Hansard, Monday, 6 August 2018

1 Ms Denise Phua Lay Peng asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) what are the actions that the Ministry will take to (i) prevent or reduce the likelihood of similar or worse cyberattacks, such as the recent attack on SingHealth, (ii) ensure organisations and individuals take more aggressive measures to protect their systems and data, and (iii) guide those whose personal data had been compromised in the recent attack on how to detect and respond to improper use of the data.

2 Mr Seah Kian Peng asked the Minister for Communications and Information besides the recent cyberattack and breach on SingHealth's IT system and data (a) how many Government agencies have also had similar attacks in the last 12 months; (b) what is the nature of such attacks; and (c) which countries have these attacks originated from.

3 Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng asked the Minister for Communications and Information what are the Government's plans to restore public confidence in its Smart Nation and Digital Government's initiatives following the recent cyberattack on SingHealth's IT system.

4 Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng asked the Minister for Communications and Information what are the composition and terms of reference of the Committee of Inquiry to investigate the recent cyberattack on SingHealth's IT system.

5 Ms Tin Pei Ling asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) whether the culprit of the cyberattack on SingHealth has been identified; and (b) whether the culprit will be publicly identified and taken to task and, if not, why.

6 Ms Tin Pei Ling asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) whether cyberattacks, such as the one on SingHealth, could have been prevented; (b) whether active steps have been taken to protect the data and system integrity of key national installations, including Government-related institutions; and (c) will the Government restore confidence in citizens as it continues to pursue a Smart Nation and Digital Government.

7 Ms Rahayu Mahzam asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) how has the recent cyberattack on SingHealth's database affected Singapore's Smart Nation plans; (b) whether the review of the different Smart Nation projects affect the timelines set for these projects; (c) whether the plan to achieve a fully digital Government by 2023 is still possible; and (d) whether there are specific areas or aspects of the Smart Nation plans which can be enhanced or reviewed in light of this cyberattack.

8 Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng asked the Minister for Communications and Information what are the implications of the Cybersecurity Act coming into effect for a cyberattack causing a personal data breach similar to the recent SingHealth incident.

9 Mr Thomas Chua Kee Seng asked the Minister for Communications and Information in view of the cyberattack on SingHealth, what are the steps taken to assure businesses that there will be no data breach when they are using the business-centric e-Government platforms, such as the Business Grants Portal, National Trade Platform and CorpPass.

10 Mr Leon Perera asked the Minister for Communications and Information given that ongoing Smart Nation and Digital Government projects will be placed on hold pending the inquiry into the SingHealth cyberattack, how will Government staff who are affected be redeployed in the meantime.

11 Ms Tin Pei Ling asked the Minister for Communications and Information what is the role of the Cyber Security Agency in defending against, and responding to, an incident, such as the attack on healthcare data in SingHealth.

12 Mr Png Eng Huat asked the Minister for Communications and Information whether the Government is going to bear responsibility for any stolen identity crime committed as a result of the SingHealth data breach, including unauthorised registration of legal and illegal services, such as SingPass and online gambling sites.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission for the Minister in charge of Cyber Security to take Question Nos 1 through to 12 in a Ministerial Statement later in the Sitting, please?

Alright.

The following question stood in the name of Dr Chia Shi-Lu –

To ask the Minister for Health with regard to the SingHealth cyberattack, how will the Ministry assess whether (i) the data have not been tampered with, (ii) subversive latent programmes have not infiltrated and been installed in SingHealth's network, and (iii) access to other Government networks has not been gained through SingHealth's system.

14 Ms Joan Pereira asked the Minister for Health (a) what steps will be taken to ensure that the data on the National Electronic Health Record (NEHR) system is protected from cyberattacks; (b) what systems are in place to determine whether medical records are tampered with; and (c) when there is a data leak or alteration of personal information or medical records, what will be done to safeguard the interests of patients whose data are in the record.

15 Mr Christopher de Souza asked the Minister for Health with regard to the recent hacking of SingHealth's IT system (a) what has been discovered in the investigations thus far; (b) what lessons are learnt; and (c) how will similar situations be avoided in the future.

16 Mr Ang Wei Neng asked the Minister for Health (a) when was the last audit, internal or external, conducted on the public SingHealth IT system, particularly in areas related to the patient database; (b) which are the public healthcare systems that use similar IT systems as that of SingHealth; (c) what are the immediate rectification measures taken by SingHealth and other healthcare groups under the Eastern, Western and Central regions.

17 Assoc Prof Daniel Goh Pei Siong asked the Minister for Health whether security measures implemented after the cyberattack on the SingHealth system have affected waiting time and consultation time at public hospitals and polyclinics.

18 Ms Sylvia Lim asked the Minister for Health whether he can elaborate on the reasons for the significant delay in informing the public of the cyberattack affecting SingHealth's database from the time the breach was discovered.

19 Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong asked the Minister for Health (a) why were details of the cyberattack on the medical records of 1.5 million people under SingHealth's hospitals, speciality clinics and polyclinics not disclosed to the public earlier; (b) what measures have been taken to improve security since the cyberattack; and (c) what actions will be taken against the perpetrators of the cyberattack.

Question No 13.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to also take Question Nos 13 to 19 subsequently in my Ministerial Statement.

Please do. Dr Lim Wee Kiak.

20 Dr Lim Wee Kiak asked the Minister for Defence with regard to the rejection of National Service deferment for Mr Benjamin Davis (a) what are the criteria to qualify for deferment; (b) whether the Ministry considers a professional contract with an English Premier League football club a rare achievement for a Singaporean; and (c) whether consideration is given to how Mr Davis can contribute to the soccer scene in Singapore when he returns.

21 Mr Darryl David asked the Minister for Defence (a) what are the criteria that are used to determine whether a sportsman can be deferred from National Service to pursue his sporting growth and development; (b) whether there are different criteria used to assess the potential of sportsmen who are taking part in sports where success is not easily measured using quantitative benchmarks; and (c) whether there are different criteria used for individual sportsmen and those participating in team sports and, if so, what are the criteria used for individuals participating in team sports.

22 Mr Darryl David asked the Minister for Defence whether the Government can consider deferring National Service for outstanding young male Singaporeans who have the potential to accomplish significant successes in fields other than sports if those successful achievements can also bring international fame and recognition for Singapore.

23 Mr Sitoh Yih Pin asked the Minister for Defence what are the criteria for a young outstanding athlete in a team sport to be granted deferment from National Service.

24 Ms Joan Pereira asked the Minister for Defence whether the Ministry will conduct a study to review its criteria for NS deferment for sporting talent, especially in light of more young Singaporeans showing potential and making their mark in regional and international sports.

25 Mr Muhamad Faisal Bin Abdul Manap asked the Minister for Defence (a) whether National Service deferments can be considered for team sports and not only for individual sports; (b) what documents and supporting evidence are required to meet the criteria for deferment; (c) what consultation is held with direct and supporting parties in evaluating deferment applications; (d) what types of cases does the Ministry deem to be exceptional; and (e) when was the deferment policy last reviewed and when will it be next reviewed.

Mr Speaker, let me thank Members for their questions that allow the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) to explain our policies.

Minister, if you have a statement, we can take that later after the Parliamentary Questions (PQs).

Mr Speaker, I am not making a Ministerial Statement. I am replying to the PQs.

Please proceed. My apologies.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to take the six PQs that are directed to MINDEF and to give a common reply from Question Nos 20 to 25?

Please do.

Mr Speaker, I thank Members for their questions. It allows MINDEF to explain our policies. Singapore's founding leaders knew the strict conditions that National Service (NS) would impose on its citizens when they passed the National Service (Amendment) Bill. This was 51 years ago and the Enlistment Act in 1970. In 1984, just as he was about to retire, a reflective Dr Goh Keng Swee acknowledged it plain and simple, "National Service imposes (not only) a great sacrifice of time and money on the young men called up." But Dr Goh followed with the reason why this sacrifice was called for and why NS was crucial to our nation's survival. I continue, quote, Dr Goh's words, "deep in his heart, the average Singapore Citizen knows the danger he faces are real and not hypothetical, and that there is a need to defend ourselves."

The Appellate High Court also brought their minds to bear on our NS policy, just as recently as 2017, last year. This was during an appeal on the sentencing of NS defaulters. Their written judgment spelt out the reasons why more stringent sentencing benchmarks were justified but those same reasons lie at the heart of what various Members of Parliament (MPs) asked today – Dr Lim Wee Kiak, Mr Darryl David, Mr Sitoh Yih Pin, Ms Joan Pereira, Mr Muhamad Faisal Abdul Manap, and Dr Intan Mokhtar in her Question for Written Answer. In various forms, they asked these questions: how strict is this requirement for every male to serve his NS when required? What exceptions or flexibility can be given?

It was a landmark decision, presided over by the Chief Justice. The Appellate High Court referred to Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean's Ministerial Statement given in 2006 to this House, when he was Defence Minister. That Ministerial Statement, coupled with the written judgment of the Appellate High Court, illuminates the fundamentals on which our NS policy is based, that we must not unwittingly weaken lest we undo this nation’s foundations. I urge all Members to read them. It is crucial. The judges opined that, "In practical terms, what the three fundamental principles of national security, universality and equity mean is that in order to ensure Singapore's national survival, every male Singaporean must serve NS and at the time he is required to under the (Enlistment) Act, without regard to his personal convenience and considerations. When a person refuses to serve NS at the time that he is required to and instead returns to serve at a time of his own choosing, or worse, at an age when he can no longer serve, his actions strike at the very core of the principles of national security, universality and equity."

Thirteen NS defaulters were prosecuted after the new sentencing framework was established last year. In Court, in every case, each of them gave reasons why he did not enlist as required. Some wanted to complete their university degree first before NS. Others said they had to support their families. But in every case, in every judgment, the Courts dismissed these personal reasons, convicted and sentenced them to jail because, harsh as it is, the Enlistment Act is blind to "personal convenience and considerations", no matter how talented the individual, no matter how exceptional his circumstances. That is the core of the Enlistment Act. The critical need for a strong defence puts aside personal pursuits and mandates that each liable male performs his NS when required. This is the law our founding leaders and subsequent leaders passed in this House. We may have forgotten it or diluted it, but the Enlistment Act stands.

The written judgment noted that everyone was asked to do his "fair share". "This entails every citizen who is required to serve NS making sacrifices or postponing individual goals to serve the nation when the nation needs his service". The sum of it – these arguments spell out in unequivocal terms the NS obligations for every Singaporean male.

So, deferment cannot be for the individual, no matter how talented, to pursue his own interests or career. In other words, because I am so exceptional in talent, I deserve to be deferred. This is not the Enlistment Act. No matter how talented, and even if it vicariously brings credit or fame to Singapore because that would be fundamentally wrong and goes against the core principle of equity.

The Enlistment Act is blind to talent, personal considerations, personal circumstances.

Some Singaporeans have voiced the same opinions over Mr Davis' application. I assume Members filed these questions as a result of that. Mr Suresh Nair, who wrote to our feedback unit and said this, "Let this Davis case be the right and timely reminder of the need for absolute fairness in applying laws regarding NS deferment". He has understood this.

Therefore, to preserve equity for all National Servicemen, MINDEF will only defer individuals very selectively if their deferment serves Singapore's interest first and foremost, never their own. That is the only basis. This was the only basis to defer three sportsmen, swimmers Joseph Schooling and Quah Zheng Wen, and sailor Maximilian Soh, from NS so that they could train and compete in the Olympics. The sportsmen who were deferred, knew this because clear expectations were laid out when deferment was given. We discussed it with the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY) on the standards required for their training. Neither was deferment open-ended nor unconditional. They will have to return to serve NS, and if they do not meet the standards agreed upon, deferment will be curtailed. These strict conditions are necessary because even for these individuals who can bring glory to Singapore, there are detractors, who think it is unfair for anyone to be deferred. Mr T Ng wrote to MINDEF, “Please be fair to all Singaporean males, who spent years serving NS. Every Singaporean male’s career is important from his own point of view.”

Disruption for individuals after they are enlisted for NS follows the same principles and is also given only for national reasons. We disrupt medical students to complete their medical studies because we need them to serve as Medical Officers during their NS to take care of their fellow soldiers. It is not a personal career choice. We need them. It is not an entitlement, and once the reasons are no longer valid, the disruption will end. No discussions. For example, we previously allowed overseas medical students to disrupt, but this was stopped in 1992, when we could produce enough doctors locally. You can appeal, but we will just say "no", because we have enough. Similarly, dental students were not disrupted after 1989, as there was no need for NS Dental Officers. And for transparency, MINDEF publishes a full list of all medical students who are disrupted every year.

Having stated the general principles, let me explain why the application by Mr Harvey Davis for his son's deferment was rejected even though MINDEF recognised his son, Mr Ben Davis' achievement in obtaining a senior contract with Fulham Football Club (FC).

First, Mr Ben Davis is playing for Fulham FC as an English national, not a Singaporean Citizen. MINDEF is not privy to the contract signed between them, but we assume this published information is correct and that the father must have his reasons for doing so.

Second, Mr Harvey Davis has consistently refused to indicate when his son would return to serve NS, if deferred. The father replied to MCCY, Sport Singapore (SportSG) and Football Association of Singapore (FAS), stating, "We are unable to commit to a date for his return should he be playing professional football in the United Kingdom or Europe. In addition, it is also a possibility that Ben could be offered a new two-year contract in 2019 after the first year of his pro contract just like he has been offered a new two-year pro contract halfway through his two-year scholarship contract. Or he could be sent out on loan or sold to another club. There are a lot of variables all dependent on his development and progression."

Third, if he was not granted deferment, the father indicated that Mr Ben Davis would still proceed to sign the contract, and he has done so. The reason given by the father was that his son would only return to fulfil his NS commitment if he is unsuccessful in his professional career. In fact, Mr Harvey Davis went further after MINDEF rejected the application – that he would consider the option for his son to renounce his Singapore citizenship in order to pursue his career.

The father's responses made clear his intent for his son to pursue a professional football career to the fullest. If Mr Ben Davis will not give up his senior contract, which he is now offered, which provides for an allowance of a few hundred pounds a week, to serve his NS, it is even more unlikely that he will return to serve NS if he subsequently gets offered a contract worth many times more. And if he is not given a further contract with Fulham FC, the father has said that he may find other clubs which his son can be loaned to.

The application by Mr Harvey Davis for his son’s deferment is to further his son’s professional career first and to the longest extent possible. He has been quite open about this. And you would have read what he said. Singapore and her interests, including his son's NS obligations, are secondary considerations, if at all. There has been no indication, commitment or plans as to how Mr Ben Davis would help football standards in Singapore, if deferred. Mr Harvey Davis has urged MINDEF to approve deferment for his son so that it would serve as an inspiration, he tells us, for the 1,000 students registered with his company Junior Soccer School and League Singapore (JSSL Singapore), 500 or so who are local. For your information, JSSL Singapore is a youth football club and academy business run by Mr Harvey Davis and advertises itself as having links to Fulham FC.

MINDEF could not find any valid grounds to approve the application for deferment by Mr Harvey Davis for his son. There is no commitment to serve Singapore or our national interests. To grant deferment to Mr Ben Davis to pursue his personal development and professional career would be unfair to the many others who have served their NS dutifully as required, and not at a time of their choosing. It would also erode the basis on which our Courts have upheld the Enlistment Act passed by Parliament and punished those for not fulfilling their NS liabilities but instead pursue their own personal concerns and careers.

As a writer, Mr Patrick Tan Siong Kuan, wrote to The Straits Times Forum, "The defence of our country cannot be a matter of serving when it is most convenient. It is a responsibility that every man must take seriously when called upon, regardless of race, family connections or financial status. It takes personal sacrifice and putting the country before self. Otherwise, there will be no Singapore tomorrow."

Mr Suresh Nair who wrote to the MINDEF Feedback Unit said this, "If Davis is proud of his red passport, he must do what every Singapore teenager does, to dutifully observe the National Service obligations."

I know it must be difficult for a 17-year-old, Mr Ben Davis, to receive such public attention. It was never MINDEF's intent, but we had to respond to his father’s claims to the media to explain to Members of Parliament and Singaporeans the basis of our decision on this crucial national policy.

I have dealt with the application by Mr Harvey Davis for his son. Let me now address the important issue that Members of Parliament have asked – can we and how do we achieve sporting excellence, including for team sports, if National Service duties are to be fulfilled? I think that was the second thing most Members asked. National Service does require sacrifices, certainly personal ones, but performing one’s National Service duties and pursuing national aspirations for sports excellence need not be mutually exclusive.

Many talented sportsmen have served National Service as required and yet, at the same time, raised the level of their own skills and the teams they played with. To MINDEF's knowledge, there are three other footballers who have also been talent-spotted to take part in trials for professional leagues overseas. All three have completed their National Service as required – Saifullah Akbar, and Ikhsan and Irfan Fandi. In fact, Saifullah Akbar and Ikhsan Fandi asked to be enlisted early, presumably so that they could complete their NS first to pursue their professional careers.

Prior to enlisting, Saifullah played for the Under-16 national team and he was actually spotted by a professional Australian club at age 16 but he went ahead to enlist for NS. During their National Service, Irfan and Ikhsan trained and played for the Under-22 national team during the 2017 Southeast Asian (SEA) Games. They were supported by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and Home Team. Irfan and Ikhsan are now playing for the Young Lions in the Singapore Premier League and representing Singapore in regional football competitions. I understand Irfan has gone for trials with European clubs, including an upcoming trial with Sporting Braga, and Saifullah and Ikhsan are slated to follow suit at CD Tenerife and Braga. I am not a football fan, so these clubs are quite foreign to me, but you would know it, football fans out there. This is a good sign for football in Singapore and talented footballers.

Talented footballers, Ben Davis included, can emulate the example of Irfan, Saifullah and Ikhsan to complete their National Service duties as required and also advance their professional football careers. In fact, Saifullah Akbar will finish his National Service today and he is going to try out for a European club. You may have read his interviews, they asked him, "How did you feel when you were called up for National Service?" He said, "I tried to have a positive attitude. I told myself that army training will strengthen me. And now that I have finished NS, I can go on to pursue my dreams". For him, it was never a choice that he had to make not to fulfil his National Service obligations like everyone else. He said, "I had to train harder" but he kept a positive attitude. That is the kind of example we want young Singaporeans to emulate.

For the recent SEA Games in 2015 and 2017, MINDEF supported those competing, whether they were competing individually or as a team. We adjusted some enlistment dates for National Servicemen, so that they could participate in the Games first and enlist later. This included some footballers. Those who were already enlisted were given time off to train and maintain their peak performance. For the upcoming Asian Games later this month, so far, 10 of our National Servicemen have been given a short postponement of their enlistment of a few weeks, or if they have been enlisted, they have been given time off to train for the Games. This includes a member of the Water Polo team who clinched their 27th straight SEA Games Gold last year. We wish all these sportsmen every success and hope that they can continue to do well for Singapore in the Asian Games and beyond.

MINDEF has done more. Beyond these provisions, we have offered disruption to Full-time National Servicemen (NSFs) competing in these games. But very few have chosen to disrupt, presumably because they are able to train adequately in the SAF.

These many examples show that MINDEF has exercised flexibility towards sportsmen competing in team sports, a question asked by Dr Intan Mokhtar, Mr Muhamad Faisal and others. But we have done so without transgressing the fundamentals of National Service and still maintaining equity for all National Servicemen. MINDEF will work with MCCY, SportSG and other relevant agencies through various pathways that can allow sportsmen to do well and still fulfil their National Service obligations, whether it is individual or team sports.

Dr Lim Wee Kiak.

Mr Speaker, let me thank the Minister for the very, very long and elaborate explanation. I think we all agree that National Service is pivotal and essential to our national security.

I would like to just seek a clarification from the Minister now. Currently, is there a rising trend in terms of application for deferment or disruption for NS with regard to sports excellence over the last few years? That is one.

Two, if Ben Davis had given a date to say that he would return, would MINDEF consider his deferment?

Mr Speaker, as Member of Parliament Dr Lim Wee Kiak noted, I have given a long reply. Because this is crucial to state the fundamentals of our National Service policy and from that, whether deferment or disruption can be given. We have to understand that our Courts have upheld it. I said, after the revision of the sentencing benchmarks, 13 defaulters went to jail. So, the Courts take it very seriously and I know Members here, too.

The Member asked specifically whether there has been a trend in increased applications. I do not have the figures but I do not think so. What MINDEF has done is to, on its own, work with MCCY and SportSG to increase flexibility, and I gave some details in terms of adjusting enlistment dates, disruptions, time off. And the fact that we have fewer people disrupting or taking up the offers to disrupt indicates to me that they probably have weighed what they wanted to do and did not see the need to disrupt.

Dr Lim Wee Kiak asked a hypothetical question: if someone like Mr Davis had said that they would come back, would it have affected our judgement? I have spent a long time explaining how we decide. If you come back to serve your NS, it is your duty. But the main considerations are: is there a national interest? It can never be for personal pursuits, it must be for national interest, first and foremost.

In the last 15 years, we have agreed to long-term deferments for three sportsmen who met that, and we will continue to keep to those standards so that we can be fair to other National Servicemen who do their NS dutifully, who put aside their own careers to do NS, as well as not undermine the Court's basis for sentencing those who default their National Service.

Mr Vikram Nair.

I thank the Minister for the clarification. I just wanted to clarify two further points.

First, I understand that Ben Davis was called up to play for Singapore but he was never capped, which meant he was never fielded for Singapore. But is it correct that all those who, in fact, played for Singapore have found a way to do their National Service duties alongside representing the country? That is the first question.

Second, even where national athletes are deferred, is it always pegged to representing the country at a specific game, for example, rather than just open-ended?

Mr Speaker, I am not privy to all the facts for Mr Davis – or MINDEF is not privy to all the facts – as I understand it. By the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) rules, he has not played for Singapore. So, he is still free to choose which country he wants to play for. FIFA rules are quite interesting, and this is from my understanding; I stand corrected, but you can only choose one country for the rest of your life. That particular shirt you wear can never be changed. Even if you change your citizenship, you can only represent one country. In that sense, I think they have taken a particular philosophy.

The question is: do you peg those deferred? The key consideration is national interest. There is a misconception that you can be deferred if you are exceptionally talented. That is not the Enlistment Act. How do you decide between one who is exceptionally talented versus another with exceptional circumstances? Someone who is poor who needs to work to support his family because the parents are sick. From the Court's point of view, they have ruled that personal considerations – put aside. That has been the basis and I think that is correct.

Now, obviously, you need some talent, exceptional talent, to be able to compete and bring glory to the country. That is a given. We judge it on that basis. It is never easy, it is not a science. We will consider each case with all the facts and make a decision and tell the public, if not satisfy the majority of National Servicemen, who put aside personal considerations to do their National Service duties.

Mr Darryl David.

I thank the Minister for the reply. I think we all agree on the critical importance of National Service and the sanctity of serving the country. I have a couple of supplementary questions, Mr Speaker.

First of all, will the Minister or MINDEF be prepared to consider sports that perhaps cannot be so quantitatively assessed? For example, should a Singaporean sportsman one day win the Australian Junior Open Tennis Championship and have a real possibility of achieving success on a global stage, thereby playing under the Singapore flag, would we be able to consider something like that?

My second question is, would we be able to consider outstanding achievement in activities other than sports, say, in performing arts or perhaps even in music?

The answer is yes, if it satisfies the criteria that I talked about, that we maintain equity for all other National Servicemen, and that it serves the national interest, never their own. The first example the Member gave was that he competes in tennis and then he decides he wants to be a professional tennis player before he comes back, obviously, that will affect our considerations.

The second question is outstanding achievements. Yes, in fact, we have. We have gone on record to say that we have deferred some very exceptional musicians. And as I have said, it is not a science and, for the cases that we have deferred, they went on to their development and enlisted either at the same time or very soon after their cohorts were also enlisted. So, there was equity maintained. Similarly, for academic. I know that we have on record somebody who entered university in his teens but completed his university education at the same time that his cohorts went to the army and he went in together with them. So, those considerations are maintained.

So, the key considerations are how do we maintain equity for all National Servicemen, and for national interests.

Mr Pritam Singh.

I thank the Minister for the clarification on the deferment policy. I asked a question on deferment during the Committee of Supply in 2012 and I asked my question in relation to the Olympics because there is this constant reference to a high watermark sporting event before deferment is considered by MINDEF, or at least that is the popular perception. In the 2012 reply given by the Minister, it was stated that 13 athletes were deferred for a period of two to six months to participate in the 2011 SEA Games and the 2010 Asian Games. Can I confirm that, with the Minister's statement, there is no change in the policy for NS deferment?

The second question actually is picking up from what Dr Lim Wee Kiak said about a two-year contract. For example, if a Singaporean commits to return to performing his NS after his cohort has been called up, let us, say, at the age of 18, and that individual says, "At the age of 20, no matter how this training contract goes, I will come back to serve", would MINDEF allow deferment in that particular case?

Let me answer the first question, which is more factual. If I said so in Parliament, it must be so. The Hansard says so and there is no change in our deferment policy. On the fundamental principles, we must maintain equity for all National Servicemen, and it must be for national interest, never for personal interest. So, that has not changed. In fact, it has not changed over the time that MINDEF has administered this policy.

On the second question, my reply to Dr Lim Wee Kiak is that I really do not want to engage in hypothetical circumstances. We assess the individual as it is. It is hypothetical, indeed. If you are not willing to come back to serve your NS when you are earning a few hundred pounds a week, how is MINDEF to believe that you would come back when you are earning many times more? So, that has to come into consideration. And also he has to serve the purposes for deferment based on our current policy.

26 Dr Lim Wee Kiak asked the Minister for Culture, Community and Youth (a) what is the Ministry's policy on assisting young Singaporeans who seek National Service (NS) deferment to pursue their sporting ambition; and (b) whether there is an approved list of sports or recognised international sporting bodies where young men can qualify for NS deferment if they are accepted for training.

27 Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry asked the Minister for Culture, Community and Youth what are the programmes to nurture talented young sportsmen especially for the team sports given that their training can be interrupted by National Service.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to answer Question Nos 26 and 27 together, as they are related?

Yes, please.

Thank you. MCCY recognises the power of sport in inspiring the nation and engendering a sense of national pride. Through Sport Singapore (SportSG) and its partners, including Singapore National Olympic Council, the National Sports Associations (NSAs), the Singapore Sports School, and the National Youth Sports Institute, the High Performance Sports (HPS) system has been established to support our athletes to reach their fullest sporting potential. The System involves identifying, developing and benchmarking the progress of sporting talents across key sports, covering the provision of training facilities, coaching support, sports science and sports medicine expertise, as well as overseas training and competition opportunities. In other words, we support the sports and the athletes comprehensively by working with the NSAs to develop their Multi-Year Sports Plans.

As young male athletes progress in their development over the years, the timing of National Service will be a factor for consideration. And our considerations are:

How will the two-year commitment affect the athlete?

What is the potential and motivation of the athlete?

What is the training and development plan for the athlete? and

How is the athlete being developed to progressively achieve personal bests and breakthrough performances?

I must say that the athlete is seen as one of a bigger team for the sports, not just by himself, but also what he can do to contribute to the sports and also to the development of the sports as a whole.

As part of the long-term plan under HPS, we work closely with MINDEF, MHA and the NSAs to enable our male Team Singapore athletes to pursue their sports development and fulfil their NS obligations. The Minister for Defence has, in his earlier reply to PQs, explained how MINDEF has accommodated the training requirements of enlisted Team Singapore athletes, and allowed these athletes to take up additional training opportunities in the lead-up to the Major Games – within the duration of their NS. For instance, enlisted members of the national football and water polo teams have in the past been given permission to train with their team mates in preparation for the Southeast Asian Games and other major international competitions. In this regard, NS deferment is not the only avenue for supporting the development of our young male athletes.

MCCY is prepared to support NS deferment applications by sporting talents who have consistently demonstrated the potential to succeed at the highest levels of competition, serve Singapore’s interests, and have provided a definitive commitment to return to serve NS. These include swimmers Joseph Schooling and Quah Zheng Wen, who have been granted deferment to train full-time for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. In the case of Joseph, his original NS deferment was from 2013 to the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. Following his Gold-medal achievement in Rio, thus meeting the agreed milestone target that we have with him and the NSA, MINDEF extended his deferment to the Tokyo 2020 Olympics on the recommendation of MCCY.

My Ministry shares Singaporeans' aspirations for excellence in sports, and does not favour individual sports over team sports. Across all sports, we objectively assess the NSAs' development plans and targets, as well as the performance and potential of the athletes. For team sports, we have to adopt a whole-team development strategy which covers the entire squad of athletes, beyond just an individual athlete. We have several considerations when we assess our support for NS-liable athletes involved in team sports. For example, we look at the robustness of the NSA's development plans for the team, whether there is a clear target for a Major Games competition in sight and the plans to achieve this, as well as the individual athlete’s role and potential contribution to the national team. If there are sporting talents who are part of this squad, and who demonstrate commitment to represent Singapore and serve NS, MCCY is prepared to work with MINDEF to evaluate NS deferment applications, or training privileges during NS so that the enlisted athletes can train together with the rest of the squad.

28 Mr Desmond Choo asked the Minister for Manpower in view of the recent spate of workplace fatal accidents (a) whether there are common causes of the accidents; (b) which are the sectors where such accidents are more prevalent; (c) whether the current framework of measures is adequate; and (d) what new measures may be needed to prevent industrial accidents in future.

29 Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye asked the Minister for Manpower (a) what is the number of construction-related workplace fatalities for the past five years; (b) what is the local-foreign worker ratio of these fatalities; and (c) what is the Ministry's plan to further reduce the number of construction-related workplace fatalities.

Mr Speaker, in the first half of 2018, there were 20 workplace fatalities. This is slightly more than the 19 cases in the same period last year.

Besides the construction sector, recent fatal accidents were also prevalent in the manufacturing sector and in commercial diving.

One common cause of the fatalities was the use of improper work methods. To address this, the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) works with companies to raise awareness of accident risks in their workplaces. Besides engaging industry associations like the Singapore Contractors Association Limited and the Commercial Diving Association of Singapore, we also issue regular alerts to share learning points from recent accidents. For example, we have notified companies on the dangers of improper use of material hoists, which led to a fatal accident in a food factory. We issued reminders on the proper procedures for doing construction work, especially at heights, as falls have accounted for about half of construction fatalities this year.

Overall, workplace fatalities in the construction sector have declined over the last five years, from 34 in 2013 to 12 in 2017. On average, foreigners constituted 88% of the fatalities, even though they comprised 75% of the construction workforce.

To guard against complacency, and to prevent injuries to both local and foreign workers, MOM has ramped up enforcement operations at construction sites. By the end of the year, MOM would have inspected about 70% of all active construction sites.

We will continue to adopt a mix of targeted enforcement while raising awareness on safety lapses. To achieve sustained improvements in workplace safety and health (WSH), we convened the WSH2028 Tripartite Strategy Committee to recommend new approaches. It will share its preliminary recommendations at the Singapore WSH Conference later this month.

I take it that the Minister of State is taking Question No 29 as well?

Yes, Mr Speaker.

Mr Desmond Choo.

I would like to thank the Minister of State for his comprehensive answer and for MOM's efforts to tackle fatalities. But I note that the number of fatalities has been higher in the first part of 2018 compared to that the year before. I would like to ask the Minister of State whether the current framework and the current penalties are sufficient to send a deterrent message to errant employers and what further action may be taken against companies, especially those with repeated infringements.

I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. Certainly, this year, we saw an increase and largely driven by the construction sector. In May, I announced that we are conducting additional inspections, about 500 inspections, and we also extended another 250 when we saw fatalities in the construction sector still increasing. We have completed about 80% of the extended inspections. What we have done so far is to issue six stop-work orders and 164 composition fines amounting to $188,750. We hope that this will send a strong message to the construction sector to be more vigilant, especially since they have contributed a significant amount of fatalities to the workplaces this year.

But it is not just the construction sector that we are working on. We have also been working with the manufacturing and commercial diving sector as well, which have also contributed some amount of fatalities this year. So, it is an area that we are constantly working on, but we hope that employers make conscious decisions to mitigate risks at the worksites to reduce fatalities.

Mr Melvin Yong.

I thank the Minister of State for the answer. I note that there are higher incidences of foreign workers in construction worksites falling victim to workplace accidents. I think the Minister of State's reply says that the fatality rate is higher for the foreign workers. Are there any plans by MOM to focus on education and raising awareness among this group of foreign workers?

I thank the Member for his questions. MOM and WSH Council both reach out to workers through various means, such as roadshows, events at dormitories and on weekends, to convey these messages to foreign workers. I think it is also important that as they settle in, especially for those working in construction, to be trained in terms of safety aspects since they come from different backgrounds.

We also ensure that WSH collaterals are printed in different languages so that workers from different nationalities are also able to benefit from the different advice.

30 Mr Chong Kee Hiong asked the Minister for Manpower with regard to the Fair Consideration Framework (FCF) (a) which are the top five sectors and industries on the FCF Watchlist; (b) what are the most common job categories and their salary ranges on the Watchlist; and (c) what measures will be implemented to facilitate senior job opportunities for Singapore Citizens in critical sectors.

Mr Speaker, the Fair Consideration Framework (FCF) Watchlist targets employers that are suspected to have discriminatory hiring practices. Currently, about 350 firms are on the FCF Watchlist.

Administrative and Support Services, Construction, Education, Infocomm and Professional Services are among the top five sectors which firms on the FCF Watchlist belong to. These firms employ a range of occupations, such as architects and engineers, business professionals, information technology (IT) professionals and managers with many being paid between $3,000 and $10,000. Firms on the FCF Watchlist will have their Employment Pass applications scrutinised and, consequently, experience longer processing times. The Tripartite Alliance for Fair and Progressive Employment Practices (TAFEP) also engages these firms to offer assistance to improve their hiring practices. To date, over 2,000 Singaporean professionals, managers, executives and technicians (PMETs) have been hired by firms on the FCF Watchlist.

At the other end of the spectrum, we recognise employers with exemplary human resource (HR) practices as our Human Capital Partners (HCPartners). HCPartners actively groom Singaporeans for senior positions, through initiatives, such as management trainee programmes, overseas assignments and postings, as well as job rotations, across different business functions. As a result, HCPartners have a healthy local workforce share at all levels, including at senior levels.

Additionally, the SkillsFuture Leadership Development Initiative (LDI) supports employers in developing the next generation of Singaporean leaders. Through the programme, Singaporeans will acquire leadership competencies and critical experiences to take on senior positions.

Mr Patrick Tay.

I thank the Minister for the reply. I just want to ask the Minister since the update during the Committee of Supply (COS) on the number of companies that are on the FCF Watchlist, which is 350, has there been an increase or a decrease? Likewise, because of the new broadened coverage of the FCF with effect from 1 July this year, what is the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) seeing? Has there been an increase or a decrease in the number of Watchlist companies?

Mr Speaker, the number of companies on the Watchlist is largely stable. We continue to work with each one of them to improve their hiring practices. As and when we are told of companies that have practices that are suspected to be discriminatory, TAFEP will engage the companies. Our intent is really to help them improve their practices in order to be fairer and more progressive towards Singaporeans. So, the number that we work with is not a fixed target, but it does give an indication of the intensity of the effort that we are applying.

The question which the Member asked relates to the advertising requirement under FCF. We have expanded the requirement so that more companies that employ Employment Pass holders have to make known the jobs that they are seeking candidates for. It used to be that for jobs that pay up to $12,000, you have to advertise; we have expanded it. Up to $15,000, you have to advertise.

We have also requested more companies to be covered under FCF. It used to be that you have to hire more than 25 persons. Now, as long as you hire 10 or more persons, you are covered.

So, as it stands right now, the advertising requirement would already cover the large majority of jobs at the PMET level. We will continue to monitor and make sure that FCF remains credible.

Ms Thanaletchimi.

I would like to ask the Minister a follow-up question on those companies on the FCF Watchlist. Are they still eligible for Government funding, such as Adapt and Grow and all the others, to improve their businesses? Are they still eligible to apply for those kinds of fundings?

Mr Speaker, if I remember correctly, the Member had a question some months back whether one of the conditions for eligibility to apply for various Government schemes, including those that are administered by MOM, ought to include their support for FCF, and perhaps some other schemes as well.

I think we try not to conflate the two. Whilst these firms may be on the Watchlist, and we are working with them to improve their hiring practices, in the meantime, they are still employers of Singaporeans, and we do not want to unfairly penalise their Singaporean employees whilst they are going through this process. If the scheme is beneficial to the companies, if the scheme can benefit our citizens, I do not see why we should prevent them from doing so.

Having said that, generally speaking, if the firms are on the Watchlist, I think they have multiple issues, and it is not quite likely that they are at the same time looking at application to the other schemes to support various human resource initiatives.

31 Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang asked the Minister for Manpower (a) in the past three years, of the notifications received to reduce the salary of a Work Permit holder stated in their in-principle approval letter, what proportions are within (i) one month, (ii) one year of the Work Permit issue date; and (b) whether the Ministry will consider a limit on the amount a company is allowed to reduce the salary of the Work Permit holder.

In the past three years, the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) was notified of salary reductions affecting less than 2% of non-domestic Work Permit holders per year. From that number, less than one in 10 were within one month, and about four in 10 were within one year, after the Work Permit was issued.

As explained in a reply to a Parliamentary Question raised by the Member on this topic last month, MOM is studying the issue and we will consult the relevant stakeholders to determine the best step forward for foreign workers.

Mr Louis Ng.

I thank the Minister of State for the reply. Could I just check further whether 2% is about 14,000 workers every year? It is quite a huge number. So, I want to check whether MOM obtains this copy of the written consent to show that the worker accepts the salary reduction, or do we only verify that this written consent exists when a dispute occurs, during the dispute resolution stage.

Second, could I also ask, with the upcoming consultation, whether MOM would also be consulting with non-government organisations (NGOs) that are working on this issue as well?

I thank the Member. I will take the second question first. Certainly, we are open to NGOs being consulted or taking their feedback.

On the first question, certainly, I think that all the foreign workers have direct access to MOM if they want to make a complaint. At this moment, we do not take every written change at the point of application. But having said that, when there is a dispute, we will require the documentation to be provided. And the law protects the worker, especially when there is no documentation provided in terms of a written agreement on the change in salary.

Mr Louis Ng.

Sir, just one more question. I understand that the reply is that five in 10 of these salary reductions occurred within one year from the Work Permit issue date. But could I also check whether we have data on how many of the salary reductions occurred before the Work Permit issue date, which means that the foreign workers were promised a salary, but when they arrived in Singapore, the salary was immediately reduced? Does this conduct constitute providing false information to MOM during the Work Permit application stage?

I thank the Member. In short, any reduction in salary before the Work Permit issuance will constitute an offence. Technically, there is no need for them to submit any documentation because reduction in salary before Work Permit issuance is not allowed.

32 Mr Alex Yam asked the Minister for National Development (a) what the sizes of the largest available public rental flats in each decade since 1965 are; (b) why the sizes have changed, and (c) whether the size of new public rental flats built since 2006 are suited for large families.

33 Mr Alex Yam asked the Minister for National Development (a) whether there is a limit to the number of occupants for HDB's rental flats; and (b) whether the Ministry has plans to introduce basic occupancy standards for these rental flats.

Minister, are you taking both questions?

Yes. Thank you for the reminder. I am taking Question Nos 32 and 33 together, with your permission, Sir.

Yes, please.

Public housing first started with Housing and Development Board (HDB) blocks comprising 1-, 2- and 3-room rental flats. Subsequently, as part of the Government's overall move to encourage Singaporeans towards home ownership, HDB sold existing 3-room rental flats to the sitting tenants and closed the 3-room rental register in 1982. Hence, when HDB resumed the rental building programme in 2007, only 1- and 2-room flats were built.

The rental rates for these 1- and 2-room public rental flats are heavily subsidised so that they remain accessible to the lower-income households. More than 90% of households in these public rental flats have four or fewer persons living together. Larger families who form two separate family nuclei, such as grandparents living with parents and children, and need more space may also apply for two separate rental flats.

There are no plans to impose a limit on the number of family members who can live in a rental flat or to impose occupancy standards for such flats. And we take a similar approach for flats which are sold or rented in the open market because, in the same manner, there is no limit on the number of related persons who can stay together as a family in these units.

We will continue to review how best to meet the needs of public rental households, including larger families, as part of the Government's broader effort to support vulnerable families.

Mr Alex Yam.

I thank the Minister for his reassurance. Just one very quick factual clarification. The Minister mentioned that larger family units can rent two separate rental flats. How many of these families have applied for them, and how many have been approved so far?

Mr Speaker, as I mentioned, they have to form two separate family nuclei. So, this would typically apply to multi-generational families. I do not have the numbers, but the applicants are not many. This also goes back to the reason why we have to better understand the needs of the families we are talking about.

When HDB closed the 3-room register in 1982, the experience was that many of these families, in fact, preferred to buy, rather than to rent, the 3-room flats because it made more financial sense for them. They could pay using their Central Provident Fund and, at the end of the day, they would have a flat of their own.

So, if you were to talk larger families who want to apply for two separate units, they would have to pay a larger rental amount. Some of them may prefer not to do so. They may prefer to save, for example. If it is a first-timer family, they may very well prefer to build up their savings first in order to buy a flat later. So, I think there are multiple needs here. The Housing and Development Board and the social service agencies are committed to engage these families to better understand their needs and to resolve and tackle them holistically.

34 Mr Alex Yam asked the Minister for National Development (a) what the main reasons for the rejection of applications for HDB rental flats are; and (b) what HDB's projections for new rental flats in the next decade are.

Mr Speaker, the Housing and Development Board's (HDB's) public rental flats, which are heavily subsidised, cater to needy citizen households who have no other viable housing options or family support.

The most common reasons for rejecting requests for HDB public rental flats are that applicants have the ability to buy a flat, have family support, or are unable to meet the citizenship requirement. For households who do not meet the eligibility criteria, HDB exercises flexibility based on their individual needs and circumstances.

On the Member's second question, there are about 60,000 existing HDB rental flats, with another 3,000 units under construction. HDB will continue to monitor the net demand for rental flats, as more rental families have become homeowners, and make adjustments to our rental flat supply as required.

Mr Alex Yam.

I thank the Parliamentary Secretary. Two follow-ups. One is with regard to a point on the citizenship criterion. I think a number of Members in this House have mentioned this before, especially those who are undergoing a divorce and come from a Permanent Resident (PR) background, so the mother is a PR. And because of the Court requirement to sell the flat, they then have an issue of housing their children, especially if they are young. Does HDB guide these families in the process of application or point them in the right direction, especially if they do not qualify for a rental flat?

A second issue is with regard to the Joint Single Scheme where quite a number of people have also given feedback that they prefer to stay on their own. What advice does HDB provide to them because they are unable to find an appropriate, related family member or friend to stay with them, but still prefer to stay on their own?

I thank the Member for his question. For non-citizen parents with a Singapore Citizen child, we will adopt a child-centric approach. So, in such cases, the Member could reflect the case to HDB and HDB will take a child-centric approach and make sure that where the applicant has no other options for housing, they will make sure that accommodation is provided for the child.

On the second question, could I ask the Member to repeat, please?

For the Joint Single Scheme, for those unable to find an appropriate, related family member or friend to stay with them, but still prefer to stay alone, what options are available to them?

Firstly, based on our understanding, the number of singles who have not been able to find a suitable, eligible single person to live or rent with, is not large. But where such cases are surfaced to us, HDB will try its very best to find a suitable person to co-rent with the applicant.

Members are encouraged to use the microphones where possible. Asst Prof Mahdev Mohan.

35 Asst Prof Mahdev Mohan asked the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources (a) how will the Government tackle marine plastic pollution in the region; (b) what steps are being taken to prolong the life of Semakau landfill beyond 2035 by reducing excessive consumption of single-use plastic; and (c) how is the Government encouraging the private sector to develop, use and promote sustainable alternatives to plastic.

36 Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang asked the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources what plans does the Ministry have to encourage more businesses to reduce usage of single-use plastic.

With your permission, Speaker, may I take Question Nos 35 and 36 together?

Yes, please.

Thank you. My Ministry takes the issue of marine plastic pollution seriously, and measures are in place to prevent marine pollution from land-based sources. For example, we have strict anti-littering measures and dispose of all general waste at our waste-to-energy plants. Any litter that enters our waterways is removed using litter traps and flotsam removal craft before it reaches the sea. Beach and underwater clean-ups are also conducted.

However, tackling marine plastic pollution will require international and regional cooperation because of its transboundary nature. There has been positive momentum. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14 emphasises the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans, seas and marine resources. Singapore actively participates in regional and global discussions to address marine litter and microplastics. Singapore also contributes to international capacity building efforts under the Singapore Cooperation Programme. Last October, the National Environment Agency (NEA) organised a joint Third Country Training Programme with Norway on waste management and reduction of marine litter for government officials from our region.

Our only landfill at Semakau will run out of space by 2035 based on our current waste disposal trends. Waste, including single-use plastics, are already incinerated where possible as this reduces the volume of waste by up to 90%. To prolong the lifespan of Semakau Landfill, my Ministry has been developing measures that address the entire waste value chain and across different waste streams by encouraging businesses and producers to reduce waste and recycle, engaging and partnering the public and private sector and supporting research and development (R&D).

Regarding single-use plastics, a recent NEA life-cycle assessment study found that available alternatives to plastics, including biodegradable bags, also have an environmental impact. For example, they consume water during production or they result in forest destruction. Substituting plastics with these alternatives is not likely to improve the environmental outcome. This is especially so in Singapore where we incinerate our waste instead of landfilling it. Our approach, thus, is focused on reducing the use of single-use plastics and packaging.

To encourage businesses to minimise their contribution to plastic waste, my Ministry recently announced that the implementation of mandatory reporting of packaging data and packaging reduction plans will be brought forward by one year, to 2020. This will include single-use plastic packaging. We are also studying the feasibility of implementing an Extended Producer Responsibility framework for certain single-use packaging and plastics. We have already taken the lead by disallowing the use of disposables in our new hawker centres for dine-ins.

NEA provides funding support to organisations with initiatives to reduce the use of single-use disposables or promote plastic recycling. These include the 3R Fund, 3P Partnership Fund or the Call for Ideas Fund. For instance, Zero Waste SG received funding for their Bring-Your-Own Campaign in 2017, where they partnered retailers to encourage consumers to use reusable containers, bottles and bags through educational tips, resources and incentives. We will continue to engage, educate and support businesses and the public in reducing the use of single-use plastics.

The private sector has also taken steps to discourage the excessive consumption of single-use plastics. For example, Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) has stopped providing plastic lids and straws for dine-in. Startups like UnPackt are also promoting packaging-free shopping by requiring customers to bring their own reusable containers for groceries.

To support R&D in waste reduction, recycling and the recovery of valuable fractions, NEA has embarked on the Closing the Waste Loop Initiative. The Initiative encourages collaboration between institutes of higher learning, research institutes and private sector partners to develop technologies and solutions to tackle challenges in waste management. As part of the Initiative, NEA has solicited and is evaluating research proposals on the sustainable design of plastic materials, reducing the use of plastic materials and packaging, making plastics more reusable and easier to recycle, and recovering value from waste plastics.

Ultimately, the issue of marine plastic litter and excessive use of single-use plastics will require everyone to play his or her part. This can be done by properly disposing of waste into litter bins and using reusable bags and containers, instead of disposables. Individuals can find information on other ways to reduce and reuse on our NEA website and the myENV mobile app.

Mr Louis Ng.

I thank the Senior Minister of State for the reply and I am glad that mandatory reporting is going to be brought forward. Can I ask whether we will consider providing some incentives to these businesses or companies that are promoting environmentally friendly practices, such as the companies that are not giving out straws and plastic lids or even the packaging-free companies that the Senior Minister of State had mentioned?

The second is on the plastic bag charge. I have brought this up previously. I know that, on the ground, one of the concerns is how do we reuse plastic bags when they were used to contain frozen food or meat and seafood. So, can the Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources (MEWR) consider a selective plastic bag charge so that if you are using it not for frozen food, meat or seafood, then there will be a charge involved?

On the first question relating to giving incentives to companies, as I have alluded to, we do provide support to companies that have initiatives to promote recycling, reduce the use of single use plastics and waste minimisation projects. So, an example would be the 3R Fund, which I have talked about that was launched in 2009. It is a co-funding scheme for companies. Since then, we have disbursed about $1.36 million for such projects and have diverted 11,000 tonnes of waste from the incineration plants.

There are also other incentives to acknowledge companies who have put in effort to reduce packaging waste. There is the Singapore Packaging Agreement Award that we give out. This year, we have awarded Australian Fruit Juice (S) Pte Ltd because they have put in effort to reduce their packaging waste like reducing the packaging material for their 2-litre bottles.

We also have the 3R awards for hotels and shopping malls to recognise their achievements. And there are other funds like the Call for Ideas Fund and the 3P Partnership Fund. We will continue to see and look into ways to support companies which promote waste minimisation and help us in our efforts to achieve a Zero Waste vision.

Regarding the second question about plastic bag charge, as I have said earlier, the NEA lifecycle assessment study has shown that different types of disposables, whether it is single-use plastics or other types of bags, have an impact and cost on the environment, even biodegradable bags, because you need lots of water for production, for instance, or there will be forest destruction and greenhouse gas emissions in the process.

What we are really looking at is how we can do this in a holistic manner. In fact, a city like San Francisco, for instance, is now imposing a charge not just on single-use plastic bags, but all kinds of disposable bags, paper as well as plastics. We are monitoring this closely to see the effectiveness of the policy.

Having said that, what is important is, we need to look at our local context, to adopt a rational and discerning approach to design policies suited to our unique needs and circumstances. In Singapore, for instance, the Singapore Environment Council (SEC) study, the recent survey, has shown that two-thirds of the respondents who take single-use plastic bags from supermarkets say that they use these bags to bag and dispose their garbage. In fact, many of us stay in high-rise apartments and we use plastic bags to bag and dispose of our garbage. It has taken us many years from the 1970s to get Singaporeans to do this. It is a key way for hygienic disposal of waste. Therefore, we cannot take this for granted. We need to carefully consider how imposing a mandatory charge on single-use plastics will impact on such behaviour.

Secondly, we have proactive measures in place to tackle the harmful effects of plastics in the oceans and landfills, which are actually the subject of discussion by many other countries and internationally. We have a safe and efficient waste management and disposal system. All our plastic bags that are disposed properly will be incinerated. They do not go directly into the landfill. Even for those that may get into our waterways, we have measures in place – litter traps, for instance, and flotsam removal craft – to retrieve these bags before they go into the sea.

Notwithstanding this, we recognise that plastic waste is a key waste stream. As I have noted, we will not hesitate to implement legislation and policies where they are appropriate. So, we are bringing forward our mandatory packaging waste reporting and waste reduction plans, including for plastics, by a year.

Asst Prof Mahdev Mohan.

I thank the Senior Minister of State for a very comprehensive answer. Can I just ask a follow-up question, please?

I appreciate that the Ministry is looking at both taxes and incentives. That is what we were asking about. And we know that there are some incentives for the companies that are doing the right thing. The Senior Minister of State mentioned KFC as an example, and they have a "no straw" policy. Can I ask: would the Government Ministries and agencies be encouraged not to use single-use plastics for all the catering, for all the events that happen? Will there be something that could be introduced or encouraged within the Government, in the public-private partnerships?

Certainly, this is something that we ought to consider.

Mr Louis Ng.

I thank the Senior Minister of State for the reply. May I just confirm MEWR is going to review this plastic bag charge or is this a "case closed"?

As I have said, I think what we want to do is to adopt a holistic approach and to tackle this upstream. So, by bringing forward the mandatory reporting of packaging waste and waste reduction plans, we are working on addressing the issue of excessive consumption of disposables, not just plastics, but all kinds of disposables. Currently, we do not plan to implement a charge on single-use plastics. But we will continue to monitor the effectiveness of various policies that are implemented overseas.

37 Mr Liang Eng Hwa asked the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources (a) whether NEA can extend the deployment of surveillance cameras beyond HDB estates to high-rise private estates to carry out enforcement against high-rise littering; and (b) whether the Ministry will amend the necessary legislation to empower NEA to do so.

38 Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry asked the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources whether there are effective programmes to cultivate the habit of not littering and to dispose of waste in a proper manner like that in Japan and Taiwan.

Mr Speaker, with your permission, may I take Question Nos 37 and 38 together, please?

Yes, please.

Thank you. Singaporeans take pride in a clean and green Singapore, and most do their part to keep the environment clean. However, there is an irresponsible minority that continues to litter and disregard prevailing societal norms. To tackle such anti-social conduct, the National Environment Agency (NEA) has taken a tough stance on litterbugs. Last year, it took 32,000 enforcement actions against littering offenders.

While enforcement may serve as a deterrent, it is not the panacea. Our primary line of defence against such behaviour should be to foster collective responsibility for our environment and cultivate positive social norms and civic mindedness among our people.

To this end, NEA and various partner organisations have been conducting campaigns and programmes to promote environmental awareness and encourage greater stewardship of our common spaces. The annual Clean and Green Singapore (CGS) co-organised by NEA, the Public Utilities Board, the National Parks Board and the Community Development Councils encourages the community to play an active role in keeping Singapore clean and litter-free. There are also other initiatives, such as the Public Hygiene Council's annual Keep Clean, Singapore! campaign, which advocate the value of maintaining cleanliness beyond our own homes and fostering the habit of picking up after oneself. The month-long event held in May this year saw more than 370 organisations, including grassroots organisations, public agencies and corporations, taking part in more than 500 clean-up activities across the island. NEA has also been targeting its publicity efforts at mass events, such as the National Day Parade celebrations, to remind people to pick up after themselves. These efforts reflect the whole-of-society approach needed to keep our public spaces clean.

Our national schools have also set aside time for students to clean the common areas of their school each day, and these activities have helped to inculcate values, such as a sense of responsibility and consideration for others, as well as for the environment. By starting young, these positive habits are passed down through the generations, just like in Japan today.

To the Member's question regarding littering in high-rise estates, our approach is no different. We will continue to work with grassroots organisations and Town Councils to raise awareness about this issue amongst residents. Unlike public estates, private estates are collectively owned by their residents and public access to such estates are restricted. Home owners in private estates, therefore, have the autonomy to govern and manage the shared private spaces in a responsible manner. For this to happen, residents should come together to encourage and influence acceptable social behaviour in their communities. Many condominiums have already put in place by-laws prohibiting littering within their estates. The management committees of these private estates can work with their residents to cultivate the right behaviour accordingly.

While the Government will persist in our efforts to develop greater environmental stewardship, we cannot do this alone. I, therefore, urge everyone to play their part in keeping Singapore a clean and green city.

Mr Liang Eng Hwa.

Sir, I thank the Senior Minister of State for the information and also thank the NEA officers for the hard work, carrying out 32,000 enforcement actions last year.

The fact that NEA has committed significant resources to enforce against high-rise littering, including the deployment of surveillance cameras, rightly show that NEA and the Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources are concerned about the situation of high-rise littering in our neighbourhoods. Hence, I want to ask the Senior of Minister of State: why is there a difference in the approach and actions by NEA when it comes to enforcement actions, whether it is public housing or private housing or the Executive Condominiums (EC) and the condominiums, especially where littering does pose safety concerns?

Secondly, if the EC or the condominium managing agent were to seek help from NEA to carry out such enforcement actions, can NEA assist in those situations, especially where the littering situation is very serious and a concern for safety?

Lastly, would the Ministry keep an open mind and review the need to amend the legislation as, otherwise, NEA will have to resort to a private suit to take the culprit to task in ECs and private estates?

I thank the Member for his three questions. I would take them together. With regard to the difference in treatment, let me say that the prohibition against littering under our current law, the Environmental Public Health Act applies to publicly accessible places only. That is as defined in the Act.

Private estates, such as ECs and private strata-titled condominiums, are not regarded as such a place in law, as access to such places by the public is restricted, which I have mentioned earlier. So, our anti-littering law, therefore, does not apply to littering within these private estates, such as condominiums. And NEA is, in turn, unable to carry out enforcement against littering incidents within these private estates.

However, when a Management Corporation Strata Title (MCST) approaches NEA for assistance to tackle cases of high-rise littering, NEA will explore ways to collaborate with them, to educate and advise the residents against such anti-social acts, for instance, working with them to send out advisory notices against such anti-social acts.

But having said that, many condominiums already have by-laws that prohibit littering within their estates. The management committee of these private estates can actually work with the residents to encourage and influence the right behaviour accordingly. For private estates where access is largely restricted, in fact, to residents of family members and their friends, it will be best for residents to work together to foster collective responsibility and cultivate the right positive social norms and behaviour.

But if all else fails, the management corporation can apply to the Courts to enforce these by-laws against errant residents. While the process may be challenging, MCSTs can, nonetheless, turn to this option if all other means, like reaching out to the errant residents, fail, including even community mediation, for instance.

Amending our legislation to extend our anti-littering laws to private estates would likely illicit negative reactions, such as it being intrusive. So, we currently have no plans to amend our current legislation.

39 Mr Ang Wei Neng asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what are the estimated benefits of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) for the first three years when it is implemented; (b) which industries will benefit most from CPTPP; and (c) how will the Ministry educate and promote the benefits of CPTPP to the local companies.

Mr Speaker, the ratification and pending entry into force of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a strong affirmation of the Parties' commitment to free and open trade and a rules-based trading system. The benefits include greater business and investment opportunities. It will also enhance market access opportunities for Singapore businesses in CPTPP markets, especially Mexico and Canada, with which Singapore does not currently have bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).

For the 11 CPTPP countries as a whole, accounting for approximately 13.5% of the global economy and a market of 500 million people with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of US$10 trillion, the Agreement is expected to generate an additional S$147 billion in global income. For Singapore, total exports and GDP are each expected to increase by 0.2% by 2035 arising from the CPTPP.

Many industries and sectors will be able to benefit from CPTPP. First, Singapore-based goods producers will benefit from preferential tariffs when exporting to a CPTPP market. Processed food, textile and apparel manufacturers, in particular, will benefit from preferential tariffs under CPTPP, which will be easier to qualify under CPTPP rules, to markets, such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

Second, service providers will benefit from preferential access in a wide range of sectors. Examples include transport and distribution services in Australia, energy and telecommunications in Mexico, and professional services in Canada.

Third, investors will benefit from the removal of foreign equity restrictions that would otherwise apply in certain CPTPP markets, such as the private healthcare, telecommunications, courier, energy and environmental services sectors in Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam.

Fourth, enterprises will be able to bid for government procurement projects in Malaysia, Mexico and Vietnam, which were previously closed to foreign bidders. Beyond specific business opportunities, the value of CPTPP is in establishing a common set of enforceable rules that govern trade and investment in the 21st century. These include rules in the areas of e-commerce, innovative industries and provisions to help small and medium-sized enterprises.

The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) is working with our agencies, and the Singapore Business Federation (SBF) and other trade associations and chambers to conduct outreach sessions to our companies on how to benefit from CPTPP. Our economic agencies, including Enterprise Singapore (ESG) and the Economic Development Board (EDB), are also at hand to facilitate companies' plans to access or establish supply chains in the CPTPP markets.

Mr Ang Wei Neng. Keep it short, please.

Thank you, Speaker. I have just two short questions.

One short question. We do not have time for two. Keep it short. Just one question.

What is the timeframe for the rest of the countries to ratify CPTPP and whether the United States (US) has indicated an interest to join CPTPP?

CPTPP will come into force shortly after six countries have ratified it. So far, we have three. We are on track to see three more countries come on board by the end of this year and we should see this enter into force by the first quarter of next year. As for the US, our focus at this point in time is to get CPTPP to enter into force and, subsequently, the US can then make its decision as to whether it wishes to join.

Order. End of Question Time. Ministerial Statement, Minister for Health.

[Pursuant to Standing Order No 22(3), provided that Members had not asked for questions standing in their names to be postponed to a later Sitting day or withdrawn, written answers to questions not reached by the end of Question Time are reproduced in the Appendix.]

Mr Speaker, thank you for allowing me to make a Statement on the recent cyberattack on SingHealth’s information technology (IT) system. Several Members of Parliament have also asked about the incident, and I will address their questions in my Statement.

Sir, what we encountered was a sophisticated and unprecedented cyberattack. Personal particulars and outpatient dispensed medicines of SingHealth’s patients were accessed and copied.

Let me once again apologise to our patients for this incident. Our healthcare family’s priorities are not just to provide good patient care, but also to safeguard the confidentiality of their data.

This is a very serious cyberattack. The attacker accessed SingHealth’s system through an initial breach on a frontend workstation, circumvented the multi-layered security barriers by using advanced and sophisticated tools, and then gained access to privileged credentials to access the database. This is not the work of casual hackers or criminal gangs, but a sophisticated and resourceful attacker.

Let me provide a quick recap of the incident based on what we know thus far. On 4 July 2018, data administrators of our Integrated Health Information Systems (IHiS) detected unusual activity on one of SingHealth’s IT databases. IHiS is the technology organisation that administers the IT systems for the public healthcare sector.

The immediate priority of the team was to stop the unusual activity and block the connections to prevent further access. As a result, we prevented further loss of data and no further exfiltration has been detected since 4 July.

Concurrently, the IHiS team immediately investigated the suspicious activity to determine its nature and whether it was malicious. This process took time as our hospital systems process millions of data queries daily. There will always be a number of unusual processes that need to be investigated and most of these turned out to be legitimate activities. Furthermore, the attacker was careful to remove its traces as it worked, making investigation harder. On 10 July, IHiS confirmed from its investigations that it was a cyberattack, and informed SingHealth, the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Cyber Security Agency (CSA).

Thereafter, several streams of tasks were carried out concurrently. An interagency team, comprising MOH, IHiS, SingHealth, the Ministry of Communications and Information (MCI) and CSA, worked closely together to contain the cyberattack and undertake measures to prevent further attacks. We implemented additional containment and monitoring measures, such as restricting user access, blocking additional connections, resetting security tokens, mandating password changes for users and heightened monitoring of IT systems across our public healthcare sector. At the same time, a separate team in IHiS supported SingHealth’s efforts to assess the extent of the data affected and identify the patients these data belong to, and to plan for patient engagement to inform them of the incident.

The cyberattack has resulted in the personal particulars of one-and-a-half million SingHealth patients being accessed and copied. These included the name, National Registration Identity Card (NRIC) number, address, gender, race and date of birth. Of this, 160,000 had information on their outpatient dispensed medicines accessed. However, no phone numbers, passwords or credit card information were accessed. All records in SingHealth’s IT system remain intact and are unaltered. IHiS staff combed through detailed access logs to confirm that the databases were not tampered with. Patient care has not been compromised and services were not disrupted during the period of the cyberattack.

Despite the additional cybersecurity measures, we detected further malicious activity on our networks, but no further patient data were accessed or copied. We decided to effect Internet surfing separation for SingHealth on 19 July to minimise the risk of further intrusion and exfiltration. On 20 July, we assessed that the situation had been stabilised and informed the public of the cyberattack, even while investigations were ongoing.

Between 20 and 23 July, SingHealth sent short message service (SMS) notifications to about two million patients who visited its healthcare institutions between 1 May 2015 and 4 July 2018, to inform them whether their personal information or medication information were affected. Let me just clarify that this includes patients who visited SingHealth during this period but whose data were not affected. SingHealth also set up an online data check through the SingHealth website and Health Buddy application and expanded its call centres to attend to queries from patients. Let me just clarify that this includes patients who visited SingHealth institutions during this period, but whose data was not affected.

Many of our colleagues from the healthcare family were mobilised at short notice to help manage the situation and address patient concerns about the cyberattack. I would like to thank them for stepping up in this time of need.

Patient well-being is our top priority. This includes safeguarding the confidentiality of patient data as well as ensuring safe and effective patient care. We face the constant challenge of striking the right balance between having stronger cybersecurity safeguards, while ensuring effective and safe patient care.

To achieve this, we adopted a multi-layered approach to cybersecurity.

First, prevention. Our systems are designed with defensive measures against illegal access. For example, there are multi-layer security defences in place, both at the perimeter guarding against threats on the Internet, as well as within the perimeter to protect against unauthorised access. Vulnerability scans and tests are conducted regularly. Independent IT security audits are also carried out, with the last such audit on the affected system carried out in the second half of 2017.

Second, detection. We have monitoring tools and services to detect breaches. Our systems are also designed to provide extensive detailed activity logs for internal and external round-the-clock monitoring.

Third, response. We have established operating and technical procedures and measures to contain the impact and neutralise the threat once a breach is discovered. In the event of a breach, we will also notify and work with CSA to contain and investigate the breach. Exercises are conducted regularly to ensure staff are familiar with the procedures.

Beyond setting up a resilient system, we also need a culture of vigilance and cybersecurity awareness. This applies to our healthcare staff, as well as our IT staff. We should always adopt safe cyber practices, watch for suspicious emails and messages, and report them to our IT departments as soon as possible.

Members of Parliament have also asked about Internet surfing separation (ISS). In view of continued malicious activity that we discovered, that we observed, I decided to temporarily impose ISS for all our public healthcare systems. ISS was implemented for SingHealth since 19 July, and the National University Health System (NUHS) and National Healthcare Group (NHG) have done so since 23 July. Imposing ISS will limit avenues for attackers to enter and exit the healthcare clusters’ IT systems. However, ISS has created some inconveniences as well as operational challenges for healthcare workers and patients. We have taken precautions to ensure patient care and safety are not affected. I would like to thank our healthcare workers and patients for their understanding and support.

Could we have initiated ISS earlier? ISS is not a decision to be taken lightly. In fact, even before the incident, IHiS had been working with our clusters to study and assess the feasibility of ISS and the ways to mitigate the impact on patients and healthcare professionals. Internet access is an integral part of many of our healthcare institutions’ daily operations. They rely on the Internet to access other systems for the delivery of some healthcare services. These include receiving and reading reports from laboratories, referrals to our private sector partners, video consultation and tele-rehabilitation, as well as the payments and claims systems. We were also learning from the experiences of other countries’ healthcare IT systems and exploring alternative approaches to achieve similar protection as ISS, while minimising the impact on operations and patients.

Many healthcare systems in other countries have also found it difficult to implement ISS for practical and operational considerations. Healthcare systems, such as Hong Kong’s Hospital Authority and Kaiser Permanante have not adopted full ISS. One possible approach we are studying and piloting is the virtual browser solution. This enables users to access the Internet more safely through a set of quarantined servers. This will reduce the number of potential attack points. The virtual browser solution will be complemented by the deployment of Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) measures, which will provide additional defence against advanced cyberattacks. The deployment of ATP had been initiated before this incident and is currently underway, expected to be completed by end of this month.

Our ongoing pilot on virtual browser was scheduled to be completed by September this year. Nevertheless, given the urgency of the matter, we went ahead to implement ISS, albeit a temporary measure. To mitigate the challenges on the ground and allow the healthcare institutions to continue to operate safely, our engineers worked overnight and through the weekend to put in place temporary work-around solutions. The team continues to be on the ground to resolve the problems that have arisen as a result of ISS. Areas that have been affected include reading of diagnostic reports from laboratories, video consultation and assessment of suspected stroke patients at our emergency department. Waiting times for consultation may also be longer as doctors may need to access references on the Internet through a separate computer.

There remain some issues not yet fully resolved, such as referrals to private sector partners, and submission and retrieval of results from screening systems. These do not compromise patient care and safety, but affect the efficiency of our healthcare system.

As a result of the security measures, some patients may experience a longer wait for consultations and in receiving their test results, as well as delays in checking their MediSave accounts or making their claims. The productivity and efficiency of our services may also be affected in some areas. We would like to thank our patients for their understanding as we work through these issues on the ground.

Although I said ISS was a temporary measure, now that it has been implemented, we will study the impact of ISS on the ground and determine whether we can keep it as a permanent measure, at least for some parts of our healthcare system. We will need to develop longer-term mitigation solutions to overcome the operational issues if ISS were to stay.

Sir, the cyberattack is unprecedented. Despite our security measures, the attackers had been very patient, very persistent and very resourceful. With advanced hacking tools, they eventually succeeded in gaining access to SingHealth’s IT system. We take this seriously as there is no reason to believe that they will not try again, with even more advanced tools. Therefore, we are reviewing the cybersecurity measures of our key IT projects and strengthening them where necessary.

Members of Parliament have asked about the National Electronic Health Record (NEHR) system. The NEHR is a separate system that was not affected by this cyberattack. Due to the need for the system to interface with multiple external partners, NEHR is designed differently from the systems that were infiltrated. Nevertheless, we recognise that this is an important national system of significant scale, as it will eventually house key medical records for all patients.

We will, therefore, put NEHR through a rigorous independent external review before we proceed with the mandatory contribution of electronic health records. We have engaged CSA and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Singapore as independent third parties to help identify any vulnerabilities and recommend measures to address them. We must assure ourselves, users and patients that the necessary safeguards are in place, before we proceed with wider implementation of NEHR.

However, we should not reverse our direction in the use of technology in healthcare. Digitalisation, technology and use of data in healthcare have brought many benefits to our patients. We cannot return to the days of paper and pencil.

IT systems have allowed us to greatly improve the safety and effectiveness of patient care. During an emergency where a patient is unconscious, access to his medical history in the NEHR helps doctors prescribe more effective medication and treatment in a timely manner. Data analytics help us to better understand disease patterns and plan ahead to meet our needs in the future. Automation improves productivity, reduces human errors and enables patients to receive better care.

When patients receive care beyond the hospital, integration of IT systems allows easier referrals across settings and enables better team-based care, and more effective emergency response. These have to be matched with efforts to continually improve our ability to secure patients' data, and the increasing robustness of the systems to deal with a constantly evolving cybersecurity threat.

Given the broader national cybersecurity implications, Minister Iswaran has appointed a Committee of Inquiry (COI) to look into this incident. We will extend our full support to the work of the Committee. We look forward to its report and recommendations to further strengthen our resilience against cyberattacks.

At the same time, we will be conducting a thorough review of the robustness of the cyber safeguards of our key IT systems. We will identify potential areas for improvement in cyber threat prevention, detection and response. To do this, we will bring in third-party experts to support us in this work where necessary.

Finally, we will ensure that the lessons learnt and improvements needed are shared widely, across both the public and private healthcare systems.

We must take this cyberattack seriously. While we have implemented additional cybersecurity measures, including the ISS, we must not be complacent and assume that we are now safe from cyberattacks. Instead, we must work on the assumption that the perpetrators will continue to try with increasingly sophisticated tools and techniques and may succeed in getting through. We must all remain vigilant, learn from this and continually strengthen our systems against evolving cybersecurity threats.

The Minister for Communications and Information will be making a related Ministerial Statement. I will allow Members to raise points of clarification on both Statements after this Statement. Mr Iswaran.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, Sir. Let me start by reiterating the key facts.

First, SingHealth's IT system was the target of a deliberate and well-planned cyberattack.

Second, this attack caused the most serious breach of personal data in Singapore's experience.

Third, the personal particulars of 1.5 million patients, including the outpatient dispensed medication records of 160,000 patients, were illegally accessed and copied.

Fourth, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's records were specifically and repeatedly targeted.

SingHealth and IHiS are private companies. They are not Statutory Boards. However, their patient databases are part of our Critical Information Infrastructure (CII). A cyberattack on any CII can disrupt essential services and affect public welfare and confidence.

We have done a detailed analysis of this attack and have determined that it is the work of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group. This refers to a class of sophisticated cyberattackers, typically state-linked, who conduct extended, carefully planned cyber campaigns, to steal information or disrupt operations.

The APT group that attacked SingHealth was persistent in its efforts to penetrate and anchor itself in the network, bypass the security measures, and illegally access and exfiltrate data. The attack fits the profile of certain known APT groups. But for national security reasons, we will not be making any specific public attribution. Given the serious implications of this incident for public health and safety, I have convened a COI to get to the bottom of this incident, learn from it, and implement stronger safeguards.

We will do our utmost to strengthen our cybersecurity. But it is impossible to completely eliminate the risk of another cyberattack. This is an ongoing battle, with potential cyberattackers who are constantly developing their capabilities and seeking out new vulnerabilities.

We should not let this incident or any others like it derail our Smart Nation initiatives. In fact, we must pursue these initiatives for they will bring benefits and opportunities for Singaporeans.

What matters most is that our people and systems remain resilient, that we are able to respond swiftly and effectively to a cyberattack and that we strengthen our defences and harden our systems. I want to thank Members who have raised a range of questions on the cyberattack, our response and the COI, and I will now address them in detail.

Let me start by adding CSA's perspective to the Minister for Health's detailed account of this incident and subsequent response. On 10 July 2018, CSA was notified that an unauthorised network intrusion had occurred at SingHealth. CSA immediately deployed members of its National Incident Response Team (NIRT) to investigate the incident. The CSA team conducted forensic investigations on suspected compromised computers and supported IHiS in implementing measures to contain the attack. This included blocking unauthorised connections to prevent access by the attacker, resetting servers, enforcing mandatory password resets for all SingHealth users, heightened monitoring across all public healthcare IT systems, and implementing Internet Surfing Separation.

CSA's investigations ascertained that on 4 July, IHiS system administrators had discovered unusual activity on one of SingHealth's IT databases which triggered follow-up investigations by IHiS' IT team. CSA subsequently established that the attackers had obtained a foothold in SingHealth's network by infecting a frontend computer with malicious software, or what is called malware. The attackers had evaded detection by the SingHealth network security tools, moved stealthily through the system, eventually gained access to the database servers storing SingHealth's patient records, and copied the data to servers hosted overseas on 27 June to 4 July. No further data loss has been detected since 4 July.

Based on the logs, two types of data were illegally accessed – personal particulars, including the name, NRIC number, address, gender, race and date of birth of 1.5 million patients, and the outpatient dispensed medication records of 160,000 patients.

The attackers also repeatedly and specifically tried to steal the medical records and data of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. Prime Minister Lee's personal particulars and outpatient dispensed medication records were stolen.

However, to reinforce the point that Minister Gan Kim Yong made, no telephone numbers, passwords or credit card information were accessed or stolen. Neither were other medical records, such as diagnoses, test results or doctor's notes. They were not illegally accessed. The data that was illegally copied was not tampered with, nor was it deleted.

CSA has done a detailed analysis of the SingHealth cyberattack and has determined that it is the work of an APT group. An APT group refers to a class of sophisticated, usually state-linked cyberattackers who conduct extended and carefully planned cyber campaigns to steal information or disrupt operations. Some recent examples of cyberattacks by APT groups include the hacking of the US Democratic National Committee in 2016, and the theft of more than 20 million personnel records from the US Office of Personnel Management in 2014. Singapore has also been the target of APT attacks, such as that on the National University of Singapore (NUS) and Nanyang Technological University (NTU) last year. The cyberattack on SingHealth had characteristics that are typical of an APT attack. The attacker used advanced and sophisticated tools, including customised malware that was able to evade SingHealth's anti-virus software and security tools. After establishing a foothold in the network, the attacker took steps to remain in the system undetected before stealing the patients' information. The attack fits the profile of certain known APT groups but, as I have said earlier, for national security reasons, we will not be making any specific public attribution.

Let me now turn to the COI. Mr Speaker, may I have your permission for the distribution of the note on the COI's composition and terms of reference, please?

Yes, please. [A note was distributed to hon Members.]

As the notes are being distributed, let me summarise. The COI will establish the events and contributing factors leading to the cyberattack and the incident response. It will also recommend measures to safeguard public sector IT systems containing large databases of personal data, including those in the public healthcare clusters, against similar cyberattacks. The COI will submit its report by 31 December 2018.

The Chairman and members of the Committee have the legal, technical and operational expertise to conduct a thorough and rigorous inquiry. The Chairman, Mr Richard Magnus, was formerly the Senior District Judge, and he has chaired two other COIs before; Mr Lee Fook Sun is the former president of ST Electronics and currently Executive Chairman of Quann World, a cybersecurity company; Mr T K Udairam was formerly Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Changi General Hospital and he has decades of experience in healthcare administration; Ms Cham Hui Fong is a former Nominated Member of Parliament and Assistant Secretary General at the National Trades Union Congress.

The COI has already started its work. The Committee has had preparatory meetings and will soon hold its first pre-Inquiry conference. The Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC) will lead evidence and CSA will lead a team to conduct the investigations.

After receiving CSA's investigation report, the COI will conduct the Inquiry hearings. As some aspects of the Inquiry have security implications, the COI will decide which part of its hearings can be held in public.

Some Members have asked whether the SingHealth cyberattack could have been prevented and what are the lessons learnt. As the COI will be addressing these issues, I seek Members' understanding to allow the Committee to conduct a thorough investigation and to complete its work without pre-empting its findings.

Meanwhile, the Government has taken additional measures to strengthen our cybersecurity defences. CSA's forensic investigations team has analysed the compromised computers and extracted Indicators of Compromise. These are pieces of forensic data used to identify malicious activity on a network. CSA then instructed owners and regulators of CII to scan for these Indicators and advise on possible measures to mitigate a similar incident. CSA has also instructed CII sectors to strengthen the security around their network connectivity gateways.

In addition, the Cybersecurity Act passed by this House in February this year gives the Government additional levers to strengthen the protection of CII against cyberattacks and to respond to national cybersecurity threats and incidents. CSA is currently implementing the provisions of the Act and will designate all CII by the end of 2018.

Notwithstanding these measures, we must recognise that a balance must be struck between cybersecurity on the one hand, and operational efficiency and service quality on the other. This is a dynamic balance, one that will change as the threat landscape evolves. CSA will direct CII owners on the essential security measures they must adopt to meet a required standard. Beyond this, CSA will also render its professional advice on what CII system owners could do to further strengthen their defences. Ultimately, owners and regulators of CII are responsible for ensuring the security and uninterrupted operations of the essential services they provide.

The Government had taken the added precaution of calling for a pause in the introduction of new Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, although there was no evidence that Government ICT systems had been compromised in this cyberattack. The Smart Nation and Digital Government Group (SNDGG) was directed to review the cybersecurity measures of all existing and upcoming Government systems. SNDGG has completed its review and will implement additional security safeguards where necessary. The pause on new systems was lifted on 3 August, just Friday last week.

Cybersecurity is the foundation of our Smart Nation and Digital Government drive, and the Government is resolute in its commitment to strengthen our cyber defence, as well as our detection and response capabilities, in the face of the evolving cybersecurity threat.

All organisations – not just CII operators – should take this incident as a warning to review their cybersecurity system and ensure the protection of their IT systems and databases, including personal data.

There have been concerns that the data stolen through the SingHealth cyberattack could be used for fraudulent transactions or identity theft. I want to emphasise that there are multiple safeguards in place to mitigate such risks, especially for financial transactions and sensitive Government e-transactions.

Let me elaborate. Financial institutions generally do not rely solely on personal information, like those stolen in the SingHealth cyberattack, to verify customer identity. All banks and insurance companies in Singapore already have two-factor authentication (2FA) for online financial services, such as making fund transfers or accessing account details. To log in, the account holder has to input his/her Personal Identification Number (PIN) and a one-time-password (OTP), received via SMS or the bank’s authentication token. An additional authentication layer – commonly known as "transaction signing" – protects higher-risk transactions, such as adding a third party payee or transferring large sums of money. Unless the attacker has access to all authentication information, it would not be possible for fraudulent transactions or identity theft to occur.

To address any residual risk, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has directed all financial institutions to take further measures, as announced in its press statement on 24 July.

Similarly, since July 2016, all sensitive Government e-transactions have been protected by SingPass 2FA. The account holder would need to input his/her SingPass username and password, and an OTP. Since the SingHealth cyberattack, agencies have taken further measures, such as heightened monitoring of their IT systems, and strengthening of the identity authentication process.

Individuals can also do their part by practising good personal data protection and cybersecurity habits. They should ensure that their passwords, user IDs and security questions are not based on personal data, use strong passwords, enable 2FA for online transactions, and watch out for fraudulent transactions and suspicious requests for personal data. SingCERT has published online the precautions that individuals can take in view of the SingHealth incident. Individuals may also contact SingCERT to report a cybersecurity incident, and the Personal Data Protection Commission to lodge reports of personal data breaches under the Personal Data Protection Act.

Mr Speaker, to conclude, I would like to emphasise that this was a well-planned and targeted cyberattack by an APT group. We will get to the bottom of this incident, learn from it and further strengthen Government IT systems. But I caution the House: we cannot completely eliminate the risk of another cyberattack breaking through our defences.

Ensuring cybersecurity is a ceaseless battle, like our battle against terrorism. It involves changing technology and sophisticated perpetrators who are constantly developing new techniques and probing for fresh weaknesses. Therefore, even as we do our best to strengthen our IT systems, it is crucial that our people and systems remain resilient, that we are able to respond robustly and decisively to an incident, and that we constantly learn and reinforce our system.

Despite this incident, or any others like it, we must press on with our plans for a Smart Nation, after learning and applying the lessons from this incident. We must adapt ourselves to operate effectively and securely in the digital age, to deliver better public services, enhance our economic competitiveness, and create good jobs and opportunities for Singaporeans.

The Government takes with utmost seriousness its responsibility of ensuring the security of public sector IT systems and databases. We will learn from this cyberattack, implement measures to better secure our IT systems and databases, and uphold public trust in our systems.

Dr Chia Shi-Lu.

I thank both Ministers for their comprehensive Statements. We have been talking about cyberattack but, practically, this has been more a case of cyber snooping or cyber theft rather than an attack, which brings me to my main question: how sure are we that no malicious malware still remains in the systems? I think we have been lucky in the sense that the systems have not been disrupted in terms of patients' safety or care. But as I understand it – correct me if I am wrong – with this APT type of attacks, a lot of these initial attacks are meant to demonstrate that they can actually invade the systems, but the ultimate goal may be to be able to plant some malware that can disrupt our systems when the time comes. That was my main question: how sure are we that no malicious software remains in the systems, given that the databases is a very large and complex system.

Speaker, I thank the Member for his question. First, I do not think we should speculate on the motives of the attacker. I think it does not detract from the fact that this is an illegal criminal act and we have the responsibility to get to the bottom of it.

Having said that, can we be sure that there is no remnant malicious malware in the system? As I had said earlier, our agencies –CSA working with their counterparts in IHiS and SingHealth – have done everything they can to secure the system and to detect and eliminate the risk. In fact, as we also elaborated, even as we were doing the work to contain the challenge, as late as on 19 July, there was evidence of some residual risk which had to be dealt with. At midnight on 19 July, Internet Surfing separation was then imposed.

The short answer is that we have done everything in our means to secure the system, to detect any residual risk and eliminate it. But as I have said several times in the course of my Statement, one can never be sure that we have fully eliminated that risk.

Ms Joan Pereira.

I thank the Ministers for their Statements. Since the cyberattack, a few of my elderly residents came to see me and told me that they worry that their medication records will be altered. How can we help our people, especially our elderly residents, to better understand our cybersecurity matters and even measures that will be taken?

Mr Speaker, Sir, as I explained in my speech, IHiS, together with CSA, has gone through our detailed access logs to ensure that the data has not been altered. But we understand that patients will still be anxious and want to know more about this incident, and how they can protect themselves, and what implication there is for them. I encourage them to contact SingHealth which will then follow up with more detailed explanation specifically to the affected patients. There is a hotline that they can call, and the number is 6326 5555. If they want to have more details, please contact SingHealth and our people, our hotline operators, are trained to answer their questions and to help them clarify any doubts or anxiety that they may have with regard to their medication information.

Ms Sylvia Lim.

Speaker, I have two clarifications. I have actually filed a question to the Minister for Health to ask if the Government could elaborate on the reasons for the several days of delay between the time that the attack was confirmed and the time that the public was made aware of it. According to the timeline released by the Government, it was confirmed on 10 July that a cyberattack had indeed taken place and, two days later, in fact, a Police report was lodged. But the public only got to know about this attack on 20 July. I would like to ask the Minister to elaborate on the reasons why the public was not made aware earlier because they could have taken some steps, for example, to change their passwords or protect their information.

Second question is also for the Minister for Health. During the first press conference on 20 July, we noted that the Minister apologised for the incident. But we are hearing today, really, that the CIIs are responsible for safeguarding the data on the systems. So, is there any significance as to why it was not SingHealth that apologised but rather the Minister who apologised?

I will first clarify the second question. I think SingHealth, during the press conference, had also apologised, probably it was not carried in the media. But they did apologise to the patients for the incident as well as the inconvenience that has been created. Anyway, my apology is on behalf of the entire healthcare family. I take it that, ultimately, I will have to apologise to the patients who are affected.

On the first question on the time between 10 July when we confirmed that it was a cyberattack and 20 July when we had a press conference and informed the public, I explained in my Statement that between 10 and 20 July, many things were happening and there were multiple streams of work that were carrying on at the same time. Our priority at that time was to ensure that our system was protected, our data would not be subject to further exfiltration. That took a while because, first, they had to trace back where the sources of attack came from, so that the Cyber Security staff would know where and how to protect the database. We also need to investigate to determine whether or not there were additional data that were compromised beyond what we already knew.

So, the first stream of investigation was to focus on protecting the data. The second stream of work was on investigation of the incident to trace back to see how it started, so that we were confident that this was the only attack that we were experiencing. The third stream was to identify what were the data that were compromised and who were the patients that were affected, so that we could pave the way to inform them. Therefore, the third stream was very important as well.

At the same time, SingHealth also started to prepare to inform the patients, and all these will require time. In the meantime, we also had to make sure that there were no further attacks on the system. As we mentioned earlier, as late as 19 July, there was still malicious activity in the data system. That is why we had to impose ISS on 19 July evening, so that on 20 July, when we disclosed to the public, we were quite confident that the system had been stabilised. At the same time, we have sufficient information to share with the public on how the incident happened, what were the data that were compromised, and who were the patients that were affected.

All these require time to prepare. And it is important for us to ensure that our information given to the public is accurate as far as we are able to ascertain.

Ms Denise Phua.

I thank the Minister for apologising and, in fact, not denying or defending the positions. So, thank you very much for that.

My second point is that cyberattacks, such as these, are actually, to me, a new form of terrorism that calls for the same, if not, more of the resources and attention that are given to, for example, physical terrorism by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). There is a lot of public education. I can still remember it is run-hide-tell, and many of these are things that were done to ensure that we are very cognisant of physical terrorism. So, for cyber terrorism, it is all the more important.

In view that Minister Iswaran has said that the Smart Nation plans will press on for various reasons, what is the Government's plan in terms of added resources and also acquisition of cybersecurity expertise, for example? We know that nation-wide, there is a shortage of such cybersecurity expertise. And so, what are we going to do about it to ensure that we are protected in the long term as we proceed with our Smart Nation plans?

Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for her clarification. The Member is absolutely right. We should be very clear that our challenges with cybersecurity are in no way different from our challenges with terrorism. We have raised our awareness about terrorism. We have a systematic effort for that. But when it comes to cybersecurity and defences, perhaps the level of awareness is not as palpable. The reason is probably also because many of us, all of us, use digital devices as part and parcel of everyday life and we do not pause to think sometimes what the implications are of having this hyper-connectivity and the kind of data that flows through our devices and the connections that we have with the Internet and the wider Internet community.

So, in terms of the specific question, what are we doing? First, we have to use this opportunity to reinforce the message and the importance of cybersecurity to the general public and the measures that they can take at a personal level, which is what we have just outlined, but also to organisations, public and private organisations, because often the investment in cybersecurity is seen as a cost, without an obvious payoff and value. This sort of instances helps to crystallise why cybersecurity must be taken seriously at the top management level, and you put in place systems and make the judgement in terms of what kind of resources should be allocated for this.

As far as the Government itself is concerned, we are very clear that we have to continue to invest in our ability and capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to any kind of cyberattack. As I said earlier, the reality is that this is going to be a ceaseless battle because the perpetrators or the potential perpetrators are constantly developing their own capabilities. So, we have to also ensure that we are able to do so. This is why we are investing in cybersecurity, not only in terms of building our capabilities within CSA, but also in the broader system. We have many efforts in the broader ecosystem – the ICT ecosystem – and cybersecurity is one of the focal points for that.

And the final point I would make is that as part of our overall defence, if you will, cyber defence, this is not just a battle we fight alone. We have allies from around the world. All of them face similar challenges, they are all investing in their capabilities, and the cooperation with our allies helps to strengthen our own capabilities in resisting such attacks.

Assoc Prof Daniel Goh.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Ministers. I have one clarification for Minister Iswaran and one for Minister Gan. For Minister Iswaran, will the Ministry be investigating whether there is any negligence on the part of SingHealth in meeting the standards of proactively protecting the CII under the Cyber Security Act? And for Minister Gan, the Minister mentioned that the permanent ISS may be implemented for parts of the healthcare system. Can the Minister elaborate which part of the system is likely to face the permanent ISS and, given that this attack happened at a frontline workstation, would this actually mean most of the healthcare systems face a risk?

Mr Speaker, the COI has been asked, as elaborated in the Terms of Reference, to study what were the factors that led to the incident and how were the relevant players involved in the response, in order to derive the lessons that can be used and applied in the context of our public sector ICT systems and databases and also specifically for the health system.

In that process, I imagine that they would be looking at what could have been done, what should have been done and then, make their recommendations accordingly. I would urge Members to refrain from going down the path of allocating blame at this stage. Our resolute focus should be on ensuring that the system in SingHealth is secure and patient data is protected. And for this, we need all parties who are involved to be working together in order to achieve that objective. The COI will conduct its due process and, when we have the outcome of that and we know the recommendations and findings, then we can take appropriate action.

Sir, let me, first, respond to the second part of Assoc Prof Daniel Goh's question on which part of the system should be continued with ISS and which one should be exempted from ISS. It is still early days. I would not want to pre-empt the decision. IHiS, together with SingHealth and the clusters, are reviewing and we have also just implemented ISS. We really want to understand the impact on the ground and assess which are the parts that really can continue with the ISS and which are the portions of the healthcare system that actually ISS is not practical and could affect patient care in the long term.

So, just to explain, today, whilst we have introduced ISS, there are a number of workaround solutions which the IHiS team has been working with our clusters on the ground to help our doctors and patients to ensure that the system will continue. But some of these workaround solutions are not sustainable in the long term because they are basically workarounds. And, therefore, we will have to look at whether there are practical, long-term solutions for some of these workarounds. In areas where it is not possible and there may be alternative safeguards that will be able to provide added protection but not necessarily ISS, those are the alternatives that we could consider. One example I mentioned earlier in my Statement was a virtual browser solution, together with Advanced Threat Protection measures. Taken together, they will provide significant protection without having to resort to ISS.

I would imagine that in a healthcare system where care is quite closely linked to Internet access in some areas, for example, emergency departments and so on, it may be critical, and these are the areas which are more likely to be given certain rights for Internet access. And even with Internet access, there are ways to protect against our core database system. For example, you could designate specific servers that they have access to and denied access to other servers that are not related.

I do not want to go into too much detail because these also have implications on our security measures. Suffice to say that I do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the review. We give the Committee and the team time to look at the system and to review the implementation of ISS on the ground today. And from the experience of ISS, we can then make an informed assessment of which are the parts that should continue with ISS and which are the parts we should maybe refer to alternative solutions.

Mr Saktiandi Supaat.

Mr Speaker, I would like to thank the Ministers for answering the questions and, in particular, allaying concerns about the impact of financial liabilities, especially to residents. I just have one question. In relation to the COI's Terms of Reference No 5, I noticed that the focus is largely on public sector IT systems. I am aware that the COI's Terms of Reference are, in particular, on public health data. Can the Minister for Communications and Information probably share a bit more about the private sector IT systems and, in particular, whether there are any public sector databases which potentially have systemic risk impact on Singapore and Singaporeans in particular? Maybe the Minister can share a bit more on that, in particular, for example, telecommunications companies, banks and private hospitals, and what is the plan, strategically, for CSA to address some of these issues.

I thank the Member for the clarification. First, we have to be clear. The COI's Terms of Reference have been scoped to focus on this incident because if we scope it too wide, then you will lose the value of setting up such a Committee, which is really to go deep, understand what the issues were and then to come up with valuable insights and recommendations which we can apply across the public sector and, specifically, in the healthcare system.

The Member then asked whether there are issues around databases and IT systems that reside outside the public sector. Sir, I want to bring Members back to the point I made earlier, which is that the CSA will be designating computer systems in 11 sectors as CIIs. Some of these sectors the Member highlighted are banking, telecommunications. There are others like energy, water and so on.

And each of these sectors has computer systems that may be within the public sector or in the private sector, but by virtue of the functions they perform, the databases they hold, they are deemed to be CIIs and, therefore, they will be designated and governed as such by CSA, by the rules and provisions under the Cyber Security Act.

And that is where, as I mentioned in my earlier Statement, CSA will ensure that there are certain minimum requirements that are implemented. But beyond that, there may also be certain advisory guidelines on what else they can do to further strengthen cybersecurity. But ultimately, the regulators and owners of those CIIs will have to make the judgement call and be accountable for the uninterrupted essential services they provide.

On the point of the private sector, what we learned from this incident will be shared. We have various platforms to do that in because there are, generally, various education sessions that Government agencies conduct to heighten awareness of cybersecurity and the measures that can be taken. We also have the frameworks of the Personal Data Protection Act and the Personal Data Protection Commission which are actively involved not just in following up on complaints or reports of personal data breaches but also in terms of raising awareness and education and sharing best practices, so that the general private sector can also continue to harden itself against cyberattacks.

Mr Low Thia Khiang.

Sir, Minister Iswaran, in his Statement, mentioned twice that this attack is state-linked, which means I take it that it is not a normal kind of cyberattack and Singapore is being targeted by another state and thereby this attack is state-linked. If that is the case, then may I know whether the Government knows which state is behind the attack or is linked to this attack? And, if so, whether or not the Government is prepared to share the knowledge with Singaporeans on which state is carrying out such an attack on us. In the details, Minister Iswaran mentioned that the attack was conducted by a professional group, APT Group. Does the Government or CSA in its investigations, know what is the name of the Group and where this Group has launched the attack from? And the Minister also mentioned that data was copied to another server. So, may we know where is the server sited?

Mr Speaker, let me state it for the third time for the Member's reference. The attack fits the profile of certain known APT groups, but, for national security reasons, we will not be making any specific public attribution.

The Member asked whether we are prepared to share the names, if we know specifically who, and whether we are able to then share that. I would put to the Member that, first, I have explained why we have a larger set of concerns around this matter. Secondly, in this sort of matter, whilst one can have a high level of technical confidence, one may not be able to have the certainty that you might need in order to specifically assign responsibility. And this is the kind of evidentiary threshold that may not stand up in a Court of law but, at the operational level, the agencies that are involved have a high level of confidence in their findings.

Having said that, we do not think it serves our national interest, nor is it a productive exercise for us to be making specific public attribution. What is essential is that we diagnose the problem clearly and take the appropriate steps. And if, in the process of the COI deliberations, specific attribution can be made in a manner where action can subsequently be taken up in a Court of law, we will certainly consider that course of action.

Er Dr Lee Bee Wah.

Sir, I have one question for Minister Iswaran. Many of my residents expressed concern when they heard that their personal details had been stolen, especially of NRIC. They are very worried and they do not know how this data will be used later on. I would like to ask the Minister: what more can the Government do to address the concerns of those whose details had been stolen?

And there are some suggestions whether an SMS alert can be sent to them if, let us say, their NRIC details were being used, for example, to open certain accounts or be involved in certain financial transaction.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for her question which I think is a genuine true reflection of some of the concerns on the ground. That is why, in my Statement, I try to explain why Singaporeans in general and elderly residents, in particular, can draw some comfort from the fact that transactions that involve banks, financial institutions and those involved in sensitive Government e-transactions all have 2FAs. So, it is not just about the ID, although in some cases, and I think, in many cases, the IC number is used as the ID. And this might be an opportunity for us to review that and see whether we can use other IDs which are more robust. And then, in addition to ID, you need the password as well as the one-time password.

So, what we can explain to our residents in general is that the system that is in place is a secure one. But what might be prudent for them to do is, where they have got accounts, where they have already set them up and they have used their IC number particularly as an ID, or in some cases, people even use their NRIC as the password, they should reset and ensure that they have thoroughly reviewed this kind of exposure.

On the point the Member made about alerting them to any other kind of activity which can have financial implications, typically, in all of these transactions, you would have to not just put in your IC number or name. If you are going to, for example, buy something online, you need either credit card data or some other kind of financial information. That information has not been taken in this instance and, therefore, that link is broken. Hence, the consumers and the general residents can be comforted by that. But we should not get complacent and we should review this. And where they have got some accounts, it is well worth using this opportunity to look at resetting passwords.

Mr Vikram Nair.

I believe Minister Iswaran mentioned that this has many analogies to a terror attack. And certainly, in dealing with the terrorists, the Government does have powers, for example, under the Internal Security Act, to investigate and detain without evidence that would stand up in a Court of law. And the national security reason is why you would not want to put it in the Court of law. Does the Minister think we need similar frameworks to deal with cyber threats?

I thank the Member for the question. I think our existing legislative framework provides us with sufficient scope, because if you can demonstrate and prove a criminal act, then you can take action under the Penal Code or appropriate legislation. If we can find a specific actor or individual who has posed a threat to our national security, then we also have legislation that allows us to take action against such individuals. So, the legislative levers are adequate. But this is a domain where the nature of the crime and specific attribution can be quite challenging at times.

Mr Leon Perera.

I thank the Ministers for their Statements. Just one supplementary question for Minister Iswaran. After the conclusion of the COI process, will MCI or other relevant authorities attempt to reach out to cybersecurity and IT professionals across the whole-of-Government and, indeed, in the private sector, to apprise them of some of the findings, to educate them maybe about the signatures of some of these groups that have made the attacks so that they can be better alerted to detect and pre-empt them, and also educate them on some of the preventive measures that they should undertake, drawing on the learnings from not just this attack, but perhaps the one at NUS and NTU as well that happened previously?

The answer is certainly yes. In fact, that is the objective of the exercise. We want to make sure that whatever the findings are, we are able to extract the lessons and recommendations which can then be used not just within the public sector or within the CII sectors but for other private sector operators because there is a general concern about security.

But the qualifier I will make is that what we can share is constrained by the considerations I had pointed out earlier. Secondly, it is also about having a risk-adjusted approach because, in certain types of companies and certain types of operations, their risk profiles are different and are at a lesser level and, therefore, they may not need to do everything. But they do need to take up certain basic measures for cybersecurity purposes. So, it has been a differentiated approach. But the larger point about drawing lessons which can then be shared, this is something that we certainly intend to do.

Mr Chong Kee Hiong.

As IT talents are global and, as part of our cyber defence, I would like to ask the Minister if the Singapore Government Ministries, Organs of State and Statutory Boards and agencies have in place bug bounty programmes to tap upon the global expertise of white hats or ethical computer hackers, and if the compensations for their effort and time are globally competitive.

I understand where the Member is coming from. Let me say this: we are aware of the range of possible ways to harness talent, and we have to use them in a judicious way in order to ensure that we have our fair share of the talent that is needed for the kind of challenges that we face.

Mr Cedric Foo.

My question is for the Minister for Communications and Information. While we regret this incident in SingHealth, can the Minister enlighten us whether other countries are also victims of cyberattacks? Secondly, can the Minister confirm that, apart from the COI, there is also a Police report that is lodged, and what is the purpose of that Police report? Is it to see if any crimes have been committed?

I thank the Member for the questions. First, have other countries been victims of cyberattacks? In my Statement, I highlighted a couple, both of which are in the context of the US. But there have also been other incidents in Europe. And I think many of these may not even be reported in the public domain, but we know that they are occurring. So, the truth of the matter is that this is a universal challenge; we are not an exception. In fact, every country is facing this challenge and the greater their connectivity and the use of digital technologies, the greater their challenge as well. So, that is an important point that all of us need to understand and appreciate.

The second point is on the contemporaneous Police investigation. So, the COI is doing its work. It will be aided by CSA, which leads a team of investigators, and they will also have the AGC leading evidence. The Police report was lodged because there was suspicion of a crime being committed. And so, the Police will investigate this incident in that context. But the Police will also take reference from any deliberations that take place in the COI.

And I would add that there is a third stream, because there was also a report lodged with the Personal Data Protection Commission. And they, too, are conducting their own investigations. And again, they too, will take reference from what is being conducted within the COI hearing process as well.

I will take one last question. Mr Liang Eng Hwa.

This question is for Minister Iswaran. My sense, after hearing what the Minister said in the Statement, is that we are really at the mercy of these state-linked cyberattackers, almost to operate on their terms. So, I want to ask the Minister whether besides the defensive measures that we take, are there any counter-offensive measures that we can also take as part of cybersecurity strategy so that we can not only defend but also deter such attacks.

Let me say this. First of all, I think we should not create the impression that we are helpless or that we are at the mercy of these potential perpetrators. If that was the case, then why have this strong robust response? Because we have conviction that we can deter, and we have the capability. And where we do not, we will build it, and we will find ways to strengthen our systems so that we can resist such attacks.

And as far as this effort is concerned, it is also important that even as we do this, it is important that, psychologically, not just this House, but Singaporeans at large, understand that it cannot be foolproof. And so, we must have that resilience that when it happens, we will pick ourselves up again and we will learn from it, grow stronger and we will carry on. I think that is the most important aspect of the way we can deter such attacks.

Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting. I will take the Chair at 4.35 pm. Order. Order.

Sitting accordingly suspended

at 4.14 pm until 4.35 pm.

Sitting resumed at 4.35 pm.

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

Mr Speaker, thank you for allowing me to make this Statement. In May this year, I informed the House that a Committee of Inquiry (COI) would be convened to investigate the death of full-time National Serviceman Corporal (First Class) (CFC) Dave Lee that occurred on 30 April 2018. The COI has submitted its preliminary findings to the Armed Forces Council on 16 July this year and I would like to update this House on their findings, as well as follow-up actions taken by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) since May.

Under the SAF Act, the COI is structured primarily to investigate and determine facts related to the incident and to identify causation, lapses and systemic problems, if any, which resulted in the incident. The COI does not deal with culpability of individuals. Specifically, to encourage disclosure and cooperation by all involved in the incident, section 8C of the SAF Act provides that no statements made to the COI shall be admissible as evidence in a Court Martial or for disciplinary proceedings. To keep to this remit, I will, therefore, use no names nor designations in this Statement but instead use a generic term – commander/s or person/s, as appropriate.

As I mentioned in May to this House, Police investigations are ongoing and the Coroner may hold an inquiry. Their procedures and evidence uncovered are part of the judicial process to determine if any criminal offence has been committed in this incident and are separate from the COI.

In May, I had also informed this House that the COI would submit its report to the External Review Panel on SAF Safety (ERPSS). The COI has done so for their preliminary assessment and I will also be sharing the ERPSS' responses and recommendations.

Let me start with events that occurred the day before the heat stroke occurred. On 17 April this year, CFC Dave Lee and the troopers from the Support Company participated in two physical training sessions in Bedok Camp, namely, Combat Circuit 4 from 6.30 am to 7.30 am at the hockey pitch, and Cardiovascular 6, followed by Balance, Flexibility and Mobility 6 from 3.30 pm to 5.30 pm at the running track. This was a day before the heat stroke.

The COI found the training for Combat Circuit 4 to be compliant with regulations or guidelines.

However, the COI did discover breaches of the Army's Training Safety Regulations (TSR) for Cardiovascular 6 and breaches of the Army's directive for another subsequent event that took place later that day.

Let me, first, deal with Cardiovascular 6. In this lesson, soldiers had to run six laps of 400 metres each, a total of 2.4 kilometres (km). They have to run according to the lesson plan, grouped according to their running ability. However, the entire company was asked to run at a common pace. This meant that, for the first three laps, CFC Lee was asked to run at a slightly faster pace than required, of about 10 seconds faster per lap. For the next three laps, CFC Lee was allowed to run at his own pace. The rest timing in between each lap was noted to be reduced to one minute, which is 45 seconds shorter than what was stipulated in the lesson plan. These deviations were a breach of Training Safety Regulations. The reason given was that the commanders wanted to enhance fitness and foster greater cohesion by keeping the platoon intact, and the soldiers running at the same pace, not in groups.

Later that night, before the fast march the next day, the collective punishment that was meted out to CFC Lee's platoon was also not authorised.

At about 9.40 pm, the entire Scout Platoon, including CFC Lee, were told to fall-in in their No 4 uniforms and assault bags. The commander/s had wanted to punish the platoon collectively for the perceived lack of teamwork and the use of mobile phones after Lights Out, in particular, by two troopers, despite repeated warnings. At 9.45 pm, the commander/s meted out the informal punishment. This was in the form of physical exercises, which comprised Bear Crawls, Sprints, Leopard Crawls, as well as Push-Ups and Crunches. In total, it was from 30 to 35 minutes. They also had water poured over the troopers from their water bottles and subsequently from the jerry can. The session ended with the troopers reciting the Guards Creed a few times in a high kneel position. As I have said, the entire session lasted for about 30 to 35 minutes. The platoon was eventually sent back to their bunks at about 10.25 pm to wash up and had Lights Out by 10.45 pm. The troopers were also instructed by commanders not to switch on the lights in their bunks. The COI noted that the commanders did not seek prior approval for the conduct of this informal punishment or inform their superiors after the punishment.

While the majority of the troopers interviewed opined that the commanders were good commanders who demanded high standards, this punishment was unauthorised.

The COI found that the conduct of unauthorised informal punishment compromised the seven hours of uninterrupted rest as the trainees had about six hours 15 minutes instead. Less sleep could be one of the factors which caused CFC Lee to have more fatigue before participating in the fast march.

Let me move on to the day of the heat stroke. The COI's assessment was that the conduct of the fast march was in line with the lesson plan and relevant regulations. CFC Lee had undergone the requisite build-up training prior to the eight-km fast march, and all measures to prevent heat injuries according to the TSR had been complied with – which are temperature-taking regime, hydration regime, water supply where soldiers must carry water and have resupply points planned for, work-rest cycle based on the Wet Bulb Globe Temperature, and rest management, except that CFC Lee and his platoon did not have the requisite seven hours of sleep that I have just mentioned.

Before the fast march, CFC Lee had taken his temperature, which was normal at 36.3°C, and had drunk water. This was witnessed by his buddy, who also observed him to be looking well and seemed to be his usual self. CFC Lee and his fellow scout troopers then consumed their Recommended Dietary Allowance, which consisted of an oatmeal cracker and chrysanthemum drink.

Thereafter, the safety brief was conducted by the Conducting Officer. Troopers were asked if they had completed their six-km fast march build-up training, completed their water parade, and had seven hours of uninterrupted rest, and taken their body temperature during the declaration. The troops were asked to declare if they had. The Conducting Officer had checked if there was anyone who was not feeling well. Three troopers stood out as they had not completed their six-km fast march and were subsequently deployed as marshals. No one else sounded off any other concerns when the checks were made. This was followed by the conduct of warm-up exercises to get the troopers ready for the eight-km fast march.

After the conduct of warm-up exercises, the fast march commenced just before sunrise with the troopers despatched in four waves, at five-minute intervals. Each wave included a commander as a rear sweeper. CFC Lee was in the fourth wave – the last wave.

After CFC Lee completed the first six km, he had a mandated 20-minute rest. After the 20-minute rest period, as CFC Lee was moving off for the last two km, he sounded off to the commanders that he had cramps in his calf muscles. They advised him to stretch his calf muscles, which he did, and encouraged him to complete the march.

CFC Lee was the last one to complete the eight-km fast march in around 100 minutes, including the 20-minute break. Shortly after the fast march, as CFC Lee was walking from the end point of the fast march to the Support Company line, he was observed to be disoriented and immediately attended to by the commander/s and the cover medic/s.

Let me now state the findings at the completion of the eight-km fast march.

After the fast march, the persons attending to CFC Lee thought that he was suffering from physical exhaustion. His pulse was assessed to be normal and his skin felt cold to touch. His temperature was not taken. The first aid that was administered comprised the removal of CFC Lee’s equipment, unbuttoning his uniform, applying ice packs at his vital points, pouring water on him and giving him water. He was also given oxygen. However, the COI noted that the onsite cooling measures administered were inadequate, including the failure to administer an onsite intravenous (IV) drip, the improper placement of ice packs and the improper use of a ground sheet. When his condition did not improve, CFC Lee was subsequently evacuated to the medical centre. However, there was a significant gap between the onset of symptoms and his arrival at the medical centre.

On arrival at the Bedok Camp Medical Centre, CFC Lee was semi-conscious. His temperature taken measured 42.7o Celsius (C). Two bags of fast IV drip were administered and he was also placed in the Body Cooling Unit, for two cycles. Seeing that CFC Lee was not responding to the treatment, the Medical Officer decided to evacuate him to the Changi General Hospital.

The Medical Officer accompanied CFC Lee in the SAF ambulance to Changi General Hospital’s Accident and Emergency (A&E) department where he was handed over and admitted to the Intensive Care Unit. Unfortunately, his condition deteriorated and he passed away on 30 April 2018. This was 12 days later.

The COI opined that the significant delay from the time of symptoms to evacuation could have escalated the heat injury to a heat stroke. Full body cooling should have been instituted as soon as possible and within 30 minutes of presentation of signs and symptoms.

The delay in evacuation resulted as the persons attending to CFC Lee mistook his signs and symptoms as being due to physical exhaustion. Though trained, they had never encountered any previous case of heat injury themselves.

There were several suggestions for CFC Lee to be evacuated, but these calls were either not heard or not heeded.

For completeness, let me share the COI’s finding on one other aspect, which is CFC Lee’s state of health prior to the fast march. While CFC Lee had no significant medical history, it was established that he had been taking some medication in the weeks prior to the fast march following a visit to the Jurong Polyclinic on 31 March 2018 for acute upper respiratory tract infection. This was more than two weeks before the fast march on 18 April.

Let me conclude with the COI’s preliminary assessment on the cause of death. The COI found that CFC Lee’s death was the result of heat stroke leading to multiple organ injury. Other than this, the COI did not find any physical injury sustained, as verified by the autopsy, nor any evidence indicating any foul play or medical negligence that caused his death. While the COI was unable to ascertain the direct causes which led CFC Lee to suffer from his heat stroke, it noted that possible contributing causes were accumulated fatigue, insufficient rest, CFC Lee’s less than optimal state of health and his potential use of medication. However, the COI’s preliminary assessment was that the likely reasons for CFC Lee succumbing to the heat stroke were inadequate onsite casualty management and delayed evacuation to the medical centre.

The Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) will await the outcome of the Police investigations and Coroner’s Inquiry, as well as the Attorney-General’s Chambers' decision whether to prosecute any persons in the criminal Court. If no criminal charges are filed, MINDEF will prosecute persons responsible for lapses in this incident in our military Court. In the meantime, the relevant persons in this incident had been removed from command.

Let me share the findings of the External Review Panel. With your permission, Mr Speaker, may I ask the Clerks to distribute a copy of the ERPSS’ statement?

Please do. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members.]

First, the ERPSS agreed with the COI’s preliminary assessment on the cause of death, as earlier stated.

Second, the panel emphasised that it is essential for personnel to comply with safety rules promulgated in the approved operating manuals. Breaches, such as those found by the COI in this case, should not be condoned.

Third, the ERPSS highlighted the value of strengthening the safety culture in Army units. They felt that if each soldier takes greater personal ownership and responsibility for safety, it would bring about desirable behaviours, such as (a) having a strong respect for safety rules and guidelines; (b) being willing to speak out when there are safety concerns; (c) taking care of one another; and (d) open-reporting, so as to share lessons and prevent future accidents. Such behaviours would substantially strengthen the Army’s efforts to ensure safe training.

Finally, the ERPSS flagged out three areas for further emphasis based on the COI’s findings. First, the need to strengthen commanders’ knowledge on heat injuries and improve their decision-making processes. Second, for medics to be able to exercise their professional authority when dealing with medical issues. This includes being able to communicate effectively with commanders who are much more senior than them. Third, for commanders to watch out for soldiers who are feeling unwell or are unable to cope and proactively pull them out of training before they get injured.

The COI will submit its final report after completion of the Police investigations and Coroner’s Inquiry, if held.

Let me now focus on what the SAF has done or will put in place to reduce the risks of heat injuries so that we can achieve zero training fatalities. Training and safety protocols were reviewed and advised by an External Review Panel on Heat Injury Management (ERPHIM). This was chaired by Assoc Prof Mark Leong, who is a senior consultant at the Department of Emergency Medicine at the Singapore General Hospital (SGH). The following changes will be put into place.

First, a simplified protocol to lower the bar for immediate evacuation. Under this protocol, all commanders and medics across the SAF will evacuate every trainee that cannot respond to simple questions on time, place and identity. The intent is obvious. This takes the guesswork out of the assessment and what the reason is, as this case showed, and imposes early evacuation as the default, as a strict Training Safety Regulation to be followed. This Training Safety Regulation is effective immediately.

Second, additional methods to cool servicemen during training. For example, the Army will implement what is called the Arm Immersion Cooling System – you immerse your arms – and this has been used in the United States (US) and Australian militaries to reduce heat injury for all fast marches and route marches that are 12 km and longer. Portable cooling methods, such as purpose-built cooling pads, will now replace less effective ice packs, to be used on the spot. These will be implemented in phases, starting from this month.

Third, there had been suggestions for wearables. The expert opinion of this Expert Review Panel on Heat Injuries is that those currently available in the market are not effective for measuring core temperature.

Fourth, the Army will ensure that our commanders and soldiers can better recognise the signs and symptoms of heat injuries. Lesson plans on safety will be improved and the annual Training Safety Regulation test will also include mandatory questions on heat injury prevention and management.

Fifth, the importance of open reporting will be emphasised. Soldiers will be encouraged to use the Hotline to report any unauthorised activities or violations of rules, especially during Basic Military Training phase and reinforced during In-Camp Training.

Sixth, more opportunities for make-up training. The Army will encourage our soldiers not to push themselves beyond safety limits. If a soldier feels that he is unwell during any training activity, or if the buddy notices it, soldiers will be reminded to err on the side of caution, to stop and make up training another day.

Seventh, more clinical exposure and patient contacts for medics to upgrade their skills in resuscitation and handling of emergencies. This may include periodic attachments to hospitals, A&E departments or to run in ambulances.

Mr Speaker, we need a strong SAF that can defend Singapore, but it must and can be built up without compromising the safety and well-being of Singapore’s precious sons serving their National Service. CFC Lee was an exemplary soldier who served with commitment, and was well-respected by his peers for his positive attitude. The loss of such a good soldier like CFC Lee is deeply grievous to us. It will take collective effort to achieve zero training fatalities. Each serviceman must take care of himself or sound the alert when his buddy is not well, or if regulations are not complied with during training. Commanders must be alert and pull out early those who are not coping and use another occasion to train.

Zero training deaths must be the norm and any mishap should be vigorously attended to by commanders to achieve this norm. Let me conclude by expressing this House’s deep condolences to the late CFC Lee’s family. The SAF has updated the family of the COI’s findings and the actions that the SAF is taking to prevent recurrences of the lapses found. I assure all Members that MINDEF and the SAF will do all it can to help the family through this difficult period.

Mr Murali Pillai.

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I ask the hon Minister for Defence, on 18 April 2018, before the fast march started, when CFC Lee and the other platoon mates were asked whether or not they had seven hours of uninterrupted sleep, what was the response of his platoon mates and himself? And if they did not respond that they did not have seven hours of uninterrupted sleep, how do we, in future, make sure that the soldiers would state the truth of the matter?

Mr Speaker, the facts are what I have recounted. The findings were recounted by the COI and that three troopers stood out, declared that they did not fulfil all the conditions of the conducting officer, and they were deployed as marshals and were not put on the eight-km fast march. How do we ensure that, in their zeal, perhaps, soldiers take cognisance and take training safety regulations seriously? I presume that some of them who did not have seven hours uninterrupted sleep, for instance, still said, "I can go on". As I have said, this was the external safety review panel's comment, too, that you have got to make it second nature for the trainees to say, "Look, this is for my own self-protection or my buddy. I am going to tell on you because you did not do it, because I am going to protect you." We thought that one crucial factor was to give more opportunities for make-up training. So, if they know they have time to make up and they would not fail the course, there will be more incentives for them to declare that they did not have it. And if commanders know now that if the conditions are not met, they will ensure that the conditions are met.

There is not going to be an easy answer. At this stage of ours where we have the regulations but we are not sure everybody follows these, we need everybody to play their part to achieve zero training fatalities.

Mr Dennis Tan.

I thank the Minister for the Ministerial Statement with many details of the COI Report. I would like to ask the Minister – not sure if I heard correctly – what was the COI's finding with respect to the detection of the physical status of the soldier CFC Dave Lee during the fast march itself. Did any of his colleagues or instructors detect or spot that he was not coping well during the training? My second question is: would the SAF look into the possibility of training commanders for early detection of soldiers who are not coping well during an extreme, strenuous exercise like the fast march so that they can be pulled out before the completion of the fast march?

Mr Speaker, the findings are, again, as I have given in the Ministerial Statement. For the first six km, there did not seem to be any witness who noticed anything out of the ordinary. He took his 20-minute rest. During the last two km, he complained of cramps, told his commanders and his commanders advised him to stretch, which he did. And he was the last one to complete the fast march. It was only at the end of the fast march as he was walking towards the company line that they noticed that he was disoriented and then, the medics and others gave him immediate attention.

How do we ensure better recognition by commanders and men? That, indeed, is the point. So, as I have said, one of the recommendations is to take the guesswork out of this. In this instance, those attending to him thought he had physical exhaustion, not heat exhaustion. The immediate training safety regulation, effective now, is that we do not really care what the reason is. As soon as anybody is disoriented, we take him out, we send him to the medical centre, where there are facilities, where there is expertise. And we have learnt from this that, you do not guess, you may not be in the best position, err on the side of caution. And we want a simple mechanism where you can determine if someone is disoriented. If he is not oriented to time, place and identity – that is, to either one, not all three – you evacuate him.

Mr Henry Kwek.

I thank the Minister for his comprehensive answer. In the Report, I do not sense that the weather was a factor for this heat injury. But in the face of global warming – and the last few months have been very, very intense weather – I am just curious: are commanders given the discretion to, in extreme weather conditions, extreme heat waves, pare down the training, or is there a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to allow them to have flexibility, not during normal times, but extreme heat situations?

Mr Speaker, Sir, our training requirements are much more serious than that. It is not discretionary, and Members will remember when I updated this House about what the requirements are for fast marches or any training activities, we use special sensors which measure the wet globe temperature and, depending on what the temperature is based on this instrument, you mandate work-rest cycles – you can only work so much and you need to rest so much.

So, yes, indeed, temperature is taken into account. In fact, after this, we looked around other militaries to see whether we were more stringent or less stringent than others. And we have learnt from it. So, different militaries use different work-rest cycles depending on what the temperature or the humidity is. So, we are reviewing that. But it is not a discretion given to commanders. They must follow it. It is part of the TSR.

Mr Vikram Nair.

I thank the Minister for sharing the Committee of Inquiry's Report. I think the next steps are all quite logical. But one of the things that struck me – this was a trainee who, for all intents and purposes, appeared healthy to everyone, even completed the exercise and then passed out after that. There are many situations where tough training pushes people to the limits. So, are there any thoughts about looking at exercise-specific instructions? For example, if you are doing, say, trench-digging, where you would not sleep for a number of nights, you might be a little bit tired; you might be a little bit disoriented. But does that require the same procedures – what is normal, what is not? And maybe something more attuned to specific exercises, particularly those that are higher, I guess, that test people more, may be useful as well because it will probably be different in different exercises.

The approach that the Army uses is graduation – in other words, graduated activities that train up. So, if you notice from my Ministerial Statement, one of the prerequisites that the conducting officer had asked was: have all of you done the six-km march? And some did not, alerted themselves and fell out of the march.

So, there was graduation, and not only in terms of just distance but tolerance for heat. So, that is also built into the programme. I would say at our level that we have not had a heat stroke of this magnitude for the last nine years, as I have said. Unfortunately, the commanders, those who dealt with CFC Lee had never encountered one in their own experience and that may have been part of the problem.

How do we simulate this? How do we teach better? I think it is a challenge. But for every activity, as Mr Vikram Nair pointed out, we want to make sure that the trainees are built up to take higher levels of activity, and that is the prevailing principle and practice.

Assoc Prof Randolph Tan.

Sir, I would like to thank the Minister for all the efforts that have been put in to uncover these details so far. I would like to seek two clarifications.

I am not sure if I understood correctly, is it true to say that the conclusion is that CFC Lee's condition and the six-km march could not be linked to what happened to him subsequently? Did the COI actually give any conclusions about whether there was a link? My second clarification is: I think the Minister said earlier that wearables were considered but have now been ruled out. Would the possible use of wearables continue to be explored?

Mr Speaker, what the COI did was to investigate in detail, first of all, chronologically, the events leading to the heat stroke. And they started from the day before the fast march. I have related how there were a number of activities, two of which did not comply with Training Safety Regulations – one part of the lesson plan where CFC Lee ran faster than he should have for three laps of 400 metres each. And that night where there was an informal unauthorised punishment which lasted 30-35 minutes which resulted in them not having seven hours of sleep as required – they had about six hours 15 minutes or thereabouts.

The COI concluded, based on all these findings – and I would repeat this because I think it is important – that CFC Dave Lee's death was a result of heat stroke. There is no argument there. Other than this, they did not find any physical injury sustained nor any foul play or medical negligence. The COI was unable to ascertain the direct causes which led CFC Lee to suffer from heat stroke. It noted the possible contributory causes were "accumulated fatigue, insufficient rest and less than optimal state of health and his potential use of medication". These are words that they used. But their preliminary assessment was that the likely reasons for him succumbing to the heat stroke were inadequate onsite casualty management and delayed evacuation to the medical centre. Heat stroke is usually a culmination of events – exposure to heat, your own body's mechanisms cannot cope with the heat produced and it shuts down. The COI opined that they could not find any direct cause but it could have been due to a number of accumulated causes. But they felt that his succumbing to the heat stroke was a result of delay between the symptoms and evacuation.

I think the Member's second question was on wearables. We had an expert panel of doctors – the Chair, who is a senior consultant in the A&E Department in SGH – and they concluded that wearables that are on the market do not measure core temperature that well because, for heat injuries or heat strokes, you need to measure core temperature. In this case, as Members have noticed, when they touched CFC Lee's skin, it was actually cold, cooler than norm – it was not warm. So, if you have wearables that measure surface temperature, it does not quite work. You have to measure core temperature, and the technology just is not there yet.

Mr Kok Heng Leun.

I thank the Minister for the Report. My condolences to the family. I have one clarification and one question. The first clarification is the part about the conducting officer asking them if they had seven hours of rest. The troop apparently did not respond to that. Did the COI talk about why they did not respond to that? Was there a reason why they did not? That is the first clarification.

The second question is, I wonder if there is a daily log of the activities that the troops go through that would have been recorded every day so that that would include how many hours of rest that they have or any extra activities that have been added on. Is there such a daily log that has been placed so that we could check on it, at least, for the conducting officer?

Mr Speaker, those are good questions. I would have to go back to the detailed COI Report to see whether they had asked the various platoon members why they did not all say they did not have the seven hours of sleep. From what I can recollect, they did not give specific reasons. And as I have said, one surmises that they wanted to do it because they wanted to carry on with their training.

Was there a log? As I have said earlier in my Statement, the commanders who conducted the informal punishment neither sought permission nor told their superiors of this. So, I think, this was missed – the seven hours – they did not have the requisite seven hours of sleep.

Order. Introduction of Government Bills. Minister for Transport.

"to amend certain Acts to strengthen enforcement capacity and measures across certain Acts relating to land transport management and regulation",

presented by the Senior Minister of State for Transport (Dr Lam Pin Min) on behalf of the Minister for Transport; read the First time; to be read a Second time on the next available Sitting of Parliament, and to be printed.

"to amend the Stamp Duties Act (Chapter 312 of the 2006 Revised Edition)",

recommendation of President signified; presented by the Second Minister for Finance (Mr Lawrence Wong); read the First time; to be read a Second time on the next available Sitting of Parliament, and to be printed.

"to amend the Smoking (Prohibition in Certain Places) Act (Chapter 310 of the 2002 Revised Edition)",

presented by the Senior Minister of State for the Environment and Water Resources (Dr Amy Khor Lean Suan) on behalf of the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources; read the First time; to be read a Second time on the next available Sitting of Parliament, and to be printed.

[(proc text) Order for Second Reading read. (proc text)]

Mr Speaker, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

The Bill introduces two amendments to the Companies Act.

The first amendment seeks to exempt Shipowners' Liens from the requirement of registration as a charge under the Companies Act.

The second amendment seeks to clarify the categories of persons bound by a compromise or scheme of arrangement when a company is in the course of being wound up.

Mr Speaker, let me now take Members through the details of the two amendments in the Bill.

First is on Shipowners' Liens. Clause 2 of the Bill seeks to preserve the ease of doing shipping business in Singapore. Specifically, this clause exempts Shipowners' Liens from the requirement of registration as a charge under section 131 of the Companies Act. A Shipowner's Lien is a standard feature in ship charterparties. A charterparty is a maritime contract, typically between a shipowner and a charterer or a hirer of the shipowner's vessel.

The Shipowners' Lien in such a contract gives the shipowner the right, in the event of the charterer's default, to claim payment from monies owing to the charterer by third parties. In other words, should the charterer be unable to pay the shipowner, the lien allows the shipowner to directly recover payment of sub-hire, sub-freight or, in certain instances, bill of lading freight, from a sub-charterer.

The term "Shipowner's Lien" is the term of the art used by the shipping community to refer to liens provided to others, beyond the registered owner of the ship. These include a disponent owner, bareboat charterer or other charterer, in addition to the registered owner.

In 2017, the status of an unregistered Shipowner's Lien vis-a-vis a liquidator of the charterer and its interaction with section 131 of the Companies Act was litigated in Singapore for the first time.

The High Court in Duncan, Cameron Lindsay v Diablo Fortune Inc recognised a Shipowner's Lien as a charge that is required to be registered under section 131 of the Companies Act. In March 2018, the Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court's decision.

As a consequence of non-registration under section 131, the lien in that case was not enforceable against the liquidator of the charterer and the shipowner who would otherwise have had the benefit of the lien, ranked together with the unsecured creditors of the charterer instead.

The effect of the Diablo case gives rise to several practical difficulties for the shipping industry in connection with section 131 of the Companies Act and Shipowners' Liens.

First, leaving aside the long-standing industry custom and practice where shipowners do not habitually register Shipowners' Liens, the registration of Shipowners' Liens is particularly difficult from a practical perspective. This is because each ship is typically subject to a continual series of charterparties, each entered into as quickly as possible, to ensure that the ship is continually gainfully employed. Often, charters are for periods as short as a few days. This means that many charterparties may have been completed before a charge can even be registered.

Second, given the volume of charterparties, there would likely be significant administrative and cost implications for shipping companies.

As a result, compliance with section 131 of the Companies Act in relation to Shipowners' Liens would be particularly burdensome for the shipping industry.

Furthermore, the underlying rationale of section 131 of the Companies Act, which is to protect third parties who deal with companies, by disclosing charges against a company’s property, is less applicable in the shipping context. As observed by the Court of Appeal in its grounds of decision in the Diablo case, "[n]otice…may not be necessary in the [shipping] context since all parties who deal with charterers are aware that such liens are standard in charterparties".

Moving to the specifics of the amendment, there is precedent for the introduction of a statutory exemption from registration under section 131 of the Companies Act. Similar exemptions exist within the Companies Act. For example, section 131(3A) of the Companies Act exempts charges over securities issued by the Government.

There is international precedent for excluding Shipowners' Liens from registration requirements. In Hong Kong, for example, the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance stipulates that a Shipowners' Lien does not amount to a charge and, consequently, Shipowners' Liens are excluded from the requirement of registration.

We have taken a different approach. In our case, the Bill, while exempting such Shipowners' Liens from registration requirements under section 131 of the Companies Act, maintains the Singapore Courts' characterisation in the Diablo case of such liens as charges. The effect of this is that the Shipowners' Lien retains its essential nature as a security but without the need for registration. As a result, the Shipowners' Lien will take priority over other charges created subsequent to it, as well as over unsecured creditors. This is unlike Hong Kong where, given that a Shipowners' Lien is not a charge to begin with, it will not take priority over other charges and will rank pari passu with unsecured claims.

So, this will be the position for all Shipowners' Liens that are created on or after the date that the amendments in this Bill come into effect.

With regard to Shipowners' Liens that are already in existence, or which are created before the effective date of these amendments, the position is as follows.

Clause 2 contains a saving provision that preserves, where possible, the validity of unregistered Shipowners' Liens existing prior to this amendment coming into force.

Specifically, such unregistered Shipowners’ Liens would generally remain valid, unless the relevant company is already in winding up, or a creditor has already obtained proprietary rights or interests in the subject matter of the charge.

Next, compromise and schemes of arrangement. Clause 3 of the Bill seeks to clarify the categories of persons bound by a compromise or scheme of arrangement when a company is in the course of being wound up.

Section 210 of the Companies Act provides the mechanism for a compromise or arrangement to rearrange the rights of the company, its creditors or members. In 2014, the provision was amended to clarify that holders of units of shares in a company can be parties to a compromise or scheme of arrangement. However, creditors and members, who were bound by a compromise or scheme of arrangement before the amendments in 2014, were inadvertently excluded from the amended provision, in respect of a company which is in the course of being wound up. Thus, clause 3 is a technical amendment to reinstate these categories of persons. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]

Mr Speaker, I first declare my interest as a shipping lawyer.

Mr Speaker, the main thrust of today's Companies (Amendment) Bill provides that a Shipowner's Lien for bill of lading freight, sub-freights, sub-hires or for any amount due under any charter, no longer requires registration under section 131 of the Companies Act. Under the proposed amendments, a shipowner includes a registered owner, a disponent owner or a bareboat charterer of a ship.

Simply put, the shipowner can intercept income due to charterers in the form of bill of lading freight, sub-freight under a voyage charter or sub-hire under a sub-charter.

Today's Bill for the proposed amendment of section 131 of the Companies Act stems from the recent Court of Appeal case of Diablo Fortune v Duncan Lindsay. The Court of Appeal, with five judges hearing the appeal, affirmed the decision of Judicial Commissioner Audrey Lim in the High Court below.

Diablo Fortune Inc are the owners of the cargo vessel V8 Stealth II. Their bareboat chartered the vessel to Siva Ships International Pte Ltd. The charterers entered into a pooling agreement with another company by which the charterers earned charterhire. The charterers then went into liquidation and the owners sought to enforce a lien over subhire pursuant to clause 18 of the bareboat charterparty by serving a lien on the pool. The pool withheld hire payments to the charterer. The liquidators applied to the High Court directing payment of the charterhire to the charterer.

In the High Court decision below, the hon Judicial Commissioner held that the lien over sub-hire created by a charterparty was registrable pursuant to section 131(3)(f) of the Companies Act as a book debt or pursuant to section 131(g) as a floating charge.

The decision in July 2017 last year generated a strong reaction from the maritime community in Singapore. Although it can be said that the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court are not surprising given that they are, in some respects, consistent with English law on the registrability of liens on sub-hire and sub-freights, the recent decisions are nonetheless the first local judicial pronouncements on the effect of the non-registration of such liens. The shipping community, led by the Singapore Shipping Association, bemoaned the “onerous” and “administrative burden” of having to register all such liens and pleaded for a “statutory carve out”.

The reaction from the shipping community is perhaps hardly surprising, at least to those in the community. And I am in total agreement. Such a lien clause is very common in standard charterparties all over the world, not just in bareboat charterparties which are the subject of the Diablo case, but also in time and even voyage charterparties; in many of these commonly used charterparty forms, we will use a variant of a lien clause allowing lien over hire, freight, sub-freights or sub-hire. Parties all over the world enter into charterparties on an everyday basis. Singapore is, of course, a major maritime hub in the world with many shipping businesses setting up companies, subsidiaries and operations in Singapore. Moreover, many charterparties and fixture notes have Singapore or Singapore law as part of their jurisdiction or arbitration or governing law clauses.

I agree that it is wholly impractical to require all liens for freights, hire, sub-freights or sub-hire to be registered as charges under sections 131(f) or (g) of the Companies Act.

If the law is not amended, businesses may be compelled to register charges for such liens, and failure to do so may even lead to penalties under the Companies Act.

Besides being impractical, it is inconvenient and the legal fees for registration are unnecessary expenses for businesses. Notwithstanding the recent judicial pronouncements of there being a need to register a charge under section 131(3)(f) or (g), the reality is that the practice of registering was never part of our commercial landscape in Singapore.

It is notable that the Court of Appeal made comparisons with the corresponding laws in the United Kingdom (UK) and Hong Kong, respectively. I would suggest that the comparisons with the UK and Hong Kong are not merely of jurisprudential significance. Whether as admiralty jurisdictions, legal or maritime centres, England and Hong Kong are arguably two of Singapore's closest rivals.

While it may be a slight exaggeration to say that maintaining the status quo will put Singapore in a distinct disadvantage compared to Hong Kong, it is important that we continue to make our maritime and legal hub as competitive as possible and minimise or avoid any unnecessary shortfalls that make us less sensitive to the views and needs of the business community. The amendments should, in my view, now place our law on shipowners’ lien in a better position than Hong Kong or the UK.

The proposed amendments under this amendment Bill are also timely in that Singapore is also aiming to be one of the leading international debt restructuring centres in Asia, especially with the amendments to the Companies Act provisions brought in May 2017 with the introduction of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. In recent years, insolvency cases involving internationally well-known companies have been started or filed in our Courts for various reasons, such as insolvency protection and debt restructuring. They include companies in shipping or oil and offshore industries, too. The proposed amendments will bring about some certainty to the interpretation of section 131(f) and 131(g) of the Companies Act, while the amendments themselves will not necessarily put any party in a position of great disadvantage.

Mr Speaker, for the above reasons, I support this amendment Bill. The Court of Appeal was certainly right to recommend the proposed changes to Parliament.

Mr Louis Ng.

Sir, I rise in support of this Bill. This is a swift legislative response to the Court of Appeal's proposal in the case of Diablo Fortune Inc vs Duncan, Cameron Lindsay, as the Minister has pointed out, to carve out liens on sub-freights from the registration requirement under section 131(1) of the Companies Act.

As the law currently stands, given the Court of Appeal and High Court decisions that characterise a lien on sub-freight as a floating charge and a charge on the company's book debts, a shipowner must register its lien as a charge under the Companies Act, failing which, this lien will not be valid against other creditors.

However, this requirement is viewed by the industry as onerous and commercially inconvenient for charterparties that are usually of relatively short durations.

This reform would resolve the dilemma shipowners face between expediency and protection of their right to exercise the lien.

The proposed statutory carve out differs from the Hong Kong approach, which the Minister has also mentioned, which provides under section 334(4) of its Companies Ordinance that a lien on sub-freights is not a charge on book debts of the company or a floating charge for the purposes of registration.

Given that the outcome on the registration requirements is, in effect, the same, can the Minister clarify if there are any other practical implications that are intended in affirming the Singapore Courts' characterisation of a lien on sub-freight as a charge on book debts of the company or a floating charge?

Given the lack of clarity on the characterisation and registration requirements of liens on sub-freights prior to the Courts' decisions and this amendment, shipping companies and creditors would understandably have acted according to what is most commercially expedient.

In practice, registration of liens on sub-freights is not commonplace, especially for shorter charters.

The new section 131(3AC) provides for a period of transition by clarifying that the consequences of non-registration should only apply prior to the amendments commencing where there is a liquidator or creditor.

Until the new amendments take effect, under section 132(1) of the Companies Act, the lienor or company and every officer of the company is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine for not registering such a lien. Can the Minister clarify whether these penal consequences will be applied against shipping companies and their officers?

Clarifications notwithstanding, I stand in support of this Bill, which provides much needed clarity on this area of law and is in line with commercial practice.

Second Minister.

Mr Speaker, I would like to thank Mr Dennis Tan and Mr Louis Ng for their support of the Bill. In their speeches, they have highlighted the practical difficulties that would be faced by shipping companies if the requirements for a lien to be registered were maintained. The difficulties that they have described are very real. For that reason, it was in response to feedback from the shipping industry, the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration (SCMA), and also looking at the Court decision, that we move very quickly to put forward these amendments to Parliament.

Mr Louis Ng had two questions. The first was, he asked, given the approach of Singapore and Hong Kong gives the same practical outcome, whether there were practical implications or differences between the two.

On the practical implication of affirming the Court's characterisation of the lien as a charge, as I explained earlier in my speech, this results in Shipowner's Liens retaining their nature as security. This affords enhanced protection to shipowners and charterers in the event of default and insolvency, as they will be secured creditors. Otherwise, the shipowners and charterers would have to compete with unsecured creditors for payment. In short, with these amendments, in Singapore, a lien is still a charge and, because it is a charge, it will rank ahead of charges which are created after it, and it will also rank ahead of unsecured claims.

In Hong Kong, it is not a security at all and does not have to be registered. So, in Hong Kong, the lien will rank together with unsecured claims after secured creditors and, as Mr Dennis Tan pointed out, this, in fact, puts us in a better position.

With respect to Mr Louis Ng's second question on whether, because until the new amendments take effect, he said the lienor company and officers may be guilty of an offence, and asked for clarification on whether there will be penal consequences against the shipping companies and their officers.

First and foremost, I should clarify, it is not the case that all Shipowner's Liens created prior to the effective date of these amendments need to be registered.

New subsection 3AC provides that the lien will be regarded as registrable and be subject to the consequences of non-registration only if: as at the effective date of the amendments, the company has been wound up; or a creditor has acquired a proprietary right to, or an interest in the subject matter of the Lien. So, in other words, it is only in those two situations – the company has been wound up or a creditor has acquired a proprietary right to or interest in – that it will become registrable.

Therefore, a large majority of the existing Liens will not be registrable and, hence, no offence would be committed. They will only be regarded as having been registrable in the event of winding up or other creditor acquiring an interest. So, unless this has already occurred, you would not know at this stage whether those Liens are registrable or not, as these are contingent events.

Compared to the overall number of Shipowners' Liens, we would expect that the number affected by winding up or other creditors acquiring an interest, and hence being registrable, to be a small proportion of the whole. In those instances, suffice to say that this will be a matter for prosecutorial discretion. In exercising that discretion, the Registrar of Companies will take a practical and commercial approach and all relevant factors, including the fact that current industry practice is not to register and the fact that it was an open question of whether such Liens were registrable until the Diablo case was decided.

In short, we will take a commonsense approach and also, assuming that the Bill is passed today, we will work to bring the commencement date of the amendments into effect as soon as possible. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. (proc text)]

[(proc text) The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Ms Indranee Rajah.] (proc text)]

[(proc text) Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Order for Second Reading read. (proc text)]

Mr Speaker, Sir, on behalf of the Minister for Transport, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."

Singapore is a vibrant transport hub. We have world-class air and sea ports that connect us to the rest of the world and an extensive public transport system that enables our people to move around efficiently for work and leisure.

Ensuring safety is a key focus of our transport system. We set high safety standards through legislation and regulations and close oversight of our transport operators. Our transport operators also employ technology, train their personnel and run safety campaigns.

Despite these measures, incidents happen. When they do occur, it is important that we learn from them, identify the causes and take measures to prevent a recurrence. We do this by conducting safety investigations. As these investigations aim to identify lessons and not to ascribe blame, they enable those involved in an incident to freely share information in a truthful manner without any fear of being penalised.

The Transport Safety Investigation Bureau (TSIB), a department of the Ministry of Transport, will be the authority responsible for conducting safety investigations into air, sea and certain land transport incidents.

The Transport Safety Investigations (TSI) Bill will be the single legislation that governs the conduct of safety investigations. It will facilitate the TSIB's work and enable TSIB investigators to effectively perform their safety functions.

Currently, TSIB conducts safety investigations into air and marine incidents. The TSIB Bill will extend the no-blame safety investigation principles, processes and best practices from the air and marine sectors to the rail sector. It will standardise the procedures for the conduct of investigations and apply the same set of safeguards on the treatment of information obtained during an investigation.

Mr Speaker, Sir, let me highlight the key provisions of the Bill.

Clause 3 of the Bill states the purposes of the Bill, one of which is for the prevention of future transport occurrences and not for ascribing blame to any person or organisation.

Clause 15 makes clear that TSIB may investigate incidents involving any combination of modes of transport vehicles, and between civilian and military transport vehicles.

[Deputy Speaker (Mr Lim Biow Chuan) in the Chair]

Clause 16 of the Bill sets out the scope of TSIB's investigations, which include incidents involving civilian aircraft and vessels. When TSIB has built up its rail accident investigation capabilities, they will also conduct safety investigations into domestic and international railway incidents which happen on or after a date set by the Minister under clause 5. When directed by the Minster for Transport, TSIB may also investigate incidents involving certain land transport incidents involving buses, such as those operating under the Land Transport Authority's (LTA's) public bus services contract.

As is the case under the existing legislation in the Air Navigation Act, clause 16 of the Bill will continue to allow TSIB to investigate an incident involving only military aircraft engaged in a flying display in Singapore organised by civilians.

To ensure that investigators are able to effectively perform their roles, clauses 26 to 31 of the Bill confer on TSIB investigators the necessary powers, including powers to access occurrence sites, gather information and records, take possession of evidence, and require medical examinations of persons involved.

Clause 23(5) specifies that these powers are exercisable by TSIB investigators only when and to the extent authorised by the Director of TSIB.

Clause 43 of the Bill prescribes limits on the disclosure of restricted information collected during an investigation. This limit on disclosure is important in order to encourage the free flow of safety information in transport safety investigations and is also necessary in order to meet international requirements. Examples of restricted information include witnesses' statements, medical or private information, voice and image recordings and their transcripts, analysis of information and draft final reports. This clause, however, does not prevent transport regulators and other agencies from conducting their own investigations to obtain similar information directly from the source.

Subsection 4 of clause 43, however, allows the High Court to order the disclosure of any restricted information, if the High Court is satisfied that any adverse domestic or international impact that the disclosure might have on any current or future investigation is outweighed by the public interest in the administration of justice.

Clause 44 provides that TSIB investigators are not compellable to give any evidence or provide any expert opinion in any proceedings except to a Coroner's inquiry. This reinforces the purpose of the Bill, which is not to ascribe blame to any person or organisation. Information obtained by TSIB in the course of their investigation is to be used solely for the purpose of improving safety and not by the judicial system whose purpose is for blame or liability.

Clause 18 of the Bill specifies that the expenses incurred by TSIB during an investigation is recoverable from the owner or operator, or both, of the transport vehicles involved in the incident.