Sigrid Else Roger Marthe Wauters v Lieven Corneel Leo Raymond van den Brande

Choo Han Teck J:

[1] The parties are Belgian nationals who were married on 25 February 1992. The plaintiff/wife is 50 years old and the defendant/husband is 57 years old. They have two children who are 21 and 19 years old. The wife filed for divorce on 25 June 2009. Interim judgment was granted on 11 June 2010 and the ancillary matters came before me. On 1 November 2011, I handed down a written judgment: Sigrid Else Roger Marthe Wauters v Lieven Corneel Leo Raymond van den Brande [2011] SGHC 237. I ordered that the pool of matrimonial assets, with an approximate value of $2.2 million, be divided equally between the parties. I also ordered that the maintenance order made on 28 April 2010 in the Family Court continue to stand. This order obliged the husband to pay the wife $7,800 a month as maintenance for her and their two children, in addition to direct payment of various other sums to the relevant third parties for, inter alia, rental, utilities bills and school fees.

[2] On 24 August 2012, the wife applied to vary the maintenance order by way of Summons No 4285 of 2012. The husband, in turn, likewise applied to vary the maintenance order by way of Summons No 5164 of 2012 filed on 8 October 2012. The husband also sought other orders in his application, a few of which concerned a property that the parties owned in Bali (the “Bali Property”) valued at $1,249,277.87. This was the single most valuable asset in the pool of matrimonial assets that was divided equally between the parties. I heard the two summonses together in chambers. On 28 February 2013, I ordered that maintenance be varied to a sum of $14,000 a month to be paid to the wife, of which $7,000 was for her rental expenses. I adjourned the outstanding issues, including that of the Bali Property, to a later date. Parties returned on 10 April 2013 and a week later on 17 April 2013 I gave my decision on the outstanding issues. I ordered that the Bali Property be sold within six months, that the husband have sole conduct of the sale, and that the wife hand over to him the originals of certain documents to facilitate the sale, namely, the title deeds, building permit and proof of land tax payment. I also granted parties liberty to apply.

[3] On 24 July 2013, the wife filed Summons No 3882 of 2013 and sought one of two alternative orders in relation to the Bali Property. The first option proposed was that she be given sole authority to sell the Bali Property, the proceeds from the sale to be divided equally between the parties, with the husband’s share kept in an escrow account with the court and applied towards the monthly maintenance payments of $14,000 to the wife until it was exhausted, after which he would make the monthly payments from his other funds. The second option was that the husband’s share of the Bali Property be transferred to the wife, in exchange for her forgoing her maintenance payments for 43 months, after which time the husband would resume payment of $14,000 a month. The wife also alleged that the husband had not met his maintenance obligations and sought payment of the arrears. On 22 October 2013, the husband filed an application of his own, Summons No 5502 of 2013. I shall describe and deal with the orders which he sought later in this judgment. I heard both summonses in chambers on 5 November 2013.

[5] The question that follows is how then the sale of the Bali Property should be effected. The husband argues that it is not open to the wife to seek sole conduct of the sale by invoking the liberty to apply which formed part of my 17 April 2013 order. I do not agree. As I said in Koh Ewe Chee v Koh Hua Leong and another [2002] 1 SLR(R) 943 at [4]–[5], liberty to apply is meant to “supplement the main orders in form and convenience only so that the main orders may be carried out”. In the present case, the main order was that the Bali Property be sold and the proceeds divided equally. It would not be open to parties to apply to vary this, eg, to apply for an order that one party’s share be transferred to the other, under the rubric of liberty to apply. However, my order of 17 April 2013 that the husband has sole conduct of the sale was no more than an order supplementing the main order and enabling it to be carried out. To change that 17 April 2013 order would not be to change or vary the main order. Therefore the wife was not precluded from invoking liberty to apply to seek sole conduct of the sale.