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Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi J:
[2026] SGHCF 33
Family Division of the High Court of Singapore25 Sept 2026Divorce (Transferred) No 2675 of 2023
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“(d) The CPF Board shall determine the amount of any refunds to be made by the parties to their respective accounts, in accordance with the provisions of the CPF Act and the subsidiary legislation made thereunder. Unless expressly provided for in the CPF Act, nothing in the orders herein shall be taken to affect the CPF”
“(j) The Registrar and Assistant Registrars of the Family Justice Courts are empowered under the Family Justice Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed) to execute, sign and/or indorse all necessary documents relating to the matters dealt with in these orders, on behalf of either party should such party fail to do so within seven days o”
“In ATE v ATD [2016] SGCA 2 (“ATE v ATD”), the Court of Appeal highlighted that “the overarching principle embodied in s 114(2) is that of financial preservation, which requires the wife to be maintained at a standard that is,”
“act that the bank account is in the joint names of the Wife and C1 is not determinative because the matrimonial asset is not the bank account itself, but the monies within the bank account: BUX v BUY [2019] SGHCF 4 at [4].”
“the date of or an agreed date closest to the ancillary matters (“AM”) hearing, except for monies in bank accounts and CPF accounts which are identified and valued as at the date of the IJ: CVC v CVB [2023] SGHC(A) 28 at [55].”
“other spouse who was primarily the homemaker. The relevant authorities make clear that a “broad-brush approach” is applied in ascertaining parties’ indirect contributions (see, for example, WTU v WTV [2025] SGHCF 8 at [30]). Bearing this in mind, I do not consider it appropriate to engage in an overly strict arithmetic”
Auto-detected from judgment text; not a substitute for a citator check.
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Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi J:
1
The parties in this case were married on 16 May 1994 in Singapore, and have two daughters who are aged 29 years old (“C1”) and 24 years old (“C2”) respectively (collectively, the “Children”). Both parties are aged 59 years old this year. The wife (“Wife”) is unemployed, and the husband (“Husband”) is employed as a Managing Director of a company (“Company A”).
2
Divorce proceedings were filed by the Husband on 7 June 2023. Interim judgment for divorce was granted on 20 September 2023 (“IJ”) on an uncontested basis, on the ground that parties have been separated for more than four years. The marriage therefore lasted approximately 29 years 4 months.
3
The following ancillary matters (“AM”) proceeded for hearing before me: (a) the division of matrimonial assets; and (b) maintenance for the Wife. I will deal with each matter in turn.
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Identification and valuation of the matrimonial assets
4
In respect of the division of matrimonial assets, the starting point is s 112(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“WC”), which empowers the court to divide matrimonial assets in a “just and equitable” fashion, in light of all the relevant circumstances including the non-exhaustive factors set out in s 112(2) WC.
5
Parties are agreed that in this case, matrimonial assets should be identified as at the date of the IJ and valued on the date of or an agreed date closest to the ancillary matters (“AM”) hearing, except for monies in bank accounts and CPF accounts which are identified and valued as at the date of the IJ: CVC v CVB [2023] SGHC(A) 28 at [55].
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Joint assets
6
There are three assets held in the parties’ joint names: (a) a condominium unit at [address redacted] (“Matrimonial Home”); (b) DBS Bank Multi-Currency Autosave Plus Account No. XXX-XXX947-9 (“Joint DBS Bank Account”); and (c) cash held in a Safe Deposit Box at DBS Bank’s South Bridge branch at Hong Lim (“DBS SDB”).
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The Matrimonial Home
7
Parties agree that the net value of the Matrimonial Home (ie, the market value of the Matrimonial Home less the outstanding mortgage loan) is $1,450,244.16 as at 28 February 2026. I accept this valuation of the Matrimonial Home and include it in the matrimonial pool.
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The Joint DBS Bank Account
8
As for the Joint DBS Bank Account, parties agreed in the Joint Summary that as at 31 October 2023, there was a sum of $1,263,467.14 in this account. Subsequent to the hearing on 23 July 2026, however, counsel for the Husband sent in a letter on 31 July 2026 in which it was submitted on the Husband’s behalf that the Court should value the Joint DBS Bank Account at a lower amount of $1,139,032.80, so as to reflect the amount in the Joint DBS Bank Account as at 26 February 2024. In his letter, counsel for the Husband explained that this lower amount as at 26 February 2024 took into account two transactions made on 8 February 2024 (with both parties’ consent), the purpose of which was to pay for C1’s university and rental expenses in Australia. It was also highlighted that this lower amount of $1,139,032.80 had been set out earlier by the Husband in his 1st Affidavit of Assets and Means (“AOM”). I add that aside from the issue of the two transactions on 8 February 2024, the Husband also submitted in this letter of 31 July 2026 that he should be reimbursed by the Wife for the mortgage payments made by him from the date of IJ to the date of this judgment. I deal with this issue of reimbursement of mortgage payments at [64]–[70] below.
9
In light of the belated new submissions from the Husband in his letter of 31 July 2026, I gave the Wife leave to file written submissions in response. On the issue of valuation of the Joint DBS Bank Account, the Wife has indicated in her further written submissions of 4 September 2026 that she accepts the Husband’s valuation of this account at $1,139,032.80. I therefore add this figure of $1,139,032.80 to the matrimonial pool.
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Cash contents of the DBS SDB
10
As for the DBS SDB, the Husband asserts that this contains $30,000 which was kept there as the parties’ emergency cash reserves. The Husband has adduced evidence showing that the Wife visited the DBS SDB on several occasions between 2018 and 2023 : his case is that in the course of visiting the DBS SDB, the Wife retrieved and dissipated the $30,000. Accordingly, he submits that the sum of $30,000 should be added back into the matrimonial pool.
11
The Wife’s position, on the other hand, is that no cash was kept in the DBS SDB and that the Husband has not produced any evidence to prove that there were “emergency cash reserves” of $30,000 in the SDB. While she acknowledged that she did visit the DBS SDB, she asserts that she only removed items belonging to herself and the Children, without touching the Husband’s items; that the value of the items she removed – even if considered a matrimonial asset would be de minimis compared to the size of the matrimonial pool; and that in any event, the Husband himself has removed items of value from the DBS SDB.
12
I accept the Wife’s submission that the Husband bears the onus of proving his claims about the DBS SDB having contained $30,000 cash and that he has failed to adduce any evidence of this. I highlight, moreover, that the Husband has been inconsistent on the amount of cash allegedly kept in the DBS SDB: he originally claimed that the assets in the DBS SDB included $30,000 in cash, but elsewhere, he has also claimed that there was $20,000 in cash. Having regard to the inconsistencies in his narrative and his inability to produce any evidence of the $30,000 cash, I ascribe a value of $0 to the alleged cash contents of the DBS SDB.
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The Husband’s assets
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Undisputed assets
13
The following assets, and their valuation, were undisputed and I accordingly include these in the matrimonial pool. For completeness, I do not list assets which are – by agreement between the parties – to be left out of the matrimonial pool or valued at $0.
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(a) Monies in the Husband’s Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts (including the Ordinary Account, Special Account, Retirement Account and Medisave Account ): $944,915.76.
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(b) Monies in the DBS Bank Autosave Account No. XXX-XXX060-6 (“DBS 0606 Account”): $62,873.90.
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(c) Monies in the DBS Bank Multiplier Account No. XXX-XXX993-9 (“DBS 9939 Account”): $112,932.16.
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(d) Prudential Insurance/Whole Life/Investment Policy No. XXXX2457: $158,781.80.
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(e) Prudential Investment Policy No. XXXX5002: $93,224.03.
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(f) Prudential Pruretirement Policy No. XXXX5441: $40,683.24.
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(g) AIA Whole Life/Investment Policy No. XXXXXX5760: $79,931.50.
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(h) AIA Life/Investment Policy No. XXXXXX1772: $157,365.55.
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(i) NTUC Income – Flex Retire Policy No. XXXXXX5523: $149,281.10.
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(j) Mercedes GLE43 Coupe (VRN. [redacted]): $96,979.00.
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(k) Honda Vezel (VRN. [redacted]): $4,800.00.
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(l) Income tax liability: -$79,793.08.
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Disputed assets
14
I next address the Husband’s disputed assets.
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(1) The Husband’s “leverage funding”
15
The Husband claims that the monies in the UOB Bank Privilege Account No. XXX-XXX-529-3 (“UOB 5293 Account”) are “excess funding leverage” due for return to Company A and are not marital monies. Accordingly, they should be excluded from the pool of matrimonial assets. To corroborate his account, the Husband has produced a letter said to be from the Chairman of Company A. He also asserts that the bank account statements for the UOB 5293 Account show that this account has not been used for his personal expenses.
16
The Wife disputes the Husband’s position as she claims that he is “attempting to artificially ringfence a substantial sum from the pool of matrimonial assets” . She has made a number of arguments to show that the Husband has not adequately explained why the monies in the UOB 5293 Account should be excluded from the matrimonial pool. I accept the Wife’s position for the following reason.
17
The starting point is that the amounts in the UOB 5293 Account are a matrimonial asset, since the Husband does not dispute that these monies were acquired during the marriage: s 112(10)(b) WC. The Husband thus bears the burden of proving that these monies belong to Company A and that they should for that reason be excluded from the matrimonial pool.
18
According to the Husband, the provision of “leverage funding” by Company A started in 2019, when his pay saw a 36% increase from the previous year. The following table summarises the Husband’s own breakdown of the monies he received from Company A, and my calculation of the “leverage funding” that the Husband would accordingly have received:
19
I make the observation at the outset that there has been no coherent explanation in the Husband’s affidavit evidence of what precisely the terms “excess funding leverage” and “leverage funding” mean. In his PA1 (filed 28 February 2024), this was described as monies “to incentivise various segments of the leisure and entertainment fraternity, including support services, in order to boost our very niche business concept”. In that same affidavit, it appears that the monies were then described as “business growth funds” which had “lesser avenues” to be used when the “targeted consumers such as the Chinese tourists dwindle[d] to very low numbers” during the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet another explanation was provided in the Chairman of Company A’s letter, which was exhibited to the Husband’s PA3 (filed 29 September 2025): “At times, funds are required to be disbursed at short notice and / or as cash incentives payments to others in the industry”. Suffice to say, these varying explanations were simply incoherent and it appears to me that it was deliberately left vague.
20
More importantly, there are four internal inconsistencies in the Husband’s account which I regard as being fatal to his case. First, on the Husband’s own case, the UOB 5293 Account was opened in September 2022: the account statement for October 2022 shows that $601,000 was deposited into the account. By October 2022, though, the Husband would have received “leverage funding” amounting to $691,900.00 (see table at [18] above). While it may be possible that the Husband actually spent some of the “leverage funding” received for Company A’s purposes, he has adduced no evidence to show how the final amount of $601,000 was arrived at. The Husband appears at one point to suggest that the “unused portions of the funding leverage were put into the [UOB 5293 Account]”. However, even on this account, the fact that the “leverage funding” was actively used stands in stark contrast to the fact that the bank account statements show no transactions at all (save for the monthly interest being credited) in the UOB 5293 Account between November 2022 and July 2023.
21
Second, if the Husband’s account of leverage funding being disbursed to him is to be believed, such disbursement continued through 2023, when a further sum of about $300,000 was received by him (see table at [18] above). Yet this $300,000 was not deposited into the UOB 5293 Account. The Husband has provided no explanation for this apparent anomaly.
22
Third, I agree with the Wife that the letter from the Chairman of Company A is vague and does not specify the amount disbursed to the Husband for “leverage funding”. One would have expected Company A to be precise about the specific sum disbursed, given that (on the Husband’s case) the total amount of “leverage funding” disbursed to him by Company A totalled approximately $1 million. What is also telling is that there has been no explanation provided by the Husband as to why Company A needed to disburse the “leverage funding” in the guise of salary payments to the Husband – as opposed to simply depositing these monies directly into the UOB 5293 Account.
23
Finally, as the Wife has pointed out, more than half of the $550,000 in the UOB 5293 Account is held in Fixed/Structured Deposit accounts, which manner of holding undermines the Chairman’s claim (which was adopted by the Husband) that these monies were intended for disbursement “at short notice”. As the Wife has additionally pointed out, the Husband’s own evidence shows that work-related expenses were routinely paid from his DBS 0606 Account and DBS 9939 Account, and reimbursed to such accounts. It was therefore that much harder for the Husband to credibly assert that the UOB 5293 Account was intended to hold onto the “leverage funding” from which payments might be made for work-related reasons (whatever sort of “cash incentive payments” they may be).
24
In short, the Husband’s evidence on the monies in the UOB 5293 Account is internally inconsistent and inherently incredible. I therefore reject his argument that these monies should be excluded from the matrimonial pool; and I include the sum of $551,097.85 in the matrimonial pool.
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(2) AIA Life/Investment Policy No. XXXXXX1769
25
Parties do not dispute that this policy, which I refer to as the AIA 1769 Policy, is a matrimonial asset, but they disagree on its valuation. The Husband submitted that the date of valuation for this policy should be 8 April 2026, being the date closest to the AM hearing: as at this date, the value of the policy would be $41,609.11. Apart from proposing 8 April 2026 as the valuation date, the Husband has made no other submissions. For her part, the Wife acknowledges that the general rule for insurance policies is that they are valued as at the date of the AM hearing, but submits that in this case, the AIA 1769 Policy should be valued as at 24 February 2024 – at which date the value would be $84,946.24. The Wife points out that the drastic drop in the value of the AIA 1769 Policy as between 26 February 2024 and 8 April 2026 is unaccounted for by the Husband. Further, this drastic fall in the value of the policy is unacceptable, given that the surrender value of such policies should generally increase over time.
26
Although the general position is that assets are valued at the date of the AM hearing, the court has the discretion to depart from this position where the facts warrant such departure: TDT v TDS [2016] 4 SLR 145 at [50]. I agree with the Wife that this is a case warranting such departure. The Husband does not dispute that he continued to pay the premium amount for the AIA 1769 Policy. Ordinarily, therefore, there would be an increase in the surrender value of this policy. The Husband has failed to offer any explanation for the significant 50% decrease in the surrender value of this policy. As such, I find that it is just and equitable to take the value of the AIA 1769 Policy as at 24 February 2024 (which is about five months after IJ), ie $84,946.24.
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(3) Honda Vezel (VRN. MDxxx)
27
Parties dispute the inclusion of this vehicle (which I will refer to as the “Disputed Honda Vezel”) in the matrimonial pool. It is undisputed that the Disputed Honda Vezel is currently being used in Australia by C1. Despite this, the Husband’s written submissions include this asset as part of his own assets and value it at $22,192.50 (based on conversion from A$25,000.00) as at 27 March 2026. At the hearing before me, counsel for the Husband stated that the Husband considered this vehicle to be part of his asset because he had paid for it.
28
The Wife, on the other hand, has deposed that the acquisition of the Disputed Honda Vezel was financed by the monies in parties’ Joint DBS Bank Account. In any event, the Wife’s position is that this vehicle is not a matrimonial asset because it is solely owned by C1.
29
Based on the evidence available, I accept the Wife’s submission that the vehicle was a gift to C1. In his affidavit, the Husband himself has stated: “I had purchased this car for my daughter, C1 to use in Australia”. In other words, the Husband’s own evidence is that the car was gifted to C1 and belongs to C1. At the hearing before me, counsel for the Husband claimed that the Husband had merely intended to let C1 use the vehicle in Australia without beneficial ownership of the vehicle passing to C1. When queried by me, however, counsel conceded that there was no evidence to support this bare assertion by the Husband.
30
Further and in any event, even if I were to disregard the Husband’s affidavit evidence, the absence of direct evidence in the present parent-child context would invite the application of the presumption of advancement (see Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108 at [59]–[60]), such that the Disputed Honda Vezel may be presumed to be a gift by the Husband to C1.
31
In the circumstances, I have not included the Disputed Honda Vezel in the matrimonial pool.
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(4) Dissipated sum of $40,000
32
For this item, the Wife highlights that an amount of $40,000 was withdrawn on 12 June 2023 from the Husband’s DBS 9939 account, a few days after the Writ of Divorce was filed on 7 June 2023. She submits that the Husband’s withdrawal of this amount from the account represents a dissipation of assets, and that the amount should be added back to the matrimonial pool. In his written submissions, the Husband has addressed the larger sum of $324,810.00, this being the amount that the Wife previously asked to be added back to the matrimonial pool. This larger figure of $324,810.00 was made up of the $40,000 withdrawn from the Husband’s DBS 9939 account and a further $284,810.00 withdrawn from his DBS 0606 account. For the purposes of the hearing before me, the Wife is now asking only for the $40,000 to be added back.
33
The Husband claims the aggregate amount of $324,810.00 was used by him for work-related expenses. According to him, this is supported by the fact that “the transactions are spread out over a span of many years and are each not of significant quantum”. Having reviewed the evidence, I do not find the Husband’s claim at all credible. While it is true that the sum of $284,810.00 was withdrawn from his DBS 0606 account in 229 transactions (generally involving sums in the region of $1,000 to $2,000), the same cannot be said of the single $40,000 cash withdrawal from his DBS 9939 account. The Husband has failed to explain what this single withdrawal of $40,000 was for. In the circumstances, I agree with the Wife that the sum of $40,000 ought to be added back into the matrimonial pool.
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The Wife’s assets
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Undisputed assets
34
I next address the Wife’s assets. I start by listing those of her assets which are undisputed (in terms of valuation and inclusion in the matrimonial pool), and which I include in the matrimonial pool. Again, I do not list assets which are – by agreement between the parties – to be left out of the matrimonial pool or valued at $0.
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(a) Monies in the Wife’s CPF accounts (including the Ordinary Account, Special Account, Retirement Account and Medisave Account): $209,257.48.
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(b) OCBC Bank 360 Account No. XXXXXXXX7001 (“OCBC 7001 Account”): $23,139.77.
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(c) DBS Bank Autosave Account No. XXX-XXX149-4 (“DBS 1494 Account”): $3,352.62.
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(d) UOB Bank One Account No. XXX-XXX-624-4: $19,272.28.
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(e) Maybank Privilege Plus Savings Account No. XXXXXXX7114: $11,487.32.
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(f) 12 Month iSAVvy Time Deposit Account No. XXXXXXX8514: $30,000.00.
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(g) 12 Month iSAVvy Time Deposit Account No. XXXXXXX8507: $20,000.00.
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(h) Prudential PruLink Protection Account Policy No. XXXX3347: $10,576.87.
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(i) AIA Whole Life Policy No. XXXXXX5773: $37,093.80.
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(j) 3,100 COMFORTDELGRO shares: $4,340.00.
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(k) 400 SBS TRANSIT shares: $1,072.00.
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(l) 459 SINGTEL shares: $1,087.83.
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(m) Singapore Savings Bonds SBNOV22 GX22110A: $10,000.00.
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(n) Pair of diamond earrings: $2,320.00.
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(o) Diamond ring: $9,020.00.
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(p) Singlife Account: $10,798.01.
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Disputed assets
35
I next address the Wife’s disputed assets.
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(1) POSB Bank eEveryday Savings Account No. XXX-XX709-6
36
It is undisputed that this bank account (“POSB 7096 Account”) is held in the joint names of the Wife and C1. What is disputed is the ownership of the monies in the account.
37
By way of general principle, the mere fact that the bank account is in the joint names of the Wife and C1 is not determinative because the matrimonial asset is not the bank account itself, but the monies within the bank account: BUX v BUY [2019] SGHCF 4 at [4].
38
Parties accept that the monies in the POSB 7096 Account originated from the Husband and/or the Joint DBS Bank Account. As such, the starting point is that this is a matrimonial asset. The Husband contends that the monies in the account should therefore be included in the pool. The Wife, on the other hand, asserts that the monies were deposited into this account as gifts from both parties to their daughter C1; and that C1 is the beneficial owner of the monies in the account. On top of the monies in this POSB 7096 account as at 30 September 2023 (ie, $2,094.78), the Husband further submits that a sum of $119,404.06 should be notionally added back to the matrimonial pool: this is because he claims there has been dissipation by the Wife of monies which are a matrimonial asset, in that monies were transferred from this POSB 7096 Account to C1’s Commonwealth bank account. This issue is of course moot if the monies in the POSB 7096 Account are in fact beneficially owned by C1.
39
In submitting that the monies in this account belonged beneficially to C1, the Wife explained that monies for C1’s expenses were given to her via the POSB 7096 Account, from which C1 would then transfer funds to her own Commonwealth bank account. The Wife has pointed out, for example, that $41,000 was deposited into the POSB 7096 Account on 18 January 2022 and that C1 then transferred a sum of $25,513.71 from the POSB 7096 Account to her (C1’s) Commonwealth bank account on 27 January 2022. The Husband has tried to argue that there is no correlation between these transactions: his position seems to be that in order for there to be any such correlation, once an amount is deposited into the POSB 7096 Account, one should see an almost immediate transfer of an equivalent amount out of the POSB 7096 Account into C1’s Commonwealth bank account.
40
I find no merit in the Husband’s argument. If the POSB 7096 Account was in fact treated by both parties and by C1 as C1’s bank account, into which she would receive monies for her expenses from her parents, then there was no need for C1 to always transfer to her Commonwealth bank account exactly the same amount deposited by her parents into the POSB 7096 Account. After all, if the POSB 7096 Account was in fact C1’s account, she could transfer whatever amounts she needed from this account to her Commonwealth bank account, as and when she needed.
41
Further, as the Wife has pointed out, there is evidence that both she and the Husband treated the POSB 7096 Account as belonging to C1. For example, the Husband consistently deposited C1’s monthly allowance of $2,000 into the POSB 7096 Account and also deposited C1’s birthday gift of $1,907 cash into this account. As another example, the Wife is shown to have treated the POSB 7096 Account as C1’s solely owned account when she retrieved $30,000 from this account to place in a fixed deposit for C1’s benefit, thereafter returning a sum of $31,155 to the POSB 7096 Account.
42
Finally, although the Husband has tried to paint a picture of withdrawals of increasingly larger sums being made from the POSB 7096 Account to C1’s Commonwealth bank account, the truth is that the withdrawals were of varying amounts across a period of about one year and nine months.
43
For the reasons explained, therefore, I accept the Wife’s submission that the monies in the POSB 7096 Account are beneficially owned by C1 and do not form part of the matrimonial pool. Withdrawals from this account to C1’s Commonwealth bank account thus do not represent dissipation by the Wife of a matrimonial asset.
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(2) POSB Bank Savings Account No. XXX-XX552-6
44
This bank account (“POSB 5526 Account”) is held in the joint names of the Wife and C2. As with the POSB 7096 Account, what is disputed is the beneficial ownership of the monies in the account. Here, the Husband again submits that the monies in the POSB 5526 Account are traceable either to his account or to the Joint DBS Bank Account. This much appears to be undisputed.
45
For her part, the Wife submits that C2 is the primary user and exercises sole control over the account. In support of her submission, the Wife points to the fact that the withdrawals made from this account were generally small sums, likely for use on transportation or food. Moreover, the Husband routinely deposited C2’s allowance (ranging from $500 to $2,000) into this POSB 5526 Account.
46
In light of the evidence, I accept the Wife’s submission that the monies in this POSB 5526 Account are beneficially owned by C2 and should be excluded from the matrimonial pool.
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(3) Singapore Savings Bonds SBAUG18 GX18080F
47
The Wife’s OCBC 7001 Account was opened in October 2016. It is undisputed that between October 2016 and 25 July 2018, the Wife received inheritance monies from her late parents which were deposited into the OCBC 7001 Account. Singapore Savings Bond SBAUG18 GX18080F (“SBAUG18”) was bought on 25 July 2018 using monies from the OCBC 7001 Account. The Husband contends that SBAUG18 was not purchased with inheritance monies because:
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(a) the inheritance monies were completely expended by the Wife in the form of loans made from December 2019 to May 2021; and
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(b) there has in any event been a co-mingling of marital funds with the inheritance monies.
48
With respect, the Husband’s submissions are irrelevant. As the Wife points out, on the Husband’s own analysis, prior to February 2019, there was no commingling of marital funds with the inheritance monies (and I should add, no depletion of the inheritance monies). In other words, as at the time when monies from the OCBC 7001 Account were used to purchase SBAUG18, the Husband appears to accept that the monies used for this purchase were inheritance monies. Accordingly, SBAUG18 can be directly traced to inheritance monies. I therefore accept the Wife’s submission that SBAUG18 is an asset which she acquired using inheritance monies and that it has not been substantially improved during the marriage either by the Husband or by both parties. As such, SBAUG18 should be excluded from the matrimonial pool, pursuant to s 112(10) WC.
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(4) Other disputed assets
49
The Husband previously claimed that there were (a) emergency cash monies in a locked drawer in the master bedroom, (b) cash monies amounting to $196,000 entrusted to the wife, and (c) rental income credited to the Wife’s DBS 1494 Account, all of which should be added back to the matrimonial pool. These claims were addressed by the Wife in her written submissions. I note that since then, these claims appear to have been omitted from the Joint Summary and from the Husband’s written submissions. No mention was made of these sums either during the hearing before me. As such, I see no need to deal with these claims.
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Conclusion on total value of matrimonial assets
50
Following from the findings I have set out above, the total value of the matrimonial assets is $5,490,113.99. A detailed breakdown can be found in the table at Annex 1 of this judgment. In sum, I find that the matrimonial pool comprises:
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(a) $2,589,276.96 of joint assets;
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(b) $2,498,019.05 of the Husband’s assets; and
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(c) $402,817.98 of the Wife’s assets.
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Division of the matrimonial assets
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Classification of the marriage
51
Having identified and valued the pool of matrimonial assets, I next determine the proportions in which these matrimonial assets are to be divided. Parties are agreed that this was a long single-income marriage and that the approach in TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL v TNK”) applies. In such cases, the courts “tend towards an equal division of matrimonial assets”: TNL v TNK at [48]. Nonetheless, this is not an “immutable rule”, and the specific facts of each case must be considered: DBA v DBB [2024] 1 SLR 459 (“DBA v DBB”) at [20]. Taking a 50:50 split as the starting point, I next consider whether any adjustment to this starting point is warranted.
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Adjustments for parties’ indirect contributions
52
The Husband submits that he “played an active role at home alongside his role as the primary breadwinner” (citing DBA v DBB at [21]) and thus a ratio of 60:40 in his favour would be appropriate. According to the Husband, he was “extensively” involved with the family: for example, by supporting the Wife emotionally and financially through her difficult times (eg, her pregnancies and her mother’s illness), doing household chores, driving the children around, tutoring them and supporting their endeavours. The Husband cites the following evidence to support his assertion:
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(a) Contemporaneous text messages between the Children and the Husband. Broadly, these text messages show the Children reaching out to the Husband for various requests. The Husband submits that the Children would not have constantly reached out to him for support in this manner if he were truly uninvolved and not a go-to parent.
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(b) Contemporaneous statements by the Wife and Children in cards to the Husband. Broadly, these cards were prepared on special occasions (eg Father’s Day, Valentine’s Day, the Husband’s birthday) which contain expressions of gratitude and appreciation for the Husband.
53
The Husband also alleges that he has been alienated from the Children due to the Wife’s actions. He has exhibited, for example, allegedly hostile messages sent to him by the Children on behalf of the Wife , screenshots of the Wife pointing her middle finger at the CCTV camera at home in C2’s presence, and a police report allegedly made against the Husband by C2 for outrage of modesty.
54
The Wife, on the other hand, contends that the Husband has exaggerated his indirect non-financial contributions and that he has also sought unfairly to blame her for his reduced interactions with the Children over the years. She submits that during the Children’s early years, the Husband was “frequently overseas and preoccupied with work and/or busy attending his part-time course at the Singapore Institute of Management on weekday evenings and Saturdays”. As for the cards written to the Husband by the Wife and Children, she submits that these were written for special occasions and do not reflect their daily family life. In her written submissions, the Wife has set out a list of her own contributions as the homemaker in the marriage. In addition, she has adduced two statutory declarations from C1, in which C1 described the Husband as an absent father and catalogued the Wife’s contributions to the family.
55
The marriage having irretrievably broken down, it is not surprising that both parties now seek to diminish each other’s contributions to the marriage. Having reviewed the evidence, I do not think that this is a case warranting a departure from the starting position of a 50:50 split. I find that over the 29-odd years of their marriage, both parties contributed to the marriage in their own way and, broadly speaking, equally. No doubt both parties acted bitterly towards each other when the relationship broke down as the marriage neared its end – but for the most part, the marriage was an equal partnership between a spouse who was primarily the breadwinner and the other spouse who was primarily the homemaker. The relevant authorities make clear that a “broad-brush approach” is applied in ascertaining parties’ indirect contributions (see, for example, WTU v WTV [2025] SGHCF 8 at [30]). Bearing this in mind, I do not consider it appropriate to engage in an overly strict arithmetic exercise. In my view, a 50:50 ratio for division is just and equitable in this case.
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Adverse inference
56
I note that the Husband has urged this court to draw an adverse inference against the Wife and to adjust the division ratio in his favour accordingly. Per the Husband’s case, an adverse inference should be drawn against the Wife for failing to disclose cash and jewellery held in the DBS SDB.
57
It is trite that an adverse inference may be drawn against a party where (a) there is a “substratum of evidence that establishes a prima facie case” against the party against whom the inference is to be drawn, and (b) that person must have had some particular access to the information she is said to be hiding: see, for example, UZN v UZM [2021] 1 SLR 426 at [18]. In my view, the present case does not reveal a substratum of evidence establishing a prima facie case against the Wife.
58
The Wife does not deny having accessed the SDB multiple times between 27 August 2018 and 18 October 2023. Her position is that in doing so, she only removed items belonging to herself and the Children; and she has adduced in evidence some images allegedly showing the Husband’s items still untouched in the DBS SDB. While the Husband has argued that the images are undated and therefore unreliable, he has not been able to produce any evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case against the Wife.
59
Additionally, at the hearing before me, counsel for the Wife informed me that the Wife had previously provided a list of the jewellery items removed by her from the DBS SDB; and that pursuant to this disclosure, the Husband had asked for the diamond set disclosed in her list to be valued. The diamond set was sent for valuation (with the Wife’s consent), and its value was subsequently included in the matrimonial pool as part of the Wife’s assets (see [34(n)] and [34(o)] above). Critically, the Husband did not request a valuation of the remaining jewellery items disclosed by the Wife.
60
Having regard to the evidence available, I am of the view that the Wife has provided full and frank disclosure of the items removed by her from the DBS SDB, and that there is no basis for drawing an adverse inference against her.
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Conclusion and consequential orders relating to the matrimonial assets
61
In light of the above findings, I conclude that it is just and equitable in this case to divide the matrimonial assets equally between the Husband and the Wife, such that each party is entitled to 50% of the total matrimonial pool of $5,490,113.99. As the total value of the matrimonial assets is an odd number and cannot be divided exactly, I order that the Husband should receive $2,745,057 and the Wife should receive $2,745,056.99.
62
As the Husband has indicated a wish to retain the Matrimonial Home and has requested that the Wife’s interest in the Matrimonial Home be transferred to him, I find that it is fair that the Wife’s rights, title and interest in the Matrimonial Home be transferred to the Husband (with no CPF refunds to be made by the Husband to the Wife’s CPF account) upon the payment of $725,122.08 (ie 50% of the agreed net value of the Matrimonial Home) by the Husband to the Wife.
63
After accounting for the cash consideration representing her share of the Matrimonial Home and the assets held in her sole name, the Wife is entitled to be paid another $1,617,116.93. I therefore order that parties close the Joint DBS Bank Account; that the Husband retain the monies in this account; and that the Husband then make payment of $1,617,116.93 to the Wife.
64
I note that in the letter sent by his counsel on 27 July 2026, the Husband has belatedly asked for the Wife to reimburse him for the mortgage payments made by him for the period from the date of IJ to the date of this judgment. According to the Husband, these mortgage payments amount to $126,630 (50% x $7,236 x 35 months (September 2023 to August 2026, both months inclusive)).
65
In the Wife’s further submissions in response to the 27 July 2026 letter, she has submitted that the Husband’s request is inconsistent with the broad-brush approach in TNL v TNK, as his request means that the Wife will be contributing to the mortgage repayments for the Matrimonial Home without the additional direct financial contribution being credited to her. I disagree. TNL v TNK treats both spouses’ contributions in the economic and homemaking spheres as equally fundamental to the well-being of a marital partnership (at [45]). Our courts have repeatedly held that once IJ is granted, the marriage contract has – for all practical purposes – come to an end (see, for example, ARY v ARX [2016] 2 SLR 686 at [28] and [32]). In respect of determining parties’ contributions to the marriage, just as the Wife is not expected to contribute in the homemaking sphere after the date of IJ, the Husband cannot be expected to contribute in the economic sphere to the (now terminated) marital partnership.
Costs
Indeed, in the present case, the Husband’s bank accounts are valued as at 30 September 2023. Any payments he made from these bank accounts after 30 September 2023 thus constitute his own monies which no longer form part of the matrimonial pool. On the other hand, the Matrimonial Home is only valued as at 28 February 2026. In other words, from 30 September 2023 to 28 February 2026, the Husband was using his own monies (which are not accounted for in the division of matrimonial assets) to make mortgage repayments which directly resulted in a higher net value for the Matrimonial Home – a benefit which the Wife now reaps in the division of the matrimonial assets. Having reaped the benefit of these mortgage repayments, it is also just and equitable that the Wife should share the cost of the mortgage repayments. I reiterate that this is because in this case, the repayments were made after IJ, ie after the marital partnership is deemed to have ceased.
Costs
In my view, the cost of the mortgage repayments should be shared between the parties in the division ratio of 50:50 which I have arrived at. This is because the mortgage repayments directly affect the value of the Matrimonial Home. Where the Matrimonial Home appreciates in value, this benefit (arising from the mortgage repayments) should, in my view, be shared between parties equally; and likewise, the cost of the mortgage repayments should be shared by them equally.
68
As to quantum, the Husband has based his calculations on 35 months’ worth of mortgage repayments, spanning from September 2023 to August 2026 (both months inclusive). Following from the findings I have just set out, however, the Wife should reimburse the Husband only for those amounts he paid which directly affected the net value of the Matrimonial Home; ie, the period between the valuation of his bank accounts and the valuation of the Matrimonial Home. After the date of valuation of the Matrimonial Home, the mortgage repayments made by the Husband would have resulted in an increase in the net value of the Matrimonial Home which – given my order that he retain the Matrimonial Home (on the terms stated in [62] above) – he will now enjoy solely. Accordingly, the Wife is to reimburse to the Husband 50% of the mortgage repayments made in the period from October 2023 to February 2026 (both months inclusive).
69
I also note that the Wife has taken issue with the Husband’s reliance on the figure of $7,236 as the alleged monthly mortgage repayment sum. The Wife has highlighted that this figure is based on the monthly mortgage repayments as at January 2024, and that the Husband’s calculation does not account for subsequent reductions in the monthly instalments. I agree. Having regard to the relatively short period of mortgage repayments involved (October 2023 to February 2026), I order that the Husband’s counsel is to provide the Wife’s counsel with documentary proof of the Husband’s actual mortgage repayment amounts for this period. Upon such documentary proof being provided to and verified by the Wife’s counsel, the Husband may proceed to deduct 50% of his total mortgage repayments for this period from the sum which he is to transfer to the Wife for her share of matrimonial assets.
70
For the avoidance of doubt, the Husband is to remain solely responsible for the mortgage repayments, since he will now be the one reaping the benefits of such mortgage repayments.
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Spousal maintenance
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Applicable law
71
I next address the Wife’s claim for spousal maintenance. Pursuant to s 113(1) WC, this court has the power to order the Husband to pay maintenance to the Wife. The court is to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the matters listed at s 114(1) WC. The court should endeavour to place the parties, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down: s 114(2) WC.
72
In ATE v ATD [2016] SGCA 2 (“ATE v ATD”), the Court of Appeal highlighted that “the overarching principle embodied in s 114(2) is that of financial preservation, which requires the wife to be maintained at a standard that is, to a reasonable extent, commensurate with the standard of living she had enjoyed during the marriage – but … s 114(2) [also] had to be applied in a ‘commonsense holistic manner that takes into account the new realities that flow from the breakdown of marriage’”: at [31]. The Court of Appeal also reaffirmed its earlier decision in Foo Ah Yan v Chiam Heng Chow [2012] 2 SLR 506 that the objectives of an interim maintenance order and a final maintenance order are different, and that the court’s power to order maintenance is supplementary to the power to order division of matrimonial assets (at [31]). This is seen in TNL v TNK, where the Court held (at [63]) that “if, from the division of matrimonial assets, there is a sum which, if invested properly, would be sufficient to maintain the wife, the award of maintenance should be no more than what is necessary to allow the wife to … weather the transition of divorce”.
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My decision
73
In this case, the Wife originally sought lump sum maintenance of $300,000 (equivalent to $5,000 per month for a period of five years). In making this submission, the Wife stated that her monthly personal expenses amounted to $7,816.56, and while she did not expect to be maintained at the same level that she was accustomed to during the marriage, she required maintenance nonetheless in order to weather the transition of the divorce. Subsequent to the hearing, however, counsel for the Wife wrote in on 27 July 2026 to say that the Wife had revised her position on spousal maintenance. In gist, having proposed that the Matrimonial Home be sold, the Wife now seeks maintenance of $2,000 per month until the completion of the sale.
74
The Husband, for his part, submits that no spousal maintenance should be ordered, since the Wife is “likely to receive a substantial share of the matrimonial assets which ought to provide sufficient income to sustain herself”, and she has moreover a substantial amount of inheritance monies which she has allegedly lent to others (with these loans yet to be repaid to her).
75
I agree with the Husband that no spousal maintenance ought to be ordered. Pursuant to my findings on the division of matrimonial assets, the Wife will be receiving $2,745,056.99 (inclusive of assets held in her own name and a sum representing her share of the Matrimonial Home). To borrow the words of the Court of Appeal in TNL v TNK, this is “a sum which, if invested properly, would be sufficient to maintain the wife”, and I do not think that a further maintenance order is necessary for the Wife to weather the transition of divorce.
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Conclusion
76
For the reasons explained above, my orders are:
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(a) Upon payment of cash in the sum of $725,122.08 from the Husband to the Wife, the Wife’s rights, title and interest in the Matrimonial Home shall be transferred (other than by way of sale) to the Husband, with no CPF refunds to be made by the Husband to the Wife’s CPF Account. The transfer shall be made within six months from the date of this judgment. The Husband shall bear the costs related to the transfer.
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(b) Following the above transfer, the Wife shall be responsible for refunding, from her share of the matrimonial assets to her CPF Account, any CPF monies used by her for the purchase of the Matrimonial Home (together with any accrued interest).
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(c) In the event of a subsequent disposal of the Matrimonial Home by the Husband, the Husband shall be responsible for refunding to his CPF Account the CPF monies used by him for the purchase of the Matrimonial Home (together with any accrued interest).
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(d) The CPF Board shall determine the amount of any refunds to be made by the parties to their respective accounts, in accordance with the provisions of the CPF Act and the subsidiary legislation made thereunder. Unless expressly provided for in the CPF Act, nothing in the orders herein shall be taken to affect the CPF Board’s charge on the matrimonial home.
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(e) The Wife shall vacate the Matrimonial Home within six months from the date of this judgment. Until such time as the Wife has vacated the Matrimonial Home, the parties shall be jointly responsible for the MCST charges, property tax and utilities for the Matrimonial Home. Thereafter, the Husband shall be solely responsible for the same. For the avoidance of doubt, the Husband is to remain solely responsible for the mortgage repayments.
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(f) Within three months of the date of this judgment, parties are to close the Joint DBS Bank Account and the Husband shall retain all monies in the said account. Upon the closure of the Joint DBS Bank Account, the Husband is to pay the Wife $1,617,116.93, being her share of the matrimonial assets ($2,745,056.99), less the following sums: (1) the assets in the Wife’s sole name ($402,817.98); (2) the value of the Wife’s share of the Matrimonial Home ($725,122.08); and (3) 50% of the mortgage repayments made by the Husband from October 2023 to February 2026 (both months inclusive) – subject to the Husband’s counsel providing the Wife’s counsel with documentary proof of the actual mortgage repayments made in the said period and the Wife’s counsel verifying the amounts.
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(g) Within one month from the date of this judgment, the Husband shall transfer all of the Wife’s insurance policies to the Wife. Thereafter, the Wife shall be solely responsible for all insurance policies in her name and for her benefit.
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(h) The parties are to retain all other assets in their sole names.
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(i) There shall be no maintenance for the Wife. The interim maintenance order (FC/ORC 5455/2023) is rescinded from the date of this order, but does not affect any liability accrued up to the date of this order.
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(j) The Registrar and Assistant Registrars of the Family Justice Courts are empowered under the Family Justice Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed) to execute, sign and/or indorse all necessary documents relating to the matters dealt with in these orders, on behalf of either party should such party fail to do so within seven days of written request being made to such party. In such event, the defaulting party shall be liable for all costs and expenses incurred.
para
(k) Both parties, as well as the CPF Board, shall have liberty to apply.
Costs
Having regard to the nature of these proceedings and the findings I have arrived at, I find that it is fair to order that each party bear his or her own costs of these proceedings; and I so order.
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Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi Judge of the High Court
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Amolat Singh and Helena Amolak (Amolat & Partners) for the Plaintiff;
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Alvina Chitra Logan, Lim Junchen Xavier and Sankari Siva Sankaran (Yeo & Associates LLC) for the Defendant.
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Annex 1: Table of matrimonial assets
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