Hansard, Monday, 12 January 2026

Order. Oaths and Affirmations of Allegiance. Pursuant to the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, the Special Select Committee nominated the following nine persons to the President for appointment as Nominated Members of Parliament:

Mr Azhar Bin Othman

Assoc Prof Goh Toh Chuan, Kenneth

Dr Haresh s/o Singaraju

Assoc Prof Terence Ho Wai Luen

Ms Kuah Boon Theng

Mr Mark Lee Kean Phi

Dr Neo Kok Beng

Prof Kenneth Poon Kin Loong

Mr Sanjeev Kumar Tiwari

President Tharman Shanmugaratnam, by Instruments of Appointment dated on the same day, appointed the nine Members as Nominated Members of Parliament for a term of two and a half years, with effect from 8 January 2026.

The Nominated Members are present today to take their seats. They will now take their oaths and affirmations of allegiance, and will proceed to the Table to do so, when their names are called.

[(proc text) The following Members took and subscribed the Oath of Allegiance, or made Affirmation of Allegiance, in the order below: (proc text)]

[(proc text) Mr Azhar Bin Othman (proc text)]

[(proc text) Assoc Prof Goh Toh Chuan, Kenneth (proc text)]

[(proc text) Dr Haresh s/o Singaraju (proc text)]

[(proc text) Assoc Prof Terence Ho Wai Luen (proc text)]

[(proc text) Ms Kuah Boon Theng (proc text)]

[(proc text) Mr Mark Lee Kean Phi (proc text)]

[(proc text) Dr Neo Kok Beng (proc text)]

[(proc text) Prof Kenneth Poon Kin Loong (proc text)]

[(proc text) Mr Sanjeev Kumar Tiwari (proc text)]

I welcome the Nominated Members and look forward to their participation in the proceedings of this House. [Applause.]

1 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health regarding the new Integrated Shield Plan rider requirements (a) whether there will be an absolute cap on patients' out-of-pocket costs; (b) whether insurers can retain older policies with higher coverage; and (c) what measures will be implemented to prevent insurers from unilaterally reducing coverage for ageing policyholders on existing plans.

2 Ms Poh Li San asked the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health in view of the Ministry’s move to curb rising healthcare insurance premiums by April 2026, how will families facing hefty medical bills be supported if their out-of-pocket expenses for co-payments become unaffordable.

3 Dr Hamid Razak asked the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health regarding the new Integrated Shield Plan rider (a) whether the policy design anticipates that policyholders will continue to access private healthcare despite higher cost-sharing; (b) if so, what is the policy basis; and (c) what contingency measures have been developed to support restructured hospitals should there be increased patient volume due to shifts from private to public healthcare.

4 Mr Kenneth Tiong Boon Kiat asked the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health given that the Monetary Authority of Singapore primarily regulates solvency, whether the Ministry intends to establish a dual-regulation framework to oversee the (i) healthcare outcomes (ii) panel selection criteria and (iii) loss-ratio efficiency of private insurers to ensure they align with national health goals.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to answer Question Nos 1 to 4 together?

Please proceed.

My response will also address written Parliamentary Questions raised by Dr Hamid Razak in today's Order Paper, and a similar question raised by Ms Mariam Jaafar scheduled for a subsequent Sitting. If the Members are satisfied with the response, they may wish to withdraw their questions after this session.

Let me first try to put everyone on the same page. Over the past few years, patient load has been shifting from private hospitals to public hospitals. In 2010, the split between private and public was 15:85. In 2020, it became 12:88. Now, it is 10:90.

The issue of insurance and insurance riders is not the reason why patient load is shifting from private to public. This has been happening for the last 15 years and there are many reasons. Part of it is that as people get older, some of them prefer public hospitals, where there are more disciplines and more holistic care.

Another key reason is the escalating cost of private healthcare. That is in turn fuelled by Integrated Shield Plan (IP) riders, which provide overly generous health insurance coverage, and that leads to a greater tendency for over-servicing and over-consumption of healthcare services. Higher private healthcare cost is translated into higher private hospital IP rider premiums. IP premiums for private hospital have been growing at an average rate of 17% annually for the past three years – it is double that of IP premiums and even higher compared to MediShield Life premiums.

Hence, every year, about 100,000 policyholders cancel or downgrade their IP rider policies. And I suspect amongst them, many switched from using private to public hospitals.

To Dr Hamid’s question on the indicators that we used as a basis to decide policies, the data and signs have been clear and the situation is not ideal and not sustainable.

We have been actively expanding healthcare infrastructure and expanding manpower in order to cope with rising workload and manage wait times. Our plans are significant, I have made them public before and I will not repeat here.

To Mr Yip’s question, the new requirements for IP riders will only affect policyholders who purchased riders on or after 27 November 2025. Individual IP insurers will decide on their approach for rider policyholders who purchased their plans before 27 November 2025.

As for affected IP riders, and these are the new ones, we should expect the following changes.

First, IP rider premiums under the new design should be lower, on average 30% lower, compared to existing policies with maximum coverage. This is a significant recurrent saving.

Second, the new IP rider policies will not cover the minimum IP deductibles and also require higher co-payment. We share Members’ concerns about patients’ out-of-pocket costs, especially for large medical bills. But this is precisely the main aim of the rider changes: preserve the protection against very large, unexpected medical bills, but disallow coverage of the minimum deductible, which is a fixed sum, which users of private hospitals tend to be able to afford. This would help restore health insurance to its original objective, which is to provide assurance against large, infrequent, often unexpected healthcare bills, rather than the small bills.

For a rider plan designed with the new requirements, there will still be a cap of 5% co-payment up to $6,000 a year, in addition to the deductibles. In reality, these need not be out-of-pocket cash payments because patients can tap on their MediSave. We project that six in 10 rider claimants should not have to pay cash out-of-pocket after MediSave. For the remaining four in 10, majority of those with cash out-of-pocket would pay $1,000 or less, and practically all will pay $3,000 or less.

We should bear in mind that most of the affected claimants that I am talking about pertain to private hospital patients. Their IP rider premiums have been driven up so high that under the new design, many can expect significant premium savings which can more or less offset the higher co-payments.

In short, the current design of IP riders may no longer make financial sense for many policyholders and this change will help redress the situation.

Let me give you an example. A 60-year-old on a private hospital IP and rider with maximum coverage, can now save about $1,600 a year in premiums by switching to the new rider. Over three years, he would have saved $4,800 in cash, which would be more than sufficient to offset the increase in co-payment for a typical procedure – for instance, $3,300 for a knee joint replacement surgery in a private hospital.

Ms Poh asked about support measures for families facing unaffordable out-of-pocket expenses. Patients should consider their financial and healthcare needs when choosing where to seek care, including seeking subsidised care in public hospitals should affordability become an issue.

Third impact, there should be, in the medium to long term, changes in the respective utilisation of private and public care and wait times. As I explained earlier, this change is part of our efforts to mitigate the shift of patients from private to public healthcare that has happened over the last 10 to 15 years, by putting the private healthcare sector and health insurance on a more sustainable path and ensuring private care remains accessible to Singaporeans in the long term.

However, in the short term, as a few Members have expressed concern about, some individuals on the new riders may choose to seek care at public hospitals to reduce their co-payment. We will monitor this closely. Efforts to expand public health capacity – both in terms of hospital beds and outpatient capacity – are already ongoing to support the demands of an ageing population. If need be, we may need to implement surge capacity for selected treatments.

On Mr Kenneth Tiong’s question relating to the regulation of IP insurers, the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) work closely together in exercising regulatory oversight of IP insurers, to ensure that policyholders’ interests are protected and the products are sustainable.

MOH’s key role is to oversee the development and operation of the public healthcare system and ensure universal access to healthcare. For individuals who prefer private healthcare and purchase private insurance, we should not micro-manage or prescribe the market practices. Instead, we set requirements pertaining to the key parameters of IPs and riders, such as co-payment and deductible requirements, to ensure that the schemes are sustainable. We only step in when we see a serious market failure emerging, which is why we have intervened in this case, to tighten the design of IP riders.

Doctor panels are an example of cost-management measures put in place by the market, by insurers in response to rising private healthcare bills and claims. MOH has been and will continue working with key stakeholders including insurers, healthcare providers, hospitals, medical professionals and consumer representatives through the Multilateral Healthcare Insurance Committee on these matters, to strike a balance between the interests of all stakeholders.

To sum up, we must take a long-term and balanced view of this issue so that we can put private healthcare and insurance on a more sustainable path.

Mr Yip Hon Weng.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister for his response. Minister, I filed this Parliamentary Question (PQ) because I have received much feedback from many seniors in my constituency who have concerns about the new rider requirements.

I just have one supplementary question. I understand that policyholders may keep existing riders, but insurers may respond by re-pricing or adjusting the benefits that amount to the de facto coverage reduction. What specific safeguards will MOH impose to prevent such indirect erosion of benefits, especially for ageing policyholders with limited options?

The most important safeguard is to make sure that IP rider policies are sustainable. So, while at the point of being sold the policies, the agent probably told them, "Buy all these for peace of mind – not just peace of mind, but absolute peace of mind, you do not have to worry".

But that went down a path of unsustainability. So, while you enjoy it for a while, it is obvious, through my answer, that I have explained, it is becoming unsustainable. Because when there is over-coverage, in a private hospital, the bill just goes up. You cannot blame anybody; it is just the way human nature is. Somebody else is paying for most of the bill, so between doctor and patient, somehow, you will oversupply and I will overconsume. And the bill just keeps on going up at an unsustainable pace. And it still comes back to the consumer, to the patient, in terms of higher premiums – which is why, now, the same residents that gave the Member the feedback, is also screaming, "Why is my IP rider premium going up at 20% a year?" It is because cost is going up.

We need to tackle the issue at the root and our strong hypothesis is – in fact, there is a lot of literature on this – over-coverage just leads to wastage and cost increases. To redress this, for new riders, we are making the design different, a bit more co-payment, instil discipline in both the supply and demand for healthcare; then, I think we are much more likely to have a more sustainable position.

So, explain to your residents: choose this new rider; tell them they are paying very high premiums, rising premiums now for a tail risk, and it may not be worth it. Do their calculations, talk to their financial advisors. If they choose the new rider design, they save, on average, 30% on premiums every year. For someone in their 70s, that is a lot. That is $3,000 a year! Someone in their 60s saves about $2,000 a year.

That money saved – it differs from case to case – often is more than enough to pay the deductibles and co-payment.

Ms Poh Li San.

Thank you, Speaker and Minister. I have one supplementary question. How would MOH prevent adverse selection, that is, those who have existing riders continue to over-consume medical services; or those who actually do not have the means to finance the co-payments and deductibles, then, decide to give up their existing riders and may, possibly, end up delaying their treatment?

There are a few questions in that question, I think. But if I were to suss out what are the key questions, one is, you want to have continuity of care. So, be assured, even if they find that, today, they cannot afford their IP rider anymore, because it is getting expensive and they give it up, there is always public subsidised healthcare. That is our assurance to all Singaporeans. You can always come back to public healthcare. And we are expanding the system; we are recruiting manpower. While we are very busy, this is our commitment to all Singaporeans.

So, on the healthcare front, be assured that it is always universal healthcare through the public health system.

As for others, who continue to stay on their riders, I think they are also feeling the pinch. As I mentioned to Mr Yip just now, IP rider premiums are going up at a very fast rate because cost is going up at a very fast rate. And why is cost going up? Because there is over-generous coverage, leading to overconsumption, unnecessary treatment. So, many existing rider policyholders are also rethinking. I hope more would do so.

Increasingly, over dinner tables, amongst friends and colleagues, more people are thinking about their rider policies, that they may not be worth it. And more and more people do their calculations and find that it is not worth it. And as it is, 100,000 every year are changing. With these changes, with this signalling, I think more may do so. At some point, insurance companies have to do their calculations. Year to year, they do change their terms and conditions, and we have to see what they intend to do with existing rider policyholders.

Dr Hamid Razak.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Minister for the reply. The reason I asked the PQ is that there has been lots of sentiments from my colleagues in the restructured hospitals that waiting times for subsidised patients have been increasing. They are worried that with this new rider that is coming up from April that those who are on private riders will then switch to public healthcare because of the higher cost-sharing that is in place.

Will the Ministry and the Minister be able to reassure that there is data in place to say that this new rider principles will, in fact, continue to encourage those with private riders to remain in private healthcare? And also reassure that insurance companies will not make unilateral decisions on premium hikes, for example, which, again, will deter our residents from staying in the private healthcare and this will give rise to a surge capacity in our public institutions as well?

Let me briefly address the comment that Dr Hamid made towards the end of his question, which is to hope that insurers do not unilaterally make premium hikes. But these are private contracts. The Government does not regulate their premiums. And when insurance companies find that cost is going up and they are barely making – most of them are actually making losses on their private hospital insurance portfolio – they will end up raising premiums. This is something we are watching, but this is a commercial arrangement, something that they may do.

I thank the Member for raising the concerns of his colleagues in the public healthcare system. I am totally with them. I am equally concerned as them, which is why we are making this move. Because, as I mentioned earlier, over 10, 15 years, the shift is very discernible, away from private into public and as I mentioned, a key reason is the rising cost in private hospitals.

And why is cost rising? It is because IP riders are fuelling that cost increase, shifting people from private to public. It makes a lot more sense when someone who has the ability to buy private healthcare insurance, including a rider, wants to use private insurance. But half of them, today, switch to public subsidised care, for whatever reasons.

It will help the entire system and in particular, the public healthcare system, if more of them who can afford it, stay with private hospital care. And so, private hospital care has to become more accessible, more affordable. But we cannot do that without this adjustment in IP rider policy.

So, please tell your colleagues that my and my colleagues in MOH's assurance is that we are watching this closely. Wait times are very important to us, capacity adequacy is very important to us and their well-being is very important to us.

Mr Kenneth Tiong.

Thank you, Speaker. MOH itself notes a trend of escalating cost and premiums alongside tightening claims practices. MAS can act on unfair claims handling, but MAS is primarily a financial regulator. MOH's direct levers seem strongest when policies are MediSave-linked.

So, my question is, what enforceable levers does MOH have to ensure that insurer conduct advances healthcare affordability and access? And where does MOH remain dependent on MAS?

Also, it appears to me that no one is cleanly accountable for insurer behaviour as a health system actor. Does the Minister believe that this is a gap that requires filling?

The IP rider has become a problem and we are taking action. And I think that shows accountability that when something is not sustainable, not working in the best interest of the patients and people, we will take action.

Between MAS and MOH, I think we have plenty of levers and we will work together to make sure that insurers are operating in a way that is ethical, that is viable but at the same time in the interest of patients and the people we serve. And I think we have more than enough levers to do so.

There is a part of Mr Tiong's question that talks about panel doctors. What we want to make sure is that Government's main responsibility is actually to run the public healthcare system to ensure universal accessibility. But when it comes to private healthcare, we let the market operate. But if the market cannot operate in a laissez-faire manner, we will regulate. Where we regulate is clinical effectiveness, safety, and key parameters that are sensible and make the system sustainable, and there is no market failure.

But we should not be tempted to become micro-managing, because it is the worst thing to do to say that we leave it to the market, but we micro-manage all their actions and behaviour. I think that is the worst of both worlds. Then, you might as well nationalise it. But we already have a huge nationalised system in public healthcare. So, for private healthcare, control the important levers, control the key parameters, but let the market operate.

Last supplementary question. Mr Fadli Fawzi.

Thank you, Speaker, Minister. Is there sufficient surge capacity in our healthcare system to deal with more private patients coming in after this policy change, especially for smaller procedures that are under the deductible limit?

Again, I will want to remind the Member that because of the ageing population, demand has been going up. There has also been a trend, a secular trend of private hospital patients moving to public. So, whatever problem that the Member is painting now, it has been happening for the last 15, 20 years.

And it is an issue we are most concerned about. We have spoken in this Chamber, many times how we are expanding capacity, ensuring people are healthy, moderating the demand by controlling chronic diseases. But IP riders are an additional fuel to the fire that we are facing, which is, mainly, an ageing population pushing up healthcare demand.

So, we will continue to expand the system and take a multi-prong approach to both increase supply and moderating the demand for healthcare, especially unnecessary treatment and wastage.

5 Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Government assesses that Temasek’s and GIC’s risk-adjusted returns relative to appropriate global benchmarks remain competitive; and (b) how their mandates should evolve to balance capital preservation with the need for higher real returns ahead.

6 Mr Shawn Loh asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the investment returns of GIC and Temasek Holdings have underperformed the Government's expectation; (b) if so, whether there is an impact on the Government's Net Investment Returns Contribution to the Budget; and (c) what steps have been taken to ensure that the investment entities have incentives that are aligned to achieve better performance.

7 Mr Shawn Loh asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Government has assessed the merits of a low-cost passive index-tracking investment approach for its investments; (b) whether the Government has compared this to GIC and Temasek Holdings’ active and more costly investment management approaches; and (c) if so, what are the considerations in deciding to give GIC and Temasek Holdings the investment mandates to choose the latter approach.

8 Mr Liang Eng Hwa asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Government is satisfied with the long-term investment performances of GIC, Temasek and MAS when measured against the relevant risk-adjusted global benchmarks; and (b) whether the Government sees the need to review the capital allocation and investment risks framework of GIC, Temasek and MAS.

9 Mr Fadli Fawzi asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the difference between GIC's investment returns and the interest payments made by the Government to the CPF Board on Special Singapore Government Securities has narrowed in tandem with the underperformance of GIC relative to other major sovereign wealth funds; and (b) if so, how will this impact the Government's fiscal position or rate of reserves accumulation.

10 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Government is aware if GIC uses risk-adjusted performance metrics such as the Sharpe ratio in assessing portfolio performance relative to its reference portfolio; and (b) if so, whether a description of such metrics can be provided at a high level.

11 Mr Liang Eng Hwa asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) in view of the fragmenting global geopolitical environment and its associated investment risks, whether the Government sees the need to review the current investment mandates of both GIC and Temasek; and (b) whether the emerging investment landscape is assessed to be conducive to sustaining a steady Net Investment Returns Contribution in the next decade.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to answer Question Nos 5 to 11 in today's Order Paper together?

Please proceed.

Thank you. My reply will also cover Question No 4 for written answer filed by Mr Ng Shi Xuan for today's Sitting.

Mr Speaker, recent media reports have compared the performance of GIC and Temasek with that of other funds, including other sovereign wealth funds. Such comparisons are often done, but they should be interpreted in their proper context because different funds operate under different mandates and risk profiles.

The Government assesses GIC and Temasek's performance primarily against their respective mandates and risk profiles, and not with other funds. Our focus has always been on long-term performance, rather than on short-term or year-to-year fluctuations.

GIC is the Government's fund manager, and its mandate is to preserve and enhance the international purchasing power of the assets under its management. In recent years, GIC took pre-emptive measures to moderate its risk exposure, in anticipation of increased market volatility and heightened valuations. These measures were intended to keep portfolio risks within acceptable limits and to guard against the possibility of significant asset impairment in the event of a sharp market correction. But as equity markets have continued to remain elevated, these prudent de-risking measures resulted in some foregone returns.

Any assessment of returns must, therefore, be considered alongside the risks that are taken to achieve them – a point that Assoc Prof Jamus Lim made, where he referred to the Sharpe ratio in his Parliamentary Question (PQ). GIC monitors a wide range of risk indicators, including and beyond the Sharpe ratio. In fact, GIC publishes both the returns and volatility or the risks associated with its portfolio in its annual report to provide a more complete picture.

Ultimately, what is more important is the longer-term performance that is achieved within acceptable risk limits. On that basis, GIC has achieved a real return of 3.8% per annum over the past 20 years. This outcome reflects, in part, GIC’s active management, which enabled it to consistently add value to portfolio returns, preserve the international purchasing power of the assets under its management and deliver returns above global inflation.

Temasek began as a holding company for the Government’s local assets. While Singapore-based Temasek Portfolio Companies (TPCs) continue to form a core part of its total portfolio, Temasek has progressively expanded its direct equity investments overseas – initially in Asia, and more recently, across global markets.

Temasek operates mainly as an active, bottom-up investor. It does not operate against a conventional reference portfolio. Instead, it invests directly in companies in the geographies and domains where it has built deep capabilities, and where it sees long-term growth potential. Relative to GIC, Temasek therefore operates at the higher end of the risk spectrum.

In recent years, Temasek’s performance was affected by the performance of the Chinese market, though this was mitigated by higher returns from its growing investments in Europe and the United States (US). Nonetheless, over the last 20-year period, Temasek has reported a Total Shareholder Return of 8% per annum in US dollar terms.

Taken as a whole, the Government’s assessment is that the returns generated by GIC and Temasek are reasonable and within expectations, given their mandates and risk profiles. We will continue to review their mandates and performance regularly, in line with changes in the global economic investment landscape.

Some Members asked about the implications of our investment entities’ recent performance on the sustainability of the Net Investment Returns Contribution (NIRC) and the Government’s ability to meet our Central Provident Fund (CPF) liabilities. As explained in this House previously, the Net Investment Return framework was designed to ensure a steady and sustainable stream of income for the annual Budget. The NIRC is thus derived from the expected long-term real rate of return which the Reserves can sustain, and not short-term market returns.

The Government is able to meet all debt servicing costs and obligations, including the committed CPF rates through the Special Singapore Government Securities (SSGS). GIC does not just manage the SSGS or CPF monies on their own, but a combined pool of Government funds, including a significant sum of unencumbered assets. This approach allows GIC to invest for the long term and to secure good long-term returns.

As investment markets are uncertain and volatile, GIC’s returns over shorter periods could be low or even negative. But the Government is able to absorb these short-term market risks, because it has a strong balance sheet. This substantial buffer of net assets enables the Government to meet the obligations on its liabilities and continues to underpin the Government’s strong fiscal position.

Mr Saktiandi Supaat.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have two supplementary questions. First of all, I would like to declare that I am an employee of a financial institution.

Mr Speaker, the income from the Reserves play an important role in the Government's revenue, but as the Senior Minister of State has mentioned, the environment has become more volatile. Global markets have become more volatile. In the previous PQ, we have actually discussed about expenditure on healthcare and others being more demanding.

So, my two supplementary questions, Mr Speaker: first, how will the Ministry model the impact of a prolonged global resolve cycle on sovereign investment returns and the resulting implications for the Budget stability and social spending sustainability?

My second supplementary question is whether the Government plans to enhance long-term public reporting on portfolio risks? I think the Acting Minister mentioned the Sharpe ratio and others as well. But in terms of public reporting on portfolio risks, volatility and drawdowns for Singapore's foreign investment entities to strengthen public confidence, as reliance on investment income increases?

Mr Speaker, I thank the hon Member for his supplementary questions. The Government's approach on assessing the returns of our investment entities is to take a long-term view. Market outcomes will inevitably fluctuate from year to year, there will be periods where returns are weak. But the way our system works is that these are not directly linked to our NIRC.

The Government's strong balance sheet, as I explained earlier in my reply, enables it to take investment risks and ride out market cycles that are inherent in investing for the long term. We have a significant buffer on net assets, which enables the Government to guarantee CPF savings and pay fair interest rates on CPF savings despite changes in the financial cycle. And this is also why we are able to have a significant stream of investment income through the NIRC, which is then used to meet important spending priorities, as we discussed earlier.

The Net Investment Returns taken into the Government Budget every year is based on the long-term expected returns of the investment entities, not on the year-to-year returns, which can fluctuate. In addition, the asset base that is used to calculate the NIRC is smoothed over the long term. So, the impact of a single year, or even a few years' worth of lower returns will take time to be passed through to the NIRC due to the smoothing of the asset base.

Notwithstanding all these, we recognise that it is becoming structurally more difficult or more challenging to generate good investment returns in the current global environment and this trend is likely to persist in the longer term. Hence, the Government will indeed have to monitor this and take a prudent approach to ensure that our investment income is able to meet our spending and our long-term obligations.

On the hon Member's question on whether or not the Government intends to enhance long-term public reporting, I think the investment entities already provide quite a good amount of public information on their investment approach and on their returns. This can be found in their annual reports, their regular press releases, and occasionally in their opinion and research pieces which they put out.

GIC discloses their five-, 10- and 20-year returns, but we have spoken in this House before about how we do not disclose their total assets under management, because we do not want to encourage speculative attacks on the Singapore dollar.

Temasek, as a direct investor, releases even more information. They talk about total portfolio value, its investment approach, the domains and the geographical areas where they are investing. And I will encourage Members as well as members of the public to look at the information that they put online.

Over time, GIC and Temasek have disclosed more information, and we will continue to encourage them to review if there are other meaningful disclosures to make. Our principle is that what the entities disclose should be part of an overall system that enables them to maximise their ability to generate long-term returns.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Thank you, Speaker. I have two supplementary questions, one on GIC and the other on Temasek. I understand that GIC has publicly stated that it does not regard its 65/35 Global Equity Bond Reference portfolio as a benchmark, but rather as an expression of risk tolerance. GIC has also publicly stated that it has attained lower returns, but with lower volatility.

For me, taken together, that suggests that GIC has either taken less risk than what its reference portfolio would suggest, or that it has returned less than what might be expected, given its risk profile. So, my question is whether the Ministry plans to undertake any steps to address the lower returns received by GIC relative to its reference portfolio; or if it is indeed satisfied with this more conservative approach, why does it not request GIC to adopt a different reference portfolio with lower risk?

My second question is on Temasek and I note the Minister's response on how its mandate is more to focus on companies rather than indexes. Nevertheless, I wonder if the Minister would be able to share how Temasek has performed on a risk adjusted basis, relative to the other sovereign wealth fund, GIC? And if indeed it is taking on such concentrated risk, I also wonder if there is room to reconsider its geographical diversification strategy adopted in the early 2000s and return to a more domestically oriented mandate.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. As I mentioned in my reply earlier, the Government assesses the returns of our investment entities based on their mandates and risk profiles. GIC has achieved a real return of 3.8% per annum over the past 20 years, which is within the Government's expectations, given the risk profile that we have given.

The Member referred to the 65/35 reference portfolio, which is on the GIC website. That is not a returns benchmark, but is an expression of our risk tolerance and the risk profile we would like GIC to take. Ultimately, the Government assesses GIC performance based primarily on whether it has met this mandate. There will be periods where GIC takes less risk than the reference portfolio. And as I mentioned in my earlier reply, GIC did pre-emptively decide to de-risk in periods which had resulted in foregone returns. At the same time, GIC returns were much less volatile in the same timeframe and in fact, have outperformed the reference portfolio on a risk adjusted basis, given that it has achieved higher returns per unit of volatility.

Should GIC not have de-risked and ridden through the drawdowns? I think that is a matter of a judgement. While one can ride through market cycles, there have also been instances where the stocks or the assets are permanently impaired. And because of the mandate of GIC, it has to balance with the need to preserve our capital assets, I think that is a judgement that they have taken. On hindsight, we can always make all sorts of assertions, but they have taken that decision to de-risk and preserve our capital, and still be able to make the returns that we expect of them.

Ultimately, every investment fund must operate according to its own mandate and risk appetite. We expect GIC to construct its portfolio to both safeguard our assets and to also achieve our returns. The approach that they have taken has helped them build a diversified portfolio that is resilient to market cycles and volatility, while achieving good risk adjusted returns.

On the hon Member's second question on how to assess Temasek's performance, as I mentioned earlier, Temasek is different from GIC. It is a bottom-up active investor. It has a history of how it has gotten to where it is today. It started off as a holding company for Singapore Temasek-linked portfolio companies. Over time, it has broadened its coverage to include investments globally. It has, in the process of doing so, tried to give a sense of how it is performing on these areas, and on its website, it has referred to a few international indexes, whether it is the MSCI World Index or the Singapore stock market Index when it comes to measuring performance of the local companies.

I think these are possible ways of seeing how they are performing. We do not intervene in individual investment decisions that are made by Temasek. So, which geographies they choose to go into and which domains they prefer to invest in, these are things we leave to the management. The Government works with the board to make sure that Temasek meets the mandate that we have set out for them and we do not want to have to intervene in these decisions that they make on individual investments.

Mr Shawn Loh.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. And a Happy New Year to all Parliamentary colleagues, including our Nominated Member of Parliament colleagues.

With regard to the Senior Minister of State's reply, I fully agree and accept that global rankings of investment returns are not helpful because they do not take into account the unique investment mandates and the unique contexts that each country's investment entity invest in.

Our investment entities should have clear benchmarks and should take into account our own unique context, including, as the Senior Minister of State mentioned, that one fifth of our national Budget is from the returns on our investments and the Government has an obligation to pay interest rates on the CPF savings. To that end, I have two questions.

The first question is, when should we worry? I note the Senior Minister of State's reply, but when should we worry? What level of long-term investment returns should be the threshold which triggers a Government review of the NIRC framework to look at its sustainability, based on new structural trends in the global investment climate?

And the second question is in regard to the fact that GIC and Temasek are active managers that have illiquid portfolios. We should expect better returns from active investment managers, as well as a premium from illiquidity. How is the Government convinced that the active investment approach taken by GIC and Temasek is giving the alpha that Singaporeans deserve on the Reserves and on their CPF savings?

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the hon Member for his questions. I agree with the hon Member that we should recognise that it has become more challenging to generate good investment returns in the current global environment and that this trend is likely to persist in the longer term. That is why the Government will continue to take a prudent approach in ensuring that our investment income is able to meet our long-term obligations.

But as I have explained earlier, the basis for why we are able to do the things that we are doing today is not because of year-to-year fluctuations in terms of market performance. In fact, the system is structured such that we are able to ride out some of these year-to-year fluctuations, even periods of sustained global under-performance in markets, because we have a large asset base and because we are able to take a long-term view of our investment returns.

And so, in that sense, I think we have to continue to make sure that the mandates of the investment entities continue to be met, that they understand that they are doing this for the longer term, and they are able to take strategies and to take the right decisions to ensure that the returns over the longer term are indeed sustainable.

As to whether we should be concerned whether the GIC and our investment entities are earning alpha, I think it is quite understandable that we look at how potentially the investment entities performance are benchmarked towards, for example, simple passive global benchmarks. When we do not have investment expertise or do not have time to make investments, the most common investment advice is just leave it to the market. We decide to buy an index fund, let them decide what to do.

But that is not what we are doing, because GIC here is the Government's fund manager. They are the professionals. They have a large pool of assets that range from the passive assets to assets that require them to take a closer monitoring and to make sure that those assets continue to generate high returns and they have to make active decisions to manage them.

Overall, the GIC team has been doing so over the years and their track record, given the mandate they have been given, demonstrates that they are able to do so. They have taken the decision as we talked about, to de-risk during periods of distress, during COVID, for instance, in the recent years. If they had not done so, our asset base could have been permanently impaired, as other funds would have experienced during this period.

So, I think we have to leave the professionals to do the work that they do. The Government works with the GIC board to make sure that the mandate continues to be met, given the risk profile of what we want them to do, to take a more conservative approach, to preserve our capital base. And we think they have met the expectations in this regard.

Mr Liang Eng Hwa.

Thank you, Sir. Let me first declare my interest as I work in an entity significantly owned by Temasek.

There are two questions for the Acting Minister. Firstly, we know that Temasek and GIC do compete with the fast growing global sovereign wealth funds, the global funds, such as the pension funds, the wealth houses and so on – chasing for limited good investment grade targets, which may ultimately impact their returns, because there is competition for all these investments. So, can I ask the Acting Minister, whether the Ministry of Finance sees investing more of our Reserves into the local infrastructures that comes with commercial returns, as another way to deploy our growing Reserves?

My second question is related to what the Acting Minister has said in his reply on Temasek. There are two parts. One portfolio is the local companies that they hold. For strategic reasons, we want to hold these companies. And the other one is the international portfolio, which actually comes with different management investment skills. And as such, we will have to assess for their difference in performance. For example, the holding company for the strategic companies that we hold, like Singapore Airlines or PSA and so on, we would not expect Temasek to actively trade this portfolio or choose levels to buy and sell; whereas the international portfolio, there are some investment decisions to be made there, and how they charge the market, how they perform; we want to assess that.

So, can I ask that Acting Minister, whether in terms of evaluating the performance of Temasek, would the Ministry consider carving out that local portfolio, that we hold for strategic reasons, to measure the performance separately from the portfolio that is invested internationally?

Thank you, Mr Speaker. The hon Member asked two questions. Number one, I think is on whether or not, given the competition with global funds, whether Temasek or GIC should take a different focus and to focus on investment in local infrastructure – I think that was the first question. And the second question, was whether or not, given that it has a cluster, in terms of local Singapore companies, whether we should evaluate performance differently. I think in gist, those are the two questions.

On the first question, I think we do not work on the basis of individual investment decisions. I think we want to structure how the relationship between the Government and our investment entities, structure them at the broad level to enable them to fulfil this mandate of achieving sustainable returns, preserving our asset base, while giving them, as commercial entities, the freedom to do the things that they need to do. And so, insofar as requiring them to have a specific investment focus or to invest locally, I think that is something as an entity, they need to decide and in light of the mandate that we have given them, to see whether that it is the most preferred strategy. So, we will not direct it personally or directly, but we would leave them to make those decisions.

As to whether or not we should carve them out separately to have a separate entity and evaluate the performance of the parts of Temasek that looks after our TPCs, I think we have to take this in context of how Temasek has evolved its capabilities over time. As the hon Member said, it started off as a company with deep expertise in managing our local TPCs. Over time, it is moving towards becoming more of a global investor with more geographical diversification and thus, this also requires Temasek to build up its own capabilities – just as it had built up its capabilities managing the portfolio of Temasek companies.

I think it is a matter of judgement for them to do this, as long as they achieve the mandate that we have given to them. Overall, looking at the total portfolio of Temasek's assets, I think as long as it can generate sustainable returns as a portfolio, that will be a good outcome. Bearing in mind also that there are synergies between the different portfolios. In managing the local Temasek-linked companies, there are benefits to having a global outlook on matters, having some global expertise and domain expertise in different areas, which I think Temasek is very focused on trying to generate as a result of their investment disposition.

Last supplementary question. Mr Fadli Fawzi.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. Firstly, can the Acting Minister clarify whether the difference between GIC's investment returns and the SSGS interest payments made by the Government to the CPF Board, goes directly to the Reserves?

My second question is how does the Government intend to act under a scenario where GIC's returns consistently underperform SSGS interest rates? Would it then be sustainable for the Government to continue maintaining the current SSGS interest rates?

Mr Speaker, I think I will go back to explaining how the basic features of the system work. The Government has a strong balance sheet. This enables us to take investment risks and to ride out the market cycles that are inherent in investing for the longer term. We have a significant buffer of net assets, which enables the Government to guarantee CPF savings and to pay fair interest rates on CPF savings despite market cycles. The way this is done is it insulates the CPF returns and interest rates from the vagaries of the market.

Sir, we have explained this before and I think we do not have to go through the whole process again. I think the Member has asked a question on this previously as well and we can refer to the answer there.

The following question stood in the name of Mr Edward Chia Bing Hui –

12 To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Government is aware of the (i) mandates (ii) workforce sizes and (iii) manpower cost benchmarks for each new entity after Temasek’s planned 2026 restructuring; (b) if so, what are they; (c) whether the Ministry conducted assessments on the appropriateness of workforce size and manpower costs vis-à-vis investment performance, risk management and organisational nimbleness; and (d) if so, what are the results.

13 Mr Ng Shi Xuan asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether there are circumstances under which Temasek Holdings is expected to accept lower financial returns when pursuing strategic or developmental outcomes under the investment mandates given by the Government; and (b) if so, how are such expectations articulated and governed, given that the Government does not direct or influence individual investment decisions made by Temasek Holdings.

14 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Government is aware if Temasek has a reference portfolio; (b) if so, what this is; and (c) if not, how does the fund benchmark its investment performance.

Question No 12.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to answer Question Nos 12 to 14 on today's Order Paper together?

Please go ahead.

My response will also cover Question No 3 for written answer filed for today's Sitting, as well as the question filed by Mr Kenneth Tiong for oral answer at a subsequent Sitting. I would thereafter invite Members who have filed questions for this and future Sittings to seek clarifications if need be. If sufficiently addressed, the Member may wish to withdraw the question filed for a subsequent Sitting.

Mr Speaker, the Government's mandate for Temasek is that it should deliver good, sustainable long-term returns. The Government ensures that Temasek has a competent board to oversee its management but does not otherwise influence or direct Temasek's individual investment decisions.

With regard to Question No 14 on whether Temasek has any performance benchmarks, I had addressed this in the earlier reply; but in short, Temasek does not operate against a specific conventional reference portfolio as it is a direct investor, an investor that is bottom-up. Nonetheless, it does publish some indexes as reference, as I mentioned earlier, including the MSCI and the STI.

The Government expects Temasek to ensure that its overall portfolio of investments, including its Singapore-based Temasek Portfolio Companies (TPCs), achieves good commercial outcomes. Temasek actively and constructively engages its TPCs. From time to time, Temasek will work with the TPCs on strategic reviews and initiatives to strengthen their foundations for future growth. Temasek’s Singapore portfolio has been able to contribute steady returns to Temasek's overall portfolio and to Singapore’s economic growth over the long term.

Beyond exercising the appropriate oversight over its investments, there is no requirement for Temasek to pursue specific strategic or economic development strategies. Efforts to develop industry ecosystems or to enhance the financing for early-stage startups are led by the Government, rather than by Temasek. For example, Enterprise Singapore has a Startup SG Equity scheme, through which the Government co-invests with third-party investors in Singapore-based deep tech startups to catalyse the deep tech ecosystem.

And from time to time, Temasek may participate in the Government's initiatives, but it does so on commercial terms, strictly consistent with its mandate. For example, the Government has co-invested with Temasek in the Local Enterprises Fund, which aims to help large local enterprises transform and scale up; and the Anchor Fund which supports promising high-growth enterprises to raise capital through public listings in Singapore. Both funds are managed on a commercial basis by 65 Equity Partners, a Temasek-owned platform.

As Temasek expands its investment activities across new geographies and sectors, it may need to adjust its organisational structure to sharpen its focus and better achieve its objectives. And in this regard, Temasek has publicly explained the rationale for its latest restructuring. These are matters for the Temasek board to determine and the Government does not intervene in such decisions.

Ultimately, the Government holds the board of Temasek accountable for delivering good long-term returns on its overall portfolio and that is on the basis of net portfolio performance, after deducting all investment fees and expenses.

Mr Ng Shi Xuan.

I thank the Acting Minister for his answer. I have three supplementary questions. The first one being, how does Temasek assess Singapore-based companies' performance separately from their national and developmental roles? The second one would be, over the past decade, have unlisted investments outperformed listed assets and what are the factors that can explain any such of these performance differences? The last one would be, I understand that the Government assesses that the long-term performance has been satisfactory, but it is a long-term view – and that is good in the sense that we do not take any knee-jerk reactions. But in the event that it is deemed unsatisfactory, what levers does the Government have to rectify or act on their returns and investment?

Mr Speaker, let me recap the three questions very quickly. Number one is whether or not, again, we should assess the performance of Singapore-based companies differently as part of Temasek's overall performance. Second is the performance of unlisted assets versus listed assets; how do we assess them? And then thirdly, how do we assess their short-term variations in performance and what do we do if that is affected?

So, on the first question, I have answered that as part of the previous Parliamentary Question. I think, first of all, for Temasek, we do assess them overall, looking at their broad mandate, whether or not they have performed to meet the mandate in delivering sustainable long-term returns. At the same time, we do work with them closely to understand the performance of the different groups of companies. Looking at how the Singapore portfolio companies perform, we do work with them closely to understand if they have performed in a certain way and to see how the performance of those companies can be specifically improved, because these are Singaporean companies and they are important to us. So, we do work with them on that basis. But in terms of assessing them overall as part of their mandates, that is not something that we look at more directly, as I have explained earlier.

As for the difference between listed and unlisted assets, well, unlisted assets, by definition, should generate higher returns because they have a risk premium associated with them. But I think the way Temasek values its unlisted assets, they take a conservative approach. What they do is they value them at the book value, less, I think, the impairment that comes with these assets, the potential impairment. And in their annual report, they do indicate a value if they were to mark these unlisted assets to market. And I think the Member can refer to the Temasek annual report on the website to get a sense of the difference in terms of the value of these unlisted assets.

Again, it is a variant of the question which another hon Member asked – which is, when should we worry? When should we worry if Temasek's long-term returns on their assets are not what is desired? I think we have to accept that as an investor with a larger risk profile or rather a bottom-up investor, the way it is an active investor, we should expect some volatility in Temasek's returns over time. But over the long period, these volatilities and these fluctuations should even out. And as long as they make what we require of them, which is something that is sustainable, that is something that is in line with their risk profile, in line with some of the decisions they are taking, including their capability building and investments in new areas, I think we should be able to accept that these are within our expectations and that they are delivering what they have been set out to do.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

My understanding is that Temasek currently holds about half of its portfolio in public assets and the remainder in private exposures. If you take a global benchmark, such as the ACWI IMI over a very long term, say 20 years, the returns are more or less about 7%. And this, as it turns out, matches Temasek's 20-year return of 7%.

That said, however, it appears to me that if we accept the state of affairs, Temasek is not successfully harvesting this illiquidity premium that, according to the Minister, it is trying to maximise according to its mandate. So, I wonder if the Minister would agree that maybe one strategy would be to take, for example, dividends issued by its privately held portfolio assets and then redirect those toward the public-facing exposures.

I thank the hon Member for his question. I think we go back to first principles, which is that it is not always appropriate or meaningful to directly compare Temasek's performance with other funds. It really depends on the mandate and the risk profile that Temasek was set up to do.

As I explained in my reply, Temasek is not quite the same as a typical sovereign wealth fund. It is an active bottom-up investor, and it also has a history and development as a holding company for Singapore portfolio companies.

Nonetheless, as a comparison, I think Temasek's performance has, indeed, been commensurate with other sovereign wealth funds with a higher risk profile, such as the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board. Just as a comparison, both have achieved 20-year annualised total shareholder returns of about 8%.

So, the Government does expect Temasek to achieve good sustainable returns over the long term. And as an asset holder of major Singapore-based assets, we expect them to exercise appropriate oversights over their investments, no different from any other responsible asset holder. While we do not benchmark them to any specific reference portfolio and nor does it invest to meet the specific index returns, I think the Member can compare available indices to see whether or not it has, on the various aspects, met its expectations.

Inherently, I think Temasek's returns would be more volatile compared to funds with a lower risk profile. I think it has a mix of both listed and unlisted assets, as the hon Member has noted. The investment approach is one that we want them to do, which is to develop and build a diversified portfolio that reduces the volatility and outperforms a broad-based market index. And so, the Government will continue to engage them to do that. Beyond that, we will not go into exactly how the dividends are spent and what proportion of listed or unlisted assets they should manage. That is something for the Temasek management to decide and we will not interfere in those decisions.

15 Mr Ng Chee Meng asked the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs (a) how many residential unit fires were there in 2025 and how does this compare to 2024; and (b) whether the Ministry will consider stepping up education, enforcement and conduct more regular inspection on buildings especially in older housing estates for compliance to fire safety codes.

16 Mr Alex Yam asked the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs in light of the recent tragic high-rise fire in Tai Po, Hong Kong (a) whether the Government will be reviewing Singapore’s building, fire and construction safety codes to ensure they remain robust for high-density developments; and (b) what further measures are being taken to strengthen compliance, inspection and enforcement so as to reassure residents and building users.

Mr Speaker, may I seek your permission to answer Question No 15 filed by Mr Ng Chee Meng and Question No 16 filed by Mr Alex Yam in today’s Order Paper?

Go ahead.

Mr Speaker, my response will also cover the question raised by Mr Lee Hong Chuang1, which is scheduled for a subsequent Sitting. And I invite Mr Lee to seek clarifications today, if need be. If his question has been addressed, it may not be necessary to proceed with his question subsequently.

In 2025, there were 1,051 residential building fires. This is up from 968 in 2024. This is a slight increase amidst a stable trend of residential building fires over the past five years.

The statistics should also be viewed in the context of Singapore’s housing stock. The percentage of fires vis-à-vis our total dwelling stock has actually decreased, from 0.067% in 2021 to 0.065% in 2025.

However, recent tragic events remind us that we cannot afford to be complacent about fire safety. The Wang Fuk Court fire in Hong Kong last November is a grim example. The Government has started reviewing the early observations from Hong Kong’s ongoing investigations and is studying whether we need to strengthen the relevant regulations for works during the construction and maintenance of residential buildings. This will allow us to better manage fire risks, and the outcome of this ongoing review will be announced in due course.

Allow me to share more about the multi-faceted approach we take towards fire safety in Singapore, namely, good fire safety design, enforcement against fire safety non-compliance, effective firefighting response and public preparedness.

All buildings in Singapore are designed and built in accordance with the prevailing Fire Code, which stipulates fire safety requirements, such as the compartmentalisation of residential units to limit fire spread, prior to Singapore Civil Defence Force’s (SCDF’s) arrival. Other fire safety provisions include adequate staircases to support swift evacuation, fire engine access roads and rising mains to support SCDF’s firefighting operations.

It is important for building owners to fully comply with the Fire Code and ensure that fire safety provisions are kept in good working order. In this regard, Town Councils and Management Corporation Strata Titles (MCSTs) are responsible for managing the common areas within Housing and Development Board (HDB) estates and the strata-titled residential developments respectively, including ensuring compliance with SCDF’s fire safety requirements.

They work closely with SCDF to regulate and rectify obstructions at common areas that may be fire hazards. And if fire hazards are detected during SCDF’s checks, SCDF will take enforcement action against the Town Council or MCST.

The SCDF constantly reviews its firefighting tactics and equipment, and the fire safety requirements for high-rise buildings. This includes exploring new technologies and studying international best practices.

To effectively conduct firefighting and rescue operations in high-rise settings, the SCDF has capabilities, such as aerial appliances, that can reach up to 90 metres, as well as surveillance drones.

High-rise buildings are required to have additional fire safety provisions, such as more fire lifts and rising mains, to ensure that SCDF can conduct operations on the upper floors effectively.

In addition, high-rise residential buildings that exceed 40 storeys in height require at least one refuge floor per 20 storeys. The refuge floor is designed to provide evacuees with quick access to a safe holding space in the event of a fire.

Last, SCDF conducts regular outreach through campaigns, such as the Community Resilience Days, to educate residents on fire prevention and fire safety, and provide free hands-on training on the use of fire extinguishers, cardiopulmonary resuscitation and the use of automated external defibrillators (AEDs).

SCDF also collaborates with other Government agencies and stakeholders to promote fire safety awareness, such as through the recent "Better Awareness, Safer Homes" programme jointly launched with the People's Association and National Fire and Emergency Preparedness Council, as well as the "Be-Device-Safe" programme with the Land Transport Authority.

Fire safety is a collective responsibility. We must work together, each doing our part, if we are to keep our homes safe from fires.

Mr Ng Chee Meng.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Minister of State for his answer. The lines of defence that Minister of State mentioned are, indeed assuring, including the good work by our SCDF. However, in spite of all the different measures, there were three serious fires that resulted in death in Singapore last year; one particular case in Toa Payoh, where the fire spread from the 10th floor to the 11th floor, where then some residents above had some difficulties evacuating. [Please refer to "Personal Explanation", Official Report, 14 January 2026, Vol 96, Issue 14, Personal Explanation section.]

In the context that the Minister of State mentioned where we are building higher, with higher density, including now, where we have an ageing society, where there are more elderly with mobility challenges. Fire prevention measures are good, but when it does happen, what may be the new measures that we can take pre-emptively to either educate, maybe even consider fire drills like in many other private buildings? Could we be doing some of these in the public housing estates so that residents get more hands-on education besides head knowledge? Maybe the neighbours can come together to rally in case of such emergencies. I hope that in the review, the Ministry can consider that.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for his question and comments. I fully agree with the Member's emphasis on public preparedness and public education. These are important and the SCDF works very, very closely with all the respective agencies, including with the constituencies and the grassroots leaders nationwide, actually, to help raise public awareness. It is important for the public to know what they can do and what they need to do to play their part. And as I mentioned earlier in my reply, a prepared and ready public is actually our best line of defence against fires.

Indeed, with regard to the cases that the Member mentioned, it is regretful and every fire, every death, is one too many, and we deeply regret that. And I think that is the reason why all the more we do need to step up. The SCDF spares no effort in making sure that not only is the SCDF best prepared to fight fires operationally, but in terms of working together with the public.

Let me amplify some of the community engagement efforts. Beyond what I mentioned earlier – Community Resilience Days, "Be-Device-Safe" campaigns, the "Better Awareness, Safer Homes" campaigns – we have various Responder Plus Programmes that the SCDF does across the country in the various constituencies, to work with and educate our residents in terms of how they can play their part in their homes, how to use fire extinguishers, AEDs, for example. And these are not just initial education programmes, but also refresher training courses to ensure that everyone can play their part.

It is also about raising the overall awareness and sensitivity to danger. It is that sense of awareness that is initially most important. So, the "Better Awareness, Safer Homes" campaign is the initial education effort to get people aware. Statistics show that the main primary cause of fires is actually unattended cooking. So, actually, it is about individual responsibility. And if you are able to get everyone aware that these can cause fires, I think that solves a part, a big part of the problem.

I will take the comments from the Member seriously. And if there are any further suggestions, we will be happy to work together with the constituencies.

Mr Alex Yam.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister of State for his answers earlier.

Could the Minister of State reassure the public the current inspection enforcement regime during construction and renovation works is assessed to be sufficiently robust, given that these time periods where the confluence of hot works, temporary wiring and flammable materials significantly heighten risk, as we saw in in the tragic example in Tai Po?

Building on the point that the hon Member, Mr Ng Chee Meng, mentioned earlier as well, in terms of community efforts, in my constituency, we organise regular block evacuation exercises so that residents are better prepared on evacuation routes and looking out for one another. What we saw from the Tai Po example, from interviews with survivors, as well as some of the experiences of those who were trapped, it is that many did not take the initial evacuation alert seriously enough and that may have contributed to the increased number of fatalities. With a growing number of vulnerable and elderly residents, is there more that the Ministry can do to heighten evacuation awareness, especially with the higher density and taller residential developments that we have today?

Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for his question. There are two parts to the question, so let me address the first one first, and this is with regard to precautions for construction.

Any construction and maintenance works done in Singapore must adhere to the safety requirements set out in the Fire Code, and the Workplace Safety and Health Regulations. For example, any hoarding used during construction must be made of non-combustible material and all fire safety systems must remain functional. It is also a requirement to ensure proper supervision that hot works are separated from flammable materials. The use of bamboo as scaffolding is not allowed in Singapore.

At the same time, SCDF also runs programmes and is willing to work with employers in terms of how to best educate their workers to be fire-safe. At the same time, SCDF regularly reviews the Fire Code to ensure that fire safety measures for buildings, including those undergoing construction maintenance, are robust and up-to-date with the best practices.