YFI v YFJ [2026] SGFC 89

Introduction

By an Interim Judgment dated 13 August 2025:

(a) the marriage between the plaintiff husband (the “Husband”) and the defendant wife (the “Wife”) was dissolved on the ground that the marriage has irretrievably broken down by reason that:

(i) the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of at least 4 years immediately preceding the filing of the writ; and

(ii) the plaintiff has behaved in such a way that the defendant cannot reasonably be expected to live with the plaintiff; and

(b) the ancillary matters relating to division of the matrimonial assets, maintenance for the wife, and costs, were adjourned to be heard in Chambers.

I heard arguments on the ancillary matters on 11 February 2026. At the end of the hearing, I reserved judgment, but allowed the Wife to make a clarification (on the identity of the named beneficiary under an insurance policy of which the Wife was both the policy owner and the life insured) by letter. On 10 March 2026, the Wife’s solicitors submitted a letter dealing with matters that went beyond the clarification allowed. On 13 March 2026, the Husband’s solicitors submitted a letter in response. On 16 June 2026, I issued a written judgment, paragraph 102 of which set out the orders that I made in relation to the ancillary matters. On 29 June 2026, the Wife filed a Notice of Appeal against the whole of my decision, except for the orders in paragraph 102(b), (d) and (f) of the written judgment. For ease of reference, I reproduce the orders set out in paragraph 102 of the written judgment:

Evidence

Each party filed 2 affidavits for the ancillary matters hearing. These were (in the sequence in which the affidavits were filed):

(a) the Husband’s first affidavit of assets and means filed on 3 October 2025 (“HA1”);

(b) the Wife’s first affidavit of assets and means filed on 3 October 2025 (“WA1”);

(c) the Husband’s second affidavit of assets and means filed on 14 November 2025 (“HA2”); and

(d) the Wife’s second affidavit of assets and means filed on 26 November 2025 (“WA2”).

The Wife also attempted to introduce 143 pages of additional documentary evidence through her solicitors’ letter dated 10 March 2026. The Husband’s solicitors, by their letter dated 13 March, requested that the Court disregard the Wife’s solicitors’ letter and its contents, observing that:

(a) the Court had granted leave for the Wife to provide clarification on the beneficiaries (if any) of the Wife’s insurance policy to assist the Court to ascertain whether or not the Wife held the policy on trust for the named beneficiaries;

(b) the Court had informed the parties that the Defendant was not allowed to adduce further evidence, and that any intended clarification on the policy should be uncontroversial and subject to the Husband’s solicitors’ consent prior to filing in Court;

(c) the matters raised in the Wife’s solicitors’ letter went beyond the clarification as allowed by the Court;

(d) the Husband’s solicitors’ prior consent was not sought before the Wife’s solicitors filed the letter; and

(e) the Wife’s solicitors’ letter did not contain information disclosing any beneficiaries of the policy.

Facts

The parties

The parties were married in Singapore on 2 August 1977. They have 3 adult children, namely, a son born in December 1978, a daughter born in November 1986, and a son born in January 1988.

According to HA1, the Husband was 77 years old and unemployed. From 1970 to 1990, the Husband was employed as a storekeeper. From 1978 to 1990, the Husband worked as a part-time taxi driver. After the Husband lost his job as a storekeeper in 1990 when the company that he was employed with closed, he started driving a taxi on a full-time basis, and earned between $1,000 and $1,300 per month. In 2023, the Husband stopped working as a taxi-driver as, by then, he was already 75 years old and was no longer able to secure employment with any taxi company. The Husband has been unemployed since then, as he was unable to secure any employment due to his age. The Husband’s only source of regular income was a payout from his annuity policy with AIA Singapore Pte Ltd (“AIA”) of $227.39 per month, which was deposited into his UOB account. From time to time, the Husband received payouts from the Government, such as GST vouchers, which were also deposited into his UOB account. Apart from these, the Husband did not have any other sources of income.

According to WA1, the Wife was 69 years old and “self-employed” as Director of a company (“AA Pte Ltd”) in business as a commercial school offering general secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education programmes. The Wife claimed that she did not take any salary from AA Pte Ltd. However, the Wife received rental income of $1,388 from a commercial property owned by her (the “Wife’s commercial property”).

The matrimonial assets

The parties do not have any joint assets.

The parties’ matrimonial home (the “Matrimonial Home”) is a 4-room 10th storey Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) flat in Clementi Avenue 5 in the sole name of the Husband. The Matrimonial Home was fully paid for by the Husband with withdrawals from his Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts. The Wife admitted that she did not make any direct financial contributions to the Matrimonial Home. As at 1 October 2025, the principal withdrawn (for the down payment and payment for HDB housing loan) was $31,003.42, and the accrued interest was $90,398.75, making a total of $121,402.17. The Husband valued the Matrimonial Home at $635,000 as at 15 September 2025 (based on the resale price in July 2025 of a similar flat on the 7th to 9th storey of the same block). The Wife estimated the value of the Matrimonial Home to be $529,888 as at 2 October 2025, but the figure she quoted was based on the resale price in June 2024 of a similar flat on the 4th to 6th storey of a different block. The portion of the Wife’s search results that the Wife chose to disclose also revealed that 3 similar flats in different blocks from the Matrimonial Home had resale prices ranging from $540,000 (for a flat on the 1st to 3rd storey sold in December 2024) to $588,000 (for a flat on the 10th to 12th storey sold in July 2024).

The Husband declared in HA1 the following assets in his name:

(a) the Matrimonial Home;

(b) an OCBC account with a balance of $8.91 as of 30 September 2025 (or $10.91 as of 30 August 2025);

(c) a POSB current account with a balance of $33.00 as of 31 August 2025;

(d) a POSB savings account with a balance of $26.31 as of 31 August 2025;

(e) a UOB account with a balance of $2,194.49 as of 1 October 2025 (or $1,887.03 as of 30 August 2025); and

(f) a balance of $49,283.24 as of 1 October 2025 in his CPF Medisave Account.

The Wife declared in WA1 the following assets in her name:

(a) the Wife’s commercial property;

(b) balances as of 2 October 2025 of $2,097.78 in her CPF Ordinary Account, $42,226.07 in her CPF Medisave Account, and $199,622.51 in her CPF Retirement Account (making a total balance of $243,946.36 in her CPF accounts);

(c) a UOB account (ending 7312) with a balance of $500.00 as of 31 August 2025 (a bank statement exhibited in WA1 shows the balance to be $1,054.45 as of 30 August 2025);

(d) a UOB account (ending 1641) with a balance of $687.67 as of 30 September 2025 (a bank statement exhibited in WA1 shows the balance to be $687.65 as of 30 August 2025);

(e) a UOB account (ending 1668) with a balance of $1,561.96 as of 31 August 2025;

(f) a UOB account (ending 5935) with a balance of $1,439.84 as of 31 August 2025;

(g) 7 UOB foreign currency accounts, each with a balance of $0.00;

(h) a UOB account (ending 8702) with a balance of $55.63 as of 31 August 2025 (a bank statement exhibited in WA1 shows the balance to be RM 55.63 as of 31 August 2025);

(i) a DBS account with a balance of $1,888.02 as of 2 October 2025 (a bank statement exhibited in WA1 shows the balance to be $1,888.04 as of 31 August 2025, if a withdrawal of $1,388.04 on 1 September 2025 is added back, and 2 deposits of $1,388.00 and $0.02 on 30 September 2025 are deducted);

(j) a POSB account (ending 6107) with a balance of $317.84 as of 2 October 2025 (a bank statement exhibited in WA1 shows the balance to be $1,814.84 as of 31 August 2025, if a deposit of $1,404 pm 3 September 2025 is deducted, and 2 withdrawals of $2,700 and $201 on 11 and 26 September 2025 are added back);

(k) a POSB account (ending 0887) with a balance of $543.82 as of 2 October 2025;

(l) a Standard Chartered Bank account with a balance of $1,000.04 as of 30 August 2025;

(m) an AM Bank savings account with a balance of about $30,000;

(n) an AM Bank fixed deposit account with a balance of $2,000;

(o) a Manulife whole life investment-linked policy as of 30 December 2017 with a basic premium of $50,000;

(p) a Great Eastern Eldershield severe disability insurance policy as of 30 September 2006 renewed at a premium of $250.77;

(q) a Keppel Insurance whole life investment-linked policy as of 2 April 2022 with a sum assured of $50,000;

(r) an AIG Advance Silver personal accident insurance policy as of 20 January 2023 with coverage of $122,650.00;

(s) an Aviva MyCare for Basic ElderShield severe disability insurance policy as of 20 May 2013 with a yearly premium of $572.34, offering $300 monthly cash payouts for up to 60 months;

(t) a MyShield Plus hospital and medical insurance policy as of 1 September 2013 with a yearly premium of $572;

(u) a Singlife Cancer Cover Plus policy as of 19 March 2024;

(v) a Singlife Shield medical insurance policy as of 1 January 2026;

(w) a Citiport Credit Cooperative Limited savings account with a balance of $22,046.99 as of 1 October 2025;

(x) one share in AA Pte Ltd, for which the Wife did not provide any valuation;

(y) 11,433 shares in Comfortdelgro with an estimated value of $16,234.86 as of 2 October 2025 (the Account Statement issued by the Central Depository (Pte) Limited, on which the estimated value is based, was in fact issued for May 2025, and shows the market value of the shares concerned based on the closing price of those shares on the last trading day in May 2025);

(z) 1,000 shares in Panunited with an estimated value of $745 as of 2 October 2025;

(aa) 200 shares in Polaris with an estimated value of $0.20 as of 2 October 2025;

(bb) 1,200 shares in SBS Transit with an estimated value of $3,348.00 as of 2 October 2025; and

(cc) 177 shares in Singtel with an estimated value of $674.37 as of 2 October 2025.

The Wife’s commercial property was a fully paid first storey unit in Golden Mile Tower. According to the Singapore Titles Automated Registration System extract on the Wife’s commercial property exhibited at page 45 of WA1, the Wife’s commercial property had a lot area of 42.0 square metres (about 452.08 square feet), and a 99 year lease expiring on 8 June 2068. The Wife estimated the value of her commercial property at $335,000 as of 2 October 2025, based on a sale in July 2024 of a first storey unit in Golden Mile Tower with a size of 205 square feet (about 19.045 square metres). The Husband’s solicitors submitted that the Wife’s commercial property should be valued at $550,000, relying on a sale in September 2025 of a 10th storey unit in Golden Mile Tower with a size of 344 square feet (about 31.959 square metres).

The Wife did not disclose the surrender values of any of her insurance policies, including the investment-linked policies that one would reasonably expect to have a surrender value. She tendered only documents that showed the policy numbers and the last premium paid, but provided no other information relevant to the valuation of the insurance policies as assets.

The Wife declared the following liabilities in WA1:

(a) a credit card bill of $100 as of 31 August 2025;

(b) an amount of $250,000 attributed to a “Held on trust Manulife Insurance policy”; and

(c) an alleged loan from the first child amounting to $65,335.26 as of 2 October 2025.

The Wife did not provide any explanation in her affidavits for how or why these alleged liabilities were incurred. Nor did she provide in her affidavits any supporting documents that would explain how or why the alleged liabilities were incurred.

The parties’ cases

Division of matrimonial assets

The Husband’s case

According to the Husband, he purchased the Matrimonial Home from the HDB using his CPF moneys, and paid for all renovations to, and furniture and fittings for, the Matrimonial Home. The Wife did not make any financial contributions to the purchase and renovation of the Matrimonial Home. She refused to sign any documents relating to the purchase of the Matrimonial Home, as she was unhappy with its location, which was some distance from her mother’s flat in Changi Village.

When the first child was born, the parties were still living with the Husband’s parents. The Husband gave the Wife $600 per month, which was about half of his earnings then, for the maintenance of the first child. The Husband claimed he could not afford more, as he was also supporting his parents and younger siblings.

Upon moving to the Matrimonial Home, the Husband stopped giving the Wife a monthly allowance, but paid for all household expenses (such as utilities, service and conservancy charges, telephone bills and property tax) as well as the family’s meals during weekends. The Husband also paid for all the children’s expenses (except when the children were staying with the Wife’s parents) until the Wife moved out of the matrimonial home in 1990.

While the parties were living together, the Husband cooked for the family on some weekends. The Wife would assist with the cooking when she was free. The Husband also did marketing for the meals, and paid for the marketing expenses. The Husband did all the household chores and cooking for the children whenever he could.

Although the Wife was then working as a clerk, she did not contribute to the household expenses. The Wife seldom cleaned the Matrimonial Home or cooked for the Husband and the children, as she was working.

The Wife enrolled the first child in a kindergarten in Changi Village without consulting the Husband. As a result, the first child stayed with the Wife’s parents on weekdays. The Wife would also regularly stay at her parents’ home during weekdays. The Wife and the first child would return to the Matrimonial Home only during weekends.

Around that time, the Husband stopped paying for the first child’s expenses, as the Wife and the child were staying at the Wife’s parents’ flat most of the time. When the Wife applied for a maintenance order against the Husband, the Husband complied with the Court order to pay $110 per month. The Husband also complied with a Court order that increased the amount of maintenance to $160 per month.

The Husband then applied for a divorce, but later withdrew that application and reconciled with the Wife, who returned to the Matrimonial Home with the first child. The parties subsequently had 2 more children.

The Wife moved out of the Matrimonial Home permanently in 1990, when the younger children had to be enrolled in kindergarten. Since then, the Wife did not request for any maintenance for herself or the children from the Husband, and the Wife looked after the children herself with the help of her mother.

Initially, the Husband visited the children “a couple of times a week”, and brought food for them or took them out for meals when he visited. When the Wife’s parents moved to a flat in Bedok South, the Husband hired a lorry to help them with the move. However, the Husband’s visits to see the children became less frequent, as he had to coordinate access arrangements with the Wife and her parents.

When the second child was studying in a polytechnic, the Husband would fetch her to and from school when he could, and also gave her $20 to $50 as pocket money when he saw her. He also paid for ad hoc expenses such as the second child’s laptop, and the second child’s attire for a school event. The Husband also bought a pair of Adidas shoes for the third child.

The Wife’s case

The Wife admitted that she did not make any direct financial contributions towards the acquisition or improvement of the Matrimonial Home. The Wife also claimed that the Husband did not contribute to the assets in the Wife’s name.

According to the Wife, she was the primary caregiver of the 3 children from birth until they graduated from school. She took care of the children’s welfare and emotional needs. The Husband did not care for the children much, and rarely spent time with them.

The Wife claimed that she did all the homemaking and household management in the matrimonial home, such as cleaning, cooking, doing laundry and maintaining the household.

The Wife proposed that the Matrimonial Home be sold in the open market, that she be given conduct of the sale, and that the net sale proceeds be divided 25% to the Husband and 75% to the Wife, with each party to pay CPF refunds (if any) from his or her own share of the sale proceeds. The Wife also proposed that the parties retain all other assets held in their respective sole names.

The Husband’s response

In HA2, the Husband acknowledged that the Wife was the primary caregiver of all 3 children, but disagreed with the Wife’s claims that he did not care for the children and rarely spent time with them. The Husband claimed that after the Wife left the Matrimonial Home with the children, on her own accord and without the Husband’s consent, the Wife refused to allow the Husband to be involved in the children’s lives. The Wife refused to discuss matters concerning the children with the Husband, and made all decisions for the children by herself. The Wife also blocked the Husband’s access to the children.

The Husband denied the Wife’s claim that he had persistently failed to make full monthly maintenance payments for the first child. While admitting that there were occasions where the payments were delayed due to financial difficulties, the Husband claimed that he eventually paid in full all child maintenance amounts (including outstanding arrears) that were ordered until 21 October 1985, when the maintenance order was rescinded.

While admitting that the Wife might have paid for most of the children’s expenses, the Husband claimed that he also contributed financially to the maintenance of the children, by providing payments ranging between $300 and $900 in the 1990s for the children’s expenses. The Husband also paid for handphone bills for the first child and second child, paid $2,600 for the second child’s laptop, gave $300 to the second child for her to buy an outfit for a school event, bought a pair of new shoes for the third child, and gave pocket money to the children whenever he could.

The Husband denied the Wife’s claims of indirect non-financial contributions while the parties were living together. The Husband claimed that the Wife only cooked occasionally, as she was usually tired after work. The Husband also claimed that the Wife never did any laundry nor cleaned the Matrimonial Home.

The Husband admitted renting 1 room int he Matrimonial Home to students from the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) for approximately 3 to 4 years for $160 to $200 in rent. The Husband used the money collected to pay for house instalments, maintenance and conservancy fees. Part of the rental proceeds were also used to pay the Wife the sums ranging between $300 and $900 for the children’s maintenance. The Husband stopped renting out the room after NUS had built student hostels.

The Husband agreed that the Matrimonial Home be sold in the open market, and that the parties retain all other assets held in their respective sole names. However, he disagreed with the Wife’s proposal for how the balance sale proceeds were to be distributed.

The Wife’s response

In WA2, the Wife made a host of new allegations that went beyond responding to the matters raised in HA1. I summarise only the points that are relevant to the issues before the Court.

The Wife claimed that in 1979, the Husband had withdrawn money belonging to her from the parties’ joint account without her consent, that this money was used for the renovation of the Matrimonial Home, and that she had thereby “contributed indirectly to the lion’s share of the renovation of the matrimonial home”.

The Wife claimed that there was “no practical reason” for her to be unhappy about the location of the Matrimonial Home, and ridiculed the Husband for having a fertile imagination in concluding that she was unhappy with the location. She now alleged that the signing of the sale agreement for the Matrimonial Home took place one week before the end of her confinement, and that the Husband had plotted to exclude her from being listed as a legal owner of the Matrimonial Home.

The Wife claimed that the Husband was a violent and depraved individual who treated his family in a deplorable manner. She recounted that the Husband had disciplined the first child (for jumping on the bed) by caning the child, and alleged that the Husband had physically assaulted her.

The Wife denied the Husband’s contributions to the family, and put the Husband to strict proof that he had paid for the renovations, and furniture and fittings, for the Matrimonial Home. The Wife disputed the Husband’s claims about why he did not contribute more to the maintenance of the children.

Spousal maintenance

The Husband proposed not to pay any maintenance to the Wife, for the following reasons:

(a) The Husband was 77 years old, unemployed and unlikely to be able to secure gainful employment due to his age. The Husband did not have any substantial regular income, and depended on Government payouts and financial assistance for his own maintenance.

(b) The Wife had been maintaining herself since leaving the Matrimonial Home in 1990. As the Wife did not ask the Husband for any maintenance, he did not provide her with any.

(c) The Husband believed that the Wife would have substantial savings in her CPF accounts.

(d) The Husband believed that the first child and third child were supporting the Wife.

The Husband observed that the Wife had significant assets and investments, including a monthly income of $1,388, being rental collected from the Wife’s commercial property.

The Wife sought an “equitable lump sum” as maintenance for herself.

Decision

Division of matrimonial assets

Preliminary observations

I begin by observing that the Wife lacked candour in her evidence on certain material matters. For instance, there were clear contradictions between the positions that the Wife had taken in WA1 and WA2 on the nature of her financial contributions to the Matrimonial Home, which the Wife never explained.

(a) In WA1, the Wife unequivocably admitted that she did not make direct financial contributions to the Matrimonial Home. The examples she gave of her indirect financial contributions in relation to home maintenance, repairs or improvements were confined to “buying toiletries, kitchen appliances and materials for cleaning and cleaning agents”. The Wife also claimed to have purchased “other essential items ... such as the washing machine, iron and bedding”.

(b) However, in WA2, the Wife claimed that in 1979, the Husband had withdrawn “at least $1,800” belonging to her from the parties’ joint account without her consent, and that this was a “source of funds” for the $2,500 that the Husband claimed to have paid for the renovations to the Matrimonial Home. On that basis, the Wife claimed to have “contributed indirectly to the lion’s share of the renovation of the matrimonial home”.

(c) $1,800 was a very significant amount in 1979. If the Wife had in fact “contributed indirectly” to the renovation of the Matrimonial Home, one would have expected her to have mentioned that in WA1. Her silence on this matter in WA1 suggested that this claim (founded on the Wife’s bare allegation) was an afterthought, inserted to cast doubt on the Husband’s financial contributions to the Matrimonial Home only when the Husband had no right of reply.

I also thought that the Husband gave a more plausible explanation than the Wife for why the Wife did not become a co-owner of the Matrimonial Home.

(a) The Husband explained that the Wife refused to sign any documents relating to the purchase of the Matrimonial Home, and did not make any financial contributions to the purchase of the Matrimonial Home, because she was unhappy with its location in Clementi, which was far from her mother’s home in Changi Village. While the Wife claimed in WA2 that “There was ... no practical reason to be unhappy about the location of the [Matrimonial Home] being in Clementi” (emphasis added), and even ridiculed the Husband over his “fertile imagination”, she never specifically denied being unhappy about the location of the Matrimonial Home. I had the distinct impression from reading her evidence on this point that she was deliberately evasive.

(b) The Wife could have explained in WA1 why the Matrimonial Home was in the Husband’s sole name, despite her claim to “own” the Matrimonial Home, but she chose not to do so. The Wife’s response in WA2 to the Husband’s explanation went beyond a denial or clarification. She chose to make a new bare allegation that the Husband had plotted to exclude her from being listed as a legal owner of the Matrimonial Home, only when the Husband had no right of reply.

(c) The copy of the HDB Flat Information on the Matrimonial Home exhibited in HA1 shows that the Matrimonial Home was purchased from the HDB on 1 January 1979. The first child was born on 6 December 1978. While the Wife’s assertion that the Matrimonial Home was purchased during her confinement was true, it did not necessarily follow that the rest of her bare allegation about how the Husband had plotted against her during her confinement was true. The purchase of a flat from the HDB marks the end of a process that begins with an application to the HDB to purchase a flat. If (as the Wife would have the Court believe) the parties had applied jointly for the Matrimonial Home, then how would the Husband have been able to complete the purchase on his own? If the Wife was in fact keen on being a co-owner of the Matrimonial Home at the time it was purchased, then why did she not protest in 1979 about not being made a co-owner of the Matrimonial Home? The Wife did not address any of these obvious questions, after floating the idea of the alleged plot.

(d) The fact that the Wife was content to let the Husband foot the entire bill for the acquisition of the Matrimonial Home was also more consistent with the Husband’s explanation.

I add that while the Wife accused the Husband of “selective disclosure” in failing to disclose income that the Wife alleged was earned in the 1970s to the 1990s (which, in any event, was irrelevant to the matters before the Court), the Wife herself engaged in a pattern of wilful non-disclosure. In particular, the Wife had no qualms about:

(a) choosing not to disclose the surrender values of at least 2 investment-linked insurance policies that she had acquired;

(b) classifying a Manulife insurance policy (for which she was the policy owner and insured) as a liability for $250,000, without providing any details of, or any supporting documents for, the alleged liability in WA1 or WA2; and

(c) alleging that the first child had given her a loan, and that she was indebted to the first child under the alleged loan for an amount of $65,335.26 as of 2 October 2025, without providing any details of, or supporting documents for, the alleged loan.

Value of Matrimonial Home

I prefer the Husband’s valuation of the Matrimonial Home to the Wife’s corresponding valuation, and accept the Husband’s evidence that the Matrimonial Home should be valued at $635,000.

(a) The Matrimonial Home was a flat on the 10th storey. The Husband and the Wife made their valuations based on the search results of searches of resale flat prices conducted on the HDB Internet website on 15 September 2025 and 2 October 2025, respectively.

(b) The Husband valued the Matrimonial Home at $635,000 based on the resale price in July 2025 of a similar flat on a slightly lower level (7th to 9th storey) in the same block.

(c) In contrast, the Wife valued the Matrimonial Home at $529,888 based on the resale price in June 2024 of a similar flat on a much lower level (4th to 6th storey) of a different block. This was the lowest price listed in the disclosed portion of the Wife’s search results. The printout of the Wife’s search results exhibited at pages 57 to 58 of WA1 had clear indications (such as a scroll bar and a partially blocked table setting out a list of resale transactions) that the Wife only disclosed part of her search results. The disclosed portion of the Wife’s search results also revealed that 3 similar flats in different blocks from the Matrimonial Home had resale prices ranging from $540,000 (for a flat on the 1st to 3rd storey sold in December 2024) to $588,000 (for a flat on the 10th to 12th storey sold in July 2024). The Wife’s search results suggested that similar flats had been sold at much higher prices than the Wife cared to disclose.

(d) As assets (other than balances in bank accounts and CPF accounts) should generally be valued as of the date of the ancillary matters hearing, and as the Husband’s valuation was based on the most recent transaction involving a similar flat on a similar level compared to the Matrimonial Home, the Husband’s valuation was the most reliable evidence provided by the parties of the value of the Matrimonial Home.

Value of Wife’s commercial property

Based on the documentary evidence provided by the Wife, I of the view that the Wife’s commercial property has a value of at least $637,000. My reasons are as follows:

(a) According to the Singapore Titles Automated Registration System extract on the Wife’s commercial property exhibited at page 45 of WA1, the Wife’s commercial property was a unit on the 1st storey of Golden Mile Tower that had an area of 42.0 square metres (about 452.08 square feet).

(b) Both parties valued the Wife’s commercial property based on the transaction data for the sale of units in Golden Mile Tower exhibited at page 54 of WA1.

(c) The Wife estimated the value of her commercial property at $335,000 as of 2 October 2025, based on a sale in July 2024 of a first storey unit in Golden Mile Tower with a size of 205 square feet (about 19.045 square metres) for approximately $335,000. The corresponding price per square foot for that unit was $1,638.

(d) The Husband’s solicitors submitted that the Wife’s commercial property should be valued at $550,000, based on a sale in September 2025 of a 10th storey unit in Golden Mile Tower with a size of 344 square feet (about 31.959 square metres). The corresponding price per square foot for that unit was $1,597.

(e) The transaction relied on by the Husband’s solicitors concerned a unit on the 10th storey of Golden Mile Tower that had a smaller area than the Wife’s commercial property. It was therefore not a comparable transaction.

(f) The transaction relied on by the Wife concerned a unit on the 1st storey that was less than half the size of the Wife’s commercial property. To be exact, the Wife’s commercial property was about 2.2 times the area of the unit in that transaction. While I accept that different units on the same level may have different values depending on their location, commonsense suggests that when one unit is 2.2 times the size of another unit, the larger unit would logically have a higher price than the smaller unit.

(g) In the absence of expert evidence as to the value of a property, the issue of valuation of the property will turn on the factual evidence available on the record (see Ong Han Nam v Borneo Ventures Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC(A) 30 at [32]).

(h) The transaction data relied on by both parties suggested that a larger unit on a higher level of Golden Mile Tower would carry a lower price per square foot compared to a unit on the 1st storey. The same transaction data indicated that the lowest price per square foot for the 3 units in Golden Mile Tower that were listed was $1,411. Applying the lowest rate of $1,411 per square foot to the Wife’s commercial property (which had an area of approximately 452 square feet), and rounding down to the nearest $100,000, I arrived at a value of $637,000, which is approximately 1.9 times the price of the 1st storey unit in the transaction relied on by the Wife.

Wife’s liabilities

The Wife claimed to have incurred the following liabilities in WA1:

(a) a UOB Absolute Cashback Amex credit card bill of $100 as at 31 August 2025;

(b) an amount of $250,000 attributed to a “Held on trust Manulife Insurance policy”; and

(c) an alleged loan from the first child amounting to $65,335.26 as at 2 October 2025.

The Wife’s counsel orally submitted that the Wife had provided information on the UOB Absolute credit card bill and the Manulife insurance policy at page 79 and pages 61 to 64, respectively, of WA1, and added that the “$100 liability” was put in “for record”. The Wife’s counsel also submitted that the Manulife insurance policy was “taken for the son” and “held on trust for the son”, but did not respond to the observation by the Husband’s counsel that there wasn’t any document on the $250,000 trust and how the trust was formed. Instead, the Wife’s counsel stated that the Wife “said to refer to page 64 for declaration portion”. When the Court asked for the identity of the beneficiary named in the Manulife insurance policy, the Wife’s counsel stated that the Wife was the policy owner and life insured, but would have to check who the beneficiary was.

I am of the view that the Wife has not proven that she owed $100 as at 31 August 2025 on her UOB Absolute credit card. Page 79 of WA1 was an undated printout of the Wife’s UOB personal Internet banking account summary. Although the printout suggested that the Wife had spent $100 on her UOB Absolute credit card at the time the printout was made, as the Wife did not provide any evidence on when the printout was made, the printout did not constitute evidence that the Wife had incurred a credit card debt of $100 as at 31 August 2025.

I also observe that the Wife’s UOB credit card statement dated 8 October 2025, which was exhibited at pages 64 and 65 of WA2, indicated that the previous balance for the Wife’s UOB Absolute credit card, which the Wife paid on 28 September 2025, was only $49.47. That balance would have been the amount due on the Wife’s UOB Absolute credit card as at the date of the previous credit card statement issued in early September 2025. This begs the question whether the balance as at 31 August 2025 was in fact $100 (as the Wife claimed) or a lower amount (as suggested by the balance of $49.47).

By submitting that the Wife had provided, at pages 61 to 64 of WA1, information on the Manulife insurance policy that the Wife had classified as a liability for $250,000, the Wife’s counsel confirmed that this policy was in fact the Manulife whole life investment-linked policy that the Wife had identified as an asset. Such a policy would normally be treated as an asset valued at its surrender value. However, the Wife classified this as a liability for $250,000, without providing any details of, or any supporting documents for, the alleged liability in WA1 or WA2.

The Wife’s reference (through her counsel’s oral submissions) to page 64 of WA1 was of no assistance. The Wife did not provide any explanation of the document exhibited at pages 63 to 64 of WA1, but that document appears to be an amendment to the Wife’s application for the Manulife insurance policy to enable “part of the premium” for the policy to be paid by the first child. However, this amendment did not result in the policy being held on trust for the first child. There was no evidence that the Wife, as the policy owner and life insured of the Manulife insurance policy, had made a nomination of the first child as beneficiary under the policy in accordance with section 132(2) of the Insurance Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed), so as to create a trust of the policy moneys in favour of the first child. Nor did this amendment transform the Manulife insurance policy from an asset to a liability, let alone a liability amounting to $250,000.

If it is the Wife’s case that the first child had paid premiums amounting to a total of $250,000 on the Wife’s behalf for the Manulife insurance policy, and that she is thereby indebted to the first child for a total of $250,000, then this is a different liability (namely, a debt incurred by the Wife to finance the premiums payable for the Manulife insurance policy) from the liability declared by the Wife (which is the Manulife insurance policy itself). The Wife’s alleged debt to the son did not transform the Manulife insurance policy from an asset into a liability, or result in the policy being held on trust for the son. The onus is on the Wife to prove the existence and extent of the alleged debt to the first child by adducing evidence of the premium payments made by the first child, and the Wife’s agreement to repay the first child for those premium payments. However, no such evidence was adduced by the Wife in WA1 or WA2.

I also observe that page 146 of the Wife’s solicitors’ letter dated 10 March 2026, which appears to be a summary of the policy values of the Wife’s Manulife insurance policy, suggests that the Manulife insurance policy had an estimated surrender value of $270,645.94, and an estimated maximum partial withdrawal amount of $269,645.94, as at 10 March 2026. If the alleged debt on account of the premiums paid for the Manulife insurance policy is to be recognised as a liability, then the surrender value of that policy (which the Wife chose not to disclose in WA1 or WA2) should also be recognised as an asset. It defies logic that the Wife would incur a debt of $250,000 to her son if she did not receive an asset in return. If the alleged debt is set off against the estimated surrender value of the Manulife insurance policy (as disclosed at page 146 of the Wife’s solicitors’ letter dated 10 March 2026), then the policy would have an estimated value of $20,654.94 as at 10 March 2026.

In the circumstances, I am of the view that the Wife has not proven that the Wife’s Manulife insurance policy constituted a liability of $250,000. The Wife also failed to adduce any evidence in WA1 or WA2 to substantiate the existence and extent of any alleged debt of $250,000 to the first child. The Wife’s solicitors’ letter dated 10 March 2026 went beyond the clarification (on the Manulife insurance policy) allowed by the Court. As the Wife did not apply for or obtain permission to file a further affidavit to adduce evidence of the matters tendered in her solicitors’ letter dated 10 March 2026, and as those matters were not adduced by affidavit, those matters could not be relied on to supplement the Wife’s evidence in WA1 and WA2.

I am also of the view that the Wife has not proven the existence of the alleged loan from the first child amounting to $65,335.26 as at 2 October 2025. The Wife made 2 bare allegations alluding to the existence of this loan at paragraph 4 of Part A, and paragraph 14 of Part B, of WA1. However, no explanation or supporting document was provided in WA1 or WA2 to substantiate this alleged liability, despite its alleged extent.

In WAS v WAT [2022] SGHCF 7 at [46], the Family Division of the High Court decided that debts proven to exist at the time of the divorce should be deducted from the pool of matrimonial assets. As the Wife has failed to prove the existence and extent of the alleged liabilities that she relied on, for the purposes of dividing the parties’ matrimonial assets, I disregard those alleged liabilities.

Approach

Both parties agreed that the parties’ marriage should be treated as a dual-income marriage, as both parties held fulltime jobs for most of the marriage, and that the structured approach set out in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043; [2015] SGCA 34 (“ANJ v ANK”) would apply to the division of matrimonial assets. Under the structured approach, the Court would:

(a) first, ascribe a ratio that represents each party’s direct contributions relative to that of the other party, having regard to the amount of financial contribution each party has made towards the acquisition or improvement of the matrimonial assets;

(b) second, to give credit to both parties’ indirect contributions (financial and non-financial) throughout the marriage, ascribe a second ratio to represent each party’s indirect contribution to the well-being of the family relative to that of the other; and

(c) third, using each party’s respective direct and indirect percentage contributions, derive each party’s “average” percentage contribution to the family which would form the basis to divide the matrimonial assets, with the appropriate weight being attributed to the parties’ collective direct contributions as against their indirect contributions.

Direct financial contributions

I find that the Wife made no direct financial contributions towards the acquisition or improvement of the Matrimonial Home. This was in fact admitted by the Wife in paragraph 15 of Part B of WA1. As mentioned earlier, I do not think the Wife was truthful when she alleged in WA2 that she had contributed at least $1,800 towards the renovation of the Matrimonial Home. All of the financial contributions that the Wife made during the marriage were in the nature of indirect financial contributions.

I used the value of the Matrimonial Home, instead of the amount that the Husband actually paid towards the acquisition of the Matrimonial Home, to determine the value of his direct financial contributions to the pool of matrimonial assets.

(a) As the Husband was the only party to make direct financial contributions towards the acquisition or improvement of the Matrimonial Home, any appreciation in the value of the Matrimonial Home should be treated as the Husband direct financial contribution to the pool of matrimonial assets. This approach is consistent with the treatment of any appreciation in the value of any investment made by a party as that party’s direct financial contribution to the pool of matrimonial assets. This approach is also consistent with the treatment of the value of the Wife’s commercial property (as opposed to the amount that she actually paid towards the acquisition of that property) as the Wife’s direct financial contribution to the pool of matrimonial assets.

(b) There is also some support for this approach in XIW v XIX [2025] SGHCF 18 (“XIW v XIX”) at [29], XCZ v XDA [2025] SGHCF 38 at [29], and XOY v XOZ and another matter [2025] SGHCF 49 at [89], [90] and [93]. In each of these cases, the Family Division of the High Court applied the relative ratio of the actual amounts that the parties had paid towards acquiring the matrimonial property to the current market value of the matrimonial property, and used each party’s pro-rated share of the current market value, to determine each party’s direct financial contributions to the pool of matrimonial assets. In choosing this approach, instead of relying on the actual amounts that the parties had paid for the acquisition of the matrimonial property, the Family Division of the High Court observed, in XIW v XIX at [29], that this approach was more reflective of the reality of the present value of the matrimonial property.

In determining the Wife’s direct financial contributions to the pool of matrimonial assets, I disregarded the balances in the AM Bank savings account and AM Bank fixed deposit account declared by the Wife, as the Wife did not provide any documentary evidence to substantiate the existence of those accounts and the balances in those accounts, and the Wife could not even provide the account numbers for those accounts. I also disregarded all insurance policies declared by the Wife, as the Wife chose not to declare in WA1 or WA2 the surrender values (if any) of those policies, or declared the values of those policies to be $0, making it impossible to assign any value to even those policies that probably had asset values (such as the Wife’s investment-linked polices). As the Wife did not provide any valuation of her share in AA Pte Ltd, but the business profile of that company issued by the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (a copy of which was exhibited at pages 37 to 41 of WA1) shows the company to have a paid-up capital of $1, I treated the value of the Wife’s share in the company as $1.

In the circumstances, I assess the parties’ direct financial contributions towards the acquisition of all matrimonial assets as follows:

Indirect contributions (financial and non- financial)

The parties’ indirect contributions (both financial and non-financial) varied in 3 different phases of the marriage. The first phase started with the parties’ marriage on 2 August 1977 and ended when the Wife and children moved out of the Matrimonial Home in 1990. It includes periods of temporary separation, when the Wife and the first child stayed with the Wife’s parents. The second phase began from the time of the parties’ separation in 1990 and ended when the youngest child attained the age of 21 years in January 2009. The third phase began when the parties’ duties to maintain their children ended in January 2009, and ended when the Interim Judgment was granted on 13 August 2025.

During the period when the parties were staying together, it is also likely that each party made non-financial contributions, such as by doing household chores and cooking, when they were able to do so. The Wife probably contributed more than the Husband in terms of non-financial contributions, as the Wife was the primary caregiver of the children, and as the Husband was then holding both a fulltime job as a storekeeper and a part-time job as a taxi driver.

All things considered, I assigned the parties’ indirect contributions during the first phase of the marriage the ratio of 55 : 45 in the Wife’s favour.

After the parties separated in 1990, the Wife’s contributions to the welfare of the children increased substantially, and so did her indirect contributions (both financial and non-financial). The Husband admitted that after the Wife moved out of the Matrimonial Home in 1990, the Wife “maintained the children herself”. By the Husband’s own admission, his indirect contributions were minimal during the second phase of the marriage, and were confined to paying for expenses related to the Matrimonial Home, taking the children for meals during the initial phase of the parties’ separation, sending the second child to or from polytechnic occasionally, and giving gifts to the children.

All things considered, I assigned the parties’ indirect contributions during the second phase of the marriage the ratio of 90 : 10 in the Wife’s favour.

From January 2009 until the Interim Judgment was granted on 13 August 2025, all of the parties’ children were adults, and the parties were not under a duty to maintain them. As the parties had already been living apart, the parties effectively ceased to be part of the same family, and there was no well-being of the family to speak of. It would therefore be fair to say that neither party made any indirect contributions during the third phase of the marriage.

The first phase of the marriage lasted about 12.5 years (from August 1977 to around January 1990). The second phase of the marriage lasted about 19 years (from around January 1990 to January 2009). Collectively, these 2 phases lasted about 31.5 years.

Giving the parties’ indirect contributions during the first and second phases of the marriage a weighted average, I assigned the parties’ indirect contributions during the marriage the ratio of 76.1 : 23.9 in the Wife’s favour, calculated as follows:

(a) Wife’s indirect contributions = [0.55 x (12.5/31.5)] + [0.9 x (19/31.5)] = 0.761 (o 76.1%)

(b) Husband’s indirect contributions = [0.45 x (12.5/31.5)] + [0.1 x (19/31.5)] = 0.239 (or 23.9%)

Distribution of pool of matrimonial assets

The Husband’s solicitors submitted that, for the purposes of the third stage of the structured approach in ANJ v ANK, a weightage ratio of 2:1 in favour of direct financial contributions (as against indirect financial contributions) was appropriate in this case, taking account the parties’ long period of separation (35 years out of a 48 year marriage). The Husband’s solicitors relied on the conclusion in WNW v WNX [2024] 3 SLR 1761; [2023] SGHCF 54 (“WNW v WNX”) at [47], where the Family Division of the High Court, after observing that the parties in that case had a relatively long marriage with an early separation (26 years out of 31 years of marriage), and that the parties’ indirect contribution to the care of their child for a lengthy period of 20 years was substantial, expressed the view that a ratio of 2:1 in favour of direct contributions was more appropriate than a 50:50 weightage.

However, each case is decided on its particular facts. The circumstances in WNW v WNX were quite unique. In that case, the matrimonial home was purchased in 1982 in the joint names of the husband and his mother. The parties were married in 1989, and moved into the matrimonial home the same year. The parties had a child born in 1993. The parties separated in 1994 by leading separate households, while still living in the matrimonial home. The wife commenced divorce proceedings in November 2019, and an Interim Judgment was entered by consent in September 2020. Both parties had filed their first and second affidavits of assets and means in the period January to June 2022. In September 2022, the husband’s mother passed away, and the husband became the sole owner of the matrimonial home by virtue of the right of survivorship. The matrimonial home formed the bulk of the matrimonial assets in the husband’s name. The assets in the wife’s name consisted of substantial balances in her CPF accounts (worth more than the matrimonial home) and her bank accounts. The husband tried to suppress the value of the assets in his name, and to rely on his indirect contributions, to claim a larger share of the wife’s financial assets.

At first instance, the District Judge included 100% of the matrimonial home in the pool of matrimonial assts, even though the Husband owned only 50% of the matrimonial home as at the date of the Interim Judgment. The District Judge reasoned that the matrimonial home should be treated as the same single asset (as it was at the time of the Interim Judgment) but with its value to the husband having increased at the time of the ancillary matters hearing. The District Judge then found that the ratio of the parties’ indirect contributions amounted to 50:50, taking into account the fact that the parties had been living separate lives for most of their marriage and only interacted when it came to their child. The District Judge then considered that in arriving at the average ratio, equal weight could not be given to the direct and indirect contributions of the parties, and that the fact that the parties had been separated for 26 out of 31 years of their marriage warranted a ratio of 80:20 in favour of direct contributions.

On appeal, the issues were: (a) whether 50% or 100% of the matrimonial home should be added to the pool of matrimonial assets; and (b) whether the District Judge erred in his assessment of the proper weight to be given to the direct and indirect contributions of the parties to the marriage. The Family Division of the High Court saw no reason to disturb the District Judge’s decision to include 100% of matrimonial home in the pool of matrimonial assets, but took the view that a ratio of 2:1 in favour of direct contributions was more appropriate. One underlying rationale was that if the weightage between the parties’ indirect and direct contributions were to be changed to 50:50 as advanced by the husband, the “inequity” that would befall the wife would be “even worse” (see WNW v WNX at [42]).

The case before me is distinguishable from WNW v WNX. In that case, the District Judge found that the ratio of the parties’ indirect contributions amounted to 50:50 because the parties had been living separate lives for most of their marriage and only interacted when it came to their child. However, much of the appreciation in the value of the parties’ assets, including the matrimonial home, took place only after the parties had separated. In such circumstances, giving equal weightage to the parties direct financial contributions and indirect contributions would give a disproportionate significance to the parties’ indirect contributions, and could even give rise to inequitable results.

No such difficulty arises in the case before me. In the case before me, there was a significant disparity between the indirect contributions of the Husband and the Wife after the parties separated. Giving the parties’ indirect contributions a lower weightage than the parties’ direct financial contributions would be dismissive of the wife’s substantial indirect contributions and inequitable to her. My calculation of the ratio of the parties’ indirect contributions also took into account the different extents of each party’s indirect contributions during the 3 different phases of their marriage, and the fact that each party did not make any indirect contributions towards the other’s wellbeing during the third phase (when the parties’ child maintaining duties had ended). Therefore, on the facts of the case before me, I decided that it would be more appropriate to give equal weightage to the parties’ direct financial contributions and indirect contributions (financial and non-financial) despite the length of the marriage and the period of separation.

The parties’ average percentage contributions (as derived from the parties’ direct financial contributions and indirect contributions (both financial and non-financial), represented in tabular form, were therefore as follows:

On the evidence, the matrimonial assets available for distribution, and their values, are as follows:

As the Wife’s average percentage contribution to the $1,618,498.85 total value of the parties’ matrimonial assets is 66.85%, the Wife is entitled to $1,081,966.48 from the pool of matrimonial assets.

As the assets in the Wife’s sole name have a total value of $931,952.90, if these assets are to be retained by the Wife, the difference of $150,013.58 between the total value of these assets and the value of the Wife’s share of the matrimonial assets would have to be satisfied from the assets in the Husband’s sole name.

If the Husband is to retain the balances in his bank accounts and his CPF Medisave Account, then the Wife should be accorded a share of the Matrimonial Home that is representative of the difference between the value of her share of the matrimonial and the value of the assets in her sole name. $150,013.58 is approximately 23.6% of the $635,000 estimated value of the Matrimonial Home. I therefore find that the Wife is entitled to a 23.6% share of the Matrimonial Home. This would crystallise the Wife’s share of the Matrimonial Home and entitle her to partake in any further appreciation in the value of the Matrimonial Home.

It is not disputed that the Matrimonial Home should be sold in the open market.

(a) The Husband’s solicitors proposed that the Matrimonial Home be sold at a price not lower than $635,000. However, I do not think I should make an order to that effect. Market conditions may change. Imposing such an order may delay the sale of the Matrimonial Home.

(b) The Wife’s solicitors proposed that the Wife have sole conduct of the sale of the Matrimonial Home, and that the Matrimonial Home be sold within 6 months from the date of the Final Judgment. I think it is reasonable to require the Matrimonial Home to be sold within 6 months after the date of the Final Judgment. However, as the Wife would only be entitled to 23.6% of the net sale proceeds of the Matrimonial Home, I did not think it would be equitable to order, at this stage, that she be given sole conduct of the sale. I will leave it to the parties to agree between themselves on how the sale should be managed, but should the parties fail to agree on the matter, they have liberty to apply for directions.

In the circumstances, I made the following orders on the division of matrimonial assets:

(a) The Matrimonial Home is to be sold in the open market within 6 months after the date of the Final Judgment, and the net sale proceeds (after deducting the costs and expenses of the sale) are to be divided in the proportion of 76.4% to the Husband and 23.6% to the Wife.

(b) Any refund to be made to the Husband’s CPF accounts is to be paid from the Husband’s share of the net sale proceeds from the sale of the Matrimonial Home.

(c) The parties have liberty to apply for directions on the conduct of the sale of the Matrimonial Home.

(d) Each party is to retain all other assets held in his or her sole name.

Spousal maintenance

In ATE v ATD and another appeal [2016] SGCA 2 at [31] to [34], the Court of Appeal observed that:

(a) the power to order maintenance for a former spouse is supplementary to the power to order a division of matrimonial assets;

(b) an order for a husband to continue to provide maintenance to his former wife, being supplementary to the order to divide their matrimonial assets between them, fills the gap remaining between the financial statuses of the former spouses, and corrects any residual inequality that remains in their financial resources; and

(c) where the exercise of the power to divide matrimonial assets suffices to equalise the financial statuses of the former spouses, the Court may make no order of maintenance for the former wife, a mere nominal order (to keep the husband’s liability alive) or, at most, a modest order of maintenance.

When HA1 was filed in October 2025, the Husband was already 77 years old and unemployed. He had difficulty finding a job due to his age, had minimal savings, and relied on Government financial assistance for his daily expenses. It was unclear what amount (if any) would have to be refunded to the Husband’s CPF accounts to satisfy his CPF retirement sum obligations (if any) under section 15(6) of the Central Provident Fund Act 1953 (2020 Rev Ed), upon the sale of the Matrimonial Home. The Husband would also have to acquire or rent suitable accommodation, and this would no doubt consume a substantial portion of his share of the net sale proceeds from the sale of the Matrimonial Home.

In contrast, when WA1 was filed in October 2025, the Wife was 69 years old, owned a business, and collected a monthly rental of $1,388 from her commercial property. She had substantial assets, including an income-generating commercial property estimated to be worth $637,000, a balance of $243,946.36 in her CPF accounts, publicly traded shares worth about $21,000, and savings of about $30,000. She would also receive 23.6% of the net sale proceeds of the Matrimonial Home in cash. In addition, the Wife had 2 investment-linked insurance policies, of which she chose not to disclose the surrender values.

Comparing the financial statuses of the parties after the division of their matrimonial assets, there was clearly no “residual inequality” in the parties’ financial resources that was suffered by the Wife, or that needed to be corrected in her favour.

The Wife also blatantly inflated her monthly expenses by including discretionary items such as entertainment expenses of $1,200 per month, travel expenses of $3,000 a year, and gifts amounting to $3,000 per year. She had no regard whatsoever for the Husband’s lack of means and earning capacity.

All things considered, I make no order for the maintenance of the Wife. Whatever may have been the Husband’s failings as a husband and father, this was clearly not a case where the Wife required, or should be awarded, any maintenance after divorce.

Costs

(a) not disclosing in HA1 that the Matrimonial Home had been rented in the past;

(b) failing to disclose the total amount of rent received from renting the Matrimonial Home;

(c) not disclosing 3 months of his POSB bank statements in HA1; and

(d) not disclosing in HA1 an Income Tax Notice of Assessment for the Year of Assessment 2025, despite making CPF contributions as a self-employed person in 2025.

The Wife had the audacity to authorise her counsel to make such submissions, when she herself was guilty of far more egregious non-disclosures. In particular, the Wife failed to provide, in WA1 or WA2, the surrender values of her investment-linked insurance policies, and full particulars of, and supporting documents for, her alleged liabilities. Page 146 of the Wife’s solicitors’ letter dated 10 March 2026 suggested that one of these investment-linked insurance policies had an estimated surrender value of $270,645.94, and an estimated maximum partial withdrawal amount of $269,645.94, as at 10 March 2026.

The Wife did not explain how she was prejudiced by the non-disclosures she attributed to the Husband. To be clear, the Husband did admit in HA2 that he had in the past rented one room in the Matrimonial Home for 3 to 4 years for $160 to $200. The Husband also stated that the rent received had been expended. The Husband disclosed in HA1 a POSB consolidated statement showing his bank balances for the period 1 to 31 August 2025, as well as his Income Tax Notices of Assessment for the Years of Assessment 2022, 2023 and 2024, reflecting his income as a taxi driver from 2021 to 2023. The Wife’s solicitors could have requested for copies of any omitted documents, but there is nothing to suggest that they did so. The Husband disclosed in HA1 that he had made contributions, as a self-employed person, of $7 or $44 to his CPF accounts in certain months in 2025. This did not suggest that the Husband earned any substantial income in 2025. In any event, any such income would have been disclosed only in an Income Tax Notice of Assessment for the Year of Assessment 2026, and not in an Income Tax Notice of Assessment for the Year of Assessment 2025. Unlike the Wife’s material non-disclosures, it was unclear how any of the non-disclosures attributed to the Husband would have made a difference to the Court’s assessment of the issues of division of matrimonial assets and spousal maintenance.

Conclusion

In the circumstances, I made the following orders in my written judgment issued on 16 June 2026:

(a) The Matrimonial Home is to be sold in the open market within 6 months after the date of the Final Judgment, and the net sale proceeds (after deducting the costs and expenses of the sale) are to be divided in the proportion of 76.4% to the Husband and 23.6% to the Wife.

(b) Any refund to be made to the Husband’s CPF accounts is to be paid from the Husband’s share of the net sale proceeds from the sale of the Matrimonial Home.

(c) The parties have liberty to apply for directions on the conduct of the sale of the Matrimonial Home.

(d) Each party is to retain all other assets held in his or her sole name.

(e) There be no order for the maintenance of the Wife.

(f) Each party is to bear his or her own costs of the proceedings.

I also gave the parties liberty to apply, within 7 days after the date of that judgment, to correct any mathematical or calculation error in that judgment.