Attorney-General v Au Wai Pang

1. Belinda Ang Saw Ean J:

2. Introduction

3. [1]

   [1] The Attorney-General (“the AG”) brought these committal proceedings against the respondent, Au Wai Pang (“the Respondent”), in connection with the publication of two articles on his blog which the AG said amounted to contempt of court in the form of scandalising the Supreme Court of Singapore (“the Supreme Court”). The alleged contempt imputed bias on the part of the Supreme Court against homosexuals.

4. [2]

   [2] The first article, titled “377 [sic] wheels come off Supreme Court’s best-laid plans” (“the First Article”), was posted on the Internet at the Respondent’s blog address http://yawningbread.wordpress.com/ (“the Yawning Bread blog”) on 5 October 2013. It concerned two parallel High Court cases on the constitutionality of s 377A of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“s 377A”), which criminalises sex between males. The issue for decision by the High Court in these two cases (hereafter referred to as “the Tan Eng Hong case” and “the Lim Meng Suang case”) was whether s 377A was unconstitutional as being inconsistent with Art 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) (“the Singapore Constitution”).

5. [3]

   [3] The second article, titled “Church sacks employee and sues government – on one ground right, on another ground wrong” (“the Second Article”), was posted on the same blog (ie, the Yawning Bread blog) on 12 October 2013. It concerned two separate civil cases in the High Court brought by Lawrence Bernard Wee Kim San (“Wee”), a former employee of Robinson & Company (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“Robinson”). In the first civil case (“the Robinson Suit”), Wee claimed that he had been constructively dismissed by Robinson on the grounds of his sexual orientation or in breach of an implied term of mutual trust and confidence in his employment contract with the company. On 23 August 2013, after the Robinson Suit was struck out by the High Court and pending Wee’s appeal against that decision to the Court of Appeal, Wee filed a separate set of proceedings in Originating Summons No 763 of 2013 (“Wee’s Constitutional Claim”) seeking a declaration that Art 12 of the Singapore Constitution prohibited discrimination against gay men in the workplace. The AG was named as the defendant in Wee’s Constitutional Claim.

6. [4]

   [4] The debate in the present committal proceedings is whether the First Article and the Second Article (collectively, “the Impugned Articles”) fall within the legal limits that permit the Respondent to exercise a genuine right of fair criticism, or whether they lend themselves to imputations of bias and impropriety on the part of the Supreme Court and thereby carry a real risk of undermining public confidence in the Singapore judiciary. This judgment will discuss what amounts to contempt of court in the form of scandalising the court, and what must be proved to establish this offence. One important inquiry in the present case is whether the AG has satisfied the “real risk” test for determining liability for this offence. In order to satisfy this test, the AG must prove that the facts of this case establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Impugned Articles carry a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore. In this regard, this judgment will undertake an analysis of the Impugned Articles with the relevant legal principles in mind.

7. The law on contempt in the form of scandalising the court

8. The nature of the contempt

9. [5]

   [5] The form of contempt of court known as “scandalising the court” (also referred to hereafter as “scandalising contempt”) is part of the law of Singapore. Under s 7(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), both the High Court and the Court of Appeal have the power to punish for such contempt. (The State Courts have a similar power under s 8(1) of the State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed).)

10. [6]

    [6] Shadrake Alan v Attorney-General [2011] 3 SLR 778 (“Shadrake CA”) is the leading local authority on the law of scandalising contempt. This offence is not intended to shield judges from the publication of fair criticism of their decisions. It exists not to protect the dignity of judges, but to protect the integrity of the administration of justice by the court, whose central role in upholding the rule of law requires it to enjoy public confidence. The upholding of the rule of law is the function of the court, and the court can only effectively discharge that function if it commands the authority and respect of the public. Scandalising contempt may, depending on the facts and surrounding context, embrace conduct and/or words that undermine public confidence in the integrity, propriety and impartiality of the court, and thus, the authority of the court as a whole.

11. [7]

    [7] The fundamental purpose underlying the law of contempt of court generally, and the law of scandalising contempt in particular, can be seen from (among other cases) the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Shadrake CA, which was delivered by Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA. At [21] of Shadrake CA, Phang JA cited the following passage from Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd v Karaha Bodas Co LLC [2007] 2 SLR(R) 518 (“Pertamina Energy”) at [22]:

12. [8]

    [8] In Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238, the High Court of Australia justified the continued existence of the offence of scandalising contempt as follows (at 243):

13. [9]

    [9] There is significant tension between freedom of speech and the administration of justice because of the public interest in protecting both principles. The offence of scandalising contempt is viewed by Singapore law as a reasonable limit upon freedom of speech, and recognises that limitations upon freedom of speech are necessary in the public interest so as to take into account the rights of others and the interests of the whole community. As Phang JA put it in Shadrake CA at [17]:

14. [10]

    [10] David Tan (“Mr Tan”), in his article “A ‘real risk’ of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice” (2011) 16 Media & Arts Law Review 191, argues (at 202) that the decision in Shadrake CA strikes an appropriate balance between safeguarding, on the one hand, freedom of speech and, on the other hand, the public interest in protecting public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore. He suggests that this balance is achieved by the application of the “real risk” test for liability, coupled with the placing of the onus on the party bringing the committal proceedings (typically, the prosecuting authorities of the jurisdiction concerned (“the Prosecution”)) to prove the elements of the offence based on the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt.

15. [11]

    [11] I agree with Mr Tan that the combination of the “real risk” test and the placing of the legal burden on the Prosecution “calibrates” appropriately the tension between freedom of speech and the public interest in protecting public confidence in the administration of justice. Notably, the “real risk” test for liability sets a higher threshold for establishing liability than the “inherent tendency” test that was previously applied in Singapore. The “real risk” test is also in line with the test applied in other common law jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong. In addition, as just mentioned, the legal burden is on the Prosecution (in the Singapore context, the AG) to prove the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Shadrake CA (at [80]) chose to treat fair criticism as an element to be evaluated within the ambit of liability for scandalising contempt. This is different from the law of defamation (where fair criticism is a defence), and has the effect of firmly retaining the legal burden on the AG to prove that the impugned statement in question does not constitute fair criticism, but instead poses a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore. Therefore, the broad effect of Shadrake CA is that the AG must prove the absence of fair criticism within the ambit of liability for scandalising contempt. This ensures that the alleged contemnor (“the defendant”) is not disadvantaged.

16. The applicable legal principles

17. [12]

    [12] The offence of scandalising contempt is made up of mens rea and actus reus. I set out below the applicable legal principles on these two elements of the offence.

18. The mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt

19. [13]

    [13] The mens rea required for the offence of scandalising contempt is easily satisfied as all that needs to be proved is the intention on the part of the defendant to publish the article(s) complained of. There is no legal requirement to prove an intention to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore. In other words, proof of an actual intention to interfere with the administration of justice in Singapore is not required to establish liability.

20. [14]

    [14] Quentin Loh J’s enunciation of the mens rea required for the offence of scandalising contempt in Attorney-General v Shadrake Alan [2011] 2 SLR 445 (“Shadrake HC”) at [55] was clearly affirmed by Phang JA in Shadrake CA at [23], who said that the requisite mens rea was “well-established”:

21. [15]

    [15] Mr Choo Zheng Xi (“Mr Choo”), who presented the Respondent’s arguments on the First Article, submitted that the ruling in Shadrake CA on the mens rea required for the offence of scandalising contempt was given per incuriam, and that this court should revisit the issue of mens rea in the light of the Privy Council case of Dhooharika v Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association intervening) [2014] 3 WLR 1081 (“Dhooharika”), a decision which post-dates both Shadrake HC and Shadrake CA. In Dhooharika, the Board held that the requisite mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt was “an intention to interfere with the administration of justice, and in this context that would mean the undermining of public confidence”.

22. [16]

    [16] I make two main points in relation to Mr Choo’s submissions at [15] above. First, I do not agree with Mr Choo’s assessment that Phang JA’s pronouncement on the mens rea requirement for the offence of scandalising contempt was given per incuriam in Shadrake CA. In this regard, I agree with counsel for the AG, Mr Tai Wei Shyong (“Mr Tai”), who argued that the traditional formulation of a “per incuriam” decision is one which is “given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned”, or which shows “a manifest slip or error” (see Morelle Ld v Wakeling and Another [1955] 2 QB 379 (“Morelle”) at 406). Notably, the five-judge English Court of Appeal in Morelle remarked that cases of per incuriam decisions must be “of the rarest occurrence”.

23. [17]

    [17] In Shadrake CA, the requisite mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt was addressed by Phang JA as part of the appellate court’s overall consideration of the test for liability for this offence, which (as mentioned earlier) comprises the requisite actus reus and the requisite mens rea. Since the mens rea for the offence was dealt with by the appellate court in its enunciation of the applicable and relevant legal principles (at [23]), Mr Choo’s argument that its decision on mens rea in Shadrake CA was given per incuriam is untenable.

24. [18]

    [18] Mr Choo’s contention is legally flawed for another reason because even if, for the sake of argument, Phang JA’s ruling on mens rea in Shadrake CA had indeed been given per incuriam, it is not open to this court, as a lower court, to decline to follow the decision of a superior appellate court. Two cases were cited by Mr Tai (namely, Goh Cheng Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1990] 1 SLR(R) 660 and Indo Commercial Society (Pte) Ltd v Ebrahim and another [1992] 2 SLR(R) 667) for the general proposition that the per incuriam rule is inapplicable vis-à-vis decisions of a court of superior jurisdiction because the doctrine of stare decisis obliges judges to adjudicate with reference to decided cases of superior courts (see generally See Toh Siew Kee v Ho Ah Lam Ferrocement (Pte) Ltd and others [2013] 3 SLR 284 at [35]).

25. [19]

    [19] Secondly, Dhooharika is distinguishable from our Court of Appeal’s decision in Shadrake CA, given the respective local circumstances and constitutional contexts in which these two cases were decided. This point was alluded to by Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC, who delivered the decision of the Board in Dhooharika. His Lordship expressly stated that although the offence of scandalising contempt continued to exist in many parts of the common law world (see the cases listed in Annex 1 of Dhooharika (“Annex 1”)), the specific ingredients of the offence might vary across different jurisdictions, and not all courts would approach the relevant issues in the same way (at [38]):

26. [20]

    [20] Shadrake CA was one of the 26 cases listed in Annex 1 where the offence of scandalising contempt was established. It bears emphasis that our Court of Appeal in Shadrake CA found that the offence had been established based on the ingredients of the offence which it identified as applicable under Singapore law. Hence, Dhooharika is not applicable in Singapore as it arguably represents the balance which the Board chose to strike between freedom of speech and the public interest in protecting public confidence in the administration of justice having regard to the Constitution of Mauritius and the circumstances prevailing there.

27. [21]

    [21] Case law on the offence of scandalising contempt provides clear illustrations of the conflicting positions in different jurisdictions on the requisite mens rea for this offence. For instance, in the South African case of State v Van Niekerk [1970] 3 SA 655 (T), the court held that an academic who had imputed racial bias to judges in the application of the death penalty had not committed contempt of court. Classen J reasoned (at 657):

28. In Dhooharika, the Board held that the requisite mens rea in the context of Mauritius comprised an intention to publish the impugned material and an intention to undermine the administration of justice.

29. [22]

    [22] On the other hand, as noted by Loh J in Shadrake HC (at [55]), there are decisions in common law jurisdictions that categorically reject – once an intention to publish the impugned material is established – a further legal requirement to prove an intention to undermine the administration of justice as part of the mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt. For instance, our High Court held in Attorney-General v Lingle and others [1995] 1 SLR(R) 199 (“Lingle”) that the requisite mens rea was the intention to publish the impugned material. This position is consistent with the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision in Solicitor-General v Radio Avon Ltd and Another [1978] 1 NZLR 225 as well as with the Board’s decision in another appeal from the Supreme Court of Mauritius, Gilbert Ahnee and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 2 AC 294 (“Ahnee”). However, in Dhooharika, the Board appeared to reinterpret Ahnee in a way that is inconsistent with Loh J’s treatment of the case. I thus propose to make a few observations on the Board’s decision in Dhooharika.

30. [23]

    [23] In Dhooharika, the defendant, the editor of a newspaper in Mauritius, wrote an article concerning the Chief Justice of Mauritius based on serious allegations made against the latter in the media by a disbarred barrister (“H”), who was a former parliamentarian and a director of a company involved in court proceedings. Essentially, H alleged misbehaviour, including abuse of and disrespect for constitutional rights, by the Chief Justice of Mauritius, and called for a tribunal to investigate his allegations. The defendant summarised H’s comments in the impugned article and pointed out the importance of judges maintaining their integrity and being publicly accountable. The Director of Public Prosecutions of Mauritius brought contempt proceedings against the defendant for scandalising the court. Before the Supreme Court of Mauritius, the defendant argued that he was not guilty of contempt because he had published the interview with H in good faith and had merely reported H’s views. The Supreme Court of Mauritius rejected that argument and held that the article conveyed the message that H’s allegations were justified. That article, it found, brought the Mauritian judiciary into disrepute and damaged public confidence in the administration of justice in Mauritius. The Board reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Mauritius and acquitted the defendant, who had been denied the opportunity to give evidence in the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Mauritius. The Board also found that the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Mauritius that the defendant had been acting in bad faith was unjustified.

31. [24]

    [24] It is necessary to flag the issues that were before the Board in Dhooharika in the light of s 12 of the Constitution of Mauritius. That section provides that “no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression”, subject to (among other limitations) anything contained in or done under any authority of law “for the purpose of … maintaining the authority and independence of the courts … except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done under its authority is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society”. The issues before the Board were: (a) whether the offence of scandalising the court still existed in Mauritius in the light of s 12 of the Constitution of Mauritius; (b) if it did, what the ingredients of the offence were; (c) whether the defendant’s trial had been unfair as a result of his having been refused the right to give evidence; and (d) whether the defendant had been properly convicted.

32. [25]

    [25] In discussing the ingredients of the offence of scandalising contempt, Lord Clarke, in an apparent departure from the traditional position relating to mens rea, held that the Prosecution had to show that in publishing the article in question, the defendant intended to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or was subjectively reckless as to whether he did so. In so ruling, Lord Clarke was, as pointed out at [19] above, particularly mindful that “[t]he specific ingredients of the offence may vary across different jurisdictions” (at [38] of Dhooharika).

33. [26]

    [26] Dhooharika represented a “new approach” to the law of scandalising contempt in Mauritius as a result of Lord Clarke’s reconciliation (at [36]-[37]) of the following two (apparently inconsistent) passages in Lord Steyn’s judgment in Ahnee. The first passage (“the Issue B passage”), which is at 306A–306E of Ahnee, discusses the sub-issue “Freedom of expression: section 12” [emphasis in original] and falls under the heading “Issue B: The impact of the Constitution on the power to punish for contempt” [emphasis in original]. The second passage (“the Issue C passage”), which is at 307D of Ahnee, discusses the same sub-issue of freedom of expression in relation to s 12 of the Constitution of Mauritius, but falls under the heading “Issue C: mens rea” [emphasis in original].

34. [27]

    [27] In relation to the Issue B passage, Lord Steyn rejected (at 305H) the submission that the offence of scandalising contempt was inconsistent with s 12 of the Constitution of Mauritius and concluded that the offence existed in principle to protect the administration of justice in Mauritius. However, he left open the question of whether the offence was “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society” within the meaning of s 12 of the Constitution of Mauritius, although he did add that it was permissible to take into account the fact that the administration of justice was more vulnerable in a small island state such as Mauritius when contrasted with the United Kingdom. Lord Steyn further pointed out at 306A–306E:

35. [28]

    [28] With regard to the Issue C passage, Lord Steyn said at 307D–307E of Ahnee:

36. [29]

    [29] As to how the above two quotations pertaining to two different issues in Ahnee could be reconciled, Lord Clarke said in Dhooharika (at [36]) that it was at least arguable that the term “fair criticism in good faith” used by Lord Steyn in Ahnee (at 307D) imported the objective question of whether the criticism was fair, with the result that a defendant could be convicted of scandalising contempt on the basis that his criticism was not objectively fair even though he had acted in good faith. However, Lord Clarke was of the opinion (at [37]) that the more detailed analysis of “good faith” given by Lord Steyn in an earlier part of his judgment in Ahnee (at 306) was to be preferred. According to that analysis, if the defendant had been acting in good faith, it did not matter that his criticism could not be shown to be objectively fair. The burden was therefore on the Prosecution to establish the absence of good faith beyond reasonable doubt (per Lord Clarke in Dhooharika at [37]).

37. [30]

    [30] The Board stated that the Prosecution had to prove an intention to interfere with the administration of justice in the course of establishing the mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt (per Lord Clarke at [48]–[49]):

38. [31]

    [31] Interestingly, Lord Steyn in Ahnee at 307 referred to “good faith” in the context of “the defence of fair criticism” while classifying the entire discussion under the mens rea issue. The Board in Dhooharika reconciled Lord Steyn’s statements and treated “good faith” not as a defence, but as giving rise to a requirement to establish bad faith vis-à-vis the mens rea. It equated such bad faith with an intention to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. Hence, it was for the Prosecution to establish that the defendant had either intended to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or had been subjectively reckless as to whether he did so.

39. [32]

    [32] In contrast, our Court of Appeal in Shadrake CA at [80] treated “good faith” as an element that goes to the issue of fair criticism, which is separate from the mens rea requirement. In other words, the Court of Appeal in Shadrake CA approached the issue of good faith in the more general context of fair criticism, where it characterised good faith as the touchstone of fair criticism. As Phang JA put it at [86] of Shadrake CA:

40. Phang JA’s differing view on the interaction between good faith and fair criticism is, of course, consistent with Lord Clarke’s observation in Dhooharika (at [38]) that “not all courts approach the issues [relating to the offence of scandalising contempt] in the same way”.

41. [33]

    [33] There is something further to be said about the relationship between the “real risk” test and the mens rea requirement formulated by Lord Clarke at [49] of Dhooharika (quoted above at [30]). Let me elaborate. Based on the Board’s formulation of the mens rea requirement in Dhooharika, fair criticism, whether as a defence or an element of liability, would be superfluous. This same point was perhaps recognised by Lord Clarke when he referred to good faith as an absolute defence, such that (at [37]):

42. Although “good faith” was sometimes described as a defence, Lord Clarke was quick to point out in the concluding sentence of [37] of Dhooharika that “the true position is that the burden is on the prosecution to prove absence of good faith”.

43. [34]

    [34] The effect of the Board’s decision of Dhooharika is therefore to elevate the threshold for proving the mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt in Mauritius. Further, as the Board explained at [48], satisfaction of the mens rea element (viz, an intention to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice) would ipso facto also satisfy the requirement of bad faith. The Board opined at [49] that it could not imagine any more general form of “bad faith” other than the aforesaid “intention to undermine”. Notably, Lord Clarke approved the “real risk” test and equated the relevant mens rea with the intention to create a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice. However, if the Prosecution is able to prove that the defendant had an intention to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, the Prosecution would also, in all practicality, have ipso facto satisfied the less stringent “real risk” test. A moment’s reflection will reveal that the broad effect of equating the relevant mens rea with an intention to bring about a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice may, in the overall scheme of things and depending on the facts of the particular case at hand, have the unintended consequence of raising the threshold for the test for liability for scandalising contempt to the extreme end of the legal spectrum required by the “clear and present danger” test, which our Court of Appeal rejected in Shadrake CA at [39]. It is apposite to reiterate Phang JA’s warning at [36] of Shadrake CA against distorting the “real risk” test in such a manner:

44. [35]

    [35] In the final analysis, under Singapore law, the defendant in committal proceedings must deal with good faith in the context of fair criticism within the ambit of the actus reus of the offence of scandalising contempt (see Shadrake CA at [25] and [86]). This approach, which recognises the Court of Appeal’s provisional view in Shadrake CA that there are two elements to the requisite actus reus (ie, a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration and fair criticism), is correct, seeing that the actus reus of an offence, as a matter of principle, includes whatever circumstances and consequences which are recognised for the purposes of establishing liability for that offence. In the case of the offence of scandalising contempt, the burden is plainly on the Prosecution to prove the absence of fair criticism. And in the light of the matters discussed and explained at [16]–[34] above, under Singapore law, the intention to publish the material complained of is the only ingredient that needs to be proved in order to satisfy the mens rea requirement for the offence of scandalising contempt.

45. [36]

    [36] Finally, for the purposes of the offence of scandalising contempt, publication occurs once the offending material is made available. The publication of material on the Internet is considered to be a continuing act so long as the defendant leaves the material available on the Internet (see Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim and Others (2012) 293 ALR 384 at [43]).

46. The actus reus of the offence of scandalising contempt

47. [37]

    [37] Before a statement can be held to be contemptuous, the “real risk” test has to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. It need not be shown that the statement in question actually had the effect of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore. As observed by the Court of Appeal of Victoria, Australia, in News Digital Media Pty Ltd and Another v Mokbel and Another [2010] 30 VR 248 at [65], contempt occurs when the administration of justice is exposed to risk, whether or not the risk actually materialises.

48. [38]

    [38] The “real risk” test must be applied having regard to the facts and surrounding context of the case at hand. As Phang JA put it at [30] of Shadrake CA:

49. [39]

    [39] This statement by Phang JA should be read with his earlier comments at [29]:

50. [40]

    [40] I earlier noted that the “real risk” test is an objective one and must be applied objectively, having regard to the facts and surrounding context of the case at hand. As each case must be decided based on its own facts, it seems to me that the court should look at each offending article separately and apply the relevant test of liability to the matters prevailing at the time each article was published. So where two or more publications are involved, it is a question of fact whether, and to what extent, the latest publication has created a further real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice, given that there is, by reason of the earlier publication, already such a real risk. This question is relevant to the Second Article, which I will come to in due course.

51. [41]

    [41] As to who constitutes “the public”, Phang JA explained at [32] of Shadrake CA:

52. He continued at [34]:

53. Fair comment

54. [42]

    [42] I said earlier (at [10]–[11] above) that the legal burden is (in the context of Singapore) on the AG to prove that the impugned statement is contemptuous because it does not constitute fair criticism and has crossed the legal line so as to pose a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore. Criticism is fair when there is a rational basis for the criticism and the rational basis is accurately stated. Criticism is not likely to be fair if it is not made in good faith. Whilst the legal burden remains throughout on the AG, the evidential burden would be on the party relying on fair criticism (see Shadrake CA at [78]).

55. [43]

    [43] Mr Tai invited this court to revisit the issue of fair comment as a defence, given that the Court of Appeal’s view in Shadrake CA that fair comment was not a defence was a provisional view. He argued that if fair comment was not a defence, the AG would have to prove the absence of good faith on the part of the defendant. That would be tantamount to asking the AG to establish a negative fact beyond reasonable doubt, contrary to the general principle that the onus should not be placed on a party to prove a matter which is within the knowledge of the other party.

56. [44]

    [44] I make three points on Mr Tai’s argument. First, although reference was made in Shadrake CA (at [80]) to the appellate court’s provisional view, it is clear from the decision that the Court of Appeal treated and applied “fair comment” as an element within the ambit of liability rather than as a defence. Secondly, the Court of Appeal stated at [79] of Shadrake CA that the provision of any defence to the offence of scandalising contempt should be left to Parliament to legislate since it was a policy issue.

57. [45]

    [45] Thirdly, in relation to the issue of proving a negative, Mr Tai’s argument was in essence that the AG should not be required to prove a negative fact when that negative fact was the absence of a certain state of mind in a defendant. Yet, the need to prove the existence of a person’s state of mind, such as his intention, knowledge, good faith and bad faith, is not unique to the law of scandalising contempt as it also appears in some statutory offences and there are rules of evidence to turn to. Generally, a person’s state of mind is not incapable of proof. As Bowen LJ said in Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 at 483:

58. [46]

    [46] In practice, the AG can evidentially show the absence of good faith not from direct evidence, but from indirect and circumstantial evidence provided by the parties. I have in mind the definition of “fact” in s 3(1) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“the EA”) read with Illustration (d) thereto, as well as the provision on facts showing the “existence of state of mind or of body or bodily feeling” in s 14 of the EA.

59. [47]

    [47] In relation to s 3(1) of the EA, good faith is a fact that must be proved or disproved. Section 3(1) defines “fact” to include:

60. [48]

    [48] Although s 3(1) of the EA does not define an “opinion”, Illustration (d) classifies a “fact” as including the situation where “a man holds a certain opinion”. Jeffrey Pinsler SC, in Evidence and The Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 4th Ed, 2013) (“Evidence and The Litigation Process”), explains at para 8.004:

61. This explanation is consistent with the general definition of “fact” in s 3(1) of the EA as including “any thing, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being received by the senses”.

62. [49]

    [49] I turn now to s 14 of the EA, which governs the admissibility of evidence showing the existence of a state of mind or of body or bodily feeling. Section 14 reads as follows:

63. [50]

    [50] The above provisions of the EA show that the law provides adequate guidance on how good faith may be proved. I therefore reject Mr Tai’s concerns that proving a negative fact “entails practical difficulty”. Good faith as a state of mind need not necessarily be directly proved as a fact; it can be inferred from other facts that have been proved. I reiterate my earlier comments on the Court of Appeal’s reasons in Shadrake CA for treating fair comment within the ambit of liability in the context of the legal burden of proof, and the importance of striking an appropriate balance between safeguarding, on the one hand, freedom of speech and, on the other hand, the public interest in protecting public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore (see [10]–[11] above).

64. [51]

    [51] Since good faith is a question of fact that can be inferred from other facts that have been proved, the following, amongst other matters (and the list is not exhaustive as the court is entitled to take into account all the circumstances of the case that go towards showing bad faith), arise for consideration in determining whether there is bad faith:

65. (a) the prominence of the defendant and the content of the publication, including the size of its readership – a large audience will make a finding of contempt more likely, but it is not necessarily the case that the existence of a small audience will prevent a finding of contempt; and

66. (b) the factors identified by Judith Prakash J in Attorney-General v Tan Liang Joo John [2009] 2 SLR(R) 1132 at [15]–[23], such as the rationale and basis for the criticism, as well as the tone, tenor and manner of the criticism.

67. [52]

    [52] Some guidance can also be gleaned from the following commentary on good faith in Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (S Sarkar and V R Manohar eds) (LexisNexis Butterworths, 17th Ed, 2011) at vol 1, p 505:

68. The standard of proof

69. [53]

    [53] The court will not convict a defendant of the offence of scandalising contempt unless the facts complained of are established beyond reasonable doubt. As the applicant, the AG has to prove all the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.

70. The First Article

71. [54]

    [54] Bearing in mind the above legal principles, I will now examine the Impugned Articles in turn. I begin with the First Article.

72. The contents of the First Article

73. [55]

    [55] As mentioned earlier, the First Article is titled “377 [sic] wheels come off Supreme Court’s best-laid plans”. The First Article is reproduced in full below, with the offensive statements complained of by the AG set out in bold:

74. The AG’s case on the First Article

75. [56]

    [56] In the statement (as amended on 19 August 2014) which the AG filed pursuant to O 52 r 2(2) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (the AG’s “O 52 Statement”), the AG’s case as to the Respondent’s scandalising contempt was set out as follows:

76. [57]

    [57] In his submissions for the AG before this court, Mr Tai argued that a number of factors specific to this case needed to be taken into account when striking the requisite balance between, on the one hand, freedom of speech and, on the other hand, the public interest in protecting public confidence in an impartial judiciary which determined cases without extraneous influence.

77. [58]

    [58] Mr Tai pointed to the title of the First Article: “377 [sic] wheels come off Supreme Court’s best-laid plans”. He argued that this title made two points: first that the Supreme Court had “best-laid” plans, and secondly, the wheels had “come off” those plans. Mr Tai observed that according to the Respondent:

78. (a) the Supreme Court’s plan was to enable the Chief Justice, the Honourable Sundaresh Menon (“the Chief Justice”), to be part of the three-judge bench hearing the appeal arising from the Lim Meng Suang case (“the Lim Meng Suang appeal”); and

79. (b) although the Chief Justice would be able to hear the Lim Meng Suang appeal, he would be conflicted out of hearing the appeal brought by Tan Eng Hong against the High Court’s decision in the Tan Eng Hong case (“the Tan Eng Hong appeal”) as, at the time of the prosecution of Tan Eng Hong under s 377A, the Chief Justice was the Attorney-General.

80. The Respondent wrote in the fifth paragraph of the First Article:

81. [59]

    [59] Mr Tai further pointed out that according to the Respondent, the Supreme Court then came up with the plan for Loh J to delay the release of his judgment for the Tan Eng Hong case. The First Article clearly stated that this delay was deliberate, and that the Tan Eng Hong case had been “red-lighted” so that the Tan Eng Hong appeal could not proceed until the Chief Justice had presided over the Lim Meng Suang appeal. Mr Tai submitted that the thrust of the First Article clearly insinuated that the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court as a whole had a vested and improper interest in the outcome of cases dealing with the constitutionality of s 377A. Furthermore, Mr Tai argued that the First Article insinuated that either the Chief Justice or the Supreme Court had manipulated the timing of the release of the judgment for the Tan Eng Hong case, and had thereby manipulated the judicial system.

82. [60]

    [60] Mr Tai then addressed this court on that part of the First Article which related to the wheels coming off the Supreme Court’s “best-laid” plans due to the efforts of Mr M Ravi (“Mr Ravi”), who represented Tan Eng Hong. Paragraph 7 of the First Article reads:

83. Mr Tai noted that according to the Respondent, it was this intervention by Mr Ravi that upset the Supreme Court’s “best-laid” plans as described.

84. [61]

    [61] Mr Tai also referred to that part of the First Article pertaining to the withdrawal of Mr Ravi’s application for leave for Tan Eng Hong to intervene as an interested party in the Lim Meng Suang appeal (Mr Ravi’s “‘intervention’ application”) following telephone calls exchanged between the High Court and Mr Ravi’s office. According to the First Article, Mr Ravi was persuaded to withdraw that application on the understanding that Loh J’s judgment for the Tan Eng Hong case would be released shortly. And that was why Loh J released that judgment on 2 October 2013. The First Article stated that the release of that judgment came as a surprise, timing-wise.

85. [62]

    [62] Mr Tai submitted that there was no evidence whatsoever that Mr Ravi had been persuaded to withdraw his “intervention” application. Put another way, the Respondent had not provided any rational basis to justify his comments in the First Article that there were telephone calls between the High Court and Mr Ravi, pursuant to which the latter withdrew his “intervention” application. In this regard, Mr Tai relied on the unchallenged affidavit of Ms Arneda Jasman (“Ms Jasman”), who is Loh J’s private secretary. She deposed to the following matters in her affidavit:

86. [63]

    [63] Turning to the rest of the First Article, Mr Tai observed that it talked about further derailment of the Supreme Court’s “best-laid” plans by Mr Ravi, who might apply to consolidate the Lim Meng Suang appeal and the Tan Eng Hong appeal, in which case, the Chief Justice would be conflicted out of the coram hearing both appeals (collectively, “the consolidated appeals”). The First Article ended with the Respondent opining that the chances of success of the consolidated appeals (assuming consolidation was effected) remained uncertain as much would depend on the judge “chose[n] to replace” the Chief Justice.

87. [64]

    [64] Mr Tai submitted that the Respondent had not shown any rational basis for the allegations and/or insinuations made in the First Article. He also contended that the evidence adduced showed the Respondent’s lack of good faith at the time of publication of the First Article. The Respondent, Mr Tai argued, could not satisfy the requirement of good faith simply by asserting that he had merely been repeating the views of others. The statements and views of others could not constitute the cogent evidence that was required of him in order to show a rational basis for his comments in the First Article.

88. [65]

    [65] Mr Tai concluded by reasserting the AG’s view that the First Article contained clear insinuations that there was some wrongdoing or malfeasance on the part of the Chief Justice or the Supreme Court in relation to the management of the Tan Eng Hong case and the Lim Meng Suang case so as to enable the Chief Justice to determine the Lim Meng Suang appeal in an inappropriate way.

89. [66]

    [66] To this end, Mr Tai argued that the terms and phrases used by the Respondent in the First Article also hinted at judicial partiality when it came to cases pertaining to or touching on homosexuality. In particular, the First Article:

90. The Respondent’s case on the First Article

91. [67]

    [67] I turn now to Mr Choo’s arguments for the Respondent. Mr Choo made three broad submissions in relation to the AG’s case. First, he claimed that the Respondent had at all times been acting in good faith and did not possess the requisite mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt. He cited Dhooharika for the proposition that the mens rea for this offence required the AG to prove the Respondent’s intention to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore, and argued that the Respondent had no such intention. There were lengthy submissions on this topic which I need not set out or deal with as I have already explained earlier that under Singapore law, the mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt consists solely of the intention to publish the offending material. On the evidence before me, the requisite mens rea has been made out vis-à-vis the First Article. In this regard, that part of the Respondent’s affidavit evidence which states that he wrote the Impugned Articles “in good faith, with absolutely no intention to bring the institution of the judiciary into disrepute nor to call into question its impartiality” was based on the Board’s ruling on mens rea in Dhooharika. That ruling was made in the context of Mauritius; it is beside the point and does not assist the Respondent.

92. [68]

    [68] Returning to Mr Choo’s submissions, his second broad point was that the Respondent, who is a prominent member of the gay community in Singapore, had steadfastly maintained that the Impugned Articles were well-intentioned and reasonable writings that posed no risk of undermining public confidence in the Singapore judiciary. Thirdly, the Impugned Articles constituted fair criticism. In short, the principal point in Mr Choo’s submissions was that the Respondent had at all times acted in good faith, and since his comments were (so Mr Choo submitted) fair, no scandalising contempt had been committed. It was argued that what the Respondent had written could not in any way be characterised as a deliberate and provocative vilification of the Singapore courts. There was no suggestion that the Singapore courts were acting improperly; and nowhere was it suggested in the First Article that if the Chief Justice were to sit on the panel of judges hearing the Lim Meng Suang appeal, that would change the outcome of that appeal in any way.

93. [69]

    [69] Mr Choo further argued that the Respondent had taken all reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of the statements in each of the passages in the First Article which the AG objected to, namely, the statements set out in bold in the First Article as reproduced at [55] above (collectively, “the statements in bold in the First Article”). The Respondent’s comments, he contended, were based on facts that were reasonable and sound.

94. [70]

    [70] Finally, Mr Choo submitted that the AG’s reading of the Impugned Articles was a “most sinister interpretation”, and urged this court to adopt a more favourable interpretation of the two articles to the extent that the Respondent’s interpretation differed from that of the AG. This was the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Shadrake CA in respect of the second and 14th statements in dispute there. On this matter, and as it is a short point, I must state here that the more accurate question is whether any difference in interpretation is the product of the AG’s failure (if that be the case) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of the offence of scandalising contempt.

95. Decision on the First Article

96. [71]

    [71] I am satisfied that the AG has established beyond reasonable doubt that the First Article posed – or would pose – a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore. This entails that the Respondent’s contention that he acted in good faith and that his comments in the First Article were fair fails. My reasons are as follows.

97. [72]

    [72] In my view, the statements in bold in the First Article (see [55] above) suggest that as the Chief Justice wanted to hear one case, the Supreme Court deliberately delayed the determination of another case so that the outcome of the first case would likely have an influence on the outcome of the second case. These remarks do not qualify as fair comment. The concluding statement in para 8 of the First Article – viz, that “[w]hatever ruling comes out of the Court of Appeal in Gary and Kenneth’s case, it would clearly impact Tan Eng Hong’s case” – is important. These remarks do not reassure the average reasonable person that there will be a fair hearing of the Lim Meng Suang appeal. Indeed, what the Respondent appears to be saying is that the Lim Meng Suang appeal would be dismissed even if the hearing before the Court of Appeal was fair.

98. [73]

    [73] Furthermore, the title and the contents of the First Article read as a whole assume that there was a plan on the part of the Supreme Court which involved the Chief Justice and Loh J acting in a way that was contrary to the fundamental principles of judicial independence, including the principle of the independence of judges from one another. Corresponding to the principle that the Chief Justice should not have the capacity to control or influence a judge’s exercise of judicial power, there is a duty upon Loh J to act independently and in accordance with his judicial oath. The Respondent’s insinuation is that Loh J abused and misused his judicial power in order to delay his decision in the Tan Eng Hong case so that the Lim Meng Suang case, despite having been filed later, would proceed on appeal to the Court of Appeal ahead of the Tan Eng Hong appeal. According to the First Article, this was done to enable the Chief Justice to hear the Lim Meng Suang appeal and determine the constitutionality of s 377A ahead of the Tan Eng Hong appeal. A deliberate delay in the disposal of the Tan Eng Hong case for the aforesaid purpose implies impropriety, in that the due process of the law was deliberately withheld from Tan Eng Hong and justice was denied to him in the context of the common adage that “justice delayed is justice denied”. In my view, the statements in bold in the First Article promote the impression that access to justice in Singapore can be flouted in the sense that the authority of the Singapore legal system as a whole can be flouted. I am here referring to access to justice in terms of an effective procedure for getting a case before the court and the speedy determination of the case by the court.

99. [74]

    [74] The Respondent explained in his affidavit that he had merely been reporting the views of others and described his writing style as theory construction. In addition, Mr Choo advanced the Respondent’s case on the footing that the First Article was based on the Respondent’s logical deductions arising out of an objective set of facts (ie, the timing of the release of the judgments for the Tan Eng Hong case and the Lim Meng Suang case). In my view, the Respondent’s logical deductions – or rather, his theories, which are really his opinions – were not solely based on and confined to an objective set of facts. Not only did the Respondent rely on a mixture of unsubstantiated views received from unidentified persons (the Respondent was not able to identify the persons from whom he had passively received the relevant information), he also went beyond reporting the views of those persons to stating his inferences and developing his opinions. Notably, as a matter of legal principle, articles that are in the nature of an opinion can be contemptuous (see Lingle at [2] and [63]).

100. [75]

     [75] In this regard, Pinsler SC’s commentary in Evidence and The Litigation Process at para 8.005 is instructive:

101. I also note that Illustration (d) of s 3(1) of the EA states, in relation to the definition of “fact”, that a “fact” includes “a certain opinion” held by a person. Drawing together the threads of these two points, the Respondent’s opinion as regards the Supreme Court’s “best-laid” plans and how they operated is a relevant fact to explain his conduct and his state of mind at the time of publication of the First Article. The Respondent’s opinions, in my view, patently demonstrated the absence of good faith on his part.

102. [76]

     [76] All in all, I agree with Mr Tai that the First Article was about improper manipulation of the Supreme Court’s hearing calendar and coram-fixture procedure. In his submissions before this court, Mr Choo pointed out that there were no allegations of judicial misconduct in the First Article. The statements in the First Article, he asserted, were true in that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Singapore judiciary, was entitled to preside over any case of his choosing, and there was nothing improper in what was said in the First Article since the Chief Justice was entitled to make the necessary scheduling arrangements to ensure that he could sit on the coram hearing the Lim Meng Suang appeal. After all, Mr Choo submitted, it was proper for the Chief Justice to want to preside over an important case involving a constitutional challenge. In this regard, Mr Choo referred to material in legal writings and commentaries to show that it was permissible for judges in other jurisdictions to ask to hear specific cases that were of particular interest to them. Mr Choo added that the Respondent’s “theory” regarding the release of the judgments for the Tan Eng Hong case and the Lim Meng Suang case had been constructed in the honest belief that the process described in the aforesaid legal writings and commentaries was perfectly legitimate. There was thus no intention to criticise the Singapore courts and no suggestion of any impropriety on the part of the members of the Singapore judiciary. Mr Choo further stated that nowhere in the First Article was it suggested that the fact of the Chief Justice sitting on the coram hearing the Lim Meng Suang appeal would change the outcome of the appeal in any way. On that last contention, Mr Tai’s rebuttal was that the Respondent’s writing style was to make insinuations without explicitly stating the conclusions that ought to be drawn; nevertheless, the message in the First Article was clear and unequivocal - “the (less than) subtle undertones in the [F]irst [A]rticle will not be missed by an average reasonable reader, and indeed that was [the Respondent’s] intention”.

103. [77]

     [77] I find Mr Choo submissions as outlined at [76] above disingenuous, and they serve to underscore the absence of good faith on the part of the Respondent. I agree with Mr Tai that the Respondent is retreating from his previous position, and his current stance in trying to downplay or neutralise his unsupported attacks against the Singapore judiciary evidences his lack of bona fides. In my view, there is now a clear attempt by the Respondent to not only retract from what he wrote in the First Article, but also facetiously paper over the message conveyed in that article that something furtive was going on, with Loh J deliberately holding back his judgment on the Tan Eng Hong case with the sole objective of having the Lim Meng Suang appeal heard first by a coram which included the Chief Justice (who, as the then Attorney-General, had prosecuted Tan Eng Hong under s 377A). That the Supreme Court’s “strange calendaring” (see para 5 of the First Article) was a manipulation of the judicial system to achieve the aforesaid objective was quite clearly the thrust of what was meant by the reference in the title of the First Article to the “Supreme Court’s best-laid plans”.

104. [78]

     [78] As noted at [76] above, the Respondent now claims that:

105. (a) it was not necessarily a bad thing for the Chief Justice to sit on the coram hearing the Lim Meng Suang appeal;

106. (b) it was proper for the Chief Justice to want to preside over an important case involving a challenge to the constitutionality of s 377A; and

107. (c) nowhere in the First Article was it suggested that the fact of the Chief Justice sitting on the coram hearing the Lim Meng Suang appeal (if that came to pass) would change the outcome of the appeal in any way.

108. These assertions are plainly untenable in the light of the barefaced statement in para 8 of the First Article that “[w]hatever ruling comes out of the Court of Appeal in Gary and Kenneth’s case, it would clearly impact Tan Eng Hong’s case”. That statement has to be understood in the context of the fact that at the time Tan Eng Hong was prosecuted under s 377A, the Chief Justice was the Attorney-General. Given this context, that statement insinuates that the Chief Justice has a vested and improper interest in upholding the constitutionality of s 377A.

109. [79]

     [79] The Respondent is a blogger with a following in the gay community; he is also a self-professed social activist and prominent member of the gay community in Singapore. He admits to “sharing his views of the world” with a larger readership that includes non-gay readers with an interest in gay issues. In painting things in the worst possible light in the First Article, and by making that article available on the Internet, the Respondent conveyed to the average reasonable person (see the definition of “the public” at [41] above) the impression that the Supreme Court would have got away with its “best-laid” plans but for Mr Ravi.

110. [80]

     [80] The statements in bold in the First Article were unfair comments - they were made without any rational basis and in the absence of good faith. In this regard, Mr Tai said that given the quality of the Respondent’s evidence as to the alleged rational basis of his comments in the First Article, that evidence should be rejected. I agree and wholly reject the Respondent’s evidence as inadequate and, hence, unsatisfactory. I accept Mr Tai’s contention that the Respondent has not shown any rational basis for the allegations and/or insinuations made in the First Article. The evidence adduced by the Respondent as the alleged rational basis of his comments cannot constitute the cogent evidence that is required of him because of the following factors:

111. (a) the Respondent’s attribution of his “neat theory” is to an unknown/unspecified “practising lawyer”;

112. (b) the Respondent’s assertion that his “lawyer acquaintances” have expressed concurrence with that “neat theory” is too vague;

113. (c) the Respondent has conspicuously omitted to obtain direct evidence vis-à-vis the alleged telephone exchange incident between Mr Ravi and the High Court in relation to Mr Ravi’s “intervention” application; and

114. (d) the Respondent has relied on ex post facto materials (ie, documents that came to his knowledge only after the First Article was published).

115. [81]

     [81] I have already touched on Ms Jasman’s evidence at [62] above. Her evidence remains unchallenged. As for the ex post facto materials, they are irrelevant as the assessment of the Respondent’s good faith (or the lack thereof) is based on his state of mind at the time of publication of the First Article (see [40] above). It is sufficient that at the time of publication, the First Article, assessed objectively, created a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore. As pointed out earlier, scandalising contempt occurs when the administration of justice is exposed to a real risk of being undermined, irrespective of whether that risk becomes an actuality.

116. [82]

     [82] That said, notwithstanding my finding at [71]–[81] above that the First Article imputes partiality on the part of the Chief Justice in relation to the constitutional challenges of s 377A mounted in the Tan Eng Hong case and the Lim Meng Suang case (in that the First Article insinuates that since the Chief Justice was previously the Attorney-General, he would have a vested and improper interest in upholding the constitutionality of s 377A), I am not persuaded that Mr Tai has established beyond reasonable doubt that the First Article read as a whole imputes partiality on the part of the Supreme Court as a whole, “at the very least when it comes to cases pertaining to the issue of homosexuality”. In my view, the First Article makes no such suggestions or hints of judicial partiality on the part of the Supreme Court as a whole as regards cases pertaining to or touching on homosexuality. I have in mind the last paragraph of the First Article, which, for ease of reference, is set out again below:

117. [83]

     [83] In the paragraph quoted above, and in particular, in the two italicised sentences therein, the Respondent wrote that the chances of the consolidated appeals succeeding (if consolidation of the Tan Eng Hong appeal and the Lim Meng Suang appeal was effected) remained uncertain as much would depend on the third judge chosen to replace the Chief Justice (who would, in the event of consolidation, be recused from hearing the consolidated appeals). The italicised sentences presuppose that: (a) there would be a split vote between the two Judges of Appeal; and (b) a successful constitutional challenge would be secured if the third judge chosen to replace the Chief Justice agreed with the Judge of Appeal in favour of allowing the consolidated appeals. Plainly, the assumption of a split vote between the two Judges of Appeal – which rests on the premise that at least one of the Judges of Appeal will decide in favour of the appellants in the consolidated appeals – is incompatible with Mr Tai’s claim that the Supreme Court as a whole is biased against homosexuals or, at least, is biased in respect of cases pertaining to or touching on homosexuality. In my view, the two italicised sentences in the last paragraph of the First Article, read in the context of the whole of that paragraph, militate against Mr Tai’s assertion of partiality on the part of the Singapore judiciary as a whole with regard to cases pertaining to or touching on homosexuality.

118. [84]

     [84] However, and to reiterate what I said earlier, I agree and accept that Mr Tai has established beyond reasonable doubt that the statements in bold in the First Article impute judicial partiality on the part of the Chief Justice with regards to the s 377A constitutional challenges mounted in the Tan Eng Hong case and the Lim Meng Suang case, and also impute impropriety on the part of the Chief Justice and Loh J. For the reasons stated, I am satisfied that the AG has established beyond reasonable doubt that the First Article as a whole poses or would pose a real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore. I therefore find the Respondent guilty of scandalising contempt in respect of that article.

119. The Second Article

120. The contents of the Second Article

121. [85]

     [85] I turn now to the Second Article, which is titled “Church sacks employee and sues government – on one ground right, on another ground wrong”. The Second Article is reproduced in full below, with the alleged offensive statements complained of by the AG set out in bold:

122. The AG’s case on the Second Article

123. [86]

     [86] The AG set out its case as to the Respondent’s scandalising contempt apropos the Second Article as follows in its O 52 Statement:

124. [87]

     [87] In his written submissions, Mr Tai argued that the Second Article should be read individually or collectively with the First Article. In his oral submissions, however, he placed greater emphasis on a collective reading of the Impugned Articles. He pointed out that these articles were published within a space of seven days, dealt with the same issue (viz, cases before the Supreme Court touching on or pertaining to the issue of homosexuality) and were both tagged under the keyword “homosexuality”. He explained that the sting of the Second Article lay in the statement “I don’t have high hopes for this new suit [ie, Wee’s Constitutional Claim], mostly because my confidence in the Singapore judiciary is as limp as a flag on a windless day” (see the statement in bold italics in the Second Article as reproduced at [85] above (“the offending statement in the Second Article”)), and that statement had to be read in the context of the First Article because the Respondent was repeating in the Second Article the contemptuous insinuations made in the First Article. As to the effect of reading the Impugned Articles together, Mr Tai contended:

125. [88]

     [88] According to Mr Tai, the reference in the offending statement in the Second Article to the Respondent’s lack of confidence in “the Singapore judiciary” and the use of the imagery “as limp as a flag on a windless day” (see [85] above) would create in the mind of the average reasonable person the impression that the Singapore judiciary was biased in relation to cases touching on or pertaining to homosexuality. Mr Tai argued that the Second Article expanded on the theme of the First Article that there was systemic bias within the Singapore judiciary in respect of such cases. This, he submitted, was evident from the Respondent’s reference to the dismissal of the Robinson Suit, which decision was (according to the Respondent) inexplicable except for extraneous considerations, namely, Wee’s sexual orientation. As such, the Respondent had no “high hopes” in respect of Wee’s Constitutional Claim as he considered that it was bound to suffer the same fate as the Robinson Suit and fail, regardless of its merits. Mr Tai further submitted that the Respondent’s insinuation that the Robinson Suit had been dismissed based on extraneous grounds was not supported by any rational basis and was not made in good faith.

126. [89]

     [89] In his oral submissions, Mr Tai emphasised that the offending statement in the Second Article, read in the context of the First Article, repeated the contemptuous insinuation that the Supreme Court “has the ulterior motive and is prepared to resort to manipulations when it comes to cases involving homosexuality”. The terms and phrases used in the Second Article, so Mr Tai’s argument ran, conveyed to the average reasonable person the impression that the Singapore judiciary was influenced by extraneous factors, including Wee’s sexual orientation where the Robinson Suit was concerned, and thus could not be trusted to discharge its judicial functions in an impartial manner. In other words, the insinuation in the Second Article, according to Mr Tai, was that the High Court came to their respective decisions on the Robinson Suit based on the same extraneous consideration, namely, judicial bias against cases touching on or pertaining to homosexuality. Mr Tai contended that in the absence of any cogent rational basis to support fair criticism, the Second Article was contemptuous.

127. [90]

     [90] Mr Tai further argued that the key mischief in the Impugned Articles, when read collectively, lay in the insinuations which they made without explicitly stating what conclusions ought to be drawn. That mischief, he submitted, “bespeaks a lack of bona fides” on the Respondent’s part.

128. The Respondent’s case on the Second Article

129. [91]

     [91] The Respondent’s case on the Second Article was presented by Mr Peter Low (“Mr Low”). Generally, Mr Low’s submissions were that:

130. (a) the AG had failed to establish the requisite mens rea on the part of the Respondent to undermine public confidence in the Singapore judiciary;

131. (b) there was no real risk of the Second Article undermining public confidence in the Singapore judiciary and the administration of justice in Singapore; and

132. (c) the Second Article had been written in good faith and constituted fair criticism.

133. [92]

     [92] Like Mr Choo did in relation to the First Article, Mr Low relied on Dhooharika for the proposition that the mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt required the AG to prove the Respondent’s intention to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice in Singapore. Mr Low’s argument on this point has no merit because, as I stated earlier, under Singapore law, the mens rea for the offence of scandalising contempt consists solely of the intention to publish the offending article, and on the evidence before me, the requisite mens rea has been made out.

134. [93]

     [93] On his assertion that the Second Article amounted to fair criticism in that it had been written in good faith, the Respondent argued that his lack of confidence in the Singapore judiciary (as set out in the offending statement in the Second Article) had been expressed vis-à-vis Wee’s Constitutional Claim. He thought that Wee’s claim in the Robinson Suit had merits, and was perplexed and disappointed that the court did not seem to give weight to Wee’s claim of oppressive behaviour by his superiors. The Respondent expressed his doubts about the chances of Wee’s Constitutional Claim succeeding, given the Singapore courts’ conservatism when it came to constitutional interpretation.

135. Decision on the Second Article

136. [94]

     [94] I have to consider whether the impugned statements in the Second Article (ie, the offending statement in the Second Article (in bold italics) and the other two statements in bold as reproduced at [85] above) were made in the context of criticising a judicial decision, namely, the Robinson Suit. In that article, the Respondent admitted to not knowing the grounds of the decision as the written judgment of the judge, Woo Bih Li J, had yet to be published. In the absence of published grounds, what was the Respondent writing about in the Second Article? Was he engaging in conjectures and speculations that, by their very nature and characteristics, would not qualify as fair criticism of the decision in the Robinson Suit, or was he making fair criticism in good faith?

137. [95]

     [95] As mentioned earlier, in his oral submissions, Mr Tai urged this court to consider the Second Article collectively with the First Article. In this regard, it is worth repeating what I said earlier (at [40] above) about what the court has to do when it is asked to consider two or more offending publications collectively:

138. [96]

     [96] Mr Tai cited Attorney-General v Hertzberg Daniel [2009] 1 SLR(R) 1103 (“Hertzberg Daniel”) as authority for the “collective reading” approach and in support of his argument that the Second Article should be considered collectively with the First Article. In Hertzberg Daniel, the High Court had to analyse three publications in the Wall Street Journal Asia to see if they were in contempt of court. As can be seen from [36]–[51] of that case, Tay Yong Kwang J analysed each publication individually and determined that each of them amounted to a contempt of court. His statement (at [55]) that the articles “collectively, contained insinuations of bias, lack of impartiality and lack of independence” [emphasis added] must be viewed in the light of his further finding (also at [55]) that the publications also individually “implied that the Judiciary is subservient to Mr Lee and/or the PAP and is a tool for silencing political dissent”. Viewed as such, Tay J’s finding that the publications collectively contained the aforesaid insinuations was a logical conclusion that flowed from his detailed analysis of each publication. It is for this reason that Hertzberg Daniel does not really support Mr Tai’s “collective reading” approach argument, which suggests that a weak article, when read collectively with a stronger article, might be strengthened and gain notoriety by virtue of the stronger article. Hertzberg Daniel confirms that each of the offending articles in question must be assessed independently first. In short, each article must be decided on its own facts as assessed at the time of its publication.

139. [97]

     [97] The Respondent began the Second Article with a discussion of two employment cases, the first involving a church worker and the other, an employee of Robinson. He then made the point that an employee’s standard of behaviour at the workplace was dictated by his or her job requirements, with the result that an employee might have to toe the line at his or her workplace despite his or her own private views and beliefs to the contrary. In the case of the church employee, she was responsible for running the marriage counselling programme in the church concerned, and her pregnancy from an illicit relationship with a fellow divorced church worker was arguably inappropriate. At the time of the affair, the church employee was still married, albeit separated from her husband. The Respondent opined that whatever that employee’s personal morals and standard of personal behaviour might be, they ought to be compatible with the job which she was hired to do, and the church’s decision to sack her for her sexual indiscretions in the conduct of her personal life on an entirely private matter was, in his view, right. He commented as follows in the Second Article:

140. [98]

     [98] In contrast, the Respondent wrote, Wee’s sexual orientation had nothing to do with his job scope in Robinson, and he had been forced to resign because of discrimination against homosexuals in the workplace. According to Wee, the new acting Chief Executive Officer of Robinson had made his time there difficult because of his sexual orientation. The Respondent opined that “Robinsons [sic] was wrong to make life so difficult for [Wee] that he had little choice but to resign”, and went on to remark “but the court found Robinsons [sic] right”. The Respondent stated that he “[couldn’t] understand how the court arrived at the conclusion it did”, but qualified his comments by pointing out that: (a) the Robinson Suit had been argued on “purely contract grounds”; and (b) his views on the suit were expressed without the benefit of Woo J’s written decision. According to the Respondent, his qualifying comments stated the basis of his knowledge and its limitations.

The judgment continues past this page. Read the rest at eLitigation.