CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE - (AMENDMENT NO. 2) BILL
Mr Speaker, Sir, first, let me thank all the MPs who have contributed to the discussion on this Bill. My sense is that this is not a Bill which troubles the public, but is one which has the MPs troubled. I want to make it very clear that there is no intention whatsoever when I introduced this Bill to slight the MPs, because some MPs felt quite emotional about this, thinking that the proposal of having nominated MPs is a slight on them. I have high regard for the PAP MPs. Sir, I had a hand in choosing many of them and I can tell you that if we do not think that our MPs can hold their own against any nominated MPs in future, our MPs will not be here in this Parliament. In other words, if they are no good they will not be here. Fullstop. It is simple as that. I want to address primarily the nub of the problem and address my remarks at those who reject the Bill, primarily because they feel that what we are doing goes against the practice of democracy. If I can convince Members that it does not, and if they listen to my arguments dispassionately, I hope I can bring them on board. First, on the principles and intent of the Bill. It is to encourage participation, to build consensus, to accommodate alternative viewpoints and dissent. I believe there is no disagreement on this. Leave aside the Bill for a while. Assume that there is no Bill. Do you agree or do you not agree with this intent of mine, ie, to do something which will allow us to forge consensus? I believe there is no disagreement on this. It is part of our programme. It is in the President's address and I have spoken on this many times. If there is no disagreement on the principle, we can now move on to the next stage, whether the Bill advances this and whether it is the best way to do this. I think those who object to the Bill do so because they feel quite strongly that it erodes democracy, that if one is not an elected representative, he should not be in Parliament. I want to argue that the Bill does not in any way erode the principles of democracy and that one need not be an elected Member to be in Parliament. There are precedents for this and I shall quote them. Let us start from basic principle. What is Parliament? I am not a lawyer. So I did some reading of some popular work. This is a book written by Stanley de Smith on Constitutional and Administrative Law. It is a popular Penguin version for laymen and undergraduates. What is Parliament? I quote: 'At common law, Parliament as the legislative body, consists of the House of Commons, the House of Lords and the Queen.' In other words, the Upper House and the Lower House together plus the Queen, in this case, form Parliament. That is in Britain. In Canada, Parliament consists of the sovereign as represented by the Governor-General, the Senate and the House of Commons and Parliament makes laws. Again, there are three components to Parliament - the Governor-General, the Senate and the House of Commons. For Malaysia, the Constitution says, and this is Article 44 of the Constitution: 'The legislative authority of the Federation shall be vested in the Parliament, which shall consist of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and two Majlis (Houses of Parliament) to be known as the Dewan Negara (Senate) and the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives).' Parliament again is a total body comprising the Upper House and the Lower House. For Singapore, our Constitution provides that the legislature of Singapore shall consist of the President and Parliament. We do not have an Upper House. So Parliament is a single chamber body and together with the President makes laws. Of course, amongst other functions of Parliament are the control of national expenditure, the Budget debate and scrutiny over Ministries' expenditure, taxation, scrutiny of national policies, probing of the central government, in our case, the Government. There are no hard and fast rules whether Parliament should have one or two Chambers. In many other countries, Parliament consists of two Chambers. In our case, it is only one Chamber. Sir, if you refer to the publication by the Inter-Parliamentary Union on Parliaments of the world, you can count the number of parliaments in the world which have two Chambers and those with one chamber. The point I am stressing here is that Parliament does not comprise only the House of Representative. It can have two Chambers. In many of these two-Chamber Parliaments, there are appointed Members in the Upper House, not elected. Some are elected but there are appointed Members in the Upper House. Let us take the example of Britain. The Upper House is the House of Lords. What are their functions? What can they do? What can they not do? Again, I refer to this popular version of the Constitutional and Administrative Law. It says: 'The House of Lords as at present constituted is a useful legislative chamber. ... many of the less controversial Government bills are introduced there; the debates will often be well informed; helpful amendments to law reform bills may be moved by Law Lords at committee stage. The Government's legislative output is thereby enlarged and its efficiency improved. Not so generally appreciated is its value as a chamber for the introduction of private members' bills which may be crowded out in the Commons;' In other words, Britain has non-elected Members of Parliament, because the House of Lords is part of the British Parliament who can initiate Bills, pass Bills, question government, and speak on various policies. Would you question that they do not have the mandate because they are not elected by the people? If I can remove this point from the argument, then perhaps we can make some progress in your support of the Bill. It is not necessary for a parliamentarian to be elected in order to have the authority to debate on Bills. The Malaysian Senate has many appointed Senators. The Canadian Senate too has many appointed Senators. All these unelected Senators have the authority and the mandate to debate Government policies, to initiate Bills and to pass Bills. I hope I have removed this fundamental objection to having some nominated MPs into our Parliament which is a single Chamber. In other words, if others can have unelected representatives or Members in their parliament, even though it is in another House, we should, on principle, be able to accommodate nominated MPs in our Parliament. What we are trying to do is actually to introduce some elements of the Upper House into our Chamber over here, not for checks and balances, but in order that our Government policy can be better scrutinised by able Singaporeans, by PAP MPs, Opposition MPs and a group of MPs who does not belong to any political party. These are elements of an Upper House. I cannot foresee how our political institution will evolve over time. Maybe at some time in the future we may evolve into a two-Chamber political institution and have an Upper House. It is not on the cards at this stage. I do not have this in mind but we cannot preclude this in some future years. If we move in that direction, think of this inclusion of six nominated MPs into our Parliament as a step in this direction. If we regard it as a step in this direction, it is a progressive step, not a retrogressive step. We are advancing forward, not backward, we have this element of an Upper House in this Chamber over here. In the UK, the Members of the House of Lords can also be Ministers. They can also be Prime Ministers. When MacMillan was on his dying bed in 1963, he summoned Sir Alec Douglas Home to take over the leadership of the Conservative Party. Lord Home, as he was known at that time, asked for time because he wanted to know whether his party members supported him and whether other colleagues in the Cabinet would support him. When he had that support, he went to the Queen, kissed the Queen's hand, and accepted the Prime Ministership. He was still a Member of the House of Lords, not elected by the people when he assumed the Prime Ministership. The Conservative Party then arranged for him to stand for election in one of the safe seats in Scotland so that he could get elected. Yes, he had to seek the mandate of the people. But the point is he can be a Minister without it. He was Foreign Minister before he assumed the Prime Ministership. In other words, in an established system of parliamentary democracy, like Britain's, one can be a Minister or a Prime Minister without having to be elected by the people. Therefore, what we are doing over here is nothing exceptional. One can be an MP without having to be elected. My earlier examples on Botswana, Pakistan and Bangladesh should not be taken amiss. I think the Member for Tampines GRC, Dr Aline Wong, missed the point. I was trying to illustrate that there are as many variations of constitutions as there are countries and each constitution has to be tailored to meet the special circumstances of the country. In the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh, they have to tailor the constitution to provide for Parliament to elect woman representatives. Otherwise, women will be under-represented. Likewise, some of the other countries, make special provisions for minorities. In our case, as I explained yesterday, we have our special circumstances, ie, the dominance of the PAP, the first-past-the-post system and the electoral uniformity of our constituencies. I was not making the point that because they have it, we can have it. Our circumstances are different. I think I should pause here and check whether I have demolished some Members' fundamental objection to the fact that one must be elected to have authority. I have shown that you do not have to. I hope you can now come several steps forward. Does our Bill contradict the principle of democracy? Does it erode democracy? What is democracy? What are the features of democracy? Let us test what we are doing against such features. The Encyclo- paedia Britannica, from which this quote is taken, defines democracy in this way: 'The minimal definition in institutional terms of a constitutional democracy is that it should provide for a regularised system of periodic elections with a free choice of candidates...' The first feature - regular and fair elections. Does the Bill in any way deprive Singaporeans of free, fair and regular elections? Does it? It does not. Do they have a free choice of candidates? In the last elections, I think some eight political parties stood for elections fielding over 50 candidates. Did they have a free choice? Would the nominated MPs deprive Singaporeans of this free choice of candidates? Can they not choose Opposition MPs if they want to? The answer is yes. They can choose any candidate they want to, be they from the Opposition or from the PAP. I continue: " ... the opportunity to organise competing political parties ...". That exists. The Bill does not in any way take away the opportunity to organise competing political parties. " ... Adult suffrage ..." - that is voting by those over 21 years old in the case of Singapore. The Bill does not take that away. " ... Decisions by majority vote with protection of minority rights ..." - that is how decisions are taken over here. If there is a dispute over certain Bills, over certain policies, they are put to a vote and those policies and Bills will be carried by the majority in this House. So how does this nominated MP proposal affect this feature of democracy? And we have the Presidential Council for Minority Rights to protect the rights of the minority communities in Singapore, and also the GRCs. " .... an independent judiciary", that is another feature required of a democracy. By this definition of Encyclopaedia Britannica, we have it. "... and the opportunity to change any aspect of the governmental system through agreed procedures" - which is what we are trying to do. We are trying to change an aspect of Government through agreed procedures. In other words, put the Bill before the House, get it debated, refer it to Select Committee, get it passed, enact it as law. So how does the proposal for nominated MPs in any way conflict with the principle of democracy? Let me now read this definition in full: "The minimal definition in institutional terms of a constitutional democracy is that it should provide for a regularized system of periodic elections with a free choice of candidates, the opportunity to organize competing political parties, adult suffrage, decisions by majority vote with protection of minority rights, an independent judiciary, constitutional safeguards for basic civil liberties, [Yes, I missed it out just now] and the opportunity to change any aspect of the governmental system through agreed procedures." Now, prove to me that the proposal to have nominated MPs takes away anything from that definition of democracy. If you cannot prove it, and if you agree with me that it does not in any way diminish the practice of democracy in Singapore, can you shift a few more steps forward? Can you? Be dispassionate, do not be so emotional that NMPs in this House would be a slight on your performance. It does not. So can you move a few more steps forward? The two fundamental objections which some Members have, or one really if you roll the two together, against the Bill is that you must be elected to be in Parliament. I have shown that one does not have to be elected to be in Parliament. Yes, in most countries, their Houses of Representatives have only elected members. But I have also shown that there are many such Houses which have appointed, not elected, representatives. I hope you can now come several steps forward, seeing that your fundamental objection is demolished. Now, there were two calls for referendum, one by the Member for Potong Pasir and the other by the Member for Fengshan. I thought I should comment on this because that deals with another aspect of government. And again, I quote from this popular version for layman and undergraduates. This is on the British system: "The British system of parliamentary government is above all a system of government. It is not a system geared to a series of opinion polls or referendums in which the garbled voice of the people is equated with deity. Among the factors which the government and members of Parliament have to take into account is a strength of public sentiments on particular issues. But this is one factor among many. Members of Parliament are representatives but not delegates of the constituents. Nor is a Cabinet a committee of the House of Commons or of Parliament. A government and its parliamentary supporters ought to act in the way they think best in the general interest of the country. It is open to the electorate to use criticism and ridicule to exert pressure on their representatives by legitimate means, to voice their displeasure at by-elections and to turn the Government out at the next General Election. But there is no constitutional convention to the effect that the Government which loses the confidence of the country [and country here is in italics] must resign or advise a dissolution of Parliament so long as it commands a majority in the House of Commons." (Pg. 103) In other words, so long as a party commands a majority in the House, it has got to govern in accordance with the general interests of the people. It does not refer matters to a referendum all the time. And this Party has just won an overwhelming victory in September 1988 - 80 out of 81 seats. We do not have to go back to the people for a referendum on this simple Bill. Having dealt with the fundamentals, I do not think I need to elaborate too much on other points raised by MPs. I will not go into full details because I have said that the Bill will be referred to a Select Committee. I will just comment very quickly on a few matters. One is the procedure of appointment. I think this can be improved upon if we get considered and better suggestions on how to deal with this. The MP for Ayer Rajah has a valid point, not the point about the spectre of chauvinists and communalists taking advantage of the process to come into Parliament. That point I do not agree. But his valid point is that many people will think they have a chance to nominate candidates into Parliament - the clans, the religious groups, functional constituencies and so on. We are going to receive many, many nominations and we select only six. Those who are not selected, I think, will feel quite resentful, and rather let down that their nominations are not being accepted. Well, maybe we can think of other ways to improve on the process. On credibility, I do not think it depends so much on the procedures of appointment as on the credibility of the people who come into Parliament; the stature, the contribution of the nominated MPs is what counts. If they do not carry themselves well, are unable to debate on policies, or contribute substantially to our discus- sions, no matter how they are nominated or appointed, there will be no credibility to them. That is the key to the success of this scheme, to be able to get people of stature, people with certain expertise, good practical experience, to come to Parliament to contribute to our debate. If we have them in Parliament, I think they will be able to establish their credibility very quickly. I would not worry too much about who appoints them. We should not fall into the trap that so long as they are appointed by the Government they are not credible or that they are only credible if they are appointed by the Opposition. I think that cannot be. I think the remarks of many MPs imply that if it is seen by the people that NMPs are appointed by the PAP or by a PAP-dominated government, they have no credibility. So what does that mean? You mean they have more credibility if they are appointed by Opposition MPs or by an independent panel? I do not buy that. Votes, again this point can be discussed at the Select Committee. Should nominated MPs be given votes? I think we can argue either way. If we give votes to the nominated MPs, under certain circumstances they can affect the course of a Bill. For example, if Parliament is more or less evenly divided between Government party and the Opposition parties, the nominated MPs, if they are given votes, can hold the balance. They can either get the Bills passed or get the Bills rejected by Parliament. Should we or should we not allow them to do so? I think it is a matter for us to decide, whether we should grant them this ability. I would prefer to give them some voting powers; otherwise, as some MPs put it, they come to this House, they talk, but they have no real influence on Bills. My interest in giving them some voting power is this. If they vote with the Government most of the time, they are in fact endorsing our policies, and our Bills, provided, as I expect they would, they are people of stature and their views are considered. And if they vote against the Bills from time to time, we have got to ask ourselves why, since these are people who have got no vested partisan political interests who vote against our Bills. I think it lends weight to their speech over here and we have got to take them seriously. But I am prepared to have this matter further reviewed at the Select Committee and decide at that point of time. On the nomenclature for nominated MPs, some suggested that they could be called "Parliamentary Councillors". Again, I think these are not important matters for us to decide today. We can leave it to the Select Committee and choose a term which could increase the stature of nominated MPs, and not one which diminishes it. Because if we have a term which clips their stature, then why should people want to come into Parliament? I think it is totally unnecessary for us to diminish their stature by using a term which implies that they are not quite an MP. But again, this is a matter which we can work on in the Select Committee. Just one small point on waste of expenditure. Mr Chiam said it would be a waste of public expenditure. I can debunk that point easily. This is a privilege which we are extending to a group of Singaporeans who, in our view, can contribute to good government, to the affairs of the State. We do not have to pay them any allowances if we do not want to. But, in my view, I think it is better that we pay them some allowances, not quite the same as the allowance for a Member of Parliament. It can be a quarter, it can be less. But if I have to meet his point, I can say, "Look, it is a privilege which we extend to you and you should be happy that you are given this privilege; therefore, no allowances." So his point on waste of expenditure is debunked. If I may use this to illustrate why we think we should have nominated MPs. The point made by Mr Chiam is actually a political point, playing to the public gallery. "Here you are, the PAP getting six more people, paying them for what? Just for talking in Parliament. A waste of taxpayers' money." If we have nominated MPs over here, they will not be playing politics. They will be examining each Bill, each policy, for its intrinsic worth: does it or does it not benefit the people, and not does it or does it not benefit me as a Member of Parliament or as a party. Let me explain again why the Government wants to move ahead with this Bill. It is the principle, the objective, which is important, and that is to encourage participation. I believe in consensus democracy. I do not think adversarial politics is good for Singapore. Look at the case of India now. The country is divided. Political parties looking to the Hindus for support, other groups looking to the Muslims for support, some looking to the Sikhs. What is the result? I think adversarial politics in India will tear the country apart. In Singapore's context, if we do not succeed in getting our people to share a common vision and to work together, and instead each one of us tries to win political support by appealing to certain groups of Singaporeans, I think this country too will be torn apart because we have Muslims, we have Hindus, we have Christians, we have Buddhists, Taoists, we have employers, we have unionists, we have workers. Each one of us can cater to a different group and get a few seats in Parliament. But the net result of such politics will tear the whole country apart. I want to build consensus. I want to practise firm cohesive politics where we can. But to succeed, we have got to set out to accommodate alternative views and even dissent, constructive dissent preferably, destructive if necessary. But if we meet destructive dissent, we will meet it all the way, firmly. If we can succeed in this plan, we can involve Singaporeans in climbing a few more steps to achieve the goals that we have set out for them in building a better Singapore for ourselves and our children. I feel quite strongly that we should have the best people in Government. The PAP has set out to try and gather the best and the most representative of each generation into the Party to stand for elections so that they can be in Parliament to lead Singapore. But speaking from experience, I know that despite all our efforts, there are still some Singaporeans who can contribute but who are not in Parliament. So I try and gather these Singaporeans into the political process. Resource Panels to help the Government Parliamentary Committees. That is an effort to gather these Singaporeans to help us. Feedback Unit is another institution which I hope can gather such Singaporeans to help us. Institute of Policy Studies which we endorse and encourage, that is another effort. This is another effort to identify, locate and bring in such Singaporeans into the highest forum in the land. And if we can succeed in getting six good nominated MPs into Parliament, I believe there are only pluses, no minuses. My approach is from the angle of the good of Singapore. Is the proposal good for Singaporeans, good for Singapore? Never mind whether it is good for us as individual MPs or not. Is it good for Singapore that we bring in such people into Parliament? Because no matter how comprehensive our network is, we have not brought in some of these people into Parliament. I am trying to do that. I hope you can see it in that light and help me get these people into Parliament to contribute for the good of Singapore. I understand that many MPs over here have reservations. I will take this approach. Give this Bill a try. There is nothing to lose by trying. There is something to lose if we were to reject it outright. I am prepared at the Select Committee stage to build in a "sunset" clause, a "self-destruct" clause. After a certain time, maybe four or five years from now, either before the next general elections or soon after, if the Bill, which if it is enacted becomes law, does not bring us the benefits which I expect, and if Members of Parliament are still not convinced by the wisdom of having such people in Parliament, that law will self-destruct unless it is renewed again by Members in this House. That instrument can be built in at the Select Committee. Some MPs are not convinced at this stage. But I am convinced that I will be proven right. So my final word to Members is: give this a try. We lose nothing by trying. Thank you. [Applause.]