Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." Sir, the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act was enacted on 21st October 1955. Since then, Parliament has extended it nine times. The last time was five years ago in 1994. The Act will expire on 20th October this year. Hence, this Bill which seeks to further extend the Act for another five years to enable Government to continue dealing effectively with secret society or "SS" activities, drug trafficking and serious crimes. The Bill also seeks to give officers from the Central Narcotics Bureau or "CNB" certain powers which the Police already has under the Act. This will enhance CNB's operational efficiency and streamline its work process. Rationale for the Act The Act provides for the maintenance of public order and detention of criminals in the interests of public safety, peace and good order. Let me, however, emphasise, at the outset, that we do not invoke the Act as a convenient alternative to prosecution in court. The Government's consistent approach is always to consider a court conviction in the first instance. Hence, the vast majority of cases are prosecuted. But prosecution is not always possible, not because there is no evidence, but because witnesses and accomplices are not prepared to testify in court for fear of reprisal or for other reasons. This is especially so when accused persons are associated with SS activities, organised crime gangs or drug trafficking syndicates. SS members often refuse to give evidence in court against fellow members. As for drug traffickers, witnesses are usually drug addicts who refuse to testify against their suppliers because of their vulnerable status or for fear of reprisal. An additional difficulty is that traffickers have resorted to using couriers and go-betweens to conceal their involvement, thus making it harder to apprehend them. Since the Act's enactment in 1955, it has proven to be an effective tool in suppressing SS activities in Singapore. This is evident in the number of SS incidents recorded by Police which has fallen from 416 in 1959, to 10 in 1988, and 3 in 1998. The number of Detention Orders (DOs) issued against SS members has also fallen from 72 in 1988, to 42 in 1998. As for drug trafficking, the Act has enabled the CNB to cripple many drug syndicates and shatter their distribution networks in Singapore. This has contributed to the much improved drug situation today. As a result, the number of DOs issued against drug traffickers has also fallen from 192 in 1988 to 48 last year. The Act has also been invoked against criminals who have committed serious crimes, such as murder where witnesses were not prepared to testify in court. However, let me assure Members that the Act is used sparingly for these cases. Indeed, the last time the Act was so invoked was in 1994 when 5 Thai nationals were detained for their involvement in the murders of security guards and construction workers while committing thefts of surveying equipment or "theodolites". Since then, no DO has been issued against any serious crime offender. Overall, the number of DOs issued has declined from 270 in 1988 to 90 in 1998. The number under detention has also declined from 1,260 in 1988 to 463 in 1998. These statistics prove the point that the Act is effective in suppressing SS activities, drug trafficking and other organised criminal syndicates. Does it therefore mean that we can now do away with the Act? The answer is an emphatic "no". The Act still plays a useful role today. We cannot be complacent. Despite strict laws and tough police enforcement, SS incidents still occur today. For example, in March last year, a group of triad members viciously attacked rival triad members at a coffeeshop with gangland weapons, such as home-made samurai swords and parangs. Four innocent customers were seriously injured in the attack. There is no indication that we have completely eliminated secret societies in Singapore. They still pose a menace. Apart from rioting, SS members are involved in syndicated criminal activities, such as extortion, illegal moneylending and smuggling of illegal immigrants. For example, in May 1997, the Police detected some SS members extorting `protection' money from contractors soliciting for renovation contracts at several new housing estates. Contractors who refused to pay up were chased away. This lucrative monopoly led to an atmosphere of lawlessness as different gangs wrestled for territorial control of the estates. The gangs' activities went undetected initially as victimised contractors kept quiet for fear of reprisal. Police acted swiftly and crippled five `protection rackets' between September and December that year. 23 SS members were arrested under the Act. 15 of them were issued with DOs and 8 with Police Supervision Orders. Since then, Police has not detected any `protection racket' at new housing estates. The Act has therefore provided Police with the arsenal to nip the problem in the bud. SS gangs are also involved in illegal moneylending. In June last year, Police crippled a loanshark syndicate operating in the Geylang area. The syndicate organiser cum financier had recruited about 50 SS members to be his loansharks and financed some of them. These loansharks assaulted and intimidated debtors and their families, vandalising their property if the repayments were late. The victims could not identify the leader because he operated behind-the-scene. He had no direct dealings with the debtors. It was under these circumstances that Police invoked the Act to detain the organiser cum syndicate leader, together with a henchman. I now move on to street gangs. The SS scene today is characterised by loosely-organised street gangs with fluid membership. Despite Police action, new gangs are detected every year. In 1998, 55 street gangs were detected and dealt with by Police under the Act compared to 79 in 1997 and 45 in 1996. These street gang members are not as vicious as traditional SS members but they still fight over trivial matters, such as staring incidents, passing of remarks and accidental contact, thus impacting law and order and lowering Singaporeans' sense of safety. We must therefore deter these street gangs from becoming full-fledged secret societies. Where necessary, the Act will be used. Sir, I have mentioned the above examples to show why, despite the good law and order situation prevailing today, the Act is still necessary. Some Singaporeans may think, quite naively, that the Act was enacted in 1955 to deal with rampant gang lawlessness, and therefore has no further use today. But, Sir, nothing is as far from the truth. The setting may have changed but the threat remains. Many countries are losing their battle against triads because of the lack of sufficiently deterrent penalties. The recent gangland warfare in Macau is a grim reminder of the violent nature of these triad groups. In an interview reported in the Straits Times on 25th May 1998, Mr Victor Ng, a Legislative Assembly member of the Preparatory Committee set up by China to oversee Macau's return to Chinese sovereignty, commented, and I quote: 'The sort of crimes being committed are very serious, and the government cannot control. It proves that the Macau government has no means, no capacity, to rule Macau in a lawful manner.' Another example, which those of us who have followed in the press would know, is the murder of Dr Victor Chang, the world-renowned heart surgeon, in Sydney in 1991. Two Malaysian triad members were convicted of killing him because he refused to accede to their extortion demands. Again, these are examples which highlight the danger of letting triads gain a foothold in any society. Law enforcement agencies must have sufficient teeth in their legal arsenal to deter such violent gangs. We must therefore constantly be on guard. Police has assessed that there are gangland members in Singapore and the region who are linked to prominent East Asian Gangs (EAGs) in Hong Kong and Taiwan. But these EAG members are discreet. They are not involved in triad activities, such as initiation ceremonies and extortion. However, they have the "muscle", the money and even the firepower to commit cross-border crimes. According to Police, EAGs consider Singapore to be an unattractive operational base. Police attributes this primarily to the deterring effect of the CL(TP) Act. But we cannot rule out the possibility of these triads transferring their operations here. Hence, Singapore needs the CL(TP) Act as our shield against this potential threat. Our law enforcement agencies must be well-equipped to counter any attempts by such triad groups to infiltrate Singapore. Singapore has, so far, managed to avoid the many pitfalls currently faced by other countries in dealing with organised triads and criminal gangs. The Act is a critical factor in deterring such foreign gangs from gaining a foothold in Singapore. Let me now turn to the drug situation. Drug trafficking is an extremely lucrative trade. Drug traffickers and syndicate leaders have become very sophisticated in their modus operandi. They stay clear from physical drug transactions by engaging money couriers, organisers and recruiters to conduct their trafficking businesses. Sir, although the drug situation in Singapore is under control, drug traffickers play a high stakes life-and-death game. They will not hesitate to do everything necessary to save their own skins. We have a duty to protect our people. Allowing the Act to lapse may be misinterpreted as a softening of our tough stance and a weakening of our ability to deal with drug trafficking. This may encourage international drug trafficking syndicates to use Singapore as a staging point for their illicit drug activities. More drugs will then find their way to the local population, resulting in higher `contamination' levels. Such a scenario has implications on crime. We should not expose ourselves to this possibility. In short, SS and drug trafficking activities have declined considerably but the threat of resurgence is very real. We therefore still need the strong deterrence offered by the Act. Having explained why the Act is still necessary today, let me assure Members that there are safeguards in the process. These safeguards ensure that Police and CNB cannot take the easy way out by invoking the Act when a person should instead be charged in court. They are both built into the Act itself as well as found in administrative procedures which ensure that enforcement agencies do not resort to using the Act without the strongest justification. First, any proposal by Police or CNB to detain a person under the Act or to place him under police supervision will be scrutinsed by senior officials in MHA and the Attorney-General's Chambers and indeed by the AG before the Detention or Police Supervision Order is issued. Departments cannot take the easy way out. They have to justify the use of the Act in every case. Second, an Advisory Committee comprising prominent private citizens such as Justices of the Peace, senior lawyers and a few community leaders scrutinise the investigations and documentary evidence and may examine investigation officers and witnesses. At the Committee's hearing, the detainees or supervisees may be represented by legal counsel. The Committee makes its recommendation to the President. I must reiterate that the Committee is not a rubber-stamping body. Over the past 10 years, the Committee has disagreed with MHA's recommendations on 12 occasions, by recommending instead that DOs be either revoked or changed to PSOs. We have taken the objections seriously and accepted the majority of these recommendations. Third, DOs are reviewed annually by a separate Review Committee, also comprising prominent private citizens. Hence, no detainee is just locked up and the key thrown away. The Review Advisory Committee members are distinct from the Advisory Committee, ensuring independent decision-making. Any recommendation to extend the detention for a further 12-month period must be approved by the President. And fourth, a separate Review Board, also with a different set of members, considers all cases of detention cases extending 10 years or more. This process ensures that longer term detainees' cases are specially looked at. Finally, this exercise of coming before Parliament every 5 years to renew the Act is an additional safeguard. An Advisory Committee Chairman has asked why the Act is temporary and not permanent. The reason is that, this way, the Government has to come to the House to justify the continued use of the Act every 5 years. Once again, let me assure this House that where there are witnesses willing to testify in court, we will charge the culprits in court. But where victims and accomplices refuse to testify in open court, the CL(TP) Act prevents the chief offenders from getting away scot-free. Even when invoked, the Act is not used as a blunt instrument. Depending on the gravity of the offence, either a Detention Order or a Police Supervision Order would be issued. Therefore, this allows for the exercise of flexibility based on the facts of each case. Let me now touch on the proposed amendments to the Act. Currently, only Police officers are empowered to arrest and detain a suspect without a warrant for not more than 24 hours under section 44 of the Act. Section 44(2) of the Act further empowers a police officer of the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police or above to extend the detention period for another 24 hours. Under section 44(3) of the Act, a Police officer of or above the rank of Superintendent of Police may authorise further detention up to 14 days for investigation into the case to be completed. Under current practice, CNB must obtain authorisation from a Police officer of the appropriate rank to arrest and detain a suspected drug trafficker under the Act. CNB investigates a large number of drug trafficking cases under the Act - 51 in 1997 and 48 in 1998. The requirement for CNB to obtain authorisation from Police hampers CNB's effectiveness and efficiency. Therefore, Sir, it is proposed that Part V of the Act be amended to give CNB officers powers, similar to that of Police officers, to arrest and detain suspected drug traffickers and persons who had assisted these traffickers in one way or another, eg, in collecting monies. A new section 46A will be introduced to empower the Director, Deputy Director and Assistant Directors and other Narcotics Officers of CNB, to exercise the powers conferred on Police officers to detain and arrest suspected persons, and to enter and search premises to effect arrest. Under section 46A(2), any CNB officer holding the appointment of Assistant Director or above may exercise the powers conferred on a Police officer holding the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police or above. Under section 46A(3), the Director or Deputy Director of CNB may exercise the powers conferred on a Police officer holding the rank of Superintendent of Police or above. Sir, this is a right move. CNB officers, like Police officers, are responsible law enforcement officers. In fact, currently, CNB officers can already exercise powers of a police officer under the Criminal Procedure Code in relation to investigation of drug offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act. Hence, this amendment plugs a gap. Sir, these amendments will allow CNB to be more efficient. The enhanced powers will only apply to drug trafficking-related cases, unless approved by the Minister. The Director and Deputy Director of CNB will be responsible for authorising investigations related to Criminal Law cases. These enhanced powers will thus be tightly controlled. As in the case of police officers, any abuse will be severely dealt with. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed.