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Grounds publishedDecided 28 Nov 2005

High Court

Wong Ser Wan v Ng Cheong Ling

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[2005] SGHC 218Case no. D 2545/1999, MSS 6483/2000, 6641/2000, 22/2001

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Grounds of decision

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  1. Judith Prakash J:

  2. Introduction

  3. [1] There are several related matters for decision before me. All arose out of the breakdown of the marital relationship between Mdm Wong Ser Wan (“the wife”) and Mr Ng Cheong Ling (“the husband”). The main proceedings concern the ancillary matters arising out of their divorce and the others concern maintenance of the wife and children.

  4. [2] The parties were married in January 1976. They had three children: a son, Ng Ezine (“Ezine”), born on 16 June 1977, a daughter, Ng Eharn (“Eharn”), born on 14 September 1979 and another son, Ng Ewe (“Ewe”), born on 6 May 1986. In 1999, the wife filed the petition in the main proceedings. The husband did not contest the petition and a decree nisi was granted to her on 1 August 2000. Custody of the youngest child was given to the wife. The marriage had lasted for 24 and a half years. The wife is now 57 years old while the husband is 54 years old.

  5. [3] The matters in issue in the ancillary proceedings are the division of the matrimonial assets and the wife’s claim for future maintenance of herself and Ewe. The maintenance summonses concern Ezine and Eharn’s claims for maintenance from the husband and the husband’s application for variation of the existing consent maintenance order made on 14 August 1996 (“the consent maintenance order”) to nothing. The wife had also filed Maintenance Summons No 1269 of 2001 to enforce payment of arrears under the consent maintenance order but that summons is not before me for decision.

  6. [4] The facts in this case are somewhat different from those that usually present themselves in applications of a similar nature. There are two reasons for this. First, the breakdown of the marriage took place over a prolonged period of time during which the parties had various dealings with each other in relation to maintenance and property. Such dealings resulted in written agreements on these matters. One of the main issues before me is the extent to which such agreements should be recognised now that the decree nisi has been granted. Second, the parties were involved in two previous sets of court proceedings, viz, District Court Suit No 600011 of 2001 (“the DC suit”) and High Court Suit No 310 of 2003 (“Suit 310”) in which findings were made that may have an impact on this decision.

  7. Background

  8. [5] The breakdown of the marriage started in 1993 when the wife discovered that the husband was having an affair. Subsequently, there were problems about maintenance and in December 1995, the wife filed a maintenance summons against him. This summons was withdrawn in March 1996 after the husband promised to give the wife maintenance of $12,000 a month. The situation deteriorated thereafter and in July 1996, the wife filed a fresh maintenance summons. At the hearing of this summons on 14 August 1996, the parties, both of whom were represented by solicitors, agreed on the consent maintenance order. This provided for the husband to pay the following sums to the wife:

  9. (a) $15,000 per month for the maintenance of the wife and the three children comprising:

  10. (i) $7,000 for household expenses, children’s day-to-day expenses, salaries of maids and cost of groceries; and

  11. (ii) $8,000 for the personal expenses of the wife;

  12. (b) all expenses incurred by the wife in relation to overseas travel including airfare, transport and accommodation expenses;

  13. (c) the credit card expenses of the wife,

  14. (i) in the case of overseas expenses, comprising expenses for car rental, taxis, dining, and shopping for the children; and

  15. (ii) in the case of expenses in Singapore, limited to $2,000 a month;

  16. (d) all the medical, educational, travel and overseas living expenses of Ezine;

  17. (e) all the medical, educational and travel expenses of the other two children;

  18. (f) all the wife’s medical expenses and her expenses at the American Club; and

  19. (g) all wages for the driver and gardener, and all petrol expenses for the car.

  20. [6] The husband did not, however, fully meet his obligations under the consent maintenance order. Additionally, in October 1996, he admitted to the wife that he had continued his adulterous affair. Shortly thereafter, the wife filed a divorce petition grounded on adultery. Three months later she filed a maintenance summons against the husband for arrears in maintenance.

  21. [7] Following a letter from his solicitors which expressed the desire of the husband to save the marriage, the parties began negotiations. These discussions eventually led to the signing of an agreement termed the “Financial Agreement” on 1 December 1997. By the terms of the Financial Agreement, the husband agreed to cease his relationship with the co-respondent named in the divorce petition and to carry out his moral and financial obligations towards the wife and the children. By cl 7, the husband agreed that he would continue to pay the wife monthly maintenance in accordance with the terms of the consent maintenance order. The Financial Agreement also contained a whole list of gifts to be made by the husband to the wife. These were as follows:

  22. (a) the husband agreed to give to the wife absolutely and irrevocably the following immovable properties:

  23. (i) 5633 Chancellor Boulevard, Vancouver, BC (“Chancellor Boulevard”);

  24. (ii) 4756 Drummond Drive, Vancouver, BC (“Drummond Drive”);

  25. (iii) #3-1919 Beach Avenue, Vancouver, BC (“Beach Avenue”); and

  26. (iv) 3 Cluny Hill, Singapore (“Cluny Hill”).

  27. (b) he agreed to repay the sum of C$1.23m secured by Beach Avenue by 31 December 2003;

  28. (c) he agreed to pay the mortgage instalments for Cluny Hill and to discharge all indebtedness relating to that property within the next three years;

  29. (d) he agreed to give her the sums of S$2.5m and US$320,000 in the following instalments:

  30. (i) the US$320,000 was to be paid within seven days of the date of the Financial Agreement;

  31. (ii) S$500,000 was to be paid within three months;

  32. (iii) S$1m was to be paid by 30 November 1998; and

  33. (iv) the remaining S$1m was to be paid by 30 November 1999.

  34. (e) he agreed to transfer to her all shares then held by him in a company called Lei Garden Restaurant Pte Ltd, such transfer to be completed no later than 15 February 1998.

  35. [8] The husband fulfilled some but not all of the provisions of the Financial Agreement. He did not transfer the shares in Lei Garden Restaurant Pte Ltd to the wife by 15 February 1998 but on 10 February 1999, he paid over to her the sum of S$2,646,000 which he had received from a third party on the sale of these shares and the wife accepted this sum in satisfaction of the husband’s obligation in respect of the shares. He did transfer to her all the immovable properties but he did not pay off the mortgage on Beach Avenue or that on Cluny Hill. Further, he failed to pay all the mortgage instalment repayments accruing in respect of Cluny Hill and the wife had to pay those. In respect of the cash gifts, the husband did not pay the wife the sums of $1m due on 30 November 1998 and 30 November 1999. Finally, he did not comply fully with the consent maintenance order.

  36. [9] In the meantime in mid-1998, the husband sold certain assets. The first was a property at 764 Mountbatten Road, Singapore (“the Mountbatten property”) which he sold to a company called Ng Bok Eng Holdings Pte Ltd (“NBEH”) for US$2m. The second comprised shares in NBEH which he sold to another company called Bian Bee Company Pte Ltd (“Bian Bee”) at the price of US$1m. Both Bian Bee and NBEH are companies owned and controlled by the husband’s family. In Suit 310, sitting in the High Court, I found that the two conveyances of these assets had been made by the husband with the intent of defrauding the wife and declared the conveyances to be void. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No 87 of 2004.

  37. [10] On 8 July 1999, the parties entered into a deed of separation (“the Deed”). By this deed, they agreed to continue to live separately and apart at Cluny Hill and made provision for the wife to have care and control of the children and for the husband to have liberal access to them. The Deed provided that the terms set out in the consent maintenance order and the Financial Agreement should continue to apply. It was also agreed that if either party was in breach of any of the provisions of the Deed, the other party might proceed to take such legal action, including the presentation of divorce proceedings, as if the Deed had not been made. After the Deed was signed and pursuant to its terms, the wife withdrew the divorce petition that she had filed in 1996.

  38. [11] Shortly thereafter, however, the wife learnt that the husband had been seen again with the woman he had previously had the affair with. Suspecting that he was not keeping his promise to cease improperly associating with other women, the wife began recording the husband’s telephone conversations at his office at Aromate Pte Ltd (“Aromate”). After listening to some of these conversations, she believed that he was planning to dissipate his assets so that she would receive a smaller share of the matrimonial assets in the event of a divorce. She was so upset that she filed a fresh divorce petition on 8 October 1999 (the petition in the present proceedings) and instructed her solicitors to apply for a Mareva injunction to prevent the husband from dissipating his assets. A Mareva order was granted in her favour in March 2000.

  39. [12] In the meantime, the husband had filed an application in the Magistrate’s Court for a downward variation of the consent maintenance order on the basis of his poor financial position and the wife’s alleged abuse of the order. The husband was cross-examined on the affidavits he had filed in support of his application and, after the evidence was taken, his application was dismissed. This happened on 13 April 2000.

  40. [13] Shortly before that, on 18 March 2000, the husband had filed an originating summons in the High Court against the wife for a declaration that the Financial Agreement was null and void. The eventual basis of this application was that the Financial Agreement had been procured by undue influence and misrepresentation on the part of the wife. The originating summons was subsequently converted into a writ action and transferred from the High Court to the Family Court where it became the DC Suit. After a ten-day trial, the DC Suit was dismissed in December 2001.

  41. [14] In November 2000, the husband stopped paying maintenance to the wife. He has not paid any maintenance to her since then. Instead, on 20 November 2000, he made an application in the Magistrate’s Court by way of Maintenance Summons No 6483 of 2000 for variation of the consent maintenance order, to naught. This is one of the applications that is before me.

  42. [15] On 7 December 2000, Eharn (who was by then 21 years old and studying in a tertiary institution) filed her own maintenance summons, Maintenance Summons No 6641 of 2000 against the husband. In January 2001, the wife filed Maintenance Summons No 22 of 2001 (“MSS 22/2001”) for and on behalf of Ezine (who was by then over 21 years of age and studying in a tertiary institution in the United States) against the husband for maintenance. These summonses are also before me.

  43. Division of matrimonial assets

  44. [17] The first task facing the court when it has to decide how to divide the matrimonial assets between the parties is to ascertain what matrimonial assets each of the parties owns and the value of those assets.

  45. [18] In May 2004, in preparation for the hearing of these proceedings, each of the parties filed an updated affidavit of means. The husband’s affidavit was short. He referred to the statement of affairs that he had submitted to his former Trustee in Bankruptcy in late 2002. In that statement, the husband estimated his total realisable assets at $23,954,905.08 and his total indebtedness at $16,473,391.09. The figure of $23,954,905.08 included the amount of $15,707,960 that the husband said was the value of the assets transferred to the wife under the Financial Agreement. In his affidavit, the husband excluded that amount from the calculation and declared that the estimated deficiency in his estate as at October 2002 was $7,631,513.99. It should be noted that whilst the husband set out a list of his assets and liabilities in the statement, he did not attach to it documents supporting his valuations of his assets. Further, this affidavit represented quite a change in the husband’s situation since he had in previous affidavits produced reports that showed his net asset position to be positive rather than negative. These reports were prepared by one Mr Foong Daw Cheng, an accountant, whom he had employed to value his assets.

  46. [19] The husband’s assets comprise his interests in some 36 private companies in Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Canada and the British Virgin Islands plus the Mountbatten property and the NBEH shares. For convenience, I shall from time to time hereafter refer to these companies as “the NCL group” although in many of the companies the husband owned 50% or less of the issued shares. There are two issues here: the more minor one is whether all these assets are matrimonial property, and the more important one is whether the husband has correctly valued his interests in these assets.

  47. The status of the NBEH shares and the Mountbatten property

  48. [20] In relation to the first issue, the husband’s case is that the NBEH shares and the Mountbatten property are not matrimonial assets. He does not dispute the status of any of his other assets.

  49. [21] The husband said that his holding of the NBEH shares resulted from a gift from his father in 1970, some six years before the marriage. He submitted that even if the shareholding had changed over time, there was no evidence that he had paid or was paid for any of the shares that were in his name from time to time. At the end of the day what the husband had remained the same – 60,000 shares in NBEH. The wife did not dispute that the husband’s original shareholding in NBEH had been a gift from his father. She submitted that, in view of the changes in the shareholding over the course of the marriage, it could not be said that the NBEH shares presently held were the original gift made by the father. She pointed out that in Suit 310, I had observed that I could not determine whether the 60,000 shares that the husband held in 1998 were the original 60,000 shares given to him by the father or were transferred to him in 1988 when his shareholding had increased to 120,000 NBEH shares. The wife submitted that there was insufficient evidence to show that the NBEH shares constituted a gift from the father. In any case, she submitted, even if the shares were a gift from the father, it was clear from the changes in the shareholding over the years and from the husband’s role as a director of NBEH that the husband must be deemed to have substantially improved the value of the shares during the marriage. It followed from that that the NBEH shares had to constitute a matrimonial asset.

  50. [22] It is clear that the original 60,000 NBEH shares that the husband held were a gift from his father. The origin of the subsequent acquisitions is not so clear. In 1979 he had 100,000 shares; in 1980, 120,000 shares; by 1983, he was back to 60,000 shares; in 1988 he had 120,000 shares; and in 1993 his shareholding fell back to 60,000 shares. The issue I had to decide in Suit 310 was whether these 60,000 shares belonged to the husband beneficially or were held on trust for his father. I decided they were the husband’s but that decision is not determinative of whether the NBEH shares constitute a matrimonial asset. I have concluded that these shares have, for the purposes of these proceedings, to be treated as if they were the original block given to the husband. This is because throughout the marriage the husband has never held less than 60,000 shares in NBEH. Thus, whatever share movements there may have been, these could easily have been accomplished without impinging in any way on the original holding. The husband came to the marriage with 60,000 NBEH shares and, in view of the annulment of the purported sale of shares in Suit 310, on the dissolution of the marriage he still had 60,000 NBEH shares. Since the husband has shown that the NBEH shares were a gift made before the marriage, the onus shifts to the wife to show that these shares were nevertheless a matrimonial asset under s 112(10)(a) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) (“the Act”) because the husband had substantially improved them during the marriage. In my judgment, the wife has not discharged that onus. She has not produced evidence that the value of the 60,000 shares increased substantially during the marriage as a result of the efforts of the husband. The NBEH shares therefore do not constitute a matrimonial asset.

  51. [23] As far as the Mountbatten property is concerned, as this court had found, it was bought in 1980 for S$988,404. It was, the husband submitted, bought as a gift for him by his father who had paid the upfront cash payment and had thereafter serviced the monthly instalments due under a mortgage loan taken from a bank. The mortgage was discharged in 1986 when the father had paid it up in full. The husband maintained that he had no money to pay for this property himself as he had completed National Service in 1976, had married that year and had thereafter had a family and had had to support them. The husband referred to the wife’s allegations that the husband himself had paid for the Mountbatten property. He submitted that the various versions of fact given by the wife were contradictory. On the one hand, the wife claimed that he was an impoverished young man when she had married him, so much so that she had to buy their first matrimonial home at Beverly Mai and she had to set up a boutique in order to help meet expenses. The husband argued that if this was to be believed, how could he have been able to obtain $1m to pay for the Mountbatten property between 1980 and 1986? He submitted that while he had had the means to support the family, he did not have enough to also buy the Mountbatten property and discharge the mortgage by 1986. These arguments do not, however, assist the husband’s case. I had found in Suit 310 that there was no evidence to substantiate the husband’s bald assertion that the Mountbatten property was a gift to him from his father and accordingly had found that it was acquired by the husband himself. This finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The husband was a witness in Suit 310 and documents relating to the purchase of the Mountbatten property were adduced in that action. The husband did not adduce any additional evidence in this action relating to the acquisition of the Mountbatten property. Thus, the finding that the Mountbatten property was acquired by the husband himself must stand. I further find, for the purposes of this action, that since it was purchased during the marriage, the Mountbatten property is a matrimonial asset.

  52. The value of the husband’s matrimonial assets

  53. [24] Mr Foong’s reports tabulate the husband’s worth as at 31 December 1999. The first report is dated 4 December 2000. There, Mr Foong estimated the husband’s gross worth to be approximately $27.6m. Of this sum, about $11.1m came from the value of the husband’s interest in the NCL group and a further $15m came from his valuation of the assets listed in the Financial Agreement (“the FA assets”). The husband’s net worth after deduction of his liabilities was approximately $17.1m. Mr Foong’s second report was produced on 8 February 2001 and in it Mr Foong dealt with various points raised by the wife in an affidavit commenting on the first report. He ended by adjusting the net worth of the husband slightly upwards to $17.3m. That meant the husband was worth about $2.3m after deduction of the FA assets.

  54. [25] On 2 May 2001, Mr Foong produced a revised report on the husband’s net worth. This report was specifically stated to supersede his earlier reports. Mr Foong also took the opportunity of dealing with various comments made by the wife’s accountant, Mr Chan Ket Teck, who had scrutinised the first two reports, and to justify his choice of the “net tangible assets” (“NTA”) method to value the private companies in which the husband was interested. Mr Foong concluded that the husband’s net worth was approximately $18.2m (or $3.2m if one excludes the FA assets). He valued the NCL group at $12.3m.

  55. [26] There was a brief report in June 2001 noting that audited financial statements for six companies had been received and that the information in these statements would have an impact on the husband’s worth. Mr Foong issued his fifth report on 13 December 2001. In it, whilst he reduced the values of some of the companies in the NCL group so that the total value of the husband’s interests in the NCL group came up to $9.5m, he made other adjustments to take into account advances made by the husband to related companies and the amount representing the undervalues at which the husband had sold the Mountbatten property and the NBEH shares. He also reduced the husband’s liabilities by some $2.6m. As a result, the husband’s net worth was increased to $22.6m or $7.6m after deduction of the FA assets. There was, thus, quite a difference between the husband’s estimates of his wealth as at October 2002 and Mr Foong’s estimates of the husband’s wealth as at the end of 1999.

  56. [27] Ms Loh Wai Mooi, counsel for the husband, submitted that the expert’s reports were historical data of little value because of the husband’s bankruptcy and the effluxion of time, the latter being an important fact because of the very nature of many of the assets, ie, they were shares in private companies. In valuing the husband’s net worth, Mr Foong had used the NTA basis of valuation. Indeed, although Mr Chan, the wife’s expert, had criticised this method of valuation, he had also adopted the same in his reports on the husband’s net worth which he concluded to be around $34m. Ms Loh submitted that since a significant part of the husband’s assets comprised shares in private companies, the NTA value of these shares had to be substantially discounted as those shares were not easily realisable or marketable. She went on to contend that since the husband’s assets were now in the hands of the official receiver, the best evidence of the value of the same would be available when they were realised by the official receiver. Basically, what Ms Loh’s submission amounted to was that the husband did not know the current value of his assets. He thought that he was in a negative position if the FA assets could not be included as part of his assets. He did not accept that Mr Foong’s last report represented the true position as so much time had passed since the date of the financial reports Mr Foong had relied on, and also the shares that represented the bulk of his assets were not easily marketable. In addition, Mr Foong’s estimate of his liabilities was out of date and inaccurate as they only reflected amounts owing as of the end of 1999. By this year 2005, the husband’s liabilities, including the amounts he would have to refund to the purchasers of the Mountbatten property and the NBEH shares, totalled approximately $19.4m.

  57. [28] Mr Ang Cheng Hock, counsel for the wife, did not place much trust in the various figures put forward on behalf of the husband. Looking at the reports and the husband’s own statement, he said that if all those calculations were to be believed, it would appear that the husband’s net worth had increased by $4.4m (or approximately 2.8 times) from 2 May 2001 to 13 December 2001. Thereafter, for reasons that the husband had not explained, the husband’s net worth rapidly decreased by $15m to a deficit of more than $7m in October 2002. Further, Mr Chan’s estimate of $37m had been given after he had reviewed and critiqued Mr Foong’s valuations on the basis of the information available in Mr Foong’s third report and in financial documents disclosed by the husband. Mr Ang submitted that given the great divergences in the valuation of the husband’s net worth by the husband himself in his statement of affairs and by Mr Foong and Mr Chan in their respective reports, it was clearly not possible for anyone to accurately estimate the husband’s full net worth.

  58. [29] Mr Ang further submitted that the husband had failed to provide full and frank disclosure of his assets and that it followed from this that any determination of his net worth based on the information he had given must be speculative and inaccurate. Mr Foong’s reports had to be inaccurate since, as regards many of the companies that he had valued, Mr Foong had had to rely on draft accounts or informal management accounts or outdated accounts to do his valuations. This was despite the fact that the husband, as a controlling shareholder or director of many of these companies, must have had the latest audited accounts in his possession or power. Based on Mr Foong’s fifth report, companies which Mr Foong had valued using informal, unaudited management accounts included Can Pacific Limited, Trump Pacific Resources Inc, GP Holdings Ltd and Bestland Investments Inc. Companies which he had valued based on draft audited accounts included Goodwood Resources Pte Ltd, Allied Pacific Hotels Limited (“APHL”), Greatwood Limited (“Greatwood Ltd”) and Aromate. In fact as far as Aromate was concerned, Mr Foong agreed during cross-examination that its draft audited accounts as provided to him might not have been accurate because they had not been confirmed by the directors. Further, the husband had not provided any accounts whatsoever for the purpose of valuing his shareholdings in NJR Investments Ltd, Dynamic Pacific Ltd and Goodwood Holdings BVI Ltd.

  59. [30] Other deficiencies in the information provided to Mr Foong were also pointed out. These were that Mr Foong had to rely on qualified auditors’ accounts in valuing the husband’s shareholdings in APHL, Fustar Chemicals Ltd (“Fustar”) and Goodwood Limited (“Goodwood Ltd”). The auditors of the three companies had qualified their accounts as a result of a lack of information and/or proper accounting records as regards the subsidiaries of the companies. Mr Foong maintained that the fact that the accounts for Allied Pacific Hotels Ltd and Fustar were qualified did not affect his valuation of either company as the qualification related to the financial affairs of the subsidiaries. He took the same view in respect of the qualification of the accounts of Goodwood Ltd. Under cross-examination, he did agree, however, that what the auditors of the companies were saying by qualifying the accounts was that the accounts did not contain sufficient information about subsidiaries or associated companies to provide a true and full view of Goodwood Ltd and its subsidiaries and associated companies. Notwithstanding that, Mr Foong maintained that it was still possible to make an informed decision whether to provide for the value of the investment in the two companies.

  60. [31] Mr Ang contended that, at the end of the day, apart from what was contained in the deficient documents and accounts provided to Mr Foong by the husband, Mr Foong’s reports were clearly based on information provided by the husband. For example, Mr Foong agreed in cross-examination that his valuations were based on either audited accounts or on management accounts that had been given to him by the husband. He agreed that he had proceeded on the basis that this information provided by the husband was accurate. In respect of some of the NCL group companies that were investment holding companies, for example, Can Pacific Limited, Dynamic Pacific Ltd and NJR Investments Ltd, the only information that Mr Foong had on the investments held by those companies was provided to him by the husband. He did not receive information from any other sources as to what other assets those companies might have invested in. He also conceded that he had accepted at face value what the management told him as regards two Chinese subsidiaries of Fustar and had accordingly made provision for Fustar’s investment in those subsidiaries.

  61. [32] Mr Ang also criticised the method which Mr Foong had used to determine the value of the NCL group. He said:

  62. (a) Mr Foong did not give consideration to the future earnings potential of the companies because he thought that since such potential was subjective, it should not be taken to account in determining the value of a company;

  63. (b) Mr Foong had failed to consider that the NTA value would be the break-up value of the company upon liquidation and therefore would not reflect the real value of the company as it did not take into account the goodwill of the business and its future earning potential;

  64. (c) Mr Foong’s assumptions that firstly, if a debtor company had a negative NTA then the debt was not fully recoverable and, secondly, if an investee company’s NTA was less than the cost of investment in that company, then the cost of the investment must be written down to the NTA value, were simplistic and flawed, as to make a fair assessment of whether a debt was fully recoverable, a number of factors had to be taken into account; and

  65. (d) many of the companies were related parties who had borrowed from each other and Mr Chan had disagreed with many of the provisions made by Mr Foong for doubtful debts in respect of such companies. Mr Chan’s view was that the debts should be regarded as good debts since, as a director acting in good faith and in the best interests of the companies concerned, the husband would not have caused such companies to continue making loans to other companies which had no means of repaying the same.

  66. [33] It should be noted that in court Mr Foong stated that he had used the NTA method because he had assumed that the husband’s shares would have to be disposed of on a “forced sale basis” in the divorce proceedings. He agreed that if the husband could keep his shares in the NCL group the NTA method would not be the most appropriate method of valuing these shareholdings. In that case, Mr Foong would have valued trading companies in which the husband was the majority shareholder using the price-earning method, while for hotel-owning companies, he would have used the cash-flow projection method. He maintained that the NTA method would still have applied to property-owning companies and dormant companies. In this connection, Mr Ang submitted that since the wife was not asking to be given a share of the husband’s interest in any of the NCL group companies, their value to the husband should not be assessed on the NTA basis.

  67. [34] Another submission made on behalf of the wife was that even if the final valuation by Mr Foong was not flawed and it accurately reflected the husband’s true net worth, much of the apparent deterioration in the financial affairs of the NCL group was a direct consequence of his deliberate mismanagement of such companies. Many of these companies had their values drastically reduced after substantial provision for doubtful debts had been made. From the cross-examination of Mr Foong, it was apparent that when he made the provision for doubtful debts he assumed that, since the husband was a shareholder of all the borrowing and lending companies, the loans were simply a situation of the husband “transferring money from one pocket to another”. The wife used this evidence to make a rather odd argument. She said that “if indeed” the husband had caused some of his companies to continue to make loans to other companies which had negative NTA values and had treated such loans as a mere transfer of money from one pocket to another, he would have failed to act in the lender companies’ best interests. The use of the words “if indeed” in that submission indicates that the wife was speculating. She built on this speculation by then submitting that “such mismanagement of the companies is deliberate and [the husband] had caused his companies to make apparently unrecoverable loans to his other companies so as to ostensibly reduce the values of such companies and, consequently, his own net worth”.

  68. [36] It would be seen from the above account that one substantial reason for the financial difficulties of various companies in the NCL group was the failure by Nanyang to pay for goods purchased from companies in the group. The husband, in response to the above argument by the wife, urged the court to remember that Nanyang was never a customer of Aromate. It was a customer of Fustar and/or Goodwood Ltd. Whilst the wife had suggested that the husband had diverted the business away from Aromate, if Aromate had had a direct business relationship with Nanyang, it would have borne the full brunt of Nanyang’s default and would have suffered even greater financial loss. The husband was not a director or a shareholder of Nanyang. He did not control it. That company was sued by Fustar and Goodwood Ltd in Hong Kong and judgment was entered against it in July 1999. It was also sued by a bank in Hong Kong with which the husband was not connected. Finally, Nanyang was wound up in June 2000 on a petition presented by China State Bank Ltd, another company with which the husband had no connection. In any case, any business diverted from Aromate was diverted to Fustar and/or Goodwood Ltd which were companies belonging to the husband and hence matrimonial assets available for division on divorce. The value of the alleged diverted business would therefore remain within the pool of matrimonial assets for division.

  69. [37] As far as the NCL group is concerned, in my judgment, the wife has not established her proposition that the husband deliberately mismanaged the group or companies within the group (like Aromate) in order to reduce the value of such companies. Her argument was built upon speculation and her reference to the Aromate transactions could not shore up such speculations, as whatever may have been the husband’s breach of duty vis-à-vis Aromate, the ultimate cause of Aromate’s financial problems lay in its inability to recover amounts due from Fustar and/or Goodwood Ltd and those companies could not pay because of the default of Nanyang, a completely distinct entity that had defaulted on its commercial obligations due to its own commercial difficulties rather than due to any manipulation on the part of the husband.

  70. [38] There are, however, as Mr Ang pointed out, some specific problems with some of Mr Foong’s valuations. In relation to Aromate, Mr Foong could not substantiate his decision to make provision for a debt due from Goodwood Resources Pte Ltd in the sum of $344,367. In relation to Fustar, Mr Foong in his first report assessed its NTA value as a negative HK$9,779,844. Some five months later, however, in his third report, he assessed its NTA as a negative HK$101,867,690. There was no explanation for this huge change in Fustar’s position. In relation to Goodwood Ltd, the position was supposed to be that Nanyang owed Goodwood Ltd approximately HK$22m but the accounts of Goodwood Ltd did not clearly disclose this figure. That cast doubt on exactly how much this debt was. Mr Foong admitted in court that he thought that the auditors had made a mistake in the accounts. Mr Foong also made provision in the amount of HK$10.9m for doubtful debts owing to Goodwood Ltd by APHL. Whether he should have done so is questionable as the latter company had a 52% interest in Dickson Hotel which was, as far as the information before the court went, a profitable venture and had a positive NTA. The husband himself had stated that he believed that Dickson Hotel would generate positive returns in the medium and long run. In relation to APHL itself, in his first report, Mr Foong included as an asset inter-company accounts valued at HK$20m. In his third report, Mr Foong removed this asset but did not explain why he did so and how this money had been utilised. Also, another asset was reduced from its value of HK$1.4m in the first report to HK$380,000 in the third report without explanation.

  71. [39] Another Hong Kong company, Greatwood Ltd, had a 40% stake in two associated companies and, under cross-examination, Mr Foong conceded that he had made provisions for Greatwood Ltd’s investment in these two companies despite there being a lack of information on the same. These provisions totalled approximately HK$3.2m and Greatwood Ltd was said to have a negative asset value of HK$4.9m. The husband is, indirectly, interested in 30% of the shares of Can Pacific Limited but the value of this company was completely written-off on the basis of a provision of over HK$5m for diminution in value of quoted shares. No explanation was given, however, as to what those investments were and why the provision was necessary. Mr Foong admitted that he made the provision despite not knowing the nature of Can Pacific Limited’s investments.

  72. [40] There was a dispute between the two experts in relation to the NTA value of Trump Pacific Resources Inc. As at 31 December 1999, according to the balance sheet of that company, this appeared to be C$3,379,102, but in his second report, Mr Foong adjusted it to a negative C$1,355,084. The adjustment was mainly due to provisions made for diminution in value of investments in Allied Pacific Investments Inc and Chateau Ottawa Hotels Inc. Both these companies had positive NTA positions at that time and appeared to be profitable. Chateau Ottawa Hotels Inc is the owner and operator of the Sheraton Hotel, Ottawa. Mr Chan took the view that it was wrong to make provisions for Trump Pacific Resources Inc’s investments in the two companies without taking into account their substantial property holdings and future earnings potential and that there was no basis for such provisions to have been made. There seems to me to be merit in his criticism.

  73. [41] One of the wife’s main submissions was that the husband had purportedly taken “loans” to increase his liabilities. Her submission was that the huge loans he had taken from related parties were not represented by assets he had acquired from the proceeds of the loans because in fact these were false loans which the husband had used to increase his liabilities in order to give the court the impression that he was heavily in debt.

  74. [42] Mr Foong’s fifth report showed that the husband had taken the following loans from relatives, friends and related companies:

  75. Amount borrowed by the husband

  76. Aromate Pte Ltd

  77. S$1,214,292

  78. Bundall Trading Pte Ltd

  79. S$495,000

  80. Goodwood Limited

  81. HK$7,759,388

  82. Goodray Limited

  83. HK$21,329,213

  84. Fostar Limited

  85. HK$24,086

  86. Can Pacific Limited

  87. HK$2,075,810

  88. Dickson Hotel, Tianjin

  89. RMB1,014,499

  90. Mr Daniel Thie (the husband’s cousin)

  91. S$76,169

  92. Mdm Ng Chai Loan (the husband’s sister)

  93. S$99,488

  94. Mr Ng Bok Beng (the husband’s father) in 18 April 2000

  95. US$3,635,168

  96. Golders Green Holdings Pte Ltd (controlled by the husband’s friend) on 18 April 2000

  97. S$952,500

  98. The list of proofs of debt filed in the husband’s bankruptcy also showed a claim by his brother Ng Cheong Bian for $275,000, reflecting loans made between 2001 and 2002, and a claim by NBEH for $305,000, being a loan made pursuant to a resolution made on 22 April 2002.

  99. [43] No specific submissions were made by the wife in relation to the amounts borrowed by the husband from the first seven creditors named above, ie, the companies starting with Aromate and ending with Dickson Hotel, Tianjin. In relation to Aromate, as Ms Loh pointed out, over the years sums were taken out of Aromate to pay for the living expenses of the family and these were all booked under the husband’s current account. The wife admitted in court that many of the family’s expenses had been paid by Aromate. Secondly, it was argued that it could not be disputed that the husband’s sources of funds were his businesses. He managed to acquire an impressive number of properties over time in Singapore and elsewhere. It was not suggested that Cluny Hill or the three Canadian properties registered in the wife’s name were gifts from any third party. The funds for their acquisition came from the husband and therefore from his businesses. Thus, although the husband might not have pointed to specific assets purchased with particular loans from his businesses, it was likely that he had acquired many of the matrimonial assets including the FA assets from moneys taken from his various companies which had subsequently been reflected in their books as loans to him.

  100. [44] The wife concentrated on the loans made to the husband by his family members and the last creditor, Golders Green Holdings Pte Ltd (“GGPL”). She justified her assertion that loans from these persons had been taken to increase the husband’s apparent indebtedness by referring to various circumstances existing at that time. First, she had filed the petition in these proceedings in October 1999 and had obtained, on 10 March 2000, a Mareva injunction against the husband. After she had obtained the latter order, and during the short period of five months between then and July 2000, the husband claimed to have taken substantial personal loans from his relatives. This conduct was consistent with the husband’s statements in the telephone conversations which he had had with one Tan Kok Kiong in September and October 1999 that he would take substantial loans in order to increase his liabilities and reduce his net worth. The husband also told Mr Tan that he had previously borrowed money from his friend Jackie and had not repaid it so that he would be in debt. The Jackie referred to controlled GGPL which had filed a proof of debt for $952,500 against the husband.

  101. [45] The husband’s father, Ng Bok Beng (“NBB”), had filed a proof of debt for loans totalling US$3,635,168 given in April 2000. The wife said that this loan in particular had been taken as part of the husband’s overall scheme to reduce his net worth. She reminded me that in Suit 310, the husband had asserted that he had had to sell the Mountbatten property and the NBEH shares in order to pay off debts owing by Aromate and Fustar in 1998, but that I had found that his predominant purpose in transferring the two properties was to reduce the wife’s share in the matrimonial assets.

  102. [46] The husband’s position was that the loans he took in 2000 had been used to pay the further indebtedness of these two companies: US$2,005,168 went to Fustar’s debts and US$1,630,000 went to Aromate’s. During the trial, the husband produced a bundle of documents obtained from Standard Chartered Bank and United Overseas Bank (“UOB”) in Hong Kong relating to the use of the sum of US$3,635,168 by Fustar and Aromate in 2000. At the same time, he produced another bundle of documents relating to the use of the moneys obtained from the sale of the Mountbatten property and the NBEH shares in 1998. The wife submitted that even if the documents produced did support the husband’s account of how the funds were used (and the documents were not wholly consistent with his story), his dominant purpose in borrowing the money was not to satisfy Fustar’s and/or Aromate’s debts.

  103. [47] Under cross-examination in the present proceedings, the husband testified that for transactions in which Nanyang was the end buyer, he had used Aromate’s credit facilities with Standard Chartered Bank and Fustar’s facilities from UOB in Hong Kong. He agreed that he had also caused Aromate to act as a commission agent for Fustar in the transactions with a company called Zhu Hai and to extend its credit facilities for these Zhu Hai transactions. Both Nanyang and Zhu Hai had defaulted. As a result, Aromate owed Standard Chartered Bank US$1.5m and Fustar owed UOB US$2m. UOB had sued the husband and Fustar in Hong Kong for the US$2m and he had then borrowed US$3.6m from NBB to pay off this debt and the Standard Chartered Bank debt. The wife pointed out that Aromate’s and Fustar’s liabilities to the two banks were a consequence of the same transactions for which the husband was held liable in Suit No 1396 of 2001. She then submitted that even if the husband had used the loan moneys to repay such liabilities, his dominant intention was not to assist Aromate or Fustar but instead to further reduce his net worth. I do not accept this submission in relation to the moneys borrowed in 2000. Here, there was no sale at an undervalue but a borrowing to settle liabilities owed to banks arising from failed business transactions in which the end-customers, Nanyang and Zhu Hai, were strangers dealing at arm’s length. The husband made some bad business decisions and he acted in breach of his fiduciary duties to Aromate in procuring its involvement in the transactions in the manner he had. Having done this, however, he had to settle Aromate’s and Fustar’s liabilities or see the companies liquidated and his own position threatened by the UOB suit in Hong Kong. Since the amount borrowed was approximately the amount owed, in this case there does not appear, on the balance of probabilities, to be any ulterior motive relating to the divorce behind the loan.

  104. [48] The wife questioned the authenticity of the loan of $275,000 made by the husband’s brother on the basis that this indebtedness had not been mentioned by the husband in the affidavits of means that he had filed in December 2000 and February 2001. According to the proof of debt filed with the Official Assignee’s office, however, these debts were only incurred during the period between 2001 and 2002. The same criticism was made by the wife in respect of the debt of $305,000 owed to NBEH but here again such a disclosure in the earlier affidavits would have been an impossibility since the loan was only made in April 2002. As regards the amounts owing to the husband’s sister, the wife pointed out that in December 2000 the husband had claimed that he owed his sister a sum of $99,480, but that the sister had now put in a claim for $176,693. According to the proof filed, the total amount claimed represented loans made in March 2000, April 2000, June 2000, August 2001 and April 2002. Similarly, the amount claimed by the husband’s cousin, Daniel Thie, was declared in the proof of debt to be $101,169.01 whereas the husband had stated in December 2000 that he had borrowed only $76,169.01 from his cousin. The wife submitted that there were questionable circumstances surrounding the loans advanced by the husband’s relatives and that these so-called loans were part of an elaborate attempt by the husband to depict himself, falsely, as being poor and laden with debts.

  105. [49] The wife’s allegations would appear to be somewhat thin, based as they are on the difference between the husband’s declarations made at an earlier date and the amounts claimed by the creditors concerned at a later date, since one big change in the husband’s circumstances between the two dates was that his assets in Singapore had been frozen by reason of the issue of the Mareva order. That meant that the husband’s access to his assets was impeded and he may have had to borrow to meet his needs. The wife, however, was also relying on the other circumstances mentioned in [44] above, and in particular, on the recordings of telephone conversations between the husband and various parties in which the husband discussed his plans to dissipate his assets in order to reduce the amount available to the wife in the event of a divorce. The wife referred to my finding in Suit 310 that these telephone conversations provided independent evidence of the husband’s intentions to put the Mountbatten property and the NBEH shares beyond the reach of the wife. The Court of Appeal had also held that these transcripts confirmed that the husband had planned to make himself look poor so that the wife would not be able to get at the two assets.

  106. [50] The husband, on the other hand, submitted that his marital problems had started by the mid-1990s at the latest and, between then and the time the Aromate action was taken against him, seven years had gone by. During this period, the husband had had a long and hard struggle while he tried to save his marriage, family and businesses, but to no avail. This, he said, was not the case of an angry husband who at the first hint of a marriage breakdown cleaned out the matrimonial coffers to deny his wife her share of matrimonial assets on divorce. This was the case of a man who wanted to save his marriage and in trying to do so, over the years, he went down the proverbial slippery slope and lost his marriage and his businesses. Ms Loh argued that it was surprising that the husband had managed to stave off financial ruin for as long as he did. As early as March 2000 Standard Chartered Bank had taken out a bankruptcy action against him and the wife had also taken such action the same month and then again in January 2002 and finally, successfully, in October 2002. The husband also referred to various tape recordings that had been produced by the wife for the first time during the hearing of these proceedings. Some of the conversations recorded on those tapes showed that between the end of 1999 and early 2000, the husband had had difficulties with some of his businesses and was especially concerned with payment of the debts owing to UOB and Standard Chartered Bank.

  107. [51] It is clear from the above account of the evidence and the arguments, that it is not possible at this stage to come to a definite conclusion about the value of the husband’s assets and the quantum of his liabilities. The husband is a bankrupt and, on paper at least, his debts are monumental. Some of his companies have failed, others are still in operation and, as far as the information before the court is concerned, appear to be profitable. There are some that are completely mysterious because no information on them has been provided. In the circumstances, I do, however, think there is enough evidence to justify my drawing an adverse inference against the husband in the matter of full disclosure. This inference would mean that I have to treat the husband as being worth more than he says he is although it is extremely difficult to put a figure to that value. I also think that the valuations of the companies done by Mr Foong do not and cannot be regarded as full and complete in view of the difficulties that I have mentioned in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment.

  108. [52] It is possible that the husband has sufficient assets, even without including the FA assets, to meet all his debts and not just those mentioned by Mr Foong. Whilst no evidence on the value of either the Mountbatten property or the NBEH shares was given in these proceedings and the return of these assets to the husband’s estate means that his indebtedness would increase by the US$3m he was paid for them, the evidence in Suit 310 indicated that in June 1998, the Mountbatten property had a value of $8.2m if it was considered as a redevelopment site for residential use whilst the value of the NBEH shares was between $1.1m and $3.5m in September 1998. If the gross value of these assets is taken as being $10m (which seems reasonable in the circumstances), then the husband’s estate in bankruptcy will be increased by this amount.

  109. The value of the wife’s matrimonial assets

  110. [53] The wife set out an up-to-date list of her assets and liabilities in her affidavit filed on 7 May 2004. She disclosed the following:

  111. (a) various bank accounts holding amounts totalling approximately $97,385;

  112. (b) various bank accounts holding amounts totalling approximately US$533,435.71 ($896,172);

  113. (c) two bank accounts holding a total of £1,034.51;

  114. (d) shares in Singapore listed companies which, as at 31 December 2003, had a market value of $783,402.50;

  115. (e) shares in Malaysian public listed companies for which no value was provided;

  116. (f) Cluny Hill which the wife believed to have an open market value of $7.8m based on a valuation done in February 2001 and on which the outstanding mortgage loans stood at $3.678m as at February 2004;

  117. (g) Chancellor Boulevard (which had been valued at C$1.075m in February 2000) and Beach Avenue (which had been valued at C$2.345m in February 2000), both of which secured an outstanding amount of C$1m;

  118. (h) Canadian treasury bills amounting to C$1.009m ($1,412,600) purchased with the proceeds of sale of Drummond Drive; and

  119. (i) one Audi A4 purchased in November 2002 for $191,658.

  120. In June 2004, the wife sold Beach Avenue for C$1.626m. The bulk of the proceeds was converted into twin currencies for foreign currency investment and the rest was used to pay for the various expenses of the wife and the children.

  121. [54] Looking at the above list of assets, the wife’s assets, after deducting her liabilities and excluding the Malaysian shares and the car, according to her own valuations, are worth $5.02m, US$533,435.71 and C$3.710m. If the US dollar assets are converted to Singapore dollars using the current rate of US$1 = S$1.68 and the Canadian dollar assets are converted to Singapore dollars using the rate of C$1 = S$1.4 then these assets are worth S$896,172 and S$5.194m respectively. This would bring the total value of the wife’s assets to at least $11.11m of which the cash component is $2,406,157.

  122. [55] The husband submitted that the wife had not been truthful about the amount of assets she declared. The assets which she had received over the years meant that she should have more than $6m in cash alone. The items making up this amount comprised:

  123. (a) US$320,000 and S$500,000 paid to the wife under the Financial Agreement;

  124. (b) proceeds from the sale of the Lei Garden shares amounting to $2.646m under the Financial Agreement;

  125. (c) $60,000 for the legal fees under the Financial Agreement;

  126. (d) $289,000 being the sum that the wife took from an OCBC overdraft facility on 9 June 1994 allegedly for her sister Regina Wong and other withdrawals on various other dates prior to that;

  127. (e) $300,000 paid to the wife by herself from the OCBC overdraft facility;

  128. (f) $560,000 paid to the wife by way of various cheques from Aromate;

  129. (g) $260,000 received as directors’ fees from Aromate;

  130. (h) the proceeds of sale of the Porsche car that she had purchased for approximately $480,000 in 1999 and sold the same year; and

  131. (i) the rental proceeds from the three Canadian properties in Vancouver which amounted to approximately $941,664.

  132. On the husband’s calculation, the total cash assets of the wife amounted to $6,476,664, much more than the amount that she had disclosed. He also asserted that she had failed to disclose many of her personal valuables such as expensive jewellery, watches and other expensive items, although in 2001, she had provided his solicitors with an inventory on jewellery valued at $73,960. The wife had also chosen to hide the sale of Fustar’s shares in Fortune Holdings for about $1,115,000 which had taken place even before she filed her affidavit on 7 April 2004.

  133. [56] In response, the wife explained that she had not tried to hide the sale of the shares in Fortune Holdings in 2001. The wife said that she had disclosed her shareholding in Fustar in her previous affidavit filed on 19 November 2001 and her shareholdings in Fustar had not changed thereafter. Further, the wife submitted that the husband was well aware of the sale and of the fact that the sale had taken place as a result of legal proceedings commenced by Fortune Travel Pte Ltd, the wholly-owned subsidiary of Fortune Holdings, for the travel expenses of the wife and the children which the husband had been obliged to pay for. The wife had been sued for more than $90,000. Notwithstanding the wife’s explanation, when she filed her updated affidavit of means she should have included the value of her shareholding in Fustar. Bearing in mind the price at which the shares had been sold, that shareholding would have to be valued at $1,115,000 and that amount would have added to the value of the wife’s assets.

  134. [58] As regards item (f), the moneys from Aromate, the wife pointed out that whilst the husband had claimed that she had received $560,000 from Aromate, of the five cheques that he had exhibited to substantiate this assertion, only three (totalling $260,000) were from Aromate. The other two cheques were from Goodwood Resources Pte Ltd ($100,000) and the parties’ joint account ($200,000). The wife explained in cross-examination that the parties had sold a property in Nassim Hill in 1997 and that they had agreed to share the profits from the sale equally. Her share of these profits had been between $400,000 and $500,000 and the husband had paid her by way of a few cheques for varying amounts. The husband’s position was that he had given her one cheque for $460,000 in January 1997 and another for $43,000 in April 1997. As evidence of the payment of $460,000, the husband had produced a cheque stub but no copy of the cheque itself nor any bank statement to substantiate the alleged withdrawal. The wife maintained that she had received several smaller payments and had never received one cheque for $460,000. She agreed that the total sum received from the sale of Nassim Hill was not part of the Financial Agreement. Weighing up the evidence, it is clear that the wife received at least $500,000 in 1997 from that transaction and this sum could have, if not spent, formed part of her cash assets upon the divorce.

  135. [59] Dealing with item (e), the amount of $300,000 taken from the overdraft facility in June 1994, the wife’s position was that that amount was meant for her sister. However, the wife had admitted in cross-examination that she had drawn the cheque in her own favour and signed it and banked it in. The notes of evidence that I took do not show the wife’s assertion that the money was meant for her sister but even if she said this and I failed to make a note of it at the time, there was no evidence to back up her assertion that the money had been given to her sister. The cheque was not made out to her sister and she proffered no explanation as to why she had paid this money to her sister. If she had done this, it could very well have been a private loan between the two of them. I think this sum has to be considered as having been taken by the wife. Of course, it also could have been spent long before the divorce took place.

  136. [60] As for item (h), the wife stated that the Porsche had been bought for $480,000 in October 1998 and had been sold for $420,000 in December 1999. She did not explain what had happened to the proceeds of sale. As for item (i), the rental proceeds from the three Canadian properties had been used, as the wife had explained in her affidavits in February 2001 and May 2004, to service the monthly mortgage payments to Royal Trust Bank, Canada, which mortgage the husband had, under the Financial Agreement, agreed to discharge.

  137. [61] The wife submitted that she had at no point in time held more than $6.4m in cash. She considered the husband’s approach to the calculation of her cash to be deliberately simplistic because he ignored the fact that she had had expenses to meet which had to be satisfied out of her cash in hand. The husband had not made any payment under the consent maintenance order from November 2000 onwards and had not paid any of the mortgage payments in respect of Cluny Hill from March 2000 onwards. The wife had to pay the children’s and her own expenses and the mortgage payments out of her own cash resources. She also had to pay legal and other professional fees in relation to the protracted legal proceedings between the husband and herself.

  138. [62] To summarise the above discussion, on the basis of the evidence, it would appear that the wife received in cash the moneys described in items (a), (b), (e), at least $500,000 of the amount described in items (f) and (g). As for the proceeds of sale of the Porsche car, I do not think that that can represent a separate cash amount since the wife would have bought the car with cash already in her possession and it would be double-counting to add the sale proceeds to the cash in hand. As for the rental proceeds, I accept the wife had to pay the mortgage loans using these moneys and probably had to meet other expenses relating to these properties from the same. To the items mentioned has to be added the sum of $1.115m derived from the sale of shares by Fustar. I therefore conclude that the sums received by the wife in cash over the years would have amounted to US$320,000 (S$537,600) and $5,416,000 or almost $6m. Even if one discounts the $300,000 received in 1994 and the $260,000 received in directors’ fees on the basis that these two sums were received long before the divorce proceedings started and may now be represented by other assets like the wife’s share portfolio (which the wife herself claimed to have purchased from her own savings), the adjusted total of $5.39m is considerably more cash than the wife disclosed in her latest affidavit and in her evidence in court as can be seen from [53] above. There are two possible reasons as to why the wife’s affidavits did not show this amount, the first being that the wife has been extremely free-spending over the years and does not have that money any more and the second being that she has not disclosed all her cash assets. Having heard the wife’s evidence and seen the documentation relating to her expenses and those of the children, I incline towards the first reason. The wife does not seem to have seen any need to stint herself or the children since the divorce proceedings began in October 1999. Both she and they, especially the eldest son, Ezine, seem to have enjoyed a very lavish lifestyle of which the wife’s purchase of a Porsche and Ezine’s many purchases of expensive vehicles are merely some examples. Additionally, the wife’s disclosure has been fairly detailed although some of it was made at a rather late stage and, as the husband pointed out, she has not given full disclosure of the value of her jewellery and other personal belongings, though in cross-examination she said she said she had sold some jewellery in 2002 and 2003.

  139. [63] I should note that the valuation of the wife’s assets at about $11.11m included a gross valuation of Cluny Hill at $7.8m based on what the wife called “an indicative open market valuation” obtained from a company named OrangeTee.com Pte Ltd in February 2001. The husband, however, relying on a valuation done by Robert Khan & Co in November 2000 put the value of Cluny Hill as being at least $10m. The valuation obtained by the wife is a very brief affair and refers simply to the type of property valued, its address, the tenure on which the land is held and the land area. On the other hand, the valuation report produced by Robert Khan & Co was much more detailed and the valuer had obviously visited the premises and inspected the nature and general condition of the structure and fixtures and fittings. It would seem to be a more reliable guide to the value of Cluny Hill than what was clearly a desktop valuation given by OrangeTee.com Pte Ltd. If the value of Cluny Hill is based on this report then the wife’s assets would be worth $2.2m more, ie, $13.31m in total.

  140. Division of the assets

  141. [64] The factors that the court will take into account in ordering a division of matrimonial assets are set out in s 112(2) of the Act and are well known. I will not repeat them here. In this case, it is the wife’s submission that there are two main factors that I should give weight to in carrying out the division. These are:

  142. (a) the Financial Agreement as affirmed by the Deed; and

  143. (b) the wife’s years of contribution to the marriage and to bringing up the children.

  144. [65] The husband’s position was that if the court considered the Financial Agreement and the Deed to be agreements in contemplation of divorce, then these agreements constituted but one of several factors which the court must have regard to in dividing the assets. Ms Loh submitted that the court would also have to take into account the following:

  145. (a) the extent of the contribution made by the husband in money and effort towards acquiring the matrimonial assets;

  146. (b) the debts owing or obligations incurred or undertaken by the husband (especially in the current accounts of various companies like Aromate and Fustar) for the benefit of the family, for example, the amount of $1.26m that the husband said he had overdrawn from Aromate over the years in order to pay the amounts due under the consent maintenance order;

  147. (c) the extent of contributions made by the husband to the welfare of the family;

  148. (d) the fact that the FA assets in the wife’s hands were acquired by the husband;

  149. (e) the period of rent-free occupation of the matrimonial home enjoyed by the wife to the exclusion of the husband since the end of 2000;

  150. (f) the reduced income, earning capacity, property and financial resources which the husband had and was likely to have in the foreseeable future;

  151. (g) the husband’s age; and

  152. (h) the material adverse change in circumstances which had taken place since the Financial Agreement and the Deed were entered into between the parties.

  153. The husband submitted that a fair and equitable distribution of the matrimonial assets would be a division of 30% to the wife and 70% to him of all assets now in the hands of the Official Receiver and in the hands of the wife including the FA assets.

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