Hansard, Tuesday, 3 October 2023

1 Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked the Minister for Home Affairs how is the MAS working with the relevant agencies to prevent movable assets like gemstones, jewellery and luxury watches from being used to launder money in Singapore.

2 Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked the Minister for Home Affairs regarding the estimated value of about $1 billion dollars in assets seized in the recent case of money laundering activities (a) what are the measures to ensure that the restrictions under the relevant rules, such as the Precious Stones and Precious Metals (Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing) Act 2019, are not circumvented; and (b) whether there will be tighter controls through importers, retailers and our checkpoints over movable assets like gemstones, jewellery and luxury watches into Singapore.

3 Mr Murali Pillai asked the Minister for Home Affairs whether the 10 foreigners who have been charged by the Police on 16 August 2023 for money-laundering activities in relation to the $1 billion cash and assets seized are being or will be investigated for running any organised crime syndicate in or from Singapore and, if so, what facts have been established thus far in this regard.

4 Mr Murali Pillai asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether there is a reporting requirement on landlords to lodge Suspicious Transaction Reports against their tenants if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that their tenants have access to ill-gotten wealth or gains; and (b) if so, whether the landlords of the private properties where foreign nationals holding passports of convenience were found to be residing when arrested by the Singapore Police on 15 August 2023 for suspected money-laundering related activities will be scrutinised for compliance with this requirement.

5 Mr Murali Pillai asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether any additional steps will be taken to protect the real estate market in Singapore from being targeted by money launderers; and (b) if so, what are they.

6 Mr Gan Thiam Poh asked the Minister for Home Affairs whether the Police will initiate investigations and arrest any person who is on the wanted list for criminal offences in another country but not listed under the wanted list of the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL).

7 Mr Don Wee asked the Minister for Home Affairs whether MAS shares information obtained from suspicious financial transactions with banks, the Immigration Checkpoint Authority of Singapore and the Ministry of Manpower.

8 Mr Don Wee asked the Minister for Home Affairs whether information obtained from Suspicious Transaction Reports is shared with banks, the Immigration Checkpoint Authority of Singapore and the Ministry of Manpower.

9 Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked the Minister for Home Affairs in cases where seized assets are ordered by the Court to be forfeited to the state, how are such assets used or liquidated for the benefit of the public or the Consolidated Fund.

10 Mr Don Wee asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether ACRA pays attention or conduct surveillance on (i) foreign directors (ii) beneficial owners and (iii) local directors appearing to be nominee directors, where such appointment can be an indication of the misuse of legal entity; and (b) whether there is any public-private partnership between ACRA, CAD or MAS and the banks to share intelligence on emerging risks such as alerts or placement on undesirable lists.

11 Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) how many business entities are currently registered with ACRA as "dormant" or any other status that indicates that they are not trading; (b) what is the number of such companies for each of the last 10 years; (c) how often does ACRA check on the reason why such companies remain registered despite being inactive; and (d) whether there is a need to step up active enforcement so that Singapore-registered companies are not misused for money laundering or illegal activities.

12 Mr Derrick Goh asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) how Singapore compares to other global financial centres in terms of preventing and detecting anti-money laundering activities; and (b) whether the roll-out of the Collaborative Sharing of Money Laundering/Terrorism Financing (ML/TF) Information and Cases (COSMIC) digital platform will be accelerated and also extended to other industries to detect such illicit transactions across local industries beyond financial institutions.

Mr Speaker, may I seek your permission to take Question Nos 1 to 12 together?

Yes, go ahead.

These queries relate to the recent anti-money laundering operations conducted by the Police and Singapore's anti-money laundering framework. Mr Speaker, with your permission, the Ministry of Home Affairs, together with various other Ministries, will respond to the queries comprehensively in the Ministerial Statement that will be delivered later today.

13 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for Transport (a) whether deferring public transport fare increments to future years remains sustainable, given the anticipated continued rise in cost of living in Singapore; (b) whether the Ministry has mandated any measures to be taken by public transport operators to streamline processes and reduce expenses in order to mitigate rising costs; and (c) if so, what are these measures.

14 Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Minister for Transport whether the Public Transport Council plans to expunge the 15.6% fare increase deferred for future Fare Review Exercises (FREs) after a 7% increase having been granted in 2023.

15 Ms Mariam Jaafar asked the Minister for Transport (a) what is the mean and median monthly spend on public transport in the past 12 months by (i) persons with disabilities (PwDs) and (ii) seniors who use public transport; and (b) whether the Ministry will consider introducing hybrid monthly concession passes for PwDs and seniors to be made available in different denominations for light, moderate and heavy users.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to take Question Nos 13 to 15 together?

Yes, please proceed.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. Sir, my reply will also address written Question No 14 by Mr Louis Chua for today's Sitting and related questions from Mr Gerald Giam1,2, Ms Hazel Poa, Mr Don Wee and Mr Leong Mun Wai for subsequent Sittings.

Sir, in setting public transport fares, the Public Transport Council (PTC) is guided by the fare formula and aims to keep fares affordable for commuters, while ensuring that our public transport system remains financially sustainable.

The fare formula reflects the general cost drivers of providing public transport services, based on macroeconomic factors such as core inflation, national wage growth and energy prices. It provides for fares to be adjusted in tandem with changes in these cost drivers, rather than changes in operators' actual costs. In this way, the operators cannot assume that their cost increases will be matched by correspondingly higher fares. Hence, they need to be disciplined in managing their costs and improving their productivity over time.

This approach also applies to wage costs. In setting fares, the PTC does not focus on the actual salaries paid by the operators. The formula is based on the national wage index. This allows operators to keep public transport sector salaries competitive with the rest of the economy, so that they are able to attract and retain their workers. Wage increases that exceed changes in the national wage index will not be covered by the fare formula. Over the past five years, the wages of public transport workers grew at a similar pace as the national wage index.

The fare formula also includes a Productivity Contribution, which reduces the allowable fare adjustment by 0.1 percentage points every year. This further incentivises the operators to look for continuous productivity improvements to reduce their costs. For example, the operators have been using joint tenders to achieve economies of scale, automating their maintenance processes and upskilling their workers to improve productivity.

The fare formula therefore avoids operators' costs from being directly passed on to commuters, while allowing commuters to benefit from productivity savings from the operators.

Guided by the formula, the PTC exercises judgement on how much of the allowable fare adjustment to implement each year, taking into consideration economic and social factors. For example, the PTC looks at affordability as measured by the estimated proportion of household income spent on public transport. For the lower-income, this proportion has fallen from 3.1% in 2013 to 2.4% in 2022. For average public transport users, the figure has also reduced from 2.2% in 2013 to 1.7% in 2022.

The quantum of allowable fare adjustment that is not implemented in a particular year is deferred and carried forward to future years. In the 2022 Fare Review Exercise (FRE), the PTC deferred 10.6% percentage points of the fare increase. In this year's FRE, the fare formula output was 12%, driven by a 62% increase in energy prices, strong national wage growth at about 7%, and core inflation at about 4%. Adding the deferred quantum of 10.6% to the fare formula output, the maximum allowable fare increase for 2023 was 22.6%.

To keep public transport fares affordable for commuters and understanding that Singaporean families are currently facing higher costs of living, the PTC again decided not to grant the full quantum this year. Instead, the PTC decided on an overall fare increase of 7% – which is less than a third of the maximum allowable fare increase of 22.6%. The remaining 15.6 percentage points will be deferred to future years.

To account for this funding gap, the Government will provide $300 million of additional subsidies in 2023, which is $100 million more than the previous year. This amount is on top of the $2 billion annual subsidies to fund bus and train services. In addition, the cost of public transport infrastructure is also fully funded by the Government.

Mr Louis Chua asked whether the PTC plans to "expunge" the 15.6 percentage points. Mr Don Wee asked if the PTC can "impose a moratorium" on future fare increases. Mr Speaker, I am concerned that Mr Chua and Mr Wee are making these suggestions. Please allow me to explain why their proposals are not sound, as these will affect the longer-term reliability and financial sustainability of our public transport system, to the detriment of Singapore and Singaporeans.

I had earlier mentioned that the fare formula reflects real cost increases in our economy, such as energy costs and wages. If the deferred fare amount is "expunged" as Mr Louis Chua proposed, or if fares are frozen for future years as Mr Don Wee suggested, it does not mean that these costs of running the public transport system will simply disappear into thin air.

Hence, I would like to ask Mr Chua and Mr Wee to clarify whether they are proposing for the operators to absorb this cost, or for taxpayers to bear a larger cost burden to provide higher Government subsidies on a permanent basis? If it is the latter, they should elaborate how such a move will be funded every year and whether they are proposing for Singaporeans to pay additional taxes to do so? I hope that is not what they have in mind.

If it is to ask the public transport operators to absorb the costs, we need to consider how this will impact their financial sustainability over time and in turn, affect their ability to provide accessible and reliable public transport services.

Mr Louis Chua asked about the profits of the public transport operators and Mr Don Wee suggested that we could freeze fares given that operators have been profitable. Sir, bus and rail services adopt different operating models. For buses, Government collects the fare revenue and pays the operators a service fee that is derived from competitive bids via bus contracting tenders. Overall, bus services are operating at a loss and that is why Government needs to provide about $1 billion in subsidies for buses every year. Expunging the deferred fare or freezing future fare increases will result in larger losses and higher Government subsidies.

For rail services, the operators collect the fares to cover their operating costs, so fares do impact the rail operators' profitability directly. In the latest financial year, after accounting for Government grants, SBS Transit reported a loss of several million dollars for their rail operations, while SMRT Corporation (SMRT) Trains reported an operating profit of $6 million, which represents a profit margin of less than 1%.

We should not pretend that the deferred fare increases can somehow be expunged and magically disappear, or assume that future fare increases can be frozen without consequences to our public transport system. Making such populist moves will further enlarge the funding gap over time which must be supported by higher Government subsidies funded by taxpayers. It is not the responsible thing to do. We need to be clear that Government subsidies are ultimately borne by current and future generations of taxpayers.

The PTC will continue to ensure that fare adjustments each year are affordable. In each future FRE, the PTC will assess the cost increases as reflected by the fare formula, the deferred fare amount from previous years, as well as the impact on affordability for commuters, before deciding on the fare increase to be granted for that year. And when the opportunity arises, the PTC will consider whether it is possible to lower the total deferred fare amount so the gap will gradually reduce over time.

The PTC and Government are also mindful that fare increases affect different groups of commuters differently. While it is important that commuters bear their fair share of cost increases, we are committed to ensuring that fares remain affordable, especially for concession groups such as seniors, students, lower-wage workers and Persons with Disabilities. These groups enjoy discounts of up to 70% off adult per-journey fares.

Within each concession group, there is a wide range of spending on public transport, depending on different commuting patterns. Among all seniors, persons with disabilities (PwDs) and individuals on the Workfare Transport Concession Scheme (WTCS), the median monthly spending on public transport is about $16, $24 and $35 respectively.

As heavy users of public transport will be more affected by the increase in per-journey fares, we will reduce the price of hybrid monthly concession passes by up to 10%, and introduce a new discounted WTCS monthly pass. This is expected to benefit about 60,000 commuters, including about 1,600 WTCS cardholders who currently pay per-journey fares and spend more than the monthly pass price of $96. Concession cardholders who make fewer public transport journeys will continue to enjoy substantial discounts off adult per-journey fares.

When fares increase, the PTC requires rail operators to contribute a proportion of their increased fare revenue to the Public Transport Fund. In the coming year, the rail operators will contribute a total of $16 million. Together with Government's contributions to the Fund, these monies are used to provide Public Transport Vouchers (PTVs) to help cushion the impact on lower-income households. The Government will increase the PTV amount from $30 in 2022 to $50 this year.

Over the past decade, we have steadily enhanced the quality of our public transport system by expanding the network, and improving accessibility and reliability of services. These outcomes have been achieved through our strong tripartite partnership between the Government, operators and workers, while keeping fares affordable and the public transport system financially sustainable. This will remain our approach going forward.

Mr Yip Hon Weng.

I thank the Acting Minister for his very comprehensive reply. My supplementary questions pertain to service reliability. Does the PTC take into consideration the recent number of train breakdowns before allowing for the increase in fares? And if so, will maintenance of service reliability be taken into account before we ask commuters to pay more? Also, can the Ministry share and elaborate on some of the initiatives their transport operators are undertaking to reduce expenses that will not affect the reliability of our transport services?

Sir, I thank Mr Yip for his two supplementary questions. On reliability, the public transport operators are subject to stringent service standards and we have not relaxed these standards.

For rail, the measurement that we use is what they call the "mean kilometres between failures" (MKBF). Since 2019, MKBF has exceeded one million train kilometres.

Under the Bus Contracting Model, frequency of all basic bus services, by which I mean trunk services, are 15 minutes or less during peak periods. Feeder services run even more frequently at no more than eight minutes during peak periods. The Land Transport Authority (LTA) will track the commuter demand and ensure that there is sufficient capacity by adjusting the frequencies where needed. And as I explained in this House previously, whenever there are new Build-To-Order developments, new demand, we will also look at whether we need to introduce new feeder services to serve these new estates.

Sir, Mr Yip also asked about what are some of the productivity measures that the transport operators would embark on to reduce costs. Sir, this is an ongoing effort. In the fare formula, I explained that we have a productivity contribution component to incentivise them to do so, but on the ground, the operators have been working very closely with their suppliers, and also with the unions, with the help from our unions, together with the workers, to encourage a lot of ground-up initiatives.

In SMRT, for example, they focus a lot on "kaizen". They use this as a movement within the organisation to identify areas for improvement, to improve safety, to improve reliability and to also reduce costs. When I visited SMRT, they shared with me that in the latest year, "kaizen" has allowed them to save more than $100 million, in total. And these savings will help not only to keep our public transport system financially sustainable and avoid subsidies going up and up over the years, importantly, I think that it is also in the spirit of continuous improvement and we empower the workers to look for ways in which they can make things better, improve the processes and the ground-up initiatives are then given top-down support by management.

Mr Louis Chua.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. Two clarifications for the Acting Minister. The first is in relation to the PTC's work, I understand that it is guided by the fare formula. But if you look at the increase that is been granted, 7%, I think that is well above what we are seeing in the overall inflation rates here in Singapore, so far.

If you look at the 15.6 percentage-point increase that is going to be deferred to the future, this is going to cause a significant effect, a lasting effect into the increases in public transport fares for Singaporeans, given that this could have a snowballing effect, since there will be the deferred increase and future increases to consider.

So, in that sense, would the Minister not consider, even if not expunging, then moderating the level of increase, just as it did in the fare review exercise in 2021, when the PTC did not fully agree with the outputs from the fare formula? So, this is the first clarification.

The second is in terms of financial sustainability. In relation to the written answer which Minister has partially responded to, when I look at the public transport operator, should we not look at the public transport system as a whole, and in that sense, would the Minister not agree that if we look at the returns that some of these operators are generating – one of them, for example, is actually generating close to 11% return on equity in the last one year and 13% in the last five years – one would struggle to see how the financial sustainability of the operator, at this point in time, is actually in question?

Mr Speaker, I thank Mr Chua for his two supplementary questions. Sir, the fare formula was revised last year and some of the changes that we have made to the fare formula is then reflected in this year's fare review.

Sir, the inflation that we look at in a fare formula is captured under the Consumer Price Index (CPI). And yes, that is part of the fare formula. It is 0.5 times the core CPI.

However, we also need to look at other components that affect the cost of the operators, but taken, as I explained my main reply, not their actual cost but as a benchmark looking at the national wage index and looking at the energy index, because these are significant cost components that will affect overall public transport operations.

So, that is why the fare formula, using these components, we worked it out last year, we carried it forward, 10.6%. And this year, it was 12%. So, if you add that to the 10.6%, the total is 22.6%.

But this is where – perhaps Mr Chua and myself, we may not disagree so much – that the PTC does not just go for the formula maximum amount and say, "It is 22.6%, therefore I go for 22.6%". That is not how it is done. As I explained, they will exercise judgement, they will consider the impact on commuters, on affordability and then after that, they will exercise judgement in terms of what is the level to set and how much to defer.

This year, for example, the maximum amount that could be set was 22.6%. But the PTC did exactly like what Mr Chua mentioned, they factored in all these different considerations and they decided that we should only increase by less than a third, 7%, and the rest will be deferred.

But when we say "deferred", what it actually means is that the Government is then topping up to ensure that this funding gap is provided for. And in this year's fare review, the Government is providing $300 million of subsidies to cater to this gap.

That is why I explained earlier that if we do not find ways, in subsequent years when we can, to gradually to reduce this gap, and if we expunge it, what it means is that the $300 million will remain as a permanent subsidy. And it will add on to the existing subsidies that we already provide: $1 billion for rail, $1 billion for bus. This will increase the burden on taxpayers.

I appreciate Mr Chua's concern. I think it is a valid point that we do want to look at affordability on commuters, we do want to consider the impact, including on the overall cost of living. And that is why the PTC exercises judgement and it is not just driven by the formula. I hope that addresses Mr Chua's concern.

Sir, Mr Chua also had a second point about the profit numbers and the financial sustainability of the public transport operators. I have explained this in my main reply as well. We need to look at bus and rail separately. For buses, the fares that are being collected do not go to the operators. We are discussing fare review here. The fares that are being collected actually do not go to the revenue of the bus operations. The revenue of the bus operations come from LTA, when we tender out bus contracts. And they bid and then, the service fee, based on the bids, that is what we pay them.

I would be happy to share with the House that over time, as we do more bus contracting tenders and as of now, there are more operators – there are now four bus operators – the bids are also becoming more competitive and we have also refined the way we do the bus contracting, that the service fees and the margins have been coming down in the more recent contracts. So, hopefully, over time, it will allow us to squeeze out more productivity gains, more savings, that we can then pass on to taxpayers and to commuters.

Ms Mariam Jaafar.

I thank the Acting Minister for his responses and I also fully agree with the Minister about the need for public transportation to be financially sustainable. I fully empathise with the delicate balance that has to be struck.

My supplementary question relates to whether the Minister would consider additional tiers within the hybrid cards and calibrating across these tiers to better reflect the diversity in usage patterns.

Even on the concession cards, I believe that the discounts given to seniors also reflects the very different usage patterns, using the buses and off-peak hours, which do not drive as much of the cost of the transportation network. And so, as our seniors become a larger and larger share, and will eventually become 25% of our population, would the Minister agree that there may be room to consider a slightly more differentiated approach to our hybrid cards for seniors, to allow more people to benefit?

The figures that the Minister cited $16, $24, are quite far from the hybrid card costs of $58 today. So, could we allow a bigger diversity of seniors to benefit from the subsidies? Not an overall increase, but a better calibration across different tiers, where you have your young seniors who may still be working, you have your Pioneer Generation – these groups have very different usage patterns.

Mr Speaker, I understand where Ms Mariam Jaafar is coming from. That is why in this year's FRE, the PTC has looked at how to lower the cost of the concession pass for the different vulnerable groups.

Sir, before I respond to her question directly, allow me to briefly recap that we are providing help in a few ways.

First, we subsidise public transport services by more than $2 billion every year. If you were to translate it to per journey, it is more than $1 per journey. For the coming year, there will be an additional $300 million subsidy to cover the fare deferment, which I have explained earlier, and these subsidies go towards helping commuters, because they help to cushion the fare increase that is needed.

Second, for the concession card holders, they enjoy discounts of up to 70% of the adult per journey fares. So, this is even if you do not buy the concession pass, because we do have a separate rate for the different concession groups. And the benefit applies to all concession users, whether they are light users, moderate users or heavy users.

I understand Ms Mariam Jaafar's point, that because today, the concession passes are set to cater to people who are heavy users – if I understood her correctly, I think she is asking whether we can have different tiers of passes. Sir, I think that it is not impossible. We can take a look to see how we can do this. We will ask the PTC to consider different options, whether there are ways in which we can provide more flexibility.

But I just want to raise one factual point, that I hope Ms Mariam agrees with me, which is that it is quite difficult to tell ex ante when a person walks in and say, "I want to buy a concession pass", whether this person is a light, moderate or heavy user. We cannot tell – ex post, you can tell, but not ex ante.

So, when this person comes in and wants to buy a concession pass, unless we set a limit to how many times this person can use the pass, which then goes against our current concession pass concept – which is once you buy the concession pass, it is unlimited, it is like a buffet, you can use as many times as you like. So, I think we can take a look, but I do not think we can implement the current all-you-can-use approach and have different tiers because it is not possible to tell ex ante whether the person is a light, moderate or heavy user.

Mr Gerald Giam.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. Sir, the Acting Minister has responded to two of my Parliamentary Questions, so, I have several supplementary questions to ask related to them.

Sir, the $50 PTV provides less than two weeks of travel for a family of four, and larger households will deplete it even more quickly. Even for workers and the WTCS, the PTV covers less than half a month's public transport expenses per worker. Given this, what is the rationale for setting the PTV quantum at $50 and can this be increased further?

Second, many families have multiple family members working or schooling, and each of them may need help to cover the cost of public transport. Can the PTVs be provided on an individual basis rather than per household to help larger families that are working hard to make ends meet?

Next, one of commuters' bugbears is that despite increases in bus fares, bus routes – especially trunk services which are popular among the elderly – continue to be rationalised. While this boosts operator profits and Government savings, it diminishes service quality for the affected commuters. Even to this day, my residents in Bedok Reservoir still complain to me about reduced bus services and request for the return of bus services 66 and 506. Will LTA continue to rationalise bus services despite this increase in bus fares?

And lastly, the public transport fare hikes coincide with record-high COE prices and increases in fares and fees for taxis and private hire vehicles in July. Singaporeans cannot help but feel squeezed no matter which mode of transport they take. Did the PTC consider the recent increases in private transport costs when approving the public transport fare hike and its impact on Singapore's plans to become a car-lite city?

Mr Speaker, I think the last question that Mr Giam asked, I already explained earlier in my response to Mr Louis Chua that the PTC is mindful of the overall higher costs of living concerns of Singaporeans, and therefore makes a judgement call not to allow the full amount but to allow only less than one third.

Sir, the first question that Mr Giam asked was about the quantum of the PTVs. We look at it differently. The PTVs are not designed or not intended to defray the total public transport expenditure, but rather, they are meant to cushion the impact of the fare increase on lower-income households. So, if you look at it from that point of view, we estimate that $50 would cover about six months of fare increase for these households.

That said, I do agree with Mr Giam that families and households have different compositions – some have more members. I do acknowledge that point. The way we have done it, Sir, is as with past exercises, households with genuine needs but may have missed the eligibility criteria or if they need more help because they have a larger family size, they can appeal to their local community centres. For this round, they can start doing so from early-2024. The appeals will then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Sir, the second question that Mr Giam asks, I think we have discussed this previously, but allow me to just recap some of the key points. Sir, we do not rationalise or take away buses in a frivolous manner. I understand the concerns. This has to be very carefully considered because there are commuters who are affected. We try our best not to do that. But because there are new estates that are coming up, including, I am sure, in Mr Giam's constituency, we do need to also cater new feeder services to meet new demand. So, if we do not find a way to re-allocate some of the resources from existing services to meet new demand, then the concern there is that the bill will keep growing for commuters and for taxpayers.

So, when we have to take away some of these longer trunk routes, the considerations are, first, is there an alternative? So, we do not take away if there is no alternative. Second, is there a parallel Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) route or line that the commuter can take? The concept that I hope Mr Giam can help us as well to explain to his residents, is that we encourage people to take public transport as much as possible within the town, feeder services to bring them from their homes or near their homes to the key transport notes like bus interchanges and MRT stations. And then for the longer trunk routes, gradually as we develop our MRT system and it becomes better connected, a more efficient way is to use the MRT to cater to the demand for the longer trunk routes. So, think about it as feeder services mainly for the local, bringing you to key transport nodes; and then the MRT to cater to longer trunk routes. I think if we can help to move towards such a system, it will be more efficient and also from a connectivity point of view, better for commuters.

Okay, last question. Mr Liang Eng Hwa.

Thank you, Sir. Can I ask the Acting Minister if there is further upside to increase ridership? Whether with increased ridership, you can improve the overall financials of the operators running the public transport and hence, help to reduce further fare increases?

Mr Speaker, the short answer is yes. In fact, our target is to further increase the public transport modal share. It is not only because it will help with the cost recovery ratio or the financial sustainability of the public transport system – I mean, that is one benefit as Mr Liang highlighted – but also from the environmental sustainability point of view, because public transport is more environmentally sustainable than private cars. Certainly, I think that is a direction that we want to encourage Singapore to head towards.

Next question, Ms Mariam Jaafar.

16 Ms Mariam Jaafar asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment in light of the continued rise in food prices at hawker centres (a) what proportion of meals sold at a hawker stall are budget meals; and (b) whether there has been feedback from hawkers that the budget meals are increasingly difficult to sustain.

Sir, while the National Environment Agency (NEA) does not regulate prices of cooked food sold at hawker centres, it aims to provide hawkers with a conducive environment to set affordable food prices. Thus far, despite rising costs, affordable meal options remain available at our hawker centres, including those managed by NEA and Town Councils, as well as socially conscious enterprises, where the operators are required to keep food affordable and have done so by ensuring at least one budget meal option per stall.

Ms Mariam Jaafar.

I thank the Senior Minister of State for the response. I have one supplementary question. Basically, we are still seeing an increase in prices at our hawker centres. The budget meals are much appreciated, but we are starting to see quite a big divergence between the budget meals and the regular price meals; and also starting to see a creep in the lower price options, say from a $3.80-budget meal has become a $4.20-budget meal in one of my coffee shops.

So, I understand that currently they have a rental rebate of 5% to sustain these budget meals and that is for a year. Does the NEA or the Housing and Development Board have any plans to extend that rebate or do we see any risk of the prices of budget meals not being able to be sustained at the $4 price range that they are at today?

Sir, I thank the Member for raising this concern. As I said, NEA does not regulate food prices sold at hawker centres because hawkers face different cost pressures in running their operations. Some of these factors can include the operating costs, perhaps utilities, it could also pertain to some of the other cost that they incur from buying their raw materials, for example. These things differ from stall to stall.

But as she has mentioned, NEA does provide some help in terms of moderating their rentals and in times of need, there has been some rent rebates given to these hawkers. We will watch these pressures on our hawkers closely and if there are further needs, we can see how we can best assist them.

The longer-term sustainable option is to really see how they can also become more productive. Some of these hawkers have already adopted more productive formats, with shared resources such as centralised cleaning as well as dishwashing, so that they can pool their resources together and incur less costs from their cleaning and their dishwashing needs. Other options that can help defray the costs to consumers, for example, would come in the form of our cost-of-living Assurance Packages, including Community Development Council vouchers, that help our residents to have some extra cash to spend at these hawker centres and also bring some revenue benefit to these hawkers as well.

So, I think, through these kind of efforts in a multi-pronged manner, we hope to reduce the cost impact on consumers while helping our hawkers to remain sustainable.

Ms Mariam Jaafar, next question.

17 Ms Mariam Jaafar asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) how many cases have been referred to the Committee Against Profiteering per quarter since it was reconvened on 16 March 2022; (b) how many cases have been found to constitute profiteering; (c) what penalties have been imposed following investigation, beyond asking the businesses involved to be transparent on their pricing and communication; and (d) how many repeat complaints have been received.

Sir, the Committee Against Profiteering (CAP) has received over 350 feedback submissions to date. Among these submissions, 32 cases involved specific allegations of Goods and Services Tax (GST) misrepresentation. The CAP worked with partners including the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, the Consumers Association of Singapore and the People's Association to investigate these cases. The businesses concerned were cooperative and have ceased the practices of GST misrepresentation. The CAP has not received any repeat complaints of GST misrepresentation against the same shops.

Ms Mariam Jaafar.

With the impending rise of water prices and electricity prices, there is some fear that may trigger another round of price increases at our hawker centres and coffee shops. My supplementary question is: while there is not a lot of water in a bowl of noodles or it does not take that much water to clean a store, how can the CAP take a proactive approach to ensure that these increases and prices do not translate into opportunities for profiteering?

Sir, I thank the Member for her supplementary question and I also acknowledge that these are valid concerns on the ground. As the Member would also understand, business costs arise through a variety of factors, including the cost of utilities, including water, manpower and also a variety of different factors. Singapore has a robust regime in place to ensure that our businesses compete fairly and consumers have sufficient choices across the board.

Should a member of the public come across egregious cases of potential profiteering, they can report this to the CAP via three channels: first, the online feedback form – it is at cap.gov.sg; second, the hotline – I will just give the number here at 67970618; or you can visit any of our 112 Community Clubs and these can help to deal with vernacular speakers.

Sir, I also wanted to emphasise on Senior Minister of State Dr Koh Poh Koon's point earlier on that the Government has taken on and in fact announced a suite of measures over the past couple of years, including recently the $1.1 billion Cost-of-Living Support Package announced by Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong.

But the Government's efforts alone are not enough. I would like to express appreciation to our businesses for also doing their part to promote the welfare of our consumers by holding prices steady or providing discounts to our vulnerable groups. I would also like to acknowledge businesses which voluntarily absorbed the impact of the GST increase for an initial period in 2023, such as Fairprice, Giant, Sheng Siong supermarkets as well as retailers like IKEA and Owndays.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

I thank the Senior Minister of State for his answer. As he is well aware, these price increases occur in a general environment where both prices in general are rising because of inflation, but also potentially because of GST. Is there a specific formula or a model that the Ministry applies or that the Committee applies to try to distinguish between how much of the increase is due to potentially profiteering from the increase or from price rises more generally?

I thank the Member for his question. I will give a bit of a context as well the few ways in which we are handling inflation – and we have discussed this and debated this in the House multiple times: one, is monetary policy, which helps to dampen imported inflation; and the second is, as I have mentioned earlier, our fiscal policies.

I will also share that during the first GST increase to 8% that we saw earlier this year, the CAP also saw an increase in feedback volume received on this. So, we will monitor that very carefully and one of the key measures is also to get feedback from the ground and then we will take the appropriate measures.

18 Ms Yeo Wan Ling asked the Minister for Manpower (a) since the implementation of the Progressive Wage (PW) Mark accreditation, recognising companies that pay progressive wages to lower-wage workers, how has the uptake of the PW Mark accreditation been; and (b) whether the Ministry tracks if more service buyers have chosen to do business exclusively with companies accredited with the PW Mark.

Since the Progressive Wage Mark's (PW Mark's) launch in January 2023, more than 3,600 firms have been accredited with the PW Mark.

The Ministry of Manpower (MOM) encourages service buyers to procure from PW Mark-accredited suppliers. However, MOM does not track the number of service buyers that have chosen to do business exclusively with companies accredited with the PW Mark. Nonetheless, based on our recent business sentiment survey, nine in 10 businesses polled indicated that they will prioritise purchases from corporate suppliers with the PW Mark, in support of our lower-wage workers.

As a major service buyer, the Government has taken the lead in making the PW Mark a contractual obligation for tenders since 1 March 2023. This requirement will be extended to include Government quotations from 1 March 2024.

Sir, uplifting lower-wage workers is a whole-of-society effort. We urge all employers to pay Progressive Wages to their lower-wage workers and to apply for the PW Mark if eligible. We also encourage service buyers and consumers to do their part by purchasing from PW Mark-accredited companies, where possible.

Ms Yeo Wan Ling.

In the successful roll-out of the Progressive Work Model, it is important that service buyers embrace revised wage ladders set up by the Tripartite Committee. It is very heartening to note that the take-up rate has been healthy for the PW Mark. How many employees does this translate to and the percentage of 20th percentile and below worker segments?

I also note what Senior Minister of State had mentioned – that the Government had taken the lead and requiring for PW Mark for suppliers and sub-contractors in new Government tenders. In the same vein, will they also take the lead in starting the re-negotiation process for existing contracts, especially for the long-term contracts which can extend up to 10 years?

Additionally, there has been some feedback that some service buyers have asked for service providers to pass on or share their Progressive Wage Credit Scheme (PWCS) credits that the service providers receive during the re-negotiation process. While this advisory shows that the practice is not supported and that PWCS support should instead be made transparent by service providers in the negotiation process, what pragmatic steps is the Ministry taking to safeguard service providers against such requests in the process of re-negotiations?

To the Member's first supplementary question on how many workers are covered, I mentioned earlier that we have got more than 3,600 firms that are accredited with the PW Mark and that collectively, they hire approximately 56,000 low-wage workers. If you think about the percentages, in the 2021 Tripartite Workgroup Report, we sized the low-wage worker segment to be about 283,000 workers. So, this is about 20% of the total population. Which I think is encouraging, given it has been implemented for the first few months.

Secondly, as the Government has also put in place requirements for contract obligations for firms who want to tender and subsequently, in future, to quote as well to Government, this will hopefully drive more adoption. I think this is an encouraging sign.

To the Member's question on contract re-negotiations, these are commercial negotiations. Therefore, the Government does not intervene in contracting. I think that has to be the principle. However, on the Government procurement, I think we are largely aligned with the Tripartite Advisory. So, the terms, conditions and the advisory given by the tripartite partners are quite clear. And therefore, we encourage and we certainly will make sure that our Government agencies abide by it and support this.

On the question relating to long-term contracts and some of these unscrupulous practices, I suggest that the Tripartite Advisory is an agreement made between the Government, the Labour Movement as well as their employers. So, if they are specific cases, I recommend the National Trades Union Congress or the Member surface them to us so that we can look into them and advise accordingly.

19 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) whether the Government is considering a redefinition of what constitutes basic needs given its evolving understanding which extends beyond traditional necessities like housing and food; (b) if so, will this redefinition take into consideration the need to foster a sense of belonging and living dignity in Singapore; and (c) whether the Government will look into addressing the income inequality gap and relative deprivation, recognising that raising the wage floor may be inadequate to foster this sense of belonging.

Basic needs comprise not just biological and physical necessities like food, shelter and transport, but also socio-psychological needs, such as social connections and emotional support. The Government works with the community to provide multiple lines of support to families who have difficulty meeting these needs on their own.

ComCare helps lower-income families to meet their basic living expenses. The Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) reviews the scheme regularly to ensure that it remains relevant and adequate. During these reviews, MSF considers the items that should be covered under ComCare, taking into account what other Government schemes or Government-funded programmes would cover, as well as help available through community organisations. As an example of how the ComCare scheme has evolved over time, mobile data plans are now covered under ComCare assistance as we recognise that digital connectivity, which in turn enables human connection, is a basic need in modern society today.

Beyond ComCare, other Government schemes and Government-funded programmes enable lower-income individuals to meet other needs. Examples include schemes such as MediFund, the Ministry of Education's Financial Assistance Scheme and the Infocomm Media Development Agency's DigitalAccess@Home scheme, which address lower-income families' needs relating to healthcare, education and digital access respectively.

Community stakeholders also play an important role. For example, social service agencies provide befriending services that support seniors' social and psychological well-being and in-kind contributions to assist low-income families with one-off needs, such as furniture and electrical items like refrigerators and washing machines. Grassroots organisations organise community activities, including affordable local outings and trips to nearby countries, to promote social and family bonding. For lower-income families, grassroots organisations also render support through programmes and initiatives, such as free tuition and local bursary awards for students and monthly free haircuts for seniors. Donors, including corporate donors, have also helped by sponsoring lower-income families for outings to local attractions, such as Universal Studios.

Ultimately, addressing income inequality is not just about shoring up basic needs, but about providing opportunity and seeking to level the playing field for those who face disadvantages. This is why we have introduced initiatives, such as Community Link (ComLink) for lower-income families with children living in public rental housing, to proactively identify their needs, journey with them on customised action plans to secure a better future for them. A key feature of ComLink is that Government agencies, social service agencies, corporates and individual volunteers all work together to befriend, encourage and help ComLink families address their needs and challenges. This collective effort is key to strengthening Singapore's social compact and building a more caring and inclusive society. And as is commonly found by many who volunteer their time and resources to help others, it is not just the recipients of care, concern and resources that gain an increased sense of hope and belonging, those who step forward to give often find that they too have received.

Mr Yip Hon Weng.

I thank the Senior Parliamentary Secretary for his reply. I am glad to hear that the Ministry is undertaking this review regularly. I wish to ask how often will the review take place? Also, can the Ministry share some details on how the review will be undertaken and will this involve interviewing more residents on the ground? Specifically, will respondents be surveyed on their personal willingness to pay higher taxes? And what each respondent will be willing to contribute monthly to support the basic needs of others?

Sir, I thank the Member for his additional supplementary question. I think the question is not one about whether how regular are such reviews but rather whether these supports that we have put in place are adequate and relevant for the families in need.

The last review that we have done was in August 2022 and the Member would agree that with the recent pressures on cost-of-living, we need to be adept and prompt in addressing the needs of these families because oftentimes, those that are in these families are hardest hit by cost of living pressures.

In terms of how we review what is to be included and at what level do we provide support for these families, we do look at a basket of needs that get reviewed from time to time, periodically – as I have mentioned in my main reply. We also do include items that perhaps over time, should be included in what these families will probably need as a basic need. I raised the example of mobile data plans as one of the instances that we have included necessities into this basket.

So, I hope the Member and other Members of this House are adequately assured that we do review the basket of ComCare support as a basic set of necessities for these families regularly and that the support for these families are adequate and relevant.

Because we are rather slow in our Parliamentary Questions, I am going to move it along. Ms He Ting Ru, next question.

20 Ms He Ting Ru asked the Minister for Transport (a) in each of the last five years, how many requests have been received to waive the additional levy payable by vehicle owners who transfer their vehicles between the fourth and sixth month from the date of registration; (b) how many requests for waiver have been granted; and (c) what are the main reasons for such waivers to be granted.

21 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Minister for Transport whether the Ministry has assessed the effectiveness of the imposition of an additional levy on cars sold between the fourth and sixth month of ownership in discouraging COE speculation.

Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to answer Question Nos 20 and 21 on today's Order Paper?

Please proceed.

Cars registered under Category A (Cat A) and Category B (Cat B) of the Certificate of Entitlement (COE) are only allowed to apply for a transfer of vehicle ownership three months after the date of registration. If cars are transferred between four and six months from the date of registration, an additional levy would be payable if the Quota Premium (QP) of the corresponding COE category at the point of transfer is higher than the original QP paid upon successful bidding for the COE.

The additional levy is part of a suite of measures to discourage COE speculation, which also includes requiring a bid deposit and disallowing the transfer of Temporary COEs (TCOEs) for Cat A and Cat B vehicles. Over the last five years, the Land Transport Authority (LTA) received, on average, three requests annually to waive the additional levy payable by the vehicles' owners. Over the same period, only one request to transfer car ownership from a deceased person to the executor of the deceased estate was acceded to.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. Just to follow up quickly on the original question in the Parliamentary Question. I am wondering if Senior Minister of State Amy Khor would elaborate on whether the efforts at discouraging speculation along the lines of banning transfers between four and six months have been relatively more effective than other kinds of measures. For instance, right now, my understanding is that lots of COEs are being speculated on indirectly by those that are purchased during a high supply year and then subsequently resold it in a low supply year.

First, let me clarify that for vehicle transfers within four to six months of registration is not a ban on transfer. You just need to pay the additional levy. With regard to the question about whether this is an effective policy tool, I have said in my reply earlier that it is part of a suite of measures to discourage COE speculation.

By way of explanation, let me also say that this policy to discourage double transfers was first implemented in 1995. That is really to discourage double transfers whereby you may bypass, to this means, the non-transfer TCOE policy of Cat A and Cat B vehicles. And there were public sentiments that double transfers would have resulted in higher COE prices. So, there were measures put in. For the first three months, you are not allowed to transfer for Cat A and Cat B vehicles and then, subsequently, in the next three months, you can transfer, but you will need to pay an additional levy only if what you paid is actually lower than the QP at the point of transfer, otherwise, there would not be any additional levy.

If you look at the numbers, I have said that, over the last five years, we received, on average, about three appeals for a waiver of the additional levy. So, it is a handful of appeals. Over the same period, the proportion of Cat A and Cat B vehicles that are transferred within four to six months, as a proportion of the total Cat A and Cat B vehicles registered, is also very low, at about 0.3%.

So, I think these numbers do suggest that this policy tool remains relevant and useful as part of this suite of measures to counter COE speculation.

Ms He Ting Ru.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Senior Minister of State for the reply and for sharing some of the reasons as well why one of the approvals for waiver was given because of a deceased person. I am just also wondering whether it is possible that LTA would consider cases where there is a very sudden, unexpected and catastrophic event, something like a permanent disability to the car owner or within the family, whether or not that would also qualify for waiver of the additional levy, because, sometimes, we do not plan it, especially when we are at a relatively young age. But, of course, the additional waiver can be quite a significant burden on this household which is already struggling and having to deal with this permanent disability or long-term illness.

I thank the Member for her questions. Let me say that I do sympathise with such families. As I have said, this is part of a suite of policy tools to discourage double-transfer COE speculation. So, for this to remain useful and relevant, the conditions or circumstances under which waiver of the additional levy can be given would necessarily need to be stringent and limited in terms of circumstances. But having said that, as I have earlier clarified, the additional levy policy just means that if you want to transfer within four to six months, you have to pay an additional levy. It is not that you cannot transfer.

And for vehicle owners who wish to transfer within the four to six months and not wait thereafter because of various circumstances, they can actually sell it to motorcar dealers registered with LTA – what we called the electronic service agents – whereby they will not need to bear the additional levy. So, these registered dealers can take temporary ownership without incurring an actual transfer count and they have 12 months to sell the vehicle. And if they actually sell it after six months of vehicle registration, they also do not need to pay additional levy.

So, there is a way out, an option, for the appellant. But having said that, we hear the Member's views. And let me say that we will continue to look at appeals and review the circumstances under which waivers can be granted, where the conditions warrant such a waiver.

Ms He Ting Ru.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I just want to ask one last clarification from the Senior Minister of State. I thank the Senior Minister of State for sharing with us this kind of way-out, that is, this option that is available to these families who find themselves in very trying circumstances, obviously with zero intention of speculating on COE for any financial gain. I am just wondering whether, in terms of awareness of this scheme, this is something that LTA actually tells people who ask for this, because I just do not think that many people out there are aware that this is possible.

I am also aware that the Member has an appeal case on this. Indeed, we have told the appellant that there is this route that she could take, by transferring it to the registered motorcar dealer. We do have some 2,000 of these registered motorcar dealers. And our advice would usually be that they should approach CaseTrust- Singapore Vehicle Traders Association-accredited dealers for such an option. Most of them would be registered.

Okay. Final supplementary question. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. Just a quick clarification. I am wondering if the Senior Minister of State will clarify that, indeed, the Ministry's assessment of the efficacy of this particular additional levy scheme in discouraging speculation is based on the low number of transfers that are being transacted as a result of this scheme.

Let me say that it is part of a suite of measures. So, basically, you cannot strip one out from the other. But having said that, the low number is an indication, a suggestion, that it remains useful and relevant. But we continue to monitor the various policies we have to counter COE speculation.

22 Ms Poh Li San asked the Minister for Culture, Community and Youth (a) whether the use of Mr Lee Kuan Yew's image on a local company's commemorative packet drinks contravenes the guidelines set out on the use of the name and image of founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew; and (b) if so, whether the Ministry has the authority to demand that distribution of such commercial products be withdrawn.

Mr Speaker, Sir, before launching their commemorative initiative, Yeo's had consulted the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY) to ensure that it was in line with the published guidelines on the use of Mr Lee Kuan Yew's name and image. MCCY assessed that the use of Mr Lee's image on the commemorative drinks packet was respectful because the intent was to highlight Mr Lee's contribution to the transformation of Singapore into a green city. Yeo's also clarified that the commemorative packet drinks were not available for sale, but were being distributed for free.

Ms Poh.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Minister of State for the clarification. My supplementary question pertains to a question on the packet drinks as they would be thrown into trash bins or even become litter. So, how can MCCY ensure that there is no undue disrespect to Mr Lee Kuan Yew if packet drinks or similar commercial products are being allowed?

Sir, we advise the public to dispose of the packets in an appropriate and responsible manner, and MCCY will take public feedback into consideration in future as well.

23 Ms Joan Pereira asked the Minister for Education how many students have been referred to the Health Sciences Authority for vaping in the last five years.

Mr Speaker, the number of students from schools and institutes of higher learning (IHLs) referred to the Health Sciences Authority (HSA) for vaping offences was less than 50 before 2020. Our schools and IHLs have stepped up checks in recent years and the number of students referred to HSA increased to about 800 in 2022. Still, it is likely there is under-detection.

The Ministry of Education (MOE), Ministry of Health (MOH), HSA and the Health Promotion Board (HPB) are concerned about the vaping situation not just among students, but in the wider community.

MOE is working with MOH, HSA and HPB to strengthen detection, enforcement and education. Besides enforcement checks, our schools and IHLs have stepped up preventive education to convey the harmful effects of vaping on one's health. We seek the cooperation of families and the wider community to reinforce these messages strongly to stem this worrying trend.

Ms Joan Pereira.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Second Minister for the reply. I have one supplementary question. Can I ask if there are plans to allocate more resources, be it technology, teaching tools or maybe even manpower, to assist our schools in addressing the issue of vaping among our youths?

I thank the Member for the supplementary question. Certainly, where necessary, we will allocate the necessary resources to improve our effort at reaching out to the students.

Let me just very quickly articulate what we have been doing at our schools. We imbue the messages against smoking and vaping in our curriculum. For example, in Physical Education at the upper primary, students are taught that all tobacco products are harmful and can affect their health and fitness. They are also taught about the harmful substances when offered. In the Science curriculum in education, we also explain to the students the harmful effects of substances found in products as well as the consequences on individuals, families and society are discussed at the lower secondary level.

In our Character and Citizenship Education, the students also learn about recognising impulsive and addictive behaviours that harm one's mental health, physical well-being and how to manage the concept of self-esteem as well as management of negative peer influence.

So, these are efforts that are being done today.

On the question of personnel, we recognise that personnel in schools are role models and they are also mentors and guides to our students. So, we equip them with the necessary skillsets to be able to support our students. As form teachers, they educate students on self-control and how to manage addictive behaviour. So, we are doing at this point in time what we can to reach out to the students. They know that vaping, for example, is an illegal activity. They know the harmful effects of it not just on their body but the fact that they are doing illegal activities. If they are involved, we engage parents, in the first instance, to try to help. But we will do more where necessary to increase our effort at addressing this trend.

24 Ms Denise Phua Lay Peng asked Minister for National Development (a) whether an update can be provided on the revised approach to prioritise inspections of occupied HDB rental flats; and (b) what is the annual schedule and budget allotted under the revised approach for proactive regular maintenance of these flats beyond the repairs requested by tenants.

Mr Speaker, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) proactively visits occupied rental flats annually to identify those that require repairs or maintenance. However, this practice was disrupted when COVID-19 Safe Management Measures (SMMs) were imposed. Currently, HDB conducts physical inspections in response to tenants' feedback and seeks to do so promptly.

Nevertheless, HDB aims to resume the proactive inspection and maintenance regime, and is studying options, such as outsourcing. We will share more details on the revised approach when ready.

In the meantime, tenants can continue to alert HDB on areas requiring repair or maintenance, and HDB will attend to these requests promptly.

Ms Denise Phua.

Mr Speaker, first, I just want to commend again the local HDB officers and also, the headquarters' rental department, who have been extremely helpful and caring when I raise such issues to them.

My question stems from a desire, maybe from a systemic level, to speed up and to give more allocation and discretion to these officers. I see in my rental house visits – and some of us actually have quite a number of them – quite a bit of rusty gates, defective windows, spalling concrete in ceilings due to wear and tear. I do not think it is the fault of anybody. It is due to wear and tear.

I thought there is a need to speed up and revive the proactive preventive maintenance programme, and I want to ask if HDB and the Ministry of National Development could look into this. Perhaps we could also think of other creative methods, other than just outsourcing to typical vendors, maybe to engage, say, workers from the Yellow Ribbon movement that the Senior Minister of State is also very actively involved with or halfway houses like New Charis Mission – to employ and deploy them so that these preventive maintenance exercises could be revived soon and our residents can live in even better conditions.

Sir, I thank the Member for the supplementary questions and I thank her for commending our officers. I would also like to thank her for being proactive and working in partnership with our officers on the ground to see how we can help our rental tenants.

I want to assure the Member and the House that we are studying various options. We want to see how the options can be practical and also get collaboration and partnerships with the community organisations. While we offer repairs or replacements for fittings and fixtures of rental flats if they are spoiled or dysfunctional, that is one part. For items which are aesthetic and less functional, these are essentially the tenants' responsibility. Nevertheless, for the needy ones, this would be where we work with community organisations and grassroots organisations, to assist them. There are many good-hearted people, on-the-ground groups, who have reached out proactively to help these tenants.

So, we will continue to look at some of these options. Again, I want to thank the Member for being very proactive and positive in this area.

25 Ms Carrie Tan asked the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) whether the Ministry keeps track of how many adult persons with special needs or persons with disability are financially dependent on their parents who have retired; (b) what are the current programmes and schemes available to help adult persons with special needs or disabilities to secure their own livelihood for their financial self-sufficiency, in particular those who are high functioning; and (c) what is the success rate of these programmes and schemes.

Mr Speaker, the Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) does not track whether adult persons with disabilities (PwDs) are financially dependent on parents who have retired. Based on the Comprehensive Labour Force Survey, the average resident employment rate for PwDs aged 15 to 64 has increased steadily from 28.2% in the period of 2018 to 2019 when data on PwDs was first collected, to 31.4% in 2021 to 2022.

SG Enable offers a wide variety of support for PwDs seeking employment. Under the Open Door Programme (ODP), PwDs receive up to one year of job matching and customised employment support from trained job coaches. Grants under the ODP provide subsidies for PwDs to attend training courses by the Enabling Academy – SG Enable's disability learning hub – as well as for workshops that prepare employers and their employees without disabilities to interact with, hire, integrate and retain employees with disabilities in their organisation. Between 2020 and 2022, SG Enable and its partners placed an average of 500 PwDs into jobs each year.

PwDs can also take up job and training opportunities created under the customised Place-and-Train and Attach-and-Train programmes. More than 380 job and training opportunities have been filled under these two programmes since they were introduced in 2021.

The Government also provides employers with wage support through the Enabling Employment Credit (EEC). The EEC provides up to 20% wage support for employees with disabilities earning below $4,000 per month, capped at $400. More support is provided to encourage the hiring of PwDs who are long-term unemployed and are more likely to be financially reliant on their families. Employers who hire PwDs who have not been working for at least six months will receive an additional 20% of wage offsets, capped at $400 per month per employee, for the first nine months. In 2022, close to 6,600 organisations received the EEC and collectively employed more than 10,000 employees with disabilities, including close to 2,000 who had not been in work for at least six months. The Workfare Income Supplement also provides additional support to lower-income workers, including PwDs, by supplementing their income and Central Provident Fund savings.

Building an inclusive workplace requires a whole-of-society effort. As part of the Enabling Masterplan 2030, we encourage more employers to provide suitable employment opportunities for PwDs. Later this year, the first Enabling Business Hub (EBH) will be launched to bring jobs and employment support closer to where PwDs live. The EBH will provide more customised skills training and job coaching to help PwDs remain in their jobs and also open up opportunities in new sectors such as logistics. We encourage partners across the private, people and public sectors to join our efforts to achieve the aspirational target to raise the employment rate of PwDs to 40% by 2030.

Ms Carrie Tan.

Speaker, I thank the Senior Parliamentary Secretary for the answer. It is quite heartening to hear that we have been making progress. I understand that since December last year, we have 35,500 students with special needs who are in our education system right now, which means that they will be growing up to become adults in the next 10 to 15 years.

Given that we are making some progress, are there going to be further investments in ensuring that this whole-of-society approach can be accelerated to further enable more numbers of persons with special needs to be employed in their adulthood, to greater success, meaning, more retention and to measure their level of self-sufficiency, because this is likely to be a cost to the country? And whether, in the long term, do we look at the support and integration of persons with special needs based on a certain ratio of welfare versus self-sufficiency target? There are some who may not be able to work. But among those who can, with the relevant training and the relevant sensitisation of the employers and the general public, can we move that needle further and faster?

Sir, I thank the Member for her questions. The short answer to what she is asking about, essentially, is yes, more will be done. The EBH that I spoke about earlier is the first, the pilot. More business hubs will be set up across the island so that we can bring employment services and support services closer to where PwDs and their caregivers live.

In terms of how we want to achieve our aspirational target of getting 40% employment rates for PwDs by 2030, another strategy is to look at which other industries are more amenable to disability inclusive employment. Today, the industries that are more amenable include services, food and beverages. As I mentioned in my main reply, we are trying to move into other new growth areas, blue oceans for PwDs, such as logistics.

To achieve the aspirations that we want for PwDs, I think we need to go beyond the tangibles, we need to go beyond programmes. Essentially, we are also talking about a change of mindsets, a change of hearts as well. We do need a change of hearts on multiple fronts.

First of all, for PwDs themselves, many of them would also have this question in their minds, especially if they have not been in the workplace for a long time, "Can I do it, can I be an employee of an organisation, a business, a corporate?" That is the question we need to address.

Secondly, caregivers. They will ask, "Can my loved ones do it? Can my loved ones work? Will he or she be bullied?" These are concerns we need to address as well.

Most of all, I would say, beyond the C-suite consent or support that we get from industries, we do need every employee, every supervisor – or as many of them as we can – to really embrace the fact that PwDs can live amongst us, can also be my fellow employee, can be my fellow workmate. I think we do need to initiate a conversation around these issues – not that we have not already, but we need to push the conversation even further so that we can drive this cause to a maximal effect.

Final supplementary question. Ms Denise Phua. Keep it short, please.

I thank the Senior Parliamentary Secretary, MSF and SG Enable for doing quite a lot of work in this space, especially in employment for adults with disabilities in the last decade. I do think that the hon Member Ms Carrie Tan's request to track data on the financial situation of adults with disabilities has some merit. Tracking data will ensure that there is better financial security for all adults with disabilities in our country, just like we would encourage typical folks to do the same as well.

I think that there is a need to gauge the size of the monster, the issue. There should be an intentional approach to first determine the archetypes of adults with disabilities – some can work full-time, some can work part-time, some will need more care and cannot really work in open employment. And then, there are also the family archetypes. There are different types of families – some can afford, very much they have their own resources —

Ms Phua, can you get to your supplementary question?

And then, there are others who cannot. So, I think that there should be a better way of segmentation of these archetypes so that better methods in ensuring financial security can come about for this particular sector. For consideration, please.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Member Ms Denise Phua for her question. I think I will summarise it into two parts. Firstly, spectrum, yes, we recognise the diversity of this community and we do want to be able to support them in a very targeted fashion. Secondly, in terms of tracking, we do take that feedback and we will see how best we can do it between SG Enable and MSF.

26 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Minister for Health (a) since 2022, how many inpatient hospice patients have sought ElderShield claims; (b) of these, how many claims have been approved; (c) what is the median time taken from application to the commencement of payout; (d) how many have been approved through (i) severe disability assessor review by a visiting assessor and (ii) resident assessment forms submitted by the inpatient hospices, respectively; and (d) whether the claims of patients with severely limited life expectancy in inpatient hospices can be expedited.

Mr Speaker, between January 2022 and June 2023, around 20 inpatient hospice patients have sought ElderShield claims, and all were approved, supported by severe disability assessments conducted by the Ministry of Health (MOH)-accredited severe disability assessors. The Resident Assessment Form is an assessment tool that is typically used in nursing homes and is not commonly used in inpatient hospices.

Currently, the median time for processing all severe disability scheme claims applications is 10 working days. Payouts are disbursed in the month after application approval and will include payouts for prior months between date of disability assessment and approval date. The Agency for Integrated Care (AIC) proactively looks out for claims applications from patients with limited life expectancy and prioritises the processing of their claims applications.

Dr Tan.

I thank MOH for the answer. I have got two supplementary questions. My Clementi resident was terminally ill, admitted to an inpatient hospice. Her family shared they had difficulty getting an assessor to go to the inpatient hospice. Eventually, the AIC asked if the hospice could arrange a Resident Assessment Form. But then, the family were told there needed to be two assessments done six months apart.

Sir, I know our agencies mean well and try their best. But six months is a very long time for a terminally ill patient in a hospice. My resident died that same month. Can I ask the Senior Parliamentary Secretary, can MOH do a review of existing policies to see how assessments and outcomes can be expedited for terminally ill Singaporeans who do not have much time left? Secondly, can I also ask how can we improve access to ElderShield claims and payouts for persons who are less mobile at home and therefore, cannot easily seek medical assessment?

We recognise that requiring two Resident Assessment Forms six months apart is not very applicable to the patients in hospices. For patients in the inpatient hospice setting, the best assessment arrangement is to use the severe disability assessment, but we acknowledge the issue that Dr Tan's resident faced. In that particular case, the ElderShield application was eventually approved based on the doctor's memo.

We thank Dr Tan for raising a very important issue so that we can enhance our claims processes for patients with limited life expectancy. In following up with Dr Tan's feedback, MOH is working with AIC to improve access to severe disability assessors. In particular, AIC will work with inpatient hospices to actively link them up with available severe disability assessors. More broadly, AIC will proactively look up for claims from patients with limited life expectancies and prioritise processing of their applications.

To further enhance this, we are also looking at enhancing access to severe disability assessments at home for patients who may be less mobile. We will continue to expand our pool of house-call assessors who are currently in the number of about 230. We are also exploring the possibility of allowing tele-assessments to further improve accessibility of severe disability accessors.

So, we hope that in doing all these efforts, the concerns raised by Dr Tan will be addressed.

Order and of Question Time. Ministerial Statement. Second Minister for Home Affairs.

[Pursuant to Standing Order No 22(3), provided that Members had not asked for questions standing in their names to be postponed to a later Sitting day or withdrawn, written answers to questions not reached by the end of Question Time are reproduced in the Appendix.]

Mr Speaker, on 15 August 2023, more than 400 Police Officers conducted simultaneous raids at multiple locations island-wide. Ten persons were arrested and charged for offences, including laundering proceeds from overseas criminal activities, and their seizeable assets in Singapore were seized.

This is one of Singapore's largest anti-money laundering operations. Many Parliamentary Questions (PQs) have been filed. They centre around the effectiveness of Singapore's existing measures to detect and counter money laundering activities; and whether additional measures are needed to curb money laundering in Singapore.

My Statement will be in five parts: first, an update on this case and the investigations; second, money laundering risks in international financial centres; third, an overview of Singapore's anti-money laundering regime; fourth, the immigration-related issues that have arisen from this case; and fifth, an outline of our plans to ensure that Singapore's anti-money laundering regime remains robust and effective.

After my Statement, there will be Statements by Second Minister for Finance and National Development Ms Indranee Rajah, and Minister of State and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) Board Member Mr Alvin Tan.

Sir, let me start with how the case unfolded. Mr Murali Pillai, Mr Gan Thiam Poh and Assoc Prof Jamus Lim asked whether there were red-flag indicators before the arrests were made and whether the arrested persons will be investigated for running organised crime syndicates or for criminal offences in other jurisdictions.

Sir, the intelligence gathering and planning for a major operation like this are not trivial. They take months, years even. I will share what I can, without undermining ongoing investigations by Police.

Police had initially received disparate information on suspicious activities. In 2021, our anti-money laundering regime picked up a few signals, including the use of suspected forged documents to substantiate sources of funds in bank accounts in Singapore. Some Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) were filed by financial institutions and other companies. Police began looking separately into these alerts.

In early 2022, Police launched a comprehensive, coordinated intelligence probe. The probe uncovered a web of individuals believed to have connections amongst themselves, including by familial ties.

Police analysed the information and probed further, quietly. To avoid alerting the suspects, the work was kept to a very small group of officers, and a decision was made to hold off any enforcement or overt investigative actions. Police's aim was to probe extensively and develop as full a picture as possible of the suspects and their associates, their suspected criminal activities and their assets, before making any move against them.

As the probe progressed, the web uncovered by the Police grew and grew. More and more individuals were implicated in the alleged money laundering operation, and more and more of their assets held in Singapore were discovered. Police painstakingly and discreetly traced their ties and assets.

Members would appreciate that anti-money laundering probes of this scale and nature are complex. Connecting the dots between people and things is a lot easier said than done. We also had to be very discreet, and so Police moved cautiously and with only a very small team. Had the suspects caught wind of our probes, the suspects and their assets might have fled, and the investigations and the entire operation might have been jeopardised.

Earlier this year, the Police assessed that they had enough information, and consulted the Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC). AGC assessed that we had sufficient reason to suspect that criminal offences had been committed in Singapore.

Following the intensive intelligence probes, extensive reviews of information and examination of evidence, Police moved decisively against the suspects on 15 August this year.

There has been some speculation circulating in news outlets – internationally and domestically – that this operation was carried out at the behest of China. This is completely untrue.

Singapore does not need another country to tell us what to do to enforce our laws, nor will we do anything unless it is in our own interests. In this case, we started investigations because we suspected that offences had been committed in Singapore. Once we confirmed our suspicions, we acted.

So far, 10 persons have been arrested and charged for offences, including laundering criminal proceeds. As investigations are ongoing, I will provide an update to the extent possible.

The proceeds likely came from criminal activities that took place outside of Singapore. These include illegal online gambling and unlicensed moneylending.

In addition to money laundering, some of the accused have been charged with forgery as well. Two of the 10 persons have been charged with additional offences of resisting arrest and perverting the course of justice.

Many others, not arrested, are assisting with investigations. Yet, others are wanted by Police for investigations but are not in Singapore.

On 20 September, Police updated that the total value of assets seized or issued with prohibition of disposal orders stood at more than $2.4 billion. Since then, Police have conducted further operations and extensive investigations. To date, the total value of assets seized or issued with prohibition of disposal orders by the Police stands at more than $2.8 billion. This includes:

Prohibition of disposal orders issued against 152 properties and 62 vehicles with a total estimated value of more than $1.24 billion, as well as thousands of bottles of liquor and wine;

And seizures of monies in bank accounts amounting to more than $1.45 billion; cash, including foreign currencies, amounting to more than $76 million; cryptocurrencies of more than $38 million; 68 gold bars, 294 luxury bags, 164 luxury watches and 546 pieces of jewellery.

Police's investigations are still ongoing. As we probe further, there may be more arrests and assets seized.

There has been some interest in how we will deal with the seized assets. Mr Zhulkarnain asked about this. The seized assets will be dealt with accordingly and under our laws, depending on the findings. The disposal will be conducted by the Courts.

There are also ongoing probes by various sectoral regulators, including Government agencies overseeing corporate service providers, real estate agents, financial institutions and others. Police are working closely with the sectoral regulators and will take action against the companies and individuals should criminal offences be disclosed, such as abetment of money laundering. If there is negligence or non-compliance with anti-money laundering requirements, the sectoral regulators will take action.

Some of the arrested individuals made donations to charities in Singapore. Mr Edward Chia asked whether these are being investigated. Some charities have decided on their own to ringfence these donations. Others have made Police reports and plan to surrender the monies to the Police. The Commissioner of Charities (COC) will issue an advisory to encourage all charities to review their donor records to ascertain whether they have received donations from the arrested individuals and entities linked to them, and file the requisite STRs. It will also include advice to charities on how to handle the monies.

In summary, this case is one of the largest anti-money laundering operations not just in Singapore, but likely the world. We probed extensively to uncover the linkages. We were comprehensive in our actions and operation.

We will not hesitate to take strong enforcement action against people who would use Singapore as a haven to launder proceeds of crime. We will deal with them and their ill-gotten gains to the fullest extent of our laws.

Let me now provide the backdrop to the anti-money laundering operation which we have just carried out, in particular, the risks that global financial hubs like Singapore face.

Singapore is an attractive place for investments and businesses. There is political and economic stability, strong rule of law and transparency. People are assured that their money is safe here.

The facts speak for themselves. Singapore was ranked third in the Global Financial Centres Index last year, behind only New York and London. Our ability to attract international funds has facilitated investments, growth and good jobs for Singaporeans. The financial sector contributes about 14% of our gross domestic product (GDP) and employs about 200,000 people. It is important for us.

When we open for business – and we must be – criminals will also try to exploit the same economic openness and our strong reputation for the rule of law, to launder their illicit funds and create the appearance of legitimacy.

In fact, all major financial hubs, not just Singapore, are vulnerable. The same characteristics that make them attractive as financial hubs also make them attractive targets for money laundering. Reputable jurisdictions like Singapore take our anti-money laundering responsibilities seriously and pursue cases thoroughly.

Mr Saktiandi Supaat and Ms Foo Mee Har have asked how our efforts compare with others.

In February last year, the United States (US) Department of Justice announced its largest financial seizure to date of more than US$3.5 billion, which is equivalent to about $4.8 billion. This was linked to the laundering of billions of dollars in cryptocurrency stolen from a 2016 hack of Bitfinex, a cryptocurrency exchange registered in the British Virgin Islands.

In January this year, Hong Kong Customs arrested nine persons suspected of 7,600 illicit deals involving over HK$6 billion, which is equivalent to about S$1 billion. The individuals were found to have operated multiple bank accounts for illegal transactions.

Earlier this year, in a case similar to ours, the Australian Federal Police charged nine members of an international money laundering syndicate. They had enabled multiple transnational organised crime groups to launder funds derived from criminal activities. The Australian Federal Police restrained more than AU$150 million – equivalent to about $130 million – in property, cash and luxury items.

What about Singapore? Everyone knows that we have a zero-tolerance approach for money laundering. But just as low crime does not mean no crime, zero tolerance does not mean zero occurrence. We are under no illusion that we can always keep out dirty money.

As one of the leading international financial centres in the world, the daily transactions in Singapore are voluminous. We have to rely on various stakeholders – the financial institutions and other gatekeepers in the system like corporate service providers, property agents, precious stones and precious metals (PSPM) dealers – to conduct the necessary checks and detect possible risks. A lot of it is picked up and acted upon.

This is therefore not the first time that we have taken serious enforcement action against money laundering and breaches of our money laundering requirements.

Members would recall the transnational case related to 1MDB, involving illicit flows through Singapore. Police extensively investigated the individuals who were suspected of committing offences in Singapore, while MAS thoroughly examined the financial institutions through which the funds flowed.

Assets amounting to more than $240 million were seized or prohibited. Three bankers were convicted for failure to report suspicious transactions and fined between $10,000 and $128,000 each. One banker was convicted of offences including money laundering and sentenced to more than four years of imprisonment. MAS issued to 11 individuals prohibition orders ranging from three years to lifetime bans from working in Singapore's financial sector for their gross misconduct.

Another example involved Wirecard. Following news of irregularities in Wirecard's financial statements and the alleged involvement of Singapore-based individuals and entities in the matter, MAS closely examined these suspicions.

Three banks and an insurer in Singapore were issued penalties amounting to $3.8 million for failure to perform customer due diligence (CDD) and to adequately establish the sources of wealth of high-risk customers. Seven individuals have been charged in relation to this case. Three of them have been convicted for offences including money laundering.

These examples leave no doubt that Singapore takes money laundering seriously. When there is reasonable suspicion to investigate, we do not hesitate to do so. We do not turn a blind eye to any risks once we are made aware of them. This is not the first time that we have taken serious enforcement action against money laundering offences, nor will it be the last.

Even with stringent measures in place, we continuously review our practices. Each time we tighten up, the realistic aim is not to expect that no dirty money will ever come in because that would inevitably also affect legitimate investments and businesses. Instead, the aim is to reduce risk, have a robust alert system and take prompt enforcement action when we discover such activities as we did in this case.

We must also not fool ourselves into thinking that no news is good news. Instead, we must have the capability to detect wrongdoings and when we do, have the resolve to act decisively and robustly.

This is why we have steadily and systematically built up our anti-money laundering regime over the years. We adopt a holistic ecosystem approach across the Government, public-private partnership and international collaboration.

A whole-of-Government (WOG) effort is led by an inter-agency steering committee co-chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the Second Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and the Managing Director of MAS.

There is close partnership between the public and private sectors. An example is the Anti-money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Industry Partnership (ACIP). Co-chaired by MAS and the Police, ACIP brings together financial institutions to share analyses of emerging money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) risks as well as intelligence on specific cases.

Internationally, Singapore currently holds the presidency of the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF). FATF is an international organisation that sets the global standards to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing activities. We have been playing an active role in helping to enhance cross-border collaboration and strengthen anti-money laundering controls against new risk typologies.

Singapore's anti-money laundering strategy has three prongs and that applies across various sectors. First, prevention, underpinned by a robust legal and regulatory framework to deter criminals. The second prong, detection, is anchored by our STR regime and supervision by sectoral regulators. Our third prong, enforcement, is about taking strong action when there is suspicion of money laundering.

Allow me to elaborate. We have a robust legal and regulatory framework. Gatekeepers in various sectors have to comply with anti-money laundering requirements, including the conduct of due diligence.

Financial institutions are important gatekeepers. MAS requires them to conduct rigorous Know Your Customer (KYC) processes when accounts are opened and CDD on transactions. MAS ensures financial institutions' adherence to the anti-money laundering requirements through close supervision and surveillance.

Besides the financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) in other industries are also legally required to conduct KYC and CDD for their customers and transactions.

DNFBPs are gatekeepers in sectors that are known internationally to present higher risks of money laundering. They include real estate agents for property transactions, corporate service providers for company incorporation and dealers of PSPM. There are also DNFBPs that provide professional services, such as lawyers and accountants.

The Government agencies regulating the respective sectors regularly engage with the gatekeepers to ensure that they adhere to the anti-money laundering requirements.

Customers to these financial institutions and DNFBPs are also held accountable. Mr Murali asked whether it is a criminal offence if customers refuse to provide, or provide false or misleading information to commercial entities conducting CDD checks.

If financial institutions and DNFBPs assess that certain information from their customer is required for the CDD checks and their customer refuses to provide the information, this should itself raise red flags. Financial institutions and DNFBPs would be legally required to file an STR if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a transaction is connected to criminal conduct.

If a customer intentionally provides false or misleading information to commercial entities in order to circumvent the CDD checks, this may constitute a criminal offence under the Penal Code. We deal with this seriously.

Several Members – Mr Zhulkarnain, Ms Hany Soh, Miss Rachel Ong, Mr Don Wee, Mr Murali and Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant – enquired about the anti-money laundering laws related to high-value items.

The Precious Stones and Precious Metals (Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing) Act (PSPM Act) covers PSPM and "precious products", which refer to any jewellery, watch or other finished product where at least 50% of its value is attributable to precious stones or precious metals.

Simply put, among the items seized, gold bars would be covered by our laws. Some watches and jewelleries would also be covered, depending on the proportion of their value which is attributable to PSPM.

PSPM dealers are required to perform CDD before they conduct transactions involving cash exceeding $20,000 or where there are reasons to suspect money laundering. As PSPMs may easily be converted to cash, PSPM dealers are also required to file cash transaction reports with the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO) of the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) if they conduct transactions involving cash exceeding $20,000.

Mr Zhulkarnain asked what measures are in place to ensure that the requirements are not circumvented. PSPM are subject to inspections to ensure compliance with our regulations. Appropriate actions are taken against contraventions of the PSPM Act.

To the question by Assoc Prof Razwana, since 2021, 96 enforcement actions have been taken against PSPM dealers for failure to comply with CDD and cash transaction reporting requirements.

A number of the suspects had purchased high-value assets, such as luxury cars, bags, liquor and ornaments. These were among the assets that were seized or issued with a prohibition of disposal order. They are currently not regulated, unlike, for example, PSPMs.

In fact, Singapore's AML/CFT requirements comply with international standards set by FATF, which takes a risk-based approach targeting areas that have been assessed internationally to present higher money laundering risks.

We will examine if Singapore needs to extend anti-money laundering requirements to new classes of assets beyond what FATF has recommended. This has to be evaluated carefully so that we do not end up unduly inconveniencing legitimate businesses and customers.

The second prong of our AML regime is detection, of which a cornerstone is the STR regime.

Our laws make it a duty for everyone – including but not limited to landlords, property developers, financial institutions and corporate service providers – to report suspicious transactions.

Under section 45 of the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act, all persons have a duty to inform STRO if the person knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect, through the course of his profession or business, that any property or transaction they are dealing with may be illicit.

There is no minimum threshold for STR filing. There are also sector-specific requirements to file STRs.

We take STR reporting obligations seriously. Failure to file an STR is an offence. We have taken and will take action against those who failed to file an STR when it was merited.

Several Members – Mr Dennis Tan, Ms Sylvia Lim, Mr Vikram Nair, Mr Wee, Ms Ng Ling Ling, Assoc Prof Razwana, Mr Derrick Goh – enquired about our STR regime. These queries centre around: (a) the extent to which STRs are filed; (b) whether information obtained from STRs is shared across Government agencies; as well as (c) whether any updates will be made to enhance the effectiveness of our STR regime.

Sir, Singapore handles massive volumes of transactions every day. The reality is that this sheer volume provides easy camouflage for illicit activities. Spotting a suspicious transaction among millions is challenging.

To improve effectiveness, STRO has worked with sectoral regulators to develop red flag indicators to improve the detection of money laundering activities by gatekeepers. The red flag indicators are regularly updated to take into account emerging risk types in the money laundering landscape.

STRO received an average of 43,000 STRs annually between 2020 and 2022. That is more than 150 every working day. Over 80% were filed by our financial institutions.

Intelligence received – whether from STRs, STRO's foreign counterparts, or other sources – is analysed thoroughly and extensively by STRO. If STRO assesses that the information is relevant, it will disseminate the information to relevant Government agencies which will then conduct further investigations.

All this work done by the STRO, sectoral regulators and Police is incredibly difficult. It is not just one needle in a haystack, but one needle in several haystacks. It is also not a static field, because determined money launderers are always finding new ways to hide their tracks and avoid detection. In Chinese, we say, 道高一尺，魔高一丈. (In English): The righteous path is one foot high, the evil path is 10 feet high.

Against this backdrop, it is remarkable that our officers were able to uncover this web and in a fairly short time.

STRO will, of course, continue to update its methods and help agencies better connect the dots. In February last year, STRO commissioned a new data analytics system to enhance its ability to process large volumes of STRs and raise the quality of financial intelligence disseminated to domestic law enforcement agencies.

But let us understand that this is a never-ending challenge. With each new case, we will gain fresh insights and enhance our ability to detect the next one.

Third, enforcement. As Members would know, we take firm enforcement action against money laundering activities. From 2020 to 2022, at least 240 individuals were convicted of money laundering offences, largely for laundering domestic scam proceeds. In that same period, Police seized more than $1.2 billion worth of assets in money laundering investigations.

Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how many money laundering- and forgery-related cases involving S$500 million and above have been reported in the past three years. Mr Derrick Goh asked how we are deepening cooperation with foreign authorities to stem money laundering risks. Allow me to address these together.

Let me cite a case which involved working closely with foreign authorities to trace and interdict the illicit proceeds in Singapore.

In February 2021, the Police received information from our international partners and commenced investigations into a case of embezzlement of Angolan state funds that was alleged to have been laundered through foreign banks to Singapore. In the course of the investigations, Singapore Police Force (SPF) seized over $750 million from several bank accounts in Singapore.

Another example of our cooperation with international counterparts. We rendered assistance to United Kingdom (UK) law enforcement agencies for the case involving former Formula One boss Bernie Ecclestone. The MAS, SPF and AGC worked closely with the UK authorities on their investigation and prosecution of Ecclestone. Singapore had proactively shared relevant information with our UK counterparts, which helped them develop their case.

Domestic sectoral regulators have also taken to task entities which fell short of their legal obligations. For example, MAS has taken firm enforcement actions where financial institutions' controls had been unsatisfactory. In the past five years, 17 financial institutions had been taken to task for breaches of MAS' AML/CFT requirements.

Members – Ms Foo Mee Har, Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, Mr Patrick Tay, Mr Don Wee, Mr Alex Yam, Mr Leong Mun Wai – have filed questions relating to the entry and stay of foreign nationals in Singapore. Specifically, how do we scrutinise applications for work passes and other immigration facilities and how we step up checks on high-risk individuals, including those with criminal records or who are wanted in foreign jurisdictions, or who may have used false identities.

Let me first provide an update on the immigration status of the individuals under arrest.

To recap, 10 persons have been arrested and charged. They hold Employment Passes and Dependant's Passes. At the time of their applications, none of them were on INTERPOL's Red Notice. As I updated earlier, Police has been casting its net much wider than these 10.

Investigations are ongoing and many persons have been interviewed, and more will be. They include Singaporeans, Permanent Residents (PRs) and those on different types of immigration passes. Anyone who is found complicit in the wrongdoing after ongoing investigations will be dealt with in accordance with the law, regardless of their immigration status or whether they are Singapore Citizens (SCs).

We have frameworks in place for the assessment of applications for work passes and other long-term immigration facilities. The frameworks incorporate information from multiple sources and agencies. Applicants are screened against a database of blacklisted individuals. We use data analytics to identify and scrutinise higher-risk applications. Foreigners convicted of an offence in Singapore may be deported from Singapore and in some cases, banned permanently.

Mr Don Wee asked whether we work with foreign governments to verify the information provided by applicants. Where the agencies have suspicions, we do so. Our Singapore overseas missions also help to verify the authenticity of the documents. However, given the volume of applications, it is not possible to conduct verification checks for all of them.

Members will appreciate that no screening process is foolproof. We will review how to tighten our verification checks at various points. At the same time, we should be sensible. Most people are not illegal money launderers or criminals. If we make the rules too tight, then it is the vast majority of innocent applicants who will be unnecessarily penalised. The crooks will still try to find a way around the rules.

So, we need rules, we need to apply them, but let us be careful about knee-jerk reactions, which may make our business environment unfriendly. What we need are rules which are internationally accepted and workable. Our task is to minimise the risks and increase our ability to catch these persons, without affecting the majority of proper, legal transactions.

Should there be further clarifications on the work pass application regime, my colleague, Minister Tan See Leng will address them later.

Sir, let me conclude. Singapore has in place a robust anti-money laundering regime. We are held in high regard internationally not just as a financial centre, but for our strong, principled and no-nonsense approach to taking down individuals who break our laws.

In its last evaluation of Singapore in 2016, the FATF assessed Singapore to have a strong legal and institutional framework against ML/TF. We achieved substantial results in several aspects, even as a few areas were identified for improvement.

We have moved since the evaluation to address these areas and to further strengthen our regime. We have updated our prevention frameworks to keep pace with the evolving risks and typologies of money laundering and strengthened our capabilities to proactively detect and take firm enforcement action.

Nevertheless, this case is a reminder that even the most stringent preventive measures can be circumvented by determined criminals. But it also shows that our system is able to detect suspicious individuals and activities, and that when we do, we have the resolve and capabilities to track them down and take them to task.

Just as low crime does not mean no crime, zero tolerance of money laundering does not mean zero occurrence. This is not the first time Singapore has detected and acted against such money launderers, nor will it be the last.

As I mentioned, we have been undertaking ongoing reviews in the various sectors, to tighten our anti-money laundering regime. Learning from this case, we will consider further measures to strengthen our regime. Second Minister for Finance Indranee Rajah will be leading an Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) involving the relevant sectoral regulators. Later in her speech, she will outline its terms of reference and priorities.

Sir, this Police investigation has strengthened our reputation as a serious, high-quality financial centre and for law and order. It will strengthen trust and confidence among investors and Singaporeans, that we run a clean system that stands among the tallest in the world.

With your permission, I will respond to any clarifications which Members may have, after my colleagues have made their statements.

Minister of State Alvin Tan and Minister Indranee Rajah will be making related Ministerial Statements. I will allow Members to raise points of clarification on three Statements after the third Statement is made. Ministerial Statement on behalf of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Minister of State Alvin Tan.

Mr Speaker, Sir, as Minister Josephine Teo has mentioned, financial institutions play a critical gatekeeper role to keep criminals out of our financial system. Singapore is one of the world's leading financial centres and our financial institutions handle millions of transactions every single day. The vast majority of these are legitimate transactions that support the functioning of our economy and allow international trade and investments to be intermediated through Singapore.

The international connectedness, diversity and depth of our financial ecosystem also make us attractive to criminals, who will seek to exploit these very qualities to hide their tracks and launder their ill-gotten gains.

MAS is keenly aware of this risk. For decades now, MAS has been working together with our financial institutions to identify and disrupt such illicit activities.

This is MAS' priority. Singapore's hard-earned reputation as a trusted and well-governed international financial and trade hub with a strong rule of law, is at stake. Furthermore, it is the right thing to do.

Our dual objectives of building a dynamic, thriving financial centre on the one hand and maintaining a clean system on the other hand, are mutually reinforcing. We cannot and will not trade one against the other.

Minister Josephine Teo outlined the Government's three-pronged strategy to deal with money laundering risks. Let me describe how MAS applies this approach to bolster our financial sector's defences against ML/TF risks.

The first prong of our strategy is prevention. MAS imposes strict AML/CFT requirements on financial institutions. These requirements are in line with the standards set by FATF and international best practices.

Amongst these requirements, financial institutions must perform due diligence checks on their customers. This includes verifying their customers' identities and monitoring customer accounts to detect suspicious customer transactions or activities.

For higher risk customers, financial institutions must perform additional checks to establish if the customer's wealth and funds are legitimate. Where a financial institution detects suspicious customer behaviour, it must promptly report this to the STRO and then take appropriate mitigation measures, such as placing restrictions on the account or where warranted, terminating the customer relationship.

Beyond imposing requirements and expectations on financial institutions, MAS regularly alerts financial institutions to emerging risks and criminal typologies. MAS also publishes guidance papers and circulars to highlight good practices, to raise risk awareness and industry standards. MAS has also strongly encouraged our financial industry to deploy data analytics to further sharpen their detection capabilities.

These efforts have produced results. For example, financial institutions have improved their ability to pick up suspicious behaviour amongst their corporate customers and flag specific transactions, characteristics or even networks of concerns by filing STRs.

Ms Usha Chandradas asked about the anti-money laundering checks conducted on single family offices (SFOs) before tax incentives are granted and whether such incentives have been granted to any of the entities associated with this case. Please allow me to explain.

All SFOs applying for MAS' tax incentives are required to show proof that they have opened accounts with financial institutions in Singapore. Before onboarding the SFOs as customers, MAS expects financial institutions to conduct robust due diligence checks on them. In addition, before granting these tax incentives, MAS screens the individuals and entities involved in the SFO against databases and other information sources for money laundering, terrorism financing and other adverse news.

Ongoing investigations and supervisory engagements suggest that one or more of the accused persons in this case may have been linked to SFOs that were awarded tax incentives. These SFOs were subject to the checks I just outlined. At the point of application, no adverse information of note related to the individuals and entities had surfaced. Nonetheless, MAS is reviewing our internal incentive administration processes and will tighten them where necessary.

More broadly and even before this case, MAS had already in July 2023 announced plans to strengthen its surveillance and defence against potential money laundering risks posed by SFOs. The consultation, which just closed last Saturday, 30 September, proposed specific requirements to ensure that all SFOs, regardless of whether they apply for tax incentives, are subject to strict anti-money laundering controls. For example, SFOs will have to maintain a business relationship with an MAS-regulated financial institution, which will perform anti-money laundering checks on them. The proposed enhancements consulted on go beyond most other leading jurisdictions and financial centres. They aim to ensure that we have quality SFOs that contribute to Singapore and that we keenly watch any money laundering or terrorist financing risks. Arising from the findings from this case, MAS will also study whether further measures beyond those that have been proposed in the consultation are necessary, to ensure our approach to SFOs remains robust.

The second prong of our strategy is detection. This involves partnering financial institutions and other agencies to detect bad actors and also tighten our collective defences. The efforts of individual financial institutions or even individual Government agencies are not enough on their own. Criminals layer their nefarious activities across multiple financial institutions and other parties to evade detection. Let me elaborate on the partnerships we already have in place to thwart these illicit activities.

As Minister Teo mentioned earlier, the ACIP is one key platform through which we collaborate with the financial industry. These efforts, too, have borne fruit, for example, with the conviction of the former Chief Financial Officer of Agritrade International for her role in deceiving financial institutions to grant at least $776 million in credit facilities. On 17 January 2023, she was sentenced to an imprisonment term of 20 years.

To strengthen our detection capabilities, we are introducing the Collaborative Sharing of ML/TF information and Cases (COSMIC). COSMIC will augment ACIP's efforts. I spoke about COSMIC in this House in May this year but will reiterate to refresh Members' memories.

COSMIC is a digital platform which MAS is co-developing with six major banks in Singapore. It will allow participant financial institutions to share with one another information on customers whose profile or behaviour exhibits potential financial crime concerns, which they currently cannot, due to customer confidentiality obligations. The Bill we passed will allow participating financial institutions to share such information through COSMIC. One of the key risks COSMIC will target is the misuse of corporate or other legal vehicles to obscure the nature of transactions or the ownership of assets. This is a typology used by the suspects in this case. With COSMIC, financial institutions and authorities should be able to detect such risks more promptly.

Assoc Prof Razwana Begum Abdul Rahim, Miss Rachel Ong and Mr Derrick Goh asked if MAS can consider expanding participation in COSMIC beyond financial institutions to include additional parties, as well as whether we can expedite the launch of COSMIC.

I am pleased to note that we are now working really expeditiously on COSMIC and are on track to launch it in the second half of 2024, if not earlier. MAS will permit participant financial institutions to share information they receive from COSMIC with their local as well as overseas affiliates, provided certain conditions to ensure confidentiality are met. This will prevent bad actors from establishing relationships with overseas affiliates of the six banks.

Because of the sensitivity of the information that can be shared on COSMIC, MAS is proceeding carefully with its roll-out. At this stage, there are no plans to extend COSMIC to entities beyond the financial sector, or for COSMIC information to be shared directly with financial institutions overseas or with international counterparts. Nevertheless, MAS will review information from COSMIC as part of our overall surveillance efforts and distil key information for sharing with relevant Government agencies and international supervisory counterparts, to combat risks that cut across sectors and borders.

Besides upcoming platforms like COSMIC and ongoing partnerships between the public and private sectors and amongst financial institutions, there is also robust collaboration across Government agencies. For instance, MAS and MHA co-chair the Risk and Typologies Inter-Agency Group (RTIG). RTIG is an interagency body overseeing the identification, assessment and mitigation of ML/TF risks. It involves all relevant supervisory and law enforcement agencies and the STRO. RTIG allows agencies to share information on surveillance outputs, such as networks and subjects of concern, for collective action.

These efforts to raise awareness, sharpen detection and tighten collaboration across the industry and Government have borne fruit. As Minister Teo mentioned, over 80% of STRs filed between 2020 and 2022 were by financial institutions. The quality of these STRs has improved over time, as STRO and MAS gave guidance and feedback to the financial institutions. This has facilitated more timely responses to illicit activities.

This case is a prime example of how this effort has made a difference. Financial institutions detected many of these illicit activities, filing numerous STRs on the persons of interest prior to the case breaking publicly. These STRs helped law enforcement agencies to identify and take enforcement action against these individuals. In many instances, the financial institutions took additional precautions and actions, including closing these individuals' accounts.

Through RTIG, law enforcement and supervisory agencies were also alerted to similar criminal typologies. In April 2022, MAS issued a circular to warn financial institutions of these emerging typologies and engaged major financial institutions to tighten their controls.

We saw how this close and effective cooperation made an impact on the case as the Police commenced its operations. For example, MAS worked closely with our financial institutions to rapidly identify tainted funds so that the Police could seize these funds swiftly. This prevented the suspects from dissipating their ill-gotten gains.

Some of the funds in this case were seized very shortly before there were attempts to move them, because of this close cooperation. Our financial institutions also responded promptly to Police orders to produce information, which helped Police build their case against these subjects.

Mr Desmond Choo asked how surveillance and international partnerships between MAS and other regulators have helped to disrupt money laundering activities and syndicates. As money laundering networks frequently operate across borders, international cooperation is critical to combating them. MAS actively works with our international supervisory counterparts on common areas of concern, such as the 1MDB and Wirecard cases.

The third thrust of our approach, or the third prong of our approach, is enforcement. This complements the first two prongs of prevention and detection. Where there are breaches of MAS' requirements, MAS takes firm enforcement action against financial institutions as well as key financial institution staff. MAS has done so before. In the 1MDB case, we imposed significant penalties for AML/CFT violations, permanently banned some individuals and senior management from working in Singapore's financial sector, and even closed down two banks for egregious AML/CFT breaches. We will not hesitate to take firm enforcement action against errant financial institutions and their key staff, should we encounter similar material weaknesses.

I have explained, with examples, how the three key prongs – prevention, detection and enforcement – in MAS' strategy that underpin our financial sectors' defences against ML/TF risks have made an impact, including how they have led to the detection of many of these bad actors.

But we cannot be satisfied with these efforts alone. We must and we will do more. The fact that more than $1.45 billion in financial assets have been so far seized in relation to this case is concerning. MAS is conducting detailed supervisory reviews and inspections of the financial institutions with a major nexus to this case.

MAS will also take a critical look at how the suspects were able to access financial services in Singapore. Some of them have been charged for presenting forged documents to financial institutions. MAS will assess whether financial institutions had upheld robust AML/CFT practices, including performing adequate checks on their customers' sources of wealth and funds, monitoring customer transactions to pick out suspicious ones and taking all reasonable steps to mitigate against ML/TF risks. This will complement and feed into the work of the Inter-Ministry Taskforce to be led by Minister Indranee, which MAS will also be a part of.

Finally, Mr Speaker, Sir, Ms Foo Mee Har asked an important question about how this case has affected Singapore's reputation as a leading wealth management hub. Indeed, there had been some speculation that this money laundering operation has hurt our standing as an international financial centre. On the contrary, I would say that this case is clear evidence of our unflinching commitment to keep Singapore clean. While criminals will vary their tactics to conceal their illicit activities, we will deploy all the resources and powers at our disposal to thwart them, bring them to justice and continually strengthen our defences against them.

Sir, I believe that our approach to this case will, in fact, enhance Singapore's global standing as a trusted financial centre with a strong rule of law and that we will continue to keep the trust and confidence that Singaporeans and investors have in us.

Let me now pass the floor to Minister Indranee.

Second Minister for Finance and National Development.

Mr Speaker, Sir. My colleagues, Minister Josephine Teo and Minister of State Alvin Tan, have spoken about the case, our overall AML regime and the measures we have in place, including in the financial sector. I will elaborate on two further areas: the real estate sector and companies. The regimes in these areas closely align with our WOG three-pronged strategy outlined by Minister Teo earlier.

My Statement will be in three parts: first, our restrictions on the foreign ownership of landed residential properties and our controls against money laundering in the real estate sector; second, our regulatory and enforcement measures to deter the misuse of companies; and third, how we will further strengthen our system, incorporating the lessons that we have learnt.

Let me first set the context by providing an update on the properties involved in the case. To date, 94 residential properties have been issued with prohibition orders. Of these, 60 are completed resale units and 34 were uncompleted units sold directly by developers. Eight of these properties were landed residential properties at Sentosa Cove. In addition, 53 commercial properties and five industrial properties have been issued with prohibition orders.

With this in mind, let me explain the framework governing purchases of residential property in Singapore by foreigners.

First and foremost, foreign ownership of landed residential properties is restricted under the Residential Property Act (RPA). Landed residential properties in Singapore remain primarily the preserve of SCs. Foreigners are not allowed to buy or own landed residential properties without approval. If approval is given, approved foreign purchasers are only allowed to own one landed residential property in Singapore for their own occupation.

Ms He Ting Ru asked about the grant of approvals. There are two categories of landed residential property in respect of which approvals can be granted: landed residential properties on mainland Singapore and landed residential property developed with a view to allowing foreign ownership. The latter is a very small category, that is, the landed residential properties developed in Sentosa Cove.

The Government takes a very strict approach when granting approvals for foreigners to own landed residential properties in Singapore mainland.

Under this regime, applicants must be a Singapore PR for at least five years and must have made exceptional economic contribution to Singapore. This is assessed considering factors like income tax contributions to Singapore.

We also consider whether applicants have a strong Singapore nexus. For example, PRs with children who have served National Service and who have demonstrated strong commitment to Singapore.

These factors point towards an applicant's connection to Singapore and their long-term commitment and contribution to Singapore.

The number of approvals granted to foreigners to acquire landed residential properties in Singapore mainland under the RPA remains low. In 2020, 2021 and 2022, 24, 51 and 34 approvals were granted in each year respectively to PRs to own landed residential property on Singapore mainland. This should be seen in contrast with our total landed housing stock of more than 73,000 properties and average annual transaction volume of more than 2,700 landed properties on Singapore mainland over the same period.

For the second category of landed residential property, which are those in Sentosa Cove, some of the restrictions are lifted to allow foreigners to buy them. Sentosa Cove was developed as a unique world-class integrated waterfront development aimed at an international clientele. Hence, foreigners who are non-PRs may acquire landed residential properties in Sentosa Cove and approvals are generally granted.

Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant asked about the applications and approval numbers for Sentosa Cove. In the past three years, the Singapore Land Authority (SLA) had received a total of 88 applications from foreigners to purchase landed properties in Sentosa Cove. All but two have been approved.

Since we have set aside landed residential properties primarily for Singaporeans, we do not restrict foreign ownership for non-landed residential properties in Singapore. That said, we impose a higher Additional Buyer's Stamp Duty on any residential property purchase by a foreigner. In April 2023, this was raised from 30% to 60% as part of pre-emptive measures to dampen local and foreign investment and prioritise Singaporean owner-occupation. Today, the proportion of foreign property purchases is low, at about 2%.

To reiterate, the eight landed residential properties issued with the prohibition of disposal orders are all at Sentosa Cove, where some RPA restrictions are lifted. None are landed residential properties on the mainland, where the approval criteria are much stricter. The rest are non-landed units, which can be purchased by foreigners. Hence, the requirements of the RPA had been met.

To answer the question filed by Mr Saktiandi Supaat on the impact on the market, while it is difficult to pinpoint the exact effect of the transactions involved in the case on the property market, their impact on property prices is likely to have been minimal. They make up an insignificant share of residential, commercial and industrial transactions.

Next, Members have asked about anti-money laundering safeguards in the real estate sector. Mr Yip Hon Weng, Mr Gerald Giam and Ms Hany Soh asked about CDD checks that property agents need to perform and the measures in place to train them.

These are valid questions as money laundering is often carried out through asset acquisition and real estate is a valuable and attractive asset class. We know that there are higher risks of money laundering in the real estate sector and so, we have been working over the years to address this.

We have put in place a risk management framework guided by the recommendations made by the FATF. Our framework leverages key sectoral players as DNFBPs with the obligation to look out for red flags and report suspicious transactions to the Police. This complements other DNFBP professionals involved in real estate transactions.

The obligations apply to landed and non-landed residential properties as well as commercial and industrial properties.

In the real estate sector, our gatekeepers are: (a) property agents, (b) property agencies; and (c) developers. They are the first line of defence as they are the ones who generally come into contact with parties undertaking real estate transactions. They therefore play an important role in the "prevention" and "detection" of money laundering activities in property transactions – the first two prongs of our anti-money laundering strategy.

We have progressively strengthened our regime, including enacting various legislation on the anti-money laundering requirements of our gatekeepers.

While there had been practice guidelines in place prior, in 2021, we legislated the prescribed duties of property agents with the introduction of the Estate Agents (Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism) Regulations.

In 2023, we introduced changes to the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Act and the Sale of Commercial Properties Act to also extend anti-money laundering requirements to developers of residential, commercial and industrial properties.

As gatekeepers, each property agent, agency and developer has a duty to perform CDD on their clients or customers. This includes verifying the identity of the client or the beneficial owner, screening these parties and assessing their level of risk, for example, identifying foreign politically exposed persons, persons from countries or jurisdictions identified by FATF as higher risk, and maintaining records of the relevant documents.

Sir, let me give some examples. If the customer purports to act on behalf of another party, the gatekeepers must request for the relevant documents authorising such representation.

For entities who intend to purchase, the gatekeepers must also check on the nature of its business, ownership and control structure, and place of incorporation. For purchasers from countries where there is a higher risk of money laundering, they are further required to verify their income and the source of their wealth and funds.

The degree of checks required is commensurate with the assessed level of risk, for example, enhanced CDD is required for higher-risk transactions. This includes verifying the income level, source of wealth or funds of the purchaser.

Given the nature of property development, developers are also required to periodically review the information about purchasers that had been furnished to ensure that it remains accurate and updated until the completion of the property.

Internally, property agencies and developers are also required to implement policies, procedures and controls, such as internal audits to prevent money laundering activities.

Finally, as part of the detection prong of our anti-money laundering strategy, every property agent, agency and developer is required to file an STR through their respective agencies if in the course of their business or profession, they know or have reasonable grounds to suspect that any property may be connected to criminal conduct. Failure to do so may result in regulatory action.

Relatedly, Assoc Prof Jamus Lim asked about guidelines on cash payments. For uncompleted property sales, developers are not allowed to accept payment in cash.

In general, quantitative thresholds may not be useful as there are many indicators that could point to money laundering activities and any line drawn would be arbitrary. Each case should be considered holistically. This is why we look to industry practitioners, who know how the market works and are in contact with the buyers and sellers, to make a judgement based on their experience while we provide guidance on what they should look out for.

Under the third prong of our anti-money laundering strategy, which is enforcement, our sectoral regulators play an important role in ensuring that gatekeepers carry out their responsibilities properly.

In the real estate sector, the Council for Estate Agencies (CEA) is the regulator which oversees the property agents and agencies while the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) regulates the developers. CEA has made considerable effort to help property agents and agencies carry out their responsibilities.

First, to educate the industry, CEA has issued a guide to property agents and agencies on compliance with anti-money laundering regulations. It provides details on the checks to be conducted and the measures that need to be put in place, including checklists to guide agents and agencies in fulfilling their CDD obligations.

Second, CEA provides a list of common suspicious indicators to aid agents and agencies in identifying suspicious transactions. These include: buying multiple properties within a short time; purchasing properties without inspecting them; and entering into transactions at a value much higher or lower than market value.

Third, CEA regularly shares latest developments and responses to common queries by property agents and agencies relating to their anti-money laundering duties. CEA is also developing a one-stop resource webpage to make it easier for the industry to retrieve information on anti-money laundering requirements.

Fourth, property agents who require additional training on their anti-money laundering duties may take up the continuing professional development course provided by CEA's course providers. Like CEA, the URA regularly conducts briefings and has been issuing circulars to guide developers in their duties, even before the legislation had been passed earlier this year.

As part of ensuring compliance, CEA and URA conduct anti-money laundering-related inspections regularly. Property agents, agencies, and developers that are identified to be of higher risk are prioritised for inspections and subject to more regular inspections. For example, those who deal more in private housing, especially higher-end projects, could be considered higher risk.

CEA and URA also conduct ad hoc inspections based on feedback from law enforcement agencies on possible infringements by property agents, agencies and developers.

We would also like to point out that besides the developers, property agencies and agents, professionals such as conveyancing lawyers, accountants and financial institutions, who similarly have anti-money laundering obligations, are also involved in nearly all property transactions.

As highlighted by Minister Josephine, lawyers and accountants also have strict KYC and anti-money laundering obligations. Conveyancing lawyers and the relevant accountants are required to perform CDD when preparing for or carrying out any acquisition, divestment or any other dealing of any interest in real estate.

These professionals are also required to file an STR with the STRO if in the course of their business or profession, these professionals know or have reasonable grounds to suspect that any property may be connected to criminal conduct.

Apart from these legal obligations, lawyers and accountants who are mindful of their professional reputations and risk exposure would and should decline to act for the potential client in the suspicious transactions.

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim asked whether there are differences between financial institutions and property agents in implementing anti-money laundering measures. In general, while the underlying principles are the same, the anti-money laundering measures required must be tailored to address risks unique to the sector and the party involved.

Principally, as my colleagues have emphasised, our regime is a comprehensive one. Any person who knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that any property represents the proceeds of, or is connected with criminal conduct, is required to file an STR to the Police. To answer Mr Murali Pillai's question, this includes landlords, if they have reasonable grounds to suspect their tenants. Failure to file such STRs as soon as reasonably practicable is an offence.

In sum, in the real estate sector, there are several layers of defence to mitigate risks of money-laundering and protect the system from abuse. The gatekeepers cover different areas, but play complementary roles in strengthening prevention and detection in our regime.

As such, the vast majority of purchase and sale transactions are subject to CDD checks, in some form and at various stages. In fact, most of them are subject to more than one layer of checks.

If any of the gatekeepers fall short of their duties or do not carry out their obligations, they will be subject to penalties. Enforcement is taken by CEA and URA, our sectoral regulators who also work hard to guide our gatekeepers in their responsibilities.

Investigations are ongoing into the property agencies and agents who had facilitated transactions for the properties involved in the money laundering probe. We will fully investigate the incident and if any breaches are found, take the necessary regulatory action.

Next, let me address Members' questions on the Government's efforts to detect illicit activities conducted by or through companies incorporated in Singapore.

Our regulatory regime seeks to balance between maintaining the ease of doing business, which has been the hallmark of Singapore as a business and financial hub and ensuring strong corporate governance to uphold investors' confidence.

Today, the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA) has in place various measures to deter the misuse of companies for money laundering. In response to Members' questions, let me first describe the baseline framework that ACRA has in place, before I explain the additional measures that are in place for intermediaries such as Registered Filing Agents, which similarly follow the spirit of prevention, detection and enforcement.

When a company is incorporated, ACRA screens all the officers and shareholders in its registers against lists of known adverse information. As and when there are changes to the directorships, companies will need to update ACRA accordingly and the new additions will be screened.

In addition, all companies are required to have at least one director resident in Singapore, to ensure that we will be able to hold someone accountable for any breaches committed by the company in Singapore. This goes beyond the requirements of many other jurisdictions. Non-resident foreigners looking to set up companies in Singapore will therefore need to either appoint a resident business partner as a director, or appoint a nominee director to act on their behalf. I will elaborate on this later.

Post-incorporation, ACRA monitors companies and takes proactive enforcement measures to guard against their potential misuse.

Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked about the prevalence of non-trading or inactive companies and how ACRA addresses the issue. Let me first clarify that just because a company is non-trading or inactive, it does not necessarily mean that they are being misused for money laundering purposes. There are various reasons why an owner may choose to keep his company despite not actively operating it, for example, due to other business priorities, illness or other challenges.

A clear sign of inactivity is when a company fails to file its annual returns. As companies could be inactive due to legitimate reasons, ACRA does not take action immediately. Instead, ACRA continues to track such companies and if they remain inactive after a period, or are flagged via intelligence provided by other agencies, ACRA will proceed to strike them off. About 17,000 such companies have been struck off over the last five years.

Thus far, the companies associated with this case have largely been filing annual returns with ACRA and have thus remained on the register.

I should clarify, however, that not all companies that are being misused for money laundering are inactive or dormant firms. Criminals often use front companies with a portfolio of businesses, comprising a mix of legitimate and illicit activities. This makes it challenging for regulators to identify the true nature of companies, unless active investigations of the company's activities are undertaken.

The checks that I have mentioned apply to all companies in Singapore.

Let me now touch on aspects of ACRA's regulatory regime, that seek to mitigate specific areas of higher risk, as part of our overall prevention efforts.

The first relates to the role that Registered Filing Agents play in mitigating the risks posed by foreign-owned companies.

As a business hub, we attract many foreign companies to Singapore. By and large, they are bona fide, and we welcome them because they contribute to our economy and provide good jobs for our locals. However, we recognise that there could be some bad actors, who may take advantage of Singapore's pro-business environment and open financial markets to conduct illicit activities.

So, as part of our prevention efforts, we therefore impose additional requirements on foreign-owned or foreign-controlled companies. Non-residents who are looking to set up companies in Singapore must engage ACRA-authorised corporate service providers, also known as Registered Filing Agents, to incorporate a company. Registered Filing Agents provide another layer of scrutiny, which is particularly useful for foreign-owned or controlled companies, in addition to ACRA's pre-incorporation checks.

The Registered Filing Agents are legally required to: one, conduct CDD, by identifying and verifying the identities of the customer and the beneficial owners of the intended incorporated company; two, conduct enhanced CDD to compensate for the higher risk if the customer is not physically present, such as ensuring that the customer's identity is established by additional documents or information, and three, inquire into the purpose and legitimacy of the use of a company structure.

Next, detection. If the Registered Filing Agent fails to complete the due diligence measures, it must not proceed with the intended incorporation transaction and should file an STR. Registered Filing Agents should also file STRs if they encounter any suspicious transactions in the course of their work. This helps to alert authorities of risks surrounding specific companies.

Then enforcement. Registered Filing Agents play an important role as gatekeepers in reducing the likelihood of a Singapore entity being incorporated and subsequently misused for money laundering. They are subject to supervision by ACRA for compliance with AML/CFT obligations.

ACRA takes enforcement actions on Registered Filing Agents found to have breached any requirement. Between 2021 and 2023, ACRA imposed 24 sanctions against Registered Filing Agents, including eight cases where the Registered Filing Agent's registration was cancelled or suspended. ACRA is investigating the role played by the Registered Filing Agents involved in this case, and will take enforcement action if necessary. [Please refer to "Clarification by Minister, Prime Minister's Office and Second Minister for Finance and National Development", Official Report, 3 October 2023, Vol 95, Issue 113, Correction By Written Statement section.]

ACRA has planned additional measures, such as enhancing the penalties on errant service providers, to strengthen the effectiveness of our anti-money laundering regime. The proposals had undergone public consultation earlier and we are looking to table them in Parliament in early 2024.

The second area relates to directorships. Because of Singapore's requirement for companies to appoint at least one ordinarily resident director, foreigners based overseas often look for local nominee directors to act on their behalf on matters relating to their company.

To address this need, corporate service providers provide services for nominee directors to be appointed, among other services. As some individuals take on nominee directorships as a business service, it is understandable for them to hold multiple directorships, to support their clients in due diligence checks and incorporating their business. Nominee directors have the same legal obligations as other directors and are required to discharge their duties responsibly, with honesty and reasonable diligence. Those who fail to do so can face sanctions, including disqualification and debarment.

Mr Melvin Yong asked about the number of individuals who have held a large number of directorships. In line with international benchmarks like the UK, US and Australia, there are currently no limits to the number of companies that a director can be involved in. Having said that, 99% of directors hold fewer than 10 directorships.

ACRA has been studying restrictions on directorships, both to ensure that nominee directors are fit and proper to take up the role and whether it would be useful to limit the number of nominee directorships that one can hold. These proposals were put out for public consultation in 2022. We will take into account risk factors and business needs, in deciding whether to introduce additional measures. These proposals will also be tabled in Parliament early next year.

A third area, which Mr Don Wee asked about, is to address the cloaking of the ownership of companies and the identity of money launderers through the use of complex corporate structures, by requiring companies to identify their beneficial owners and file this information with ACRA. ACRA manages a central register of controllers, which sets out the beneficial owners of companies, that is, the individuals who ultimately own or control a company.

This data on beneficial ownership is crucial in combating money laundering and foiling the plans of criminals. It aids law enforcement agencies in their investigations, by enabling them to peel back the different layers, identify the criminals behind the companies that are used for illicit activities and bring them to task.

To maintain its data quality, ACRA conducts regular inspections to ensure that companies file their beneficial ownership information in a timely manner. Enforcement action is taken on those who fail to comply.

Sir, I have outlined the various measures that ACRA has in place to prevent the misuse of corporate structures, whether directly relating to companies or through the regulation of Registered Filing Agents and the requirements for nominee directors for foreign-owned or controlled companies.

As part of its detection efforts, ACRA utilises data analytics to identify individuals who may be nominee directors of high-risk companies that are potentially being misused, as well as Registered Filing Agents who might be involved in the setup of such companies.

In addition, as Minister Teo mentioned earlier, as a sectoral regulator, ACRA works closely with STRO and law enforcement agencies, and flags high-risk individuals to them regularly for more in-depth review.

ACRA also undertakes checks and takes action with the help of intelligence received from other agencies, such as the CAD.

Should ACRA or CAD's investigations uncover any wrongdoing, ACRA will take action to impose sanctions on the Registered Filing Agent, which could include cancellation or suspension, and against the company and its directors.

Notwithstanding all these efforts from various agencies, our anti-money laundering efforts are an unending endeavour. As this case has shown, criminals are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Even as we identify new areas to tighten, criminals will inevitably find new loopholes to exploit.

As criminals will constantly find new ways to circumvent our laws and regulations, Government agencies and relevant industry players must become ever more coordinated to successfully uncover and arrest money laundering. To this end, we must strengthen our information-gathering and intel-sharing capabilities so that we can better detect illicit activities conducted by companies incorporated in Singapore.

To ensure that our anti-money laundering regime remains robust, the inter-agency steering committee will continue to oversee the WOG anti-money laundering efforts. In addition, we will be setting up an IMC comprising political office holders from MAS, MHA, the Ministry of Law (MinLaw), the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) and chaired by myself to review our system with the benefit of what we are learning from this case and to keep our regime up-to-date with increasingly sophisticated crimes.

The review will focus on four main areas: first, on how we can better prevent corporate structures from being abused by money launderers; second, how financial institutions can enhance their controls and collaborate more effectively with each other and authorities to guard against and flag suspicious transactions; third, how other players in the system, like corporate service providers, real estate agents and precious stones and metals dealers can help to better guard against money laundering risks; and fourth, how we can centralise and strengthen monitoring and sense-making capabilities across Government agencies to better detect suspicious activities.

Where gaps are identified, we will tighten our regulations and enforcement to prevent exploitation by criminals. The Committee will share its progress and findings in due time.

Singapore is determined to preserve our hard-earned reputation as a clean and trusted business hub. We will continue to uphold our zero-tolerance approach towards money laundering and do our best to ensure a strong and robust regulatory regime.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I have come to the end of my Statement. Members will naturally have clarifications. May I suggest that the House seek clarifications in five segments: the first segment to be on our overall anti-money laundering regime; the second segment to be on our financial system and sector; the third segment to be on our real estate sector; the fourth segment to be on companies and work or immigration passes; and the fifth segment on other clarifications.

Should the queries be sufficiently addressed, it may not be necessary for Members to pose identical PQs for the future Sittings.

I know there is a lot of interest in this subject which is why 30 Members have filed a total of 57 PQs for the last Sitting and this Sitting. I will make sure that everyone who have filed PQs will be given an opportunity to seek clarifications. But before I call on Members for clarifications, I wish to point out two Standing Orders to guide Members and to facilitate discussions on the Ministerial Statements.

Firstly, pursuant to Standing Order 23, Members may seek clarification on the Ministerial Statements on Singapore's anti-money laundering regime, but there is no debate that should be allowed thereon.

Members can seek clarifications by way of asking questions. So, I seek Members' understanding to keep your clarifications clear and concise so that Ministers can answer as many clarifications as possible. Likewise, I would also ask the Ministers to also keep your answers clear and concise.

Secondly, pursuant to Standing Order 50(2), reference should not be made to any matter which is sub judice. I would like to advise Members to exercise caution in discussing or reflecting the details of the cases before the Courts as it could be sub judice or prejudice the investigations and interests of the parties to the matters.

I will ask the Clerks to help me spot all the hands. But I will call on Mr Murali Pillai first.

Mr Speaker, my colleagues in the Government Parliamentary Committee for Home Affairs and Law and I have been closely scrutinising this case and would like to commend the officers of the Police force, particularly the CAD for detecting this case and successfully executing an extensive operation that led to the seizure of more than $2.8 billion worth of assets to-date.

Practitioners in the area often refer to assets from ill-gotten gains as "oxygen" for the criminals. Seizing and confiscating such high value assets in one fell swoop is tantamount to depriving criminals of "oxygen", thereby decisively crippling their activities constitutes, in my view, the best deterrent against anti-money laundering activities in Singapore. I invite hon Members in this House to join me to congratulate the Police force for a job well-done. [Applause.]

Mr Speaker, Sir, I have a clarification for the hon Second Minister for Home Affairs. In her speech, she referred to the FATF as setting the global anti-money laundering standards and that Singapore, as a member, subscribes to these standards. I understand that the FATF has conducted mutual evaluation of Singapore's anti-money laundering standards to gauge compliance with its 40 recommendations to tackle illicit financial flaws. How have we fared in these mutual evaluations as far as the abilities and the enforcement records of our enforcement agencies are concerned, and how do we compare to the abilities of enforcement agencies in other major financial centres, such as in London or New York?

Mr Speaker, I would also like to thank Members as well as Mr Murali Pillai for their affirmation of the work done by our law enforcement agencies.

Sir, I would like to keep my response to Mr Murali Pillai quite brief. But understandably, all the work that goes into our anti-money laundering regime is quite involved. So, with your permission, Sir, may I ask the Clerks to distribute a handout which describes more fully the different aspects of our anti-money laundering regime?

Okay. Please proceed to give out the handout. [A handout was distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 1.]

Thank you, Sir. Members may also access the handout through the MP@SGPARL app. Whilst the materials are making their way to the Members, Mr Murali Pillai, in his question, referred to FATF and the mutual evaluations that are being conducted by FATF.

By way of background, for Members' information, Singapore has been a member of FATF since 1992. And FATF, as an international organisation that sets standards for the prevention of money laundering, is well-recognised for several things.

For one thing, the standards that FATF has set are adopted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. So, as far as the IMF and the World Bank are concerned, FATF's standards are gold standards. If you are a serious financial centre and you meet those standards, then, in a sense, you have passed the test.

But how does one get evaluated against the standards? So, what Mr Murali referred to are mutual evaluations. And who does the mutual evaluation? These are experts that are drawn from within FATF itself as an organisation as well as a global network of expert practitioners. So, individuals like that are held in high regard. What they say carry weight.

Because this is a very involved exercise to carry out a mutual evaluation, countries do not get to be audited so regularly. We were last audited through this mutual evaluation in 2016. We have joined the queue. The next time we go through mutual evaluation is, in fact, in 2025.

But what was said after the evaluation in 2016? I quote from the FATF report and it says, "Singapore has a strong legal and institutional framework to fight money laundering and terrorist financing. Singapore's AML/CFT coordination is highly sophisticated and inclusive of all relevant competent authorities." It says that we are highly sophisticated and inclusive of all relevant competent authorities.

Mr Murali's question is: how does it put us in comparison to other jurisdictions? It puts us in good standing when compared to leading jurisdictions like Australia.

But because the evaluations are done at different times, it is not possible to treat this as an apple-for-apple comparison. What we do have, if you refer to the handout, under Annex A, I think there is a Table 1 which provides the ratings that Singapore was awarded in eight outcome areas that were relevant to money laundering. We have also, in Table 1, reflected the ratings that were awarded to other leading jurisdictions who were evaluated around the same time as Singapore. So, that gives Members a sense.

It does not mean after the evaluation, we sit still, we are happy with what we have gotten. In all that seven years that have since passed, we have made significant progress in enhancing our anti-money laundering regime. For example, we have strengthened the regime for non-financial sectors. What I talked about earlier, DNFBPs, that would fall under one category.

We have also enhanced the pursuit of cross-border money laundering offences and confiscation of proceeds of crime by all law enforcement agencies, including through international cooperation. And this ongoing case is an excellent example of our efforts.

But apart from what FATF says, I would like to draw Members' attention to another index that is known as the Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index. And the latest Index was tabulated in 2022. I am afraid I have not been able to include it in the handout. But there were 128 regions that were ranked in the Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index. And if you are at 128, that is the lowest risk. But lowest risk can also mean that nothing is happening in your region. So, you may not be a financial centre of any scale.

So, I do not think it is possible for Singapore to aim to be number 128. It would mean that we do not really have a financial centre of international importance. Singapore was ranked 100 out of 128, amongst those that are considered to be lowest risk. This ranking puts us ahead of the US, Switzerland as well as financial hubs, such as Hong Kong and Dubai. So, I think the facts do speak for themselves.

Following up from where Second Minister for Finance had suggested, I would ask Members, for this first set of clarifications, if they could centre around clarifications on the anti-money laundering system.

Let me repeat. So, that is the first segment we will try to cover. And then, we will move to the financial system and sector. And then, we will move on to real estate. And then, we will move on to companies, immigration and work passes. And finally, the last one is an open category.

So, for the first series of clarification, let us try to centre it around the anti-money laundering system. Mr Raj Joshua Thomas.

Thank you, Sir, and I thank the Ministers for setting out in the Ministerial Statement the AML/CFT measures.

I would like to ask if the Ministers could shed some light on how it is that despite what appears to be a very comprehensive set of measures which have been ranked well internationally that such huge amounts of money were still able to enter into our financial system? How is it that these monies could also be spent in various types of transactions?

Secondly, related to my earlier question, I would like to ask also whether there was any indication of complicity on the part of our Singapore-regulated banks and/or their employees in facilitating transactions carried out by the accused persons.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for his questions.

I explained during my Statement that when we set up our strategies for prevention of money laundering, we must understand that it is not all about prevention only.

We must know from the outset that however stringent the measures we put in place, criminal actors, money launderers, will find ways and means to still take advantage of our openness and our solid reputation as a sound financial centre. It is precisely because of our openness and precisely because we are deemed to have a very high reputation that the money launderers find us just as attractive as the legitimate investors.

So, we must know that they are resolved, they are determined to try and circumvent the rules that we have put in place.

Therefore, the strategy must also include detection and enforcement. If we merely had prevention and then imagine that all is well and good, we are kidding no one else but ourselves. And, so, it is useful for us to remember if we do not detect any cases at all and, more importantly, if we are not able to mount a robust response by way of enforcement and taking these criminals to task, it does not necessarily speak better of the robustness of our anti-money laundering regime.

In this particular instance, we have uncovered a very large web. I do not mean to cast aspersions on other regimes. But the examples that I cited shows you how difficult it is to round up criminals. Some of the amounts that I cited, if we think that that is all there is to the illicit funds that are sloshing around in these other regimes, I think that is not being very realistic. So, the strength of our regime is also in detection and then, to be able to enforce in a decisive and robust manner.

In this particular instance, if we had not made the decision to withhold enforcement action until as full a picture emerged – we might have been able to, say, sometime in 2022 or the earlier part of 2023 gone after the suspects – we might not have gotten what was initially $1.8 billion, which grew to $2.4 billion and now $2.8 billion. We might have found a much smaller amount and we might have patted ourselves on the back and said, "That was not too bad. Well done."

But, in fact, we would have missed an opportunity to get to the root of the problem and to try our very best to stamp it out.

This ability to uncover a web of this size is actually something that speaks volumes. So, if you are a money launderer, if you still think that Singapore is a good place to try and flow your dirty money through, please know that we are equally resolved to catch you.

Ms Hazel Poa.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I would like to seek two clarifications.

First, is MAS of the view that our existing penalties imposed on financial institutions for breaches of anti-money laundering measures are sufficiently deterrent and are the financial penalties linked to the amount that is being laundered?

Second, what sort of penalties have been imposed on the real estate companies or agents for breaching anti-money laundering measures?

Sir, I thank the Member for her supplementary questions. As my colleagues have mentioned, there are three prongs to the approach towards anti-ML/TF. The key to this is the first prong, which is prevention, and MAS regularly reviews all of our AML/CFT procedures. We review them as we go along and, of course, regularly as well.

The first also is that, given that there are huge financial flows into the system – millions of transactions every day – the same qualities which are strengths in our financial system will also be exploited by criminals.

In this case, and also, in speaking to Member Raj Thomas' view, MAS' supervisory engagements with financial institutions, underpinned by all of the different procedures, regulations and preventions, are ongoing in this case. We will constantly review whether there had been any lapses in the AML/CFT regime in accordance with our process and our policies and also whether any of these lapses had been incurred in onboarding the accused persons.

Where there has been complicity on the part of the relationship manager, for example, or senior management, in onboarding the accused persons, I want to assure all Members that if MAS finds any complicity or collusion by banks or their staff, we will not hesitate to take firm actions against the financial institutions and individuals involved to hold them accountable.

Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim.

Thank you, Sir. I thank the Second Minister for Home Affairs for answering my PQ. Sir, I have just one supplementary question.

Although we need strict controls for our anti-money laundering regime, I think we need to balance that with the cost of due diligence and overburdening our businesses for checks and reporting. What are the steps to sensemake and regularly consult the stakeholders, particularly financial institutions, pawnbrokers and our precious stone and metal dealers as well?

Mr Speaker, I thank Mr Zhulkarnain for his question. May I also just note that Mr Mark Lee made largely the same comments when he posed his PQ, which was to urge caution in terms of the extent of the measures that we put in place.

To Mr Zhulkarnain's question, in fact, our sectoral regulators engage with their gatekeepers very regularly. Earlier this year, for example, because of the impending changes in our PSPM Act, MinLaw had engaged with the industry behind closed doors to get a sense of what they were observing and to also find out if the additional measures that MinLaw was intending, was thinking about, would be too onerous to implement and also, more importantly, to what extent they could be effective.

MAS, as well as the CEA, regularly engage their respective communities of gatekeepers as well.

So, these engagements are ongoing. But I think the point that the Member is also trying to make, Sir, if I may, is that the key is in sensemaking. It is not just a question of imposing reporting requirements for the sake of the reporting requirements. We would have to try and connect the dots. Otherwise, it is just lots of signals and a lot of noise, which you cannot really do very much about.

You have heard me talk about how the STRO had put in place a new data analytics system since February last year. Minister of State Alvin Tan also talked about using COSMIC as a way of helping financial institutions make better sense of what information has already been captured through the STRs.

These efforts will obviously have to intensify. I should also say that each time we have a big bust like that, it also offers us fresh insights as to what kinds of signals we should be paying greater attention to.

Mr Neil Parekh.

The truth is that with even the best technology today, it is impossible to completely weed out money laundering. As the Minister put it so eloquently, it is not like looking for one needle in one haystack, but looking for one needle in multiple haystacks. And we also have to keep in mind that while good guys are getting smarter, perhaps the not-so-good guys are getting smarter even faster. Having spent many years as the Asia Chief Executive Officer for a large Australian bank, I have lived through this experience myself –

Mr Parekh, can you get to your clarification, please?

Very quickly. My question is: from most gatekeepers, intermediaries wish to enforce the anti-money laundering rules on a regular basis but often are not equipped or knowledgeable enough to ask the right questions during the process. So, perhaps the focus should be more on providing additional training and guidance for these intermediaries as well as potential gatekeepers to make sure that the right questions are asked. In many ways, one feels that the non-banking financial institution intermediaries are where banking institutions used to be 15 years ago.

Mr Speaker, I fully agree with Mr Neil Parekh. He is absolutely right.

We do have a set of red flag indicators that each sectoral regulator provides to their community of gatekeepers. Clearly, these indicators can be improved and we will continue to do so over time.

Clearly, it is also in our interest to ensure that the training of the gatekeepers is properly done so that they, like Mr Neil Parekh said, also ask their customers the right questions and their minds are correctly attuned to the potential risks.

So, I thank him for his suggestion. It is certainly something that we will continue to uplift our capabilities in, and I am sure that Minister Indranee and her IMC will look into. I think it is, in fact, the fourth of her terms of reference, if I heard her correctly.

Mr Leong Mun Wai.

Sir, I have two supplementary questions: one for Minister Josephine Teo and one for Minister Indranee Rajah.

For Minister Josephine, can I ask, based on the investigations so far, how was the $2.8 billion of funds placed in our system? For example, how much was through our banking system and how much was through cash and then how much through other channels?

For Minister Indranee, may I ask, just now she answered the question on the cash transactions, although she said it is not appropriate to impose a quantum on the amount of cash to be used in transactions but I used to run a stockbroking company in Singapore, I can declare, and we report suspicious transactions as well. So, can I ask Minister Indranee, so far what was the maximum amount of cash that was reported by the institutions – whether financial institutions or whether the integrated resorts (IRs) or public companies – the highest amount of cash transaction reported by IRs, banks and property companies through the suspicious transaction reporting system.

Mr Speaker, I thank Mr Leong for his questions. But as I explained during my Ministerial Statement, this is a live investigation. I have shared with Members the extent to which I am able to reveal. So, as to his specific question, this is a level of detail that will have to be made known at a later stage. I am not able to comment more on the details of this case – Mr Leong asked how they came to be placed in our financial system. This is a level of detail that we are not at liberty to discuss right now. As you can well imagine, we are continuing to uncover new assets. And if we are in the process of still trying to uncover the assets that have been procured as a result of these likely criminal proceeds, it would not be in the interest to say more at this point in time how the tracks were eventually identified.

I am also not sure that the question that the Member posed to Minister Indranee ought to be answered by her. I think I should answer it because it relates to the STRO. I mentioned in my Statement that 43,000 STRs were filed on average annually between 2020 and 2022, 80% of them came from the financial institutions, 20% came from the other non-financial institution gatekeepers that would include corporate service providers, that would include property agents and other types of gatekeepers. So, that is the overall number. He might have missed that. Or I am not sure that there was another level of detail that that he was seeking.

Sir, sorry.

Mr Leong, okay.

Yes. Can I clarify for the Minister that I am asking for specific amount of cash reported by the IRs, reported by the banks and reported by the property companies in the STR system?

Sir, as much as I like to be able to provide this level of detail, I am afraid this is not possible right now.

Okay.

Minister Indranee, is there anything that you like to add?

Thank you, Mr Speaker. No, there is nothing that I would like to add except to say one other thing, which is that the STRs, by their nature, are confidential. Insofar as anybody is asking what does an STR contain, this is not information that is generally disclosed in any event because it is part of the investigation and this is a live investigation.

Mr Mark Lee.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I extend my gratitude to the Ministers for their thorough response concerning this case.

I have a few supplementary questions. The first is, considering Singapore's amplified efforts to combat money laundering, would we be maintaining a universally welcoming stance for businesses or transition to a more discerning and selective methodology? Are there plans to recalibrate our focus towards specific countries or demographic sectors?

The second is, as the Government introduced new protocols which are crucial to uphold our reputation as a reliable financial centre, these compliance measures would also require capacity development, skilled enhancement and adaptation periods for both frontline and backend personnel across all participating entities. How are we planning to bolster these capabilities without compromising the system's overall efficiency?

Mr Speaker, to Mr Lee's first question, we will proceed carefully. I think within his question is the concern that we will have knee-jerk reactions and overdo the reporting requirements as well as the other anti-money laundering obligations that we impose on different companies. So, his point is very well taken. We always strive to be very calibrated in the statements of my colleagues and I; we were careful to emphasise that maintaining Singapore's overall friendliness towards legitimate businesses and legitimate investors. That must still be a priority for us to uphold. It is not a question of just layering on new measures without regard to their effectiveness but, really, weighing which are the new approaches or measures that will be necessary in order for us to uphold our reputation as a sound financial centre. So, that is to his first question.

The second question is with regard to capability development and expanding the capacity of both our law enforcement agencies as well as our gatekeepers. It is very much related to Mr Neil Parekh's points, and we totally agree with him and that is also an area of effort that we will have to step up.

I am sorry I was not sure that there was a third question specifically.

No.

Okay, thank you.

Mr Saktiandi Supaat.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have one supplementary question. I would like to direct it to Minister Indranee and Minister of State Alvin Tan.

I listened to Minister Josephine's speech just now. She mentioned about the financial sector contributing about 14% to GDP and 200,000 workers. I am mindful of the importance that the financial sector contributes to Singapore's GDP and, of course, our entrepot hub, trade hub as well. So, I just want to ask a supplementary question on the enhancement aspects of things, following this episode.

First question I have for Minister of State Alvin is with regards to resources: how much we have spent on handling anti-money laundering in MAS to handle such things, including in terms of staffing, in terms of capacity building? So, it is somewhat related to the previous supplementary questions on staffing, resources.

An additional question is to Minister Indranee: in the IMC, in terms of capacity building for agencies in relation to the financial sector like MAS, how do we compare – in terms of staffing and amount spent on capacity building comparing to other financial hubs like New York, London, Hong Kong and other jurisdictions as well? Do we pale in comparison in terms of spending, in terms of spending, in term of staffing levels, going forwards as well?

I thank Mr Saktiandi Supaat for his questions and I acknowledge also that it is very important that the financial sector represents 14% of our GDP and accounts for 200,000 jobs. So, we must make sure that our financial sector remains robust, both in terms of the vibrancy of the financial sector as well as being stringent to prevent illicit activities in the financial sector.

In that case, in the second limb of that question, therefore, it is – how are we preparing our sector regulators, supervisors, for example, to be prepared and to be able to look out for these illicit activities? Let me share a few.

On anti-money laundering resources, the MAS' approach to the supervision of anti-money laundering and the countering of financial terrorism, is that it has established the dedicated department, that is the Anti-Money Laundering Department (AMLD), in 2016. This department is responsible for three aspects, including regularly reviewing policies relating to money laundering and illicit financing, and also to then supervise how financial institutions manage these risks. The third is also being forward looking and constantly looking at trends and typologies that will emerge, such as the typologies that have emerged in this case.

But we also know that there are some limitations. The AMLD currently has 40 staff and they work very closely with other departments to tackle money laundering as well as terrorist financing.

We also understand that the volume – Minister Josephine Teo talks about 43,000 over 2020 to 2022, and 80% of these STRs are filed by financial institutions. I wanted to assure the Member and also Members of this House that MAS has in fact been building up these capabilities and at present are using data analytics and network analysis tools to conduct system-wide money laundering and terrorist financing risk surveillance.

It is really our approach to continue to review and enhance these surveillance capabilities, including with the money laundering and terrorist financing information when we launch and we roll out COSMIC, which allow greater sharing of information amongst financial institutions.

We will also share information with RTIG and other agencies, inter-Ministry agencies, to act on the typologies that I mentioned, that are emerging and quickly stop these illicit activities from gaining ground.

Mr Speaker, Sir, Mr Saktiandi asked how we compare with other hubs in terms of the spending that we put in for the resources.

If I may, that may not be perhaps the way to look at how to strengthen effectiveness because it is not so much how much money you put into it but how effective you are and how much value you get for whatever money you put into it.

So, we just take a broader look at the system. You think about it this way. There are so many parts of our system. It is not just who is staffing the STRO or who is staffing Police or who is staffing a particular Ministry. Every bank officer who deals with people is a part of the system. Every real estate agent is a part of the system. Every lawyer. Every accountant. Every Registered Filing Agent. And each of them has parts of the puzzle.

The real nature or the real key to uncovering the money laundering is making sense of the patterns because everybody owns a little piece of it. You file, you send it to STRO and I think Minister Josephine mentioned earlier, STRO is doing much more of the data analytics now. So, increasingly, it is going to become technology and analytics that pull together all the information that different people in this system submit up.

So, I think, to answer his question, when we set up the IMC, one of the key areas of focus that I talked about was, how we can centralise and strengthen monitoring and sensemaking capabilities across Government agencies to better detect suspicious activities. So, we will put in whatever resources are necessary to be able to make better sense of this and some of it will have to be done by technology, some of it has to be done through better training of whether it is real estate agents or anybody and the financial sector. And then the real key is how do you design it in a way that pulls together all this information and a pattern emerges. That is really how the detection and the capability building should be built up.