Court of Appeal · Decided 16 January 2017
Attorney-General v Ting Choon Meng and another appeal
Feedback & support[2017] SGCA 6 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 26 of 2016
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Grounds of decision
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Introduction
Background
- [2]
[2] The respondent in Civil Appeal No 26 of 2016 (“Dr Ting”), is a director of MobileStats Technologies Pte Ltd (“MobileStats”). MobileStats was the owner of Singapore Patent No 113446 (“the Patent”), which was registered sometime in 2005. The respondents in Civil Appeal No 27 of 2016 (“CA 27/2016”) are affiliated with “The Online Citizen”, a website that states that it aims to be the “leading online source for social-political news and views in Singapore”.
- [3]
[3] On 29 July 2011, lawyers for MobileStats wrote to the Ministry of Defence (“MINDEF”), alleging that military medical vehicles known as “Battalion Casualty Stations” that MINDEF had purchased from Syntech Engineers Pte Ltd (“Syntech”) infringed the Patent. Notwithstanding MINDEF’s invitation that MobileStats direct its complaints towards Syntech, MobileStats proceeded with Suit No 619 of 2011 (“S 619/2011”) against MINDEF for patent infringement. MINDEF’s defence was conducted by Syntech, who instituted a counterclaim for the revocation of the Patent on the ground of invalidity. As it turned out, S 619/2011 was discontinued mid-way through the trial due to the financial position of MobileStats, and judgment was entered on the counterclaim on 15 January 2014.
- [4]
[4] On 30 December 2014, Dr Ting gave an interview to the first respondent in CA 27/2016. The video of the interview and an accompanying article were uploaded on The Online Citizen on 15 January 2015. In the video, Dr Ting made a number of allegations against MINDEF, including the following: (a) that it had intended from the start to infringe the Patent and had been waiting in a “premeditated” way to revoke the Patent; and (b) that it had been conducting a “war of attrition” in S 619/2011 to deplete MobileStats’ financial resources (collectively, “the Allegations”). MINDEF responded by way of a statement posted on its Facebook page refuting the Allegations, which it said were “false and baseless”. This last-mentioned statement was reproduced in full in a subsequent article published on The Online Citizen, and a link to the same was provided on the webpage hosting the original article and the video.
The decisions in the courts below
- [6]
[6] The District Judge granted the orders in terms, holding that ss 3 and 36 of the Government Proceedings Act (Cap 121, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the GPA”) provided the Government the “legal right to make an application” under s 15: see Attorney-General v Lee Kwai Hou Howard and others [2015] SGDC 114 at [35]. He found the Allegations to be false and that it was just and equitable to grant the orders for two reasons: (a) that the Allegations would “severely undermine public confidence in the Government and in the public institutions” if left unchecked, and (b) that they constituted a collateral attack on the judgment rendered in S 619/2011 (at [84]–[85]).
The respective parties’ arguments in the appeals
- [10]
[10] The respondents do not contest the submission that the accusation that MINDEF had waged a “war of attrition” is a false statement of fact. They largely rely on the reasons given by the Judge and the speeches given during the parliamentary debates. Additionally, Dr Ting submits that to read “person” in s 15 in a manner to include the Government would infringe upon his right to free speech under Art 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) (“the Constitution”). In a slightly different vein, the respondents in CA 27/2016 submit that because to construe “person” in s 15 in the aforementioned manner would impose a significant burden on an individual’s right to free speech, the appellant must adduce “cogent and unusually convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that Parliament did not … intend to impose [such] a significant burden”.
Our decision
Issue 1 – whether the Government is a “person” under s 15
The issue stated
- [11]
[11] This particular issue is of the first – as well as threshold – importance in so far as the present appeal is concerned. At risk of belying the many difficulties of statutory interpretation that were evident from both the written submissions as well as oral arguments before this court, the issue that arises from s 15 can be stated simply as follows: does this provision apply only to human beings or does it also apply to other entities (such as corporations and (as was argued by the appellant in the present case) the Government)? Before proceeding to examine the issue at length, we should state that, like the Judge, we do not accept the arguments made by the appellant that centred on ss 3 and 36 of the GPA. The provisions read as follows:
- [12]
[12] The appellant refers us to the decision of the majority in Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor v Chong Chieng Jen [2016] 3 MLJ 41 (“Chong Chieng Jen”), which involved a defamation suit commenced by the State Government of Sarawak and the state’s financial authority against an individual. The majority of the Malaysian Court of Appeal held (at [23]) that s 3 of the Malaysian Government Proceedings Act 1956 (Act 359) (Revised 1988), which is in pari materia with s 3 of the GPA, gives the government “the same right as a private individual to enforce a claim … by way of civil action” [emphasis added]. The majority of the court were persuaded by the absence of any equivalent provision in Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (c 44) (UK) (“the CPA”), which was referred to during the Second Reading of the Malaysian Government Proceedings Bill 1956. However, that, with respect, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that s 3 of the GPA was enacted to confer upon the Government the right to invoke any statutory provision. Rather, the provision is merely “a general piece of legislation to cloth [sic] the government the legal status to sue”: see Chong Chieng Jen at [109].
- [13]
[13] In so far as s 36 of the GPA is concerned, we do not find the English Court of Appeal decision of Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1976] 1 WLR 1126 to be of much assistance. An issue that arose in the case was whether the Crown could take advantage of counter-inflation legislation to limit the rent that could be charged for sub-leases that it had purportedly entered into. Lawton LJ found that it could by way of s 31(1) of the CPA (which is in pari materia with s 36 of the GPA), consistent with the centuries-old belief that “the Crown can take the benefit of any statute although not specifically named in it” (at 1142). However, s 36 of the GPA does not specify if “to take advantage” of a provision extends to possessing a right under any statutory cause of action unless otherwise specified, and it is noteworthy that it only contemplates civil proceedings against the Government.
- [14]
[14] We therefore agree wholly with the Judge’s holding at [25] of the Judgment that ss 3 and 36 of the GPA provide only that the Government may enforce its rights by commencing legal action; these provisions say nothing as to whether the rights in question exist in the first place. This anterior question must be answered within the context of the Act itself.
On text and context
- [15]
[15] At this juncture (and in fairness to the appellant), it would appear to be the case that, read alone, s 15 would appear to be broad enough to encompass entities such as the Government. Section 15 reads as follows:
- [16]
[16] Support for this particular interpretation includes the reference to “the subject” of the alleged false statement(s) – as opposed to the reference to a “victim” pursuant to ss 3 to 7 of the Act. There is also some (apparent) support in the language of the long title to the Act itself, which reads as follows:
- [17]
[17] However, the approach just described looks only at the text. It is, in our view, also as (if not more) important to look at the context in which s 15 was promulgated. This is particularly important for at least three reasons:
(a) First, s 15 appears to be a uniquely Singaporean legal innovation inasmuch as it does not appear to have any legal counterpart in other jurisdictions.
(b) Second, s 15 appears to be the only provision in the entire Act that could potentially apply to entities other than human beings.
(c) Third, merely looking at the text of s 15 shorn of (and in isolation from) its context will result in a distortion of what, in our view, was the actual Parliamentary intention behind the promulgation of this particular provision.
- [18]
[18] In so far as the third of these reasons (above at [17(c)]) is concerned, it is trite to state that one has to ascertain what the Parliamentary intention underlying s 15 was at the time when it was promulgated. This (in turn) entails an analysis of not only the actual language of s 15 itself but also all relevant materials surrounding the actual promulgation of s 15 (including the relevant parliamentary debates). The legislative intent to be discerned is that at or around the time the law is passed: see the High Court decision of BFC v Comptroller of Income Tax [2013] 4 SLR 741 at [46]. It is also well-established that s 9A of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) (“the IA”) mandates that the purposive approach be preferred over all other statutory interpretation approaches, and there is no requirement that a provision be ambiguous or inconsistent before a purposive approach can be taken: see the Singapore High Court decision of Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 (“Low Kok Heng”) at [41] and [43]. In this particular regard, it is clear that both the text and context of s 15 are of the first importance. Put simply, what appears to be a broad purpose that results from a reading of only the text of s 15 disappears and gives way to the actual Parliamentary intention once regard is also had to the context in which that provision was promulgated. It is this integration of text and context that is of the first importance in interpreting s 15 – and which is also the approach the Judge adopted in the court below (see the Judgment at [32]).
- [19]
[19] With these important preliminary observations in mind, we now turn to the interpretation of s 15 proper.
Section 15 and the interaction of text and context
- [20]
[20] We refer first to the observations by the Minister of Law, Mr K Shanmugam (“the Minister”) that are directly related to s 15 itself. At this juncture, we pause to note that, whilst s 9A of the IA is salutary in permitting the Singapore courts to look at the relevant Parliamentary material, wisdom must be exercised when referring to such material. It is, in our view, a useful rule of thumb to pay special attention not only to the Minister who actually moves the Bill concerned in Parliament but also (and in particular) to that part of his speech which relates directly to the clause(s) that are sought to be interpreted. Returning to the present appeal, it is useful – in light of the ambiguity in the term “person” in s 15 – to set out the Minister’s observations during the Second Reading of the Protection from Harassment Bill (No 12 of 2014) (“the Bill”) in full, as follows (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (13 March 2014) vol 91 (Mr K Shanmugam, Minister for Law)):
- [21]
[21] In our view, the following observations can be made with respect to the Minister’s speech quoted above.
- [22]
[22] It is clear that the Minister’s focus was solely on human beings (as opposed to other entities) – as evidenced by the references (on no fewer than five occasions in his speech) to “victims” as well as by the references (again, on no fewer than five occasions in his speech) to “harassment” (excluding the references to “borderline harassment” and “nearly harassment”). Whilst this does not – at least literally – of itself rule out the fact that other entities were definitely excluded from the scope of s 15 itself, it is curious that there is no reference whatsoever to such other entities. More importantly, the detailed speech by the Minister points, in our view, to a more general and universal rationale that undergirds s 15 – that s 15 was intended by Parliament to confer upon human beings (only) an additional (albeit somewhat different) remedy that was unique to Singapore in general and the Act in particular. In the Minister’s own words, this (additional) remedy was unique and different inasmuch as it was in the nature of a kind of “quasi” self-help remedy. We use the term “quasi” because it is not a self-help remedy in its purest form (for example, where an innocent party can elect to discharge himself from a contract in the event of a serious breach that justifies such an election without more) – an application must still be made to the court. However, it does partake of the nature of self-help in so far as an application pursuant to s 15 is a lower-tier remedy that is unique in at least two ways (see also the Judgment at [32], [38], [40] and [58], which, in fact, refer to the very same terminology (“lower tier remedy”) utilised by the Minister himself in his speech (see above at [20])).
- [23]
[23] The first is that, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant might be a victim pursuant to ss 3 to 7 of the Act and who could therefore avail himself or herself of the other remedies set out in Pt III of the Act (which is entitled “Remedies”), he or she might nevertheless choose not to escalate the matter at hand and opt for the less drastic remedy under s 15 instead. Such an applicant would – technically – be more appropriately termed a “victim” instead of a “subject” (the latter of which is the terminology utilised in s 15) and whom we would term a “s 15 Applicant by Choice” (this is especially evident throughout the paragraphs that we have labelled [a], [b], [c] and [e] in the Minister’s speech quoted above at [20]). However, it is important, in our view, to note that such a “victim” would nevertheless fall within the category of a “subject” simply because the latter is the more general genus of which the former is a species. But, it may be asked, why, then, did the Singapore Parliament utilise the word “subject” in s 15? In particular, would this not support the appellant’s contention in the present appeal to the effect that a broader category of persons was intended to be encompassed within s 15 as well? The short answer is that it does, but that says nothing about whether the broader category of persons includes the Government. It is important to note what the original Parliamentary intention was. To reiterate, it was to confer upon human beings (only) an additional (albeit somewhat different) remedy that was unique to Singapore in general and the Act in particular. And this leads us to a second (and quite different) category of human beings that s 15 was intended to encompass.
- [24]
[24] This second (and quite different) category of human beings comprises applicants who would not necessarily be “victims” within the meaning of ss 3 to 7 of the Act. As the Minister himself pointed out in his speech in Parliament (see above at [20]), an applicant may suffer from false statements that, however, fall short of actually resulting in him or her being a “victim” within the meaning of ss 3 to 7 of the Act. Such situations could include – in the Minister’s own words – situations of “borderline harassment”, or where there is “nearly harassment”, or where there is no harassment but a “clear falsehood”. And it is – again, in the Minister’s own words – such situations in relation to which the Singapore Parliament also sought to grant the applicant a remedy to (see the paragraph labelled [c] in the Minister’s speech quoted above at [20]). Whilst not, strictly speaking, an additional remedy to that available to an applicant who is not a “victim” within the meaning of ss 3 to 7 of the Act, it is – in a manner of speaking – an “additional” remedy inasmuch as the applicant concerned would otherwise have no remedy at all (and whom, in contrast to a “s 15 Applicant by Choice”, we would term a “s 15 Applicant Without Choice”). Looked at in this light it is – as in the category briefly considered in the preceding paragraph – a category of applicants who are, likewise, afforded an additional (albeit somewhat different) remedy that is unique to Singapore in general and the Act in particular.
- [25]
[25] At this juncture, it is of the first importance to note that it is precisely because the last-mentioned (second) category of applicants are not “victims” within the meaning of ss 3 to 7 of the Act that s 15 could not, first, refer to ss 3 to 7 of the Act (lest one of the raisons d’être of the provision itself be defeated, viz, to encompass this particular category of applicants as well) and, second, could not utilise the terminology of “victim” and had to utilise the terminology of “subject” instead (thus encompassing this particular category of applicants as well). Indeed, as we have already noted earlier (at [23]), the terminology of “subject” is broader than that of “victim” and would, hence, include both victims (ie, “s 15 Applicants by Choice”) as well as other applicants who (whilst not victims) had suffered from false statements (ie, “s 15 Applicants Without Choice”).
- [27]
[27] The interpretation we have adopted is, in fact, also buttressed by the Minister himself in the paragraph labelled [e] in the Minister’s speech (quoted above at [20]), and which is reproduced again, as follows:
- [28]
[28] These observations refer clearly to applicants who are human beings (in particular, what we have termed a s 15 Applicant by Choice).
What about arguments in the appellant’s favour?
- [29]
[29] However, in fairness to the appellant, this is not an end to the matter. Could it not be argued, on the appellant’s behalf, that there was nevertheless an intention by the Singapore Parliament to also extend the benefit of s 15 to entities other than human beings as well? In particular, counsel for the appellant, Mr Hui Choon Kuen (“Mr Hui”), referred to the following observation by the Minister during the Second Reading of the Bill in response to a question from Mr Pritam Singh and which we have designated in bold italics (to furnish the necessary context with regard to the analysis that follows) in the quotation below (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (13 March 2014) vol 91 (Mr K Shanmugam, Minister for Law)):
- [31]
[31] It is significant, in our view, that the Minister’s reply was an isolated (and, with respect, generic) observation that is sandwiched, so to speak, between a couple of responses to other questions that were asked earlier during the parliamentary debates. More importantly, it is apparent that the observation by the Minister in reply to Mr Pritam Singh and which was reproduced in bold italics at [29] does not (unlike the earlier observations quoted in full above at [20]) refer to s 15 at all. This poses considerable difficulty for the appellant, who does not dispute the Judge’s starting premise that “there are other provisions of the Act in which it would not be sensible to include the Government within the meaning of the word ‘person’” (see the Judgment at [33]). Put simply, the Minister could not have meant that every reference to a “person” must necessarily include “any company or association or body of persons, corporate or unincorporated”. Indeed, s 2 of the IA itself does not assign the meanings defined therein where “there is something in the subject or context inconsistent with such construction”. In the circumstances, the Minister’s reply is, at best, neutral and therefore does not advance the appellant’s case.
- [33]
[33] Finally (again, in fairness to the appellant), there is – as alluded to earlier in our judgment – a reference by Mr Hui to the long title to the Act (quoted above at [16]) which, because of its importance to the appellant’s argument, we set out again, as follows:
- [34]
[34] As a matter of general principle, it is important to bear in mind the following observations by Chao Hick Tin J (as he then was) in the Singapore High Court decision of Chief Assessor and another v Van Ommeren Terminal (S) Pte Ltd [1993] 2 SLR(R) 354 at [21]−[22]:
- [35]
[35] Apart from the fact that the long title of a statute is generally of limited value in statutory interpretation, it seems to us that the long title in the Act in the present case is, at best, neutral. Although it is true that the literal language of the long title may support the appellant’s case, it is equally true, however, that the phrase in it, “or in relation to false statements of facts” is not inconsistent with the Parliamentary intention (noted above) to furnish victims of harassment and unlawful stalking and subjects of falsehoods that do not constitute harassment with the additional and/or alternative remedy of a correction of the false statements of fact.
- [36]
[36] In summary, there is little – or no – evidence in favour of the appellant’s submission as compared to the evidence in favour of the respondents’ submission. Indeed, interpreting s 15 in the manner set out above is, in our view, consistent with the entire scheme and structure of the Act (which would apply throughout only to the individual (and human) victims of harassment as well as unlawful stalking. On the other hand, interpreting s 15 in the contrary manner, as argued for by the appellant, would lead to the insertion of a right on behalf of entities (other than human beings) that would sit incongruously (and be out of sync) with the other provisions of the Act, especially when the Act is viewed as an integrated as well as holistic whole. As already emphasised, the fact that at no time was there any discussion with regard to the rights of entities (other than human beings) pursuant to s 15 is itself telling. We say this because the extension of such a general right (as was argued for by the appellant) would necessarily entail a myriad of possible scenarios (and, more importantly, the accompanying policy issues, if nothing else, because there are so many possible organisations (both governmental and non-governmental and large as well as small) as well as possible scenarios (for example, as between organisations and individuals or as between organisations themselves) that would have merited more discussion as well as elaboration (which might even have led to the tweaking of s 15 or additional provisions or even new legislation)). At this juncture, all that can be confidently said with regard to s 15 is – as the Judge himself correctly pointed out at [44] of the Judgment – that (given the myriad possibilities of factual scenarios) one cannot rule out the fact that recourse to s 15 might be possible even in situations where false statements are directed against entities other than human beings. As the Judge illustrated saliently, “an allegation ostensibly aimed at a corporate body might be, in substance, an allegation against human beings who manage that corporate body” and, if so, “it is open to those human beings to seek redress under s 15” (see ibid; emphasis added).
Conclusion
Issue 2 – when is it “just and equitable” to grant a s 15 order?
(a) the nature of the false statement and the seriousness of the allegation made;
(b) the purpose of the false statement, for example, whether it is said in jest or for the purposes of satire;
(c) the impact of the statement on the subject and the degree of adverse emotional or psychological harm suffered;
(d) the degree to which the false statement has been publicised to the public;
(e) whether the subject has the means to publicise his or her own version of the truth (and on a channel that is accessible to the readers of the false statement);
(f) whether the author and/or publisher of the statement has made genuine efforts to point out that the veracity of the statement is not undisputed; and
(g) the ordinary instances of daily living that may be expected to be tolerated by reasonable persons.
- [45]
[45] As the Judge held, such efforts to present the different sides of the story should be encouraged. Additionally, MINDEF was anything but a helpless victim. It is a government agency possessed of significant resources and access to media channels. In the present case, MINDEF was able to put across its side of the story through traditional media as well as on its Facebook page. The Online Citizen had, in fact, published MINDEF’s statement in full and provided a link to it from the offending article. Given all this, it is difficult to see what discernible impact the Allegations and The Online Citizen’s publication of the Allegations could have had on MINDEF’s reputation or public image.
Conclusion
Sundaresh Menon CJ (dissenting):
Introduction
- [50]
[50] The present appeal turns on the meaning of s 15. The Act was passed recently and this is the first occasion an issue pertaining to its proper interpretation has come before us. In general, it is common ground that the Act is directed at conduct that amounts to harassment or illegal stalking of a sort that engenders emotions of fear, alarm or distress. Because of this, it is also common ground, that in general, the Act confers the benefit of the prescribed remedies on those who are natural persons and therefore capable of experiencing emotions. The question to be answered in this case is whether this general position extends also to s 15, which appears, on its face, to prescribe an independent standalone remedy that can be invoked even in the absence of conduct which amounts to harassment where the falsity of a statement can be proved. Flowing from this, the specific question that arises is whether s 15 may be invoked by a non-natural legal person such as the Government or whether it only avails a natural person.
The judgment below
- [51]
[51] The Judge held, in essence, that s 15 was part of a continuum of remedies targeted at the social problem of harassment and associated disruptive and anti-social behaviour. This continuum extends from the higher tier of remedies comprising criminal penalties and separate civil remedies for such conduct to the lower-tiered remedy in s 15 that fell short either of seeking criminal punishment or civil remedies such as damages. In this vein, he considered s 15 (and thereby its purpose and object) to be part of “a holistic or harmonious whole” that included the other provisions of the Act, even if s 15 strictly did not concern harassment (at [38] of the Judgment). Given that the purpose and object of the other provisions was to protect persons from the detrimental emotional or psychological impact of the words or deeds of other persons, having regard to the place of s 15 in the “tiered” scheme created by the Act, the rationale behind s 15 was understood as being for the protection of persons from the similar detrimental emotional or psychological impact that flowed from false statements (at [40] of the Judgment). Following from this, the Judge held that the scope of s 15 was confined to false statements that were capable of affecting their intended subject emotionally or psychologically, which presupposed that the subject was a natural person who could experience these emotions (at [41] of the Judgment). He therefore dismissed the appellant’s claim.
My decision
How should the purposive approach to statutory interpretation be utilised?
- [52]
[52] Before turning to the text of s 15, the structure of the Act and the task of construing the relevant provisions, I consider it helpful, first, to make some observations about the nature of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. This is, after all, central to the construction of s 15. From the time that s 9A of the IA was introduced into our law in 1993, the purposive approach has been consistently regarded as an approach which is “paramount”, taking precedence over any other common law principle of or approach to statutory interpretation including, among others, the plain meaning rule: see for instance Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [18] in which we affirmed the pronouncement of V K Rajah JA to this effect in Low Kok Heng at [57]. This much is uncontroversial. In fact, this view has gained such widespread acceptance that some years after the enactment of s 9A, we described as “trite” the proposition that a court should give effect to the legislative purpose when interpreting an Act of Parliament (Donald McArthy Trading Pte Ltd v Pankaj s/o Dhirajlal (trading as TopBottom Impex) [2007] 2 SLR 321 at [6]).
- [53]
[53] But the methodology underlying the purposive approach tends to be less straightforward. The purposive approach as encapsulated in s 9A of the IA directs the court to prefer a construction that advances the objects and purposes underlying a written law over one that does not. It also allows recourse to extraneous materials, meaning material other than the written law in question, to construe the text that is in issue. But although s 9A expressly allows the consideration of extraneous material, a close reading of the text of s 9A reveals that the purposive approach does not automatically or necessarily require the consideration of any material that does not form part of the legislation in question. In fact, in s 9A(2)(a) and (b), the IA expressly prescribes three situations in which the court may consider extraneous material to interpret a statute. In my judgment, it is a matter of importance that the court should be satisfied that the circumstances relating to the interpretation of the statutory text in question do in fact bring the matter within either s 9A(2)(a) or (b) before it has recourse to any extraneous material, including the record of the parliamentary debates.
- [54]
[54] Before developing this analysis, I set out parts of s 9A of the IA, with appropriate emphases, as follows:
- [55]
[55] The scheme of s 9A of the IA can be understood by reference to how it deals with these issues:
(a) the meaning of the purposive approach to interpretation, which is dealt with in s 9A(1);
(b) how and when extraneous material may be used to ascertain the meaning of the provision that is being interpreted, which is dealt with in s 9A(2);
(c) the types of extraneous materials that may be considered, which is dealt with, albeit not in exhaustive terms, in s 9A(3); and
(d) the considerations that guide the weight to be placed on extraneous materials, which is dealt with in s 9A(4).
- [56]
[56] In my judgment, it follows from this scheme of s 9A that:
(a) the purposive approach shall be applied by the courts;
(b) this can in certain circumstances, but need not in every case, entail the use of extraneous material to help the court ascertain the meaning of the provision that is being interpreted;
(c) whether recourse is to be had to extraneous material depends on what is provided in s 9A(1) read with s 9A(2); and
(d) even if recourse may be had to such material, the court should separately consider what weight is to be given to it.
I therefore set out my further analysis according to these points.
The purposive approach understood and applied
- [58]
[58] Section 9A(1) of the IA therefore comes into play principally where different approaches to statutory interpretation lead to divergent results; and it has rather more limited utility and effect where the purposive and literal interpretations of a statutory provision are coincident with each other. The application of the purposive approach, more importantly, does not allow the court to construe the provision in a manner that would do violence to the express wording; instead, it should generally be used to construe the provision “in harmony” with the express wording. The cautionary note against rewriting an Act in the name of the purposive approach has in fact been observed on many an occasion (see eg, Mills v Meeking (1990) 91 ALR 16 per Dawson J).
- [59]
[59] It follows from this that the court’s task when undertaking a purposive interpretation of a legislative text should begin with three steps:
(a) first, ascertaining the possible interpretations of the text, as it has been enacted. This however should never be done by examining the provision in question in isolation. Rather, it should be undertaken having due regard to the context of that text within the written law as a whole;
(b) second, ascertaining the legislative purpose or object of the statute. This may be discerned from the language used in the enactment; but as I demonstrate below, it can also be discerned by resorting to extraneous material in certain circumstances. In this regard, the court should principally consider the general legislative purpose of the enactment by reference to any mischief that Parliament was seeking to address by it. In addition, the court should be mindful of the possibility that the specific provision that is being interpreted may have been enacted by reason of some specific mischief or object that may be distinct from, but not inconsistent with, the general legislative purpose underlying the written law as a whole. I elaborate on this in the following two paragraphs; and
(c) third, comparing the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute. Where the purpose of the provision in question as discerned from the language used in the enactment clearly supports one interpretation, reference to extraneous materials may be had for a limited function – to confirm but not to alter the ordinary meaning of the provision as purposively ascertained; but I elaborate on this in the following section.
- [60]
[60] I now elaborate on the approach the court should take in determining the general legislative purpose or object of the statute. This is a point of some importance because if it is not carefully applied, the articulation of the object at either too high or too low level of generality can result in the court describing the objects or purposes in whatever terms would support the interpretation that it prefers. There is also a question as to whether this is best considered by reference to the purpose and object of the statute as a whole or of the specific provision. In this regard, there may be some ambiguity in the words of s 9A of the IA given that s 9A(1) refers to the purpose or object underlying the “written law”, which would refer to the statute in general, while ss 9A(2) and (3) refer to the search for the meaning of the “provision of the written law” [emphasis added]. The courts have often treated the two as interchangeable – a point made in Goh Yihan, “Statutory Interpretation in Singapore: 15 Years on from Legislative Reform” (2009) 21 SAcLJ 97 (“Statutory Interpretation in Singapore”) at p 129 – and indeed, one imagines that it would be rare to find a specific purpose which contradicts or opposes the general purpose behind the Act.
- [61]
[61] However, even if the purpose underlying a specific provision does not go against the grain of Parliamentary intent in enacting the statute as a whole, that purpose behind a particular provision may yet be distinct from the general purpose underlying the statute as a whole, even if it might be related to or complementary with that purpose. The specific purpose behind a particular provision should therefore be separately considered in appropriate cases. This coheres with the recent trend in our case law which suggests, as observed by Assoc Prof Goh in Statutory Interpretation in Singapore at p 117, that, in fact, we tend to focus on the purpose behind particular statutory provisions. Given that different sections of a particular statute may target different mischiefs and that Parliament may even use the same word to mean different things (see eg, Madras Electric Supply Corporation Ld v Boarland (Inspector of Taxes) [1955] AC 667 (“Madras Electric”)), this approach seems sensible. As described by the Federal Court of Australia in Evans v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 276 at [16], “[u]nder the umbrella of the general object is a multitude of objects of specific provisions” and to that extent, the general object may at times cast little, if any, light on the meaning of specific provisions. It should therefore not be assumed that the specific purpose of a particular provision does not need to be separately considered to ascertain the legislative intent.
The use of extraneous material
- [62]
[62] As I have already observed, s 9A(1) of the IA helps us to understand the paramount importance of interpreting statutory provisions by reference to the legislative intent. But it says nothing about the use of extraneous material even though this is often regarded as the most innovative aspect of s 9A. When s 9A was introduced in Parliament and the Bill was read a second time, the then-Minister for Law, Prof S Jayakumar, in fact specifically stated that the purpose of the amendment was as follows (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (26 February 1993) vol 60 at col 516 (Prof S Jayakumar, Minister for Law)):
Section 9A should therefore be understood as a permissive or enabling provision which allows the courts to refer to extraneous materials subject to certain conditions (Low Kok Heng at [48]). The conditions which govern when extraneous material can be referred to are dealt with in s 9A(2), (3) and (4) which in broad terms address the matters I have outlined at [55(b)]–[55(d)] above. I begin with s 9A(2).
- [63]
[63] The first point to note in s 9A(2) of the IA is what is meant by what I have hitherto referred to as extraneous material. This is not the terminology used in the Act but it serves to capture in essence what the Act does contemplate; and that is “any material not forming part of the written law [and] is capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision”. Hence, in the endeavour to ascertain the meaning of the text contained within a statute, the court is permitted to consider any material that is not included as part of the statute. Section 9A(3) does expand on this by setting out, on a non-exhaustive basis, examples of such extraneous material. On its face, the potential range of such material is unlimited. However, in my judgment, it is limited at least by reference to the purpose for which such material may be resorted to. Section 9A(2) states that it is material which is capable of helping to ascertain the meaning of the provision. This too is broad. Nevertheless, reading s 9A(2) in context with s 9A(1), such extraneous material may be resorted to where it is capable of helping to ascertain the meaning of the provision by shedding light on the objects and purposes of the statute as a whole, and where applicable, on the objects and purposes of the particular provision in question.
- [64]
[64] I take this view for two related reasons. First, any other interpretation would have courts, and perhaps more importantly, others who need to know what the law means, floundering in a sea of material which may be completely irrelevant to the task at hand. Indeed, one can imagine that some such extraneous material may well be inconsistent with other such material thus exacerbating the problem. Second, Parliament has expressed its will in the form of the statute it has enacted. It is only to overcome the imperfect ability of language and the limitations of the draftsman’s mind that provision is made by way of s 9A to help the court give effect to what Parliament intended to achieve and this inevitably draws us back to the objects and purposes underlying the enactment. I also note in passing that this approach is in fact consistent with the Minister’s statement at the second reading of the Bill to introduce s 9A of the IA, which I have referred to at [62] above.
- [65]
[65] Returning to s 9A(2) of the IA, the rest of that section sets out the specific ways in which and reasons for which such extraneous material may be applied. In my judgment, there are three situations in which this can be done and they each begin with a determination of the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision in question understood in the context of the written law as a whole. This context is of critical importance because it will often afford the best guide to the objects and purposes of the enactment. This is the first of the three steps I have identified at [59] (see sub-paragraph [59(a)]) above. Having identified the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text in this context, consideration may then be had to extraneous material, subject to s 9A(4) and subject to such material being of assistance in ascertaining the meaning of the provision, in the following three situations:
(a) under s 9A(2)(a), to confirm that the ordinary meaning deduced as aforesaid is, after all the correct and intended meaning having regard to any extraneous material that further elucidates the purpose or object of the written law;
(b) under s 9A(2)(b)(i), to ascertain the meaning of the text in question when the provision on its face is ambiguous or obscure; and
(c) under s 9A(2)(b)(ii), to ascertain the meaning of the text in question where having deduced the ordinary meaning of the text as aforesaid, and considering the underlying object and purpose of the written law, such ordinary meaning is absurd or unreasonable.
- [66]
[66] In my judgment, what follows from this, as I have already foreshadowed, is that the meaning of the text in question should first be derived from its context, namely the written law as a whole, which would often give sufficient indication of the objects and purposes of the written law and even of the specific provision. This should first be done without relying on extraneous materials. It is only after the court has determined the ordinary meaning of the provision in this way that it can then evaluate whether recourse to the extraneous materials for either the confirmatory or clarificatory functions can be had, and this will usually be because it proves to be impossible to discern, without such extraneous materials, the precise objects and purposes of the enactment.
- [67]
[67] At first blush, it might seem as though this is an implicit return to the literal approach of the past but such a view both ignores the text of s 9A of the IA and overlooks the nuances of what I believe that text directs us to do. The text itself has already been explained. As to the inquiry that the court is undertaking before turning to extraneous materials, this is not limited to interpreting the text of the provision alone, but also takes into account the statutory context of the particular provision and also the purpose and object underlying the provision and the statute to the extent this can be discerned from the written law as a whole. In this regard, it has in fact been observed that on balance, more decisions probably appear to accept that the purpose and object of a statute can be found within the statute itself, often from examining the statutory provision concerned in the context of its surrounding provisions: Statutory Interpretation in Singapore at p 121. One example of this can be found in Comptroller of Income Tax v GE Pacific Pte Ltd [1994] 2 SLR(R) 948 where we ascertained Parliament’s intention in relation to capital allowances by looking at other provisions within the same statute. Extraneous materials that go outside the statute are one of the tools that may be employed to determine Parliamentary intent, and such recourse can be very useful but this is by no means essential in every case for the purpose of ascertaining Parliamentary intent.
- [68]
[68] There is a further point of difference from the literal approach. Because extraneous materials can be considered either to confirm or to help ascertain the meaning of a provision, there is no requirement for any ambiguity or absurdity to be found before recourse may be had to such materials (Planmarine AG v Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore [1999] 1 SLR(R) 669 at [22]). The Minister’s speech at the second reading of the Interpretation (Amendment) Bill which introduced s 9A of the IA (at [62]) should not be read to exclude the confirmatory role that extraneous materials can play even where the ordinary meaning is clear because to do so would defeat the express wording of s 9A(2)(a).
- [69]
[69] Nonetheless, I consider it important that the analytical process I have outlined above is followed. Where there is ambiguity or absurdity or even unreasonableness in the interpretation that follows upon the consideration of the text in context, as I have outlined, the use of extraneous materials may enable the court to ascertain the meaning of the provision and it may then select a meaning that would not ordinarily be borne out by the text of the provision. This is potentially a far-reaching power and it gives cause for pause since that text was chosen by Parliament. Therefore, strict adherence to the framework prescribed in s 9A as a whole is necessary to resolve the tension inherent in trying to bridge Parliament’s intention with the words with which it has chosen to articulate that intention.
What weight should be placed on permitted extraneous material?
- [70]
[70] Having considered the meaning and use of extraneous material, I return to s 9A(4) of the IA which draws a distinction between the court’s determination of whether consideration should be given to any extraneous material and the weight that it chooses to give to such material. This consideration is guided by reference to two factors. The first relates to the need to avoid prolonging legal proceedings without compensating advantage. The second is the desirability of persons being able to rely on the ordinary meaning of the text in its statutory context and purpose apart from extraneous materials, to understand Parliament’s enactments. In this regard, two further points may be noted:
(a) In relation to statements made in Parliament in particular, it has been observed in several decisions of the English courts that these must be “clear and unequivocal” to be of any real use: Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex parte Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349 (“Spath Holme”) at 398. See also, for example, R v Warner [1969] 2 AC 256 at 279e. The danger lies in the likelihood of the court being drawn into comparing one Parliamentary statement with another, appraising the meaning and effect of what was said and then considering what was left unsaid and why (per Lord Bingham of Cornhill at 392 of Spath Holme). In the process, it can begin to appear as if the court is being asked to construe the statements made by Parliamentarians rather than the Parliamentary enactment. In line with this, and in my judgment, more importantly, a requirement recognised by the English courts is that the statement in question must “disclose the mischief aimed at [by the enactment] or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words” (Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 at 634). Lord Browne-Wilkinson has further re-stated this in terms of a requirement that the statement should be “directed to the very point in question in the litigation” because to do otherwise would “involve the interpretation of the ministerial statement in question” (Melluish (Inspector of Taxes) v BMI (No 3) Ltd [1995] 4 All ER 453 at 468).
(b) While I recognise that these observations were made in the context of the admissibility of extraneous material, an issue we do not have to contend with given the enactment of s 9A, I do consider that the concerns that underlie them are valid and that they should be considered at least when determining the weight to be placed on the relevant extraneous material.
- [71]
[71] To summarise, I regard the following principles to be relevant in using the purposive approach in statutory interpretation:
(a) The purposive interpretation of a statutory provision must be preferred to a literal interpretation that does not advance the underlying general or specific purpose or object of the enactment.
(b) The general object underlying the statute as a whole may be distinct from and hence, at times, might cast little light on the object of a given specific provision. This should therefore be separately considered in appropriate cases.
(c) A purposive interpretation simply requires one to approach the literal wording of a statutory provision bearing in mind the underlying purpose of that provision as reflected by and generally in harmony with the express wording of the legislation. It may therefore be coincident with a literal interpretation of the provision if the draftsman is successful in expressing Parliamentary intent through the express words chosen.
(d) The court may resort to extraneous material where this helps with the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision by shedding light on the objects and purpose of the statute as a whole, and where applicable, on the objects and purposes of the particular provision in question.
(e) Extraneous material can be used only in three specific ways: (1) to confirm the ordinary meaning deduced by the text of the provision and the context of the written law; (2) to ascertain the meaning of the text when the provision is ambiguous or obscure; or (3) to ascertain the meaning of the text where the ordinary meaning is absurd or unreasonable.
(f) The court must first determine the ordinary meaning of the provision in its context, namely the written law as a whole, which would often give sufficient indication of the objects and purposes of the written law, before evaluating whether recourse to the extraneous materials for either the confirmatory or clarificatory functions can be had.
(g) The court should bear in mind – both in determining whether consideration should be given to extraneous material and in determining the weight to be accorded to such material – the need to avoid prolonging legal proceedings without compensating advantage, and the desirability of persons being able to rely on the ordinary meaning of the text in its statutory context and purpose apart from extraneous materials, to understand Parliament’s enactments.
(h) In determining the weight to be placed on extraneous material, the court should further have regard to the clarity of the material and whether the statement is directed to the very point in dispute between the parties.
Against that backdrop of what I regard to be the relevant principles relating to the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, I now turn to the specific provision in dispute in the present case in its statutory context.
Whether the Government can invoke s 15 in relation to a false statement
Interpretation and analysis of s 15
- [72]
[72] Section 15 provides as follows:
The ordinary meaning of the text of the provision
- [73]
[73] The ordinary meaning of the text of s 15 as enacted is significant. The text refers to any falsehood which is made about “any person”. To ascertain the ordinary meaning of “person”, the first port of call should be s 2 of the IA, which contains a list of words and expressions and their respective interpretations. That provides that “person” “include[s] any company or association or body of persons, corporate or unincorporated” [emphasis added]. It does not seem to have been contentious that this could notionally include the Government. The plain and ordinary meaning of the text of the provision, without more, therefore indicates that “person” under s 15 can include the Government.
- [74]
[74] Section 15 thereafter refers to the “person” within its ambit as “the subject”. This can be distinguished from the offence-creating provisions in Part 2 of the Act which refer to the “person” in those provisions as “the victim”. The appellant submits that “subject” on its plain meaning encompasses a wider meaning than “victim” as the former can apply to corporate entities and other non-natural persons. The respondents, on the other hand, argue that the distinction is not material to the present issue because all it signifies is that the “person” under s 15 need not have suffered from conduct that amounts to harassment to invoke the remedy contained under s 15.
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