the parties deteriorated further.

  27. [25] Veronica also claimed that in early 2006, Dr Segar began to speak unkindly of her in front of third parties. In particular, Veronica alleged that Dr Segar told one Tore Dalseide (“Tore”), a customer of Veroncia’s, that Veronica was not trustworthy and a bitch (the “Statement to Tore”). In or around July or August 2006, Veronica informed Dr Segar that she did not wish to invest any more moneys in the jewellery business.

  28. [26] Veronica and Dr Segar are in agreement on how the 1 January SMS came to be sent: see [14] above. The 31 March SMS to ATM and the 31 March SMS to Marlene were also shown to Veronica when they were received. Veronica did not deny sending the emails that were the subject matter of Dr Segar’s claim in defamation (see [15] and [17] above).

  29. SUIT 310: THE DEFAMATION ACTION

  30. The publications complained of by Dr Segar

  31. [27] As stated, there are three emails in this libel action. The full text of each email is set out below. It is relevant to note that Veronica admitted, at the trial, that the three emails referred to Dr Segar; that she was the author of the emails, and that she had sent the emails to a group of people – 31 March Email was sent to 24 addressees; the first 5 April Email was sent to 46 addressees (which included the first 24 addressees); and the second 5 April Email was sent to 46 addressees. In light of her admission, the issue for determination is whether the contents of the emails are defamatory.

  32. [28] As can be seen below, the words and passages complained of are highlighted, and the meanings attributed to the emails are set out immediately below the text. Veronica’s defence that the words bear lesser meanings are also set out below. Veronica is also claiming justification in relation to the natural and ordinary meaning which Dr Segar attributes to the offensive statements in the emails as well as the less serious meanings which she attributes to the emails. I will set out the plea of justification at a later section of this judgment.

  33. First alleged libel: the 31 March Email

  34. [29] The 31 March Email was sent by Veronica to 24 individuals comprising of Marlene, Dr Segar’s brother, and Dr Segar’s circle of friends and associates but not Dr Segar himself. The email is entitled “THE TRUE COLOURS OF A SINGAPORE DOCTOR” (emphasis as in the original email). For ease of reference, I have inserted paragraph numbers and the double underline is to highlight the words complained of by Dr Segar as defamatory. The caps, bold, italicised and single underlined texts are the author’s. The email reads as follows:

  35. [30] Dr Segar alleges in pleadings that the natural and ordinary meanings of the words used in the 31 March Email and/or inferentially meant or are understood to mean the following:

  36. Second alleged libel: the first 5 April Email

  37. [31] Veronica had sent the same 31 March Email on 5 April 2007 to Dr Segar. As such, the same meanings set out above in [30] are being alleged. I should for completeness mention the differences between the two emails. They are: (a) the typographical error in the heading of the first 5 April Email - “THE TRYE COLOURS OF A SINGAPORE DOCTOR”; (b) the email was addressed to Dr Segar, marked “WITHOUT PREJUDICE” and with the note “Compliments from Veronica Koh” and; (c) there were also more recipients: 46 email addresses. Some 13 minutes later, Veronica sent the second 5 April Email to the same number of addressees.

  38. Third alleged libel: the second 5 April Email

  39. [32] The second 5 April Email to Dr Segar and Marlene was entitled “Will the REAL ASHOK SEGAR stand out please…:” The email referred to the first 5 April Email copied and sent 13 minutes earlier to 46 email addresses. As before paragraph numbers have been added to the email for ease of reference and the double underline is to highlight the alleged defamatory words. Again, the caps, bold and italicised and single underlined texts are the author’s. The email reads as follows:

  40. [33] Dr Segar alleges that the natural and ordinary meanings of the words used in the second email of 5 April and/or inferentially meant or are understood to mean the following:

  41. [34] Dr Segar seeks general damages and aggravated damages in respect of the three emails. In respect of the claim for aggravated damages, Dr Segar alleges malice, the particulars of which are set out in paras 8, 14 and 21 of the Statement of Claim (Amendment No 1).

  42. Veronica’s lesser meanings in relation to three emails

  43. [35] Veronica denies that the contents of the emails are capable of bearing one or any defamatory meanings ascribed by Dr Segar. She maintains that the emails have to be read in context, and that one has to have in mind how they came to be written. In respect of the 31 March Email, the lesser meanings pleaded by Veronica are as follows:

  44. [36] Veronica adopts the same lesser meanings in respect of the First 5 April Email. In respect of the Second 5 April Email, the lesser meanings pleaded by Veronica are as follows:

  45. [37] Veronica is also relying on the defence of justification, particulars of which are set out in paras 6, 7 and 16 of the Defence (Amendments No 5).

  46. First issue: Whether each of the meaning pleaded by Dr Segar is capable of being conveyed by the matter complained of and whether it is capable of defaming him

  47. [38] On the first issue of the meanings to which the impugned words are capable, the approach of the court is well settled. The parties are also in agreement as to the approach to be followed. The principles to be applied by a court (on this first issue) have been most recently summarised by the Court of Appeal in Review Publishing Co Ltd and Another v Lee Hsien Loong and Another [2010] 1 SLR(R) 52 (“Lee Hsien Loong (CA)”) at [27]as follows:

  48. [39] In adopting the aforementioned factors to determine the meanings borne by the three emails (which I will take in turn), I am mindful that an important part of the approach is the court’s task to put itself in the position of an ordinary reasonable reader reading the offending email as a whole and as such should not be too analytical or too literal in considering the words used. In addition, the ordinary reasonable reader possessed only of his or her general knowledge may infer a meaning from all the surrounding circumstances which goes beyond the strictly literal meaning of the words used.

  49. [40] After the natural words and ordinary meaning or the lesser meaning has been established, the next consideration is whether the meaning is defamatory. In this regard, a helpful summary of the legal principles is found in Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore, Vol 18, (LexisNexis, 2009 Reissue) (“Halsbury’s”), para [240.091] and it reads as follows:

  50. With all these principles in mind, I now turn to the meanings of the words complained of.

  51. The meanings of the words complained of

  52. (1) Dr Segar’s pleaded meanings: the 31 March Email

  53. [41] I will first consider what impression the emails are capable of having on the hypothetical reasonable reader, rather than subjecting each of them to an artificial and lengthy analysis which does not reflect the way in which it would be read by the ordinary reasonable reader. On that basis, it seems to me that in respect of the 31 March Email, the overall impression it had on me, when determining what impact it would have had on the hypothetical reasonable reader reading the email as a whole on 31 March 2007, comes from calling Dr Segar a “FIRST CLASS CON ARTISTE??!!”. The tone and gist of the email is also epitomised in the heading of the email which is as follows: “THE TRUE COLOURS OF A SINGAPORE DOCTOR”.

  54. [42] In my judgment, the sting is the accusation that Dr Segar is a first class con artist. In its natural and ordinary meaning, the hypothetical reasonable reader would get from these words the impression that Dr Segar has befriended his victims but was, in reality, a conman practised in the art of deceit. And in essence, the relationship between Dr Segar and Veronica was that between a conman or confident trickster and his victim.

  55. [43] Collins, Cobuild English Dictionary (5 ed) defines a con artist as “some one who tricks other people into giving them their money or property”. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (4 ed) (“Longman Dictionary”) defines the term “con man” as “someone who tries to get money from people by tricking them”. In my view, the word “conman” or “con artist” is capable of a range of meanings. A person can “con” others for all kinds of purposes and with a view to different benefits, not necessarily monetary. It does not necessarily mean or include the meaning that he ripped people off for their money.

  56. [44] As stated, the sting can arise from the words “first class con artiste” and it is reinforced through the combination of references to the words “first class con artiste” with other words in the email such as “suckers like us in this world who will buy a Sob story”; …“Till we find out the truth before he [moves] to the his next victim”;… “He has always been trying to play [one] against the other…”; …“He is very good at playing on your emotions and heart strings”;… “Guess I was under some kind of spells (sic)”; “…that he is a BOTTOMLESS PIT”;… “An EXPENSIVE and HARD Lesson that I will learn and have learn (sic) well. I have learn (sic) for the BEST MASTER this time”; and …“With him, THERE IS ALWAYS AN ULTERIOR MOTIVE!!!”. These statements produced a picture of Veronica who was conned by Dr Segar for all kinds of purposes and with a view to different benefits, not necessarily monetary. In all she claimed to have spent over $500,000 on him over the last six years (see para [16] of email quoted at [29] above). The monetary benefits were, for example, the $6,000 per month payments for over a year for free to help tie over Dr Segar’s money problems; paying “above OD rates” for the $300,000 loan; the addition of the bank penalty of over $45,000 to the $300,000 loan, and finally, paying the renovations of Dr Segar’s shophouse at 184, East Coast Road. The other different benefits were, for instance, overseas travels, meals at fancy restaurants, unreasonable demands on Veronica’s time and use of her driver and car. In all, the imputation is that Dr Segar is a con artist; that he deceived Veronica and is otherwise a cheat and is dishonest.

  57. [45] On the jewellery business, the deceit is inferred. Even though they were “actually equal partners in the business”, the imputation that their relationship was that between a conman and his victim comes from the following impugned statements that

  58. [18] Only to return the Unsold sets Jewellery to me But keeping the good stuffs…All the loose stones….

  59. [19] His share of the keep are double of mine…

  60. [20] But telling the world he has given me all the jewellery? Something which I absolutely had NO SAY and NO CHOICE!

  61. [21] The problem with him is he is always telling half a story and leaving it to you to imagine the other half. With the better benefiting him.

  62. [22] It is a pity a PERSON of SUCH GOOD Family Background needs to retort (sic) to such tricks and tactics.

  63. In short, the inference is that Veronica was cheated by Dr Segar, and he is dishonest.

  64. [46] To summarise, the sting comes from the words typed in capital letters “A FIRST CLASS CON ARTISTE” and the impugned statement is defamatory in the natural and ordinary meaning pleaded ie. he deceived Veronica and is otherwise a cheat and is dishonest. The words are defamatory as they are enough to induce an ill opinion of Dr Segar in the minds of the recipients of the email and to deprive him of their society.

  65. (2) Dr Segar’s pleaded meanings: first 5 April Email

  66. [47] The contents of the first 5 April Email is substantially the same as the 31 March Email, and the overall impression it had on me, when determining what impact it would have had on the hypothetical reasonable reader reading the email as a whole on 31 March 2007, is already explained above. The same meaning can be attributed to the words complained of in paras 5.3.and 5.5 of the Statement of Claim (Amendment No 5), that is to say, Dr Segar is dishonest; and Dr Segar had lied to and cheated Veronica.

  67. [48] One related point raised by Mr Rai concerns the sapphires. The 31 March Email referred to the sapphires retained by Dr Segar. Dr Segar’s case is that he kept the sapphires initially because Veronica had agreed to it. However, after the 31 March Email, Dr Segar returned the sapphires on 3 April 2007 with an undated handwritten note to ATM. Chronologically speaking, when Veronica sent the first email on 5 April 2007 to Dr Segar and several other addressees, the sapphires had already been returned to Veronica. As such, Veronica’s reference to Dr Segar keeping the sapphires as of 5 April 2007 was untrue, and Veronica had thereby (so the argument developed) increased the sting of what was said in the 31 March Email when it was sent again on 5 April to a wider circle of friends and associates. I do not agree with this submission as none of the addressees were privy to what Dr Segar actually did on 3 April 2007, there being no evidence to suggest otherwise. In the circumstances, the hypothetical reasonable reader with no special knowledge that the sapphires were returned would not read the first 5 April Email in a different light.

  68. (3) Dr Segar’s pleaded meanings: second 5 April Email

  69. [49] In my overall impression of the 31 March Email, I did not agree with Mr Rai that para 1 of that email is capable of bearing the meaning that Dr Segar cheated his mother and brother of his mother’s property. In context, Veronica was asking Marlene to explain what she wrote. The question marks were relevant and not rhetorical in nature as Mr Rai submits. However, I accept that the position is different in the case of the second 5 April Email. The hypothetical reasonable reader would have understood this second 5 April Email read in conjunction with its subject heading “Will the REAL ASHOK SEGAR stand out please…” as capable of bearing the meanings attributed to paras 3 and 4 of the email: that Dr Segar cheated his brother by committing forgery to cut him out of his inheritance. Paras 3 and 4 of the email read:

  70. [50] The other parts of the email on the same topic written in bold by Veronica for emphasis reads:

  71. [51] Paragraphs 3, 4 and 37 of the second 5 April Email and the use of question marks to emphasise the words “professional” like a medical doctor coupled with the words “commit forgery” and “interesting revelation” read together show that the author wanted the readers to indulge in loose thinking that the forgery by a professional man mentioned in the email was related to the mother’s estate and the forger would be exposed after forensic investigations by HSA or after a lie detector test. In her email she taunted and dared Dr Segar to take the tests if he had nothing to hide.

  72. [52] The sting in the 31 Email - that Veronica was “conned” by Dr Segar - is repeated in the second 5 April Email. She again wrote that she was cheated by Dr Segar (para 17) and that she was conned of more that $500,000 for 5 years. She wrote:

  73. [53] Other facts Veronica suggested as important to being “con” in her second 5 April Email were premeditation and planning in her second 5 April Email. In para 20, she mentioned that “what you [Dr Segar] did to me” was a “very well thought plan”. Immediately thereafter she explained the “plan” as follows:

  74. [54] I agree with Mr Rai that the email wants the hypothetical reasonable reader to evaluate what kind of a con man Dr Segar is. The context of the email is laid before the hypothetical reasonable reader and it calls him/her to judge Dr Segar. In my view, the hypothetical reasonable reader would have gotten the impression that the email accuses Dr Segar of having committed forgery and for being untruthful, that he deceived his brother and Veronica and is otherwise a cheat and is dishonest. Such meanings are defamatory. They are enough to induce an ill opinion of Dr Segar in the minds of the recipients and to deprive him of their society.

  75. Textual analysis of the emails

  76. [55] Save for the view expressed above that the emails bear the meanings for which I have found and are defamatory (see [46] and [54] above), I disagree with the rest of the detailed textual arguments addressed by both sides which do not cast doubt on my impression. I return to the various texts of the emails for completeness.

  77. (i) 31 March Email

  78. [56] Mr Rai submits that the pleaded meanings - that Dr Segar cheated his mother and brother - are derived from on a reasonable reading of para 2 of the 31 March Email

  79. [57] Mr Rai submits that the question marks are irrelevant given the general tone and content of the entire email bearing in mind the caption heading: “THE TRUE COLOURS OF A SINGAPORE DOCTOR”. The questions, so the arguments develop, are not genuine questions requiring an honest answer but are, in essence, rhetorical questions asked to induce a train of thought. Mr Rai points out that, in context, the question marks were used for emphasis in relation to Veronica’s allegation that Dr Segar had cheated his mother and brother.

  80. [58] In contrast, counsel for Veronica, Mr Giam Chin Toon SC (“Mr Giam”), argues that para 2 and the question marks were not rhetorical questions – they were nothing more than queries as Veronica was seeking Marlene’s clarification of what Marlene had written in her email. I accept Mr Giam’s submissions. An ordinary, reasonable person not unduly suspicious would read para 2 in the context of para 1 where Veronica’s incomprehension of Marlene’s email was clearly stated and she then sought clarification. I pause to mention Mr Rai’s argument that the second 5 April Email supports the meaning of the words in para 2 of the 31 March Email. The argument is untenable. It seeks to introduce on 31 March 2007 extrinsic evidence, which is inadmissible, to support the meaning of the words in para 2 of the 31 March Email. The next sentence “Is he REALLY SUCH A MONSTER?” is, in my view, to be understood in the context of her queries in para 2 of the email. The queries in para 2 are all followed by a question mark.

  81. [59] The only sentence with two question marks and two exclamation marks is “A FIRST CON ARTISTE??!! I have already dealt with that sentence in the context of the gist and tone of the email.

  82. [60] Mr Rai argues that para 30 of the email suggests that Dr Segar had attempted to extort $10,000 per month for life from Veronica. She had written:

  83. [61] In response, Mr Giam argues that Dr Segar’s demand for $10,000 cannot amount to extortion. There was no threat or fear involved. Veronica also asserted that the statement was true. One defect in the imputation in terms of capacity is that the notion of extortion of $10,000 per month involves unwillingness at the very least, a reluctance to part with money, and it is the essence of the story that Veronica willingly parted with her money in response to sob stories. In that exercise, the word “con” there was not the generally understood element of extortion. To the hypothetical reasonable reader, it is more probable that Dr Segar was making a facetious request which Veronica rightly ignored. She was not under pressure to give Dr Segar’s request any serious thought. In the circumstances, the statement in para 30 of the email could not amount to extortion as argued for by Mr Rai.

  84. [62] Separately, I agree with Mr Giam that simply stating that Veronica had paid above commercial rates for the loan of $300,000 was not defamatory. There may be various reasons for doing so, not in the least that Veronica had agreed to do so. There is little reason for a hypothetical reasonable reader to arrive at the conclusion that Dr Segar had unfairly overcharged Veronica by taking advantage of her. Overcharging implies an intention to cheat someone by making that person pay more than was required. Such an intention was not borne out by the wording of para 10 of the 31 March Email. It simply gave the hypothetical reasonable reader the impression that Veronica had more than repaid any debt that she might owe to Dr Segar. It did not cast Dr Segar in any negative light.

  85. [63] In relation to the alleged implication that Dr Segar was instrumental in Marlene’s divorce, Mr Rai said the defamatory statement is in para 34 and it reads:

  86. [64] Mr Rai argues that the plain meaning of the above sentence is that the plaintiff was instrumental in causing or contributing to the divorce of Marlene by convincing Henry to divorce her. I agree with Mr Giam that the para 34 is not defamatory.

  87. [65] On the allegation that Dr Segar lacks financial competence and integrity, Mr Rai relies on the 31 March Email in its entirety to support this defamatory meaning. He asserts that by insinuating that Dr Segar had cheated his mother and brother, demanding that Veronica pay for his travelling and entertainment expenses and attempting to extort money from her, a reasonable reader would deduce that Dr Segar is financially incompetent and lacks integrity.

  88. [66] In reply, Mr Giam argues that none of the words or paragraphs complained of in the whole email bore the meanings that Dr Segar tried to ascribe to them. Having reached the conclusion on the sting of the email, it is not necessary to find that the 31 March Email conveyed the implication that Dr Segar lacked financial competence and integrity. To conclude otherwise would involve an over analysis of the email.

  89. [67] Finally, I also did not agree that the email read as a whole attacked Dr Segar in his professional capacity such as lack of qualification, knowledge, skill, capacity, judgment or efficiency in the conduct of his medical practice. A dishonest person is not necessarily an incompetent or unskilled doctor. By virtue of his occupation, the plaintiff has some standing in society. If anything, the email attacks his social reputation and personal character rather than his professional character. There is therefore no basis that for the allegation that words complained of bear meaning or is understood to mean that Dr Segar is unfit to be a medical practitioner.

  90. (ii) The first 5 April Email

  91. [68] The same observations made earlier apply equally to this email.

  92. (iii) The second 5 April Email

  93. [69] There are parts of the email that related to Veronica’s question as to why Dr Segar kept calling her a “Money Faced Lying Pariah Bitch” and in chiding him for accusing her of cheating him without proof, she mocks Dr Segar. In the present case, I do not think parts of the email – that rhetorically asked Dr Segar if he was a “Wicked Soul”; likening Dr Segar as someone who “shoot Blanks”; rebuking him for “Gossiping and Lieing (sic)..Ruining Others’ Reputation!; and finally chiding Dr Segar for having gone too far in their vendetta like “Literally, You Bit the Very Hand That Feed You”- made Dr Segar looked ridiculous or lowered his social reputation in the eyes of the hypothetical reasonable person who read the email. I agree with Millett LJ’s observations in Berkoff v Burchill and Another [1997] EMLR 139 at 153 that the line between mockery and defamation may sometime be difficult to draw. I am not convinced that the aforementioned words fall on the wrong side of the line to amount to defaming Dr Segar.

  94. Second issue: Were the publications complained of substantially true

  95. [70] The law relating to justification is well settled. The gist of the defence is that the defamatory statements made were true or substantially true. The defence of justification is summarised in Halsbury’s at paras [240.132] and [240.133] as follows:

  96. [71] In the defence of justification, it is paramount that the defendant identifies precisely what meaning he or she seeks to justify. The Court of Appeal in Aaron Anne Joseph v Cheong Yip Seng [1996] 1 SLR (R) 258 held (at [68] and [70]):

  97. Discussions and decision on the defence of justification

  98. [72] In her Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No 5), Veronica pleads the following defences of justification in relation to the 31 March Email and the first 5 April Email:

  99. Paragraph 5 read as follows:

  100. [73] As is discernible from the plea above, Veronica’s defence of justification relates only to the lesser meanings ascribed by her to the words complained of by Dr Segar in his pleadings. The pleaded position is the same for the second 5 April Email. Paragraph 16 of the Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No 5) reads:

  101. Paragraph 15 states:

  102. [74] Since I do not agree with the lesser meanings, the defence of justification is not, in the main, applicable. However, that is not the end of the matter. I must still consider paras 7 and 17 of the Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No 5). These paras seek to rely on the defence of justification in relation to the natural and ordinary meanings pleaded by Dr Segar in respect of the 31 March Email and the second 5 April Email. The paragraphs are set out below.

  103. [75] I start with para 17 which referred to the particulars in para 16 of the Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No 5). Notably, the matters pleaded in para 16 are confined to the lesser meanings pleaded by Veronica in para 15 of her Defence in respect of the second 5 April Email. As such, no particulars have been given of the statements of fact and of the facts and matters she relies on in support of her defence that the words are true. As pointed out in Aaron Anne Joseph v Cheong Yip Seng (see [71] above), particulars are crucial when justification is pleaded as the issues to be tried under this plea are limited to the matters referred to in the particulars. Accordingly, Veronica’s plea of justification fails for lack of particulars.

  104. [76] Moving on to para 7 of the Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No 5), which is Veronica’s defence of justification in respect of the 31 March Email, the particulars are notably confined to the loan of $300,000. To this end, Veronica’s reliance on s 8 of the Defamation Act (Cap 75, 1985 Rev Ed) - which provided that the failure of a defendant to prove the truth of every imputation against the plaintiff would not be fatal to the plea of justification if the imputations not proved to be true did not materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation when regard was had to those imputations which had been proved against the plaintiff - does not assist her. In the circumstances, Veronica has failed to prove the truth of the meanings which I have found to be defamatory of Dr Segar.

  105. [77] Turning to her defence that the statement on the $300,000 loan and the refinancing of the Merryn Road property benefited Dr Segar, and not as she was told that the transaction was for her sole benefit, Mr Giam in the light of paras 7.2 and 7.2A of the Defence and Counterclaim (Amendment No 5) submits:

  106. [78] Since Veronica was deceived in the manner described, so the argument develops, the words complained of in their natural and ordinary meanings are true. Mr Giam’s submissions, in my view, are not borne out by Veronica’s evidence which is far from satisfactory. Neither was Dr Segar’s evidence on the matter reliable.

  107. [79] I note that Dr Segar claimed that he told Veronica about this loan of $205,180.89 to himself but when pressed by Mr Giam to tell the court when he told Veronica, he could only say that the information was in the bank statement of their joint account, and she would have seen the money in the account as she had access to the bank statement. I note that Dr Segar did not mention the loan to himself in his affidavit of evidence-in-chief or that he had told Veronica about it. In closing submissions, the position Mr Rai took was that Veronica knew from the bank statement or was in a position to know of the loan of $205,180.89 to Dr Segar.

  108. [80] In cross-examination, Mr Rai put to Veronica that on or about 12 April 2003 she knew that the balance of the redemption proceeds of $205,180.89 would be paid out to Dr Segar. Veronica denied that the deal between herself and Dr Segar was for Veronica to receive $300,000 of the money raised on refinancing Dr Segar’s Merryn Road property, while the balance of the redemption proceeds would go to Dr Segar. She claimed that she only knew that Dr Segar took $205,180.89 in the course of this court case.

  109. [81] On the evidence, it is clear that Dr Segar did not actually inform Veronica of the balance redemption amount of $205,189.89. Neither would she have known about it on or about 12 April 2003 as the April bank statement would only be available in May 2003. As for Veronica’s testimony that she did not see the April bank statement until it was discovered in the proceedings, her testimony is not corroborated. In the 31 March Email, she alluded to the fact that the refinancing was not entirely for her sole benefit. She wrote (at para [28]):

  110. [82] It is not entirely clear whether the benefit she referred to in para 28 was to the low interest rate in the following para of the email (see [29] above) or something else (ie. balance of the redemption proceeds). She did not explain nor was she asked by her counsel to clarify. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that she has discharged the burden of proving paras 7.2 and 7.2A of her Defence. Accordingly, her defence of justification fails.

  111. Veronica’s counterclaim: Dr Segar’s three SMS message and Letter

  112. [83] In her counterclaim, Veronica is seeking damages for libel and slander. She also has a monetary claim of $209,137.44 being moneys paid to Dr Segar as well as to third parties on behalf of Dr Segar and she accordingly seeks reimbursements of this sum. I will deal with the monetary claim later.

  113. First alleged libel: the 1 January SMS

  114. [84] The first SMS message that the defendant relies on for her counterclaim was sent on 1 January 2007 by Dr Segar to her husband, ATM, and Marlene. This SMS message reads as follows:

  115. [85] In her counterclaim, Veronica alleges that the 1 January SMS is defamatory in that the natural and ordinary meanings of the statements complained of are capable of conveying the following meanings:

  116. [86] Dr Segar has pleaded an alternative meaning: Veronica had behaved in a discreditable manner in not keeping her promise to him. However, in his closing submissions, Mr Rai argued that the natural and ordinary meaning to be derived from the 1 January SMS is that Veronica is a person who fails to keep her promises and, therefore she is a liar. To that extend, Dr Segar is really only contesting meanings (v) and (vi) as pleaded by Veronica.

  117. Second alleged libel: the 31 March SMS to ATM

  118. [87] The 31 March SMS message to ATM which was sent after Veronica’s 31 March Email to Marlene (see [29] above) reads as follows:

  119. [88] Veronica alleges the following defamatory meanings from the words “money faced lying pariah bitch”:

  120. [89] On Dr Segar’s part, he has proferred that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words “money faced lying pariah bitch” is that the defendant is a liar, and is only interested in money. Mr Rai submits that that this meaning is consistent with the alternative meaning pleaded, ie. Veronica had behaved in a discredible manner.

  121. Third alleged libel: the 31 March SMS to Marlene

  122. [90] The SMS message to Marlene on the same date reads as follows:

  123. [91] Veronica alleges the following defamatory meanings from the SMS to Marlene:

  124. Dr Segar agrees with meanings (ii) and (iii) but not the other two meanings.

  125. Fourth alleged libel: the Letter to ATM

  126. [92] This Letter was actually an undated handwritten note from Dr Segar to ATM and it was sent together with 32 blue sapphires on 3 April 2007. In the Letter, Dr Segar wrote as follows:

  127. [93] In their natural and ordinary meaning, Veronica’s pleaded case is that the Letter is capable of the following meanings:

  128. Dr Segar agrees to meanings (i),(vii),(viii) and (ix) but not the rest.

  129. The alleged slander: Statement to Tore

  130. [94] Veronica has accused Dr Segar of slandering her by telling Tore, a customer of hers, that she was not trustworthy and was a bitch. Dr Segar denies slandering Veronica. I note that the particulars of this accusation are sketchy to say the least and all Veronica revealed in her pleadings is that the statement was made in Marlene’s presence during a dinner with Tore. Veronica claims that the words uttered are defamatory as the natural and ordinary meanings of the words are that:

  131. First issue: Whether each of the meaning pleaded by Veronica is capable of being conveyed by the matter complained of and whether it is capable of defaming her

  132. Veronica’s pleaded meanings in respect of the SMS messages and the Letter

  133. [95] I have already stated the legal principles and I adopt the same approach when determining the meanings of the publications complained of (see [38]-[39] above). As can be seen from the use of intemperate language, the manifest dislike that Dr Segar entertains for Veronica may well have come from unhappy episodes giving rise to complaints of broken promises all of which seem to have merged towards the end of 2006 and on 1 January 2007, Dr Segar accused Veronica of breaking her promises to him. Whilst the words “money faced” and “pariah bitch” are vulgar abuses rather than words capable of being defamatory, a suggestion that the defendant is a liar, malicious and deceitfully dishonest may potentially fall on the side of defamation. The word “bloodsucker” bears the common dictionary meaning of someone who always uses other people’s money or help (see Longman’s Dictionary at [43] above) as was the case here with reference to the $300,000 loan and her broken promise to reciprocate by helping to finance his renovations.

  134. [96] One important feature here is that save for the 1 January SMS which was sent to ATM and Marlene, the other SMS publications were on each occasion sent to only person, namely Veronica’s husband or to her friend, Marlene. The Letter was sent only to ATM. Whilst at law, the publication to even one person will suffice to make out a finding of liability, with the scale of publication affecting instead, the question of damages, the point here is quite different in the sense that the publications were solely to persons on the side of Veronica, and this fact will have a bearing on whether the tort is made out given the definition of “defamatory”. Significantly, ATM and Marlene are persons on the side of Veronica and they would not have taken (and on their evidence confirmed that they did not take) the derogatory words seriously. As such the words complained of would not have lowered Veronica in their estimation. It follows, and I so hold, that the SMS messages and the Letter are not defamatory of Veronica. With this finding, it is not necessary to consider Dr Segar’s defences. The counterclaim for libel therefore fails.

  135. Statement to Tore

  136. [97] The primary issue is whether Veronica is able to prove that Dr Segar uttered the words pleaded. It is also necessary to consider whether any and, if so, which of the words would have been defamatory of Veronica and in what sense. I need also address whether any of the allegations would, if published, be actionable without proof of special damage. The only relevant exception would be if it could be shown that the words tended to injure Veronica in the way of a calling, trade or profession being carried on by her at the time of the publication. There is also the matter of the claim for special damages.

  137. [98] Veronica’s principal witness is Marlene. She says in her testimony that Dr Segar spoke the words complained of – that Veronica was untrustworthy and was a bitch - in the presence of Tore and herself at Tamon Restaurant. Dr Segar, however, denies that the words were spoken on that occasion or at all. Dr Segar called three witnesses to corroborate his evidence. Since Marlene in her affidavit of evidence-in-chief affirmed that the words were uttered in the presence of TT Durai, Gauksheim Kjell Goran and his wife, Gauksheim Beate Jakobsen, all three witnesses were called by Dr Segar and they denied that the alleged words were uttered in their presence. How reliable the evidence of each and every one after a lapse of several years is unclear. As is well known, the essence of any slander action is the actual words spoken. They need to be proved with reasonable clarity. This is one of those cases where the court is left with the impression that none of the testimony can be accepted with unqualified confidence. After considering the conflict of evidence, and the sketchy nature of Veronica’s plea, I am not persuaded and so hold that, on a balance of probabilities, Dr Segar did not utter the alleged words against Veronica. This disposes the case of slander against Dr Segar.

  138. Damages for libel

  139. [99] The law relating to damages is well settled. The purpose is to compensate the claimant for the damage to his reputation; to vindicate his good name and to provide solatium which takes account of the distress, hurt feelings and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused. The factors which appear to me to be relevant in Dr Segar’s case against Veronica when calculating the appropriate level of the damages are as follows:

  140. (i) the gravity of the libels: the allegation of cheating and dishonesty is particularly serious;

  141. (ii) standing of Dr Segar as a professional. I do not think he qualifies as a community figure from volunteering at Aljunied MP’s Meet the People sessions. This activity was mentioned only in passing and there are no details of his involvement.

  142. (iii) the fact that the libels were repeated on three occasions, but they were over a very short period of time, and as such the impact was short-lived;

  143. (iv) the fact that there were no apologies and that Veronica sought unsuccessfully to justify her statements about Dr Segar and continued to do so in a public trial lasting many days; and

  144. (v) the distress and injury to Dr Segar’s feelings caused by the libels.

  145. [100] At the same time, there are some compelling mitigating factors. One mitigating factor is the small number of recipients of the emails who were his circle of friends and acquaintances and they are less likely to take the emails seriously. One recipient expressed disbelief and two others asked to be taken off the email circulation list, one of them citing a private fight which does not concern him. By the time of the second 5 April Email, the acrimonious relationship between Dr Segar and Veronica would have been common knowledge to the 46 recipients and that fact would have a negative impact on the person reading the second 5 April Email. If authority for this proposition is required, I refer to Halsbury’s at para [240.245] which states:

  146. [101] I have already mentioned that the impact of the publication was short-lived. In my view, Dr Segar’s conduct served as an additional factor to mitigate the damage. The relevance of the plaintiff’s conduct is summarised in Halsbury’s at para [240.247] as follows:

  147. [102] Similary, Gatley on Libel and Slander (11 Ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) at para 35.51 states:

  148. [103] Equally relevant is the dictum of Lord Hailsham LC in Broom v Cassell & Co [1972] AC 1027 at 1071 on the conduct of the plaintiff:

  149. [104] Evans on Defamation (3 Ed, LexisNexis, 2008) at 201 cites the decision of AJA Peter v OG Nio & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 226 to illustrate the application of the proposition that the plaintiff’s behaviour is a reason for awarding lower damages. In that case, the court reduced the award from $15,000 to $9,000 because the plaintiff’s conduct had contributed to the defamatory remarks having been made in the first place.

  150. [105] I note and accept as accurate the sequence of events outlined by Mr Giam and, in particular, their relevance to the question of Dr Segar’s provocative behaviour in assessing damages. They are:

  151. (i) SMS on 1 January 2007 to ATM and Marlene.

  152. (ii) On 6 January 2007, unknown to Veronica, Marlene herself had some discord with Dr Segar. She had sent an email dated 6 January 2007 to Dr Segar in which she wrote that Dr Segar had classified Marlene’s husband, Henry, as belonging to the same group of persons as Veronica, Marlene was unhappy with Dr Segar over that. Months later, Marlene in her quarrels with Dr Segar decided to send copies of the 6 January 2007 email to several persons including Veronica on 30 March 2007. It was after receipt of this email that Veronica decided to respond to Dr Segar’s “attacks” on her. She felt that it was time to tell her side of the story after having kept quiet for so long (see para 5 of 31 March Email at [29] above).

  153. (iii) Veronica replies to Marlene. Dr Segar thereafter sends SMS to ATM on same day ie. 31 March 2007.

  154. (iv) Dr Segar on same day sends another SMS to Marlene.

  155. (v) Dr Segar on 3 April 2007 sends an undated handwritten note to ATM

  156. (vi) Veronica on 5 April 2007 sends her email of 31 March to Dr Segar and copied to a larger circle of friends and associates.

  157. (vii) Veronica on 5 April 2007 sends her second email to Dr Segar and copied to the same number of friends and associates.

  158. [106] On the particular facts of this case, the provocative behaviour of Dr Segar is capable of having a bearing upon the damages to which he might become entitled, and is both relevant and admissible. Dr Segar fired his first salvo of abusive attack on Veronica on 1 January 2007. The SMS also contained damnation of Veronica for the New Year. The attacks on Veronica restarted on 31 March 2007 immediately after the 31 March Email to Marlene – Dr Segar sent one SMS to ATM and another to Marlene. The undated handwritten note was sent on 3 April 2007 before the two emails sent on 5 April 2007. Again the Letter contained intemperate language. I am satisfied that his conduct and the intemperate language of Dr Segar were causally connected to Veronica’s emails. She said in cross-examination:

  159. I accept her evidence in cross-examination that the 31 March Email was due to Dr Segar’s 1 January SMS. It is clear from her second 5 April Email that she was fed up and angry with Dr Segar for calling her a “Money Faced Lying Pariah Bitch” in his SMS to ATM and she went on to chide him for “passing [such] messages through others”.

  160. [107] I note that Mr Rai has asked that Dr Segar be awarded damages exceeding $250,000. In his submissions, Mr Rai argues that Arul Chandran v Chew Chin Aik Victor JP [2000] SGHC 111 (HC); [2001] 1 SLR(R) 86 (CA)(“Arul Chandran”) pales in its significance relative to the defamatory remarks, aggravation and malice present in Dr Segar’s case. In that case, the plaintiff was awarded $100,000 as damages and $50,000 as aggravated damages. In response, Mr Giam argues that damages should be within the range of $20,000 to $80,000 given “the limited publication and the frivolity of the dispute”. In his view, the lower end of the range “would probably be the more appropriate sum to be awarded”.

  161. [108] I agree with Mr Rai that Veronica was reckless in making the statements that suggested that Dr Segar committed forgery to cheat his brother. On that count, there was a reckless disregard of the truth. As for the rest of the libel that referred Dr Segar to as a con artist, and hence, dishonest, I also reached the same conclusion on the question of Veronica’s recklessness. I agree with the observations of Yong Pun How CJ in Maidstone Pte Ltd v Takenaka Corp [1992] 1 SLR (R) 752 where he states (at [50])

  162. For the same reasons, subsequent publications in the second 5 April Email that Veronica was conned would be ground for aggravated damages.

  163. [109] Cases like Au Mun Chew (practising as Au & Associates) v Lim Ban Lee [1997] 1 SLR(R) 220 and Yeap Beng San Louis v Choo Pit Hong Peter [1999] 1 SLR(R) 397 (“Louis Yeap”) demonstrate that damages awarded to a plaintiff who is not a community or public figure generally do not exceed $45,000. Mr Giam referred to the lower end of the range of awards at $20,000 as gathered from cases like Chen Cheng and another v Central Christian Church and other appeals [1998] 3 SLR(R) 236 ($20,000 & $30,000), and TJ System (S) Pte Ltd and Others v Ngow Kheong Shen (No 2) [2003] SGHC 217 ($30,000, $25,000 and $20,000). In these cases, the mitigating factors, however, were not as many and as significant as the ones in the present case.

  164. [110] Cases of Arul Chandran and Yeo Nai Meng v Ei-Nets Ltd and Another [2004] 1 SLR(R) 73 (HC) and [2004] 1 SLR(R) 153 (CA)(“Ei-Nets Ltd ”) are not comparables given the nature of the defamation and the number of aggravating factors. The plaintiff in Arul Chandran was a practising lawyer of more than 30 years and at the time of the publication, he held the position of vice-president of a well-know prestigious social club, The Tanglin Club. The defamatory remarks were contained in a newspaper report and two letters referring to the plaintiff as “a vicious and most dangerous fraud”. Compensatory damages were given for the plaintiff’s hurt feelings and reduction in his standing before his social peers in the Tanglin Club’s General Committee.

  165. [111] In Ei-Nets Ltd, the Court of Appeal noted that although the plaintiff was not a leading public figure, he was, nevertheless, a man of business and has held positions of responsibility in public and private organisations. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal noted that the award of $80,000 was on the high side but it was not so high as to warrant the intervention of the court. The nature of defamation in that case were two reports that were circulated to the Audit Committee and the Board of Directors of Ei-Nets Ltd suggesting that the plaintiff was guilty of fraudulent misconduct. In the reports, the plaintiff was painted as a dishonest person who had conspired to make fictitious journal entries in the company’s books with a view to misappropriating funds. The sting was greater because the reports were purported to be considered opinions of a senior lawyer and a senior accountant.

  166. [112] In the circumstances of this case, it seems to me that the most important factor in arriving at an assessment of the appropriate compensation is that of the impact on Dr Segar’s feelings and the distress caused. There was probably a sense of injustice and indeed genuine outrage on his part. As to vindication, this factor is less important in a situation where there has been only limited publication. Furthermore, although there is no tangible evidence of any actual diminution in Dr Segar’s reputation, some damage is presumed to his social reputation rather than his competence and skill as a doctor. Veronica’s emails did not impinge on Dr Segar’s professional capabilities. The contents of her emails discussed Dr Segar’s behaviour towards her as a friend and business partner, not in anyway his professional capacity as a doctor. I have already held that the emails did not defame Dr Segar in his professional capacity. Nonetheless, Veronica was unyielding, unapologetic and had acted unreasonably in spreading their private tiff to other persons who had no interest in the quarrel. The erstwhile storm in a teacup between Dr Segar and Veronica developed into a bigger dimension because emotions ran high and out of hand and it also involved Marlene. Dr Segar in his 31 March SMS to Marlene had accused her of planning with Veronica to destroy him. But fortunately for Veronica, damages are less than modest because of the limited publications and they were in all probability disbelieved as the ranting of an irate and aggrieved person. She also did not seek to justify or prolong the charge of forgery to cheat Dr Segar’s brother.

  167. [113] Bearing in mind my comments in [112] and having regard to both the gravity of the allegation (the sting in the emails is substantially the same, namely dishonesty), limited aggravating factors, limited scale of publication, and the impact of the defamation in light of the acrimonious relationship between Dr Segar and Veronica, the right starting figure (there being, in my view, no comparable cases where the tort of defamation attacks the social reputation of the plaintiff) for a single award would be in the order of $15,000. Certainly, Dr Segar’s provocative behaviour was, and I so find, casually connected to the libels sued upon and as such damages should be significantly less. In my judgment, Dr Segar should receive a reduction in damages as well. Doing the best that I can to reflect the various factors which I have mentioned, I come to the conclusion that the total sum I award in damages is $10,000 in respect of the emails where the defence of justification failed.

  168. Veronica’s counterclaim for $209,137.44

  169. [114] Veronica’s pleaded case is that during the period 2002 to 2006, she had from time to time, at Dr Segar’s request, disbursed numerous sums of money to him and to third parties on his behalf. The sums in question are (a) a total sum of $168,911.00 to Dr Segar, and (b) a total sum of $204,407.90 to third parties on Dr Segar’s behalf. In addition, there were two other payments of $31,884 and $84,000. After deducting $258,872.13 for the loan from Dr Segar, Veronica seeks recovery of $230,330.77 ($489,202.90-$258,872.13). However, in closing submissions, the claim amount is now $209,137.44, a breakdown of which is follows:

  170. [115] At closing submissions, Dr Segar concedes that he had received a total sum of $309,579.58 from Veronica. This figure of $309,579.58 comes from Dr Segar’s acceptance of certain items in Annex C to Veronica’s second affidavit of evidence-in-chief. Mr Rai submits that after deducting the loan of $300,000, the counterclaim should be only for the sum of $9,579.58.

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