MAIN AND DEVELOPMENT ESTIMATES - OF SINGAPORE FOR THE FINANCIAL - YEAR 1ST APRIL, 1983 TO 31ST MARCH, 1984
Mr Speaker, Sit, I will try and deal with the many points raised by the two Members one at a time. First of all, the question of the Non-Aligned Movement. A question has been asked why did we adopt such a high profile and what is the result of this meeting that has just ended in New Delhi. There were two main subjects that we concentrated on in the meeting in New Delhi. One was the question of Cambodia, both the subject as well as the seating of Cambodia, and the other important subject was the question of where the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole was heading. On the subject of Cambodia, to be quite frank, Mr Speaker, Sir, our expectations were not high. We did not go to New Delhi in the hope that we would be able to seat Democratic Kampuchea as a member of he Movement. In the Havana meeting in 1979, a vacant seat had been created by Cuba and, as matters stand in the Non-Aligned Movement, since decisions are not taken by vote but by consensus, in order to fill that seat a new consensus has to be produced. Our aim in New Delhi was to prove clearly to the Movement and to the world that the so-called decision in Havana to leave the Kampuchean seat vacant, was a decision that was not arrived at by consensus. Sir, this concept of "consensus" is a rather vague concept. It does not mean unanimity, neither does it mean majority. But it means that even those who do not entirely agree with the decision in detail must be prepared to at least accept it in substance. In other words, no member must have strong objections to the very principle involved in a decision. To give you an example, Sir, there was a South American country that wanted to become a member of the Movement in New Delhi and all the members, 90-odd members, had no objection. But one member had strong objections, a member which had some border disputes with the country that was applying for membership. And because of the strong objection of this member, the country applying for membership was not admitted into the Movement. Therefore, consensus does mean that any member which has strong objections can, in fact, prevent a consensus from emerging. We went to New Delhi to prove very clearly that the decision to leave the seat vacant in Havana did not have a consensus, and I think we proved this more than adequately. The question has been asked by the Member for Serangoon Gardens that since it was so clearly demonstrated that there was no consensus, why was Democratic Kampuchea not seated? Unfortunately, the Non-Aligned Movement follows rules and procedures which make this rather difficult to achieve. First of all, to use the word "hijacked" which the Member for Serangoon Gardens used, the Movement was hijacked in Havana which resulted in a vacant seat for Kampuchea. Since it is not possible to produce a consensus to show that there was no consensus in Havana, (i hope I am not confusing Members), it is not possible to seat Democratic Kampuchea unless another Member is prepared to hijack the Movement and put Democratic Kampuchea in its seat. Or unless the Chairman clearly is prepared to take the decision that since there was no consensus in Havana, therefore Kampuchea should be seated. Obviously, the new Chairman, India, did not want to take this action because its own national policy was quite contrary to what ASEAN was trying to do. And certainly India as the new Chairman did not have the "stomach", or I would say the courage, to take a stand against the previous Chairman and the radical group of members in the Non-Aligned Movement. Sir, I am afraid that the seat of Democratic Kampuchea in the Non-Aligned Movement will remain vacant until such time as the problem is resolved on the ground or until such time as some Chairman has the courage to take the stand that there was no consensus in Havana. But I think we have more than adequately demonstrated that Cuba took a decision which was not in accordance with the consensus procedure in the Movement. We were also successful in New Delhi in placing Cuba and Vietnam in the dock, exposing the illegitimacy of their actions and forcing them to defend themselves in a public forum. As far as Vietnam is concerned, their immediate priority in the Movement is not to seat Heng Samrin but to remove the item from the agenda because, as long as the item is on the agenda, they will continue to be placed in the dock and they will have to continue to defend themselves. So in this we were successful, and we were also successful in ensuring that the matter is kept open by way of an ad hoc committee that has been established to continue to consider the question. And among the questions that this ad hoc committee will address will be the question of criteria for expulsion and suspension of member countries. I think once this criteria is clearly established, it will become manifest that what was done in Havana was not in accordance with accepted procedures. As far as the Movement as a whole is concerned, Sir, it has been apparent for some time now that the Movement has been very strongly influenced by a few radicals and proxies of the Soviet Union, especially Cuba and Vietnam. The fact that countries like Cuba and Vietnam, which so openly espouse the interest of the Soviet Union, not only in debates and statements but by sending their troops to Afghanistan and to Africa in pursuit of Soviet ambitions, brings into question how such countries can even be considered non-aligned, let alone take a leadership role. But, unfortunately, it is not possible to remove them without a consensus, as was done in the case of Kampuchea. Our aim in Delhi was to ensure, together with many other countries who are moderates, non-radicals, that this trend of the Movement to be aligned with the Soviet Union is stopped. I must say that we have been successful in arresting this trend in the Movement. I think many of the moderate members were so outraged by the attempts of Cuba in Havana that they felt strongly that they had to take a stand in the Movement and they were no longer prepared to tolerate open abuse of non-aligned principles. They were prepared to organize themselves to resist the efforts of a radical minority and we were able to play a small role in this. The New Delhi Summit has served to confirm that the moderates are fighting back. But the battle is far from over and the radical minority will not give up the struggle but will seek to use every opportunity to make the Movement serve Soviet interests. In fact, Sir, in view of the attempts of Cuba in the past to get the Movement to declare that the natural ally of the Movement was the Soviet Union, we thought that there should be a clear declaration in Delhi that no superpower is a natural ally of the Movement. 6.00 p.m. But unfortunately the non-radicals were not sufficiently exercised about this problem to want to take a clear stand and India which has often professed to want to lead the Movement back to the right track did not throw its weight behind this attempt to make it abundantly clear that the Movement did not have any natural ally among the super powers. Therefore, we were not able to get a clearcut declaration. But I think we have arrested the rot and we need to continue to work with others who are like-minded to ensure that the Movement comes back on track. Sir, looking at what happened in Havana and looking at the majority of the members who are moderate, who are committed to the principles of non-alignment and looking at how well the radicals are organized and how poorly the moderates are organized, I am reminded of a quotation from the English poet, W. B. Yates, who writing in a poem called "The Second Coming", made the point that "the best lacked all conviction while the worst are full of passionate intensity." I think this summarizes very adequately the events that often take place in the Non-Aligned Movement. Sir, so much for the Non-Aligned Movement. I think I have covered both the Movement as a whole as well as the question of Cambodia. If I may take some of the other points before going on to the points relating to housekeeping. The Member for Serangoon Gardens raised the question of the International Conference on Cambodia. He wanted to know what is the present state of the negotiations and progress under the Committee set up by this Conference. Sir, there was an ad hoc committee that was set up to pursue a solution to this problem, and this Committee has been visiting various countries like France, Belgium, Germany and also Thailand, and it will continue to visit some other countries in ASEAN and Asia to solicit views and opinions. But I am afraid, Sir, that this Committee cannot really move very much until Vietnam is prepared to come to the negotiating table. The aim at present is to keep the Committee alive. The purpose is to keep the Committee well informed, prepared and available to play an active role when the time is ripe and the time will be ripe when events on the ground as well as relations between China and Soviet Union and China and Vietnam take a different turn. So in the meantime the Committee set up under this Conference will just have to keep itself prepared, ready and available to be used at the right time. We cannot expect anything more. The Member for Serangoon Gardens also raised the question of toxin weapons. Sir, there is some evidence that Soviet Union, and Vietnam are guilty of using chemical and toxin weapons in Indochina and in Afghanistan. Singapore condemns all use of such weapons under any circumstances. We are a party to the Convention on the prohibition of the development and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Singapore has also consistently supported all appeals by the international community and the U.N. to cease usage and to ban the use of such weapons. As I said, there is sufficient evidence that such weapons are being used in Indochina and in Afghanistan and that Vietnam and the Soviet Union have been guilty of using these barbaric weapons against innocent and defenceless populations in Cambodia and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and their friends have prevented the international community from taking effective action against them. Nevertheless Singapore will not cease in its efforts to try and stop this inhuman practice. We call upon the international community to bring every possible pressure to bear upon Vietnam and the Soviet Union not to use such weapons. Now, Sir, if I may turn to some of the other matters relating to staff and properties. Sir, the point has been rightly made that it is very important for the Foreign Service to attract good officers to serve in the Ministry. Unfortunately, Sir, the kind of requirements that the Ministry has and the kind of people that the Ministry seeks are people who are also much in demand in other services, and we have to compete with these services to get a sufficient number of people. As far as this coming fiscal year is concerned, the Member for Serangoon Gardens noted that we had, in fact, not increased the number of posts. We did not ask for an increase because there are still a number of vacant posts and, in the light of the fact that we have not been able to fill these posts, there was no point in requesting for additional posts. But I am assured that if we are able to fill these posts and the need still exists for additional posts, we should be able to obtain additional posts. The immediate priority of the Ministry is to fill the existing posts rather than fight a battle with Establishment for additional posts. In fact, we have agreed to a net reduction of two posts for the coming year. It makes a little difference whether it is a reduction of two or none until we fill all the posts. That is the reason. The Member for Serangoon Gardens and also the Member for Chong Boon want to know what programmes we have for staff development. Sir, we have planned a programme to send Foreign Service officers, abroad and locally for courses. Obviously since we are having so much difficulty in recruiting new staff we have to concentrate on improving the quality of the staff that we already have and we have to invest in the staff that we have. Promising officers are sent to overseas universities for post-graduate degree courses. At present three officers are reading for Masters Degree at Cornell, Georgetown and George Hopkins Universities in the U.S. For the year 1983 we plan to send an officer to Stanford University and another to the School of National Administration in France. Of the 65 career officers in the Foreign Service, in the senior branch 19 officers or about 30% have post-graduate degrees. Apart from post-graduate courses, it is also important that the Foreign Ministry's officers have a competency in foreign languages. Officers have been sent for intensive language training courses overseas. In 1982 two officers were trained in the Japanese language, one in German and one in French. All officers in the headquarters are encouraged to learn approved foreign languages locally, for which the Ministry pays the course for tuition fees. Staff were also sent for professional development courses abroad, such as Foreign Service Training Courses and programmes on international relations. For the last three years, from 1979 to 1982, 33 officers have attended such courses. As far as recruitment in the future is concerned, we have not thought in terms of a separate scholarship scheme for the Ministry, but the Ministry and the PSC have examined the need for such Foreign Service scholarships for undergraduate studies. We have come to the conclusion that perhaps we should have some sort of an intermediate step. From 1983 onwards, the PSC has decided to bond a number of the local merit scholars to serve in the Foreign Service. Local merit scholars who are bonded to serve in the Foreign Service will have to pursue degree courses which are relevant to the Foreign Service, such as political science, economics and law. If this scheme is successful, there will be no need to institute a separate Foreign Service Scholarship Scheme. A point was made and a question asked about overseas properties by the Member for Chong Boon. He asked what properties we bought in the last year and what we intend to do in the coming fiscal year. In FY 82, we spent approximately $5 million on purchasing new properties and upgrading a number of our existing properties. Of course, this is far below the amount that was committed, partly because we did not proceed with the purchase of properties in certain centres as prices were coming down. In the light of what has happened in some of these centres, I think it was a wise step not to rush in and allow property prices to come down before we moved in. Four residential properties were bought in London, Brussels and Paris, and of course we made progress payments towards properties in New York and the new chancery that is under construction in Canberra. We also continue to make improvements and renovations to existing pro- perties, and this also absorbs some of the funds. We decided not to buy a property in Bonn as well as one that was offered in Hong Kong because, as I mentioned just now, we expected prices to come down and, in fact, they have come down. When we think that the time is ripe to move in, we will do so. So for the coming fiscal year 1983, the Ministry will be concentrating on construction projects in Canberra, Jakarta, New Delhi and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Disbursements for these projects are estimated to be $8 million, and we will be spending another $4 million in buying residential properties as staff accommodation in Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Washington. The Member for Chong Boon said that we must be bullish. I think it is not a question of being bullish or bearish but of studying the factors in a property market at any one time and deciding whether it is the right moment to move. I think so far we have been fortunate in that we have made the moves at the right time and we have not been caught in markets where property prices have come down dramatically. But we are watching the market all the time and looking for opportunities to buy properties. In the meantime we will continue to rent them. The Member for Chong Boon made the suggestion that perhaps GIC could buy properties and rent to the Foreign Ministry. I am sure that GIC in assessing properties would also take into consideration the same factors as the Ministry, i.e. whether the time is ripe to buy properties. There may occasionally be instances where the Ministry and GIC may have a different reading on a situation in the market. If, arising out of such a different reading, they buy a property and they have it for rent, we will certainly consider renting it. I hope I have answered all the points, Sir, but if I have forgotten any, maybe the Member can remind me. 6.15 p.m.