Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." I wish to take this opportunity to explain to Members some aspects of the arcane art of Central Banking as practised in industrial countries and in Singapore. The classical model of a Central Bank is the Bank of England in Victorian England. Today it is the Federal Reserve System of the United States which carries most weight in the world's financial system, far in excess of the proportion of the world's GNP generated in the US. Central Banks, whether of the classical mould or in its modern variety, perform two essential functions: (i) They regulate the supply of money; (ii) They regulate banks. A third function has been added since the collapse in 1971 of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rate parities. Central Banks look after the external value of their nations' money by active intervention or benign neglect or, in some unhappy instances, by desperate improvisation. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is Singapore's Central Bank. However, because of the unique feature of Singapore's economy, the way it works is quite different from the practices of the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve System. This is not because we are perverse by nature. It is because the structure of our economy and the manner Government manages the public sector introduces a novel situation probably without parallel elsewhere. Let me explain this by reference to the three Central Banking functions. Every economics freshman knows that Central Banks of industrial countries keep a close watch on money supply in an effort to counter inflation which got out of hand in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Federal Reserve System tracks three measures of money supply called M1, M2, and M3. I will not explain what these Ms mean except to say that their definitions vary from time to time, as they must when major financial innovations take place. What is important to note is that the Federal Reserve System aims to keep the growth of these monetary aggregates within publicly stated limits; in the case of M1, the current limits are between 4% and 8% annual rates of growth. The Federal Reserve System is not alone among Western Central Banks in having to check the growth of money supply. There are two reasons why Central Banks have to control the money supply. First, people are fed up with inflation. Second, people also do not want to pay the price of fighting inflation in the only sensible way, that is, for the Government to balance the budget and for the country to live within its means. Under the system of one-man-one-vote, governments are elected to deliver the good things of life. However, the voters are not easily persuaded that these must be paid for by taxes. Taxes are unpopular everywhere, with or without representation. The result is predictable - huge budget deficits which have to be financed by government borrowing. Where savings are high, as in Japan, budget deficits can be easily absorbed; where savings are low, as in the United States, these deficits have to be financed in three ways:- savings of Americans, savings of foreigners and credit creation by the Central Bank. Since the last option is closed by anti-inflation policy, the US budget deficit, now running at record highs, is financed by the first two means, ie savings of Americans and savings of foreigners. The Federal Reserve, by keeping money supply under control in the face of large budget deficits, has caused US real rates of interest to rise to unprecedented heights, thereby drawing in large amounts of foreign capital. In effect, a good part of the US government budget deficit is financed by foreign loans. Only a rich and powerful country like America can conduct this kind of fiscal policy without attracting the stern gaze of the International Monetary Fund. In Singapore, which of the monetary aggregates does the MAS Watch, M1, M2 or M3? The answer is none. This does not prevent the Government from regularly publishing data on our M1, M2 and M3. From time to time, academics perform clever statistical exercises to trace the relationship of these numbers with others, the Consumer Price Index, for instance. Why do we ignore our Ms? For the very reason Western Central Banks have to watch theirs. Their public sector accounts are in a state of chronic deficit; ours are in a state of chronic surplus. We are in a state of chronic surplus because employees have 50% of their pay packets sequestered into the Central Provident Fund. Further, the Finance Ministry does not pan easily with the revenues harvested by its assiduous tax collectors. So the MAS is probably the only Central Bank that does not have to watch the Ms. What then does it watch? It watches the foreign exchange rates. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system was due to the improvident nature of elected governments, under constant pressure from voters to live beyond their means. This event, ie the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, is much to be regretted for, in a world of gyrating foreign exchange rates, it is not a comfortable one for Central Banks of small countries. Let me explain how the MAS works the system of floating rates. We create what is called a basket of currencies. Anybody can create his own basket. Ours is based on the value of trade with major trading partners. We - that is the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Trade and Industry in consultation with the MAS - decide the future worth of this basket. In other words, the value of the Singapore dollar in terms of the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the Deutschmark, Pound Sterling, etc. Upper and lower limits are then set and the MAS is given authority to manage the float within these limits. This is done by buying or selling foreign currencies against the Singapore dollar or by swap operations. The intervention currency is usually the US dollar, as is the practice with nearly all Central Banks. That is why Mr Paul Volcker is such an important person. Because the public sector is in a state of chronic surplus, funds regularly flow from the banks into the MAS because Government accounts, other than for petty cash, are kept with the MAS. If these funds are not re-circulated back to the banks, the system will soon seize up. Funds are returned to banks when the - MAS buys foreign currencies. Such purchases also serve the purpose of keeping the Singapore dollar from appreciating too much. It works beautifully guided by Adam Smith's gentle, invisible hand. So long as we continue to work diligently and skilfully, so long as we spend carefully, and so long as we do not lend Singapore dollars to foreigners, it will continue to work beautifully - unless some calamity overtakes the world banking system. Do not bother about the horrendous deficit in our balance of trade. That will look after itself. The free enterprise system rewards those great Victorian virtues of industry and thrift. But alas these human traits are unfashionable in the contemporary world. As a result, the services of economists are in great demand everywhere to find out what has gone wrong and how to put it right. Unfortunately, the profession gives conflicting advice on both diagnosis and prescription. Let me now turn to the other function of a Central Bank, the regulation of banks. Banks in Singapore conduct business in our currency as well as in foreign currencies. The latter business is conducted mostly by large international banks who have established branches hers. Off-shore banking business in Singapore is an off-shoot of the Euro-currency market. One feature of the Euro-market is relative freedom from regulation by the Central Bank of the host country. Indeed it is freedom from regulation that is the raison d'etre of off-shore banking. No Central Bank wants to be too fussy about off-shore banking for fear that the banks will move elsewhere. However, the banking failures in 1974 of the Herstan Bank and the Franklin National Bank forcefully reminded members of the rich countries' Central Banks club, the Bank for International Settlements at Basle, how vulnerable a totally unregulated market could be. This led to the formation in 1975 of the Basle Committee, also known as the Cooke Committee, which laid down guidelines on Central Banks supervisory roles. These guidelines became grandly known as the Basle Concordat. The 1975 Concordat was revised in 1983 in the light of developments in banking practices, banking supervisory techniques and experience in applying the Concordat. The 1983 Concordat clarifies that it does not address itself to lender of last resort aspects of the role of central banks. The 1975 Concordat was misunderstood by the media to include this aspect, ie lender of last resort, when Banco Ambrosiano of Luxembourg collapsed in 1982 under scandalous circumstances. In addition, the 1983 Concordat incorporates the principle of consolidated supervision to enable parent authorities to monitor the overall risk exposures and capital adequacy of banking groups. Under the principles of supervision laid down in the 1983 Concordat, the supervision of solvency of foreign banking branches is defined as the primary responsibility of parent authorities while that of subsidiaries as the joint responsibility of the parent and host authorities. The supervision of liquidity for both foreign banking branches and subsidiaries is stated as the primary responsibility of the host authorities. These matters are of importance to Singapore as an international financial centre. We are members of an entity called "The Off-shore Supervisors Group" formed in 1980 representing 14 countries which offer host facilities to off-shore financial institutions. The group conducts periodic discussions with the Cooke Committee. In one of these discussions, members of the Group and the Cooke Committee agreed that they would discourage their banks from establishing in financial centres where there are no proper and adequate systems of supervision. I draw attention to these matters, even though they do not directly concern the Bill, to show that the supervision of banks in their international activities is a complex and delicate business and that comprehensive, binding and clearly defined principles have yet to be established. It could well be that central banking can never be reduced to vigorously defined rules and we must learn to live with uncertainty. The subject is of concern to Singapore and the well-informed Singaporean should keep abreast of events. A revision of the MAS Act is now timely. The Act was introduced in 1970 and amended once in 1972. Since 1972, however, there have been substantial changes in the structure of the financial market, together with a proliferation of different types of financial institutions. Over this period, the number of commercial banks have increased from 44 in 1972 to 125. Also, the number of merchant banks have increased, from five to 51. In addition, there are currently four discount houses, sight international money brokers and five credit card companies. Furthermore, in recent years there have been structural changes in the financial operations of the Government and an increasingly significant portion of the Government's activities are being carried out through statutory boards and government-related companies. Since one of the objects of the Authority is to act as banker and financial agent to the Government, the Authority's powers in this regard should be extended so as to take into account these changes. With these introductory comments, I will now deal with the main provisions in the Bill. The proposals in the Bill, in general terms, will: (a) provide greater autonomy upon the Authority in relation to employment of its staff and make changes to the organizational structure of the Authority; and (b) widen the scope of the Authority's functions and duties to enable it better to perform its role as regulator of the financial system and as, well as banker and advisor to the Government, having regard to the changes that have occurred in the financial environment. The principal amendment affecting the structUre of the Authority appears in clause 3. These amendments would enable the President to have greater flexibility than at present in the appointment of directors to the board of directors of the Authority as well as the deputy chairman of the board. With reference to the amendments dealing with the Authority in relation to employment of its staff, it should be mentioned that since October 1981 the Public Service Commission has granted autonomy on personnel matters to all statutory boards. Moreover, consequent to its reorganization, a personnel policy was adopted to attract and retain able staff, bearing in mind the competition from the well-paid banking sector is quite severe. To reflect this policy, section 17 of the Act has been repealed and re-enacted in clause 6 to confer upon the Authority powers to appoint employees, determine their remuneration and terms and conditions of their employment, to appoint advisors, and to make rules for these purposes. In addition, opportunity has been taken to revise certain other provisions of the Act which affect existing, future and former employees of the Authority. As regards former employees of the Authority, the obligation to preserve secrecy in relation to the affairs of the Authority has been extended to them (clause 5). In relation to existing and future employees, protection is conferred upon them in clause 8 from personal liability in relation to acts done in good faith in the course of the discharge of their duties under the Act. Further, since the Authority can only grant housing and vehicle loans to employees, there is a need to extend this power to grant loans for other purposes approved by the Authority, for example, the purchase of micro-computers for personal use. Clause 16 confers such a power upon the Authority. The next group of amendments seek to widen the scope of the Authority's functions to embrace changes that have occurred in the financial operations of the Government. They would empower the Authority amongst other things: (a) to pay at its discretion interest on deposits; (b) to accept deposits from companies in which the Government has substantial interests; and (c) to act as agent in respect of companies in which the Government has a substantial interest. Clauses 9 and 14 so provide. The aim of the amendment so described is to furnish such Government companies in which the Government has a substantial interest an alternative avenue to place surplus funds at their discretion, as the funds of these companies are essentially public funds. Also, it will be noted that the Authority will assume additional responsibilities in respect of the Insurance Act and the Securities Industry Act (clause 7). Moving on to another matter which also concerns the powers of the Authority, I draw attention to clause 13. The purpose of clause 13 is to provide a regulatory framework for the increasing number of other financial institutions that do not fall entirely within either the Banking or the Finance Companies Acts. These institutions such as merchant banks, discount houses and credit card companies have come to exert a significant impact on monetary and credit conditions in the country in recent years. A new section 24C is accordingly inserted which empowers the Authority to require financial institutions whose operations are considered to affect: (a) monetary stability and credit and exchange conditions in Singapore; or (b) the development of Singapore as a financial centre; or (c) the financial situation in Singapore generally, to be approved by the Authority for the purpose of carrying on business in Singapore. Approval may be withdrawn in certain circumstances by the Authority, though an aggrieved financial institution has a right to appeal against a withdrawal to the Minister. Additionally, the Authority will be empowered to issue directions, guidelines and conditions of operations to approved financial institutions in relation to such matters as the activities they may engage in or the range of service that they may provide. An additional new section 24D allows the Authority to levy fees on such financial institutions. The only other clause in the Bill that is worthy of special mention is clause 17. This clause would confer a qualified immunity upon the Authority from defamation actions. Such an immunity is considered necessary if the Authority is to properly discharge its supervisory functions over financial institutions. This kind of provision is not new in our law for a similar immunity has been conferred on the Securities Industry Council in recent amendments made to the Companies Act. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed. 2.58 pm