ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS - BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH MALAYSIA: - WATER AND OTHER ISSUES
However, in early 2002, Prime Minister Mahathir began to criticise the water agreements as allegedly unequal treaties foisted on Malaysia by the British. Prime Minister Mahathir said that the price for water under the agreements was too low and that as such "practically, they (Singapore) get their water free". He also said that "also, the agreement was drawn up by the British which of course favoured Singapore." Later, he said "what we know is that we have been charging them 3 sen per thousand gallons of raw water and we also know that countries like Hong Kong buy their raw water from mainland China at RM 8 per thousand gallons". Other Malaysian leaders took up the refrain and stoked a frenzy of media criticism against Singapore. For example, Menteri Besar of Johor Ghani said "all this while, we have been supplying Singapore with free water..." This deliberate raising of Malaysian ground sentiments seriously alarmed Singapore. It could easily have spiralled out of control and led to grave consequences. Therefore, on 5th February last year, we sent Malaysia a diplomatic note, Third Person Note (TPN) in which we pointed out that "pending a binding agreement on the overall package of issues, all legal obligations of the existing Water Agreements and the Points of Agreement (POA) remain in force and are binding on both Governments". We reminded them that the Water Agreements are binding legal arrangements duly confirmed and guaranteed by the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore in the Separation Agreement. We said that the Separation Agreement "is the fundamental basis of Singapore's existence as an independent sovereign nation" and that "any variation of the Water Agreements without the consent of both Governments will be a breach of the Separation Agreement and that cannot be accepted". We also pointed out that "further negotiations on new agreements pertaining to the long term supply of water to Singapore can only proceed on the basis that the agreements already concluded cannot be altered without the explicit consent of both parties. And we added, otherwise any new agreements on water can similarly be altered without consent. This will have grave implications for bilateral relations." On 14th March 2002, the Malaysian Government replied to Singapore's demarche. Malaysia's TPN conveyed "its commitment to resolving the issue of water with Singapore in the context of an agreement on the overall package of issues", and they also said, "at no time was there a suggestion that the Government of Malaysia would depart from such a commitment." They said that any suggestion to the contrary is "misleading and constitutes a gross misinterpretation of the well known position of the Malaysia Government." We replied through another TPN on 25th March 2002 taking note of their commitment and assurances. And we also reiterated our own commitment to reaching a mutually beneficial agreement on the package of outstanding issues. Foreign Minister Syed Hamid himself noted at the First Ministerial Meeting at Putrajaya on 1st July 2002, and I quote: 'Malaysia has repeatedly said that it will honour the 1961 and 1962 Agreements until their expiry in 2011 and 2061 respectively..' He added: '. During the Separation of Singapore, Malaysia did not propose for the Agreements to be reviewed. It continues to honour the Agreements and such commitment is further reinforced when Malaysia signed the Separation Agreement in 1965.' We were thus flabbergasted when their Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Rais Yatim publicly declared on 24th October 2002, that as Malaysia's solution, Malaysia could enact domestic legislation to render the Water Agreements null and void. But as I had said at our sitting on 31st October 2002, no country can evade its international treaty obligations by enacting a domestic law. This is a very well established principle of international law. Should any country choose to violate that principle, it would signal to the world that it can and will do likewise for any other international agreements. Let me also add that contrary to what Malaysia has alleged, these Water Agreements of 1961 and 1962 were not fixed by the British in Singapore's favour. These Agreements were signed by the Johore State Government and the Singapore City Council in 1961 and 1962 respectively. By then, Malaysia was already an independent and sovereign nation, and Singapore had achieved self-government. It is really absurd to suggest that the Federal Government of an independent and sovereign nation Malaysia would allow the Johore State Government to be manipulated by the British to sign an agreement that was against Malaysia's national interests. Chronology of the Package and Water Agreements Now, let me address the allegations that Singapore has been the unreasonable party in the negotiations. To do so, I will have to recount to Members in some detail how the matters unfolded over the last few years. A full chronology is set out in the bundle of documents, but let me take you through the major milestones. When Malaysia experienced problems in the Asian Financial crisis in 1997-98, at Malaysia's request, Singapore began to discuss a financial assistance package for Malaysia in the context of a framework for wider cooperation. The framework included the supply of water to Singapore after the expiry of the current Water Agreements. Singapore's assistance entailed significant market risks and potential financial losses for Singapore. This framework would make it politically possible for Singapore to carry these financial risks. The price review of water under the current Water Agreements was never raised by then Prime Minister Mahathir and was not part of that framework. At the ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in December 1998, Prime Minister Mahathir informed Prime Minister Goh that Malaysia no longer needed financial assistance from Singapore. Prime Minister Mahathir proposed that the outstanding bilateral issues be resolved together as a package. In the interest of clearing the decks of bilateral issues, Prime Minister Goh agreed to this. What were the items in the final package as from August 2000? The key items in the package were: future supply of water for 100 years after 2061; use of Malaysian airspace by RSAF; variation in the terms of the POA, including giving an additional 12 parcels of KTM or Malayan Railway land at Bukit Timah for joint development; early withdrawal of CPF monies amounting to some RM 3 billion by West Malaysians. And later, as I will elaborate, two more items were added to the package by Prime Minister Mahathir, namely: the Malaysian proposal to replace the Causeway with a bridge; and revision of the current water price. The meeting between Prime Minister Goh and Prime Minister Mahathir in Hanoi was followed by three rounds of negotiations on the package at the officials' level from March to May 1999 where not much progress was made. In August 2000, with Prime Minister Goh's approval, Senior Minister Lee visited Kuala Lumpur to try to make progress on the package . He worked through then Finance Minister Tun Daim Zainuddin. After first meeting Tun Daim, Senior Minister had a four-eye meeting with Prime Minister Mahathir on 15th August 2000. Prime Minister Mahathir brought into the package two new issues: the price of current water, and the replacement of the Causeway with a new bridge. Senior Minister Lee agreed to these inclusions. The two leaders reached agreement on a list of items, including a new price of raw water for 45 sen per 1,000 gallons for both current and future water. This was the first time that the current water agreements featured in the bilateral package. Following that meeting, Senior Minister Lee wrote to Tun Daim on 24th August 2000 to confirm the list of items which he and Prime Minister Mahathir had agreed to. On 21st February 2001, Prime Minister Mahathir replied to Senior Minister Lee in which he said, "Johore believes that a fair price would be 60 cents (sic) per mgd (sic) of raw water" and this "should be reviewed every five years". Mgd is million gallons a day. I think there was a typographical error. I think what he meant was "60 sen per thousand gallons". On 23rd April 2001, Senior Minister Lee replied to Prime Minister Mahathir pointing out that this was a variation from their oral understanding of 15th August 2000 which was 45 sen for current and future water. And now Prime Minister Mahathir was proposing a higher price of 60 sen. In September 2001, Senior Minister Lee made a second visit to KL to try to close the gaps on the package of issues. After their meeting on 4th September 2001, Senior Minister Lee and Prime Minister Mahathir held a joint press conference to announce that they had agreed on a basic skeleton of an agreement on the package of bilateral issues. Senior Minister Lee told the media there, in Putrajaya, that Singapore had offered to pay 45 sen for raw water supplied under the current Water Agreements, although we were not legally obliged to do so. He explained that this offer was made in return for assured water supply from Malaysia, beyond 2061, at 60 sen per 1,000 gallons for raw water. On 21st September 2001, Senior Minister Lee wrote to Prime Minister Mahathir confirming and elaborating on this offer. Let me say here that the Malaysians have argued that since Senior Minister Lee had offered 45 sen for current water, it showed that Singapore had, in fact, accepted that Malaysia had the right to review. Prime Minister Mahathir said, "If we don't have the legal right, then why did Lee Kuan Yew come and see me and suggested that the water price should be revised upwards to 45 sen and then we said it should be 60 (sen), 15 sen more?" But, Mdm Deputy Speaker, it is clear from the documents that when Senior Minister Lee offered 45 sen for current water, it was "in return for assured water supply beyond 2061" at 60 sen. Senior Minister Lee never said that Malaysia had the right to review the price of water outside the package, which included water beyond 2061 as well as airspace. Picking up the chronology again, between 18th October and 10th December 2001, there were further exchanges of letters between Senior Minister Lee and Prime Minister Mahathir to clarify various details of the bilateral package, including the price of water. On 4th March 2002, Prime Minister Mahathir wrote to Senior Minister Lee enclosing totally different proposals. This was after Prime Minister Mahathir's statements to the press about RM8 being the real price of water. Under Malaysia's new proposal, the 60 sen price, which he had earlier agreed, would now apply for the first five years from 2002 to 2007, and from 2007 to 2011, the price will be RM3 per 1,000 gallons. And from 2011 until the expiry of the 1962 Water Agreement in 2061, the price of water would be revised annually from RM3, based on the average inflation rate of Malaysia and Singapore. And what about future supply of water after 2061? In that letter, Malaysia proposed that negotiations begin only in 2058; in other words, just three years before the expiry of the 1962 Agreement. Malaysia also proposed that the new water agreement would be valid for 100 years from 2002. In effect, this would mean that the new agreement would only last for 40 years after the expiry of the 1962 Water Agreement. So, Senior Minister Lee replied on 11th March 2002 that this had completely changed from what they had discussed before and in their subsequent exchange of notes and letters. He said that Singapore would have to study the implications of Malaysia's new offers and would respond in due course. On 11th April 2002, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong wrote to Prime Minister Mahathir to give Singapore's response to Prime Minister Mahathir's letter of 4th March 2002. Prime Minister Goh stressed that he did not want bilateral relations to be always strained by the issue of water. Hence, for the sake of good long-term relations, he said that Singapore would produce as much water as it could to supplement the existing Water Agreements. Singapore would ramp up our NEWater programme to replace the supply of water under the 1961 Water Agreement when it expires in 2011. As for water after 2061, Prime Minister Goh accepted Malaysia's offer of 100 mgd of raw water and 150 mgd of treated water. On price, as Malaysia had withdrawn its offer of 60 sen for current water and future water, Prime Minister Goh proposed to peg the price of future water to an agreed percentage of the cost of the alternative source of water, ie, NEWater. Why? This was to provide a definite basis for future price revisions. Prime Minister Goh reminded Prime Minister Mahathir that this agreement should be valid for 100 years from 2061 as this had been the basis for negotiations, and not 100 years from 2002. Prime Minister Goh did not offer revision of the current water price. So, Prime Minister Mahathir's letter of 4th March 2002 and Prime Minister Goh's reply of 11th April 2002 then formed the basis for further discussions between the respective Foreign Ministers and officials on the package of issues. Two Ministerial Meetings were held, as hon. Members know, the first in Putrajaya in July 2002, and the second in Singapore in September 2002. I updated Members on the outcome of these two meetings on 23rd July 2002 and 31st October 2002 respectively, and the Senior Officials Meeting in Johor Baru from 16-17th October 2002. In short, really, there was no progress on the key issues. Mdm Deputy Speaker, Malaysia came out with another new formula under which the price of raw water in 2002 would be RM6.25 per 1,000 gallons. They did this at the Ministerial talks, and they did not explain how this price could be justified under the provisions of the water agreements. They also insisted that they had the right to review the price of current water, when we had pointed out that they had lost their right of review. They also said that they would not negotiate the terms of future water supply until 2059 - now it is 2059 - ie, two years before the expiry of the 1962 Water Agreement, instead of the three years before the expiry, as Prime Minister Mahathir had proposed earlier. After the Second Ministerial Meeting, as I had told the House, when Prime Minister Goh met Prime Minister Mahathir in Putrajaya on 8th October 2002, Prime Minister Mahathir said that Malaysia wanted to "decouple the water issue" from the other items in the package. Prime Minister Goh responded at that meeting that all the issues were tied together. If the water issue was taken out of the package, Singapore would have less leeway to make concessions on the other issues. Members would recall the many statements in the Malaysian media and from Malaysian politicians that misrepresented what transpired at that meeting between Prime Minister Goh and Prime Minister Mahathir. The Malaysians alleged that Singapore had agreed to delink water from the package and had accepted Malaysia's prerogative to review the price of current water. Those statements distorted what was discussed at the meeting and, in fact, impugned Prime Minister Goh's integrity. Two days after his meeting with Prime Minister Mahathir, Prime Minister Goh received a letter from Prime Minister Mahathir dated 7th October 2002, ie, one day before their meeting. In his letter, Prime Minister Mahathir informed Prime Minister Goh that Malaysia had decided to "discontinue the package approach and give the highest priority to first resolving the water issue, particularly the price review of raw water". In other words, even before Prime Minister Goh had met Prime Minister Mahathir, Malaysia had already unilaterally discontinued the package approach, which had been agreed to by both Prime Ministers, and reaffirmed in Malaysia's TPN of 14th March 2002. Hon. Members would remember that I had quoted the TPN, that they said that it is outrageous that you should even make that suggestion that we would do anything other than proceed in accordance with the package approach. On 14th October 2002, Prime Minister Goh replied to Prime Minister Mahathir, reminding him that they had both agreed on the package approach in December 1998 and that was why Singapore had been prepared to make concessions. But now that Malaysia wanted to deal with the water issue separately and discontinue the package approach, trade-offs against other issues in the package were no longer possible. Henceforth, Singapore would have to deal with water and the other issues on their stand-alone merits and no longer as a package. On this basis, the Singapore officials attended the meeting in Johor Baru to discuss the water issue from 16-17th October 2002. At that meeting, it was clear that Malaysia had no intention of striking a deal on future water. This left only the current water price on the agenda. Now we could no longer trade off a current water price revision against the supply of future water. Therefore, we have no choice but to rely on the express provisions of the Water Agreements, and that any variations must be in accordance with the terms of the Water Agreements. Mdm Deputy Speaker, from this chronology of events, Members can see how Malaysia has repeatedly changed its position, not only on the water issue, but also on the entire package negotiations. First, having agreed to 45 sen for current and future water in 2000, they then raised their demand to 60 sen. When we counter-offered 45 sen for current water and 60 sen for future water, they raised their demand further - an immediate increase to 60 sen for current water and then RM3 from 2007. And, later, they came up with the figure of RM6.25 for current water. As you know, Prime Minister Mahathir recently acknowledged publicly that he had proposed 60 sen to Senior Minister Lee, but he said that he had been later advised by Malaysian officials that the price was too low. Second, the starting point for the negotiations since 1998 had been the supply of water for another 100 years after 2061. But in March 2002, the Malaysians reduced this to 40 years, and only at a formula to be negotiated in 2058 and to supply treated water at a formula to be negotiated every 20 years. On 2nd July 2002, Malaysia again agreed to 100 years but now with a price formula based on rates benchmarked against the China-Hong Kong model (or RM8) and other models. And, finally, on 2nd September 2002, Malaysia said that negotiations on future water can only take place in 2059. Third, the Malaysians committed themselves to resolving the issues as a package from December 1998 to September 2002. However, Prime Minister Mahathir later unilaterally took water price revision out of the package by his letter of 7th October, without informing Prime Minister Goh when they met on 8th October that he had written to Prime Minister Goh the day before to have the water issue dealt with separately. By taking current water out of the package, the Malaysians wanted to get this price revision without any commitment to give future water supply in exchange. They have changed the package deal Prime Minister Mahathir first offered to Senior Minister Lee in KL in August 2000, and then followed up in a letter dated 21st February 2001, where he named 60 sen as what Johor considered a "fair price". But the Malaysians know, as they have repeatedly acknowledged, they could not under international law unilaterally revise the price or other provisions of the Water Agreements. Mdm Deputy Speaker, on our part, we have tried our best to accommodate Malaysia's successive new positions. Even though Malaysia had repeatedly shifted their goalposts, Singapore has not walked away from negotiations. In fact, we attended the Johor Baru meeting in October 2002 in good faith just six days after the Malaysians had unilaterally discontinued the package approach. Members should also note, I think, that four out of the six items in the package - current water price, POA variation, CPF and the bridge - were to benefit Malaysia. Singapore was not legally obliged to pay more for current water, we are not obliged legally to vary the Points of Agreement, or to make special arrangements for West Malaysians to withdraw their CPF monies early. And we also had no interest in demolishing the Causeway and to build a bridge in its place. Singapore's overriding interest in the package was future water. We were prepared to agree to the items which Malaysia wanted, including a current water price revision, only in exchange for Malaysia agreeing to provide us a long-term supply of water beyond 2061, and RSAF access to Malaysian airspace. Let me also say that these concessions to Malaysia would have been at a considerable cost to us. They have to be seen in the context of the overall package deal being negotiated and, as we have said before, in an MFA statement on 2nd February 2002, "the total amount of money that Malaysia will receive when other items in the package are factored in will be over 1.5 billion ringgit." This did not include the cost of over S$500 million, cost to us, for building our half of the bridge and a new Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) complex. But, we thought that all these would be justified if we could secure future water. This was why when Prime Minister Mahathir proposed the package approach in 1998, Prime Minister Goh agreed. We tried to meet their demands as long as future water supply was on offer as the quid pro quo. As negotiations went on, we became aware that they did not want to sign an agreement on future water supplies. All they promised at the final meeting in Johor Baru was to discuss the matter in 2059, two years before the 1962 Water Agreement ends. Members will understand why I say that this has pushed us to prepare for a negative outcome, one that requires us to develop our capability for NEWater and desalination. These are no light tasks for us to undertake. We will need many years to build up the know-how, keep abreast with technological advances and, just as important, we must prepare psychologically our people for it. Having unfolded the story of how the negotiations went, and I hope Members will be able to see how reasonable Singapore has been, now let me reflect on the way forward. Notwithstanding our efforts to reach an agreement, we clearly find ourselves at an impasse. So, Members naturally may ask, what next? Prime Minister Mahathir and Foreign Minister Syed Hamid had spoken about referring the water issue to international arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). On 28th December 2002, when our media asked me about this, I said it was a great pity that we have not been able to reach agreement on the package, but Singapore, obviously, could not force Malaysia to the negotiating table if it chooses not to do so. Hence, I said that if Malaysia proposes to submit the water issue to PCA arbitration, Singapore would have to agree, albeit reluctantly, in the interest of overcoming the impasse. To my surprise, their Berita Harian (30th December 2002) reported Foreign Minister Syed Hamid as responding that the option of referring the water issue to PCA for arbitration did not arise, although they were quoted as suggesting this in the first place. Well, if Malaysia does not wish to send the matter for arbitration to the PCA, a world organisation which is renowned for its impartiality, then what is the next best solution? It is to have recourse to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Water Agreements. The provisions in Clauses 21 and 19 of the 1961 and 1962 Water Agreements respectively provide for the settlement of disputes arising under the Agreements. Those provisions stipulate that where disputes cannot be resolved, the matter shall be referred to arbitration "in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the arbitration law at the time of such dispute existing in the State of Johore". Indeed, Mdm Deputy Speaker, the Johor State Secretary had sent letters to the PUB dated 14th August 2002 seeking to give Notice of price review under Clause 17 and Clause 14 of the 1961 and 1962 Water Agreements, respectively. As Singapore's position was that as Malaysia had lost the right of review, the PUB replied on 9th October 2002 that it did not accept that the Johor State Government was still entitled to serve notice to seek a review of the charge of raw water under the two Water Agreements. Now, if I may interject here, on this business of the price review of current water, Members will recall that I told the House on the 31st October sitting, that the Malaysian leaders had publicly said that it was not an oversight or mistake that Malaysia did not review the price of current water in 1986/87, but it was a deliberate move. Dr Mahathir said Malaysia did not revise the water pricing when it was due because they thought Singapore would also revise the price of treated water supplied to Malaysia. (Bernama, 11th October 2002). Johor State Assembly Speaker Zainalabidin Mohd Zain also said that the Johor Government had not made a mistake in not pressing for a review in 1986 and said "there was no point in doing so because Johor was dependent on Singapore for its treated water supply, and Singapore would have also increased its price of treated water sold to Johor" (New Straits Times, 3rd July 2002). At the Second Ministerial Meeting in September 2002 in Singapore, Foreign Minister Syed Hamid pointed out that the Notice of price review which Johor had sent to PUB "made references to Clauses 17 and 14 of the 1961 and 1962 Water Agreements respectively as well as to arbitration in the event that both countries fail to reach agreement." These Clauses 17 and 14, the price review clauses, provide that "in the event of any dispute or differences arising under the provisions of this clause the same shall be referred to arbitration as hereinafter provided." In other words, Malaysia, through these formal notices, has effectively taken steps towards referring its water dispute with Singapore to arbitration. At that time, we were reluctant to go along this arbitration route because we still hoped for an agreement on a package deal including future water. However, now it has become clear that we cannot expect renewal of future water supply. As this removes the basis for further negotiations, we are ready to have the dispute resolved through arbitration according to the laws of Johor. The question as to whether there is still a right of review, as well as the quantum of the price revision, can both be resolved through the legal process as provided for in the two Water Agreements? In other words, this is the way that we are also resolving Malaysia's claim over Pedra Branca. If, in fact, Johor has not lost the right of revision by not exercising it in 1986/87, then the arbitrator tribunal's award on the price revision will take effect from the date when Johor gave its Notice to PUB as provided for in the two Agreements. As Malaysia has commenced this process, then I say, let the matter be settled through arbitration. Mdm Deputy Speaker, indeed, I want to stress that peaceful and amicable settlement of disputes has been Singapore's consistent approach. For the Pedra Branca issue, we had proposed, and they have agreed, to refer it to the ICJ. I am as concerned as Mr Steve Chia about the loose talk by the Malaysian leaders in the Malaysia media about "war". Bernama reported Foreign Minister Syed Hamid on 31st December 2002, saying, "Singapore has two choices. If it refuses to compromise ... go to war". In his New Year message, Prime Minister Mahathir said "we promise that if anyone violates our freedom, they will get what they call a `bloody nose'" (New Straits Times, 1st January 2003). Asked by reporters the following day, Prime Minister Mahathir did not specify which country he was referring to, but neither did he categorically rule out Singapore. This further encouraged the Malaysian media to play up Singapore's alleged forward defence strategy and link it to Singapore's "arrogance" in the conduct of its bilateral relations with Malaysia. This was quickly followed by remarks by various Malaysian leaders publicly emphasising their military capability, the MAF's capability, in defending Malaysia from external threats. For instance, Defence Minister Najib Tun Razak said that the MAF had experience fighting in a real war and that sophisticated weaponry systems were not the yardstick to measure whether a country could win a war (Bernama, 7th January 2003). Amidst all the bellicose talk of war, the Malaysian media created a furore over Tim Huxley's book "Defending the Lion City". Now, this book, based on academic research on the SAF's capabilities, was actually published by a British academic from Hull University more than two years ago. Back then, the Malaysian media did not pay any attention to this book. So, one can only speculate why the Malaysian media have chosen to do their book reviews only now. In the same vein, there were almost daily articles in the Malaysian Malay language press playing up Singapore's alleged aggressive intentions. On 18th January 2003, Berita Harian (Malaysia) recklessly alleged, and I quote, - I think Members should note this because this is not in English, readily available to all - "Singapore has stealthily embarked on a bioterrorism defence program, and that it has set aside more than RM201 million specifically to carry out R&D to build up its bioterrorism defence system. History has proven that every country that undertakes R&D in biodefence will also end up by doing R&D into weapons for biological attacks. Singapore is no exception to such thinking." Without any evidence to substantiate their allegations, they accuse the Singapore Government of breaching its obligations under international conventions it has signed against the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such war-mongering articles, it should be noted, are found especially in the Malay language press, which can only be designed to stir up animosities in their Malay population against Singapore. Mdm Deputy Speaker, such loose talk of war is both irresponsible and dangerous. It whips up emotions that could become difficult to control. In such an atmosphere, the Malaysian navy and marine police vessels have escalated their intrusions into Singapore territorial waters off Pedra Branca in the past one month. Such provocative actions are not only senseless, but dangerous. Why senseless? Senseless, because both sides have agreed to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, and such actions cannot in any way affect the outcome or the decision of the international court. Dangerous, because of the risk of accidents that may not only cause loss of life but also cause serious damage to naval vessels with unforeseeable consequences, and the Malaysian Government would have to bear responsibility for the consequences caused by the aggressive and repeated intrusions of its vessels. As Members know, Singapore has exercised exclusive control, ownership and sovereignty of Pedra Branca since the 1840s without any protest from any country until Malaysia published a map in 1979 claiming it as part of its territory. This was, and is, the status quo. Until Malaysia's claim is decided by the ICJ, the status quo must remain, consistent with Malaysia's own position which it has taken in the case of Sipadan/Ligitan. There, in that case, Malaysia adopted the position that as they were in possession of the islands, the status quo should prevail. For example, this is what they said in a diplomatic note to Indonesia on 3rd January 1994, a diplomatic note which they filed together with other documents in the International Court of Justice, and that note said: 'The Government of Malaysia reiterates that since Sipadan and Ligitan are parts of Malaysia, any and all activities undertaken by Malaysia on or pertaining to those islands and their surrounding waters constitute legitimate exercise of its sovereignty and jurisdiction.'