Mr Speaker, Sir, on the 18th of April this year, nine ex-detainees issued a Joint Statement. They denied everything which they had admitted about their part in the Marxist conspiracy. They claimed that ISD had tortured them. The Government arrested eight of them, together with Patrick Seong who was closely associated with several of the detainees, to get to the bottom of the matter. Within a week, the detainees had sworn statutory declarations that they had not told any untruths to ISD or on television and, in the case of five of the detainees, that they had been well treated and not tortured. After this, it became obvious that the Joint Statement was not a serious statement of facts in dispute. It was a propaganda exercise in embarrassing the Government, creating doubts, preparing the ground for the next general election. This settled what the Joint Statement was about. But it was not the whole story. The Government did not believe that the detainees who had signed the Joint Statement - eight plus one who was absent in Britain - were the only ones who were involved. It was convinced that there were foreigners who were behind these ex-detainees. And so in the Press Statement which we put out on 28th April, the Government stated its suspicion. And I quote from this Press Statement: 'FOREIGN GROUPS: STAY OUT The government has reasons to believe the prime movers of the Joint Statement are not amongst the nine detainees who signed the Joint Statement. Their intention is to turn the personal predicament of the nine into a political issue. They have opened up with this salvo on the government, accusing it of illegal use of force and detention without trial of innocent Singaporeans. ... The prime movers expected the government to be put on the defensive ... because elections were expected. Then they could build up a campaign of smears about illegal and improper use of the ISA, climaxing in an election campaign for more Western style press freedoms, democracy, and human rights. ... Overseas interest groups, the foreign press and foreign powers have no right to interfere. ... These are internal issues, and the next elections will resolve them in a decisive manner. As the general elections approach, the government expects foreign groups to make more attempts to use Singaporeans as proxies to influence the domestic politics of Singapore. It would not be for the first time in Singapore's history. ... The government has acted and must act firmly against threats to the security of Singapore. ... Singaporeans who allow themselves to be used as proxies by foreign groups, or become agents of foreign powers, should remember the government's warning, ... that subversion means acting for foreign powers, whether Communist or Western.' This was even before the Government had any definite proof of foreign involvement. But subsequent developments have borne out and vindicated its assessment. It is now clear that American diplomats had been involved instigating Patrick Seong, Francis Seow and others to oppose the Government. The central issue facing Singaporeans now is foreign interference in our domestic politics. The evidence emerged sooner than we expected. On 29th April, the First Deputy Prime Minister, Prof. Jayakumar and myself gave a press conference defending this assessment that foreign elements were involved. Even as we were speaking, although we did not know it then, ISD was making a breakthrough with Patrick Seong. That same evening, Patrick Seong was writing out, in longhand, an account of his contacts with Hendrickson. Later on, this account became Patrick Seong's second statutory declaration. The first one described how he had instigated the detainees to put out the statement and embarrass the Government. Patrick Seong's second statutory declaration described how Hendrickson had cultivated and propositioned him and urged him to enter politics against the Government. It is an exciting story. Devan Nair has said that it reads like a spy thriller. He is not far wrong because Hendrickson did have some intelligence background. (a) From 1975 to 1977, for three years, Hendrickson was Vice-Consul in Udorn, North Eastern Thailand, near the border with Laos. Udorn is the centre of many Thai border security activities. And Hendrickson's duties there included monitoring the activities of CPT insurgents (communist insurgents belonging to the Communist Party of Thailand). (b) Then he went to Bangkok to be Second Secretary. Then from 1979 to 1983, Hendrickson was First Secretary in Manila. These were the years of the Marcos government. But Hendrickson's duties were not to keep in touch with the Marcos government. His job was to keep in touch with the Aquino camp. So he must have imagined that he was doing the same thing in Singapore. But Singapore is not the Philippines. First, we have never been an American protectorate. The Philippines was, for nearly 50 years. You remember General Douglas MacArthur, the man with a corncob pipe, who said "Old soldiers never die. They only fade away." Douglas MacArthur was Military Adviser to the Philippines Commonwealth before the Second World War. He was never a Military Adviser to the President of the Republic of Singapore. Secondly, US troops have never been stationed in Singapore. Clarke and Subic are in the Philippines, not here. Thirdly, the Member for Radin Mas referred to the Prime Minister's statement in 1965, when he made public the CIA's effort to bribe one of our civil servants. The Member for Radin Mas did not point out that the Prime Minister had said this in reply to a question. And the question he was asked was, "Should the British leave their bases here, would we allow the Americans to come in and take their place?" Because we need the bases for security and for the economic activity they generated. And the Prime Minister's answer was, "No, never allow the Americans in." And he gave three reasons. The spy story was one of them, and it boiled down to the inability of the Americans to behave themselves. So if Hendrickson had known all this, he should jolly well have laid off. But he was ignorant'. He went ahead and met lawyers and cultivated them. Patrick Seong, his first contact was in May 1987. He met Seong and other lawyers at the 1819 Restaurant - a very swank place to talk politics. This could have been considered "innocent information gathering". By the next meeting, it was already not-so-innocent. In January 1988, Hendrickson telephoned Seong out of the blue. He had found Seong's telephone number, rang him up, asked Patrick Seong to meet him alone. Patrick Seong had some qualms, but went ahead. Hendrickson told Seong that he was "putting up a report on human rights in Singapore", which indeed he was. But when Patrick Seong took him at face value and started talking about the detainees who were his clients, and how they had been treated in detention, he found that Hendrickson was not interested. His concern was not torture or ill-treatment. Hendrickson wanted to talk politics - whether the General Elections would be held this year, how the GRC Bill would affect the chances for the Opposition and (the Member for Potong Pasir would be glad to hear this) the chances of the MP for Potong Pasir, Mr Chiam, winning the next elections. Hendrickson was already on dangerous ground. Under cover of "human rights-related concerns" (his phrase in the report he wrote), Hendrickson was not only collecting information on Singapore politics, but taking sides on domestic political issues. He wrote the report, a 1987 State Department official report, on human rights in Singapore. They write us up. Once a year we get a report card, like a good boy in school. And all these points which he had raised - GRCs, chances for the Opposition, Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, executive interference in the Judiciary - he put them into the report. None of these issues had anything to do with human rights. This was not just an account of what was happening in Singapore; it was not a neutral recitation. It was a listing of where the US considered Singapore to have sinned. Against what? Against American political ideals. MFA saw the report before we learnt of Hendrickson's other extra-curricular activities. We protested formally to the US at this interference in our domestic politics. It showed his bent and the trend. After this meeting, even Seong became suspicious of Hendrickson. I read what he said, Patrick Seong's own words: 'I was disappointed that Hank did not show much interest when I spoke about the detainees. His views and questions on local political issues and his effort to seek me out even though we only met once nearly one year ago made me apprehensive about what he was up to. What Soh Lung said before her arrest regarding Hank being a possible CIA agent [this is not the Government saying this, mind you; this is Teo Soh Lung saying this: Hank being a possible CIA agent] was also on my mind. So, already on dangerous ground, Hendrickson pressed on. In March 1988, just two months ago, he did something which put him clearly beyond the pale. Hendrickson told Patrick Seong, "Lambertson is coming to town". David Lambertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South East Asia, a very senior official from the State Department. "Please gather a group of like-minded friends to meet Lambertson." "Like-minded friends" means don't invite the Member for Chua Chu Kang or MacPherson or anybody like that. For that matter, they did not approach the Member for Potong Pasir; I don't know why. So Seong invited Teo Soh Lung and Tang Lay Lee to go to the meeting. The two girls went but they did not make it only because they got mixed up as to where to rendezvous at the Marina Mandarin. So they gave up and went home. But they tried to go. The meeting was held in the lobby of the Marina Mandarin. As I said, we have photographs to show that this took place. So Hendrickson went through the whole procedure. First, you must warm up your client. He warmed up Patrick Seong by asking him about various political issues in Singapore. He asked Patrick Seong whether GRCs would work to the disadvantage of the Opposition. This was an old question which he had already gone over with Patrick Seong before. So why was he saying it again? Patrick Seong explained in his statutory declaration: 'I believe he asked me this again for the benefit of David Lambertson as he had posed this question to me before at our second meeting.' In other words, Hendrickson was impressing his boss. Having done that, he went on to talk about elections. Hendrickson asked why professionals were not coming forward to stand in the elections, and who were the lawyers who could be potential candidates. Getting warmer. Then he asked Patrick Seong whether Patrick Seong would consider standing for election himself. Patrick Seong said: 'Francis Seow had invited me to join him to stand for elections but that I was unlikely to stand. I said I valued my private life and that I was not cut out for public speaking.' Patrick Seong did not tell him, but he wrote in his statutory declaration, that there was another reason, which was that he had heard of Francis Seow's reputation, his problems with money, his affairs with women, his inability even to pay his telephone bills, and he did not want to be tarred with the same brush. Patrick Seong is quite a sensible man. Having come this close, Hendrickson now came to the point of the meeting. Remember, Patrick Seong has said, "I don't want to stand." But Hendrickson nevertheless went on. He told Patrick Seong: 'Lawyers would vote against the PAP because of the Law Society's experience with the Select Committee's hearings on the Legal Profession (Amendment) Bill.' You will remember that was the occasion when Francis Seow showed up and took on the Prime Minister. Hendrickson urged lawyers to contest the elections because they were disgruntled and were articulate and enjoyed a professional status. Lambertson watching, Hendrickson speaking, Patrick Seong listening. Lambertson - did he contradict Hendrickson? Did he restrain him? He remained silent, most eloquent silence. This was not a casual remark. Hendrickson had cultivated Patrick Seong for one year. He had invited Seong to a meeting with Lambertson, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. He had explicitly asked Patrick Seong to bring along "like-minded friends", in other words, other Singaporeans opposed to the Government. And now, in the presence of his superior, he was giving Patrick Seong a serious message. In other words, it is not just Hendrickson saying this, but "This is a position which my boss adheres to." This gives the game way. This meeting exposed the reason why Patrick Seong had been cultivated by Hendrickson and why Hendrickson had cultivated other people as well. Ostensibly, just legitimate contacts but, in fact, to prepare the ground for such an approach. Hendrickson was trying to manipulate, instigate Singaporeans, to bring about a particular political outcome. And this meeting shows that Lambertson was fully aware of what Hendrickson was doing, endorsed it, and was therefore behaving equally improperly. We are not the only ones to be suspicious of this meeting. Patrick Seong, after this meeting, became even more wary of Hendrickson, and decided that he would not want to meet Hendrickson any more. He said: 'I felt odd that Hank [Hendrickson] should have made so much effort to seek me out to arrange for me to meet Lambertson, who seemed to be a senior official. I was suspicious of his motives and did not want to be involved in something over which I did not have any control. He had shown a keen interest in my political intentions but I had made up my mind that I would not stand for elections.' In other words, Patrick Seong knew that Hendrickson was trying to get him to enter politics, but Patrick felt that he was being manipulated and he did not want to get entangled. What Patrick Seong said confirmed Government's suspicions about Francis Seow. Francis Seow had been totally apolitical, enjoyed the good life, showed no interest in human rights or any political issues until after the Select Committee hearings on the Legal Profession Act. Then he took a sudden interest in politics. Overnight, he became a champion of human rights. He started speaking at regional conferences, one after the other. He went overseas to deliver eloquent addresses. We knew that he was in close contact with Hendrickson. We knew he was clearing his debts, debts which had been outstanding for many years. This was not just a chance fact, but an especially significant datum, because the Government knew that Hendrickson had said to another one of his contacts (not Francis Seow), "Surely, money should not be a problem". A facetious remark? From a man like Hendrickson, doing so many other things, with an experience in intelligence? In the context of Hendrickson's activities, this was a small, highly significant, piece, a fragment which made sense of the overall pattern. There was no choice. The Government therefore arrested Seow to find out his part in the affair. Now Seow has sworn a statutory declaration. You have read parts of it. Seow's statutory declaration confirms that he was involved, that he had a much bigger role to play than Patrick Seong; and, secondly, the US diplomats and officials were up to no good. What was the first thing Francis Seow did, when he took an interest in politics? Did he form a political party? Did he nail his banner to the mast? Did he tell the whole world that he was taking on the PAP and invite all like -minded honourable men to join him? He sought promise of asylum. And he took this very seriously. He made three attempts to make sure that he had a bolt-hole, three efforts. First, he approached the then British High Commissioner, Sir Hamilton Whyte. He said, "Can I have asylum in Britain should anything happen? " The British High Commissioner said, "It is very difficult to say. This is a Conservative government, not a Labour one. Conservatives are more strict but I will check." So Sir Hamilton Whyte checked and three or four weeks later he told Francis Seow, "I am afraid it is a no-go situation." And, as Francis Seow, says, "I was quite disappointed." It was not just a casual query. He had a serious purpose in asking for asylum. He did not give up. He tried Britain again. Francis Seow has a good friend, Haque Khan, Pakistani, "a prominent businessman in the UK". So Francis spoke to Haque Khan. Francis Seow said: 'He told me that there was no problem in getting asylum in UK as he had influential British friends and all I had to do was to go to UK and he could arrange for me the necessary stay.' It can be fixed. As our Indonesian friends would say, "bisa diator". (The Indonesians have nothing to do with this). But it was not good enough for Francis Seow. He went on to seek an assurance from a government, not a private businessman, however powerful and influential. He looked up the Americans. Hendrickson had introduced him to Snyder in Singapore. He had asked for Snyder's name, address and telephone number in Washington. He told Snyder, "I will look you up in Washington." Snyder said, "Most delighted to see you." This was at the end of October. Francis Seow was in America in November or December. He was not in Washington. He was in New York. He made a special weekend trip to Washington to meet Snyder. He telephoned Snyder at the State Department. Snyder showed up. By that time, Snyder was no longer in his old job. So to keep bureaucratic continuity, he brought along his old subordinate, Colin Helmer, a junior official, a minion, but good enough to hand over so that somebody maintains this link. They went to a fast-food restaurant. Francis Seow is very bitter about this. They talked serious business, small eats but big business. They talked about politics. Snyder asked him in detail about his plans. "Are you going to contest? How are you going to contest? Is it as an independent? Are you going to join a party or what are you going to do?" Seow remembers the whole conversation up to the crucial point. Then everything dissolved into soft focus, and he becomes vague. It is like a film which has been censored by the censors board. Seow does not say what Snyder told him on this key issue of asylum. But Seow admits that somehow he was reassured. He said; 'Snyder liked my style of approach and saw me as a potential leading opposition personality. [He's a big man.] I sensed that Snyder was well disposed towards me and my political intentions, and that he would help me to emigrate to US should I ever want to do so.' What did Snyder say to give Francis Seow such a happy sense? Francis Seow does not say. It is left to your imagination. But it was after this meeting in Washington, when Seow returned from the US, that "the idea of taking part in politics at the coming election congealed in my mind". So although he had had the thought, he did not pursue it until he got this reassurance. How do you interpret this? It must be that he tried the British. The British did not give him anything. He sought American help. Why did he go to Washington? Well, Seow was an experienced lawyer. He did not want to be told by a junior official, like Hendrickson, that he had American support. Hendrickson might be speaking off his own bat, without backing, which was why Hendrickson brought Lambertson to show Patrick Seong, remember. So to assure himself that this was not just Hendrickson, a junior first secretary at the US Embassy in Singapore, but also Snyder, a superior at headquarters, in the State Department in Washington, Seow went there, and dialled a State Department telephone, number. It worked, it was the real McCoy. Then he raised the matter with Snyder. He did not discuss it with Hendrickson. And Seow says: 'I felt comforted that I had friendly faces in the State Department who were supportive of my plans and willing to help secure refuge for me when needed.' After this, he acted with confidence, as he had received the reassurance which he had failed to get from the British High Commissioner. Is this a chance meeting? He fully understood its significance. If he did not fully understand what this meeting meant, he would not have spoken to Devan Nair about it later on, and you read what Francis Seow said to Devan Nair. He said: 'I could have given him the impression that I had the backing of the State Departemnt. I gave Devan the address and telephone number of Snyder and Colin Helmer. I said that both of them were useful chaps to know when he [Devan] was back in the US because they might be able to get things done for him. If one required asylum, they might be able to help. I disclosed these to Devan so that he would feel at ease to help me later on.' So if he had received no assurance, why did he tell Devan Nair, "If you need asylum, get in touch with these two people."? Seow's request for asylum is important because it implicates and incriminates both Seow himself and also the Americans he spoke to. Why would Seow need asylum, unless he is about to do something illegal? The Wall Street Journal pretends that this is a routine precaution which Opposition politicians in Singapore have to take. But other Opposition political leaders do not first get a guarantee of asylum before entering politics. The PAP leadership never got a guarantee before they entered politics against the British. Devan Nair did not.