As enacted

Commentary · As enacted

[SAL Ann Rev]: Competition Law

The text

(2024)

25 SAL Ann Rev 1

(Published on e-First 10 September 2026)

10. COMPETITION LAW

Kala ANANDARAJAH

LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore),

MBA (Banking and Finance)

(Nanyang Technological University of Singapore);

Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);

Partner, Head, Competition & Antitrust and Trade Practice,

Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP.

Introduction 10.1

The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore

(“CCS”), which adopted its refreshed corporate identity (moving from “CCCS” to “CCS”) as part of its 20th anniversary celebrations on 25 September 2025, maintained a sustained level of activity across all pillars that it has authority over. CCS pursued cartel enforcement action, imposing approximately S$10m in combined financial penalties across two infringement decisions, cleared several merger transactions across diverse sectors, and increased its focus on its consumer protection efforts with a particular emphasis on misleading online practices, content generated by artificial intelligence (“AI”), and the protection of vulnerable consumers. CCS also undertook important policy and legislative initiatives, including consultations on merger assessment procedures, settlement frameworks, and the harmonisation of competition regulation across the telecommunications and media sectors. On 1 July 2025, CCS consolidated consumer product safety and legal metrology functions which were previously administered by Enterprise Singapore.

This equips CCS with a unified authority with broader levers across competition and consumer mandates.

10.2

This article provides a comprehensive review of the developments in 2025, organised under the categories of (a) cartels and anti-competitive agreements; (b) abuse of dominance; (c) mergers; and

(d)

consumer protection, with analysis of the legal reasoning, penalty methodology, enforcement philosophy, and practical implications for practitioners.

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II.

Cartels and anti-competitive agreements

Bid‑rigging in public sector tenders: Trust-Build Engineering

& Construction Pte Ltd and Hunan Fengtian Construction

Group Co, Ltd 10.3

On 23 May 2025, CCS issued an infringement decision against

Trust-Build Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“TB”) and Hunan

Fengtian Construction Group Co, Ltd (“HNFT”) for bid‑rigging conduct relating to three invitations to tender called by the People’s

Association (“PA”) for upgrading works at three Community Clubs.1 CCS commenced investigations in July 2023 based on information received from PA, which had itself noticed potential bid‑rigging activity before the tenders were awarded.

10.4

Following its investigations, CCS found that HNFT had prepared TB’s tender submissions and proposed TB’s bid prices for each of the tenders, thereby removing all competitive pressure between them to submit independent and competitive offers to PA. The finding of a restriction by object followed from the nature of the conduct, which mirrored, in CCS’s view, classic bid suppression and cover pricing patterns: one party formulated the other’s bid price, eliminating any prospect of genuine competitive rivalry. CCS imposed financial penalties on both parties amounting to a total of S$4,644,409.

10.5

Notably, CCS made it clear that the fact that none of the tenders were ultimately awarded to the bid‑rigging parties had little bearing on its determination of penalties.

10.6

Separately, on penalty calculation, CCS took the view that limiting the penalty calculation to turnover attributable to tenders that were awarded would defeat the objectives of the competition penalty regime, which are to reflect the seriousness of the infringement and to deter such anti-competitive practices. This underscores CCS’s zero‑tolerance stance towards cartel activities, particularly bid‑rigging, and establishes that outcome-based arguments, which seek to establish the absence of actual harm, will not provide the parties with a safe 1

CCCS 500-100-2023-001 (23 May 2025); Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “CCCS Imposes a Total of $4.6m Penalties On Contractors for Rigging

Bids in Public Sector Tenders”, media release (23 May 2025) <https://www.ccs.

gov.sg/media-and-events/newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/cccs-imposes-a-total-of--4-6m-penalties-on-contractors-for-rigging-bids-in-public-sector-tenders/> (accessed 4 June 2026).

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Competition Law harbour. A further note of the obvious is that providing assistance to a rival in preparing its tender is treated as paradigmatic collusion.

Information exchange between remittance service providers 10.7

On 31 July 2025, CCS issued an infringement decision against

ZGR Global Pte Ltd (“ZGR”) and Hanshan Money Express Pte Ltd

(“HS”) for engaging in alleged anti-competitive conduct in the market for outward remittance of Chinese yuan (“CNY”).2 CCS commenced investigations in April 2020 based on a complaint received from a member of the public. It found that ZGR and HS had regularly exchanged information on each other’s outward remittance rates for the

CNY, which influenced the setting of their respective CNY remittance rates and thereby undermined competition in the market for CNY remittance services.

10.8

In reviewing the decision, CCS noted that the data exchanged was price-related, competitor-specific, and sufficiently current and frequent to reduce strategic uncertainty, facilitate tacit alignment, and thereby restrict rivalry in a market where marginal rate differences could drive customer switching. CCS accordingly treated the exchange as a restriction by object. CCS imposed financial penalties on both parties amounting to a total of S$5,365,007. An additional discount of 10% was applied to reduce HS’s financial penalties as a result of its admission of liability under the Fast Track Procedure, in addition to a discount for co‑operation with CCS’s investigation.

10.9

This case is noteworthy as it sets out CCS’s views on the breadth of the s 34 Competition Act 20043 (“CA”) prohibition. The prohibition captures not only “hard-core” cartel conduct such as price‑fixing and bid‑rigging, but also the exchange of commercially sensitive information that serves to align competitors’ pricing behaviour.

The decision is currently pending an appeal to the Competition Appeal

Board by ZGR, underscoring that parties may continue to contest the line between benchmarking and anti-competitive signalling.

CCCS 500-100-2020-003 (31 July 2025); Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “CCCS Penalises Chinese Yuan Remittance Service Providers $5.36

Million for Illegal Information Exchange”, media release (31 July 2025) <https://

www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-events/newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/cccs-penalises-chinese-yuan-remittance-service-providers--5-36-million-for-illegal-information-exchange/> (accessed 4 June 2026).

3 2020 Rev Ed.

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How Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore calculates financial penalties 10.10

The two infringement decisions issued in the review period and an infringement decision issued in 2024 (regarding Flex Connect

Pte Ltd (“FL”) and Tarkus Interiors Pte Ltd (“Tarkus”))4 collectively illustrate CCS’s structured approach to calculating financial penalties as set out under the “CCS Guidelines on the Appropriate Amount of Penalty in Competition Cases”.5 The methodology follows a six‑step framework that practitioners should understand in detail, as it directly shapes the quantum of exposure in any s 34 or s 47 CA case.

(a)

Step 1 – Starting point based on relevant turnover.

CCS begins by identifying the undertaking’s relevant turnover in Singapore – that being the turnover of the undertaking in the relevant product and geographic market affected by the infringement – for the undertaking’s business year preceding the date of CCS’s infringement decision. In the bid‑rigging cases, the relevant turnover was linked to the construction and interior fit‑out services markets respectively, while in the remittance case, it was the turnover attributable to outward CNY remittance services. Importantly, in the TB/HNFT case, CCS rejected the argument that relevant turnover should be limited to turnover from tenders actually awarded to the infringing parties, reasoning that such a limitation would defeat the objectives of the penalty regime. A percentage of the relevant turnover (up to 10%) is then applied, informed by the nature and seriousness of the infringement, to derive the starting-point amount.

(b)

Step 2 – Adjustment for duration. The starting-point amount is then multiplied by a factor reflecting the duration of the infringement. Longer-lasting infringements attract higher multipliers. In the FL/Tarkus case,6 the bid‑rigging persisted over approximately five years across 12 tenders, which would have materially increased the duration multiplier. In the 4

CCCS 500-100-2021-001 (20 December 2024); Competition and Consumer

Commission of

Singapore,

“CCCS

Penalises

Contractors

Specialising in

Non‑Residential

Interior

Fit‑Out

Tenders for

Bid‑Rigging”, media release

(20

December 2024)

<https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-events/

newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/cccs-penalises-contractors-specialising‑in‑non-residential-interior-fit-out-tenders-for-bid-rigging-251/>

(accessed 4 June 2026).

Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “CCS Guidelines on the

Appropriate Amount of Penalty in Competition Cases” (revised 2022).

This case was discussed in Kala Anandarajah, “Competition Law” (2024) 25 SAL

Ann Rev 246 at paras 10.28–10.32.

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Competition Law

ZGR/HS remittance case, the regular and sustained nature of the information exchange was similarly relevant to the duration assessment.

(c)

Step 3 – Adjustment for aggravating and mitigating factors. CCS then adjusts the penalty upward or downward to account for aggravating factors (such as the role of a ringleader or organiser, coercion of other parties to participate, repeated infringement or continued participation after the commencement of an investigation) and mitigating factors (such as genuine uncertainty as to whether the conduct constituted an infringement, limited involvement, co‑operation with CCS’s investigation or voluntary termination of the infringement prior to CCS’s intervention). In each of the three decisions,

CCS expressly stated that it took into account the nature and seriousness of the infringement and aggravating and mitigating factors in calibrating penalties.

(d)

Step 4 – Adjustment for deterrence. CCS may further adjust the penalty to ensure that it serves as an effective deterrent, both to the infringing undertaking (ie, specific deterrence) and to other undertakings in the market (ie, general deterrence). This step allows CCS to increase the penalty where, for example, the undertaking’s relevant turnover is small relative to its overall size and resources, such that the penalty calculated at Steps 1 to 3

above may not sufficiently deter future infringements.

(e)

Step 5 – Adjustment for the statutory maximum.

The penalty is then checked against the statutory cap of 10%

of the undertaking’s turnover in Singapore for each year of infringement, up to a maximum of three years. If the calculated penalty exceeds this cap, it is reduced accordingly.

(f)

Step 6 – Adjustment for leniency, Fast Track

Procedure, and other reductions. Finally, CCS applies any applicable reductions. Two structured discount regimes featured prominently in the cases. Under CCS’s leniency framework, the first undertaking to report a cartel and provide evidence may receive total immunity from financial penalties, while subsequent applicants may receive reductions of up to 50%, depending on the value and timing of their co‑operation.

In the FL/Tarkus decision, FL applied for and was granted leniency, resulting in a leniency discount being applied to its financial penalty.7 The Fast Track Procedure offers a reduction in financial penalties (typically 10%) in exchange for an undertaking’s 7

See Kala Anandarajah, “Competition Law” (2024) 25 SAL Ann Rev 246 at para 10.31.

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25 SAL Ann Rev admission of liability at an early stage. In the ZGR/HS decision,

HS received a 10% Fast Track discount in addition to a separate discount for co‑operation with CCS’s investigation.

10.11

The combined penalties in the three infringement decisions amounted to approximately S$19.9m: S$4,644,409 for TB/HNFT,

S$9,999,181 for FL/Tarkus, and S$5,365,007 for ZGR/HS. These figures demonstrate that CCS is prepared to impose substantial penalties even on small and medium-sized enterprises, reinforcing the deterrent effect of the regime. For practitioners, the key strategic takeaway is that the penalty framework offers meaningful scope for mitigation through early engagement: a combination of leniency and Fast Track admissions can materially reduce exposure, while the absence of co‑operation and the presence of aggravating factors can significantly increase it.

The TB/HNFT decision additionally underscores that the absence of actual harm (ie, where the rigged tenders were not awarded) does not provide a basis for penalty reduction, as CCS’s penalty framework is calibrated to reflect the seriousness of the conduct itself rather than its concrete effects.

Airline co‑operation: conditional approvals and commitments 10.12

In 2025, CCS assessed three airline co‑operation agreements under s 34 of the CA. Each agreement had raised competition concerns regarding specific origin-destination city pair routes, which were resolved through conditional approval subject to behavioural commitments.

10.13

On 28 January 2025, CCS granted conditional approval for the expanded joint venture between Singapore Airlines Ltd

(“SIA”) and Deutsche Lufthansa AG.8 CCS determined that the anti‑competitive impact on two routes, namely Singapore-Frankfurt and

Singapore‑Zurich (and vice versa), would be significant, as the applicants held close to an 80% combined market share on each route. CCS assessed theories of harm centred on the co‑ordinated price and capacity of flights between these city pairs, considered barriers to entry and the historical pace of competitive entry, and weighed the claimed benefits under the net economic benefits exclusion but found them insufficient to outweigh the 8

CCCS 400-110-2022-001 (28 January 2025); Competition and Consumer

Commission of Singapore, “CCCS Grants Conditional Approval for the Proposed

Expanded Joint Venture Between Singapore Airlines and Deutsche Lufthansa

AG After Accepting Commitments”, media release (31 January 2025) <https://www.

ccs.gov.sg/media-and-events/newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/cccs-grants-conditional-approval-for-the-proposed-expanded-joint-venture-between-singapore-airlines-and-deutsche-lufthansa-ag-after-accepting-commitments/>

(accessed 4 June 2026).

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Competition Law identified harm. Following this, and on submission by the parties, CCS reviewed and accepted commitments extending to minimum weekly seat capacity and minimum passenger numbers, with a requirement for independent auditor monitoring.

10.14

On 21 March 2025, CCS granted conditional approval for the proposed commercial co‑operation between SIA and All Nippon

Airways Co, Ltd for scheduled air passenger transport services between Singapore and Japan.9 CCS determined that the applicants had sustained a high combined market share on the Singapore-Tokyo route, and that there were significant barriers to entry and expansion.

The commitments included stipulated seat capacity maintenance, the development and submission of a credible growth business plan, reporting on schedules and capacity at the carrier level, and independent auditing.

10.15

On 7 July 2025, CCS cleared the proposed commercial co‑operation between SIA and Malaysia Airlines Berhad despite noting that price and capacity co‑ordination would restrict competition on the

Singapore-Kuala Lumpur route.10 The clearance was granted on the basis of commitments having been provided by the parties and accepted by

CCS, including maintaining a minimum seat capacity, developing business plans, and appointing an independent auditor.

Block exemption order for liner shipping agreements 10.16

On 28 October 2024, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, pursuant to CCS’s recommendations, renewed the Competition (Block

Exemption for Liner Shipping Agreements) Order11 (“Renewed LSA

CCCS 400-110-2021-001 (21 March 2025); Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “CCCS Grants Conditional Approval for the Proposed Commercial

Cooperation Between Singapore Airlines Limited and All Nippon Airways Co,

Ltd”, media release (21 March 2025) <https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-events/

newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/cccs-grants-conditional-approval-for-the-proposed-commercial-cooperation-between-singapore-airlines-limited-and-all-nippon-airways-co---ltd-/> (accessed 4 June 2026).

CCCS/400/110/2019/002 (7 July 2025); Competition and Consumer Commission of

Singapore, “CCCS Approves Proposed Commercial Cooperation Between Singapore

Airlines and Malaysia Airlines After Accepting Commitments”, media release (7 July

2025) <https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-events/newsroom/announcements‑and-media-releases/cccs-approves-proposed-commercial-cooperation-between-singapore-airlines-and-malaysia-airlines-after-accepting-commitments/> (accessed 4 June 2026).

11 2006 Rev Ed.

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BEO”) for five years, ie, from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029.12 The

Renewed LSA BEO continues to apply to vessel sharing agreements for liner shipping services and price discussion agreements for feeder services.

However, from 1 January 2025, the Renewed LSA BEO no longer covers inland carriage, reflecting current industry practice. A transitional provision allowed existing liner shipping agreements involving inland carriage signed on or before 31 December 2024 to benefit from the block exemption for one further year until 31 December 2025. For shipping clients, the substantive point is that intra-port co‑ordination under qualifying liner shipping agreements remains block-exempt, but the inland leg now demands either self-assessment for compliance under s 34 of the CA or bespoke comfort.

Environmental sustainability collaboration guidance 10.17

On 3 January 2025, CCS provided positive guidance that the joint establishment and operation of Beverage Container Return

Scheme (BCRS) Ltd (“BCRS”) by Coca-Cola Singapore Beverages Pte

Ltd, F&N Foods Pte Ltd, and Pokka Pte Ltd was unlikely to infringe s 34 or s 47 of the CA. This was the first Notification for Guidance where CCS applied its streamlined process under its “Guidance Note

On Business Collaborations Pursuing Environmental Sustainability

Objectives”,13 completing its assessment within 30 working days. In so concluding, CCS had also considered the following facts: (a) that BCRS was a not‑for-profit, regulated scheme operator with clear governance;

(b)

that BCRS had limited scope that complied with statutory obligations;

and (c) that there was no spillover into price or output co‑ordination in adjacent competitive parameters.

III.

Abuse of dominance 10.18

There were no reported enforcement actions by CCS under s 47

of the CA (which prohibits abuse of a dominant market position) during the review period. This is consistent with the broader trend in Singapore,

Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “CCCS Recommends

Five-Year Renewal of the Block Exemption Order for Liner Shipping Agreements”, media release (28 October 2024) (accessed 4 June 2026). See also the Competition

(Block Exemption for Liner Shipping Agreements) Order (2006 Rev Ed), which was renewed in 2025.

Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “Guidance Note On Business

Collaboration Pursuing Environmental Sustainability Objectives” (1 March 2024)

<https://isomer-user-content.by.gov.sg/45/cce9033c-f1c0-41ac-9fc1-e9420d79c256/

CCCS%20Environmental%20Sustainability%20Collaboration%20Guidance%20

Note_full.pdf> (accessed 4 June 2026).

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Competition Law where s 47 cases have been relatively infrequent compared to s 34 cartel enforcement cases. Nevertheless, CCS considered and cleared the BCRS collaboration against both ss 34 and 47, and CCS’s growing focus on digital markets, algorithms and platform governance – evidenced by the

AI Markets Toolkit (“AIM Toolkit”) and related consultations – suggests that s 47 enforcement could gain momentum in future periods.

IV.

Mergers

Overview 10.19

CCS was active in the review of merger transactions under s 54 of the CA, clearing a number of significant transactions across a diverse range of sectors, including advertising and media buying, private healthcare and eldercare, intermodal container logistics and automotive commercial vehicles. These were cleared in Phase 1 and without remedies.

Advertising and marketing: Omnicom Group Inc/Interpublic

Group of Companies 10.20

On 24 April 2025, CCS cleared the proposed acquisition of Interpublic Group of Companies by Omnicom Group Inc in the markets for marketing communications services, media buying services, and procurement of media buying services in Singapore.14

CCS concluded that the proposed acquisition was unlikely to substantially lessen competition as there were many alternative suppliers that customers could easily switch between, services were often procured through tenders and any potential increase in market power would likely be constrained by media owners across traditional channels and digital media platforms.

CCS 400-140-2025-004 (7 October 2025); Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “CCCS Clears Proposed Acquisition of Interpublic Group of

Companies By Omnicom Group Inc.”, media release (24 April 2025) <https://www.

ccs.gov.sg/media-and-events/newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/cccs-clears-proposed-acquisition-of-interpublic-group-of-companies-by-omnicom-group-inc-/> (accessed 4 June 2026).

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Medical oncology: TalkMed Group Ltd/Tamarind Health Ltd 10.21

On 27 June 2025, CCS cleared the proposed acquisition of

TalkMed Group Ltd by Tamarind Health Ltd.15 CCS found that the acquisition was unlikely to substantially lessen competition given the presence of alternative providers in both the public and private sector, the ability of patients to switch providers, and the constraining role of insurers and the healthcare regulatory framework.

Vehicle and spare parts: Hino Motors, Ltd/Mitsubishi Fuso

Truck and Bus Corp 10.22

On 7 October 2025, CCS cleared the proposed merger between

Hino Motors, Ltd and Mitsubishi Fuso Truck and Bus Corp.16 The relevant markets comprised the supply of light commercial vehicles, medium‑duty trucks, and heavy-duty trucks in Singapore. CCS was satisfied that the merger would not result in a substantial lessening of competition given the presence of significant competitors (including

Chinese and Korean manufacturers who had significantly accelerated their market entry), as well as the ease of switching, low barriers to entry and strong countervailing buyer power. Indeed, CCS took recent market entry seriously, recognising accelerated sales traction by Chinese and

Korean brands as a real competitive constraint.

Logistics: Global Sea Containers Ltd/ Typewriter Ascend Ltd 10.23

On 19 August 2025, CCS cleared the proposed acquisition of Global Sea Containers Ltd by Typewriter Ascend Ltd in the market for the global supply of intermodal containers.17 CCS found that the acquisition was unlikely to lead to a substantial lessening of competition 15

CCCS 400-140-2025-001 (27 June 2025); Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “CCCS Clears Proposed Acquisition of TalkMed Group Limited By

Tamarind Health Limited”, media release (27 June 2025) <https://www.ccs.gov.sg/

media-and-events/newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/cccs-clears-proposed-acquisition-of-talkmed-group-limited-by-tamarind-health-limited/>

(accessed 4 June 2026).

CCS 400-140-2025-004 (7 October 2025); Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “CCS Clears the Proposed Merger Between Hino Motors Limited and

Mitsubishi Fuso Truck and Bus Corporation”, announcement (7 October 2025)

<https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-events/newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/ccs-clears-the-proposed-merger-between-hino-motors-limited-and-mitsubishi-fuso-truck-and-bus-corporation/> (accessed 4 June 2026).

CCCS 400-140-2025-004 (19 August 2025); Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “CCCS Clears Proposed Acquisition of Global Sea Containers Limited

By Typewriter Ascend Ltd”, media release (19 August 2025) <https://www.ccs.gov.

sg/media-and-events/newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/cccs-clears-

(cont’d on the next page)

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Competition Law as the parties were not each other’s closest competitor, there were many alternative suppliers, there were low barriers to entry and expansion, and customers were likely to have bargaining power.

Healthcare: Econ Healthcare (Asia) Ltd/TPG Inc 10.24

CCS cleared the proposed acquisition of Econ Healthcare (Asia)

Ltd by TPG Inc,18 concluding that the transaction had not resulted in a substantial lessening of competition in relation to the supply of non‑residential care services and the supply of both subsidised and unsubsidised nursing home services in Singapore. CCS noted the low market shares, presence of viable competitors, constraints on price increases under Ministry of Health schemes for subsidised nursing home services, potential for competitors to switch supply of capacity to unsubsidised services and fragmented markets comprising a mix of for‑profit and non‑profit suppliers.

Proposed changes to merger and settlement procedures 10.25

CCS consulted in October–November 2025 on streamlining its Guidelines on Merger Procedure.19 The proposed changes aimed to shorten assessment timeframes, clarify information requirements, and offer stronger early resolution incentives in conduct cases. These reforms have now been introduced with effect from 1 May 202620 and allow for more straightforward transactions to be cleared in a much shorter time frame. The streamlined approach also sees changes to the issues letter phase and the phase 2 timelines, rejigging the time to be spent at each stage.

proposed-acquisition-of-global-sea-containers-limited-by-typewriter-ascend-ltd/>

(accessed 4 June 2026).

CCCS 400-140-2025-008 (9 October 2025); Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, “CCS Clears the Proposed Acquisition of Econ Healthcare (Asia)

Limited By TPG Inc”, announcement (9 October 2025) <https://www.ccs.gov.sg/

media-and-events/newsroom/announcements-and-media-releases/ccs-clears-the-proposed-acquisition-of-econ-healthcare--asia--limited-by-tpg-inc-/>

(accessed 4 June 2026).

“Proposed Changes to the CCS Guidelines and New Guidelines On CCS’s

Settlement Procedure”, Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore

(27 October 2025) <https://isomer-user-content.by.gov.sg/45/d76f8e15-32e8-431a-

9f76‑97bed74582c8/Consultation%20Paper.pdf> (accessed 4 June 2026).

“Public Consultation On Proposed Changes to Two Key Guidelines On

Competition”, Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (19 June 2026)

<https://www.ccs.gov.sg/case-register/public-consultations/closed---legislations-and-policies/public-consultation-on-proposed-changes-to-two-key-guidelines-on-competition/> (accessed 25 June 2026).

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Telecommunications and media sector harmonisation 10.26

The Ministry of Digital Development and Information and the

Infocomm Media Development Authority (“IMDA”) issued a public consultation on the draft Info-communications Media Development

Authority (Amendment) Bill,21 proposing amendments to harmonise and refine the treatment of market competition issues across the telecommunication and media sectors. Key proposed amendments include provisions on thresholds for acquisition transactions requiring

IMDA’s approval, the extent to which anti-competitive agreements will be rendered void, the power to order structural