Sinwa SS (HK) Co Ltd v Morten Innhaug

Andrew Ang J:

[1] By way of this originating summons, the plaintiff sought leave to bring a derivative action on behalf of a company, of which the plaintiff was a minority shareholder, against the defendant. After hearing submissions from both parties, I dismissed the plaintiff’s application. I now set out my reasons for doing so.

[2] While there were only two parties to this action, the factual matrix really involved seven companies and one individual. It would be convenient to identify them at this early stage, as follows:

(a) Nordic International Limited, a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“NIL”);

(b) Sinwa Limited, a Singapore-incorporated company (“Sinwa”);

(c) Sinwa SS (HK) Co Ltd, a company incorporated in Hong Kong (“the plaintiff”);

(d) Morten Innhaug, the only natural person directly involved in the litigation (“the defendant”);

(e) Nordic Maritime Pte Ltd (“NMPL”);

(f) BGP Geoexplorer Pte Ltd (“BGP”), the Singapore subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned enterprise;

(g) TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA (“TGS”); and

(h) Nordic Geo Services Limited (“NGS”).

[3] This litigation primarily revolved around NIL, a company incorporated on 16 January 2007 with the defendant as the sole director and shareholder. NIL was set up essentially as a ship-owning company whose main business was to purchase and own the fishing trawler “BGP ATLAS” (“the vessel”). The defendant intended to convert the vessel from an ordinary fishing trawler into a specialised seismic survey ship and equip it accordingly. The vessel was bought by NIL on 12 January 2007 and refitted as a seismic survey vessel in Poland.

[4] However, even before the vessel was purchased, the defendant had already put in place the various pieces required to make the business model a success. On 1 January 2007, a ship management agreement was signed between NIL and NMPL pursuant to which NMPL was to operate the vessel for a consideration of US$800 a day. The defendant was also a director and shareholder of NMPL. NIL, represented by the defendant, was also in negotiations with BGP for BGP to charter the vessel from NIL. Those negotiations took place around November 2006 and culminated in a time charter agreement (“the Time Charter”) signed on 8 June 2007, pursuant to which BGP was to charter the vessel from NIL for a period of three years beginning from 15 June 2007. By a contract signed between BGP and TGS on 22 or 23 December 2006, BGP agreed to provide seismic survey services to TGS. In short, the arrangement was as follows: the defendant was to be the owner of the vessel, NMPL the manager and operator, BGP the charterer and TGS the client.

[5] Sinwa stepped into the picture in or about February 2007. After the purchase of the vessel, it became necessary for NIL to obtain more funds to finance the retrofitting of the vessel from a fishing trawler to a seismic survey ship. It was to Sinwa that NIL, and the defendant, turned for an injection of capital. Apparently, Sinwa had access to credit facilities which could be used to buy seismic survey equipment. While Sinwa was not new to the maritime industry, it certainly was not as familiar with the seismic survey industry as the defendant was. Nevertheless, on 4 July 2007, Sinwa entered into a shareholders’ agreement (“the Shareholders’ Agreement”) with the defendant whereby the defendant was to sell 50% of his shares in NIL to Sinwa. As a result, Sinwa and the defendant were equal shareholders of NIL. Furthermore, the Shareholders’ Agreement also contained the following clauses regarding the making of decisions:

Sinwa’s rights and obligations under the Shareholders’ Agreement were novated to the plaintiff on or about 28 August 2007, thus explaining the plaintiff’s involvement in this application. As might have been anticipated, the division of decision-making power in the form and language adopted became a source for unhappiness and conflict.

[6] As it turned out, the plaintiff had many complaints regarding the conduct of the defendant in their joint venture. The main grouse, however, appeared to be regarding an assignment of the Time Charter agreed between NIL and BGP. By this assignment, NGS, a company the defendant incorporated specifically for the purpose, took over BGP’s rights under the Time Charter. It was the plaintiff’s case that NGS, being a wholly-owned subsidiary of NMPL, was controlled by the defendant. According to the plaintiff, this assignment was effected by two agreements. First, on 22 September 2008, a notice of assignment was signed between BGP and NGS whereby BGP “notified” NGS that BGP was assigning all its rights under the Time Charter to NGS (“the Notice of Assignment”). Second, by an acknowledgment and undertaking of the Notice of Assignment, also signed on 22 September 2008, BGP consented to the assignment (“the Acknowledgment of Assignment”). (Even though the documents were entitled “Notice of Assignment” and “Acknowledgment and Undertaking”, the effect of the documents was, in fact, an assignment of the Time Charter. It is further to be noted that in its closing submission the plaintiff had taken the erroneous position that a third agreement (“the Memorandum of Agreement”), entered into between NMPL, BGP and TGS, was part of the agreements putting the assignment of the Time Charter into effect. The Memorandum of Agreement, dated 23 August 2008, related to a different assignment altogether and had to do with the assignment of BGP’s agreement with TGS to provide seismic survey services to the latter.)

[7] The plaintiff was informed of the assignment of the Time Charter on 11 September 2008 via an e-mail from a representative of the defendant. Earlier, on 9 September 2008, Kjell Gauksheim (“Gauksheim”) (a director appointed by the defendant) informed the plaintiff that NMPL had taken over the “seismic operation of [the vessel]”. Of course, Gauksheim was not being entirely forthright at that point in time as it was NGS which had taken over BGP’s rights under the Time Charter. The plaintiff then enquired if the change had any financial implications for NIL. It was then that Gauksheim came clean. To this question, the plaintiff received the following reply over e-mail on 11 September 2008 (“the 11 September e-mail”):

Despite the above assurance, the plaintiff was still concerned about the financial implications of the assignment and did not recognise the assignment. To the plaintiff, the defendant procured the assignment to profit from a clause (cl 40) in the Time Charter which allowed the charterer an option to purchase the vessel together with all its equipment at the price of US$5,000,000 on completion of the three-year charter period. The defendant, it was alleged, was seeking to buy the vessel on the cheap via this clause. On 23 October 2008, the plaintiff formally issued a letter to the defendant stating its objections. By this letter, the plaintiff made known its dissatisfaction with:

(a) the assignment;

(b) an attempt by the defendant to change the name of the vessel without the plaintiff’s consent;

(c) the appointment of NMPL as managers of the vessel, given that it was also the holding company of NGS to whom the vessel was chartered – (even though the plaintiff used the word “appointment”, it was clear that it, in fact, meant “continuation”); and

(d) a purported disregard of the interests of NIL.

Accordingly, the plaintiff called for the removal of NMPL as managers of the vessel, termination of the assignment and reinstatement of BGP as charterers of the vessel. The defendant did not accede to this request.

[8] Another area of disagreement between the parties was in regard to the payment for the charter of the vessel. Despite the assignment, the plaintiff, purportedly on behalf of NIL, insisted that BGP remain liable for payment of charter hire under the Time Charter. However, for four months from September to December 2008, NGS had tendered payment of the charter hire which NIL accepted without any objections on the part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff pointed to cl 17(a) of the Time Charter which provided that while BGP might assign the charter of the vessel to another party, BGP remained primarily liable for the due performance of the obligations under the Time Charter. BGP disagreed. BGP’s position was that it had been “relieved and released of all obligations” under the Time Charter because of the assignment and it was not liable to NIL at all. Because of the impasse, the plaintiff sought to commence legal proceedings against BGP for the outstanding charter hire. However, the defendant disagreed with the plaintiff and its attempts to recover the charter hire from BGP. The defendant argued that the plaintiff, on its own, did not have authority to commence legal proceedings. Thus, the defendant, through his solicitors, required that the plaintiff cease from representing that it acted for NIL in relation to the legal proceedings.

[10] The plaintiff further complained of purported discrepancies discovered when the plaintiff audited NMPL’s management of the vessel. They included:

(a) the payment by NIL of administrative charges, amounting to US$115,750, to NMPL which the plaintiff asserted was never agreed upon;

(b) the increase of monthly salaries paid to the crew during a period when the vessel was supposed to be laid-up;

(c) the payment of crew salaries to an entity known as “Eagle Clarc Shipping Phils, Inc” (“Eagle Clarc”), a payment which NMPL did not, or could not, explain;

(d) a failure by NMPL to inform NIL of fuel costs that NIL had overpaid;

(e) the acquisition of provisions and stores at prices that the plaintiff deemed excessive; and

(f) the over-payment of insurance premiums.

The plaintiff alleged that as director in charge of all matters concerning the management of the vessel, the defendant bore full responsibility for the mismanagement of the vessel as revealed by the audits.

[11] In sum therefore, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had breached his duty as a director of NIL by doing the following:

(a) procuring an assignment of the Time Charter by BGP to NGS, a company controlled by the defendant;

(b) withholding payment or causing the withholding of charter hire to NIL by reason of the assignment of the charter hire to NGS;

(c) profiting or intending to profit from the sale of the vessel after the completion of the three-year charter period;

(d) charging NIL for an administrative fee without authority;

(e) failing to inform NIL of overpaid fuel costs;

(f) paying crew salaries erroneously or excessively;

(g) overpaying insurance premiums;

(h) making excessive payments for provisions and stores;

(i) misappropriation of funds owned by NIL;

(j) failing to explain why payment was made to Eagle Clarc;

(k) failing to procure provisions and stores at a cheaper prices; and

(l) failing to provide any or adequate information when so queried.

The plaintiff averred that the defendant had failed to address the plaintiff’s unhappiness with the way the joint venture had been conducted. Accordingly, on 21 July 2009, the plaintiff issued a “Notice of Intention to Apply for Leave of Court” to the directors of NIL, requesting that legal action be taken against the defendant for his breaches of duty as a director of NIL and seeking authority for the plaintiff to do so on behalf of NIL. While the directors appointed by the plaintiff supported this request, directors appointed by the defendant did not. In the absence of an approval from the board of directors of NIL to take legal action against the defendant, the plaintiff started this application for leave to commence a derivative action.

[12] The plaintiff relied upon the “fraud on the minority” exception to the Foss v Harbottle rule in its application. Citing the case of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (“Prudential Assurance (CA)”), the plaintiff argued that a minority shareholder would be allowed to bring an action on behalf of a company against the majority shareholder, even without the approval of the board of directors, when the majority shareholder had committed a fraud against the company and the majority shareholder was in control of the company. In the present case, the plaintiff submitted that by the various breaches of the defendant’s duty as a director of NIL, as outlined in [11] above, the defendant had committed fraud against NIL. Furthermore, even though the plaintiff was not a minority shareholder as it owned 50% of the shares in NIL, the plaintiff nevertheless argued that it could avail itself of the “fraud on a minority” exception since the defendant was able to prevent legal action from being brought against himself.

[13] The defendant objected to the plaintiff’s application on various grounds. First, he contended that the plaintiff’s application was procedurally wrong. He argued that the plaintiff should have taken out a writ of summons instead of an originating summons against the defendant and that NIL should have been added as a co-defendant. The plaintiff’s right to proceed on behalf of the company should then be determined as a preliminary issue at trial. Relying on Tan Cheng Han, Walter Woon on Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, Rev 3rd Ed, 2009) (“Walter Woon on Company Law”) the defendant submitted that in order to establish the “fraud on the minority” exception, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the defendant had obtained some benefit and that some detriment was caused to NIL. The plaintiff had failed to do either. Finally, the defendant argued that a minority shareholder ought not to be allowed to bring a derivative action on behalf of a company if other remedies were available to the company. In the present case, the defendant submitted that arbitration was available to the company.

[14] As previously mentioned, I dismissed the plaintiff’s application for leave to commence a derivative action on behalf of NIL. It is pertinent to note at the outset that because NIL was a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, the plaintiff was unable to avail itself of the remedy provided in s 216A of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Act”): see Ting Sing Ning v Ting Chek Swee [2008] 1 SLR(R) 197 (“Ting Sing Ning”). Thus, this judgment deals only with the common law derivative action.

[15] The learned authors of Walter Woon on Company Law state the proper procedure to start a derivative action in Singapore (at paras 9.60–9.62) as follows:

[16] The above position reflects that taken by the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong Industrial Park (Melaka) Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 417 (“Abdul Rahim bin Aki”). In that case, the appellant, a minority shareholder in a company known as Tunas Murni Sdn Bhd, took out an action against the first respondent and other shareholders for breaches of duty. He first did this by using the company’s name but this action was struck out as the board of directors had not approved the action. He then brought a second action by originating summons in his own name, claiming that it was a derivative action. The Malaysian High Court dismissed the second action on the basis that common law fraud had not been established on the facts. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the basis, inter alia, that there were procedural improprieties. Gopal Sri Ram JCA held as follows:

[17] In the present case, the plaintiff’s counsel admitted that he had erroneously adopted the procedure applicable to a statutory derivative action and had started the action by way of an originating summons instead of a writ of summons. Besides, the plaintiff failed to join NIL as a defendant and the title of the action did not reflect that the action was being brought in a representative capacity. However, the plaintiff’s counsel argued that such defects were not necessarily fatal to its application. In the present case, the plaintiff had consistently maintained, in the originating summons and in its affidavits, that it was bringing a derivative action. Thus, the defendant was never misled that the present proceedings was anything but a derivative action brought by the plaintiff on behalf of NIL. The defendant himself did not argue that he had suffered any prejudice as a result of the plaintiff’s procedural mistake.

[18] In this regard, O 2, r 1, of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Rules”) is instructive. The relevant rule reads as follows:

In Jeffrey Pinsler, Singapore Court Practice 2009 (LexisNexis, 2009), the author wrote (at paras 2/1/1 and 2/1/2) in relation to the above rule, as follows:

[19] I was persuaded that the procedural error committed by the plaintiff was a bona fide mistake and not born of a blatant disregard for the rules of procedure. Furthermore, as far as I could tell, no prejudice was suffered by the defendant because of the plaintiff’s mistake. Hence, the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the correct procedure was one which might be cured by the court ordering a conversion of the originating summons into a writ together with other appropriate amendments. Nevertheless, I was disinclined to exercise my discretion to cure the procedural irregularity as I was of the view that the plaintiff’s application for leave to take out a derivative action would fail in any case: see [60]–[71] below.

[20] In Prudential Assurance (CA) ([12] supra), the English Court of Appeal held (at [221]–[222]) that:

Thus, two requirements need to be satisfied before the court will consider granting leave to a minority shareholder to start a derivative action on behalf of a company against a majority shareholder. The first is that the company has a reasonable case against the defendant; the second concerns the locus standi of the plaintiff to bring the action. Even if these requirements are met, the court still has discretion to decide whether or not to grant leave to commence a derivative action: see [66] below. I will now examine each requirement in turn.

[23] This, of course, does not mean that the court at this stage should make an extensive inquiry into the merits of the claim. Indeed, it must be remembered that at this stage the court is merely ascertaining whether to grant leave for an action to be brought and not trying the action itself. Rather, the court must, having regard to the affidavits filed by both parties in support of their claims and the evidence presented before the court, ascertain whether the case brought in the company’s name has a semblance of merit. There is no need to demonstrate that the case will or is likely to succeed. In this regard, we may take a leaf out of case law relating to the statutory derivative action. In Agus Irawan v Toh Teck Chye [2002] 1 SLR(R) 471 (“Agus Irawan”), the plaintiff applied for leave to commence a derivative action in the name of a company pursuant to s 216A of the Act. Choo Han Teck JC dismissed the application. In so doing, Choo JC held (at [6]–[8]) as follows:

The above approach was approved by the Court of Appeal in Pang Yong Hock v PKS Contracts Services Pte Ltd [2004] 3 SLR(R) 1 (“Pang Yong Hock”).

[24] To put the test another way, it may be said that the application ought to be denied “if it appears that the intended action is frivolous or vexatious or is bound to be unsuccessful”: see Re Marc-Jay Investments Inc and Levy (1975) 5 OR (2d) 235 (at [237]) (“Marc-Jay”) and Teo Gek Luang v Ng Ai Tiong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 426 (“Teo Gek Luang”) (at [14]).

[25] Although the above cited cases (ie, Agus Irawan, Marc-Jay and Teo Gek Luang) all involved the interpretation of a statutory provision, the principles stated therein apply equally to the common law derivative action. Whether under statute or common law, the objective behind the derivative action is to provide an alternate voice for the corporate entity in situations where a wrong has been done to it and the wrongdoers are the very persons who are the usual spokespersons. However, at the same time, the court must be wary of “backseat drivers” who attempt to control the corporate vehicle by use of a derivative action. As was stated in Teo Gek Luang (at [14]), “[a] minority shareholder could attempt to abuse the new procedure, [and this] would be as undesirable as the tyranny of the majority directors who unreasonably refuse to act”. Thus, whether a derivative claim is brought under statute or common law, the court must, from the outset, assess whether the company has a reasonable case against the defendant for which the company may recover damages or other relief.

[26] In the present case, the plaintiff spent a large part of its submissions explaining why NIL was entitled to the relief claimed. Save with respect to one allegation, I found myself unable to agree with the plaintiff’s contentions. For completeness, I shall examine each of the plaintiff’s allegations in turn.

[27] The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had breached his duties to NIL by “procuring a purported assignment of a lucrative time-charter party entered into between [NIL] and BGP to a company owned and controlled by the Defendant, namely NGS …”: see para (i) of the Schedule to the originating summons. The plaintiff, however, did not make clear what exactly it was about the assignment that it was objecting to. At different points in its submissions and affidavits, the plaintiff seemed to make three distinct allegations. First, the plaintiff seemed to take objection to the fact that the defendant, as director of NIL, had somehow caused BGP to assign its rights and liabilities under the Time Charter to NGS. Second, the plaintiff also suggested that “the Plaintiffs and/or the Board of NIL” had not been given notice of the assignment: see para 12 of the plaintiff’s submissions. Third, the plaintiff, as director of NIL, approving the assignment without disclosing his interest in NGS to the plaintiff. I will deal with the objections in the same order.

[28] The first objection is without merit. The Time Charter unequivocally states that BGP has the right to assign the charter of the vessel to another party. Clause 17 of the Time Charter reads as follows:

Clearly, cl 17(a) of the Time Charter provides that the option of assigning the vessel belongs to BGP. NIL’s role, should BGP decide to assign the vessel, is merely to give approval, which approval cannot be unreasonably withheld. If the defendant did indeed “procure” the assignment, he did not do so qua director of NIL but as controller of NGS. At the highest, the defendant, qua director of NIL, merely gave approval for the assignment. It is not the plaintiff’s case that NIL was entitled to additional hire pursuant to cl 17(a) of the Time Charter. Hence, if the plaintiff was suggesting that the defendant had breached his duties as a director of NIL by giving approval for the assignment, such an assertion was not substantiated by any evidence as to why approval, in the circumstances, ought to have been withheld.

[29] Similarly, the second objection is completely untenable. The allegation was that the plaintiff and/or the board of NIL had not been given notice of the assignment as required under cl 17(a) of the Time Charter. However, this obligation to provide notice lay with BGP. Hence, even if such notice was not provided, it was a breach of BGP’s obligations to NIL, not the defendant’s obligations qua director of NIL. In any case, it appeared to me that such notice had been given as the defendant was at all times fully aware of the assignment.

[30] I was also not persuaded by the plaintiff’s third objection. Taking the plaintiff’s case at its highest, it was alleged that the defendant was the controlling mind of NGS. As such, the argument was presumably that the defendant had breached his fiduciary duties to NIL, to avoid profiting from his position as director of NIL (the “no profit” rule) and to avoid conflicts of interest (the “no conflict” rule).

[31] In so far as the “no profit” rule is concerned, the pithy statement of law adopted in Walter Woon on Company Law ([13] supra) (at para 8.38) is apposite: unless he has provided full disclosure and obtained the informed consent of the company, a director who acquires a benefit in connection with this office is accountable to the company for that benefit. In Furs Limited v Tomkies (1935) 35 CLR 583, the Australian High Court explained the rationale behind the “no profit” rule (at 592) as follows:

Significantly, as was emphasised repeatedly in the above passage, the “no profit” rule only applies when the director has obtained a benefit in the course of execution of his duties, ie, qua director of the company and not in any other capacity.

[32] Turning now to the “no conflict” rule, it is a principle of company law that a director is under an obligation not to place himself in a position where the interests of the company whom he is bound to protect comes into conflict with either his personal interest or the interest of a third party for whom he acts: see Walter Woon on Company Law (at para 8.40). The scope of the “no conflict” rule is wide – it applies not only to situations where there are actual conflicts of interest but also to situations where there may potentially be conflicts of interests. As described by Lord Cranworth in Aberdeen Rail Co v Blaikie Brothers [1843–60] All ER 249 (at 252):

After all, the “no conflict” rule is a prophylactic principle aimed at avoiding the risk that the director might prefer his personal or a third party’s interests over those of the company. Thus, it matters little that the director did not in fact subordinate the company’s interests as long as there is a potential that he may do so.

[33] However, the “no profit” and the “no conflict” rules, while strict, are not absolute. A director may obtain a release of his obligations under both rules by making a full disclosure of the relevant facts to the company. As is explained in Walter Woon on Company Law (at para 8.45):

[34] In the present case, the plaintiff averred that the defendant engineered the assignment of the Time Charter to further his personal interests. In particular, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was trying to profit from an option embedded in the Time Charter for the charterer to purchase the vessel after the charter period of three years. Clause 40 of the Time Charter reads as follows:

The plaintiff’s case was that the assignment would allow the defendant, via NGS and NMPL, to take advantage of the purchase option to buy the vessel on the cheap, thus breaching the “no profit” rule. Further, the defendant was in a position of conflict in giving consent to the assignment since he might potentially profit from cl 40. The defendant, while not addressing those allegations directly, averred that the reason for the assignment was that BGP was dissatisfied with the physical condition of the vessel and was looking for a way out of the Time Charter. The defendant merely facilitated this by having NGS take over BGP’s rights and obligations under the Time Charter.

[35] There is no merit to the plaintiff’s arguments. With regard to the “no profit” rule, the opportunity to purchase the vessel was provided to the charterer of the vessel and not to the director(s) of NIL or to the defendant. Therefore, even if the defendant, on the expiry of the charter period, does profit by causing NGS to take advantage of cl 40 of the Time Charter, he does so not qua director of NIL but as controller of NGS. The “no profit” rule therefore would not be breached.

[36] Addressing now the “no conflict” rule, I must first state that the defendant’s explanation was insufficient to excuse him from having to disclose his interest in NGS to NIL. The rationale for the “no conflict” rule lies in the potential for a conflict of interests. It does not matter that the director has no intention of benefiting from the transaction as long as the director may profit. Hence, if the defendant may profit from the assignment by causing NGS to take advantage of the purchase option, it behoves him to disclose his interest in NGS to the board of directors of NIL, especially the directors nominated by the plaintiff, before the assignment is completed. However, it appeared to me that this interest had indeed been disclosed, albeit informally and indirectly. From the evidence made available, it appeared that the assignment was completed via the two documents signed on 22 September 2008 – the Notice of Assignment and the Acknowledgment of Assignment. Prior thereto, the plaintiff’s director, Ms Tan Lay Ling, had been informed of the assignment of the Time Charter via the 11 September e-mail. In the same e-mail, it was also mentioned that NGS was a wholly-owned subsidiary of NMPL. At all material times, the plaintiff was well aware that the defendant was a director and shareholder of NMPL. Under those circumstances, it seemed to me that the defendant’s interest in NGS, through NMPL, had been disclosed to the plaintiff before the assignment of the Time Charter was completed. The plaintiff made no objection at that point of time. The plaintiff only raised its opposition to the assignment on 23 October 2008. In other words, for more than a month, the plaintiff kept silent and did not respond to the defendant’s disclosure. In the circumstances, it did not appear to me open to the plaintiff belatedly to allege that the defendant had breached his duty to disclose his interest in NGS before the completion of the assignment.

[37] The plaintiff next alleged that the defendant withheld payment or caused the withholding of payment of charter hire to NIL by reason of the assignment to NGS. The payment withheld was said to amount to US$6,697,000, being charter hire under the Time Charter for the periods January to June 2009. As with the allegation of procurement of the assignment of the Time Charter, this allegation was badly framed. Upon careful reading of the plaintiff’s submissions, it appeared to me that the plaintiff was not asserting that the defendant had withheld payment of the charter hire per se. Rather, the gravamen of the plaintiff’s allegation was that the defendant blocked the commencement of legal proceedings against BGP to recover the said charter hire. According to the plaintiff, it had, on behalf of NIL appointed solicitors, H A & Chung Partnership (“H A & Chung”), to take legal action against BGP for failure to pay the charter hire for the period January to June 2009. Needless to say, this was without the defendant’s concurrence. Upon learning of this, the defendant instructed his lawyers to write to H A & Chung to cease and desist from taking further action against BGP and from representing that they acted for NIL.

[38] Generally, where it is contended that there was a breach of duty on the part of a director in refusing to collect a debt owing to the company, the court ought to examine the reason (if any) for the director’s refusal. However, in so doing the court should not substitute its judgment for the business decision of the director. The issue is not whether the decision not to collect the debt was the best or most appropriate business decision in the circumstances. Rather, the question is whether the decision was made bona fide in the best interests of the company. It is not the role of the courts to act as arbiters of management decisions by the directors unless there is evidence of their voting power being exercised for an improper purpose or in bad faith (Re Tri-Circle Investment Pte Ltd [1993] 1 SLR(R) 441 at [4]).

[39] In the present case, the defendant explained his decision for not collecting the charter hire for the months January to June 2009 thus: After the assignment of the Time Charter from BGP to NGS (which the plaintiff did not recognise), NGS continued to pay the charter hire for the months of September to December 2008. However, in December 2008, TGS decided to terminate the seismic acquisition agreement with NGS owing to some unhappiness with the condition of the equipment on the vessel. As a result, the vessel was laid up at anchorage from 19 December 2008 without any employment at all. The defendant averred that, in the light of the financial crisis at that point in time, it was almost impossible to find alternative employment for the vessel. On 29 January 2009, more than a month after the vessel had been laid up, the defendant, in his capacity as a representative of NGS, wrote to the plaintiff as follows:

According to the defendant, NGS was entitled to a reduction of the charter hire by virtue of cl 5(d) of the Time Charter which reads as follows:

However, the plaintiff, in line with their stand not to recognise the assignment, refused to discuss a reduction of the charter hire rate. In those circumstances, NGS stopped paying charter hire from January 2009 pending clarification on the issue of the assignment of the Time Charter and the payable charter hire rate. Presumably, the defendant, as director of NIL, did not support the plaintiff’s attempt to collect the full charter hire as he too felt NGS was contractually entitled to a reduced rate.

[41] Therefore, prima facie, NIL has a reasonable cause of action against the defendant for his refusal to support legal proceedings against BGP. However, to be clear, I am not in any way pre-judging the merits of NIL’s case against the defendant in this respect. My decision is merely limited to the view that, on a prima facie assessment of the evidence adduced before me, NIL has a cause of action which has some chance of success.

[42] A baseless allegation launched against the defendant was that he had breached his duties as a director of NIL by “profiting or intending to profit from the sale of the vessel after the completion of the 3 year charter period at the discounted amount of USD5,000,000.00 ...”: see para (iii) of the Schedule to the originating summons. This argument overlaps with part of the objection regarding the assignment of the Time Charter and has been addressed at [30]–[36] above.

[43] The plaintiff also alleged that an audit conducted by the plaintiff of NMPL’s management of the vessel revealed several discrepancies. In sum, these accusations were regarding overpayment of various charges and expenses. As before, these allegations had nothing to do with the defendant in his capacity as a director of NIL. Even if the allegations were well-founded, they merely provide NIL a cause of action against NMPL, and not the defendant.

[44] As previously mentioned (at [9] above), another source of unhappiness lay in an alleged misappropriation of US$400,000 that the defendant had loaned to another entity without the plaintiff’s approval. However, what is significant is that the US$400,000 had earlier been properly transferred to NMPL to meet operating expenses for the vessel. Hence, even if the defendant had caused the US$400,000 to be transferred out of NMPL without authorisation, he did so as director of NMPL, not as director of NIL. As such, any claim NIL might have in this regard would be against NMPL.

[45] The last allegation laid at the door of the defendant was the assertion that he had failed to provide information to the plaintiff regarding various matters when queried, including information regarding a payment to an entity known as Eagle Clarc. This, as before, was not a failure for which NIL could claim against the defendant for breach of duties qua director. If anything, this would, at the most, found a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant to enforce the plaintiff’s rights as a member of NIL. It is patent that NIL would not be the party seeking information regarding itself.

[46] In sum therefore, on a prima facie assessment of the evidence, none, save one, of the plaintiff’s allegations against the defendant was made out. In respect of the sole exception, viz, the allegation that the defendant had breached his duty as a director of NIL by refusing to support legal proceedings taken out against BGP, NIL may have a reasonable case against the defendant.

[47] Given the foregoing conclusion that NIL may be entitled to some relief in respect of the defendant’s refusal to allow legal proceedings to be taken out against BGP, it is now necessary to ascertain if the plaintiff has the locus standi to commence a derivative action in the name of NIL. In 1982, the English Court of Appeal, in Prudential Assurance (CA) ([12] supra), summed up the rule in Foss v Harbottle (as well as its exceptions) (at 210–211) thus:

The above passage represents the orthodox understanding of the rule in Foss v Harbottle and has been accepted locally in Ting Sing Ning ([14] supra) (at [12]).

[48] Of the three “exceptions” cited by the Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance (CA) to the rule in Foss v Harbottle (see points (3)–(5) in [47] above), only point (5) is a true exception. This exception is also known as the “fraud on the minority” exception. The others (ie, points (3) and (4)) are not true exceptions as they involve situations where the rule in Foss v Harbottle does not even apply. Where the “fraud on the minority” exception is concerned (see Prudential Assurance (CA) at 211):

There are, then, two constituent elements to this exception: fraud and control.

[49] What is meant by “fraud” for the purposes of establishing the “fraud on the minority” exception has been the subject of some controversy and much academic debate. Given that the resolution of the present application did not turn on this issue, I shall not attempt to set out at length the substance of the debate. The following summary will suffice.

[50] The orthodox school of thought defines “fraud” by distinguishing between two different types of wrongs perpetrated against the company – ratifiable wrongs and unratifiable wrongs. In so far as ratifiable wrongs are concerned, no question of a derivative action arises as such wrongs may be ratified by a resolution passed by the shareholders of the company. In contrast, the nature of unratifiable wrongs is so egregious that no ratification is possible. Such unratifiable wrongs, therefore, constitute a “fraud on the minority” by virtue of their very nature; the “fraud” is one that inheres in the act giving rise to a breach of duty by the directors. The difficulty, of course, is determining where the demarcation lies between ratifiable wrongs and unratifiable wrongs. It is clear from case law that a case of dishonesty or cheating by a director would qualify as an unratifiable wrong: see Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 (at 93). The ambit of unratifiable wrongs also extends beyond dishonesty and cheating: see Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [1982] 1 WLR 2 (at 12). However, it is unclear how far beyond actual dishonesty it would extend.

[51] Given these difficulties, a different way of understanding the term “fraud” was propounded by Vinelott J in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1981] Ch 257 (“Prudential Assurance (HC)”). That case involved two senior directors, Bartlett and Laughton, of two companies, Thomas Poole & Gladstone China Ltd (“TPG”) and Newman Industries Ltd (“Newman”). Bartlett and Laughton were also shareholders of Newman but they, on their own, did not have voting control at the shareholder level. However, they also had control of TPG which held 25.6% of the shares of Newman. If this 25.6% was added to shares held in their own name, Bartlett and Laughton would have voting control of Newman. TPG was in financial difficulties and, in order to alleviate those difficulties, Bartlett and Laughton arranged for Newman to purchase the main assets of TPG at a gross over-valuation. In accordance with Stock Exchange requirements, the consent of the shareholders of Newman was required before such a transaction could be completed. This was obtained by a “tricky and misleading circular” (Prudential Assurance (HC) at 263) disseminated to the shareholders. The Prudential Assurance, a corporate minority shareholder in Newman, claimed damages against Bartlett, Laughton and TPG. In deciding the case for the Prudential Assurance, Vinelott J eschewed the orthodox ratifiable wrong/unratifiable wrong dichotomy. Instead, for Vinelott J, the term “fraud”, as understood in the context of the rule in Foss v Harbottle, refers to a composite of the breach of director’s duties and the attempt to stifle action by the company in respect of the breach by “means of manipulation” within the company: see Prudential Assurance (HC) (at 325). Indeed,“[t]he ‘fraud’ lies in [the errant directors’/shareholders’] use of their voting power, not in the character of the act or transaction giving rise to the cause of action”: see Prudential Assurance (HC) (at 307). Thus, any wrong committed by a director, if accompanied by an improper attempt to stifle an attempt by the company to obtain redress in respect of that wrong, may amount to “fraud”.

[52] This approach by Vinelott J was certainly novel and prompted strong responses, both for and against. The Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance (CA) refrained from commenting on the above approach but overturned Vinelott J’s decision on other grounds. In Singapore, the Court of Appeal in Ting Sing Ning restated the orthodox understanding of “fraud” without considering Vinelott J’s approach. This is understandable since the main issue in Ting Sing Ning was whether the majority shareholders had the requisite control rather than whether there was fraud and Prudential Assurance (HC) was not cited to the Court of Appeal. As such, it seems to me that the meaning of “fraud” as an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle is still amenable to further consideration.

[53] However, as indicated earlier, further cogitation on the meaning of fraud was unnecessary in the present case given that it was inappropriate for the court to grant leave to commence a derivative action in the circumstances: see [60]–[71] below. Suffice it to say that for present purposes, I would take the view that “fraud” is made out on the facts of this case as the defendant had, prima facie, prevented legal action from being taken out against BGP for the recovery of charter hire in order to protect his own interests in NGS.

[54] At this point, I pause briefly to address a contention raised on behalf of the defendant. Counsel for the defendant argued, relying on Walter Woon on Company Law ([13] supra), that it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that a benefit to the defendant was obtained at the expense of NIL or that NIL suffered some loss or detriment before an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle may be established. In Walter Woon on Company Law, it was argued as follows:

Elaborating upon criterion (2), the learned authors of Walter Woon on Company Law, at para 9.54, later argued:

In the present case, it was contended that NIL did not suffer any loss as NGS was more than willing to fulfil the charterer’s obligations under the Time Charter on behalf of BGP, including payment of the charter hire. Furthermore, any benefit acquired by the defendant by virtue of cl 40, which allowed the charterer the option to purchase the vessel at the end of the charter period, was not obtained at the expense of NIL since it was NIL itself which agreed to confer this right on the charterer. For this reason, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s application could not succeed.

[55] Whether the proposition contended for – that it was necessary for a minority shareholder to show that a benefit to the majority shareholder was obtained at the expense of the company or that the company suffered some loss or detriment before an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle may be established – is accurate depends on what the meaning of “fraud” for the purposes of the “fraud on the minority” exception is. As I have explained, the latter issue is not settled. If the orthodox ratifiable wrong/unratifiable wrong dichotomy is adopted, counsel for the defendant may well be right as it would be hard to imagine a wrongdoing by a director which results in neither loss to the company nor benefit to the director as being unratifiable. However, if Vinelott J’s understanding of fraud is adopted, then the proposition would be inaccurate as the “fraud on the minority” exception may still be made out regardless of the type of wrongdoing committed. Since I was disinclined to exercise my discretion in favour of the application (see [61]–[71] below), it is not necessary for me to deal with the defendant’s argument. Besides, it is arguable that NIL had indeed suffered some loss when the defendant blocked litigation proceedings from being instituted against BGP. This was the loss of charter hire withheld by BGP and/or NGS after December 2008.

[56] The issue of control is not nearly as controversial as that of fraud. However, a few brief remarks are still pertinent. In Prudential Assurance (HC) ([51] supra), the question whether Bartlett and Laughton had the requisite control over Newman arose for consideration since Bartlett and Laughton, not having in aggregate more than 50% Newman shares between them, did not have voting control. Vinelott J decided (at 274) to take a “substance over form” approach and decided that control existed:

Hence, Vinelott J departed from a purely numerical yardstick for assessing control of a company. In fact, Vinelott J extended “the notion of control to matters other than voting, such as monopoly of information and the use of managerial vetoes over litigation …”: see G R Sullivan, “Restating the Scope of the Derivative Action” [1985] CLJ 236 at 246. This approach has been lauded as a “recognition of corporate realities” and “[f]or that breakthrough, Vinelott J must be respectfully congratulated”: see K W Wedderburn, “Derivative Actions and Foss v Harbottle” (1981) 44 MLR 202.

[57] Although the English Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance (CA) ([12] supra), did not adopt Vinelott J’s notion of “control”, it did expand the concept of “control” somewhat when it held (at 219) that it:

The same approach was adopted by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Ting Sing Ning ([14] supra). In that case, the issue was whether the respondents had an absolute majority of the votes. This would be so only if the shares belonging to the first respondent’s sister (some 10%) was added to their total. Reversing the trial judge, the Court of Appeal held that the sister’s shares had to be added to the respondent’s shares in ascertaining “control” since the sister’s shares had been given to her by the first respondent and the sister had an indirect interest in preventing litigation. Both the English Court of Appeal and the Singapore Court of Appeal resolved their cases without addressing the issue whether one may have “control” of a company without having a majority of the votes howsoever the majority may be determined. This may be explained by the fact that, in both cases, it was not directly in issue whether an ability to suppress litigation without resort to voting power would suffice as “control”.

[58] In the present case, in reliance upon both Prudential Assurance (CA) and Ting Sing Ning, the defendant argued that “the main determining factor whether an alleged wrongdoer had control over the company is … his ability to garner votes amounting to more than 50% of the shareholding in the company”. As the defendant had only 50% of the shareholding in NIL, it was argued that the defendant did not possess the requisite control.

[59] In my view, while shareholding (including shares that the errant director/shareholder may be able to garner outside of his own shares) would be an obvious way of determining control, it should not be the sole determinant. In reality, controllers of companies often exercise control without resort to voting power. The crucial question, to my mind, is not whether the defendant had the requisite shareholding but whether the defendant was able to prevent an action from being brought against him. As such, I would incline towards the “substance over form” approach adopted by Vinelott J. After all, the crux of the matter is whether the errant director was able to suppress an action against himself qua director. This was also the approach adopted by the English Court of Appeal in Barrett v Duckett [1995] BCC 243 (“Barrett”). In that case, like the present, both the plaintiff and the first defendant held 50% shares in the company. Although the plaintiff’s attempt to bring a derivative action was eventually struck out, Peter Gibson LJ held, on the issue of control, as follows (at 250):

The above statement was approved by our Court of Appeal in Pang Yong Hock ([23] supra) (at [36]), albeit in the context of a statutory derivative action. In the instant case, the issue whether the defendant had requisite control could not be resolved given that, in the first place, the question was as yet unanswered who in NIL had the authority to decide whether the company should take out a civil action against the defendant. As I will explain (at [61]–[68] below), the plaintiff’s application was premature and it may be that the agreement of directors appointed by the defendant is not needed for NIL to take out an action against the defendant. If so, no question of control arises.

[60] I now turn to the issues which were determinative of this application. Counsel for the defendant argued that even if the fraud on the minority exception was made out, the plaintiff’s application should not be allowed for two further reasons. First, it was argued that if there were alternative remedies available to the plaintiff to seek redress instead of commencing a derivative action, the plaintiff had first to resort to those alternative remedies. Second, counsel for the defendant also submitted that a minority shareholder ought not be allowed to bring a derivative action if, in so doing, he was not acting bona fide in the best interests of the company but rather to further an ulterior motive. Those arguments find support in Shareholders’ Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Ed, 2007) where the learned author states (at para 6-27) as follows:

Similarly, in the case of Barrett, Peter Gibson LJ stated (at [250]) as follows:

In Portfolios of Distinction Ltd v Laird [2005] BCC 216, the English High Court determined that the two conditions stated above by Peter Gibson LJ had to be read conjunctively. In other words, if an applicant failed to satisfy either condition, the court should generally not exercise its discretion to grant leave to start a derivative action, even if the fraud on the minority exception was made out.

[61] The whole foundation of the “fraud on the minority” exception rests on the premise that without such a procedural device justice would not be done. Thus, the necessity of a derivative action must be established before such an action should be allowed to be brought before the courts. If there is an adequate remedy available to the minority shareholder, he should generally not be allowed to resort to a derivative action. This is because a derivative action derogates from the general company law principle that company decisions should be decided by the majority. Hence, before any derogation is allowed, it must first be shown that such derogation is necessary to further the cause of justice. Lord Blanesburgh, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, explained this principle in Ferguson v Wallbridge [1935] 3 DLR 66 (at 83) as follows:

[62] However, the Court of Appeal in Ting Sing Ning ([14] supra) appeared to add a gloss to the above principle. In that case, the second respondent argued that the appellant should not be allowed to bring a common law derivative action because the company in question, Havilland, had two alternative courses of action. The first was that Havilland could be wound up as the shareholders had expressed their agreement to such a course of action. The other was that the appellant was free to pursue an oppression action available under s 168A of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) given that Havilland was a company incorporated in Hong Kong. The Court of Appeal dismissed both arguments. In so far as the first was concerned, the Court of Appeal opined that it was unclear that the “authority” which the respondents relied upon, Pang Yang Hock ([23] supra), established the principle that when the remedy of a winding up is available, the court should not entertain any application to pursue a s 216A action, however meritorious it might be. I respectfully agree. Indeed, the proposition advanced by the second respondent was far too broad-brushed. While a winding up might sometimes be the solution to contention between the disputants, it is not difficult to imagine cases where winding up would be to the detriment of the minority, especially if the majority could re-group thereafter and set up a new company to undertake very much the same business as before.

[63] In regard to the second alternative, the Court of Appeal held as follows (at [30]):

The Court of Appeal in Ting Sing Ning accordingly allowed the appeal, thereby granting the appellant liberty to bring a derivative action on behalf of Havilland.

[65] In the present case, it was argued on behalf of the defendant that the Shareholders’ Agreement provided for arbitration as a forum for dispute resolution between the plaintiff and the defendant. This was an alternative remedy which was available to the plaintiff. Clause 16.2 of the Shareholders’ Agreement read as follows:

[66] In fact, an interpretation of the Shareholders’ Agreement was not as straightforward as the defendant made it out to be. As was reproduced in [5] above, the distribution of management decisions was convoluted and not easily understood. On the one hand, cl 6.7 of the Shareholders’ Agreement states that decisions are, generally, to be made by majority vote, save for certain matters which require unanimous consent. On the other, cl 8 stipulates that all technical matters, in general, are within the sole purview of the directors “appointed” by the defendant while all financial matters, in general, are to be decided by the directors “appointed” by the plaintiff. It is not easy to reconcile these clauses which seem to cover overlapping subject matter. To further complicate matters, cl 11 of the Shareholders’ Agreement provides for the breaking of a deadlock only in respect of certain matters. These are, in summary, matters which require the unanimous approval of the board of directors or shareholders. In relation to these matters, the representative of each party should use his reasonable endeavours to resolve the dispute, failing which the defendant may require the plaintiff to sell its shares in NIL to the defendant at a fair price. All this is in addition to the dispute resolution provision referred to by the defendant.

[67] In the present case, the defendant argued that “the allegations brought by the Plaintiffs against the Defendant could and should be resolved via the Shareholders’ Agreement which provides for arbitration as a dispute resolution forum”. This is not true in respect of the only allegation relevant in the present case – that the defendant had breached his fiduciary duties in not supporting the plaintiff’s attempt to take out legal proceedings against BGP for failure to pay charter hire. The cause of action arising from such allegation belongs to NIL, not the plaintiff. As such, the Shareholders’ Agreement which sets out the rights and liabilities between shareholders of NIL, does not govern that dispute.

[68] However, in the present case, the arbitration clause may be useful in another way. The issue before the board of directors was whether to bring an action against the defendant for breach of fiduciary duties. Given the uncertainty in the Shareholders’ Agreement, it is difficult to determine whether such a decision fell within the exclusive purview of the directors “appointed” by plaintiff or required the majority or unanimous approval of the board. Any disagreement as to how this issue was to be decided should first be determined by arbitration in accordance with cl 16.2 of the Shareholders’ Agreement. It may well be that the arbitrator(s) decide that this matter is one within the exclusive purview of the directors appointed by the plaintiff, in which case no derivative action would be necessary. Moreover, if the arbitrator finds that the matter is one which requires the unanimous approval of the all directors, the defendant may elect to invoke the deadlock-breaking provision of cl 11 and force a buyout of the plaintiff’s shares, thus rendering a derivative action redundant again. It is only in respect of the following situations that the possibility of a derivative action would arise:

(a) the arbitrator finds that the matter is one within the exclusive purview of the directors appointed by the defendant and these directors, without good reason, refuse to bring an action against the defendant;

(b) the arbitrator finds that the matter is one that has to be decided by a majority vote and the directors appointed by the defendant refuse, without good reason, to support the commencement of an action against the defendant; and

(c) (although the arbitrator finds that the matter is one requiring unanimity) the directors appointed by the defendant refuse, without good reason, to support the bringing of legal proceedings and the defendant refuses to activate the buyout clause.

Until one of these situations has arisen, the plaintiff’s application is premature.

[69] Finally, it must be remembered that the derivative action is an equitable device, used to alleviate the harshness which on occasion may result from a strict application of the rule in Foss v Harbottle. Accordingly, the maxim “he who comes to equity must come with clean hands” applies. It follows that he who seeks to use a derivative action must do so in the best interests of the company and not for some ulterior purpose. In this regard, the words of Lawton LJ in Nurcombe v Nurcombe (1984) 1 BCC 99,269 (at 99,273) are apposite:

This statement was cited with approval in Barrett ([59] supra) (at [250)]. In the present case, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff was seeking to bring a derivative action in the name of the company for purely self-serving reasons. In para 63 of his affidavit filed on 20 November 2009, the defendant wrote:

As I mentioned earlier, cl 11 of the Shareholders’ Agreement is a deadlock-breaking provision. It is impractical to reproduce the entire clause (which runs to almost three pages). The gist of the clause, however, is as follows. In the event of a “deadlock”, defined as a situation where the board of directors of NIL fail to decide on a matter requiring the unanimous approval of the board, both the plaintiff and the defendant are to use their reasonable endeavours to resolve the dispute. If a resolution is not arrived at within 30 days, then (at cl 11.3):

The defendant alleged that the plaintiff, being dissatisfied with the possibility of being bought out at fair value, was seeking to force the defendant, on pain of litigation, to purchase its shares in NIL at a higher price.

[70] On the basis of the evidence before me, it appeared that the plaintiff had not laid all its cards on the table. To my mind, the plaintiff might not have disclosed its real motive for bringing a derivative action in the name of NIL. Its main grouse against the defendant appeared to be in relation to the defendant’s role in the assignment of the Time Charter from BGP to NGS. However, the plaintiff’s unhappiness with the assignment could not be easily understood. While it is true that BGP remained primarily liable to NIL for the payment of charter hire even with the assignment, it is difficult to imagine why NIL should object to being paid by NGS instead of BGP, as long as the charter hire was paid. Indeed, for four months, from September to December 2008, NGS faithfully paid the charter hire on behalf of BGP, and neither NIL nor the plaintiff saw the need to return the charter hire to NGS. Thus, that the plaintiff would subsequently cite the assignment as its main basis for bringing a derivative action against the defendant seemed to me to be contrived. In so far as the outstanding charter hire from January to June 2009 was concerned, the plaintiff’s behaviour did not appear reasonable either. While NIL had accepted charter hire from NGS from September to December 2008 without demurrer, when NGS later tried to negotiate for a lower charter hire rate, which it was entitled to under the Time Charter, the plaintiff flatly refused to enter into any discussion whatsoever. That stand did not appear to be one which a director acting in the best interests of the company could take. Again, the plaintiff’s motives may be called into question with regard to cl 40 of the Time Charter. At all material times, the plaintiff had known that the Time Charter gave the charterer an option, at the end of the charter period, to purchase the vessel. In fact, according to the defendant, this had been taken into account in calculating the charter hire payable. It was therefore strange that the plaintiff took objection to NGS becoming entitled, by reason of the assignment, to purchase the vessel at the end of the charter period. With respect to these and other allegations, the plaintiff appeared to me to be throwing everything but the kitchen sink at the defendant.

[71] Hence, I was of the view that in bringing the application for leave to commence a derivative action, more likely than not, the plaintiff was not acting bona fide in the best interests of NIL. It was not for me to go beyond that to speculate on the real motive behind the plaintiff’s actions. For the purposes of the application before me, it sufficed that I was of the view that the application was not bona fide in the interests of NIL.

[72] In sum therefore, the plaintiff’s application for leave to commence a derivative action against the defendant was dismissed as the plaintiff had failed:

(a) to follow the proper procedure in taking out a derivative action;

(b) to exhaust alternative remedies available to it; and

(c) to bring the action in good faith.

Costs of S$6,500 were awarded to the defendant.