Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." This Bill seeks to bring the law in Singapore relating to libel and slander, although somewhat belatedly, in line with that in the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya. Mr Speaker, Sir, the law relating to defamation, which includes libel and slander, is based ultimately on the Common Law of England. That law grew up in England many years ago and was not entirely suited to modern conditions, with the result that statutory amendments had to be made to the law from time to time, particularly by the Law of Libel (Amendment) Act of 1888 and the Slander of Women Act, 1891. These statutory amendments were incorporated into the law in Singapore by the Libel Ordinance, which was first enacted by Ordinance No. 7 of 1915 and is now Chapter 28 of the Revised Edition. In 1952, the law in England was further amended by the Defamation Act of 1952. The provisions of this Act have been adopted in the Federation of Malaya by the Defamation Ordinance of 1957, and this Bill seeks to incorporate in our law the provisions of that Act. Mr Speaker, Sir, those Members in this House who are lawyers will know that the essence of defamation is to say something to the discredit of somebody else and to hold him up to hatred, ridicule, or contempt. The common lawyers drew a distinction between written and spoken words, and it was considered that one should not treat spoken words which were spoken rather hurriedly in the same way as words written after due deliberation. They, therefore, established the rule that, if a person writes something defamatory of somebody else, that other person can bring an action without showing that he had actually suffered any damage at all; but if a person says something defamatory of somebody else, that other person can only bring an action for slander if he had or could prove that he had suffered actual damage, such as losing a paid employment or losing a valuable contract. There were certain exceptions to this rule even under the Common Law. For example, to accuse a man of a criminal offence was actionable per se, that is, without proof of special damage. The Slander of Women Act, 1891, provided that words spoken and published which impute unchastity or adultery to any woman or girl shall not require special damage to render them actionable, and this provision was incorporated into the law in Singapore by the Libel Ordinance. Clause 4 of the Bill re-enacts this provision of the law. In addition, the Bill incorporates the amendments made by the Defamation Act of 1952. Clause 3 of the Bill provides that for the purposes of libel and slander, the broadcasting of words by means of the radio should be treated as publication in a permanent form, that is to say, it should be treated as libel, and does not require proof of special damage to be actionable. Clause 5 of the Bill amends the law to some extent with regard to slander spoken of a person in relation to his office, profession or calling. Under the Common Law, a somewhat subtle distinction was drawn between those words which were spoken of a person in relation to his profession and those which would merely affect his profession. Thus, it has been held that if a solicitor is accused of dishonesty in relation to his clients, he can bring an action without proving that he has suffered any special damage, but if he is accused of dishonesty in relation to somebody else, other than his clients, then he has to prove that he has suffered special damage. Clause 5 of the Bill now provides that in an action for slander in respect of words calculated to disparage the plaintiff in any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the time of the publication, it shall not be necessary to allege or prove special damage, whether or not the words are spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession, calling, trade or business. The next change in the law which is proposed in the Bill is in regard to what is called "unintentional defamation". There have been a number of decisions in England which had laid down the law that a person can be liable for libel or slander even though he is unaware of the circumstances in which his statement was defamatory. The Bill following the amendment of the law in the United Kingdom seeks to provide that it shall be a defence that the defamation was unintentional. In such a case the person can offer to print an apology and correction in the same manner as he printed the original libel and, if this is accepted, there would be an end of the matter. If it is not accepted, the person can then prove that the defamation was unintentional and in that case he has a complete defence. The third amendment proposed by the Bill concerns the principles of justification. It is a defence to a civil action for defamation that what is said of the plaintiff is true. But the law was very strict on this and required the person to prove every single item of the original defamation. If a person says of another man, for example, that he was a murderer and that he missed going to church last Sunday, and he is able to prove that the man was in fact a murderer, he would still pay damages for saying he had not gone to church. Clause 8 of the Bill seeks to amend the law by providing that, in an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges. The other amendment which I need mention is that a considerable extension has been made to the law with regard to the privileges of newspapers. It has always been a defence to a newspaper that it has published a fair, accurate and contemporaneous report of judicial and some other proceedings. The Bill seeks to extend these privileges. Fair, accurate and contemporaneous accounts of the proceedings of various bodies are now either absolutely privileged or else they are privileged subject to this: that the newspaper may be required to print a reasonable explanation if so requested by the person who claims that he had been defamed. The details of the protection given to newspapers are set out in Part I and Part II of the Schedule to the Bill. Part I of the Schedule deals with accurate reporting from the Legislatures of Singapore and other Commonwealth countries, of international organisations and so forth. In these cases there is absolute privilege. It is also provided that when a fair and accurate copy or extract of a register which is open to the public is printed or a notice, advertisement or report issued or published on the authority of any court is published without malice, it is privileged. In Part II of the Schedule are set out the circumstances in which a fair and accurate report of the proceedings of various other bodies formed in Malaya are protected. The privilege, in these cases is limited in that the newspaper may, if required by the plaintiff, have to publish some form of correction of any false statement. The proceedings which are covered by these provisions include the findings or decisions of any association formed for the purpose of promoting or encouraging art, science, religion or learning, or formed for the purpose of promoting the interests of any trade, business, industry or profession or persons carrying on the same or engaged in any game, sport or pastime. The Bill also assimilates radio broadcasting to newspapers and gives to radio broadcasters the same defence vis-a-vis newspapers in respect of the reports. The right to insure against libels is clarified and the right, hitherto restricted to newspapers, to give evidence that the plaintiff has already recovered damages from someone else in respect of the same or a similar libel, is extended. I do not think it is necessary, Mr Speaker, Sir, for me to deal with the other provisions of the Bill as they do not make any substantial changes in the existing law. The provisions are, I venture to hope, sufficiently dealt with in the Explanatory Statement attached to the Bill. The Bill has been referred to the Singapore Bar Committee, who have indicated that they support its provisions. Sir, I beg to move.