District Court · Decided 4 August 2026
Boido Riccardo v Alayne Wong Ee Lian
Feedback & support[2026] SGDC 254 · Case no. [2026] SGDC 254
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] Between March 2023 and October 2023, the defendant sent 6 allegedly defamatory emails (collectively, the “Emails”).
- [3]
[3] The defendant accepted that she had sent the Emails. However, she denied that the Emails were defamatory of the claimant or that publication had been established. She also relied on the defences of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege.
- [4]
[4] After reviewing the evidence and parties’ submissions, I find that while the claimant has established a prima facie case of defamation in respect of the Emails, the defendant has established a defence of qualified privilege. My detailed reasons are below.
Background facts
- [5]
[5] I first set out a brief summary of the pertinent facts.
- [12]
[12] The defendant took issue with the installation of netting.
- [13]
[13] On 7 March 2023, the defendant sent the first allegedly defamatory email, titled “YOU HAVE DISRESPECTED LAWS OF SINGAPORE Fwd: There’s no resolution passed for netting” (the “1st Email”) to the claimant, and copied the following email addresses :
(a) k_shanmugam@mha.gov.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email address of Mr K. Shanmugam, then Minster of Home Affairs and a minster for Singapore’s Ministry of Law;
(b) edwin_tong@mlaw.gov.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email address of Mr Edwin Tong, then Minister for Culture, Community and Youth and second minister for Singapore’s Ministry of Law;
(c) desmondlee@mnd.gov.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email address of Mr Desmond Lee, then Minister for Singapore’s Ministry of National Development (“MND”);
(d) heng_swee_keat@pmo.gov.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email address of Mr Heng Swee Keat, then Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Coordinating Minister for Economic Policies;
(e) lawrence_wong@mof.gov.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email address of Mr Lawrence Wong, then Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Minister for Finance; and
(f) bedok@pap.org.sg, which the claimant asserted was the email of Mr Heng Swee Keat, Member of Parliament of East Coast Group Representation Constituency (“GRC”).
- [14]
[14] I will refer to the individuals named at (a) to (e) collectively as the “5 Ministers”.
- [15]
[15] The claimant contended that the 1st Email contained the following defamatory statements :
- [16]
[16] On 24 March 2023, the defendant sent the second allegedly defamatory email, titled “Re: Please respect AGM outcome that net was not approved and needs to be taken down” (the “2nd Email”). This was sent to the claimant, a lawyer from M/s Lee & Lee LLP (Mr Enzel Tan), Mr Cripps, and copied to the 5 Ministers, bedok@pap.org.sg, and lawyers and/or staff of M/s Lee & Lee LLP (Mr Toh Kok Seng and Ms Suan Gan). The claimant contended that the 2nd Email contained the following defamatory statements :
- [17]
[17] On 11 September 2023, the defendant approached Mr Larry Chua Chin Leng (“Mr Chua”), at a Meet-the-People Session (“MPS”) to assist in arranging a mediation session to resolve the issue of the basketball stands and netting. Mr Chua was the branch secretary of the Bedok’s People’s Action Party (“Bedok PAP”) as well as Chairman of the Bedok Citizens’ Consultative Committee.
- [19]
[19] On 17 September 2023, Mr Chua conducted a mediation session. The claimant, Ms Lim, Mr Cripps and the defendant attended. They entered into an oral mediation agreement on the following terms :
(a) The Council is to procure an opinion from a Licensed Electrical Worker (“LEW”) assessing the safety of having play areas situated next to the electrical substations of Costa Del Sol;
(b) The findings of such a LEW are to be disclosed to the defendant;
(c) The issue of the retention of the basketball hoops shall be tabled as a resolution at the 2023 AGM for the subsidiary proprietors to vote on; and
(d) The Council shall abide by the voting results within one week of the same.
- [20]
[20] Pursuant to the mediation agreement, on 18 September 2023, the Strata Residential Manager of the MCST, Mr Wlkinder Singh (“Mr Singh”) wrote to the LEW, Mr Isaac Huang (“Mr Huang”), to obtain his professional opinion. On the same day, Mr Huang replied Mr Singh (the “LEW’s 18 September Email”) , stating:
- [21]
[21] In the meantime, on 18 September 2023, the defendant sent the third allegedly defamatory email titled “Re: PLEASE RESPECT ADVISORY ON ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND NOT EXPOSE KIDS TO STRAY CURRENTS” to the claimant and bedok@pap.org.sg, and copied the 5 Ministers (the “3rd Email”). The claimant contended that the 3rd Email contained the following defamatory statements :
- [22]
[22] Between 20 to 27 September 2023, the 3rd Email was forwarded by an officer in the MND to the Building Construction Authority (“BCA”) and the Energy Market Authority (“EMA”), and by an officer of the EMA to Singapore Power (“SP”).
- [23]
[23] On 19 September 2023, Mr Huang sent a further email to Mr Singh, stating “In our professional opinion as a licensed LEW, anyone can walk and/or run next [to the] substations and should not be concerned about stray currents” (the “LEW’s 19 September Email”). Mr Singh forwarded the LEW’s 19 September Email to the claimant on the same day.
- [24]
[24] On 20 September 2023, Mr Huang emailed the claimant directly, replicating the content of the LEW’s 19 September Email, save for correcting a spelling error (the “LEW’s 20 September Email”). The claimant took a screenshot of the LEW’s 20 September Email and sent it to Mr Chua via WhatsApp, requesting not to show the unredacted version to the defendant, out of a concern that “we will lose that LEW”. Mr Chua agreed that Mr Huang’s name and details would only be provided to him but not the defendant.
- [25]
[25] On 21 September 2023, the LEW’s 20 September Email was sent to the defendant. His name and details were redacted.
- [26]
[26] On 25 September 2023, the defendant submitted a petition signed by 31 subsidiary proprietors to the management office, requesting that the Council hold the 2023 AGM in hybrid mode (“Joint Letter Request”).
- [27]
[27] On 26 September 2023, the Council sent a letter to the defendant to explain the reasons for holding the 2023 AGM virtually. A similar letter was sent to another subsidiary proprietor, one Mdm Neo Sue Kim (“Mdm Neo”). The letter was signed off by Mr Cripps (the “Reply Letter”).
- [28]
[28] On 27 September 2023, the defendant sent the fourth allegedly defamatory email titled “Council cannot fully hold Fully Virtual AGM as you have not complied with BCA 26June 2023 Circular Annex B” to the claimant and Mr Cripps and copied the 5 Ministers and bedok@pap.org.sg (the “4th Email”). The claimant contended that the 4th Email contained the following defamatory statements :
- [29]
[29] On 30 September 2023, the defendant sent the fifth allegedly defamatory email titled “Re: PLEASE RESPECT ADVISORY ON ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND NOT EXPOSE KIDS TO STRAY CURRENTS” to the claimant, and copied the 5 Ministers, bedok@pap.org.sg, Mr Cripps and Ms Lim (the “5th Email”). The claimant contended that the 5th Email contained the following defamatory statements :
- [30]
[30] On 14 October 2023, the defendant sent the sixth allegedly defamatory email titled “FW: EMA & SPPG ON RISK OF PLAYAREA NEXT TO SUBSTATION -Re: PLEASE RESPECT ADVISORY ON ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND NOT EXPOSE KIDS TO STRAY CURRENTS” to the claimant, Mr Cripps and Ms Lim, and copied the 5 Ministers and bedok@pap.org.sg (the “6th Email”). The claimant contended that the 6th Email contained the following defamatory statements :
- [32]
[32] Therefore, in accordance with the mediation agreement, the basketball stands along with their protective netting were permanently removed on 16 October 2023.
- [33]
[33] On 9 November 2023, the claimant’s solicitors sent the defendant a letter of demand, demanding amongst other things, that she cease and desist from making defamatory statements against the claimant.
- [34]
[34] The claimant commenced these proceedings on 7 December 2023.
- [35]
[35] It transpired during the proceedings that one Mr Ng Siang Chye, Bernard (“Mr Ng”), who was a member of the Bedok PAP, operated the email account at the address bedok@pap.org.sg and had access to its inbox as the administrator at the material time. He forwarded all the Emails to Mr Chua.
Issues
- [36]
[36] The following issues arise for consideration:
(a) Has the claimant established a prima facie case of defamation in respect of the 6 Emails?
(b) Has the defendant made out the defences of justification, fair comment and/or qualified privilege? In this regard:
(i) Was the Council’s decision to install the netting behind the basketball stands in breach of the Building Management and Strata Management Act 2024 (“BMSMA”)?
(ii) Was the Council entitled to hold the 2023 AGM by virtual means only?
(iii) Did the claimant breach the BMSMA and/or mediation agreement when he withheld Mr Huang’s details?
(iv) Are the defences of fair comment and/or qualified privilege defeated by malice?
(c) What reliefs are the claimant entitled to, if any?
- [37]
[37] I will deal with these issues in turn.
Has the claimant established a prima facie case of defamation?
- [38]
[38] To succeed in a defamation claim, the claimant must show that:
(a) There was a statement bearing a defamatory meaning;
(b) There was publication to a third party; and
(c) Reference was made to the claimant.
Yan Jun v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 752 (“Yan Jun”) at [109].
Were the statements in the 6 Emails defamatory?
- [39]
[39] A statement is defamatory if it exposes a claimant to hatred, contempt or ridicule or tends to lower him in the esteem of right-thinking members of society: Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei and another [2009] 2 SLR(R) 1004 (“Peter Lim”) at [81].
- [40]
[40] Whether a statement is defamatory is determined based on construing the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used or based on an innuendo meaning: Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 (“Review Publishing”) at [26].
- [41]
[41] The natural and ordinary meaning of words is that which is understood by an ordinary, reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal. The meaning must be gathered from the words themselves and in the context of the entire passage in which they are set out. The court is not confined to the literal or strict meaning of the words, but takes into account what the ordinary, reasonable person may reasonably infer from the words: Review Publishing at [27].
- [42]
[42] In contrast, an innuendo meaning is some other meaning that is not defamatory to the ordinary man but is defamatory to people with knowledge of the special meaning of the words or of extrinsic facts. The burden is on the claimant to show that: (1) there are facts extrinsic to the words, where such facts give rise to a defamatory imputation; (2) these facts were known to one or more of the persons to whom the words were published; and (3) knowledge of those extrinsic facts could cause the words to convey the defamatory imputation relied on by the claimant, to a reasonable person possessing knowledge of those extrinsic facts: Peter Lim at [106].
- [43]
[43] For the reasons I now come to, the claimant has established that there were statements in the Emails bearing a defamatory meaning.
The 1st Email
- [44]
[44] The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 1st Email was that:
(a) The claimant rallied support from the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol to advance his self-interests;
(b) The claimant disregarded Singapore law;
(c) The claimant was not transparent to the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol; and
(d) The claimant misrepresented Singapore law to suit his own advantage as he did on previous occasions.
- [45]
[45] Insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo however, the claimant has not pleaded any facts extrinsic to the words which would give rise to a defamatory imputation, that these facts were known to one or more of the persons to whom the words were published, or how knowledge of these facts could cause the words to convey the alleged defamatory imputation to a reasonable person possessing knowledge. I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.
- [46]
[46] The defendant contended that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that:
(a) The act of installation of the netting in disregard of the defeat of the 2022 Motion, was disrespectful of Singapore law;
(b) As friendly advice, the claimant, in his capacity as chairperson of the Council, should not be rallying the MCST community to push for any self-interests before Singapore laws, should be transparent to the MCST community that there are laws in Singapore to comply with, and should not misrepresent or contort the spirit and intent of such laws in Singapore to suit his advantage; and
(c) The claimant had committed misrepresentation and/or contortion to suit his advantage previously.
- [47]
[47] I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements relied on by the claimant was that:
(a) The claimant had instructed for the netting to be installed in disregard of Singapore law;
(b) The claimant had rallied the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol to advance his own self-interest;
(c) The claimant was not transparent to the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol; and
(d) The claimant had on previous occasions, misrepresented or contorted Singapore law to suit his advantage.
- [48]
[48] This was because the defendant did not merely assert that the installation of the netting was in breach of Singapore law. She specifically attributed it to the claimant, in saying that “to instruct for the outcome of the motion to be disregarded is UNLAWFUL, and you need to make restitution for this ASAP…”
- [50]
[50] These assertions would lower the claimant in the esteem of right-thinking members of society as the imputation was that he had acted unlawfully and dishonestly to further his own interests.
The 2nd Email
- [51]
[51] The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 2nd Email was that the claimant was partial and influenced by personal interests when he was part of the Council that made the decision to install netting behind the two basketball stands.
- [52]
[52] Similarly, insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo, the claimant has not pleaded the facts giving rise to such an innuendo meaning (see [45] above). I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.
- [53]
[53] The defendant said that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that:
(a) Disrespecting and acting against the outcome of the 2022 Motion wa irresponsible and unlawful, out of the AGM’s constraints, breaches s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and breaches the decision of the general body to defeat the 2022 Motion; and
(b) As a principle, wise decisions made in the foremost interest of MCST should be done in good faith and with absolute objectivity, and should not be influenced by emotions of “alarm and disappointment” or partiality and personal interests.
- [54]
[54] I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements relied on was that the claimant had, in instructing for the netting to be installed, disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion and breached s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA, and that he did so because he was partial and influenced by personal interests.
- [55]
[55] This was because the defendant had referred elsewhere in the 2nd Email to the installation of the netting, and specifically referred to “the decision by Council (which Chairman [the claimant] and Secretary [Mr Cripps] are part of)” which she claimed was “in breach of the outcome of the AGM where the motion was defeated”. A reasonable reader would therefore understand her assertion as directed against the claimant as well.
- [56]
[56] By asserting that wise decisions made in the interest of the MCST should not be influenced by partiality and personal interests, a reasonable inference was that she was asserting that the claimant had done the opposite.
- [57]
[57] These assertions would lower the claimant in the esteem of right-thinking members of society as they portrayed the claimant as acting unlawfully to further his own interests.
The 3rd Email
- [58]
[58] The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 3rd Email was that, when the defendant raised the issue of the Council’s decision to install netting behind the two basketball stands during a session with Mr Chua, the claimant was unreasonable, disregarded Singapore law, and the claimant was part of the Council that made a decision which breached law and safety.
- [59]
[59] Similarly, insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo, the claimant has not pleaded the facts giving rise to such an innuendo meaning (see [45] above). I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.
- [60]
[60] The defendant said that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that:
(a) The defendant had presented a copy of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA to the claimant to seek his understanding of the law;
(b) The defendant had presented copies of the minutes of the 2022 AGM to the claimant as the basis for discussion; and
(c) The claimant unreasonably refused to look at s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and the minutes of the 2022 AGM, and the defendant saw this as reflecting an attitude on the claimant’s part that the law and the debate concerning the minutes of the 2022 AGM did not exist.
- [61]
[61] I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements the claimant relied on was that the claimant had acted unreasonably and displayed a disregard of Singapore law during the mediation session, and that the claimant was part of the Council which made a decision in breach of law and safety.
- [62]
[62] The defendant did not merely assert that that the claimant did not look at her copies of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and the minutes of the 2022 AGM, but asserted that “this was unlike [how] any reasonable person would have responded”, and further, by refusing to look at the copy of the BMSMA, the claimant had displayed “an attitude that this law didn’t exist”.
- [63]
[63] The defendant said that she “valid concerns over breaches of law and safety”. The rest of the 3rd Email then referred to the mediation session which was held to address those concerns, and the alleged refusal of the claimant (whom she referred to as “Chairman Riccardo Boido”) to look at a copy of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA, which she described as an “attitude that this law didn’t exist”. A reasonable reader would therefore understand that the claimant was involved in the Council’s alleged breaches of law and safety.
- [64]
[64] These assertions would lower the claimant in the esteem of right-thinking members of society, as it portrayed the claimant as someone who was unreasonable, did not have any heed for Singapore law, and made decisions in breach of law and safety.
The 4th Email
- [66]
[66] Similarly, insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo, the claimant has not pleaded the facts giving rise to such an innuendo meaning (see [45] above). I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.
- [67]
[67] The defendant said that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that:
(a) The defendant received a call from an elderly subsidiary proprietor who had signed the Joint Letter Request, and who was distraught and distressed owing to the Reply Letter;
(b) The claimant and Mr Cripps had deprived elderly subsidiary proprietors of their right to attend the 2023 AGM by failing to cater for their lack of tech-competence;
(c) The Reply Letter had hit at the elderly subsidiary proprietors’ psychological weakness without showing compassion;
(d) The Reply Letter was intimidating and distressful; and
(e) The Reply Letter deliberately contorted the intent of the Joint Letter Request.
- [68]
[68] I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements the claimant relied on was that the claimant had deprived elderly subsidiary proprietors of their entitlement to attend the 2023 AGM by not catering to their lack of tech-competence. This is clear from the words “you need to respect our elderlies [sic]…Already you deprive them of their entitlement to attend AGM by not catering to their lack of tech-competence…”
- [69]
[69] I also find that a natural and ordinary meaning of the statements was that the claimant had, through the Reply Letter, intimidated and caused distress to elderly subsidiary proprietors. Even though the Reply Letter was signed off by Mr Cripps, it would be reasonable to infer that the defendant’s assertion of intimidation and causing distress was also made against the claimant. The defendant in her own affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) said that her statements presumed that the claimant as chairperson had sent similar intimidating response letters to co-signatories of the Joint Letter Request, which caused intimidation and distress to elderly subsidiary proprietors. She had in the 4th Email, also addressed both Mr Cripps and the claimant, as evident from the phrase “I say to both of you..”, before alleging that they “hit at [the elderly subsidiary proprietors’] psychological weakness”.
- [70]
[70] The above assertions would lower the claimant in the esteem of right-thinking members of society as they impugned the claimant’s personal character and suggested that he not only deprived the rights of a vulnerable group to attend an AGM but intimidated them and caused them distress.
The 5th Email
- [71]
[71] The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 5th Email was that:
(a) The claimant disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion;
(b) The claimant breached s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA;
(c) The claimant made a mockery of Singapore laws, processes, and systems; and
(d) The claimant is an outsider and/or foreigner who is not in sync with the Singapore government’s narrative.
- [72]
[72] Similarly, insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo, the claimant has not pleaded the facts giving rise to such an innuendo meaning (see [45] above). I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.
- [73]
[73] The defendant said that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that:
(a) The Council or the claimant, in his capacity as Chairperson of the Council, breached s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA by disrespecting the outcome of the voting at the 2022 AGM;
(b) Singapore does not condone those who make a mockery of its laws, processes and systems; and
(c) In principle, the claimant, in his capacity of chairperson of the Council, should be in sync with Singapore laws, processes and systems.
- [74]
[74] I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements the claimant relied on was:
(a) The claimant disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion and breached s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA; and
(b) By doing so, the claimant had made a mockery of Singapore laws, processes and systems, and was not in sync with the Singapore government’s narrative.
- [75]
[75] The defendant was not merely stating as a general principle that Singapore does not condone those who made a mockery of its laws, processes, systems or that the claimant should be in sync with Singapore’s laws, processes and systems. This must be read in context: she had first accused him of breaching s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and disrespecting the outcome of the 2022 Motion before stating that Singapore does not condone those who made a mockery of its law. She also went on to conclude that “it [was] time [he] get[s] in sync with the narrative of this land”, thereby implying that the claimant was not in sync with the foregoing principle.
- [76]
[76] The above assertions would lower the claimant in the esteem of right-thinking members of society as they asserted that the claimant acted unlawfully and made Singapore laws appear of no value.
The 6th Email
- [77]
[77] The claimant pleaded that the natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning of the statements in the 6th Email was that:
(a) The claimant is skilful in misrepresenting and misinterpreting the law to suit his advantage, and provided feedback from bad people to the subsidiary proprietors of Costa Del Sol;
(b) The claimant disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion;
(c) The claimant disrespected s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA;
(d) The claimant arrogantly and blatantly rejected the existence of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA during the mediation session;
(e) The claimant disrespected s 47 of the BMSMA and withheld information from subsidiary proprietors; and
(f) The claimant disrespected the mediation agreement.
- [78]
[78] Similarly, insofar as the claimant has sought to rely on innuendo, the claimant has not pleaded the facts giving rise to such an innuendo meaning (see [45] above). I therefore only consider whether the pleaded natural and ordinary meaning has been made out.
- [79]
[79] The defendant said that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words quoted by the claimant was simply that:
(a) The claimant had a usual prowess in misrepresenting and misinterpreting to suit his advantage;
(b) The claimant had provided feedback to the ministers of behaviours by bad actors in the community;
(c) The claimant or the Council disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion;
(d) The claimant or the Council disrespected s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA;
(e) The claimant rejected the existence of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and the existence of the minutes of the discussion of the said resolution at the mediation session;
(f) The claimant disrespected the spirit of s 47 of the BMSMA; and
(g) The claimant disrespected the mediation agreement.
- [80]
[80] I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements the claimant relied on was that the claimant:
(a) Had a usual prowess in misrepresenting and misinterpreting to suit his advantage;
(b) Provided feedback to the ministers of behaviours of bad actors in the community;
(c) Disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion;
(d) Disrespected s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA;
(e) Arrogantly rejected the existence of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA and the minutes of the 2022 AGM during the mediation session;
(f) Disrespected the spirit of s 47 of the BMSMA; and
(g) Disrespected the mediation agreement.
- [81]
[81] This is because the defendant had specifically alleged that the claimant had self-demonstrated to “the Ministers” his “usual prowess in misrepresenting and misinterpreting to always suit [his] own advantage.” She then said that “they [i.e. the Ministers] have taken in the feedback [the claimant] self-provided of behaviours by bad actors in the community”. She also specifically stated that “you/Council” disrespected the outcome of the 2022 Motion and s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA. She did not merely state that he rejected the existence of s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA or the minutes of the 2022 AGM, but asserted twice that two Council members “followed [his] arrogant lead”. She also accused the claimant specifically of disrespecting the spirit of s 47 of the BMSMA and the mediation agreement by “withholding information critical to the issue at hand”.
- [82]
[82] The above assertions would lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society as they portray the claimant as someone who acted dishonestly to further his own interests, did not have any heed for Singapore law, and acted unlawfully.
Was there publication to a third party
The law on publication
- [83]
[83] There are two components of publication: (1) an act that makes the statement available to a third party in a comprehensible form, and (2) the receipt of the information by a third party in such a way that it is understood: Qingdao Bohai Construction Group Co. Ltd and others v Goh Teck Beng and another [2016] 4 SLR 977 (“Qingdao Bohai”) at [35].
- [84]
[84] The burden of proving the second component of publication can be discharged directly by proving that at least one person, other than the claimant, saw, read or heard the communication, or in appropriate cases, indirectly, by an inference that publication must have occurred (Qingdao Bohai at [38]), such as by establishing a platform of facts from which it can properly be inferred that substantial publication within the jurisdiction had taken place: Zhu Yong Zhen v AIA Singapore Private Limited and another [2013] 2 SLR 492 (“Zhu Yong Zhen”) at [44]; [48].
- [85]
[85] Specifically in relation to email messages, there would be publication if it was received and seen by a recipient, other than its author and the person defamed, who is capable of understanding it: Ng Koo Kay Benedict v Zim Integrated Shipping Services Pte Ltd [2010] 2 SLR(R) 873 (“Ng Koo Kay Benedict”) at [27]; Qingdao Bohai at [37]; Zhu Yong Zhen at [42].
- [86]
[86] In Ng Koo Kay Benedict, while it could not be proven that every person in the list of recipients of the email in question had downloaded and accessed the email in Singapore, the court found that as it was sent to a large number of email addresses, it was more likely than not, that a not insubstantial number of persons would have downloaded and read the email in Singapore. This was buttressed by the fact that there were two individuals who testified that they had downloaded and accessed the email in Singapore (at [45]).
Was there publication to the 5 Ministers?
- [87]
[87] The claimant had pleaded that the Emails were copied to the email addresses of the 5 Ministers.
- [88]
[88] There was no direct evidence that any of the 5 Ministers had read and understood any of the Emails.
- [89]
[89] The claimant has also not established a platform of facts from which it can properly be inferred that any of the 5 Ministers had read the Emails.
- [90]
[90] All the claimant relied on were:
(a) Evidence that 5 of the email addresses to which the defendant sent the Emails were the official email addresses of the 5 Ministers at the material time ;
(b) The defendant’s confirmation that she had sent the Emails to the 5 Ministers’ addresses which she found on the online Singapore government directory ;
(c) The disclaimer on the online Singapore Government directory stating that e-mails will be routinely processed by administrators from each ministry (the “Disclaimer”) ; and
(d) The fact that MND responded to the 3rd Email.
- [91]
[91] The claimant submitted based on the above that it was reasonable to assume and foresee that the administrators from each ministry would read the Emails and report their contents to the relevant Minister.
- [92]
[92] However, all the Disclaimer stated was that emails would be “routinely processed”. It is not clear what “routinely processed” entails. This is not in my view sufficient to give rise to an inference that all the Emails sent to the 5 Ministers at those email addresses would be read, much less forwarded to them.
- [93]
[93] It is also not possible to infer solely from MND’s response to the 3rd Email, that MND also read the other five Emails, or that the other ministries which the 5 Ministers oversaw would have also read all the Emails. The defendant said she did not receive any reply from any of the ministries on the other five Emails.
- [94]
[94] Lastly, the claimant sought to rely on s 116(e) of the Evidence Act 1893 which states that the court may presume that official acts have been “regularly performed”. However, for the reasons at [92], the claimant has not adduced any evidence as to what the “official act” would even encompass.
Can the claimant rely on publication to individuals other than the 5 Ministers?
- [95]
[95] The claimant has also sought to rely on publication to other individuals, namely:
(a) Mr Ng (in respect of all the Emails);
(b) Mr Chua (in respect of all the Emails);
(c) Mr Cripps (in respect of the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Emails);
(d) Ms Lim (in respect of the 5th and 6th Emails);
(e) Officers of the MND, BCA, EMA and SP (in respect of the 3rd Email);
(f) Two lawyers and a staff from M/s Lee & Lee (in respect of the 2nd Email); and
(g) Mdm Neo (in respect of the 1st Email).
- [96]
[96] The defendant submitted that the claimant should not be permitted to rely on publication to individuals other than the 5 Ministers as this goes beyond his pleaded case, and would be prejudicial to the defendant.
- [97]
[97] The claimant ought to have fully pleaded the extent of publication he was relying on. O 43 r 3(4) of the Rules of Court 2021 requires a claimant to give full particulars in the statement of claim of the facts and matters on which the claimant relies in support of the claim for damages, including details of any conduct by the defendant which has allegedly increased the loss suffered and of any loss which is peculiar to the claimant’s own circumstances.
(a) It was apparent from the face of the Emails that some of them were also copied to Mr Cripps and Ms Lim. Mr Cripps’ and Ms Lim’s AEICs stated that they had read and understood the emails which they were copied on. The claimant had, in his opening statement, also stated that he would be relying on the evidence of Mr Cripps and Ms Lim for publication. The defendant’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr Cripps and Ms Lim, and address this in closing submissions.
(b) The email address by which Mr Ng accessed the Emails, bedok@pap.org.sg, had been pleaded. It was in Mr Chua’s AEIC that Mr Ng had access to its inbox and had forwarded the Emails to him. The claimant had, in his opening statement, also stated that he would be relying on the evidence of Mr Chua and Mr Ng for publication. The defendant’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr Chua and Mr Ng, and address this in closing submissions.
(c) The purported publication to officers in MND, BCA, EMA, and SP was based on emails which the defendant herself had disclosed in these proceedings. The defendant had the chance to explain her position in cross-examination and address this in closing submissions.
- [99]
[99] The same however cannot be said in relation to the alleged publication to M/s Lee & Lee and Mdm Neo:
(a) While it was apparent from the face of the 2nd Email that staff of M/s Lee & Lee had been copied, it was not apparent from the claimant’s AEIC or his opening statement that he was relying on the alleged publication to M/s Lee & Lee. Even in the claimant’s closing submissions, it was only in the context of his submissions on damages that the claimant made a passing reference to the fact that two lawyers and a staff from M/s Lee & Lee was copied on the 2nd Email.
(b) That Mdm Neo had also received the 1st Email was something that only arose when Mdm Neo was cross-examined. While the claimant argued that the defendant could have re-examined her on this, it was not until closing submissions that the claimant indicated for the first time that he was relying on the alleged publication to Mdm Neo.
- [100]
[100] In any event, even if I allow the claimant to rely on the alleged publication to M/s Lee & Lee and Mdm Neo, this would not further the claimant’s case.
- [101]
[101] The claimant did not in his submissions, address how copying two lawyers and a staff from M/s Lee & Lee on the 2nd Email amounted to defamation.
- [102]
[102] The defendant has, on the other hand, cited 2 Canadian authorities for the position that a letter sent to a claimant’s lawyer would not amount to publication for the purpose of defamation. In Grimmer v Carleton Road Industries Association 2009 NSSC 169, it was held that a defendant’s communication to a lawyer at the request of the claimant, of allegedly defamatory statements relating to the subject matter of the retainer, does not amount to publication at law (at [45] - [46]). Publication would also not be made out even if the claimant’s lawyer did not specifically request that the defendant write to him, if the claimant expected individuals raising legal issues to contact its solicitors: Monument Mining Limited v. Balendran Chong & Bodi 2012 BCSC 1769 at [92] - [94].
- [103]
[103] Here, the MCST had instructed M/s Lee & Lee to write to the defendant on 14 March 2023. In their letter, M/s Lee and Lee had asserted that the defendant’s claim that the installation of netting was in breach of the decision made at the 2022 AGM was baseless, and that there was no legal basis for her to demand that they be removed. It was in response to this letter that the defendant sent the 2nd Email to M/s Lee & Lee. I express doubt as to whether for this reason, the requirement of publication would not be made out (as per the Canadian authorities the defendant cited), or whether this would instead go towards establishing a defence to a claim in defamation. Either way, the claimant would not be able to successfully assert defamation in respect of the alleged publication to M/s Lee & Lee.
- [104]
[104] As for Mdm Neo, her evidence (which she repeated several times on the stand) was that the defendant had forwarded the 1st Email to her when the defendant asked her to be a witness. The claimant has not elaborated how forwarding the 1st Email to Mdm Neo, which based on her evidence, suggested that it was in the course of and for the purpose of these proceedings, would amount to defamation.
- [105]
[105] I now consider if the claimant has established publication in respect of Mr Ng, Mr Chua, Mr Cripps, Ms Lim and officers in MND, BCA, EMA, and SP.
Was there publication to Mr Ng and Mr Chua (in respect of the Emails)
- [106]
[106] Mr Ng read the Emails and forwarded them to Mr Chua. Mr Chua confirmed that he received the Emails from Mr Ng, and that he read and understood their contents.
- [107]
[107] The defendant has not contended that Mr Ng and Mr Chua’s receipt of the Emails were insufficient to establish publication.
Was there publication to Mr Cripps (in respect of the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Emails) and Ms Lim (in respect of the 5th and 6th Emails)?
- [108]
[108] Mr Cripps and Ms Lim’s evidence was that they had read and understood the emails which they were copied on. Nevertheless, the defendant contended that this was insufficient to establish publication.
- [109]
[109] To constitute a defamatory statement, the statement must be published to a third party, i.e. a person distinct and external to both the alleged defaming party and the alleged defamed party: Karan Baga v Stichting Chemical Distribution Institute [2024] 5 SLR 1104 at [39]. In that case, the claimant failed to establish publication in respect of statements which the defendant organisation had made to its own internal bodies, namely, its board of directors, an executive board and an accreditation committee.
- [110]
[110] The defendant argued that Mr Cripps and Ms Lim were not external parties, as allegedly defamatory statements were also made against them as council members. In my view, they did not cease to be external third parties merely because some alleged defamatory statements may also have been made against them. The claimant is bringing a personal action for the allegations that were made against him.
- [111]
[111] In any case, not all the statements which the claimant complained of were also made against Mr Cripps and Ms Lim. For instance, the statements in regarding the claimant’s alleged attitude during the mediation were only against the claimant.
Was there publication to officers of MND, BCA, EMA and SP (in respect of the 3rd Email)?
- [112]
[112] The 3rd Email had also been forwarded to officers of the MND, BCA, EMA and SP.
(a) On 20 September 2023, one Tan Kailin from the MND forwarded the 3rd Email to bca_csd@bca.gov.sg (copying 4 other email addresses with the domain “@mnd.gov.sg”) for their information and follow up.
(b) On 22 September 2023, one Lynn Chan Li Ing from the BCA replied, and directed the MND to the EMA instead. Hence on 25 September 2023, Tan Kailin forwarded the email chain (which included the 3rd Email) to EMA_Enquiry@ema.gov.sg, copying the same 4 email addresses with the domain “@mnd.gov.sg”, seeking the EMA’s follow-up.
(c) On 27 September 2023, one Desmond Nah from the EMA forwarded the email chain (which included the 3rd Email) to powerfeedback@spgroup.com.sg. He asked that SP look into the matter and provide the necessary assistance to the defendant. SP subsequently responded to the defendant on the issue of electrical safety in the vicinity of power substations.
- [113]
[113] Liability attaches to republications if they were intended by the defendant or were a foreseeable consequence: Continental Steel Pte Ltd v Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Southeast Asia Pte Ltd and another [2023] 5 SLR 445 at [171].
- [114]
[114] I find that the republication to the officers in the MND, BCA, EMA and SP was at the very least, a foreseeable consequence.
- [115]
[115] While the defendant had no control over how any government or ministry representative would act on the 3rd Email, the defendant wanted the 5 Ministers, or expected them to, act on her Emails. She had therefore copied them on the 3rd Email, and stated that she was setting out her “experience and observations during the session as feedback to the government (copied on this issue in this email chain)”. She also confirmed on the stand that she continued to send emails to the 5 Ministers because she wanted to give feedback. It was therefore foreseeable that the 3rd Email could be provided to other parties, as part of the follow-up on her feedback.
Conclusion on publication
- [116]
[116] In summary therefore, while the claimant has not proven publication to the 5 Ministers, I find that there has been publication of the Emails, as follows:
(a) In respect of the 1st Email – to Mr Chua and Mr Ng;
(b) In respect of the 2nd Email – to Mr Chua, Mr Ng and Mr Cripps;
(c) In respect of the 3rd Email – to Mr Chua, Mr Ng and officers in MND, BCA, EMA and SP;
(d) In respect of the 4th Email – to Mr Chua, Mr Ng and Mr Cripps;
(e) In respect of the 5th Email – to Mr Chua, Mr Ng, Mr Cripps and Ms Lim; and
(f) In respect of the 6th Email – to Mr Chua, Mr Ng, Mr Cripps, and Ms Lim.
Did the statements refer to the claimant
- [117]
[117] Apart from arguments that the statements in the 4th Email regarding the Reply Letter being intimidating and distressing was referring to Mr Cripps instead of the claimant, and that the statement regarding “bad actors” in the 6th Email was too vague to refer to the claimant (see [69] – [81] above), the defendant has not contended that the Emails did not refer to the claimant.
- [118]
[118] In any case, I find that a reasonable person would understand the statements in the Emails to refer to the claimant. The claimant was specifically named in all the Emails.
- [119]
[119] In conclusion therefore, I find that the claimant has established a prima facie case of defamation in respect of all the Emails.
Is the defence of qualified privilege made out?
- [120]
[120] For the reasons I will come to, I find that the Emails were published to the established recipients (i.e. Mr Cripps, Ms Lim, Mr Ng, Mr Chua and officers of the MND, BCA, EMA and SP) on occasion of qualified privilege.
The law on qualified privilege
- [121]
[121] A defendant must show that he has an interest, whether legal, social or moral, to communicate the information and the recipient has the corresponding interest or duty to receive the information: Yan Jun at [112].
- [122]
[122] The ultimate question is whether the statements were “fairly warranted by the occasion”. The court must consider all the circumstances and ask whether the defendant had a duty or interest in publishing the defamatory communication in question to the recipient in question: Chan Cheng Wah Bernard and others v Koh Sin Chong Freddie and another appeal [2012] 1 SLR 506 (“Chan Cheng Wah Bernard”) at [87]. It is not enough to assert some vague, ill-defined sense or moral or social duty: Goh Lay Khim and others v Isabel Redrup Agency Pte Ltd and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 546 (“Goh Lay Khim”) at [80].
- [123]
[123] The defence of qualified privilege would be defeated if it is proven that the communications were actuated by malice. Malice for the purposes of defeating qualified privilege may be proven in two ways: (1) by showing that the defendant knew the statement was false or was reckless as to its truth or did not believe in its truth, or (2) even if the defendant had a genuine or honest belief in its truth, by showing that his dominant motive was to injure the claimant or was otherwise improper. Goh Lay Khim at [81].
- [124]
[124] The inquiry into whether the defendant had knowledge of falsity or was reckless as to the truth is a subjective rather than objective exercise and the threshold is a high one. It had to be shown that the defendant knew the statement was false or was reckless to the point of wilful blindness. There would be such recklessness if the defendant disregarded obvious and pertinent facts in coming to his defamatory statement: Gao Shuchao v Tan Kok Quan and others [2018] SGHC 115 (“Gao Shuchao”) at [38] – [40].
- [125]
[125] An example of improper motive would be personal spite or the abuse of the occasion to obtain some private advantage unconnected with the duty or the interest constituting the reason for the privilege. Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei [2010] 4 SLR 331 at [38].
- [126]
[126] Malice for the purpose of defeating qualified privilege can be inferred from the introduction of extraneous matter which falls outside of this legitimate interest and the use of unnecessarily strong language: Golden Season at [108] – [110].
Mr Cripps and Ms Lim
- [128]
[128] Mr Cripps and Ms Lim, as then-members of the Council, had a corresponding interest to receive the Emails, as they are obliged under s 61 of the BMSMA to use reasonable diligence in the discharge of their duties.
- [129]
[129] Specifically in respect of assertions relating to compliance with the mediation agreement, the claimant, Mr Cripps and Ms Lim agreed that the Council was a party to the mediation agreement. Mr Cripps and Ms Lim agreed that the Council’s members therefore had an interest in the defendant’s and the Council’s compliance with the mediation agreement , and in knowing any allegation of non-compliance.
Mr Ng and Mr Chua
- [131]
[131] The defendant agreed that she did not, in any of the Emails, specifically request that Bedok PAP help resolve her dispute . Nonetheless, the bedok@pap.org.sg address belonged to Bedok PAP and was an official email account for residents in the East Coast GRC to channel their feedback to their member of parliament. Both Mr Chua and Mr Ng agreed that there was nothing wrong with a constituent like the defendant sending emails to Bedok PAP to raise her concerns. Bedok PAP organised MPS to help constituents resolve their disputes, and would treat all emails sent to the Bedok PAP email address as MPS cases.
- [132]
[132] The claimant had sought to distinguish the Emails as “abusive” emails which Mr Chua said the Bedok PAP would not treat as a valid case for an MPS. However, both Mr Chua and Mr Ng had confirmed, that in this instance, all the Emails were assigned as MPS cases for necessary follow-up.
- [133]
[133] Mr Ng and Mr Chua had a corresponding duty and/or interest in receiving this information.
- [134]
[134] As a member of the Bedok PAP and administrator of bedok@pap.org.sg, Mr Ng’s main role was to ensure that all emails from Bedok PAP’s email address went to Mr Chua as secretary of Bedok PAP. Both Mr Chua and Mr Ng agreed that Bedok PAP had an interest in resolving neighbourly disputes , and that Mr Ng had an interest or duty to forward the Emails to Mr Chua.
- [135]
[135] Mr Chua had in fact sought to mediate the dispute between the defendant and the Council in his capacity as Chairman of the Bedok Citizens’ Consultative Committee. Both Mr Chua and Mr Ng explained that this committee was under the People’s Association, but like the Bedok PAP, had an interest in helping resolve neighbourly disputes.
The MND, BCA, EMA and SP
- [137]
[137] The MND had an interest or duty in receiving the 3rd Email. Under the 13th Schedule to the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Ministerial Responsibility) Notification 2020 (“MRN”), the BMSMA is listed as one of the statutes which fell within “National Development”.
- [138]
[138] The MND then forwarded the 3rd Email to BCA and EMA for their follow-up. BCA and EMA therefore had an interest or duty in receiving the 3rd Email to consider if any follow-up was required on their end. The EMA also had an interest or duty to forward the 3rd Email to SP for its follow-up, and SP had a corresponding interest or duty to follow-up on the 3rd Email, which it did when it responded to the defendant.
The 5 Ministers
- [139]
[139] Given my finding that the claimant has not established publication to the 5 Ministers, there is no need for me to consider if the alleged communications to them were protected by qualified privilege. Nevertheless, even if there had been publication to them, the publication to 2 out of the 5 Ministers would be protected by qualified privilege.
- [140]
[140] I accept that the defendant had an interest in sending the Emails to the 5 Ministers to uphold the Council’s compliance with the BMSMA. She had initially reached out to the managing agent to ask that the netting be removed, but as this was not done, she decided to escalate the matter.
- [141]
[141] While she did not explicitly request that the 5 Ministers help to resolve the dispute between her and the claimant , the absence of an express statement seeking assistance is not determinative of whether she had an interest to communicate the information. The claimant had relied on in Koh Chong Chiah v The Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No. 4111 [2025] SGDC 146, where a letter addressed to the Prime Minister’s Office contained a statement seeking its assistance to arrange a mediation session. However, that was not a case on qualified privilege as the defendant there did not pursue this defence. The existence of this statement was simply a factor which the court considered when assessing damages, in finding that the letter was not sent with an improper motive (at [66]).
- [142]
[142] In any case, the defendant did, in the 1st Email, state that she will “monitor the net situation and any further non-conforming behaviours [sic]” and “will report to this panel when required.” This is consistent with her evidence that she wanted to send feedback to the 5 Ministers.
- [143]
[143] I accept that the defendant could also have reached out to the BCA, the Strata Titles Board (“STB”) and/or the court to resolve her dispute. However, these were non-mandatory alternatives and did not negate the existence of an interest on her part to communicate the Emails to the 5 Ministers. It was also the defendant’s evidence that she wanted to explore other options which may be faster than going to the STB or the courts. Insofar as the claimant had relied on emails which he said showed that the defendant had been advised to apply to the STB for recourse, I note that those emails related to different complaints that were not the subject of the Emails.
- [144]
[144] The claimant next relied on Ho Kee Sin v Vincent Teo [2024] SGMC 83 (“Ho Kee Sin”) where it was held that the BCA, a Member of Parliament and the Minister for National Development had no reciprocity of interest in receiving information relating to a private dispute between the subsidiary proprietors of a condominium unit and the management corporation. However, the facts are distinguishable.
- [145]
[145] There, the dispute in question was over an agreement that had been separately entered into between the subsidiary proprietors of a specific unit and the management corporation. The court also found that there was no interest on the part of the authorities in question to receive the information because by the time of the alleged defamation, the issue had been fully ventilated in previous emails with the Urban Redevelopment Authority (“URA”), BCA, the Member of Parliament, and the Minister for National Development. Further, the URA/BCA had in their emails stated that they were unable to intervene in the dispute over a private agreement: in particular, the BCA had said that it had already considered the appeals through the Member of Parliament and the Minister) (at [53]).
- [146]
[146] Further, the court in Ho Kee Sin also made clear that it was not making a finding that the authorities in question do not have a duty or an interest in receiving information on issues relating to the BMSMA or compliance with the URA/BCA’s guidelines and regulations or more generally concerns about how management corporations are run.
- [147]
[147] However, I am not persuaded that all the 5 Ministers had a corresponding interest or duty to receive the Emails. I am only prepared to accept that the following 2 ministers had a corresponding interest or duty to receive the Emails, based on their portfolios at the material time:
(a) Mr Heng Swee Kiat was a member of East Coast GRC, the constituency where Costa De Sol is located. The Bedok Branch, which fell within East Coast GRC, organises MPS to help constituents resolve their disputes ; and
(b) Mr Desmond Lee was the Minister for National Development. Under the 13th Schedule to the MRN, the BMSMA is listed as one of the statutes which fell within “National Development”.
- [148]
[148] On the other hand, it would be a stretch to argue that the following ministers also had a corresponding interest or duty to receive the Emails:
(a) Mr K Shanmuggam was the Minister for Law and Home Affairs. The defendant has only pointed to the inclusion of the Land Titles Act and the Land Titles (Strata) Act under the 11th Schedule to the MRN as statutes that fell within “Law”, but no breaches of these statutes were alleged. The BMSMA is not listed as one of the statutes within his purview;
(b) The same goes for Mr Edwin Tong who was at the material time, Second Minister for Law and the Minister for Culture, Community and Youth. The defendant has only pointed to a vague interest in ensuring that people living in Singapore abided by communal norms;
(c) As for Mr Lawrence Wong was the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore at the material time, the defendant has only asserted that he had an overarching responsibility over the department listed in the 2nd Schedule to the MRN as “Strategy Group and Whole-of-Government Strategic Planning and Policy Consideration”. A more specific duty and interest on the part of the receiver is required.
- [149]
[149] For the avoidance of doubt, whether a publication is made on an occasion of qualified privilege is a fact-sensitive enquiry which is tightly focused on the specific sender and receiver of the communication, its content and surrounding circumstances: Goh Lay Khim at [80]. My finding that qualified privilege would have been made out in respect of the alleged publication to 2 ministers in this case should therefore not be taken as an endorsement that all subsidiary proprietors can or should send all their complaints to their members of parliament or the Minister of National Development.
Were the communications actuated by malice?
- [150]
[150] The claimant submitted that the defendant had knowledge of the falsity or was reckless as to the truth of the statements made in the E-mails, based on the following:
(a) Mr Singh had already informed the defendant on 18 January 2023 that the netting installed was different from the netting referred to in the 2022 Motion;
(b) Alternatively, the defendant failed to verify on-site that the netting installed was different from that referred to in the 2022 Motion; and
(c) The defendant failed to seek legal advice, before sending the Emails, on the installation of the netting and s 29(1)(d) of the BMSMA, on Council’s decision to hold a fully virtual AGM, and/or the alleged breach of the mediation agreement or s 47 of the BMSMA ; and
(d) Additionally in relation to the 5th and 6th Emails, the defendant had already received reassurance from SP via its email of 28 September 2023 that there was no danger of stray currents in the vicinity of the substations. This email was not disclosed to the MCST and she persisted in sending the 5th and 6th Emails with the same subject title as the 3rd Email, being “Re: PLEASE RESPECT ADVISORY ON ELECTRICAL SUBSTATION AND NOT EXPOSE KIDS TO STRAY CURRENTS”.
- [151]
[151] The claimant also argued that the defendant had a dominant intention to injure the defendant, relying on:
(a) The use of strong language with some words in capital letters in the Emails;
(b) Past instances of disputes over condominium affairs;
(c) The defendant’s “overconcern” with the basketball areas, which she only raised more than 2 years after being aware of their existence;
(d) Her persistence in sending the Emails even after obtaining clarification from Mr Singh that the netting installed was different from those in the 2022 Motion and was installed for safety reasons ; and
(e) Her choice of the highest level of Singapore government executives to inflict maximum damage on the claimant, whose right to live and work in Singapore as a non-citizen depended on government approval.
- [152]
[152] The claimant has not, in my view, proven that the defendant had knowledge of the falsity or was reckless as to the truth of her statements concerning the installation of netting. Even if the netting that was installed was different from those rejected at the 2022 AGM, this would not address her concern that its installation was unlawful as it had not been authorised by a special resolution.
- [153]
[153] The defendant’s failure to seek legal advice on the Council’s alleged breaches did not make her reckless as to the truth of her statements. As noted, the threshold for establishing recklessness is a high one. A failure to independently verify information cannot amount to evidence of malice, because while it may suggest a certain amount of carelessness or imprudence, it did not by itself demonstrate a lack of honest belief, unless the context put a defendant on notice as to the truth or accuracy of the information: Gao Shuchao at [47] – [49]. There was nothing which would have put the defendant on notice that the alleged breaches could not be sustained.
- [154]
[154] I also do not find the defendant’s continued reference to the existence of “stray currents” in the subject titles of the 5th and 6th Email, despite SP’s email to the contrary, indicative of any knowledge of falsity or recklessness as to the truth. To the extent that the defendant argued that she was entitled to send the 5th and 6th Emails because the LEW’s 18 September Email stated that residents should keep clear of the substation, this cannot form a basis for her belief, at the time she sent the 5th and 6th Emails, that there were stray currents. This is because her own case was that she was not even aware of the LEW’s 18 September Email until these proceedings.
- [155]
[155] Having said that, I accept the defendant’s explanation that she simply overlooked changing the subject title as her focus was whether the location should be a play area . In any event, it was not the claimant’s case that the subject title of the 5th and 6th Emails contained any imputation defamatory of the claimant.
- [156]
[156] The claimant has also not proven that the defendant had a dominant intention to injure the claimant.
- [157]
[157] None of the 17 disagreements which the claimant said the defendant had with the Council between 2019 and 2023 when he was the Chairman/Vice-Chairman/Treasurer featured complaints directed at him. Mr Singh agreed that none of the pleaded incidents related to the claimant personally :
Date
Disputes over Costa Del Sol
My findings
1.
September 2019
The defendant was then a member of Costa Del Sol’s social sub-committee. She was unhappy with how the “Lantern Festival & Sing Along” “Costa Community Day” event was organised, particularly the decision to put up only 1 Chinese poster advertising the event. She allegedly made remarks that were deemed inappropriate.
The disagreement was between the defendant and another Council member, one Mr Karthik Avlani.
Mr Singh agreed that the defendant’s dispute was with Mr Avlani, and there was no allegation by the defendant against the entire Council or managing agent.
2.
September 2020
The defendant complained to the BCA that there were children playing in the main lobby. The defendant said that her concerns were with over non-compliance with safe management measures during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The defendant was giving feedback to the BCA about residents’ breaches of COVID-19 safe management measures, and no allegations were made against the claimant. Mr Singh agreed that no allegations were made against the Council or managing agent.
3.
Between November 2020 and December 2020
Another subsidiary proprietor had posted on Costa Del Sol’s iCondo application, taking issue with an elephant symbol hanging on a main lobby glass door. The defendant posted in support of this post, using her initials instead of her full name. The defendant and Mr Singh exchanged words over the appropriateness of the defendant’s post.
The defendant said she was merely trying to maintain secularism and religious equality in common spaces. In the defendant’s email of 18 December 2020 to Mr Singh, she said Mr Singh had “perversely contorted” her post, and accused him of seeking “to intimidate and harass [her], with the aim of suppressing [her] from providing feedback” and being “unethical”. This email was copied to then-Deputy Prime Minister Mr Heng Swee Keat.
The dispute was between the defendant and Mr Singh, and not the claimant.
4.
Between February 2021 to April 2021
The defendant made several complaints against Costa Del Sol’s security guards. Two police reports were filed by the security company against the defendant. The security company also wrote a complaint letter to Mr Singh regarding the defendant’s behaviour.
The defendant said she was merely raising valid concerns about professional standards of the security officers.
The dispute was between the defendant and the security guards in Costa Del Sol, not the claimant.
Mr Henry Fu, Director of Danmax Security Management Pte Ltd, the security company for Costa Del Sol, acknowledged that the incidents of altercation he referred to in his affidavit were only between the defendant and his security guards, and the complaints were not against the Council, managing agent, or the claimant personally.
5.
April 2021
The defendant complained to the BCA about alleged lack of transparency when she attended a Council meeting on 8 March 2021. The defendant said she had highlighted fire safety concerns in the installation of digital screens at lobbies, but this was not properly recorded.
The defendant’s allegations were not targeted at the claimant.
6.
April 2021
The defendant emailed Mr Singh to complain that “festive lights” had been put up on the trees. The defendant said she was concerned that the lights would damage the trees and there was no special resolution to approve the lights.
The defendant’s allegations were not targeted at the claimant.
Mr Singh agreed that the defendant did not single out the claimant as the person responsible.
7.
May 2021
The defendant took a picture of a child walking while bouncing a ball in the walkway and emailed Mr Singh with her complaint. She said she was concerned about safety risks.
The complaint had nothing to do with the claimant.
Mr Singh agreed that the defendant did not make any allegation against the Council or managing agent.
8.
June 2021
The defendant emailed Mr Singh to complain about the decision to reconvene physical council meetings after the Singapore government terminated the COVID-19 “Heightened Alert” phase. The defendant said she had concerns over safety and the meeting should have been held virtually as was agreed at the previous Council meeting.
The defendant’s allegations were not targeted at the claimant.
9.
June 2021
The defendant emailed Mr Singh to complain that the minutes of the 15 April 2021 Council meeting were inaccurate. In particular, she complained that there was an unfounded statement that most complaints regarding breaches of COVID-19 safe management measures were without merit, and that it made light of the complaints. Her email complaint was copied to the BCA.
The defendant’s allegations were not targeted at the claimant.
10.
June 2021
The defendant emailed Mr Singh to complain that the notice put up by the managing agent on the continued prohibition against eating and drinking in common areas amounted to misrepresentation of the government’s’ COVID-19 regulations. She informed him that she had reported the matter to the BCA. The defendant said she wanted Mr Singh to interpret government regulations accurately and fairly and pass regulations that did not exceed government regulations.
The defendant’s allegations were not targeted at the claimant.
11.
Between August 2021 to October 2021
The defendant had submitted a motion to consider and pass a resolution banning the display of religious icons/symbols on common property. This was however rejected by the Council.
The defendant then distributed flyers in residents’ mailboxes. The claimant said that she had entered the other blocks by tailgating other residents, and the purpose of her flyers was to incite subsidiary proprietors to vote and support her resolution. The defendant however said that she merely wanted to give subsidiary proprietors the full context behind her motion and how the Council had allegedly misrepresented her motion, which was merely to maintain common property as a secular and inclusive space.
The claimant had written to Mr Heng Swee Kiat and the Minister for Home Affairs on this.
The defendant’s allegations were not targeted at the claimant.
12.
November 2021
The defendant accused Mr Singh of not minuting the 2021 AGM accurately. She said that she did so because she wanted to ensure there was no misinformation about her character.
The defendant’s allegations were not targeted at the claimant.
Mr Singh agreed that the defendant did not allege that the Council had lapsed in minuting accurately.
13.
October 2022
The defendant demanded that Mr Singh send her the draft minutes of the 2022 AGM in view of the “bad track record of deliberate omissions made” in the draft minutes of the last AGM. The defendant said that she had a valid basis for this, as she believed her comments at the last AGM had not been accurately recorded.
The defendant’s allegations were not targeted at the claimant.
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