Hansard, Wednesday, 21 March 2018

1 Ms Denise Phua Lay Peng asked the Minister for Education (Schools) (a) how many appeals for exemption from Mother Tongue Language (MTL) have been received in each of the last three years; (b) what are the reasons for the appeals and what are the outcomes of these appeals; and (c) which department in the Ministry is responsible for assessing the appeals for an exemption from MTL and what is their basis for the approval of the appeals.

Mr Speaker, Sir, bilingualism is a cornerstone of Singapore's education system. Under our bilingual policy, students are required to offer English and a Mother Tongue Language (MTL).

Students may only be granted MTL exemption under exceptional circumstances, such as, if they join our schools mid-stream without having learnt an official MTL or when they have certified Special Educational Needs (SEN) that severely affect their ability to cope with overall learning. Over the past three years, the proportion of Primary 6 students exempted from offering MTL due to SEN has remained fairly stable, at around 2.3% annually.

MTL exemption applications and appeals are evaluated by a Ministry of Education (MOE) panel. The panel comprises specialists with expertise in curriculum provisions and SEN. Depending on the complexity of the case, the panel may also consult clinicians in the healthcare sector in their evaluations of the applications.

Students with difficulties in reading and writing MTL can take up Foundation MTL in Primary 5 and Primary 6, and the MTL "B" curriculum at secondary and junior college levels. The Foundation MTL and MTL "B" curriculum focuses on the development of oral and listening skills, with a reduced demand on writing skills. This allows them to continue to have exposure to learning MTL.

Ms Denise Phua.

I thank the Senior Parliamentary Secretary for the answer. I strongly support MOE's direction for bilingualism and for several reasons linked to our heritage, our roots and our culture. I have received quite a number of appeals and a lot of concerns as well from some families. So, I am wondering if MOE has used this tool of exemption very bluntly, so bluntly that the families are really struggling and even thinking of future plans whether they should remain in the local education system after the compulsory education years.

So, one, I would like to ask MOE if we can relook at the ways by which we make these decisions. Can we finetune these decisions and consider those cases with merit, especially if they are strongly supported by a very well-respected psychologist and psychiatrist in the field?

Also, finally, to ask if MOE can more creatively come up with more ideas so that people who go through this system of learning MTL do not end up hating it or disliking it so much and dropping it the minute they officially can.

Mr Speaker, I want to thank Member Ms Denise Phua for her supplementary questions. I would like to assure her and Members of the House that MOE reviews and updates the criteria for MTL exemption regularly to ensure that the objectives of MTL exemption are met and also remain relevant. So, I want to assure her on that.

I also want to reiterate that MTL exemption is granted to students with SEN. Allow me to just share some of the considerations by the MOE panel. First and foremost, when we receive an application, we will look at the diagnosis by the psychologist that they had submitted. Two, we will also liaise with the student's school to understand how the student is managing his or her learning. Three, we will work with the school to better understand if the student is responding well to the teaching and instruction during the MTL lessons. All these are important inputs for the decision. The fourth consideration that we look at is how well the student is coping with the overall studies.

For students who submit MTL-exemption applications on grounds of SEN, these are the four key considerations. I mentioned earlier that we do review the criteria from time to time. I want to give Members the assurance. I also want to assure Members that MOE Headquarters takes every MTL-exemption application seriously. We look at it very thoroughly.

Mr Yee Chia Hsing.

I have received feedback that some of the families have been working abroad for many years and their kids grew up overseas. In their case, when they come back, the children are supposed to enter secondary school and they have to suddenly study MTL when they do not even speak a single word of Mandarin. Is that also ground for exemption?

Mr Speaker, I want to thank Mr Yee Chia Hsing for his supplementary question. Earlier on, in my answer, I did specify that there are two target segments of students that we will consider granting the MTL exemption. The first group will be students who are severely affected because of their SEN. The second group will be students who join our Singapore education system mid-stream, and they did not have the opportunity to learn MTL.

So, yes, we do consider the application for MTL exemption by the group that is highlighted by Mr Yee. I want to assure Mr Yee that for those applications, we would evaluate factors like the applicants' learning history, previous country of residence, admission level and also, the extent of home language environment.

Ms Denise Phua.

As a follow-up to Mr Yee's question, I would like to ask the Senior Parliamentary Secretary if it is true that one of the factors of consideration is that the child or the applicant must fail every subject before they can be exempted from MTL?

Secondly, just to comment on Mr Yee's question, I do think that even if people or children come back from overseas, there is space for us to encourage them in the learning of MTL. I would like MOE to consider, in the spirit of lifelong learning, if there is any way by which it could convene a group so that we can continue with this learning of MTL or other languages that are useful or of interest, for the longer term, beyond the formal school years.

I thank Ms Phua for her supplementary questions. The answer to the Member's first question about the marks, there is no arithmetic formula per se. I did share the four key factors that the MOE panel will consider. And one consideration is how well they are coping in their overall study, whether there is a need for us to make adjustment to the student's total academic load. That is one.

It is worthwhile for me to take a few seconds to reiterate that in MOE, we are committed to support and enable every student to learn MTL at a level that he or she is capable of, something that Ms Denise Phua earlier said that she was fully supportive of. This is why the MTL curriculum is differentiated to cater to the needs of students based on their varying abilities.

I can give an example. We do have students with SEN who have chosen to take Foundation MTL at Primary 5 and Primary 6. The focus of the Foundation MTL is to help them to develop a strong foundation in their oral and listening skills, with less demand on writing.

Let me be specific. The Member highlighted the marks. For example, if a Primary 5 student takes Foundation MTL, he or she, at this point in time, does not need to write a single character or word in MTL during exams. Why is that so? Because 55% of the marks are based on Oral Exam, 30% are based on Listening Comprehension and the other 15% are based on Comprehension with multiple choice answers. So, there are students who have chosen to take Foundation MTL so that they can build up their foundation in MTL as the parents know bilingualism is advantageous to the child.

As for the third question, yes, this is why we are working with SkillsFuture Singapore to bring MTL lessons into the heartlands to allow adult learners to continue to hone their proficiency in MTL.

2 Mr Christopher de Souza asked the Minister for Law (a) what are the measures the Government is taking to ensure that the Singapore Judiciary continues to be able to attract legal talent of the highest calibre; and (b) how does the situation in Singapore compare with that of the UK.

The basis of my question took reference from a recent 18 March report published in the British newspaper, The Times. With Speaker's permission, may I ask the Clerks to distribute copies so that Members can refer to it?

Yes, please. [Copies of article distributed to hon Members.]

I am grateful. I have also informed the Minister for Law so that the article can be addressed in the Minister's response. Question No 2, please.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank the Member for the question, and I thank him for alerting me to the report beforehand. The article which the Member has distributed speaks of a "crisis in recruiting judges to the top levels of the bench" in the United Kingdom (UK). It says that the UK courts are unable to attract high calibre legal talent to fill vacancies on the Bench.

There are likely to be several reasons. One reason is said to be because of "a perception that [judges] are not valued". The article also says that the judges went to the Employment Tribunal to argue their case on their own remuneration packages, specifically pension arrangements. And the government is appealing against the Tribunal's ruling.

So, here you have judges taking up their cases to the Employment Tribunal against the government; and now, the government is appealing against that decision. I think many of us would find this turn of events quite surprising.

The UK judiciary has always been perceived as being in an exalted position, highly valued, world-class and, really, beyond these sorts of squabbles. Our own legal system is derived from the British system, and we owe much to them. Many of us grew up as lawyers, knowing and believing that the British judiciary was, in fact, the gold standard.

It is, therefore, quite saddening to read this article. Some of the difficulties faced by judges in the UK have been quite public for some time. One of the reasons for this state of affairs, in my view, is that, for some time, the UK judiciary does not appear to have been given the resources it may have needed. And also, judges have been subjected to unfair public attacks.

These attacks have undermined the standing, prestige and morale of the judiciary. In 2015, the then-Lord Chief Justice of the UK said that “there has, overall, been a widespread feeling [amongst judges] of not being valued or appreciated for their work”. I referred Members to this when we discussed the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act (AOJP Act).

The results of a 2016 UK Judicial Attitude Survey published in February of last year showed that only 43% of judges feel valued by the public. That is down from 49% in 2014, which is, itself, low; only 2% feel valued by the UK government; and only 3% feel valued by the media. In fact, fully 42% of judges stated in the survey that they would leave the judiciary if it were a viable option.

This state of judicial morale in the UK owes somewhat to the attacks on judges by the British media. With your permission, Mr Speaker, I have asked for two newspaper cuttings to be distributed to Members in the House.

You can imagine that the standing of the judiciary in the eyes of the public does not get enhanced when these sorts of attacks are made by mass circulation media. In an earlier 2014 UK Judicial Attitude Survey, almost two-thirds or 62% of all judges said that members of the judiciary are respected by society less than they were 10 years ago.

Half of all judges – in fact, more than half – 56% of all judges saw media representation of judges and 59% saw public misunderstanding of the judiciary as factors which drove these changes. I also referred Members to this during the AOJP debate.

It is not difficult to see why when you have newspaper headlines labelling judges as "Enemies of the people" and "You fools" when the courts decide in ways that the media dislikes.

The Internet, social media in particular, seems to have worsened the problem. The current Lord Chief Justice, in a press conference in December last year, said that judges are facing "an increasing torrent of personal abuse online", some of which was designed to intimidate them. In the 2016 Judicial Attitude Survey I earlier cited, 15% of the respondents – the judges – said they had concerns about their own personal safety on social media.

What are the lessons for us? The situation we have in Singapore is slightly different. In a survey conducted by my Ministry in late 2015 on how Singaporeans viewed the Courts, 92% said they had trust and confidence in our legal system, and 96% agreed that Singapore was governed by rule of law. In fact, if you see these sorts of surveys across the system – I am particularly aware of the Police, the Courts and the legal system – they all have about 90% or above in terms of trust.

A State Courts user survey that same year found that 95% of users of our Courts had confidence in the fair and effective administration of justice by the State Courts. But this is not cast in stone, and what is happening in the UK could easily have happened in Singapore and can easily happen to us if we are not careful. The reason it has not happened is because we have chosen a different path from the UK in some ways.

First, there is a considerable difference between the UK and Singapore in our respective approaches to the remuneration of judges. I think the article says that a Senior Judge could get about £181,000, which equates to something slightly less than S$400,000 today. For us – the records are public – top practitioners do take a pay cut when they become Judges and, depending on where they were outside, it could be a significant pay cut. Some could take as much as a 70% to 80% pay cut. But many others might take a 10% to 20% pay cut. But in the UK, if you take a top silk earning ₤2 million or more, then you will see the difference on average. So, the cut that our judges take is there, but it is not as steep as in many other countries, including the UK.

We also seek to appoint the best people from the private and public sectors to the Bench and key Legal Service appointments. Our Chief Justice himself was a leading practitioner who was highly regarded both in Singapore and on the international stage. Before he went on to the Bench, he was Attorney-General and then he went on to head the Judiciary.

That is one aspect – remuneration. It is important, and we have to make sure that it remains such that, while there is a cut, it cannot come to a stage where judges feel that they are paid so little that they do not want to take it up, which is the situation seen in many places. Or you certainly do not want them going to Employment Tribunals, and appealing and arguing about their own remuneration.

Second, we have been clear about protecting our Judiciary from abuse and contempt. When we passed the AOJP Act in 2016, there were suggestions that we ought to, in fact, abolish the offence of scandalising the Judiciary, as the UK has done.

The UK Law Commission did recommend the abolition of the offence, but it noted that "there [was] a great deal of extremely abusive online material concerning judges". It also observed that the UK Judiciary had lost the deferential respect it used to enjoy and lamented that "this change is one to be regretted", and since the situation was so bad and all the judges were being attacked online, and because the UK judiciary no longer had the deferential respect, there was little point in keeping the offence because you cannot reverse it anyway.

The offence of scandalising the judiciary was, therefore, of limited value in the UK, because scandalising the courts was very common.

We did not abolish the offence. Even before the AOJP, we had always taken a strict view on scandalising the Courts, because if there is an erosion of trust and confidence in our Judiciary, that would fundamentally affect the standing of Singapore and the way Singapore functions. That is why I decided that we, in fact, had to further tighten the law on scandalising the Judiciary and lowered the test from "real risk" of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice, to one of “risk” that public confidence would be undermined. That was a specific, considered decision and it was the one change to the substance of the law that the AOJP made.

Questions were asked then, in the House as well as outside: "Other countries are going in the opposite direction. Why do we not follow them?" My answer is a simple one – we follow other countries if it makes sense, and we frequently look at the practice of other countries and more mature societies – what is good, what will work, we are happy to take. We are not shy about that. But when it makes sense, we must also be confident in charting our own paths. It is important that we are not colonised in our minds.

And the test – since the AOJP has become law, has freedom of speech suffered? Have legitimate, free discussions on Court cases been stifled? If we were to compromise on this, the effects will not be felt this year, next year or in the next two years. But some years later, we are likely to find ourselves in the same position that the British find themselves today – judges feeling under attack or judges being under attack; distrust generally pervading; and an inability to attract top legal minds to take up positions on the Bench.

When the quality of the Judiciary suffers, the rule of law suffers. When the rule of law suffers, the country suffers.

The Government regards a strong and trusted Judiciary as the bedrock of the rule of law. That is worth defending vigorously, and we will continue to do so through our laws and policies.

Mr Christopher de Souza.

I thank the Minister for his reply, and I would like to say that I agree with every word in that response. My questions are: one, how do we keep the public's esteem for our Singapore Judiciary at a high and a continued high such that it is important to maintain our rule of law standing as a country?

Two, in line with the Public Service's move towards a clean wage, could the Minister clarify whether the judges are paid a pension or provided medical benefits, that is, do they have a clean wage?

We do have a clean wage. So, they do not get a pension or medical benefits. The same goes for many other parts of the Public Service, including political officeholders.

As regards the Member's first question as to how we keep the enhanced standing of our Judiciary intact, I would, in fact, go further. I think we have a unique window of opportunity to make sure that our Judiciary is not just respected within Singapore. If you look at the development of Asia today – the huge economic growth – and the fact that if you look around in Asia, which place really stands out as the one place that has outstanding rule of law, outstanding judges, lawyers and where you can get your legal business done properly?

I think there are only two places that will seek to claim that position. One is Hong Kong and the other is Singapore. These are the two competitors for that. I am not an unbiased party in this, but I believe that we are ahead. Not only that, but I believe that we are putting clear blue water between ourselves and Hong Kong, in that respect, for a variety of reasons. I think in Hong Kong as well, to some extent, public attacks on the judiciary are not uncommon. And the standing and position of Singapore, the fact that it is seen as a neutral place that you can come to, and the fact that we have been able to make significant changes like the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), which is a unique value proposition across the region and for many places in the world. You get world-class judges sitting there hearing cases, and it can be in any law, and it may have no connection to Singapore and Singapore is a forum that they trust.

So, we should not only maintain the standing of the Judiciary which, as I have said earlier, is not a given, but we have to work hard at it. I think that means continuing to get the best available legal talent, make sure that the standing of the judiciary is not subject to unfair attacks. Their judgments can be subjected to any sort of criticism you want as a matter of law. You can say they have gotten their law wrong. You can say that you disagree with them. But do not ascribe personal motives. And if you believe there are improper reasons, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) will investigate. We have a clear system. No one, in that sense, is above the law. So, we need to make sure of that. And you need a Government that is strong enough to make sure that it protects the standing of the Judiciary.

Let me give Members an illustration. We had a verdict in the City Harvest case in the Court of Appeal in February. In terms of the actual sentences that were imposed, it is quite clear that the Government took the view that the sentences were not adequate. It is quite clear. We had said it even before the Court of Appeal ruled. We had said the sentence was not adequate, which was why the Public Prosecutor appealed. It was also clear that substantial public sentiment was very much not in favour of the judgment that was delivered.

So, politically, the easiest thing – and that happens in many places – would have been for the Government to come to Parliament if it wanted to make a point and also join in, in the criticism. I think it is most unlikely that you will get a situation where the Minister for Law will stand here and say, while we disagree with the final result, nevertheless, judges ought not to be attacked. They ought to be respected, supported and be given the freedom to decide. If we disagree, we criticise their judgments, but let us not criticise them personally.

That is very important. You need a Government – and I hope this is common to all Members here, and I believe it is common to all Members here, both Government and Opposition – that is very strong in protecting the standing of our Judiciary. Thankfully, we have not had debates in this House, nor among reasonable opinion outside, about the Judiciary along the lines that are taking place in many other countries.

Thankfully, we do not have that and, therefore, we are able to deal with the substantive issues. One can argue, agree or disagree on specific aspects of the AOJP, but I do not think there is disagreement on the fact that our Judiciary has to be protected.

In answer to Mr Christopher de Souza's question earlier on Judges' pensions, I am told by the Prime Minister that the Judges' pensions may have been taken into account in their overall remuneration. So, the answer I gave the Member is still strictly correct – in that they do not get pensions, nor medical benefits, but under the clean wage system, that factor may have been taken into account in their remuneration package. I checked it, but I will check that again. And if I have to correct it, I will come back and let the Member know.

Order. End of Question Time.

[(proc text) Order for Second Reading read. (proc text)]

Mr Speaker, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time".

In Singapore, it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which the powers in this Bill would be required. We see news reports of gunmen attacks, hostage incidents. But they are happening elsewhere, not in Singapore. Not yet, fortunately.

The closest we came was when we uncovered the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) bombing plot. Our security agencies picked it up, acted swiftly and, as a result, we avoided a calamity. That happened in 2001, well over a decade ago. After the shock, memories have faded. But for those who do remember, the thought may still send a chill down their spine.

Last year, another chilling piece of news emerged. Syaikhah Izzah, a preschool assistant, became the first female Singaporean to be detained under the Internal Security Act. She became radicalised and made plans to travel to Syria to support the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to be a martyr’s widow.

Since 2015, there have been 18 other Singaporeans like Syaikhah who had to be dealt with under the Internal Security Act (ISA). In all these cases, our security agencies managed to intervene in time. But we may not be so fortunate every time. Because a terror attack has not happened in Singapore yet, it is difficult to appreciate the severity of the threat and to imagine the grave consequences.

But Mr Speaker, the reality is that Singapore faces a clear and continuing threat. Foreign terrorists see Singapore as a prized target. We stand for many things in opposition to their ideology.

Singapore has been cited as a target in jihadist publications and videos, by both ISIS and other groups. There were two ISIS-linked plots against Singapore in 2016 alone, including the foiled plot by Batam-based terrorists to launch a rocket attack against Marina Bay Sands. We should, therefore, not be lulled into a false sense of security. We have to prepare.

In 2016, the Police introduced new capabilities to allow them to respond swiftly to an attack, and they continue to enhance these capabilities. In 2017, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) amended the Public Order Act (POA) to enhance the security for large-crowd events. The Infrastructure Protection Act was passed to enhance the security for critical buildings.

Now, MHA is introducing the Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill (POSSPA) to ensure that the Police have the necessary powers to be able to deal effectively with serious incidents, such as a terrorist attack.

Members may ask, why is POSSPA needed? Do we not already have the Public Order (Preservation) Act (POPA) that gives special powers to deal with serious public order incidents? Did we not update POA just last year?

Mr Speaker, we have been studying terror attacks in other countries to ensure that our counter-terrorism strategies are robust. They provide many useful lessons which are relevant to this debate, and I would like to share them with Members. They will help illustrate the gaps we have in our present laws.

Mr Speaker, with your permission, I would like to show some pictures and videos during this segment.

Yes, please. [Some pictures and videos were shown to hon Members.]

First example, April 2013, Boston marathon. The bombings killed three and injured about 260. The Boston Police narrowed the suspects to a pair of brothers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The police ordered an extensive manhunt.

In the residential area of Watertown, the suspects got into a shootout with the police. Tamerlan was killed and 15 officers were injured. Dzhokhar escaped and the police had to mount a house-to-house search. During this time, the police issued a voluntary stay-in-place request within a 20-block area. Despite this request by the police, some residents still ventured outdoors.

Part of the reason could be because, as you can see in the photo on the right, there was no large-scale public disorder and the streets did not look dangerous. The fact that the fugitive Dzhokhar was armed, had shot and killed one police officer, was not obvious. Regular people who ventured outdoors, in spite of the police request, unknowingly affected police operations, which became much more difficult to manage. They also put their own lives at great risk.

Had the Watertown manhunt taken place in Singapore, POPA could not have been activated because there was no public disorder. We would not, like the Boston Police, have been able to enforce a curfew in the search area to facilitate the manhunt operation and keep people safe from danger.

Second example, January 2015, gunmen attacks in Paris. On 7 January, two armed attackers entered the headquarters of the French satirical newspaper, Charlie Hebdo. They killed 12, injured 11, and then fled. Several shootouts took place, as the police pursued them across north-eastern France. The two gunmen were killed two days later, after police stormed the building in which they were hiding.

On that same day, a third gunman walked into a Jewish supermarket, and took hostages. In total, 17 were killed and 11 injured. The French Police had to pursue the suspects over many areas quickly to prevent them from killing more.

The point is this: incidents can evolve very quickly; the theatre of operations also shifts quickly. Had the Charlie Hebdo incident taken place in Singapore, POPA would be inadequate, even if we expanded its scope to apply to a terrorist attack.

The Minister would have to make new proclamations to bring the powers to bear in every new incident area every time the operations shift to the new location. The Police response would be much less timely.

Another problem was the live news footages showing police officers ready to storm the supermarket to rescue hostages. Let me show another photo. In this photo, Members can see how the police were gathering outside the supermarket and they were getting ready to storm the place.

But the terrorist was able to open fire at the police officers as soon as they started moving in. He was waiting for the precise moment to strike, and he could. In a situation like this, the terrorist had every possibility of watching every move of the police’s operation, as it happened. This would compromise the tactical options that the police could take and risk the success of the operation. It also put the lives of the officers and hostages in greater danger.

The US Homeland Security Advisory Council studied this incident and published a White Paper in 2016. One of the lessons the Council pointed out was the need to reduce the risk of information about police tactics being leaked and compromising operations. We would be wise to learn this lesson for Singapore, too.

In several overseas incidents, police forces had appealed to the public not to transmit or broadcast videos of ongoing operations, to protect the safety of their officers and the public. But this is usually not effective. Cases of individuals and media knowingly transmitting and broadcasting are common, even when they are told that the information may lead to the loss of lives.

Mr Speaker, these overseas examples show why our laws need updating. They happened in developed and cosmopolitan cities like Singapore. New threats call for new measures to better protect Singaporeans and save lives when we come under attack.

Having explained today's threat and why we need POSSPA, let me outline the situations where POSSPA can be activated, what tools Police will be given in this Bill to respond effectively to a serious incident, how these tools will be activated, and safeguards against abuse.

POSSPA is an evolution of POPA. POPA was enacted in 1958, and there have been no major reviews of POPA since. It was designed to deal with large-scale communal riots, such as the serious racial clashes in Penang, during the Centenary Celebrations in Georgetown in January 1957, the year before.

Under POPA, Police have special powers to deal with serious threats to public order, for example, to impose curfews and disperse assemblies. As there is already a legal framework within POPA that contains the necessary special powers in one Act, MHA is updating this framework to ensure that we remain effective to tackle the evolving security threats. As I explained through the examples, the security threats and challenges have evolved.

In addition to large-scale public disorder, we also have to deal with violent extremism. MHA is, therefore, proposing to repeal POPA and replace it with POSSPA. POSSPA will expand the scope of POPA beyond public order, to enable the Police to also use it for serious incidents affecting public safety, such as a terrorist attack.

This is necessary because there may not always be public order problems in, say, a manhunt following a terror attack, such as in the Boston Marathon bombings. The term "serious incident" is clearly defined in clause 3. In addition to large-scale public disorder, "serious incidents" include terrorist acts and acts of serious violence affecting the public.

What are the additional powers provided under POSSPA that will enable the Police to protect public order and safety, in the event of a serious incident? I will, first, talk about the new tools introduced in POSSPA.

The first set of tools deals with modern technologies which can endanger the safety of the public and security forces. Sixty years ago, when POPA was enacted, there were only landline telephones. Today, we have smartphones, the Internet, 24/7 television news channels, and drones. Everyone with a smartphone can broadcast, and very many do, sometimes with wider viewership than regular media channels. Such modern technologies have been both a boon and a bane for the Police.

One clear example when they can hinder Police operations is during sensitive tactical operations, like hostage rescue. The Police need to have the element of surprise over the perpetrators, so that the latter will not start to harm the victims in anticipation of the Police's response or prepare themselves to defeat Police action.

The best-laid plans for the Police can be thwarted by a stray tweet or social media livestream, but the existing laws, such as the POA may not allow the Police to deal adequately with such risks.

During a serious incident, the Police will need every help they can get to be able to successfully execute their mission to save lives. POSSPA, therefore, contains special powers, to reduce the risk that their operations are compromised by unauthorised communications. Of these powers, the power to make a Communications Stop Order has garnered the most attention following the introduction of the Bill. I would, therefore, like to spend some time to explain this power carefully.

Clause 30 empowers the Commissioner of Police to issue a Communications Stop Order (CSO) which requires a person to stop making or communicating films or pictures of the target area, and to stop communicating text or audio messages about law enforcement operations in the target area. The CSO is not an information blackout throughout a terror incident, as some have portrayed it. It is location-specific. The CSO will only apply to coverage of the target area. It is limited in duration. After the security operations are over, the CSO will be lifted.

Even with a CSO, post-incident reporting is still necessary. Therefore, the Police will allow selected media access to incident locations, so that the events can still be recorded for subsequent use. We had conveyed this arrangement to senior editors and reporters of our local media at various engagements last month. We have also informed some of the foreign media here of our plans and how we will do our best to facilitate coverage.

I should add that the CSO is a discretionary power which can only be exercised by the Commissioner of Police under specific conditions. Clause 30 allows the Commissioner to make such an order only if he assesses that the communication of information about the target area or law enforcement operations compromises the operations or endangers the safety of people during the operations.

The Police will publicise the CSO and state clearly the time that it becomes effective, and the boundaries of the target area. A breach of the CSO is an offence which carries up to two years' imprisonment, or a fine of up to $20,000, or both.

Having said that, let me give this assurance. The CSO is not aimed at civilians who, for example, may be caught in a hostage situation, and are trying to get information about their predicament to security forces by any means possible. They are not the intended targets. Instead, we are trying to stop irresponsible communication of ongoing security operations which may endanger lives, such as those of the hostages.

Some have asked, "What if someone was merely filming and not transmitting? That, surely, should not be a problem." The problem, I am afraid, is that in a situation that warrants a CSO, the Police will not have the luxury of time to confirm that everyone was merely filming to document the event and that no one was attempting to share valuable intelligence with the terrorists.

The more important question is this: when lives are at stake, should we hope for the best or must we assume the worst, that someone, somewhere, had malicious intent? Even if the Police were to order anyone they can see holding a camera to stop filming, as they can under the POA, what about people with small devices which Police did not notice amid the chaos?

Should the onus be on the Police to identify everyone who is filming and stop them, or should the onus be on individuals not to arouse suspicion of their intent? So, let us not be blindsided. We hope we will never have to issue a CSO. If ever there was a need, half measures will not cut it. Even with a CSO, we can only reduce but not fully eradicate the risk of unauthorised communications. That is something we need to bear in mind.

Mr Speaker, apart from the CSO, clause 28 empowers the Police to intercept unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and autonomous vehicles or vessels (AVs) in and around the target area. UAVs and AVs can be used for surveillance, and even as weapons. Under today's laws, the Police can take down UAVs and AVs only if they are clearly posing a threat to public safety and security. The additional powers in POSSPA will enable the Police to prevent compromising security operations, by taking down any UAVs and AVs in and around the target area.

Clause 32 updates the existing POPA section 9, which allows the Minister to issue a Direction to withdraw telecommunication services in a target area. This is also aimed at preventing the compromise of operations. Instead of issuing the Direction to the now-defunct Telecommunication Authority of Singapore, it empowers the Minister to issue the Direction to the Telecommunication Licensees (telcos) instead.

We recognise the significant impact on the public if and when clause 32 is invoked. There is, therefore, a higher threshold in place. The Direction can only be issued by the Minister. This is unlike other special powers that, once unlocked by the Activation Order, can be authorised by the Commissioner of Police. Clearly, these powers will be exercised judiciously. Where the Communications Stop Order is sufficient and effective, there will be no need for a Direction to withdraw telecommunications services.

The telcos were consulted. They understood the need for the Direction. Their main concerns were how to operationalise the Direction, and how to communicate the disruption to clients. The Police will work closely with the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) and the telcos to develop plans and conduct exercises to ensure that a Direction can be implemented effectively.

Mr Speaker, today, the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) empowers the Police to conduct enquiries in relation to a crime. The second tool, in clauses 16 and 17 of the Bill, provides enhanced powers to stop and question individuals in a target area. The Police may need, for example, to ascertain the purpose for their presence in the area or to get information which might help the Police in their operations. Under POSSPA, refusal to provide the required information will be an offence. This is to empower the Police to get as much relevant information as possible in a timely way.

The third tool helps the Police to manage buildings in the area affected by the serious incident. Where it is necessary to close the premises or restrict entry, the Police will generally work closely with premises owners. It is not a problem if premises owners are cooperative. If, however, premises owners are uncooperative, clause 27 provides powers to the Police to direct premises owners to close the premises, restrict entry or provide information and documents relating to the premises.

As military premises are sensitive locations, the Police will work closely with the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to manage any serious incidents affecting these premises, so that there will not be a need to use the clause 27 power in such circumstances.

Mr Speaker, the fourth set of tools are provisions which empower SAF servicemen, other law enforcement officers, and civilian assistants who are supporting the Police in dealing with the serious incident. During a serious incident, we may need to tap on additional resources to assist the Police. There are established plans for SAF to assist the Home Team in responding to serious security incidents. Under POPA, SAF servicemen were authorised with powers of search, arrest and to set up cordons.

This empowerment of SAF servicemen remains essential, and the Bill retains this, with an updated suite of powers needed by SAF servicemen. However, I will be introducing a Notice of Amendment later at the Committee stage to move these provisions for authorising SAF servicemen from POSSPA to the SAF Act.

This is to ensure a clearly defined command and control by the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and SAF over all deployments of SAF servicemen in support of civilian authorities, including the POSSPA powers which SAF servicemen can exercise. The POSSPA powers can only be exercised by SAF servicemen if: (a) an Activation Order under POSSPA has been issued; and (b) the Police requests for assistance from SAF; and (c) after the Minister for Defence issues the relevant orders under the SAF Act. So, there are three parts to it.

It is clear however, that the Police will lead and coordinate the overall response, with the assistance of SAF servicemen.

Clause 15 similarly empowers other law enforcement officers and civilian assistants to support the Police operations. This is new. Law enforcement officers refer to officers from other Home Team agencies, such as the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA), the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) and the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF).

The Police may also ask civilian assistants, such as the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) volunteers and private security officers, to help, for example, to man an outer cordon, away from the incident location or hot zone, or prevent persons from entering the cordoned area. This allows Police resources to be diverted to more critical tasks.

I should highlight that nothing in POSSPA obliges civilians to assist the Police, and neither will the Police request for civilian assistance where there may be danger. The Police will only rely on civilians who are able and willing to assist. In other words, a civilian can refuse to assist, and no action will be taken against him.

As spelt out in subsection (4) of clause 15, civilian assistants can only exercise a limited set of powers. They are not allowed, for example, to use lethal force. Under clause 51, law enforcement officers, SAF servicemen and civilians who are assisting Police Officers are granted protection from legal liability. This is so long as they act in good faith and with reasonable care. This legal protection extends to members of the public who are complying with the Police's orders or directions.

POSSPA also retains and updates the existing provisions from POPA. These provide tools which are still relevant for Police operations. I will talk about some of the key provisions that have been updated.

First, the powers to impose cordons under clause 18. This was provided for under POPA, section 6. It has been updated to allow the Police to set up a cordon within a private place.

Secondly, the powers of requisition under clause 35. This was provided for under POPA, section 11. During a serious incident, the Police may require the use of equipment, electricity or space within a premises or land in the target area. We have retained the compensation framework in POPA. This is in clause 36.

Thirdly, the use of lethal weapons as a last resort. In every circumstance today, lethal weapons can only be used after all other available options have been exhausted, or when it is absolutely necessary, such as for time-critical situations, where the safety and security of the public are at risk. This remains the case under POSSPA. When a serious incident has occurred, or is about to occur, the Police will use all available force options to deal with the incident, including lethal weapons as a last resort.

There are two parts to the updated powers.

Part 1, the use of lethal weapons in certain circumstances, which was provided for under POPA. Under POPA, the Police can use up to lethal force, as reasonably necessary, to prevent persons from entering the cordoned area. Clause 18 will expand this to allow the Police to use lethal weapons as reasonably necessary to prevent persons, vehicles or vessels from entering the cordoned area or to remove them from the cordoned area.

Similarly, clauses 19 and 20 allow the use of lethal weapons as reasonably necessary to enforce road closures, and disperse processions and assemblies in the target area, for example, to end an armed skirmish between protestors.

Part 2, on the use of lethal weapons to effect arrest and prevent escape from the arrest. Clause 48 will expand the range of offences which allows the Police the use of lethal weapons as reasonably necessary to effect the arrest. The use of lethal weapons is not taken lightly, and the Police have been careful at all times to first exhaust other means. Its record speaks for itself. This high standard of care will be maintained even in a serious incident.

Let me reiterate, lethal weapons can only be used after all available options have been exhausted, or when it is absolutely necessary, such as for time-critical situations. The use of lethal weapons remains subject to internal procedures and rules of engagement.

Finally, Sir, we have also enhanced the penalty for failure to comply with the Police's directions or orders under the Bill. This will now carry a maximum imprisonment term of two years, or $20,000 fine, or both. This is to reflect the seriousness of the offences and is in line with similar provisions, such as the Infrastructure Protection Act.

Mr Speaker, I have explained in some detail the various tools which the Police will need to deal with a serious incident, and which are provided for under POSSPA. POSSPA pools together the necessary tools and places these in one coherent piece of legislation.

How will the Police gain access to these tools? When an incident has happened or is being threatened, the Police will deal with it using their baseline policing powers. However, if the incident is serious, and the Police assess that they need the special powers under POSSPA, they will recommend to the Minister to activate POSSPA.

After considering the Police's assessment, the Minister can issue an Activation Order under clause 8, if he is of the opinion that:

There is a serious incident occurring, or one has occurred, or there is a threat of a serious incident occurring, in Singapore; and

The exercise of any power in POSSPA is necessary to substantially assist in preventing the incident or reducing the impact of the incident, or to control, restore and maintain public order.

Both conditions have to be met before the Minister can issue an Activation Order.

The Activation Order unlocks a range of special powers, which I have explained earlier, which the Police will need to deal with during the serious incident. But it is important to note that these special powers will not automatically come into force upon the issuance of the Activation Order by the Minister. Each special power has to be specifically unlocked by the Commissioner of Police only as and when deemed necessary.

Under clause 11, the Commissioner of Police issues a Special Authorisation that can target a specific area, person, and/or vehicle. The Commissioner may declare more than one target area, target person or target vehicle, depending on the operational need.

The Minister for Home Affairs will publicise the Activation Order in accordance with clause 8 subsection (2), for example, through the media via press releases, and online and social media platforms.

The duration of each Activation Order is capped at one month, after which, the Minister must make a new Activation Order if he assesses that there is a need for a new Order.

We do not intend to use the POSSPA powers for longer than is absolutely necessary. After a serious incident has been resolved, we would want to work with the affected communities to return to normalcy as soon as possible.

Mr Speaker, I have explained the reasons for this Bill, the additional tools the Police will need in a serious incident and how these powers can be accessed.

By necessity, the provisions of the Bill are crafted broadly. This is because the threat situation continues to evolve and, quite frankly, the methods deployed by terrorists are increasingly hard to predict.

Through POSSPA, we will provide the Police the tools they need to respond effectively to a serious incident, and some degree of latitude in exercising the special powers when they are activated.

But are there any safeguards against abuse?

First, as I described earlier, there is a two-tier unlocking mechanism in POSSPA. Not all of the special powers will be used in every case. Even after the Minister has issued the Activation Order on the request of the Police, the Commissioner must apply his mind, and decide: (a) which of the special powers are needed to respond to the serious incident, (b) who may exercise these powers, and (c) which area, person or vehicle these powers may apply to.

Second, the law also sets out clear criteria which must be met by the Minister and the Commissioner of Police before they issue the Activation Order or Special Authorisation.

Third, even on the ground, the law sets out clear criteria and limits for Police officers to adhere to, in their exercise of these powers. For example, the basis for removing a vehicle, and how they may remove a vehicle from a target area, are set out quite clearly in clause 24 (1) and (2).

Police officers are also subject to internal guidelines and rules of engagement in their exercise of powers.

Members may ask why we have not carried over the provision in POPA section 3 subsection (5), which allows Parliament to annul the proclamation by the Minister by resolution as a safeguard. There is no sinister reason for this. Even without this provision, Members can question the Minister if they believe an Activation Order should not have been issued or should have been annulled.

Parliament has not been and is not prevented from holding Ministers to account for decisions or policies, just because there are no specific provisions in the law. In any case, judicial review of the Minister's decision to make an Activation Order remains an avenue to curb improper use by the Minister of his powers.

But let me return to why we have the Bill in the first place.

In a fast-evolving incident, such as a terrorist attack, time is of the essence. In the Paris attacks of November 2015, the first incident occurred outside a football stadium. Within minutes, there was shooting on the streets. Long before anyone could make sense of what was going on, hostages had been taken at a theatre.

To save lives, the Police will have to act fast. Should we build in additional layers of approval, for example, to require Parliament to confirm the Minister’s activation or the Commissioner's authorisations even while the situation is unfolding?

Or is a better approach to enable the Police to act swiftly, effectively and in good faith, and be held to account after the crisis is over?

Minister, if you can pause. Minister Lawrence Wong.

Mr Speaker, may I seek your consent and the general assent of Members present to move, "That the proceedings on the item under discussion be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order 48(8) to remove the time limit in respect of Minister Josephine Teo's speech."

I give my consent. Does the Minister have the general assent of hon Members present to so move?

[(proc text) Hon Members indicated assent. (proc text)]

[(proc text) With the consent of Mr Speaker and the general assent of Members present, (proc text)]

[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Resolved, "That the proceedings on the item under discussion be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order 48(8) to remove the time limit in respect of Minister Josephine Teo's speech." (proc text)]

[(proc text) Debate resumed. (proc text)]

Second Minister Josephine Teo.

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

In Singapore's case, I believe the latter is better able to serve our interests and I hope Members can support this view. Mr Speaker, with your permission, I would like to give my concluding remarks in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Singapore is an international hub and a multiracial and multi-religious society. We have a good reputation; the society is stable, and people generally feel safe.

Because of these attributes, we are a prized target for terrorists. Being able to successfully attack Singapore will give terrorists significant advantage in advancing their cause and reputation, and it will be a major victory for the terrorists.

In other cities, we have seen the impact of terrorist attacks on the public. We studied their security responses carefully. We concluded that our laws need to be strengthened.

POSSPA will give our security forces the necessary powers to respond effectively to serious incidents which threaten public safety, such as terrorist attacks, and protect our people.

(In English): Mr Speaker, we did not introduce this Bill in a vacuum. We did so only after studying the terrorist attacks that had taken place in other countries, and the limitations and problems they faced in dealing with the attacks. At the same time, in requesting for the special powers in the Bill, we have put in place safeguards.

But even as we debate the extent of the special powers, let us remember that we will never really know whether our preparations go far enough, until they are put to the test in an actual incident.

The bottom line is this. It is up to us to safeguard Singaporeans and Singapore if and when we come under a terror attack. In this, we must not fail. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.

[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]

Mr Christopher de Souza.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I support this Bill because it provides our Police with the necessary powers to respond effectively to specific situations, in particular, terror attacks.

Terror attacks follow the same game play of division, terror, pandemonium. But terror attacks have ranged in form, such as lone wolf attacks, for example, knife attacks against a church in Yogyakarta, Indonesia; to coordinated firearm attacks, for example, the bombing in Paris in November 2015; or the tactic of long besiegement, for example, in Marawi, Philippines, or a quick single attack through commonplace items, for example, the vehicle rampage in Berlin's Christmas market; or highly symbolic, high impact attacks, for example, the collapse of the Twin Towers, or insidious attacks against innocent children, such as the bombing at the Ariana Grande concert.

As terrorists' methods change and vary widely, we, too, in Singapore, need to ensure that our laws keep abreast to deal with their widening and changing modus operandi.

The bases of the expanded powers are acts of serious violence affecting the public, acts causing large-scale public disorder, and terror attacks. These have been carefully defined under clauses 3 and 4. While such expanded powers are completely ill-suited for a neighbourhood theft incident, for example, the standard powers are also ill-suited for dealing with such large-scale public order and public safety events.

For example, under clause 19, read with clause 15(4)(a), the Police are able to rope in civilians to help to cordon off roads. This would be extremely useful, for example, where there is a large area to secure and when back-up is not there yet, and time is of the essence in preventing the perpetrator from escaping or other members of the public from entering.

Another example is the power to remove parked vehicles under clause 24 on the basis of endangering others, obstructing traffic flow and hindering the exercise of special powers. Imagine what would happen if a single vehicle held up the back-up Police forces, or if a vehicle was lying around as a getaway car, also doubling up as an obstruction to Police forces.

Another example is the power under clause 27 to direct premises owners to cooperate by providing information about the premises, closing the premises for a specific time, and ensuring the entrances and exits are secured. Take, for example, a situation where the perpetrator is still at large in the area. Surely, we do not want more people walking into the "minefield". And, surely, having access to floor plans is going to be extremely helpful for strategising where and how operations may be carried out.

Therefore, this Bill provides powers to deal with large-scale public disorder and serious violence incidents, which are largely different from normal day-to-day scenarios.

Additionally, this Bill is specifically targeted towards ensuring that the Police can effectively respond to the situation. This can be seen in how the applicability of the expanded powers in this Bill are triggered by the Police Commissioner, that the purpose of the power is meant to enhance Police effectiveness, is a recurrent theme throughout the Bill presented today in Parliament.

Therefore, although it is predicated on the Minister's issuance of an "activation order", which powers are to be exercised and by whom, are decisions for the Police Commissioner to make. This is done, not by the Minister, but by the Police Commissioner separately issuing temporary restraining orders, communication stop orders and requisition powers as well as the "special authorisation" under clause 11.

Importantly, the current Bill is not without safeguards, as alluded to by the good Minister. It is not a rough expansion of powers across the board, carte blanche. Rather, clause 15 carefully calibrates according to the person exercising the power. For instance, while the Police are able to enforce curfew orders, serviceman cannot.

Furthermore, other countermeasures in the Bill, such as curfews, communication stop orders, discontinuation of telecommunication service, requisition powers, do not apply across the board. They require yet another order by the Commissioner or Minister, on top of the more general conferring of broader powers. This calibrated approach makes sure that the measures are flexible enough to be effective in different situations, in different scenarios.

An activation order or a mere special authorisation is not a free pass to all the rest of the countermeasure powers. They require additional orders by the Minister or Commissioner, only arising when the situation calls for it and may apply for a shorter time period. We are not treating it as a one-size-fits-all authorisation, but we are ensuring that there are enough mechanisms to address serious incidents effectively.

Another important restriction that embeds accountability into the exercise of power is the explicit lists of acceptable purposes of the use of the power. Take, for example, the communications stop order in clause 30. In a "serious incident" like that in illustration (d) of a large sit-down demonstration impeding traffic and interfering with normal business activities, it seems a communication stop order is not to be issued to quell publicity.

Rather, it appears that it can only be issued if it is in the Police Commissioner's opinion that it would endanger safety of the public, prejudices ongoing law enforcement activity and other purposes set out in clause 30(2)(b).

Sir, zeroing into the communication stop order, I support the idea behind it. Too many hostage rescues and counter-terror attacks have been compromised through social media broadcasting, live media broadcasting. Perpetrators at the Taj and Oberoi hotels in Mumbai in 2008 were able to view and monitor actions of security forces through television (TV) coverage.

The power to take down drones in the target area should be considered. The bottom line is this. Once a theatre of threat has been established, we should remove all disadvantages to the Police. That will help to quell the threat and neutralise the danger.

This restriction on communication protects the people being rescued by increasing the chances of a successful rescue. It also protects the people who are trying to rescue them. After all, they, too, have families and friends waiting for their safe return.

Even as important as it is to control the physical situation, it is also important for the right foundations to be laid for social resilience. If there is a vacuum of information, there may be a lack of confidence that the situation is being managed. Because this may be for some time, perhaps one month, according to clause 10(2), inaccurate rumours may run amok through lack of accurate information. As the days pass, hope may dwindle. Therefore, would the Minister kindly clarify whether the communication stop order prevents a person from passing on official updates on an ongoing incident so as to quell anxiety amongst the families of those affected?

Another countermeasure that may be utilised is the power of requisition under clause 35. One can imagine that in a densely built-up urban area, such as Singapore, this power may be especially important for launching an effective surprise attack on the target person.

The Bill also provides for additional offences that seek to ensure that the situation in the target area does not escalate further. For instance, clause 37, relating to provoking breach of peace. These offences are predicated on the activation order. Therefore, I would like to seek an elaboration on what, I quote, "all reasonable steps" that must be taken by management or an officer of a company to absolve liability under clause 45(2)(b) are. Essentially, what are "all reasonable steps"?

While "reasonable steps" have been defined under clause 46(6) through the "standard provision" relating to corporate crimes as stated in the Explanatory Statement, what would it look like for a company to do all reasonable steps to promote a culture, something that is built over time, that does not encourage, tolerate or lead to noncompliance of the offences when the offences under this Bill only arise under the special circumstances of an activation order? What then? I hope the Minister will be able to clarify.

From a macro perspective, Mr Speaker, this Bill confers powers necessary to effectively deal with large-scale public order, public safety threats. It comes with an underlying tension, and I accept that. On the one hand, we do not want to face a situation where the Police is unable to neutralise the danger and quell the disorder because they lack the necessary powers. And, on the other hand, there may be sentiments that the Police should not be given disproportionate powers. In my view, the way I deal with this tension is that I do not think the Police are being given disproportionate powers here. In my view, this Bill equips the Police with a level of power necessary to quell danger and neutralise an escalating threat.

The foundation of my argument is that we have a good Police Force which largely enforce their powers professionally. And my core position is this: we do not want the Police to be unprepared, left inadequately protected because the Police officers are bereft of what they need to quell a threat. I support this Bill for it is needed to protect Singapore and Singaporeans.

Ms Sylvia Lim.

Mr Speaker, Sir, in its media release of 27 February 2018, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) stated categorically that the Special Powers under this Bill would not be available for routine operations. Two weeks later, on 15 March, MHA repeated that the Bill would not apply to day-to-day policing. This second statement was made in response to concerns from civil society groups about the wide wording of the Bill. Today, the Second Minister has just repeated the assurance in her Second Reading speech when she said she hoped that the Special Powers would never need to be used.

Sir, the understanding that the Bill should only be invoked in exceptional circumstances is a critical underlying assumption for the debate on this Bill. Parliament is being asked to approve very draconian powers to be given to law enforcement and supporting forces, but only in situations where there is an imminent and grave danger to the safety and security of the people in Singapore. As MHA has stated, the threshold for special powers to be activated in the Bill is "high". The powers under this Bill must never be misused for situations that can be adequately dealt with under other laws.

This Bill serves to repeal the POPA enacted in 1958, but its aims are wider. While the long title of POPA states that the Act relates to the maintenance and restoration of public order, this Bill states that its aim is to "extend Police powers to better prevent and respond to any incident or likely incident involving serious violence or large-scale public disorder in Singapore".

Thus, this Bill envisages prevention and response, not just to public disorder, but serious violence as well. To this end, the Bill provides some new powers not contained in POPA, such as the ability of the Police to direct owners of buildings within incident areas to take actions like closing the building for a specified time, and for the Police to question individuals within a target area when conducting a manhunt.

Sir, I accept that the nature of the threats that Singapore faces today, especially from terrorism, is different from the problems that POPA was supposed to address when it was enacted in 1958. The Government would need muscle as well as flexibility to respond quickly and effectively to those threats. I believe Singaporeans want this.

Under the Bill, the Minister can issue an Activation Order under clause 8 if he is of the opinion that a serious incident has occurred, is occurring or is threatened, and that the use of the Special Powers under the Bill would be necessary to achieve the objectives of preventing the occurrence, reducing its impact, or controlling and restoring public order. According to clause 9, the Minister's Activation Order must specify the nature of the serious incident, the duration of the Activation Order, and authorise the Commissioner of Police to exercise all or any of the Special Powers under the Bill.

It seems to me that the principle of proportionality should be a cardinal principle in exercising all the powers under the Bill. Not only must the Minister’s threshold for issuing an Activation Order be high, the decision of which Special Powers are really needed to deal with a particular scenario should be deliberately considered case by case. Earlier during the Second Minister's Second Reading speech, she confirmed that, for each incident, the Commissioner of Police would consider the need for each Special Power as commensurate with the nature of the incident.

What should also concern us today is whether any of the provisions in the Bill seem to be too wide or involve too much of a compromise on competing public interests, such as public accountability. In this regard, I have two concerns to raise.

First, the definition of "serious incident" under clause 3 of the Bill. Clause 3 defines "serious incident" to include not only terrorism-related offences and acts of serious violence, but also acts "causing large-scale public disorder". There are five factual illustrations for the scope of clause 3. The first three scenarios concern the use of explosives and firearms, and the forcible taking over of public transport, which, to most of us, warrant an exceptional response from the authorities. However, the last two illustrations which concern public disorder are more controversial. Illustration (d) covers a sit-down peaceful protest that grows in size such that there is impediment to paths, roads and normal business. Illustration (e) is about a group protesting in the street that grows in size and then starts to commit violent acts, which sounds to me like rioting, which is an arrestable offence under the Penal Code.

I would like the Minister to explain why the existing laws are not adequate to deal with such scenarios as in illustrations (d) and (e). In addition, it seems to me that in these scenarios, any law enforcement operation would not be tactically sensitive to warrant the use of Special Powers, such as the Communications Stop Order (CSO), a topic I shall deal with next.

Sir, notwithstanding what the Second Minister has said about the CSO, I am still most concerned about clauses 30 and 31. It is stated that the Commissioner of Police can issue a CSO to ban the making of relevant films or pictures, and to ban exhibiting or communicating any relevant film or picture, or a relevant text or audio message. The Commissioner can issue a CSO if he is of the view that exhibiting or communicating such relevant pictures, films, texts or audio messages would prejudice ongoing law enforcement operations relating to serious incidents or endanger the safety of the public or law enforcement officers during the law enforcement activity. The terms "relevant picture or film", and "relevant text or audio message", are defined in clause 2 broadly to mean those made while the Special Powers are activated and which are related to the target area or law enforcement activities in the target area.

Under clause 31, a Police Officer can direct persons to stop making, exhibiting or communicating such relevant films, pictures, texts or audio messages. The Police can also compel the deletion and the surrender of such material, and require persons to provide information on the recipients of any communications.

Sir, I appreciate fully that when a tactical security operation is ongoing, the details of a target area and the deployment of law enforcement require secrecy for maximum efficacy. Past incidents, such as the Mumbai attack in 2008, have shown that TV footage of ongoing operations had given perpetrators live information on the presence and tactics of law enforcement, enabling them to anticipate the actions of law enforcement forces.

However, on the other hand, it has also been proven in past incidents that footage or photographs taken at the scene of major incidents prevented fake news and enabled the truth to emerge, after the incidents were over. For instance, in 2009, a Group of Twenty (G20) summit meeting was held in London and a police operation codenamed "Operation Glencoe" was mounted to manage protestors. While the operation was on, a man named Ian Tomlinson suddenly fell and died while in the vicinity. Police initially denied that they had any altercation with him, until a video taken by an American there on business, showed Mr Tomlinson being pushed to the ground by police. This led to inquiries that uncovered the truth, which would not have happened had contemporaneous videos not been recorded.

Sir, while I can accept that the transmission of relevant films, pictures, texts and audio messages during a tactical operation may jeopardise the effectiveness of the operations, I do not accept that the making and the storing of such films and pictures for later viewing will undermine such operations.

Sir, as regards how such films and pictures can guard against Police abuse, MHA stated on 15 March that this was not required, as the Police would always look into any feedback or complaint about misconduct of its officers seriously. However, the reality is that in any investigation, evidence talks. If it is a case of "he-says-she-says", the burden will fall on the complainant to prove the complaint. A ban on making relevant films and pictures does not promote fact-finding and accountability.

I note what the Second Minister had said earlier in her Second Reading speech about the operational difficulties that the Police may face on the ground to distinguish between who is simply just making a film for record, or who is contemporaneously transmitting the films. As a former Police Officer, I understand that difficulty fully. Nevertheless, even if the offence of making films needs to be on the books in the Government's assessment, I would hope that the Government would be slow to prosecute if the film or picture adds value to post-review investigations.

So, Sir, in summary, I still have my concerns about the compromise we are making in the CSOs and I would ask the Government to adopt a more constructive approach towards unofficial recordings of major incidents.

Mr Kok Heng Leun.

Mr Speaker, today, we are discussing this proposed Bill, which will repeal the POPA, and this Bill increases the powers of the Police so that they can better deal with large-scale security threats that we may face in Singapore. These powers will include stop and search powers, requisitioning powers, powers to set up and enforce cordons and curfews.

While I recognise that in emergency situations, there is a need for the authorities to act swiftly and given some latitude in exercising their powers, we must nonetheless ensure that such security measures remain accountable and be accorded with due process and fairness so as to ensure that public confidence in the Government does not erode during crisis time.

Before I turn to discuss the substance of the Bill, I would like to understand if there was a public consultation for this Bill. I believe the public has a right to have their views heard on this Bill before its enactment, given that this Bill is a matter of public interest because it has wide-ranging implications and would intimately affect the public during emergency situations.

Mr Speaker, there are some measures in the Bill which, after my consultations with civil society, I would now want to discuss.

One of the concerns that I have was the definition of what constitutes a "serious incident". I would like to bring attention to illustration (d) under clause 3 which relates to a sit-down demonstration in the Central Business District (CBD) area which grows to a point, over a week, that it impedes the flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic and interferes with business activities. So, what in this illustration would make it a "serious" enough incident such that it could be comparable to the other illustrations, such as illustrations (a) and (b), both depicting possible terrorist attacks? Illustration (d) is a peaceful protest involving neither violence against any person or property damage and presumably attracting a substantial level of support. While such events may require some Police intervention because of some degree of disorderliness, but they are not comparable to armed attacks or hostage situations in terms of severity.

To me, illustration (d) seems to stand in stark contrast to all the other illustrations provided, as the level of severity and the threat posed is significantly lower.

Can the Second Minister share with the House why she thinks that the powers under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) or POA might be insufficient to cover an illustration (d) situation and, therefore, it is necessary to include this illustration as an example of the "serious incident" under clause 3?

Another area of concern that I have with the Bill is that it enlists the help of civilian assistants to discharge certain duties. Under clause 2 of the Bill, specific powers are given to civilian assistants to assist a Police Officer who is granted the special authorisation. Further, under clause 15(4)(a), a civilian assistant is authorised to exercise certain powers.

Mr Speaker, civilian assistants are not subject to the same training afforded to a serviceman, law enforcement officer or Police Officer. Therefore, in emergency situations that require instant decision-making under pressure, there is a possibility that civilian assistants might not possess the ability to respond quickly, decisively and even correctly as a trained personnel would. Additionally, civilian assistants may exacerbate the emergency situation or inadvertently cause harm to themselves or bystanders while discharging their duties.

As such, my concern is that enlisting of the assistance of civilian assistants might be more detrimental than beneficial during a crisis period and that the safety of these assistants might be compromised in the process of discharging their duties. I would, therefore, like to understand how the Ministry will ensure that the safety of these assistants is protected when they discharge their duties.

Sir, my third area of concern is with the broad discretion given to the Minister to grant an Activation Order. Under clause 8 of the Bill, if, in the opinion of the Minister, the granting of the Activation Order is necessary to prevent or reduce the impact of the serious incident or to control or maintain public order after the serious incident, my question is, what does the term "necessary" entail?

I would also note that the decision of the Minister does not require approval from another arm of the Government or an independent body. This is in contrast to section 3(5) of POPA which this Bill seeks to replace, where every proclamation of a dangerous area must be presented to Parliament for their concurrence.

Comparatively, under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act and the Internal Security Act (ISA), both of which are security-nature Acts, the decisions of the Minister are subject to the concurrence by the President on the advice of a special advisory committee. Just now, in the Second Minister's Second Reading speech, she has articulated the reason why she felt this should be removed. While I understand the time sensitivity of the Special Order, however, I also note the Second Minister has also said, this is such a special situation that she would even wish that it would not be ever activated. I think a mechanism of accountability should have been there. It can be done as soon as possible, without impeding the expediency of the Police when they are exercising this Order.

Further, under clause 8(3), an Activation Order must be published but a failure to publish does not invalidate the Order. Mr Speaker, I believe the two clauses are contradictory in nature. If it is a must to publish an Activation Order, logic dictates that the failure to publish the Order will invalidate it. I would like to understand the reasons behind this provision that the failure to publish does not invalidate the Order. Moreover, if there is an incident where an Order is not published and a Police Officer uses his special powers on an individual who does not know that this Order has been there, and subsequently refuses to obey the instructions of the Police Officer, is such an individual guilty of an offence under the Act?

Such a failure to publish means that the public may be uninformed. How can someone be held liable for a sudden change they have not been reasonably notified about? Additionally, if there is a situation when there is a failure to publish such a notice, should there not be a system of accountability of why the failure happened?

Now, I would like to discuss the next area of concern which pertains to clauses 30 and 31 which give the Commissioner the power to make CSOs against individuals.

In the MHA's Press Release on 27 February 2018, the Ministry explained that such a CSO is necessary to prevent leakage of such information to terrorist which could endanger the lives of security officers and members of the public who are caught in the act. The Ministry cited two examples: that of the Mumbai and Paris attacks whereby live television and media broadcast during those attacks resulted in leakage of information to the terrorists. In turn, such leakage of information made the police operation more difficult and placed the safety of the officers and hostages at greater risk.

In both incidents, it was not individual communications between persons or through the social media that impeded security operations, but rather through the live reporting of the said incidents by the media. Yet, there is an absence of guidelines or provision in this Bill that regulate or prevent the traditional media from leaking information through live broadcasts that may impede security operations, which appears to be the mischief that a CSO seeks to address.

There might also be issues arising from the issuance of CSOs against individuals. Under clause 30(1)(b), the exhibiting and communicating by any person of a relevant text may be banned during the period which the CSO is in force. If individuals near the vicinity are trying to inform their loved ones of their safety or to warn their loved ones to avoid the area of the serious incident, how are such individuals able to do so?

Also, what if an individual takes a photo or a video of an abuse of power by Police Officers, under clause 31(20(b), the Police Officer can order that individual to delete that video or photo. How is that individual then going to report to the Ministry when the only evidence to substantiate that claim has been deleted? Can the Minister please clarify what will be done in such a situation?

In the event of "serious incidents", like terrorist attacks, there will be a lot of confusion, and emotion will run high. In fact, the impact of any such security incidents is not just about fatalities and loss of properties, but it will cause fear and distress and then destabilise, paralyse and even divide the society. In the aftermath of such an event, it is important that there is enough information for us to piece things together, to verify facts, to dismiss accusations and restore justice if need be.

Hence, in these moments of high tension when people think that it is important to document certain happenings so that it could be useful in the aftermath of the event, to help the Police to understand the situations better, this CSO should not deter the individuals from doing that. In fact, documentation is important in the event of allegations of whether the Police or the public have stepped out of their line. It is a means to protect Police Officers and the public from false accusations and these documentations are witnesses and testimonies and, in the aftermath of the event, can help a lot in the healing of the community.

I have one more query pertaining to this. What if a Police Officer was accused of abuse of process by an individual who has documented the incident during the effect of the CSO could prove that the Police was innocent, would this individual who surrenders the documentation then be charged?

Another operational issue that I have is with the power of the Minister to give directions to telecommunication licensees to, amongst others, stop messages carried by a telecommunication service provided by the licensee under clause 32(3)(a) or prohibit the use of telecommunications by the licensee when an activation order is in effect. In the event that the telecommunication messaging and telecommunications services are discontinued, how would individuals caught in the vicinity where the serious incident occurred be able to send out messages of distress or call for help?

My final area of concern pertains to clause 38 of the Bill which criminalises, amongst others, the publication of materials prejudicial to public order.

Firstly, Mr Speaker, can the Minister clarify why the mere possession of a document is criminalised under clause 38? If, for instance, an individual types something on his phone, or writes something with no intention to publish it and merely for personal use, it seems disproportionate to say that such a person is liable of an offence, especially when no potential harm is caused by mere possession.

Secondly, what constitutes prejudicial material or documents appears to be too broadly defined such that a material that might not actually be prejudicial to public order and security may, nonetheless, be caught under clause 38. For instance, clause 38(1) (a) merely requires the said material to be "likely to be prejudicial", as opposed to being "highly likely to be prejudicial".

Thirdly, clause 38(2) seems to displace the element of intention for an offence relating to publishing material prejudicial to public order. It is a trite criminal law principle that an individual must have a guilty mind in addition to his or her action before one can be criminalised. Therefore, can the Minister provide reasons as to why clause 38(2) appears to deviate from this important principle?

Fourthly, Mr Speaker, I also note that in the interest of speed and efficiency, criminalising an individual under clause 38 may not necessarily be the most efficient measure to deal with materials that may be prejudicial to public order during an emergency situation. Would a takedown order that immediately forces an individual to stop distributing or take down any prejudicial matter be faster and more efficient in dealing with the publication of such material rather than criminalising the conduct?

Mr Speaker, permit me to reiterate that I do not oppose the intention of the Bill. National security is a priority in the current global climate. However, my view is that the Bill affords too much discretion on decision-makers. Therefore, more can be done in this respect to ensure greater transparency and accountability which are crucial during times of emergencies.

Mr Melvin Yong.

Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill, which seeks to extend Police powers to better prevent and respond to any incident involving serious violence or large-scale public disorder in Singapore.

As a former Police Officer myself, I can understand and appreciate fully the challenges faced by our Police Officers on the ground daily. Our Police Officers place their lives at risk constantly, and this risk increases immensely in the event of an attack. While others are running away from the threat, our officers must run towards, and seek to diffuse the threat. In my view, the powers proposed in this Bill are necessary and timely. It will help our Police and other Home Team officers better carry out their job to save lives.

Mr Speaker, MHA’s Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2017 found that terrorism threat to Singapore remains the highest in recent years. Singapore continues to be a prized target of regional and global terrorist organisations. Over the years, our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have managed to act swiftly and discreetly to foil the attempts of foreign JI and ISIS militants in carrying out an attack in Singapore. But terrorism threats to our country are not confined to within our borders. In August 2016, the Indonesian authorities foiled a plot by a Batam-based terrorist group, which had intended to launch a rocket attack against the Marina Bay Sands, using Batam as a launch point.

In recent years, we have also seen a rise in the number of self-radicalised individuals influenced by extremist ideologies to target Singapore. Clearly, the threat to Singapore has increased tremendously, and our legislation needs to evolve in tandem to combat these threats.

Under the Bill, the Minister for Home Affairs is empowered to issue an Activation Order if a serious incident affecting public safety has occurred. Such an order must describe the general nature of the incident, specify the period or periods during which the activation order has effect, and authorise the Commissioner of Police to exercise the special powers under the provision of this Bill.

The Commissioner of Police is given the flexibility to then decide the targets of special powers, depending on the evolving operational needs. I agree that this is important and time-critical for the Police, especially in the event of multiple attacks, such as the November 2015 attacks in Paris, which saw a series of coordinated terrorist attacks in multiple locations. However, who makes the operational call that these multiple incidents are connected?

In the May 2017 Manchester concert bombing, there was a separate security incident which prompted an evacuation of a shopping mall in Manchester. Some thought that it was a coordinated attack, but investigations later revealed that it was unrelated to the concert bombing. My question then is whether the subsequent incidents must have a nexus to the original incident, or should the Minister be required to issue a new Activation Order if the subsequent incidents are seemingly unrelated to the first incident? Who then makes the call if incidents are related or not to the first incident?

Mr Speaker, the Bill also serves to empower the Police to issue a CSO to prevent sensitive information from being disseminated, to the detriment of operations secrecy, as well as the safety of the public and Police Officers. I am supportive of this.

Allow me to cite a few examples. In the manhunt for the Boston marathon bombers, "live" reports showing key police operations helped the suspects to evade capture for about four days. In the Manila bus hostage incident, the "live" broadcast of impending police operations to storm the bus further agitated the hostage-taker, who executed several hostages before he was eventually taken down. Having a CSO imposed in such scenarios would help protect operation secrecy, prevent critical information from leaking to the suspects via the media and, more crucially, prevent the loss of innocent lives.

However, it is a well-known fact that the initial 30 minutes after an incident occurs is a key period where every information collected is vital for the authorities to make sense of what is happening. This is also why our Police have been advocating the concept of Run, Hide and Tell. Where possible, tell the Police as soon as you can on where you are and what is happening. How can we, in the event of a terrorist incident, strike a balance between Run, Hide and Tell, with the imposition of a CSO?

Going back to the Boston Marathon bombing, the big breakthrough in identifying the suspects came from a photo taken by a spectator watching the race from across the street. We would need to make sure that any communications ban would not inadvertently end up harming Police investigations.

Mr Speaker, section 28 of the Bill empowers a Police Officer to direct persons operating unmanned aircrafts, or drones, and autonomous vehicles away from an area. However, to do so, the Police Officer is required to locate the person operating the drone or autonomous vehicle. Drone technology is advancing rapidly. Upcoming models will soon be able to operate beyond an operator's visual line of sight. How would our Police Officers be able to find the drone operator if the drone in question is far away from the operator?

Similarly, autonomous vehicle technology is advancing towards a level of autonomy where a human will not be required to be in the car. How would the Police Officer direct an autonomous vehicle away in such an instance? These are questions that MHA would need to think about carefully, as technology advances.

Mr Speaker, due to the heightened terrorist threat, the additional powers in this Bill are essential for the Police. The POSSPA Bill is an important part of the Government's ongoing counterterrorism efforts, coming after the POA Bill and the Infrastructure Protection Bill which were passed last year.

The powers to protect the integrity of tactical operations will enable the Police to carry out their mission by choosing the best tactical options available, without having to worry that the terrorists can watch their actions "live", anticipate their actions, and ambush them around the next corner. The proposed amendments serve to ensure that our Police will not be caught without the powers they require to safeguard lives and property, when an attack occurs.

Keeping us safe and secure every day is not an easy task and our Home Team has done and continues to do an incredible job. Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.

Ms Thanaletchimi.

Mr Speaker, Sir, I stand in support of this Bill. In view of the rising terrorism threats around the world, it is increasingly important to strengthen and tighten home security to ensure public order and safety. This is even more crucial for a small and multi-ethnic nation like Singapore.

Last year, MHA had reported that the terrorism threat to Singapore remained the highest in recent years. Security is, indeed, a joint responsibility among individuals, community and the Government. I, therefore, welcome the SGSecure national movement as Singapore's community response to the threat of terror.

In our workplaces, we have people of different races and nationalities working side by side. The news on ISIS and self-radicalised individuals may affect the cohesion of the various groups of people working and living amongst us.

When there is an such incident of terror, the Bill will allow the Commissioner of Police to make a CSO while security operations are ongoing, therefore, Police powers are proposed to be expanded to deal with terror attacks and serious incidents. It is, therefore, important that our officers are trained adequately to face potential challenges and different situations.

In addition, the measure of barring the public from taking images and banning text or audio messages from the affected area is essential to ensure that no public disorder might arise due to misinformation. The Bill is also essential to protect the secrecy of tactical operations and enable the Police to respond to serious incidents more effectively.

Sir, notwithstanding this, I have the following clarifications and suggestions to make.

First, what constitutes serious incident that provides the authorities with the special power to block all communication and filming and use of social media? Does this include non-violent passive protest or demonstration that has serious societal implication besides violent or terrorist incidents?

Second, when the Commissioner of Police authorises a CSO while security operations are ongoing, it will require all people in the vicinity from not taking pictures of the incident or sending them across to others. In today’s context, almost all Singaporeans use a mobile phone to inform their loved ones of their safety. Can such harmless communication be allowed if an individual is within the vicinity of the serious incident?

More often than not, public information via social media may provide useful leads for Police investigations. With this Bill, the public may be wary of producing such information to the Police even if they had acquired them. While we want to prevent frivolous dissemination of vital information, there should be means to acquire such useful information from the public. We should encourage civil society’s active participation in deterring terrorism and serious incidents with useful public information. Will the Bill discourage such responsive nature of public involvement to apprehend perpetrators?

Will such special powers result in public fear of abuse of power by the Police? How can one independently verify Police action when there is a communication blackout as the evidence presented is one-sided?

Lastly, I call on the Ministry to create awareness of the new Bill. The public must know the serious implications as it is now deemed an offence if one violates the order. While the public gets used to the new restriction, I hope that cases of genuine violation due to ignorance will be dealt minimally with discretionary powers. Sir, notwithstanding this, I support the Bill.

Mr Louis Ng.

Sir, like other Members in this House, I am in favour of providing the Police with enhanced powers to maintain public order and safety. We have to look to incidents around the world to learn about the evolving methods that terrorists use to inflict maximum damage and terror. Even if these incidents have not occurred in Singapore, there is no guarantee that it will not happen here. And when they do, we need to be prepared for it.

The POSSPA Bill is an important step to equip and empower our security agencies to mount an effective response, should we one day need it. While I support the Bill in its intentions, allow me to seek a few clarifications on its details.

In clause 3, "serious incidents" are defined to constitute terrorist acts, acts of serious violence, acts causing large-scale public disorder, and so on. Members of this House, past and present, have continuously debated about striking the right balance between maintaining public order and proportionate responses to achieving that order. We have constantly been recalibrating this balance, not just today, but in 2009 when we discussed the POA, and again in 2014 after the Little India Riots.

In that light, can the Minister clarify why "acts causing large-scale public disorder" under part (c) of clause 3 are defined as a "serious incident" on the same scale as violent acts of terrorism?

The Bill provides an example of such an act, describing "a sit-down demonstration...

(which) attracts a large group of sympathisers who voluntarily join the sit-in… Their presence starts to impede the flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic", which many other Members of this House have quoted as well.

The Bill proposes that the Police be given the same set of powers, whether it is dealing with acts of terrorism, or sit-down demonstrations which attract a large group of sympathisers. Why?

I do understand that there is a concern that these assemblies might lead to violence and injuries, but can the Minister clarify what exactly is the "high threshold" for the activation of the special powers spelt out in the Bill? What will trigger the activation?

I would also like to seek clarity on the size of an assembly that could qualify as a "large-scale public disorder". When would a crowd be large enough for these special powers to be activated?

For some members of the public, it may also seem excessive, in these cases, to allow the Police enhanced powers to stop and question individuals within the incident areas, and, if the individual does not comply, to issue a fine of up to $20,000, or two years' imprisonment, or in clauses 18, 19 and 20, to use force, including lethal weapons, to ensure compliance with orders.

Again, members of the public are clearly supportive of the use of lethal weapons to ensure compliance with orders when there is a terrorist attack but the concern of some members of the public is whether we need to use such lethal powers for a sit-down demonstration. Can the Minister address these concerns?

Next, I believe that the CSO in clause 30 is absolutely necessary in situations where "live" communications could give terrorists the upper hand. We do not want to see an embarrassing repeat of the Mumbai attacks in 2008 or the Manila hostage crisis in 2010.

Related to my previous point, I would like to ask the rationale again for requiring such a stop order, again, for "acts causing large-scale public disorder". Can the Minister provide some clarifications on why this is needed?

I understand that a member of the public would not be penalised if he/she was taking a photo and sending it to the authorities via SGSecure. In any given situation, there could be many people using their phones concurrently for different reasons, some violating the CSO and some not. How then would this be effectively policed?

Furthermore, I believe it would be beneficial to have more clarity on certain language used in the Bill. In clauses 18, 19, 20 and 48, the Police may "use force as is reasonably necessary", "including the use of lethal weapons". Can it be more clearly defined as to what constitutes "reasonable force"?

While empowering the Police with necessary powers to maintain public order, we also need to balance this with safeguards to prevent the misuse of this power.

The Bill now also grants some special powers to "civilian assistants", which Members of this House have raised as well, which I understand was not previously included in POPA. How can we ensure that these civilian assistants are sufficiently trained, particularly to know what "reasonable force" entails?

Some members of the public are also concerned that with the CSO, if any cases of potential Police brutality were to occur, we would not have independent documentation of the event. This may lead to some questions on whether there are sufficient safeguards to prevent a scenario of disproportionate power.

MHA has since clarified that if members of the public have any allegations of misconduct or abuse of powers by Police Officers, when POSSPA has been activated, they should lodge a Police report or report directly to the Ministry. But we will have to bear in mind that they may not be in possession of any evidence to support that Police report, due to the CSO. Can the Minister provide more clarity on this issue?

Sir, I do understand the need for and the importance of this Bill and I hope that the Minister can address the concerns I have raised. Sir, notwithstanding the above clarifications, I stand in support of this Bill.

Mr Ang Wei Neng.

Mr Speaker, Sir, recent serious terror attacks in Jakarta and Selangor have resulted in serious injuries and deaths. These underscore how the current Bill is timely, necessary and important, particularly since Singapore has been cited as a target in jihadist publications and videos, by both ISIS and other terrorist groups.

Many other countries have similarly stepped up their counter-terrorism responses, such as the EU countries which have been victims of horrific attacks. Britain, for instance, under its Investigative Powers Act, is empowered to conduct mass surveillance.

While we agree that the Police need to have sweeping powers under the extraordinary circumstance of a terrorist attack, we also need to have safeguards to provide a sense of balance. Thus, I will approach the Bill on two aspects. First, on the special authorisation and, next, on the CSO.

On the special authorisation by the Commissioner of Police under the Bill, I would like to clarify the following issues with the Minister.

“A law enforcement officer is defined in clause 2(1) to mean a Police Officer, an immigration officer, a narcotics officer, a prisons officer or a Civil Defence Service officer. The class may be expanded by the Minister”, as cited in the explanatory notes. How does the Minister envisage the class to be expanded?

The second group of people who can exercise the special powers specified in the special authorisation under subsection 1(c) refers to servicemen or SAF personnel and they "do not act on the direction and in aid of the Police Officer given the authorisation". What is the rationale for this? How would the Police and SAF coordinate the operations on the ground? Would it be coordinated by Ministers or by a Ministerial Committee or by the Cabinet?

The third group who can exercise the special powers is made of any civilian, cited as a civilian assistant. I note that Minister has clarified that they can include security guards. How are the security guards organised during peace time so that they can better assist the Police during a crisis?

Fourthly, a Police Officer can close a road under section 19 of the Bill or order a curfew under section 21, for up to 24 hours, but the Commissioner of Police can extend it. For how long can the Commissioner of Police extend it? Are there any safeguards?

Lastly, under the scope of the Bill, apart from obvious terrorist attacks where injuries and outright threats to public safety are apparent, it also listed an example of a sit-down demonstration where vehicles or pedestrians may be obstructed but public safety may not be threatened. Why would such incidents fall under this Bill, which has been enacted specifically for counter-terrorism purposes? Moreover, the Police already have the power to deal with a sit-down demonstration under the ambit of unlawful assembly, for example, as defined in the Penal Code.

Next, on CSO. The CSO's main objective is to deprive terrorists or criminals of information. It will also deny the terrorists the opportunity to broadcast their terrorist acts "live" through the media, like the case of the Mumbai attacks in 2008.

But the CSO is a very blunt instrument. Breaching a CSO carries a penalty of up to S$20,000 and/or two years’ imprisonment. In order to assure the public that the CSO would not be abused and that there are safeguards in place, I hope the Minister could address and respond to the following two points.

Firstly, print and broadcast journalists exist to provide independent documentation of key events. Singapore’s history is encapsulated in their reports. Hence, it appears harsh to ban the media professionals from doing their jobs. We note that the Police are the only party that would be allowed to make any recordings of the scene when the special powers are exercised. I hope the Minister can direct the Police to release the full footage after the event so that it would not lead to a gap in the documentation of Singapore’s history for future generations and this would also help to counter criticism of any abuse by the Police during the Police operations.

Secondly, to better balance between security and documentation, we could perhaps take a leaf from France, which adopted a Code of Conduct for Journalists covering terrorist incidents after the Hypercacher Supermarket siege incident in 2015. While not a legal instrument of force, its recommendations for journalists bear thinking about as a possible guide for journalists to be allowed to do their jobs responsibly during such incidents. These include responsible coverage of the event lest the perpetrators are watching and careful phrasing of events so as not to influence the public's perception. While I understand that not all media will cooperate and adhere to the code of conduct, but we should not give up trying and should only use the CSO as a last resort.

Mr Speaker, Sir, the special powers, including the CSO given to the Police under this Bill, are wide-ranging, potent and have great implications. Let me conclude my speech in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, the special powers, including the CSO given to the Police under this Bill are wide-ranging. Could the Minister give us an idea whether there were previous incidents which would warrant such powers, especially the CSO, to be applied? Specifically, would the Little India riot in 2013 or the hijacking of SQ117 by four terrorists in 1991 require such special powers?

On the whole, the threat of terrorism is real. We have to be prepared for such an eventual attack. I would like to ask the Minister whether MHA intends to carry out exercises which will benefit the law enforcement officers, other Government agencies, the media and the public to better understand the implications of POSSPA and send a strong signal to all terrorists or would-be terrorists not to touch Singapore because you would not succeed easily. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support this Bill.

Mr Henry Kwek.

Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill. It is important to note that this is not the first time the law enforcement agencies have been given special powers to deal with security issues.

POPA was enacted in 1958 to provide the Police with the special powers to deal with large-scale communal riots which were the key threat to Singapore then.

However, much of the powers in the Act are no longer adequate to deal with today's threats. The threat of terrorism comes in multiple and complex ways, which require swift and decisive action from our law enforcement and security agencies. Therefore, it is necessary for our agencies to be equipped with the necessary powers to deal with the changing threats. As such, I support the Bill that is designed to protect our safety and security. I would like to speak on a few issues.

First, to justify the broad measures, I am glad the Minister has given several examples on recent terrorist attacks, highlighting why the current laws are inadequate to deal with these and that is why a broad-based measure like this is necessary.

My next point is that when the broad-based law is in place, sound and reasonable judgement by our law enforcement officers is needed. And this judgement, within any enforcement agency, is enforced through the guidelines.

I recognise that it may not serve our interest to publish internal guidelines which could be potentially exploited by terrorists. Nevertheless, I am heartened that the Government has articulated the broad principles that govern these internal guidelines, especially on the application of lethal force, the two-tier unlocking process of the powers in the law and the need by the Commissioner to unlock individual powers based on the needs.

The need to articulate these broad principles was originally a concern for me, and I wanted to flag them out in my speech today. I am glad that the Minister has provided a clear explanation of these broad principles.

Next, I would like to touch on the issue of limiting communications in the event of a terrorist incident. It makes sense not to have information posted online through public or open channels, be it social media or mainstream media.

And I appreciate the Second Minister for Home Affairs for clarifying that the victims of terrorist attacks are not prohibited on sending information to security agencies of their situation.

But I would like the Minister to clarify whether sharing with friends and families on closed networks is also forbidden, perhaps not video, but text messages indicating that there is an attack and please stay away.

During a crisis, we all want to make sure that our immediate loved ones are safe and stay out of any possible danger zones. So, a flurry of messages within closed networks can be expected. Some would also argue that if this information does not spill over to the public networks, or to the social media, the risk of the terrorist getting wind of getting useful information is also quite limited.

Lastly, I hope the Government can invest in more efforts to share this aspect of the law with our people. Perhaps, we can remind people at the onset of any serious terrorist incident that such a law is in place and the communication limitation is also in place. And this is because, while a limitation of communications is necessary, this provision goes against the initial instinct that many people have to share such information with their loved ones in times of crises. With that, I support the Bill.

Mr Desmond Choo.

Mr Speaker, Singapore has been extremely fortunate to remain safe and secure during a time when many cities experience terrorist attacks and serious incidents, such as hostage-taking, sit-down protests turning into violence protests. We must not stop anticipating in preparing to meet this threat. In doing so, the challenges faced by other security forces and jurisdictions are informative. Where practicable and instructive, we must learn and implement policies and procedures that can best protect our residents and officers.

This Bill is important in enhancing the powers of the Police to deal with serious incidents and security threats, including terrorist attacks. The special powers proposed in this Bill will help Police Officers to carry out these very difficult jobs to save lives and neutralise threats. In particular, the powers to protect the integrity of tactical operations are critical for operational success.

Some members of the public have raised concerns about the provision to allow the Commissioner of Police to issue a CSO. Their worry is that should this order be in effect, innocent bystanders who had unwittingly taken a photograph might be punished for a crime that they did not intend to commit. Others feel that this provision will affect the transparency of handling and managing security incidents.

These concerns are valid, and I seek the Minister's clarification and reassurance that the CSO will only be activated for exceptional situations where operational secrecy and integrity are critical to saving lives and protecting property, and that sufficient awareness and visibility will be in place to show that a CSO is in place.

In critical security situations, the safety of the public and officers is paramount. I have commanded a few operations during my 13 years with the Police Force. This included gunman operations, kidnapping, manhunt for suspects who committed capital offences. We realised that all operations are inherently risky, but those of this nature are especially dangerous to officers. I had gone into dangerous situations with my officers, knowing full well that the risk can only be managed but not totally eliminated. The responsibility was heavy. I wanted my officers to return safely. Tactical secrecy and integrity are critical to minimising risk. I constantly worried about the loss of the element of surprise and our suspects ready to inflict grievous harm on my raiding officers. I could not afford information leakages. I certainly could not allow prioritising any sharing of pictures involving the crime scene and the operations over the safety of officers and Singaporeans.

Back then, I did not have to contend with Facebook "'live", "live" Twitter feeds and the fast spread of news through apps like WhatsApp. I only had to manage and, very rarely, the odd photographer with telescopic lenses. There were no drones to contend with; information sharing was rather limited and much slower through multimedia messaging service (MMS) and short message service (SMS).

During the trial of Ajmal Kasab, the prime accused of the Mumbai terrorist attack on 26 November 2008, Justices Aftab Alam and CK Prasad called the "live" coverage of the security operations "reckless". According to the newspaper, The Hindu, they said, "it is not possible to find out whether the security forces actually suffered any casualties or injuries on account of the way the operations were being displayed on the TV screen. But it is beyond doubt that the way their operations were fully shown made the task of the security forces not only exceedingly difficult but also dangerous and risky."

Our media personnel are responsible and will not seek to compromise operations. However, the operational terrain today is a lot more complex because of social media channels. Thus, the CSO is critical to protecting lives. So is the proposal to provide the Police with the power to take down autonomous vehicles in an attack, as these can compromise tactical secrecy.

With regard to the issue of lack of transparency, every Police Officer seeks to live up to the Police's oath to protect life and property. We can trust that they will discharge their duties professionally. There is no reason to believe that we need allowing people on Facebook "live" or any other social media channels to monitor their operations in order that they may execute their mission professionally.

While I support the proposals in this Bill, there must be greater public education on these matters. I would like to ask the Minister for his plans on public education and awareness for these measures. As we have done numerous simulated terrorist attacks to prepare our security agencies and other stakeholders, including the public, may I suggest that a mock CSO be included in future exercises as a way of promoting greater awareness on this matter? Mr Speaker, allow me to continue in Chinese.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, Sir, all over the world, terrorist attacks and serious incidents occur constantly. Although there are no similar incidents happening in Singapore yet, we must always stay alert and be prepared for the contingencies. We not only need to strengthen our security measures but also increase our enforcement powers in case a serious incident happens.

The CSO and the power given to the Police to restrict the use of drones are of great importance. In order to successfully execute a high-risk operation, tactical secrecy is critical. When I was a Police Officer, I took part in many enforcement operations. Every operation was risky. Manhunt for suspects and raids are especially dangerous. When leading an operation, I was always concerned about external disturbances, for example, intrusion by innocent passers-by. If it was not handled properly, the lives of the Police Officers, victims and the public could be endangered. With this new clause in place, the Police will be able to focus on the operations to arrest the terrorists and criminals.

The second important clause in this Bill is that the Police are given the power to ask operators to assist in the operation. When an incident occurs, the Police will be able to order the operators at the site to assist Police operation and investigation. Under Police request, they must suspend their operation for the time being. When a serious crime occurs, time is critical for enforcement and investigation. Although operators are mostly willing to cooperate, however, there may be exceptions. I hope MHA can explain to the operators MHA’s requirement and their duty under this clause.

This Bill is an important link in our anti-terrorism and crime-fighting framework. I support this Bill.

Mr Gan Thiam Poh.

Mr Speaker, Sir, as we look at terror incidents around the world, the methods used by terrorists have been evolving in order to inflict maximum damage and strike fear into the hearts of target communities. Even though there have been no attacks in Singapore so far, there is no guarantee that such incidents will not happen here. We must be prepared and equipped, both at the national level where our security agencies have oversight and at the individual level. We must cooperate and work together to protect our homeland.

In this respect, refraining from communicating at the sites of terror attacks is one of the ways individuals can cooperate with and assist our security forces. Their actions, or rather, the lack of, could potentially save the lives of the unfortunate ones caught in the event and those of the men and women who risk their own to rescue them.

However, there are some concerns over the ban on the transmission of photos, videos, text and audio messages. I think it is worth our time to examine more thoroughly the implications of this ban.

Part of the anxiety expressed so far stems from the novelty of the proposal, which is probably unprecedented. I understand that Singapore is among the first in the world to introduce such legislation. I agree with the intent as it aims to protect everyone and it will empower our security agencies to mount an effective response, should we ever need it one day.

We should draw lessons from the 1972 Munich Olympic incident, the 2008 Mumbai terror attack and the 2015 Paris terrorist attack. The efforts of the security forces in all three incidents were severely compromised by television broadcasts.

Today, rescuers have more than TV crews to worry about. With a smartphone in hand, anyone can be a broadcaster, streaming real-time updates, which can potentially provide valuable information to perpetrators and give them a strategic advantage. This is what the Bill clearly seeks to prevent.

What the Ministry could have communicated better and much more strongly is that the Bill does not seek to prevent hostages or witnesses at the sites from communicating with the authorities, especially information about the attackers and their operations.

As part of our SGSecure campaign, our Home Team has been educating Singaporeans about what to do in the event of an attack – "Run, Hide, Tell". We tell Singaporeans to move away from danger, stay out of sight, switch their phones to silent mode and provide information to the Police by calling, SMSing or using the SGSecure App. This advisory has not changed. However, I hope the Ministry will consider allowing communications via other additional platforms in the event that these official channels become overloaded or malfunction.

On the other hand, in case the terrorists or their sympathisers manage to transmit images or text in the midst of the mayhem, I hope we are equipped with the technology and know-how to jam the signals and prevent their broadcasts. Fines and jail-time are not going to be deterrents for them.

Lastly, regarding the concerns by civil society groups over the definition of a "serious incident", I would like to caution that we should not assume that nothing would happen, even at seemingly small gatherings or peaceful protests. The risk of escalation is always there. It is the duty of the Police to protect everyone, regardless of language, race, religion, political convictions and beliefs.

Hence, to address the possibility of abuse whilst the communication ban is imposed, I would like to suggest we tap on the use of technology, such as equipping every policeman with a body video recorder. The record could be reviewed by an independent committee and the composition of the members can be discussed to ensure independence. Mr Speaker, Sir, in Mandarin.

(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] As the saying goes, "Don’t fear what is, fear what if". Every Singaporean must stay vigilant and must not think that terrorist attacks will never happen to them. We must prepare for the rainy days. We do not have to be overly panicky, However, it is better to remain cautious. If we stay united, we will succeed.

Second Minister Josephine Teo.

Mr Speaker, I thank the Members for speaking in support of the Bill. They raised many useful points which I shall try to address.

Several Members asked about the definition of "serious incident", specifically the inclusion of "acts causing large-scale public disorder" and the illustration (d) in clause 3 which describes such an incident. Ms K Thanaletchimi asked whether non-violent, passive protests are covered under the Bill. Ms Sylvia Lim, Mr Kok Heng Leun, Mr Ang Wei Neng and Mr Louis Ng asked why the same powers to deal with terrorism are also available for large-scale public disorder.

Outside of the House, there were even assertions that POSSPA will be applied to "peaceful demonstrations". The narrative goes something like this: first, the law allows POSSPA to be unlocked by the Minister for "peaceful protests". Such protests can attract crowds of all sizes. There is no definition of what "large-scale public disorder" means, so the law could be applied to peaceful protests involving a small group of protestors. Therefore, the law potentially allows the oppression of protesters and will have a chilling effect on society. We have come across such assertions outside the House.

These assertions misrepresent what POSSPA is about. Let me explain why.

There are three limbs under the meaning of "serious incident": a terrorist act; serious violence affecting the public; or large-scale public disorder.

The third limb, large-scale public disorder, is the subject of focus. It is not new, by the way. POPA already provided for it since 1958. In any case, peaceful protests are not the target of POSSPA. Let me say that again – peaceful protests are not the target of POSSPA.

We will only invoke POSSPA if the situation deteriorates, and the threat of large-scale public disorder or violence becomes imminent. If a protest is really peaceful, there should be no concern whatsoever about falling within the third limb of "large-scale public disorder". Illustration (d) in clause 3 makes it clear what we mean by "large-scale public disorder".

I should just quote to Members what it actually says. It goes like this: "a sit-down demonstration for a cause attracts a large group of sympathisers who voluntarily join the sit-in. For over a week, the group grows and the demonstrators start to occupy the publicly accessible paths and other open spaces in the central business district. Their presence starts to impede the flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic and interfere with normal trade or business activities in the area".

There are several parts to this. The protest was protracted; over a week. It involved a large and growing group. They occupied public places in the CBD. The last sentence is worth repeating. The demonstration "starts to impede the flow of…traffic and interfere with normal trade or business activities in the area".

The illustration shows quite clearly that not every protest will meet the high threshold to be considered a serious incident. What is required? There must be significant disruption to ordinary Singaporeans trying to go about their daily business. People – motorists, commuters, passers-by, shopkeepers, workers – are agitated. The tension is rising. If it is not diffused, things could quickly turn chaotic.

Some observers think such a situation is not intolerable, well within acceptable threshold. Mr Kok Heng Leun suggests that that situation should not be treated as a "serious incident". Is that the view of most Singaporeans? I do not think so. In fact, in such a situation, it is more likely that the Police will be asked: "Why are you allowing this chaos to unfold?", "Are you not worried something worse will happen?", "Can't you do something to prevent an escalation?"

The Police will have to make a judgement call. If they stick with existing policing powers, can they bring the situation under control? What if the chaos spins out of control and there is loss of lives? If they assess the need to seek powers under POSSPA, do they have enough justification? What if they invoked POSSPA, and were, in fact, able to restore order but were then accused of having over-reacted? That they misjudged? That there was no need to have used POSSPA?

There are no easy answers. The Police will have to judge, the Minister will have to judge and decide. This alone is not a low threshold to cross.

Since Independence, POPA has only been used once. This was after the Little India riot and, even then, it was tightly scoped to control the consumption of alcohol, to calm the situation and prevent further violence. The Police did not use any other power in POPA, even though they could.

Ms Sylvia Lim, Mr Henry Kwek and Mr Kok Heng Leun asked why existing powers in other laws are not enough to deal with the large-scale public disorder scenarios described in illustrations (d) and (e).

Let us take illustration (d), although most of it applies to illustration (e) as well. This is a large and protracted demonstration that is causing significant disruption to Singaporeans. The demonstration keeps growing and things could get chaotic. The Police may assess that they need to take measures to reduce the risk of property damage or prevent the crowd from further building up. To do this, the Police may need to order nearby premises to close, impose a cordon, and direct people to stay out of the area. The POSSPA powers are necessary to do this. No other laws have such provisions for such a situation.

Another example which occurred in Singapore: in the aftermath of the Little India riot, we activated POPA and used the POPA power to regulate conduct to stop the consumption of alcohol in public places in Little India. Given the large crowds on weekends and public holidays, alcohol was assessed to be a significant risk factor for public disorder. The Police did not have the power to do this outside of POPA until this Parliament passed new legislation under the Liquor Control Act to regulate the consumption of liquor in public places.

Mr Louis Ng, Ms Sylvia Lim and Ms K Thanaletchimi asked, how about the CSO? Will it be used for the scenario set out in illustration (d)?

Let me be clear. The CSO is not meant for peaceful assemblies. Ms Sylvia Lim said that law enforcement operations in large-scale public disorder would not tactically be sensitive to warrant CSO. I agree. I have explained in my earlier speech that strict conditions must be met before the Commissioner of Police can issue a CSO. It must be to protect the safety of the public or law enforcement operations. This confirms Mr Christopher de Souza's understanding also.

I have also explained in my earlier speech that not all the powers become automatically available once the Minister issues the Activation Order. The Commissioner of Police must assess which of the powers are necessary to deal with the situation. So, it is not the case that when there is large-scale public disorder, all the special powers of POSSPA will be used to deal with the incident.

Mr Louis Ng asked if we could put a number to what is considered "large-scale". His question is understandable, but there is also no easy answer.

The size of the protest is one of many factors. It depends also where the protest is conducted, how it is conducted and its consequences on Singapore, whether intended by its organisers or not. As Mr Gan Thiam Poh has pointed out, a "peaceful demonstration" can quickly degenerate into violence and threaten public safety.

An example is the London Riots in 2011. It started off as a peaceful demonstration against a court ruling. But degenerated into rioting, looting, setting buildings and vehicles on fire. It spread to several cities over the course of the summer, including Birmingham, Leicester and Manchester. In its trail, there were five dead and 205 injured, of which 189 were police officers. Property damage was estimated at £200 million, and the impact on the economy was significant.

Another example is the Charlottesville rally in 2017. This took place against the backdrop of the controversial removal of Confederate monuments in parts of the United States (US), in response to the Charleston church shooting in 2015. It started with a protest against the removal of a Confederate monument from a public park. Protestors chanted racist slogans while carrying rifles and banners. The protestors clashed violently with counter-protestors.

The Virginia governor declared a state of emergency in order to have additional powers to safeguard public safety. One of the protestors rammed a car into a group of counter-protestors, killing one and injuring 19. By the time the violence was over, there were three dead and at least 38 injured.

The point is this: peaceful intent does not guarantee peaceful outcomes.

Having explained what "large scale public disorder" means, I will explain what it is not. Where possible, we will, indeed, use existing laws to deal with such situations. For example, in Singapore, public assemblies are allowed in accordance with the law. This comes under the framework of the POA. The Police regularly grant permits for public assemblies: last year alone, over 900.

We have also set up the Speakers’ Corner for Singaporeans to organise events and demonstrations without having to apply for a permit, as long as certain conditions are met. Many events take place at the Speakers’ Corner. POSSPA cannot be used against demonstrations if these demonstrations do not cross the threshold of threatening "large-scale public disorder", or "serious violence".

For example, the recent student demonstrations at Dublin Scioto High School in Columbus, Ohio. About 200 students sat outside the school in silence to protest gun violence in the wake of the Florida school shooting in February 2018.

There was no violence or large-scale public disorder in this example. If such an event happens in Singapore, it can be dealt with using baseline policing powers. The POA will be sufficient. In fact, this is what we have done in the past.

An example is the 2013 illegal protests at Merlion Park. Around 100 foreigners gathered to protest the 2013 Malaysian elections on two different days. They held up signs and chanted slogans. We issued a total of 74 conditional warnings under the POA. POPA was not invoked then. So, our record is clear and consistent – we have never used POPA against political dissent.

Mr Speaker, to reiterate: POSSPA is not targeted at peaceful demonstrations or protests. It is targeted at terrorist acts, serious violence affecting the public and large-scale public disorder. As Mr Christopher de Souza reminded us right at the beginning, "we do not want the Police to be unprepared, left inadequately protected because they are bereft of what they need to quell a threat". In a serious incident, Singaporeans expect the Police to be able to act fast and to act decisively. That is what POSSPA seeks to do.

I will next address Members' queries on the specific clauses. Mr Melvin Yong asked how the Police would deal with UAVs and AVs, if they are unable to find the operator.

Clauses 28(2)(b)(ii) and 28(3)(b)(ii) empower Police Officers to act against UAVs and AVs directly, even if the operator cannot be located. The priority is to stop the UAV or AV. AVs and UAVs are a relatively new area, which SAF and the Home Team are both working on. SAF is developing a "drone catcher". The Home Team is also working on technology to target drones.

Mr Christopher de Souza asked what would constitute "reasonable steps" under the law for companies or their officers to absolve themselves from liability for obligations under POSSPA. It will be a question of fact in each case whether a corporation's officer can be shown to have taken all reasonable steps to prevent or stop the commission of an offence by the corporation.

To illustrate, clause 27 allows the Police to direct premises owners to take certain actions, like closing the premises. If the owner or if the officer of a corporation can show that he actually gave instructions for the premises to be closed, but those instructions were inadvertently not followed, then he will not be liable.

Mr Louis Ng has asked why enhanced powers to stop and question individuals are needed under POSSPA, and whether these were excessive.

In a serious incident where POSSPA is activated, the Police need to be able to obtain information quickly in order to deal with the incident. These enhanced powers make it clear that individuals have an onus to comply. For example, when the Police are searching for an unknown terrorist suspect, to stop and question individuals to ask for information, they must be able to get the information quickly in order to trace the suspect. Otherwise, the Police will waste precious time.

Mr Louis Ng asked for clarity on what constitutes "reasonable force". In a serious incident, Police Officers and the public are faced with considerable danger, and the Police will need to be legally empowered to use lethal weapons, if indeed necessary.

POSSPA allows the use of such force, as is "reasonably necessary" to effect arrests and enforce certain powers. This means that the officer can use such force, as is reasonable in the circumstances, and no more.

Operationally, and as a matter of policy, the Police will use lethal weapons only if they have no other choice. The Police do not want to use lethal weapons unless all other options have been exhausted. There are clear internal Police procedures and rules to ensure that Police Officers act as such. Therefore, Police Officers are typically equipped with a range of force options, including unarmed tactics, and non-lethal options, like batons and Tasers. Police Officers are trained to apply the appropriate force options in accordance with the situation.

The Police’s record speaks for itself. The Police have very rarely used lethal weapons. Take the Little India riot again. In fact, the Police came under criticism from some quarters, which suggested they should have used their firearms to deal with the rioters. In that situation, the Police assessed the use of lethal weapons was not necessary and exercised restraint from using firearms.

On the other hand, there are times when the use of lethal weapons is necessary and justified. Take the car that sped through concrete blocks at a Police checkpoint at the Shangri-la Dialogue in 2015. This was a high-profile event, with many foreign dignitaries in attendance. The risk that the car could be committing an act of terrorism was high. How would we know what was in the car? The Police had to use reasonable force, in this case, lethal weapons, to deal with the threat.

Mr Ang Wei Neng has also asked how SAF and the Police would coordinate operations on the ground. The Police have worked closely with SAF to develop joint plans for terror attacks. Both forces have also exercised closely together on many counter-terrorism exercises. In October 2016, the Police and SAF conducted a major joint Home Team-SAF counter-terrorism exercise. This was followed by Exercise Northstar in October 2017, a multi-agency counter-terrorism coordination exercise involving private stakeholders.

Mr Ang Wei Neng, Mr Kok Heng Leun and Mr Louis Ng have also asked for clarifications on civilians assisting the Police under POSSPA. For example, whether they will be sufficiently trained, and how we can ensure their safety.

As I have mentioned in my earlier speech, civilian assistants can only exercise selected powers, under Police Officers' directions. There are no powers to compel civilians to aid the Police; they can only do so voluntarily. Before requesting civilians to aid the Police, the Police will consider the suitability of the task at hand, and the risks to civilians. As Mr Kok Heng Leun correctly points out, in some cases, it may be detrimental to deploy the civilians. The Mandarin saying is: 成 事 不 足, 败 事 有 余. That can happen. We agree.

The volunteers will, therefore, not be assigned to tasks that will put them in harm’s way or which they are quite incapable of performing. The Police conducted an exercise in October 2016. The scenario involved multiple gunmen attacks at a shopping mall. In this exercise, mall security officers assisted the Police by evacuating the public to safety, and no more than that. It is an example of the kind of roles civilian assistants may be tasked with.

Mr Ang Wei Neng has also asked about the class of public officers who may be prescribed as "law enforcement officers". As the threats continue to evolve over time, our operational needs will change. This provision simply allows the Minister to prescribe specific groups of public officers with specialised skills to assist the Police in responding to the serious incidents, for example, cybersecurity specialists or whoever else.

Mr Speaker, there have been a number of queries raised by Members on the CSO. I would, first, like to acknowledge the support that Mr Melvin Yong and Mr Desmond Choo have voiced for the Bill, in particular for the CSO. As former Police Officers, they understand the challenges and risks that Police Officers face, and the need for the special powers in this Bill to deal with serious incidents.

Mr Desmond Choo asked whether the CSO will only be activated for exceptional situations where operational secrecy and integrity are critical for saving lives and protecting property. Mr Ang Wei Neng suggested adopting a Code of Conduct for journalists and using the CSO as a last resort. Mr Desmond Choo and Mr Henry Kwek asked whether the public will be notified when the CSO is place.

The short answer to Mr Desmond Choo's question is yes, as I have explained earlier in my speech. Mr Ang Wei Neng's suggestion on the media Code of Conduct is a useful one which we will consider. But the fact is this: in a serious incident, we cannot rely solely on a Code of Conduct. The objective of the CSO is to send a clear signal to the public to stop making and communicating films or pictures, stop communicating messages on law enforcement activities in the target area. The Police will publicise the CSO through all its public communications platforms.

Other Members raised some concerns on the CSO which can be grouped into four categories: one, whether the CSO will stop people from sending information to the Police, or sending updates on their situation to their loved ones; two, whether the CSO would lead to less accountability for the actions of the Police; three, why should mere making of films be banned; and four, how the CSO will be enforced in practice.

Firstly, whether the CSO is intended to stop members of the public caught up in the incident from sending updates to their loved ones. This was raised by Mr Henry Kwek and Mr Louis Ng. I have said in my earlier speech that the CSO is not aimed at civilians who may be caught in a hostage situation and are trying to get information to their loved ones. The CSO is intended to stop irresponsible communication of ongoing security operations which may endanger lives, such as those of hostages.

Therefore, when the Police look into reports lodged on breaches of the CSO, it will consider the circumstances of the sender and if the breach could reasonably have been avoided or should have been avoided, if the actions posed safety risk to the public or to the law enforcement officers, or if the leaked film exposed sensitive tactical information of the law enforcement activity.

Some Members, like Mr Melvin Yong, Ms Thanaletchimi, and Mr Gan Thiam Poh, asked whether the CSO would stop people from communicating information to the Police or discourage them from doing so.

Mr Speaker, the public plays an important role in providing information to assist the Police. The Police are more aware than anyone else of this. The objective of the CSO is to protect the integrity of specific security operations at a particular location and for a limited time. Outside of the scope of the CSO, there is no restriction on communications in general. This will be made clear.

The public will be encouraged to submit information to the Police via the "999" hotline or through the iWitness and SGSecure platforms. If members of the public who are acting in good faith to provide information to the authorities, but inadvertently breached the CSO, we do not intend to take action against such persons. I hope this assurance addresses Ms Sylvia Lim's concerns.

Secondly, Members like Ms Thanaletchimi have also asked whether the CSO would lead to less accountability for the actions of the Police and a lack of independent documentation. Ms Sylvia Lim said that without film or photo, the burden would fall on the complainant to prove the complaint. She also cited the example of Mr Tomlinson at the G20 Summit in 2009. In the first instance, it is unlikely that the CSO would have been issued in a public order incident like the one she described. It was not the kind of scenario in which we had envisioned CSO to be issued.

But with or without footage, any person with a complaint of misconduct by Police Officers can lodge a Police report, and they regularly do. Without footage, Ms Sylvia Lim is right that it may be harder for the Police to verify the complaint. However, the Police's investigations do not start and end with photo or video evidence. They can interview the parties involved and gather other evidence to establish the validity of the claim.

The Police have always taken a serious view of all complaints made against our officers and will thoroughly investigate these complaints. If the complaint is substantiated, the Police will not hesitate to take action against any errant officer.

Mr Kok Heng Leun also asked whether the Police will use the powers under the CSO to delete videos and photos of abuse of powers by the Police. It is a criminal offence to dispose of evidence and Police officers cannot do that.

Mr Gan Thiam Poh suggested equipping every Police Officer with a body-worn camera to mitigate the risk of unfair allegations when a CSO is in place. This is a helpful suggestion, and we will look into it.

In fact, the Police have equipped a number of their frontline officers with body-worn cameras to facilitate investigations and the gathering of evidence. The footage from these cameras is also helpful for any allegations of wrongdoing. This is on top of the in-vehicle cameras that Police have. These cameras will continue to operate when a CSO is in place.

This leaves me with the third and fourth group of issues under the CSO, which I will address together. Besides issues of accountability, Ms Sylvia Lim expressed discomfort with extending the CSO to the making of relevant pictures and films. Ms Sylvia Lim's view is that mere making of the film does not cause harm and should be allowed.

Mr Ang Wei Neng and Mr Louis Ng also asked how the CSO will be enforced by officers on the ground. For example, there could be many people using their phones at the same time for different reasons.

As I explained earlier, during a serious incident, the Police will not have the bandwidth to investigate every person who is recording a film or picture to ascertain its true intent. Ms Sylvia Lim also acknowledged from her experience as a former Police Officer that this is a challenge. The Police will exercise discretion and take into consideration the circumstances which the recorder was in and if the breach could not have been reasonably avoided.

This Bill puts the onus on the individuals to not arouse suspicion of malicious intent not because the Police want to make things difficult, but because of exigency. By doing so, the Police have a straightforward enforcement aim to make sure no one is recording. If it were not spelt out this clearly, then you could have a situation of confusion: what exactly are the Police trying to enforce against?

Mr Kok Heng Leun asked a similar point: why is the possession of materials likely to prejudice public order a criminal offence? The same consideration applies here. In a serious incident, the Police will not have the bandwidth to sort out those who have malicious intent and those who do not. And, if I may add, this particular provision has been around since 1958 and the Police have never enforced it.

Mr Speaker, there have been many questions on the CSO. This is why MHA earlier spoke to the local media to hear their concerns and discuss how we can work closely to ensure that the CSO does not disrupt their ability to report the news for documentation purposes. The local media also raised concerns similar to Members and the general public. For example, how to ensure that those caught in the incident can report to the Police? We have taken this into account and, in my earlier speech, I also talked about the importance of post-incident reporting and how we will allow the media to record incidents for subsequent reporting.

Mr Kok Heng Leun asked if there was a public consultation for this Bill. We studied international incidents, spoke to our law enforcement counterparts and gleaned learning points on how to deal with these incidents. Then we consulted key stakeholders who would be directly affected by the exercise of specific powers. This was the same approach for the POA amendment Bill, as well as the Infrastructure Protection Bill just last year. So, there is no change.

I will now move on to the issue of safeguards for POSSPA powers. Mr Henry Kwek has asked whether there will be any limits to the duration the provisions will stay in effect.

Under POSSPA, the duration of each Activation Order is capped at one month, after which the Minister must make a new Activation Order if he assesses that there is a basis for the new order. We do not intend to use the POSSPA powers for longer than is absolutely necessary. After a serious incident has been resolved, one of our key priorities is to work with the affected communities to return to normalcy as soon as possible. Having an Activation Order longer than necessary does not help.

Mr Kok Heng Leun asked why the failure to publish would not invalidate an order. Again, there is nothing sinister. All that clause 8(3) does is to ensure that the mere failure to publish the Activation Order does not invalidate the need for the Commissioner of Police to issue a special authorisation and deploy the Police Officers. This does not diminish accountability of the Minister. It can happen that the Commissioner of Police may need to act quickly and issue the special authorisations. He should not be prevented from doing so just because of a delay in publishing the Minister's Activation Order, which is a technicality. This is what the provision seeks to protect, nothing more.

Mr Melvin Yong asked whether a new Activation Order would be needed if subsequent incidents are unrelated to the first incident for which the Activation Order was made. The Commissioner of Police will only be able to issue special authorisations for incidents that have a nexus to the incident that led to the Activation Order.

If there is a subsequent serious incident that does not have a nexus to the initial incident, the Minister must issue a fresh Activation Order for POSSPA powers to be used. For example, if a large-scale public disorder occurs that is unrelated to a terrorist act for which an Activation Order has been issued, the Minister would need to issue a new Activation Order to be able to exercise POSSPA powers for the new incident.

However, Mr Melvin Yong makes a more important point about whose judgement it will be in deciding whether the two incident areas are related. It will have to be a professional assessment made by the Police based on the information at hand. The Commissioner will have to decide before he issues a special authorisation.

Mr Kok Heng Leun raised a similar line of query in many parts of his speech. I listened carefully and I must say, for me, it contrasted very much with Ms Sylvia Lim's speech, which I believe to be well-informed by her professional experience as a Police Officer and her legal training. I reflected on Mr Kok Heng Leun's point, and I think his main discomfort has to do with the discretion given to the Minister and the Commissioner of Police; whether we should trust them to act honourably at all times or whether we should curtail their discretion and not leave it to chance. Therefore, he asked whether we can impose conditions under which the powers are used and whether these conditions can be written into the Bill.

In my view, it is not unreasonable to consider such risks. Not unreasonable. In fact, Mr Kok Heng Leun cited the ISA in which we subject the decisions of the Minister to the concurrence by the President on the advice of a Special Advisory Committee. This shows clearly that the Government − this Government − is not averse to introducing such checks if there are good justifications to do so. And on a day-to-day basis, Ministers and the Commissioner of Police do not have as much latitude in their exercise of powers.

However, the POSSPA Bill is designed for serious incidents as per clause 3 where we envision the Police to be in a race against time. Hypothetically, suppose terrorists have taken some Singaporeans hostage, can we afford to put the rescue operations on hold while Parliament debates whether the Minister's Activation Order or the Commissioner's CSO are justified?

And in a terror situation, things can change by the minute. Supposing in the meantime, the terrorists start to harm the hostages and we decide we can no longer wait. The Police mount a rescue operation but, predictably, there was live coverage of the Police operations online. The result: casualties. Would it not weigh on our conscience that we have not given the hostages or the security personnel the best chance of survival because the CSO was not authorised in time?

Ultimately, it boils down to this: there is a risk of too much discretion, but there is also a risk of too much delay. Members will have to weigh which is the bigger risk in a serious incident, which has the graver consequence. This tension was also highlighted by Mr Christopher de Souza, who concluded that "this Bill equips the Police with the level of power necessary to quell danger and neutralise an escalating target". I am still quoting Mr de Souza, "The foundation of my argument is that we have a good Police Force."

Perhaps not everywhere in the world, but, in Singapore, we can and should trust that the Police will discharge their duties professionally. Mr Desmond Choo echoed this point.

I hope Members can be persuaded that the threshold, which must be met before the POSSPA powers can be activated, is high. This means that the special powers will not be used for day-to-day policing. It can only be used in exceptional circumstances with many conditions attached already, as some Members have pointed out.

Once the threshold of a serious incident is crossed, we must give the Police sufficient latitude to act decisively and respond to whatever the threat may be. Ms Sylvia Lim used two terms. She said "muscle" and "flexibility". And I think that sums it up aptly. You need the muscle; you need the flexibility in a serious incident. You need both. After the incident has been dealt with, and the danger has passed, we can have a debate, including here in Parliament, about whether the Minister and the Police did the right thing, and hold them to account. We did that for the Little India riot. We had an inquiry. The inquiry was fairly extended, and the inquiry certainly did point out areas that the members of the panel thought the Government had fallen short on. But you do that after the incident has been dealt with.

We, therefore, agree that it is important for the public to be aware of the obligations under the new Bill when an Activation Order is in place. Ms Thanaletchimi, Mr Ang Wei Neng and Mr Desmond Choo have all asked how we intend to do so.

Mr Speaker, when an Activation Order is issued by the Minister, it will be publicised via press releases and online and social media platforms. The areas which the Commissioner of Police will authorise Police Officers to exercise special powers in will also be publicised via all platforms, where appropriate.

MHA will also continue to inform the public on the key points of POSSPA, like what to do when a CSO is in place. We will do so via our Home Team outreach channels, such as SGSecure.

To increase awareness, Mr Desmond Choo and Mr Ang Wei Neng have suggested conducting exercises for the public on how the powers will be used, especially for the CSO. This is a very helpful suggestion and is something that the Police will consider.

Mr Speaker, I hope I have addressed Members' concerns. The special powers under POSSPA are needed to deal with serious incidents, like terrorist attacks. The special powers, which come with safeguards, will be used judiciously.

As the threats have changed and technologies have changed, we must ensure that the Police are empowered to respond to these new threats. Sir, I beg to move.

Mr Kok Heng Leun.

I thank the Second Minister for her reply. I was listening very intently to her argument. There are two points which I still feel a bit uncomfortable. One is the definition of the "illustration" in question, which was illustration (d). Just by the mere words of it, to be honest, I do not sense that kind of seriousness as the Second Minister has described and her subsequent elaboration of what the situation could be.

So, I would like to ask maybe, in this Bill itself, there should be some change of wording in that part of the illustration whereby it is not just about a disruption to daily businesses, but a protracted disruption. That would make it sound in terms of the severity, in comparison to what the Second Minister has said. At the same time, when things are still quite peaceful at that moment, any kind of Police intervention may, under this Bill, actually cause even more problems subsequently. That is the first clarification.

The second one is about asking for accountability from the Minister and the Commissioner. I think just because this Bill is so severe in terms of the action that comes with it, I am asking if that is really not because there is a mistrust, I guess a kind of accountability. That is why, in my speech, I did say that as much as time can permit without affecting the expediency of the Police action, I think even an official report on the decision of the Minister or the Commissioner would be very important to be submitted to Parliament in that process.

I think that is what we really need in terms of accountability. And by putting such a procedure in place, it actually places all of us, or even the Parliamentarians here, plus the Commissioner and the Minister, to a kind of accountability that is open and transparent.

Mr Speaker, I thank Mr Kok Heng Leun for his two questions. I hear what the Member says about illustration (d) and I think the purpose of a debate on legislation is very often to illuminate on what is in the Bill so that Parliament has a record of the intent of the movers of the Bill. And the explanations that go into the Hansard constitute part of the interpretation of the Bill. So, whilst I understand the nature of Mr Kok Heng Leun's request, I hope he appreciates that what has been said in this House, in the course of this debate, forms a substantial basis for us to have a proper interpretation of the Bill. That is to the first question that the Member asked.

To the second question on accountability, Mr Kok Heng Leun is looking at it from the point of view of whether or not you trust the individuals. How do you hold them to account? I would put to Mr Kok to look at it from the point of view of the person who has to exercise these powers. What is the weight of the office that he will feel? His immediate thought is, “This is serious stuff. I have to make the call. I can be asked a question in Parliament and probably not just one. Can I justify this action?”

Is this not accountability? Does this not already encapsulate what Mr Kok says? As I have said, it is not a low threshold at all. If it were such a low threshold, if it was so easy for the Minister to be able to activate POSSPA, or the powers, then I do not think, in 60 years, the number of times in which you can attribute POSSPA powers to have been invoked, to be countable on one hand. That would not be the case.

Mr Kok Heng Leun.

Thank you, Second Minister, for the reply. With regard to the second reply, I think we are sort of in the same place and, in a way, I do agree that it is a heavy and difficult decision. That is why I think that the more difficult and heavier it is, the procedure of accountability becomes even more important. That is why I am not suggesting that we have to call Parliament up to have a deliberation on that immediately. But, in certain circumstances, if Parliament needs to sit to deliberate on something really important, I think Parliament has that moral responsibility to do that.

In this particular case, I am talking about a report after the activation would really be very important to actually lay out how the decision was being made, the threshold we need, without asking for Committees of Inquiry (COIs) and things like that. So, it is just about a certain procedure so that we could also respect the kind of heavy responsibility that these people are making, and they are affecting every individual, at least within that vicinity, of course, also the whole of Singapore.

Mr Speaker, I would like to ask Mr Kok Heng Leun what would prevent him from filing a Parliamentary Question (PQ) to ask the Minister to account for his actions. He does not need a procedure for that. He can already do so.

Of course, we can always file a PQ in Parliament, but I am just seeking a kind of procedure rather than each time relying on the PQs. And we only meet once a month for that. So, in that moment, as soon as it can, if possible, I do not find that it is a problem to submit a report.

Mr Speaker, if a serious incident as envisioned in clause 3 has happened, does the Member not think that the public would demand an explanation? Does he not think that the public would already expect a report to be tabled? And that even without a PQ, any self-respecting Minister knows that he has to respond. I do not think you need to write it into a Bill. The Minister will have to stand for election. We do not know what timeframe, but he will have to, at some point. And if he has not thought about accountability, something must be seriously wrong. So, I am quite baffled by Mr Kok's insistence on this point. It is a concern that I am not quite sure I understand fully because there is already nothing that prevents Parliament from debating incidents. Far smaller-scale incidents have been discussed at length in Parliament. And when a serious incident happens, I cannot imagine that it will not be brought to Parliament for discussion.

[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. (proc text)]

[(proc text) The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mrs Josephine Teo.] (proc text)]

[(proc text) Bill considered in Committee. (proc text)]

[Mr Speaker in the Chair]

[(proc text) Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 2 – (proc text)]

Clause 2, there are seven amendments. Second Minister for Home Affairs.

Mr Chairman, in respect of amendments 1 to 4 as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement, may I seek your permission to move them together as the amendments are related?

Please proceed.

Mr Chairman, I beg to move the amendments* 1 to 4 standing in the name of the Minister for Home Affairs, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

The amendments proposed to various definitions in clause 2 are aimed at supporting the key change in this Notice, which is to make clear that MINDEF and the SAF have command and control over all deployments of SAF servicemen in support of civilian authorities during a serious incident under POSSPA.

Amendments 1 to 4 update the definition of "law enforcement activity" to include activities carried out by SAF servicemen using powers under section 201C(9) of the SAF Act.

Today, SAF servicemen may already be deployed under section 201C of the SAF Act to assist civilian authorities like the Police. The amendments made clear such activities can be considered law enforcement activities under POSSPA.

[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]

[(proc text) (1) "In page 9, lines 1 and 2: to leave out 'or servicemen'. (proc text)]

[(proc text) (2) In page 9, line 4: to leave out 'or'. (proc text)]

[(proc text) (3) In page 9, line 8: after '(b);', to insert 'or'. (proc text)]

[(proc text) (4) In page 9: after line 8 to insert – (proc text)]

[(proc text) '(d) the exercise of any power under section 201C(9) of the Singapore Armed Forces Act (Cap 295) by a serviceman, or the carrying out by a serviceman of any activity in preparation for or directly in support of the exercise of that power;'". (proc text)]

[(proc text) [(proc text) Amendments agreed to. (proc text)] (proc text)]

Amendments 5 to 7, Second Minister.

Chairman, in respect to amendments 5 to 7 as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement, may I seek your permission to move them together as the amendments are related?

Please proceed.

Mr Chairman, I beg to move amendments* 5 to 7, standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

Amendments 5 to 7 change the definition of "serviceman" to refer to a serviceman who is deployed for duty under section 201C of the SAF Act by MINDEF and is authorised under section 201E of the SAF Act to exercise powers provided for under section 201C(9) of the same Act.

It is through section 201E of the SAF Act that the Minister for Defence exercises control over which powers SAF servicemen are authorised to exercise when assisting civilian authorities.

[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]

[(proc text) (5) "In page 11, line 22: to leave out 'deployed for duty in accordance with any order made', and insert 'authorised'. (proc text)]

[(proc text) (6) In page 11, line 23, to leave out '201C', and insert '201E'. (proc text)]

[(proc text) (7) In page 11, line 23: after 'Act', to insert 'to exercise powers under section 201C(9) of that Act in connection with an activation order'". (proc text)]

[(proc text) Amendments agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clauses 3 to 10 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 11 – (proc text)]

Clause 11, there are two amendments. Second Minister.

Mr Chairman, may I seek your permission to move the two amendments together as they are related?

Please proceed.

Mr Chairman, I beg to move amendments* 1 and 2 standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

Amendments 1 and 2 are needed to make clear that the Commissioner of Police does not authorise SAF servicemen to exercise powers under POSSPA. Instead, when an activation order by the Minister for Home Affairs is in place, the Commissioner of Police will make a request for SAF servicemen to support the Police with selected POSSPA powers as are necessary.

Under these circumstances, MINDEF will authorise the powers that SAF servicemen may exercise under the SAF Act. I explained during the Second Reading this is to ensure a clearly defined command and control over all deployments of SAF servicemen in support of civilian authorities, including for serious incidents under POSSPA.

[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]

[(proc text) (1) "In page 18, line 21: to leave out 'or a serviceman, or both,'. (proc text)]

[(proc text) (2) In page 18, line 22: to leave out 'or servicemen (as the case may be).'" (proc text)]

[(proc text) Amendments agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 12 – (proc text)]

Clause 12, there are two amendments. Second Minister.

Mr Chairman, may I seek your permission to move the two amendments together as they are related?

Please proceed.

Mr Chairman, I beg to move amendments* 1 and 2 standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

These amendments are needed for the similar reason as for clause 11. SAF servicemen will no longer be given a special authorisation by the Commissioner of Police under POSSPA.

[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]

[(proc text) (1) "In page 19, line 18: to leave out 'and (6)'. (proc text)]

[(proc text) (2) In page 19, lines 29, 30 and 31: to leave out 'or serviceman'". (proc text)]

[(proc text) Amendments agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 13 – (proc text)]

Clause 13, Second Minister.

Mr Chairman, I beg to move the amendment* standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

Clause 13 is amended for the same reason given for changes to clauses 11 and 12. Our intent for powers exercisable by SAF servicemen to be authorised under the SAF Act and not by the Commissioner of Police under POSSPA.

[(proc text) *The amendment read as follows: (proc text)]

[(proc text) "In page 20, line 7: to leave out 'and serviceman'". (proc text)]

[(proc text) Amendment agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 15 – (proc text)]

Clause 15, there are four amendments. Second Minister.

Mr Chairman, may I seek your permission to move the four amendments together as they are related?

Please proceed.

Mr Chairman, I beg to move amendments* 1 to 4 standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

Clause 15 currently describes what POSSPA powers SAF servicemen can exercise and how they can exercise them. The amendments delete SAF servicemen from this clause.

A key change I will be proposing is to confer on SAF servicemen POSSPA powers through the SAF Act, so that the servicemen remain subject to the control of MINDEF and under the SAF Act.

[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]

[(proc text) (1) "In page 22, line 1: to leave out 'who', and insert '(who'. (proc text)]

[(proc text) (2) In page 22, line 1: to leave out 'servicemen', and insert 'serviceman)'. (proc text)]

[(proc text) (3) In page 22: to leave out lines 14 to 32. (proc text)]

[(proc text) (4) In page 23: to leave out lines 1 to 8". (proc text)]

[(proc text) Amendments agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clauses 16 to 31 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 32 – (proc text)]

Clause 32, Second Minister.

Mr Chairman, I beg to move the amendment* standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.

The amendment will ensure that the Minister for Home Affairs can also give directions to discontinue telecommunications services so as to avoid endangering the safety of SAF servicemen during an ongoing law enforcement activity.

[(proc text) *The amendment reads as follows: (proc text)]

[(proc text) "In page 43, line 14: after 'officer', insert 'or serviceman'. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Amendment agreed to. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 32, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clauses 33 to 49 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]

[(proc text) Clause 50 – (proc text)]

Clause 50, there are three amendments. Second Minister.

Mr Chairman, may I seek your permission to move the three amendments together as they are related?

Please proceed.