- and to seek clarification on some aspects of the Bill before the House. Referring to the comment by the Minister just now, Mr Speaker, Sir, on previous occasions you took me to task for making speeches when I was supposed to ask questions, but I hope the Minister will allow me to ask questions now that I am supposed to make a speech. I want to urge every possible safeguard and caution in the implementation of any reforms in the law relating to abortion. I would venture to say that the Abortion Bill, in its present form, justifies that caveat which I am entering. I would like first to refer to clause 5 (2) which specifies the grounds on which abortion may be permitted. Clause 5, sub-clause (2) (a) specifies that the Termination of Pregnancy Authorisation Board may authorise an abortion if continuance of pregnancy in volves risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or injury to the physical or mental health of the woman. Does it not seem, Sir, that the wording itself here appears to be a little risky? What sort of odds in favour of deleterious effects, physical and mental, should be calculated before a person can be permitted an abortion? My misgivings over this type of ambiguity are not lessened by the knowledge that such risk and possibility of injury referred to may be based on the opinion, formed in good faith, that abortion is necessary! What is this good faith, Sir? Surely, the emphasis should be on ascertainable medical skill, rather than on flimsy grounds of faith. A theological virtue, Sir, to which perhaps the Minister does not subscribe. An abortion, even when performed by a qualified and experienced doctor, poses itself as a risk to life and a danger to health physical and mental. There has been, to my mind, adequate and authoritative assertion that this is so. This being so, is it not logical to expect that an abortion should be per mitted only if there is grave danger to life or if there is grave risk of injury, and of injury that will have lasting consequences to physical or mental health? Nowhere in sub-clause (2) (a) under clause 5 do I note any qualification related to gravity or seriousness of risks involved. I must beg to differ from the Minister's statement that "In clause 5 (2) (a) the conditions under which therapeutic abortion can be done are unambiguously stated." In some sections of his speech introducing the Second Reading of this Bill, the Minister demonstrated an uncommon flair for a vivid word-picture. Surely it would not be beyond his capacity to refer to the extent of risk to life, and to the extent of injury anticipated that would warrant abortion? It must also be borne in mind that "the frequency of therapeutic terminations of pregnancy is decreasing rapidly with the advances of medical knowledge". The Encyclopa?dia Britannica is the authority for this statement, which was made in as early as the 1963 edition, in the section on "Abortion". At one time cardiac disease, tuberculosis, various diseases associated with pregnancy were all regarded by medical opinion as indications for abortion. I believe that scientific evidence indicates that this may not be so today in all respects of cardiac disease, tuberculosis, etc. Certainly these conditions do require special care before and after the birth and in some cases the social environment must be improved, but the conditions referred to may not necessarily and generically be medical indications for abortion. Continuing, Sir, if I may labour on a particular aspect of this clause, may I ask what is meant by "risk to the mental health of the pregnant woman"? Indications of this sort are notoriously un predictable. They are just as unpredictable as what would happen if a mentally unstable person does procure an abortion. Referring to a conference on abortion held in Washington, the United States of America, in September 1967, under the auspices of the Kennedy Foundation and the Harvard Divinity School, one of the conferees remarked on the vagueness of the psychiatrists present about the indications that justify abortion on grounds of damage to mental health. Mr Speaker, Sir, I am merely mentioning this reference to underline my own view about the vagueness of the term "mental health" in the clause I am discussing. Sub-clause (2) (b) of clause 5 also stipulates that an abortion may be permitted, if it is the opinion formed in good faith that the environment of the pregnant woman, both at the time when the child would be born and thereafter, so far as is foreseeable, justifies such an operation. What I would like to know is what "so far as is foreseeable" means. Presumably we shall have to depend on the foresight of the Authorisation Board. Where social work experience is concerned, in the technical sense of the term, the majority of the Board members will be lay people: there will be one member (who shall be female) who has had experience in social welfare work, besides the Director of Social Welfare. And the opinion of these members, with social work experience, could be over-ruled in one direction or another by the medical members of the Board, if supported by another lay member. What I am pointing out is that the weight of responsibility will fall upon medical people, where the grounds to determine whether an abortion may be performed will be essentially non-medical grounds. I am already sufficiently appalled by the vagueness that hangs about like a woolly cloud over this so-called environmental clause. But I must express my misgivings where environmental considerations may be determined by a caucus of persons who are not social workers. Is the Minister aware that when a similar so-called "social clause" was brought up before the British Parliament, the British Medical Association and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (the Minister for Health has on one occasion resorted to the views of the latter august body) had opposed this provision on the grounds that physicians might be un qualified or unwilling to pass judgment on non-medical aspects of a case? There are indeed those who believe that initial distress and reasons may not be sufficient to warrant an abortion, and that case work investigations should be carried out to determine the circumstances. It should be hoped that, when the occasion for the imple mentation of this Bill does come, great care will be taken to ascertain the seriousness of the circumstances that may be said to justify an abortion. I do not see in this Bill in its current form that there is any guarantee that a laissez-faire attitude will not be adopted: in fact, that there will not be abortion on demand that will be the effect of this Bill, as it stands. May I pass on to sub-clause (2) (c) of clause 5? Here, at least, there is the qualification "substantial" to the word "risk", and "seriously" to the word "handicapped". Would that such qualifications had been entered in sub-clause (2) (a) . However, if I may refer to this sub-clause (2) (c) , I hope that abortion recommended on genetic or eugenic grounds will not deteriorate into abortion permitted in a sort of generic manner. For what is meant by substantial risk of physical or mental abnormalities? Would 30 per cent chance of abnormality be adequate to warrant abortion? Or 50 per cent? Under such circumstances, would there not also be the risk of a healthy foetus being destroyed? What is the extent of wastage that would result from the destruction of foetuses with suspected abnormalities? I recollect having read of an estimate that the effect of a similar provision in the English law will mean the destruction of three foetuses by abortion for every deformed child that would have actualIy been born. If this is so, then it would be more logical to wait for the foetuses to attain their full growth and then commit infanticide where the actually deformed birth is concerned. I do not think this is what our society will permit. The point remains that prognoses resulting in abortions based on foetal indications have never been validated. Abortions are fatal - the evidence is destroyed. I shall refrain from commenting on sub-clause (2) (d) at this stage, Sir. I would like to deal with sub-clause (3) of clause 5. Here it is stated that two general practitioners (registered, of course) may decide on termination of pregnancy without the authorisation of the Board. Do I take it that these two general practitioners would also be qualified to determine the psychiatric condition of the pregnant woman and to perform an abortion on the ground that this will have less deleterious consequences on the mental health of the pregnant woman than ultimate delivery of the child? Again, Sir, in sub-clause (5) we discover that only one medical practitioner (registered - but he need not possess psychiatric qualifications) is sufficient to decide, on mental health grounds, that an abortion is immediately necessary. Is this an adequate safeguard? Furthermore, in clause 10, sub-clause (3) , a general practitioner, who may have conscientious scruples against abortion (and whose religious convic tions the Minister says should be respected), may be forced into a position where he must determine that an abortion is immediately necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the mental health of a pregnant woman. Now may I touch on the clause related to incest and rape? May I point out that this clause was originally included in the English Abortion Bill, but was removed by the sponsors themselves for legal reasons that rape is notoriously easy to allege and difficult to prove. We have an apparent resort to a legal safeguard here in our Bill. No authorisation for treatment to terminate pregnancy on grounds of rape or incest will be given unless the Attorney-General has certified that proceedings in respect of rape or incest have completed, or have begun. The last three words are significant. Without final proof abortion can be granted on grounds of rape and incest. I beg to seek the Minister's clarification. I feel that it is this sort of looseness in this piece of legislation to reform the abortion law that leads me to fear exploitation of this Bill for the avail ability of abortion on demand. What I am trying to do is to distinguish the heat from the light in the controversy over abortion. That there is justification for liberalising the law related to abortion in the view of those who are not affected by conscientious religious scruples (which we must also respect) I have no doubt. All I say is that we must proceed cautiously. It would have been far better if a systematic investigation had been carried out by the Ministry of Health to disclose objectively what would be for the good of the com munity. But certain difficulties are obvious, and time is a major consideration. Thus for the next four or five years we are experimenting with a social situation. And in such circumstances adequate control must be exercised. The Minister for Health has made a most important statement on the abortion issue. But to underline the caution which I feel about the Bill, I would like to enter certain reservations about certain things that he has said. I agree with him that we want to provide a healthy social environment in which to bring up our children. Certainly our society cannot afford to breed delinquents, criminals and antisocial elements. But I must certainly question the generalisation, as he states it, that such types are mainly derived from the ranks of unwanted children, the illegitimate and broken homes. I am sure there must be broken homes in which no abortion has ever taken place. Is the Minister trying to say that abortion will reduce delinquency? Can he substantiate with data that the crime rate in countries which permit abortion is necessarily less than in those countries which do not permit it? He has referred to the annual figure of one million illegal abortions in the United States. There are people who dispute this figure as grossly exaggerated. But we will accept the authority which he quoted. Does he conjecture that the crime rate in America would have shot up without these abortions? Has he any indication of the crime rate among those who have procured abortions? He has said that promiscuity and indeed I might add other forms of delinquency are matters that must depend on the moral fibre and character of the individual and the type of society that the individual comes from. I agree whole heartedly with him. Now, Sir, may I refer to this question of the life of the foetus? I would normally be reluctant to engage myself in philosophical discussions of this sort. But the Minister himself has mentioned this aspect. May I refer to the opinion of Norman St. John-Stevas, an English M.P, who was prominent in the debate on Abortion in the English Parliament? St. John-Stevas writes in a journal called America, 9th December, 1967. He says: 'It is worth noting that the final form of the (English Abortion) Bill left abortion as a crime but selected certain conditions under which it was considered justifiable. This form is important, since it recognises, even in attenuated form, respect for the sanctity of life.' It may be of interest to note also that one gynacologist wrote in the Times, 5th December, 1966, "that the embryo becomes genetically complete at the time of conception though only microscopic in size. It is uncommon," he continued, "for a woman to present herself for abortion before about 12 weeks, by which time these tiny foetuses are not amorphous masses of protoplasm, but are beautifully formed, move around freely in their sac of fluid, respond to noxious stimuli and evoke the same emotional response from theatre staff, as does the delivery of a full-term baby, followed by quietness and a sense of tragedy because a life has been destroyed." This emotional response was also described to me independently by a local surgeon, who is not a Catholic and who supports generally the Government's stand on abortion. Presumably this is the same sort of emotional response that one would get should one visit Woodbridge to see for oneself the pitiful plight of mongols and mental defectives. Mr Speaker, Sir, I would venture to say that there is profound sorrow to be felt in both cases over the harsh objective facts of life. Our Government wishes to reflect what our people want, and to do what is good for them. My view is that our people in general want a moderate measure of abortion law reform, and not abortion too freely available. I think this latter caution results from a belief that grave con sideration must also be given to the life of the unborn child. Any piece of legislation has an educational impact. This Bill must adequately reinforce in the minds of our people that human life in all circumstances must be treated with compassion. It is this consideration that has led me to seek the various clarifications I have sought. I find it encouraging that in its exercise of the art of the possible, our Government, in respect of this Bill, is referring it to Select Committee, and that a period of four or five years' grace will be given to study the effects of this Bill, inasmuch also as this Bill itself has had, according to the previous Minister for Health, a gestation period of two years.