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[SAL Ann Rev]: Equity & Trusts

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(2025)

26 SAL Ann Rev 1

(Published on e-First 21 October 2026)

16. EQUITY AND TRUSTS

TANG Hang Wu

PhD, LLM (Cambridge), LLB (National University of Singapore);

Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);

Professor, Yong Pung How School of Law,

Singapore Management University.

TAY Yong Seng

MA Law (Oxford), BCL (Oxford);

Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);

Partner, Allen & Gledhill LLP, Singapore.

16.1

A recurring theme in the decisions in 2025 is the courts’

continuing reluctance to mechanistically apply the six-step Chan Yuen

Lan v See Fong Mun1 (“Chan Yuen Lan”) framework to common intention constructive trusts, with the courts in Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe2

and Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong3 instead preferring to ascertain the parties’ actual intentions, whether express or inferred, as the true determinant of beneficial ownership. This shift reflects a broader judicial discomfort with rigid doctrinal tests in favour of a more fact-sensitive inquiry into the parties’ true intentions. The Court of Appeal’s landmark decision in Wong Mei Lee Millie v Ngor Shing Rong Jake4 (“Millie

Wong v Jake Ngor”) reinforces this trend, reaffirming that the Chan Yuen

Lan presumptions operate only as tools of last resort, while also holding that registering a property in a 99:1 ownership ratio to avoid additional buyer’s stamp duty (“ABSD”) may taint a resulting trust with illegality.

Beyond disputes over family and matrimonial property, the courts also grappled with equitable remedies for fraud and misappropriation, most notably in Envy Asset Management Pte Ltd v Ng Yu Zhi,5 which examined the boundaries of fiduciary duty, dishonest assistance and knowing receipt in the context of a Ponzi scheme. The decision of the General

Division of the High Court (“General Division”) in Madison Pacific Trust

Ltd v David Salim6 (“Madison Pacific Trust”) further clarified the limits of a court-appointed receiver’s powers over privileged material.

[2014] 3 SLR 1048.

[2025] SGHC 209.

[2025] 5 SLR 219.

[2026] 1 SLR 600.

Envy Asset Management Pte Ltd v Ng Yu Zhi [2025] SGHC 143 (this case is partially reported in [2025] 5 SLR 87) (“Envy Asset Management”).

[2025] 4 SLR 1512.

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26 SAL Ann Rev

Express trust 16.2

The case of Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe7 concerns a dispute between the defendant-mother, Sauw Tjiauw Koe (“Koe”), and the plaintiff-daughter, Jenny Prawesti (“Prawesti”), over (a) 26 properties, purchased between 2002 and 2012 in the names of Koe, Prawesti, and

Prawesti’s younger brother, Ronny (“26 Properties”); and (b) shares

(registered in Prawesti’s name) in a company established by Koe, ST Travel

Pte Ltd (“ST Travel”).8 This case is another instance of the many cases in

Singapore involving intergenerational disputes over property.9 16.3

The first of the 26 Properties (“Centrepoint Property”) was purchased by Koe in 2002 under Koe and Prawesti’s names as joint tenants.10 According to Prawesti, Koe had promised Prawesti that the two of them would continue to purchase properties together as equal owners in the future.11 However, Koe claimed that she was “only using [Prawesti’s]

name in [Koe’s] property investments for reasons of convenience and to teach [Prawesti] about property investment”.12 16.4

The remaining 25 of the 26 Properties were acquired between 2005 and 2012, with most properties being registered such that Koe held a 90% interest, while Prawesti and her brother Ronny held 1% and 9%

respectively.13 To facilitate these transactions and property management,

Prawesti executed four powers of attorney between 2007 and 2018, granting Koe authority to act on Prawesti’s behalf.14 16.5

In 2007, at Prawesti’s request, Koe signed a Letter of Indemnity

(“LOI”) to protect Prawesti against losses resulting from properties purchased in Prawesti’s name.15 The terms of the LOI provided that Koe indemnified Prawesti against all losses, damages, etc, which may result from the purchase of properties in Prawesti’s name, in consideration of:16 7

[2025] SGHC 209.

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [1].

See Tang Hang Wu, “Broken Kinship: Family Property Disputes and the Common

Intention Constructive Trust in Singapore” (2024) 12 International Journal of Law,

Policy and the Family 1; Yip Man, “Comparing Family Property Disputes in English and Singapore Law: ‘Context Is Everything’” (2021) 41(3) Legal Studies 474.

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [4].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [4(a)].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [4(b)].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [6].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [6]–[7].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [6].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [29].

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26 SAL Ann Rev

Equity and Trusts

(i)

the use of [Prawesti’s] name for the purchase and mortgage of properties in Singapore, whether alone or jointly with [Koe] or jointly with any other party; and

(ii)

the signing of a Power of Attorney in [Prawesti’s] favour for purchase, sale (including en‑bloc sale), mortgage and management of the properties in

Singapore[.]

16.6

In 2021, a dispute arose between Prawesti and Koe which led to

Prawesti seeking a declaration that Prawesti is a 50% beneficial co‑owner of the properties. Prawesti also claimed that Koe had gifted the shares in ST Travel to Prawesti. Koe counterclaimed that Prawesti’s registered interests in the 26 Properties and the ST Travel shares were held by

Prawesti on trust for Koe.17 16.7

An important aspect of this case is the observation by Hri Kumar

Nair JCA that “the six‑step Chan Yuen Lan framework should not be mechanistically applied even in cases involving allegations of a common intention constructive trust”.18 His Honour further noted that “where the parties’ actual intentions (expressed or inferred) can be established, there is no room to invoke the twin presumptions of resulting trust and advancement”.19 This is another case which suggests that the six‑step

Chan Yuen Lan framework might not be applied in future cases. Such a development is welcome, given the conceptual redundancy inherent in the framework.20 16.8

The General Division found that there was no express trust over the 26 Properties as there were no written declarations of trust aside from the LOI, which lacked the requisite certainty of intention and subject matter.21 First, the LOI was a unilateral undertaking by Koe that could not evince any intention by Prawesti to declare a trust over Prawesti’s interests in the 26 Properties.22 Although the LOI stated that the indemnity was provided “[i]n consideration of … the use of [Prawesti’s] name for the purchase and mortgage of properties in Singapore”,23 this was not found to necessarily suggest that Prawesti’s legal interests were held on trust for Koe.24 Second, the LOI could also not be said to have certainty in 17

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [12]–[17].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [22].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [23].

See the argument in Tang Hang Wu, “Broken Kinship: Family Property Disputes and the Common Intention Constructive Trust in Singapore” (2024) 12 International

Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 1.

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [29]–[30].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [31].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [29].

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [31].

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SAL Annual Review

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26 SAL Ann Rev subject matter as the LOI did not identify any specific properties, nor did the LOI assist in identifying which specific properties would be or were subject to the purported trust.25 16.9

The dispute in Robert Tantular v The Stephanie Karina26 (“Robert

Tantular”) arose between the appellant, Robert Tantular (“Tantular”)

and the estate of his deceased brother-in‑law, Tan Ho Yung (“Tan”), in relation to a long-running investment in “The Centrum”, a mixed‑use residential and commercial development in Dallas, Texas (“Investment”).

The Investment was structured through a limited partnership, Centrum

GS Ltd (“Centrum GS”), in which Goodyork Co, a Texas corporation solely owned by the late Tan (whose estate is the respondent), held a 20% stake as General Partner. Spurlington Inc (“Spurlington BVI”), a British Virgin

Islands (BVI) company, held the remaining 80% as Limited Partner.27

Spurlington BVI was in turn held by three shareholders: PT Sinar Sahabat

(53%), the appellant Tantular (27%), and one George Wang (20%).28 16.10

In December 1991, Tantular and Tan signed a document referred to as the “Term Sheet”, which set out the partnership structure, the profit and loss sharing arrangements, and the capital contributions of the respective partners.29 16.11

In August 2005, all the residential units (save for one unit)

were sold.30 In January 2006, Tan remitted US$2.7m to Tantular.31

Tan’s estate alleged that this sum constituted the price of a consensual buy‑out of Tantular’s stake. On the other hand, Tantular contended that Tan’s remittance of US$2.7m represented part of Tantular’s share of the sale proceeds of the sold residential units. Tantular also claimed that Tan misappropriated Tantular’s stake in the Investment and the profits therefrom.

16.12

One of Tantular’s claims was that the Term Sheet formed the basis for an express trust over Tantular’s share of the profits from the

Investment, and that Tan had breached his duties as a fiduciary and/or express trustee by misappropriating Tantular’s share of the Investment.32 25

Jenny Prawesti v Sauw Tjiauw Koe [2025] SGHC 209 at [32].

Robert Tantular v The Stephanie Karina [2025] SGHC(A) 8 (this case is partially reported in [2025] 1 SLR 1083) (“Robert Tantular”).

Robert Tantular at [5]–[6].

Robert Tantular at [6(a)].

Robert Tantular at [7].

Robert Tantular at [12].

Robert Tantular at [13].

Robert Tantular at [96].

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Equity and Trusts 16.13

The Appellate Division of the High Court (“Appellate Division”)

found that there was insufficient evidence to support Tantular’s claim of an express trust. The Appellate Division affirmed the well-established tripartite test for the constitution of an express trust: certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter, and certainty of objects.33 The Appellate

Division further emphasised that certainty of intention requires “clear evidence”34 that the settlor intended (a) to impose legally enforceable trust duties “rather than duties of a merely social or moral nature”;35 and

(b)

that any intended legal relationship was to involve trust duties, distinct from some other legal relationship such as that of debtor-creditor.36 On the facts, the Term Sheet was “bereft of any language alluding to a trust structure”,37 and Tantular was unable to point to any other evidence of a clear intention to create a legal relationship involving trust duties.38 16.14

Notwithstanding the failure of the express trust claim, the

Appellate Division proceeded to consider whether Tan had assumed the status of an ad hoc fiduciary to Tantular. The hallmark of a fiduciary obligation is that the fiduciary is to act in the interests of another.39

Critically, the fiduciary undertaking is “voluntary in the sense that it arises as a consequence of the fiduciary’s conduct”,40 rather than being imposed by law independently of the fiduciary’s intentions, and arises where “the fiduciary voluntarily places himself in a position where the law can objectively impute an intention on his or her part to undertake those obligations”.41 The precise content of a fiduciary’s duties is to be 33

Robert Tantular at [101], citing Guy Neale v Nine Squares Pty Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 1097

at [51].

Robert Tantular at [102], citing Guy Neale v Nine Squares Pty Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 1097

at [52].

Robert Tantular at [102], citing Snell’s Equity (John McGee & Steven Elliott gen ed)

(Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2020) at para 22-013. In respect of the settlor’s intention to impose legally enforceable trust duties, it is likely not required that the settlor needs to know that the duties are “trust duties” – rather, it is likely only required that the substance of the duties which the settlor intended to impose are consistent with trust duties: see The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR v Westacre

Investments Inc [2016] 5 SLR 372 at [55]. However, while the settlor need not know that the duties are trust duties, the settlor must have intended for the duties to be legally enforceable.

Robert Tantular at [102], citing Snell’s Equity (John McGee & Steven Elliott gen ed)

(Sweet & Maxwell, 34th Ed, 2020) at para 22-013.

Robert Tantular at [102].

Robert Tantular at [104], citing Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan [2017] 1 SLR 654

at [192]–[207].

Robert Tantular at [104], citing Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan [2017] 1 SLR 654

at [194].

Robert Tantular at [104], citing Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan [2017] 1 SLR 654

at [194].

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26 SAL Ann Rev deduced from the surrounding circumstances, such as any relationship between the parties.42 16.15

The Appellate Division also drew on the subsequent application of these principles in Tan Teck Kee v Ratan Kumar Rai,43 where the Court of Appeal had affirmed an open-ended inquiry into the “specific nature of the role played by the putative fiduciary”44 without requiring proof that the fiduciary had expressly undertaken to act exclusively in the principal’s interests.45 Of particular analytical significance was the Susilawati v

American Express Bank Ltd46 framework, which identified three common characteristics of fiduciary relationships:47

(1)

The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.

(2)

The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests.

(3)

The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.

16.16

Applying these principles, the Appellate Division found that Tan was indeed an ad hoc fiduciary to Tantular.48 Tan bore sole responsibility for managing the Investment, with Tantular playing a purely passive role.

This characterisation of the parties’ roles was admitted by the estate of

Tan.49 Tan was also able to unilaterally effect significant structural changes to the Investment without obtaining Tantular’s prior consent, a pattern corroborated by the testimony of the Investment’s accountant.50 In fact, the Investment’s accountant also testified that until the proceedings commenced, he believed Tan to be the only partner.51 It also appeared that some payments to Tantular on the Investment were made from Tan’s personal account.52 In the circumstances, the Appellate Division found that Tan had in fact voluntarily placed himself in a position where the law could impute an intention on Tan’s part to undertake fiduciary duties.

Robert Tantular at [104], citing Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan [2017] 1 SLR 654

at [205].

[2022] 2 SLR 1250.

Robert Tantular at [106], citing Tan Teck Kee v Ratan Kumar Rai [2022] 2 SLR 1250

at [69].

Robert Tantular at [105]–[108].

[2009] 2 SLR(R) 737.

Robert Tantular at [108], citing Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009]

2 SLR(R) 737. See Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737

at [41].

Robert Tantular at [109]–[111].

Robert Tantular at [109].

Robert Tantular at [110].

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Equity and Trusts 16.17

Having established the fiduciary relationship, the Appellate

Division went on to find that Tan owed, at minimum, the core duty to act honestly and in good faith in the best interests of Tantular.53 Tan’s conduct in terminating Tantular’s stake in the Investment without his knowledge or consent was held to constitute a breach of this duty.54 However, Tantular’s claim ultimately failed as it was time-barred pursuant to s 6(7), read with s 6(1), of the Limitation Act,55 which applies a six‑year limitation period to equitable claims including those for breach of fiduciary duty.56 16.18

Re Muhammad Naseer57 is a decision of the General Division, delivered by Choo Han Teck J on 29 April 2025. The case arose out of an application under s 54 of the Trustees Act 196758 for judicial authorisation of the sale of a private condominium held on trust for a minor beneficiary, with the net sale proceeds to be held on trust until the beneficiary turned 21 years of age. The General Division declined to make any order, finding that the trust arrangement appeared to have been designed to circumvent

Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) regulations governing private property ownership during the minimum occupation period (“MOP”) of a HDB unit.

16.19

The factual background is as follows. In August 2019, the applicant executed a trust deed declaring himself the trustee of a condominium purchased for his son, who was then a minor and therefore could not hold property in his own name.59 The trust deed provided that rental income from the property would accrue exclusively to the son’s benefit, but was silent on any power of sale by the trustee.60 After the applicant and his son relocated to France in January 2021, the HDB wrote to the applicant in November 2021, notifying him that, as an HDB flat owner still within the five-year MOP, the applicant was not permitted to hold an interest in private residential property, including property held on trust, and directed him to dispose of the private property within four months or face compulsory acquisition of his HDB flat.61 53

Robert Tantular at [112], citing Sim Poh Ping v Winsta Holdings Pte Ltd [2020]

1 SLR 1199 at [253].

Robert Tantular at [112].

Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed.

Robert Tantular at [123]–[124], citing Dynasty Line Ltd v Sukamto Sia [2014]

3 SLR 277 at [53].

[2025] 4 SLR 652.

58 2020 Rev Ed.

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [2].

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [3].

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26 SAL Ann Rev 16.20

In December 2021, the applicant responded by executing a deed of appointment transferring trusteeship to his nephew, who was then residing in Qatar.62 Crucially, just one month later, in January 2022, the applicant’s nephew executed a Power of Attorney in favour of the applicant, authorising the applicant to manage the property on the nephew’s behalf.63 The practical effect was that the applicant continued to exercise day‑to‑day control over the property notwithstanding the purported change in legal title via trusteeship.64 16.21

Rental proceeds collected over successive tenancy periods were deposited into a joint bank account held by the applicant and his son (“Trust

Account”).65 The applicant asserted that all withdrawals from the Trust

Account were for the son’s benefit (eg, for education and maintenance)

and for upkeep of the property.66 The property became vacant in October 2024 when the last tenants vacated, and the applicant sought to sell it and apply the proceeds towards his son’s living and education costs in France, which the applicant estimated at approximately $66,595 per year.67 16.22

The application was brought under s 54 of the Trustees Act 196768

which deals with vesting orders in relation to an infant’s beneficial interest. Choo J declined to make the order sought, finding that the application was “problematic”69 due to its history.70 The court believed that the execution of the trust deed was for the purpose of circumventing

HDB regulations, and that the execution of the original trust deed in 2019

appeared designed to enable the applicant to hold an interest in private property through a trust vehicle while ostensibly complying with the

HDB’s restriction on private property ownership during the MOP.71 This inference was reinforced by the sequence of events following the HDB’s letter: the trusteeship was transferred to the nephew, but the applicant promptly reclaimed functional control through the Power of Attorney.72 16.23

Choo J also noted that no evidence had been adduced to demonstrate that the Trust Account was a properly designated trust account.73 Critically, the General Division stated that “A joint account on 62

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [4].

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [10].

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [5].

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [7].

68 2020 Rev Ed.

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [2].

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [9].

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [9]–[10].

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [10].

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Equity and Trusts its own is merely a joint account, though it can become a constructive trust under some circumstances.”74 The court did not find a trust in this case.

16.24

In declining to exercise its statutory jurisdiction, the court held that “[t]he court will not assist the applicant in an application that appears to circumvent the HDB rules”,75 which appears to be a concern on the taint of illegality.

16.25

Although no order was made on the application, the applicant was granted liberty to apply should the applicant obtain the HDB’s approval for his property ownership arrangements,76 leaving open the possibility that the statutory power under s 54 of the Trustees Act 196777

might still be engaged if the HDB regulatory obstacle were removed.

II.

Resulting trust 16.26

In Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong78 (“Yangbum

Engineering”), the beneficial ownership of shares in three subcontractors

(“Shares”) of the claimant, Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd (“Yangbum”), lay at the centre of the dispute.

16.27

Since 2003, Yangbum had been owned in equal shares by the defendant, Liang Xihong (“Liang”), and the defendant’s then-husband,

Loong Soo Min (“Loong”).79 Since 2005, Loong had been Yangbum’s sole director.80 In 2008, the Ministry of Manpower (“MOM”) penalised

Yangbum for hiring foreign workers without the necessary approval from MOM by imposing a two‑year ban on the hiring of foreign workers by Yangbum or any other companies in which Loong was a director or shareholder.81 16.28

Given Yangbum’s lack of manpower, three companies were incorporated to act exclusively as subcontractors to Yangbum (“Three

Companies”). Liang was the sole shareholder of two companies, with two senior employees from Yangbum being appointed as nominee directors 74

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [10].

Re Muhammad Naseer [2025] 4 SLR 652 at [11].

77 2020 Rev Ed.

[2025] 5 SLR 219.

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [7].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [8].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [9].

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SAL Annual Review

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26 SAL Ann Rev of the two companies respectively.82 Liang’s cousin, Liang Qing Lian

(“Qing Lian”), was the sole shareholder of the third company (although it was not disputed that Qing Lian did not hold the beneficial interest in the shares of the third company), with Liang and Qing Lian both being appointed as directors of the third company.83 In 2009, Qing Lian resigned as a director of the third company and transferred her shares in the third company to Liang.84 16.29

On 3 April 2014, Loong and Liang entered into a deed of settlement relating to their divorce, division of assets and maintenance.85

The deed of settlement did not deal with the Shares in the Three

Companies.86 Similarly, an Interim Judgment entered on 10 July 2014, in

Liang’s divorce proceedings against Loong, did not deal with the Shares.87 16.30

Over the course of March 2020, Liang appointed her new partner,

Zhang Shengqiang (“Zhang”), as a director of the Three Companies, without the knowledge of the other directors, and proceeded to convene extraordinary general meetings (EGMs) and pass resolutions to wind up the Three Companies.88 16.31

Yangbum put forward the case that Liang (and Qing Lian, previously) held the Shares in the Three Companies on trust for Yangbum, either by way of a resulting trust, or a common intention constructive trust in the alternative.89 Liang pleaded that her shareholding in the Three

Companies had been incorporated as her personal investments.90 Liang also suggested that where Yangbum had failed to discharge its burden of proving that the Shares were held on resulting or common intention constructive trust for Yangbum, the beneficial interests in the Shares should follow the legal interests, which were held by Liang herself.91 16.32

The General Division found that no common intention constructive trust arose over the Shares in favour of Yangbum. With respect to common intention constructive trusts, Yangbum Engineering reiterates that “a common intention may be inferred but it may not be 82

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [10].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [12].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [15].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [17].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [18].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [21]–[25].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [32].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [33].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [34].

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Equity and Trusts imputed where one did not in fact exist”.92 On the facts of Yangbum

Engineering, the General Division noted that the mere fact that parties had not discussed the holding of the beneficial interest in the Shares did not necessarily preclude the existence of a common intention.93 Nevertheless, the General Division found that Yangbum, acting through Loong, had not thought about how the beneficial interests in the Shares were to be held at the relevant time. As no common intention existed between the parties at the material time, the General Division held that there was no room to infer the requisite common intention and the requisite common intention could not be imputed either.94 16.33

However, the General Division found that the Shares were held by Liang on a resulting trust in favour of Yangbum. A resulting trust crystallises at the time the property is acquired, which in the case of the

Shares was the time the Three Companies were incorporated.95 In this case, the acquisition cost of the Shares was the incorporation costs of the

Three Companies, paid for by Yangbum.96 A presumption of resulting trust thus arose in favour of Yangbum.97 16.34

The General Division rejected Yangbum’s submission that

Yangbum’s provision of “know‑how, resources, infrastructure support, machinery and employees”98 to the Three Companies also gave rise to the presumption of resulting trust since these contributions did not result in the Shares coming into existence as property and could not be said to be payments that resulted in the acquisition of the Shares.99 However, given that the evidence suggested that it was not Liang but Yangbum that paid for the incorporation costs of the Three Companies, a presumption of resulting trust arose over the Shares in favour of Yangbum.100 16.35

The General Division further held that Liang’s alleged subsequent repayment of the incorporation costs to Yangbum (by way of a cheque for

$50,000) had no effect on the presumption of resulting trust in Yangbum’s favour.101 The court considered (a) the lack of details regarding how the

$50,000 sum was calculated or what the sum constituted; (b) Liang’s 92

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [43], citing

Chan Yuen Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 at [160(b)] and Su Emmanuel v

Emmanuel Priya Ethel Anne [2016] 3 SLR 1222 at [83].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025] 5 SLR 219 at [44].

Yangbum Engineering Pte Ltd v Liang Xihong [2025]