Vol. 34, No. 3, September 1966. It says: `It might well be that under some forms of government or constitution, some device for tempering the harsh winds of the supposedly omnipotent powers of government to the shorn lamb of the man in the street is necessary, or at least desirable... In the Scandinavian country where the idea seems to have originated the political set-up is quite different from that operating in Canada or any of its provinces.' Mr Speaker, Sir, if Canada is different from Scandinavia, what about Singapore? `This perhaps is not so obvious in the case of New Zealand, where at least the form of government is in its origin the same as in Canada. . .. Probably therefore bureaucracy is much more firmly entrenched, and the need for relief of the individual far more urgent. Perhaps also the basic livestock and dairy farming economy of New Zealand may have an effect on the political needs of that dominion.' It goes on: `Perhaps it would be as well to take a look first of all to see what is the problem, for the solution of which it is proposed to resort to the appointment of an Ombudsman. This may not be an easy task, as there does not seem to be any degree of unanimity among those who advocate the appointment of such an official. From time to time situations arise in which it can be made to appear that some individual is being oppressively dealt with by some government agency or bureaucracy. Some enthusiastic newspaperman hears of it and seizes upon it as an excellent opportunity to ring the changes on the brand of sensationalism which is the guiding principle of the modern journalist. The man in the street rarely if ever waits to hear what the other side has to say, and indeed only does so if driven to it, and so the cry is raised for some remedial means to redress the imagined oppression. In this instance the clamour has been raised for the appointment of an official or creation of an office to be called Ombudsman as pointing the way to another utopian panacea.' If I may go on, Sir: `This forces the conclusion that to be effective an Ombudsman must be given real powers and to give him real powers would be a violation of the most fundamental of all the principles on which the parliamentary system of government is founded, that is, that no one shall be above the law. Many, if not most, of the instances that are clamourously pilloried by the drama-conscious press as grievous oppressions, arise from the actions of government agencies and administrative bodies created under regulations, the power to make which the legislature has delegated to another or others. This group of vicarious authorities is generically called the bureaucracy and bureaucracy can put rabbits to shame in the ability to proliferate. The demand for an Ombudsman or its equivalent really arises from this multiplication of authorities responsible to no one, and who therefore arrogate to themselves the right to set themselves above the law. Essentially an Ombudsman would be another bureaucrat and while the proverbial principle of setting a thief to catch a thief has in certain contexts a specious merit, it has a doubtful application to the case of putting a curb on the abuses of bureaucracy. The situation falls far more nearly within the principle of the old adage about locking the stable door after the horse has been stolen. What is really needed is much more careful consideration of powers glibly handed over to people who owe, or at least consider that they owe, no responsibility to anyone, so long as they strictly obey the letter of their charter as they interpret it, and much stronger safeguards written into the relevant statutes against abuse of any powers that can conceivably be exercised arbitrarily.' The net result, they conclude, is that: `if the law is for the general benefit, and the attention of the legislators has been drawn to the danger and they nevertheless enact it, then the public must accept it. That is one of the hazards of the parliamentary system and the remedy, if any, is at the polls.' I think that if the people are dissatisfied with this Government, their remedy is at the polls. One main reason against the introduction of this institution in Singapore is the standard of literacy. No doubt every child in Singapore is educated, and perhaps when they all grow up they will need an Ombudsman. But, at the moment, quite a part of our population is not literate and the introduction of the Ombudsman would mean that this poor Ombudsman would be flooded by complaints by people who do not know what are the limits of his jurisdiction. Mr Speaker, Sir, I will now go on to the Council of State. Here again, I think I must trace the history of the Council of State. The earliest of the modern constitutions of today to have a Council of State is the Constitution of Eire, 1937, where in Article 31, there is provision establishing a Council of State to aid and counsel the President in all matters on which the President may consult the Council in relation to the exercise and performance of his powers and the functions accorded to him by the Constitution. The Council of State envisaged by the Constitutional Report has its origin, however, in a Kenyan Constitution of 1958. The Kenya Council of State of 1958 was created for a purpose quite different from that in the Irish Constitution, though it was probably from that Constitution that the idea of such a Council was first inspired. The Kenyan Council of State, however, was done away with when Kenya became independent in 1963. In 1962 Dr Hastings Banda rejected outright a proposal by the Nyasaland Constitutional Conference to set up a Council of State. He regarded it as likely to perpetuate racial discrimination and undermine the responsibility of Ministers to the Legislative Assembly. Dr Banda had also objected to the suggestion that there should be an Ombudsman, or indeed any idea of a second Chamber. The Kenyan Council of State of 1958 was a multi-racial body set up to perform functions of safeguarding the rights of minorities. Apart from Kenya in its 1958 Constitution, but not in its present Constitution, and I believe, Southern Rhodesia, no other Commonwealth country has a Council of State. It may be true to say, therefore, that if we today create a Council of State we would perhaps be the only country in the Commonwealth to have such a Council. But then it was for reasons such as that of providing adequate safeguards of minority rights that the Council of State in Kenya was established, and those reasons, I understand, disappeared in Kenya and hence the Council was scrapped. But the reasons behind the creation of a Council of State, in my view, exist for us in Singapore, since the Council had proved effective in dealing with the circumstances that had been existing in Kenya when it was first established. It was then, as it is perhaps now, a promising innovation which can make for far more harmonious relations between the Government and the governed, and because it does not take the form or substance of a second Chamber, it cannot impede the Government's legislative programme in any significant degree. Indeed, given a proper relationship, such a Council could be as constructive and as helpful as an Ombudsman, though on a larger scale. The Council, as envisaged in this Report, would be no more than an advisory council to assist the Government in the drawing up of Bills and to advise on Bills that have been drawn up, and further to safeguard the rights of minority groups in Singapore. The legislative primacy of Parliament is not in any way affected. Yet its members who may not be members of the Legislature can be of assistance to Parliament. Their functions would, of course, be purely advisory, but, at the same time, minority groups can look to them to safeguard their interests so that measures that may in any way derogate from their interests may be brought to the attention of those responsible. Mr Speaker, at this stage, I must deal with the functions of this Council. In my previous Ministerial statement, I said that though Government accepts the recommendation to create a Council of State, Government differs from the recommendations with regard to the composition and the functions. I did set out therein some particulars of the composition of the Council, but I did not say much about what its functions should be. And perhaps it would be best if I dealt with this matter by actually referring to the recommendations as they appear at page 16 in the Report, and then set out the Government's stand in respect of every detailed recommendation. Mr Speaker, Sir, at page 16, paragraph 59, the Report says: `We recommend -
(i) the creation of a small advisory body to be called "the Council of State" consisting of 21 members of which a minimum of 15 shall always be appointed;'. This deals with the composition and, if I may refer to my previous statement, I did say that the members would be of two types, permanent members and members who are removable. But, in any case, they would consist of men of distinction, men who are mature citizens and who have either rendered distinguished public service or attained eminence in their respective walks of life regardless of race, colour or creed as recommended by the Commission. On this subject, I think the Member for Anson wants this Council to have less members and someone else also shares his views. The view of the Government is that we should be flexible and we intend to appoint a maximum of 36 and no more. We may appoint less but not beyond 36. Secondly, the Commission says: `all the members shall be appointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister but in the President's discretion;'. This is not acceptable. All the members will be appointed by the President on the advice of the Cabinet. Recommendation (iii) is acceptable. I have already referred to it. Recommendation (iv): `the other qualifications for membership shall be as set out in Article 28 (2) (a) , (c) , (d) , (e) and (f) , suitably modified, of the present Constitution of Singapore which provides for the qualifications for membership of Parliament;'. This is acceptable. `(v) the disqualifications for membership shall be -
(a) membership of any political party at the time of appointment; (b) the disqualifications set out in Article 29, suitably modified, of the present Constitution of Singapore ...' (a) is not acceptable, but (b) is. The Prime Minister has dealt with this point and has set out our view that just because someone has been in our Party or U.M.N.O. or the Labour Party or the People's Progressive Party, or some other party, we will not bar him from this Council. Parties come and go in Singapore. They change names except ours. But we feel that political affiliation should not be a bar to membership. `(vi) the circumstances under which a member shall cease to be a member shall be the same as in Article 30 (2) (a) , (c) , (d) and (e) , suitably modified, . . .'. This part is acceptable but not the second sentence which reads: `A member shall also cease to be a member if he offers himself for election to Parliament or becomes a member of any political party.' Just because one is a Member of Parliament does not mean one cannot be a member of the Council of State. In my previous statement, I did indicate that it was the Government's contention to appoint not only, say, the Chief Justice and you yourself, Sir, but also certain Ministers of the Government and also ex-Chief Ministers. `(vii) the Speaker of Parliament shall be the' Chairman and shall preside at all its meetings.' I have great pleasure in informing you, Sir, that this is acceptable. Then it goes on: `The Deputy Speaker of Parliament shall he the Deputy Chairman and shall preside during any absence of the Chairman.' We feel on this that if you are the Chairman, we would rather leave it to the Council itself to elect someone from their midst to be your Deputy. `The Speaker.... shall not be a member of the Council and shall take no part, except to preside, in the deliberations of the Council....'. Mr Speaker, Sir, if you are on that Council, you will be a member. `(viii) the Council of State shall have power to consider all proposed legislation except all Supply Bills or a Bill presented on a Certificate of Urgency;'. This, I have great pleasure in saying, is acceptable to the Government. The Member for Havelock yesterday pointed out that this is a Report on minority rights, and if the Council of State is being set up to protect the minorities, then he argued - and argued logically - that only Bills that affect the minorities in any way should go to the Council of State. He suggested one method to ascertain whether a Bill does or does not affect minority rights, and he put the burden on you, Mr Speaker, Sir. He wanted you to certify whether or not any Bill affects minority rights. This indeed would be a difficult task, though not impossible. However, Sir, to save you all that trouble, we would prefer' that all Bills, whether or not they affect minority rights, except, of course, Supply Bills or Bills presented on a Certificate of Urgency, should go to the Council of State. And at this stage I must say that it is our object, in creating this Council, not merely to protect the rights of the minorities but to protect also the rights of the majority. This is not a Council merely to protect minorities. What about the others? We are not afraid that all our Bills with the exceptions mentioned should go to the Council of State, and we would be happy to receive their advice and might benefit therefrom. (ix), Sir, deals with proceedings: `every Bill except all Supply Bills or an `Urgent" Bill shall after its First reading and after the Minister in charge has made his opening speech during the Second reading hut before any debate takes place on the principle of the Bill be submitted to the Council of State;'. Sir, this is acceptable. `(x) the Council of State shall consider the Bill in public, regulating its own procedure, ---'. If I may pause there, Sir, in order to avoid confusion. I have stated before -- and other Ministers have stated it -that the Council of State shall consider the Bill in private. But within thirty clays of the submission of the Bill to the Council, the Council may make a report to Parliament. The report, it goes on to say, shall be submitted within thirty days, and if no report is forthcoming, then proceedings in this House are to be no longer delayed. This means, in effect, Sir, a delay of one month. In accepting the Council of State, we are, in fact, entrenching it into our Constitution. I say "entrenching it into our Constitution" - I will deal in more detail with this when I come to the proposed methods of entrenchment. But if I may shortly say so, Sir, at this stage, there are three methods of entrenchment recommended. But, in my view, there is a fourth method, and that is this. Some constitutions provide that some Bills cannot go through three stages unless there is a delay of 6 months or 7 months. So there is a clause in the constitution - an entrenched clause -and in accepting the Council of State, we are, in effect, accepting the fourth method of entrenchment. `(xi) any "Urgent" Bill notwithstanding that it has been assented to shall nevertheless be submitted as soon as possible to the Council who shall consider and report on it as in the case of other Bills.' Acceptable. '(xii) the term of office of a member shall he nine years ---'. I have stated earlier that we intend to appoint permanent members and members who may be removed after three years. `(xiii) any Minister may attend all proceedings of the Council and take part in its deliberations but may not vote.' I would add "unless he has been appointed to the Council". Mr Speaker, Sir, having dealt with the detailed recommendations on the Council of State and Government's views of what we accept and what we do not, before I conclude the subject, I would like to make it clear - and I think this point must be made and stressed for the particular attention of some Members who are rather unhappy about this Council - when Government views the recommendations of the Commission on the Council and, in fact, on the whole Report, we are not looking at it just as members of the Government. We are also looking at it from the point of view of the people outside this House, non-Members of Parliament. In 10 or maybe 15 years, most of us will not be in this House. We may be outside and, if you are good enough, you may be on this Council of State. Perhaps a younger set will be occupying these seats here, and if we are on this Council, I think, with our experience, we can discuss their views and send them advice for what it is worth. At least when that day comes, we will still be making some contribution. In conclusion, with regard to the functions of the Council of State which I went through just now, with the passage of time we may even consider extending the powers of the Council to look into petitions and complaints from the public. In other words, instead of appointing an Ombudsman in 5 or 10 years' time, we may invest the powers of the Ombudsman in this Council of State, as the Member for Punggol has pointed out -