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Grounds publishedDecided 11 Mar 2019

Court of Appeal

Public Prosecutor v ASR

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[2019] SGCA 16Case no. Criminal Appeal No 10 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Writing in 1968, H L A Hart observed of criminal sentencing that “[t]he most difficult problems are presented by young children and the mentally abnormal”: see “Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility” in Punishment and Responsibility (John Gardner ed) (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2008) ch 7 at p 184. This appeal was a lucid testament to the truth of this observation as it concerned an offender, the respondent, who was possessed of both characteristics, being just over 14 years of age at the time of the offences which were in issue, and also afflicted with an intellectual disability. Compounding the difficulty of the case was the seriousness of his crimes: he raped a teenage girl in broad daylight and committed serious sexual abuse on her in other ways. On the other hand, but for his age, he might have invoked a statutory defence to criminal liability on the ground of his lack of maturity. Finally, the minimum sentences stipulated in the charges to which he pleaded guilty, the number of those charges, and the existing sentencing regime presented the sentencing court with only two real alternatives which differed starkly: a lengthy term of imprisonment with caning, or reformative training.

  3. [2] In these circumstances, the High Court chose the latter sentencing option. After hearing the Prosecution’s appeal for the former to be imposed instead, we agreed with the High Court and dismissed the appeal. In these grounds, we explain our reasons in full as well as discuss the delicate and complex issues of sentencing principle that arose for determination.

  4. Background

  5. [3] The respondent was 17 at the time he was sentenced in the court below, and 18 when this appeal was heard. Before he was remanded for the offences in issue, he lived with his mother, grandmother and six siblings in a one-bedroom flat. He was a student at a school for children with special needs, and was assessed by the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”) a few months after the commission of the offences to have an IQ of 61. His mental age was assessed by one expert to be eight years old, and by another to be between eight and ten years old. It appears that the respondent was just 11 when he first committed an offence. He was thereafter placed on a one-year guidance programme, which he completed. Between the middle of 2013 and 2014, he committed a series of offences which culminated in these proceedings. He was 13 at the time of the earliest of those offences, and 14 at the time of the three sexual offences which were the subject of the charges proceeded with in this case.

  6. The early offences

  7. [4] In June 2013, the respondent and three of his friends burgled a flat and stole a number of household items in the total value of $41. He was not charged for this and was instead administered a stern warning in April 2014 on the condition that he not reoffend within the next twelve months. Three months later, in July 2014, he breached that condition by acquiring an EZ-link card of unknown value which he had reason to believe was stolen property. In the same month, he also burgled another flat and stole $300 in cash as well as seven packets of cigarettes. The next day, together with three friends, he stole a mobile phone, six packets of cigarettes and $1,500 in cash from a stranger.

  8. [6] The respondent was then remanded at the Singapore Boys’ Home pending the investigation of these offences. He was released on bail towards the end of July 2014, and proceeded to commit two other offences. In September 2014, he appropriated a friend’s skateboard, and in October 2014, he grabbed the buttocks of a 21-year-old girl. For these actions, he was charged under the Penal Code with criminal breach of trust under s 406 and outrage of modesty under s 354(1) respectively. These were, respectively, the ninth and the tenth charges in this case. He was arrested, and later released on bail again.

  9. The rape

  10. [7] On 21 November 2014, the respondent was distributing flyers with his brother and a friend in Bukit Panjang. At about 5.00pm he went to a convenience store to take a break. It was then that he spotted the victim. She was 16 years old at the time, and has been assessed to have an IQ of 50. She was a schoolmate of the respondent, although they did not know each other.

  11. [8] The respondent decided to follow the victim because he had become aroused upon seeing her. He tailed her across two pedestrian crossings to the block of flats where she lived. He hid behind a wall while she waited for the lift. When she entered the lift, he hurried in after her. He pressed the button for the highest floor, while she pressed the button for a lower floor. When the doors opened for her floor, she exited into the lobby. He followed her and said, “Baby, I love you.” She did not respond and walked towards her flat.

  12. [9] The respondent then pushed her against the parapet. Afraid, she froze. He hugged her and kissed her on her lips and neck. She told him to go away, but he persisted. He then unzipped his shorts and took out his penis. Squatting down, he lifted her dress and pulled her panties to her ankles. He placed his hand inside her bra and felt her breasts. He then inserted a finger into her vagina. She felt pain. He then told her to lie down. She refused and tried to flee, but he restrained her, saying: “If you never lie down now, I take out my knife.” He then pushed her to the floor.

  13. [10] Climbing on top of her, the respondent inserted his penis into her vagina. He was not wearing a condom at that time. Again, the victim felt pain. He then ejaculated on her underwear. But her ordeal was not over. He went through her belongings and found a comb that was about 15cm long. He inserted it into her vagina. After taking it out, he placed it into her mouth. He had no reason to believe that she consented to his actions, but decided to have his way because, in his own words, he “felt horny”. He then said, “Bye bye”, and left the scene.

  14. The aftermath

  15. [11] The victim returned to her flat and began to cry. Her family later brought her to make a police report. Two days later, the respondent was arrested. His bail was revoked and he has been remanded at the Singapore Boys’ Home since then.

  16. [12] For inserting his finger and the comb into the victim’s vagina, the respondent was charged under the Penal Code with two counts of sexual assault by penetration under s 376(2)(a), which is punishable under s 376(3). For threatening to use a knife and penetrating the victim’s vagina with his penis, the respondent was charged under the Penal Code with one count of aggravated rape under s 375(1)(a) read with s 375(3)(a)(ii). These three charges were the third, fourth and second charges respectively in this case. There was originally a first charge for rape, but that was later withdrawn.

  17. [13] In April 2015, all ten charges were laid against the respondent in the Youth Court. The first to the fourth charges were transmitted to the High Court. Although the investigations had concluded by then, according to the Prosecution, “the pre-trial process, the need to secure various psychiatric reports, and the need to fix hearing dates that took into account the court[’s] and [the] parties’ availabilities” resulted in the matter being heard only almost two years later in February 2017. By then, the respondent had turned 16 and had spent nearly two years in remand.

  18. The proceedings below

  19. [14] Before the High Court judge (“the Judge”), the Prosecution proceeded with the second, third and fourth charges, and, with the respondent’s consent, invited the Judge to take the fifth to the tenth charges into consideration for sentencing purposes. The respondent pleaded guilty to the proceeded charges, and the Judge convicted him accordingly.

  20. The Newton hearing

  21. [15] After hearing submissions on the appropriate sentence, the Judge called for a report on the respondent’s suitability for reformative training. Dr Jacob Rajesh, a senior consultant psychiatrist in the Singapore Prisons Service (“the SPS”), prepared and issued a series of memoranda between February and March 2017 in which he maintained that because the respondent had mild mental retardation, he was not suitable for reformative training.

  22. [16] The parties then applied in April 2017 for a Newton hearing to determine two issues: (a) the respondent’s prospects of rehabilitation; and (b) his risk of reoffending. At the hearing, the Judge directed the Prosecution to provide statistics on: (a) the historical number of sexual offenders who had been deemed eligible for reformative training, the number who had been sentenced accordingly and the number who had not; (b) for those offenders who had not been sentenced to reformative training, the reasons why; (c) the number of offenders in each of the two categories who had sub-normal IQ; and (d) for those with sub-normal IQ, what had been recommended in their reformative training suitability reports.

  23. [17] The statistics showed that the mere fact that a sexual offence was involved did not preclude the imposition of a sentence of reformative training. Out of 830 reformative training suitability reports surveyed, 11 offenders (including the respondent) had been convicted of sexual offences, meaning rape simpliciter, sexual assault by penetration or outrage of modesty. Of these 11, nine had been sentenced to reformative training, one had not and the one remaining (the respondent) had not been sentenced yet. The statistics also showed that the mere fact that an offender had an intellectual disability or a low IQ score did not preclude the imposition of reformative training. Of the 830 reformative training suitability reports surveyed, 19 offenders had sub-normal IQ, that is, borderline IQ of 70–79 and low IQ of below 69. Of these 19, 11 (including the respondent) had been assessed to be unlikely to benefit from reformative training, while eight had been assessed to be likely to benefit from it. Three of these eight had been sentenced to reformative training.

  24. [18] After the Newton hearing, the Prosecution pressed for a global sentence of between 15 and 18 years’ imprisonment and at least 15 strokes of the cane. The respondent, on the other hand, submitted that reformative training would be the appropriate sentence in the present circumstances.

  25. The Judge’s decision

  26. [19] On 12 March 2018, the Judge sentenced the respondent to reformative training. The Judge’s grounds of decision were published the following month: see Public Prosecutor v ASR [2018] SGHC 94 (“the GD”). In the Judge’s view, the “main issue” before him was whether the respondent should be sentenced to reformative training (at [47]). He answered this in the affirmative because, in his view, rehabilitation was the dominant sentencing consideration, and this made reformative training the more appropriate sentence compared to imprisonment with caning. The GD addressed the main issue through two lines of inquiry: (a) whether the circumstances of the respondent’s offences made reformative training an inappropriate sentence; and (b) whether the respondent’s intellectual disability made that sentencing option inappropriate.

  27. [20] The Judge resolved the first question in the negative for the following reasons:

  28. (a) First, the Prosecution was wrong to suggest that the gravity of the respondent’s offences made reformative training inappropriate. The fact that serious offences had been committed had not stopped the courts from applying rehabilitative sentencing options in previous cases (at [59]–[63]). Also, the Prosecution had presented the respondent as being more culpable than he actually was (at [70]). In addition, the statistics showed that the mere fact that an offender had committed sexual offences and had an intellectual disability did not inherently preclude him from being sentenced to reformative training (at [84]).

  29. (b) Second, the respondent’s culpability in relation to the charges that were taken into consideration for sentencing purposes was not as serious as the Prosecution had suggested (at [87]). The Judge found that the evidence showed, among other things, that the respondent’s ninth charge (for criminal breach of trust) was in connection with his failure to return a friend’s skateboard (at [90]), and that he played a “minimal role” in relation to those offences which he was alleged to have committed with others (at [91]–[92]). The Judge also rejected the Prosecution’s view that the fifth and sixth charges showed that the respondent had a propensity to target the vulnerable, reasoning that while the victims in those charges were elderly men, there was no evidence that the respondent had targeted them because of their vulnerability (at [94]–[95]).

  30. (c) Third, the Prosecution was wrong to offer lengthy incarceration as the solution to the significant risk that the respondent would reoffend in the absence of proper rehabilitation, the existence of that risk being a fact which was accepted by the experts on both sides (at [100]–[101]). The Judge doubted that society would be better protected after the respondent was eventually released as he would by then be “stronger and bigger, but lacking insight into the consequences that his choices and conduct carry” (at [101]). Instead, rehabilitation offered a “practical, longer-term solution” which would enhance the protection of the public (at [102]).

  31. [21] The Judge also had regard to the trauma that the victim had suffered. But he decided that that had to be balanced against other considerations, including the long-term protection of the public and the rehabilitation of the respondent (at [107]). For all these reasons, the Judge concluded that rehabilitation remained the dominant sentencing consideration (at [108]).

  32. [22] Turning to the second line of inquiry, the Judge was not satisfied that the respondent’s intellectual disability made reformative training an inappropriate sentence. The Judge began by setting out his findings on the respondent’s condition. The IMH had found that the respondent functioned in the “extremely low range of intelligence” and had an IQ of 61. This score was equal to or better than just 0.5% of his peers of the same age. His “verbal comprehension” was assessed to be “extremely low”, and his “perceptual reasoning”, “working memory” and “processing speed” were “borderline” (at [112]). His adaptive behaviour skills were in the bottom 1% of young people of his age (at [113]). Based on the foregoing data, the Prosecution’s main psychiatric expert witness, Dr Cai Yiming, an emeritus consultant at the IMH’s Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, accepted that the respondent had a mild intellectual disability (at [114]).

  33. [23] Next, the Judge considered the evidence on the respondent’s suitability for reformative training. This was largely evidence in the form of expert opinion. Giving evidence for the Prosecution were Dr Rajesh; Dr Cai; Ms Desiree Choo, a clinical psychologist with the IMH; Mr Ong Pee Eng, a deputy director in the Operations Division of the SPS; Mr Ng Kheng Hong, an assistant director in the same division; and Mr Soh Tee Peng William, a senior assistant director in the SPS’s Correctional Rehabilitation Service Branch. Giving evidence for the respondent were Dr John Bosco Lee, formerly a senior consultant psychiatrist with the SPS and now a private psychiatrist, and Dr Munidasa Winslow, formerly a psychiatrist with the IMH and now a senior consultant psychiatrist in private practice. Having considered their evidence, the Judge concluded that while it would probably be difficult for the respondent to benefit from reformative training because of the way it was usually conducted, adjustments could be made to the programme to meet the respondent’s needs. The Judge summed up the evidence of the main expert witnesses as follows:

  34. (a) Dr Rajesh’s evidence was that the respondent was unsuitable for reformative training because the programme was group-based and catered for inmates with “normal levels of intelligence” (at [119]). Having a low IQ, the respondent would find it difficult to “comprehend” the programme as it was based on changing a person’s cognitive behaviour by formulating reoffending prevention strategies (at [120]). It was not impossible that the respondent would benefit, but the chances of that were “very, very low”, meaning that there was a 75–80% chance that he would not benefit (at [122]).

  35. (b) Dr Lee opined that the respondent should ideally be placed in a mental institution such as the IMH where he could receive special treatment for his condition (at [123]).

  36. (c) Dr Cai opined that the respondent needed to be kept in a structured environment, and that the focus had to be on helping him to overcome his disability in a way that he could follow and understand. Dr Cai doubted whether reformative training would be effective in this respect (at [124]).

  37. (d) Mr Ng’s evidence showed that suitable modifications could be made to the reformative training programme so as to cater to intellectually disabled individuals (at [127]). The Judge noted (at [126]) that in this regard, Mr Ng had referred to the case of Public Prosecutor v Mohammad Fadlee bin Mohammad Faizal [2016] SGDC 274 (“Mohammad Fadlee”). There, reformative training had been imposed on an offender with borderline intelligence who had been convicted of (among other charges) a charge of attempting to insult a woman’s modesty, with the reformative training programme “suitably modified” to suit the offender’s “unique circumstances”.

  38. [24] Further, the Judge found that the respondent was not suitable for imprisonment for two reasons. First, the Judge accepted Dr Lee’s opinion that imprisonment could enhance the respondent’s criminality through negative peer influence, and that prison was a stressful environment which might have particularly adverse psychological effects on persons with mental retardation, such as the respondent (at [134]). Second, the Judge rejected the Prosecution’s submission that imprisonment was the preferred option because the respondent would be adequately cared for through a tailored one-to-one rehabilitation programme which the SPS would be able to provide. If a customised programme for the respondent could be provided in prison, the Judge reasoned, it ought to be possible likewise to provide this in the context of reformative training (at [136]).

  39. [26] Next, the Judge considered that the respondent had possibly been prejudiced by the nearly two-year delay in the proceedings between the time he was charged in April 2015, when he was 14, and the time of his plea-of-guilt hearing in February 2017, by which time he had turned 16. It appeared to the Judge that if the respondent’s conviction or sentencing had taken place before he turned 16, such that he remained a “juvenile” as defined in s 2(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act (Cap 38, 2001 Rev Ed) (“the CYPA”), he would have been able to seek the exercise of the court’s discretion under s 323 of the CPC read with s 37(2) of the CYPA not to impose a sentence of imprisonment, provided he had not been certified by the court to be “of so unruly a character that he could not be detained in a place of detention or a juvenile rehabilitation centre” (at [159]–[162]). However, the Judge considered that these provisions were unclear as to the applicable date for assessing an offender’s age (which could be, among other possible dates, the date of the commission of the offences concerned or the date of the offender’s conviction), and urged legislative clarification in this regard (at [166] and [168]). In any event, the Judge did not take into account the possible prejudice that the respondent might have suffered. This was because even if there were no such prejudice, the Judge would still have been inclined to impose a sentence of reformative training (at [167]).

  40. [27] Finally, the Judge expressed a concern not to undo the progress that the respondent had already made at the Singapore Boys’ Home, where he had been remanded for the preceding three years. The Judge accepted the evidence of the manager of the Youth Guidance Management programme at the Home, Mr Murugasvaran s/o Madasamy, that the respondent was “very well-behaved” and motivated to change, could be trusted, and had shown remorse for his actions (at [172]). This evidence also suggested to the Judge that the respondent was “not as irredeemable as one might have assumed” (at [173]).

  41. [28] For these reasons, the Judge sentenced the respondent to reformative training (at [176]). The Prosecution appealed against that decision.

  42. The appeal

  43. [29] Before this appeal came on for hearing, we indicated to the parties that we wished to be addressed on whether Parliament intended at all for intellectually disabled offenders who had not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of their conduct to be liable to be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, caning or reformative training in the light of s 83 of the Penal Code and any other relevant material. Section 83 provides an absolute defence to criminal liability for any child above seven but under 12 years of age who, at the time of his offending conduct, was not of “sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequence of his conduct”. The parties understood this as an invitation to consider whether s 83 was applicable, and therefore made submissions addressing that issue. We should add here that in the course of the Newton hearing below, the Judge had similarly asked the parties to consider the applicability of this provision, and both parties had taken the position that it was not applicable: see the GD at [153].

  44. [30] We also invited submissions on whether the conviction and imposition of a sentence of imprisonment, caning or reformative training on the respondent would in any way violate the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) (“the Constitution”). The Prosecution understood this as an invitation to address the constitutionality of the legislative provisions implicated in the respondent’s conviction and sentencing, including the relevant offence-creating provisions, the provisions which created the sentencing options that were available to the court, and the provisions which set out any possible defence that the respondent might have relied upon such as s 83 of the Penal Code. In contrast, the respondent restricted his constitutional challenge to just s 83. We therefore limit ourselves in these grounds to expressing our views on whether s 83 is constitutional.

  45. The Prosecution’s case

  46. [31] The Prosecution submitted that s 83 did not apply to the respondent because it applied only to offenders “above 7 years of age and under 12”, and the respondent was 14 at the time of his offences. In particular, that phrase, in the Prosecution’s view, did not encompass the concept of mental age, considering the ordinary meaning and legislative history of s 83, and therefore, the respondent’s mental age of between eight and ten years had no significance in this context. The Prosecution also contended that s 83 was consistent with Arts 9(1) and 12(1) of the Constitution because it employed a differentia, namely, chronological age, which bore a rational relation to the object of the provision. The Prosecution further argued that in any event, the respondent was able to “judge of the nature and consequence of his conduct” within the meaning of s 83.

  47. [32] The Prosecution maintained its position that the respondent should be sentenced to a term of between 15 and 18 years’ imprisonment and at least 15 strokes of the cane. Its first principal submission was that the Judge erred by wrongly identifying the relevant and controlling sentencing objectives. It argued that rehabilitation was not the dominant sentencing consideration in this case because the respondent’s offences were serious, the harm caused was severe, the respondent was hardened and recalcitrant, and reformative training was not viable. Instead, retribution and prevention were the key sentencing objectives. The Judge erred in finding that the respondent’s culpability had been affected by his intellectual disability, and failed to appreciate that the various aggravating factors in this case compelled a retributive sentence.

  48. [33] The Prosecution’s second principal submission was that the Judge erred in selecting the wrong sentencing option to meet the applicable sentencing objectives. It argued that reformative training was manifestly inappropriate and, indeed, inadequate because it did not meet the need for retribution, and also would not reform the respondent, who was not suitable for reformative training. The Prosecution submitted that imprisonment was the only suitable sentencing option, not only because it would serve the objectives of retribution and prevention, and would be in line with the established sentencing guidelines for rape and sexual assault by penetration, but also because it would enable the respondent to be rehabilitated within a controlled environment and over a longer period of time. An incapacitating sentence was needed, the Prosecution emphasised, to protect the public from the respondent’s high risk of reoffending.

  49. The respondent’s case

  50. [34] The respondent contended that s 83 of the Penal Code ought to be read purposively to apply to offenders whose mental age was between seven and 12 regardless of whether their chronological age was above or below 12. If this interpretation of s 83 were accepted, it would mean that the respondent would be entitled to rely on the provision. However, the respondent did not seek to be acquitted because that would result in the withdrawal of rehabilitative possibilities for him. If, on the other hand, the respondent’s interpretation of s 83 were wrong, then s 83, in his view, would be inconsistent with Arts 9(1) and 12(1) of the Constitution because it would be discriminatory for failing to extend the protection of the statutory defence to offenders who, although not of the requisite chronological age, might nonetheless be of insufficient maturity of understanding as a result of their mental age.

  51. [35] The respondent adopted the reasons of the Judge in seeking to uphold his decision to impose reformative training. The respondent presented two principal sets of arguments. The first was a collection of general principles, including the propositions that the intellectually disabled should not be precluded from benefiting from reformative training, that the assessment of an offender’s culpability should be affected by his IQ, and that the seeming gravity of an offence should not automatically preclude the imposition of reformative training. The second set of arguments sought to highlight how the specific features of this case justified the Judge’s sentence of reformative training. In this regard, the respondent argued that the sentence was consistent with precedent, that his culpability as reflected in the charges taken into consideration did not demonstrate escalating criminal behaviour, and that reformative training would be in both his and society’s long-term interests.

  52. The issues on appeal and our approach

  53. [36] In that light, we outline the five broad issues which, in our judgment, arose for determination in this appeal.

  54. [38] The second broad issue was the applicability of s 83 of the Penal Code. Section 83 provides a complete defence to criminal liability if the offender is “a child above 7 years of age and under 12” and “has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequence of his conduct” on the occasion of his offence. The respondent contended that s 83 applied to him, so we had to consider whether that was correct. As we shall explain, we disagreed with the respondent. On this hypothesis, the respondent submitted that s 83 must then be unconstitutional, but we also did not accept that argument, as we shall explain.

  55. [39] The third broad issue was the appropriate sentencing framework for intellectually disabled young offenders convicted of serious offences. This was an important issue because it concerned the general framework for assessing the whole case. It invited the question whether the two-step framework for sentencing young offenders articulated in Public Prosecutor v Mohammad Al-Ansari bin Basri [2008] 1 SLR(R) 449 (“Al-Ansari”) and affirmed in cases such as Public Prosecutor v Koh Wen Jie Boaz [2016] 1 SLR 334 (“Boaz Koh”) was suitable for the sentencing of intellectually disabled young offenders who have committed serious offences.

  56. [40] The fourth broad issue was whether rehabilitation should remain the dominant sentencing objective in this case. This required us to examine whether and to what extent deterrence, incapacitation and retribution applied to the respondent in view of his youth and the extent of his intellectual disability.

  57. [41] The fifth and final issue was whether, in the light of the applicable sentencing objectives, reformative training was the appropriate sentencing option in this case. This required us to analyse the suitability of, respectively, reformative training and a long imprisonment term with caning, the latter being the Prosecution’s sentencing position.

  58. [42] We now turn to address these issues in sequence.

  59. Issue 1: The extent of the respondent’s intellectual disability

  60. [43] The extent of the respondent’s intellectual disability centred around three factual issues: first, the significance of his IQ score; second, the significance of his mental age, which entailed consideration of the meaningfulness and reliability of the concept of mental age for sentencing purposes generally; and third, the degree to which his intellectual disability affected his ability to control his impulses. Below, we address each issue in turn, and explain why, together, they demonstrated that the respondent’s intellectual functioning was seriously impaired.

  61. The respondent’s IQ

  62. [44] The respondent’s IQ test was administered when he was about 14 and a half years old by Ms Choo. The version of the IQ test which she administered was the fourth edition of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (“the WISC”), known as “the WISC-IV”. The WISC-IV, according to Ms Choo’s report, is “used to test the general thinking and reasoning skills of pupils aged six through sixteen” and “provides an overall measure of intellectual ability” [emphasis in original omitted].

  63. [45] The WISC-IV provides four “index scores”, each of which measures a different aspect of the candidate’s cognitive ability. The four indices are the Verbal Comprehension Index, the Perceptual Reasoning Index, the Working Memory Index and the Processing Speed Index, which are abbreviated in Ms Choo’s report as “VCI”, “PRI”, “WMI” and “PSI” respectively. According to Ms Choo, VCI measures the ability to understand verbal information, to think and reason with words, as well as to express thoughts in words; PRI measures perceptual organisation, which includes the ability to think in visual images, to manipulate such images, to reason without the use of words, and to perceive and interpret visual material; WMI measures the ability to maintain information in conscious awareness, to perform some operation or manipulation of it, and to produce a result; and PSI measures the speed of mental and graphomotor (meaning handwriting) processing, visual-perceptual discrimination, and eye-hand coordination.

  64. [46] The candidate’s four index scores are averaged to yield what is called his Full Scale IQ or “FSIQ” score. It is this overall metric that we have in mind, as did the Judge, when we refer to the respondent’s IQ score. The respondent’s WISC-IV test results, including his individual index scores and his overall FSIQ score, were set out in Ms Choo’s report in the form of the following table:

  65. [47] In her report, Ms Choo stated that the respondent’s FSIQ score should be “interpreted with caution”, and that his intellectual functioning would be “more meaningfully understood by his performance on the separate indices” because there was “a significant difference between his scores on the individual subtests within this domain”. Explaining the significance of each of the respondent’s index scores, she stated that he scored equal to or better than 0.1%, 6%, 3% and 5% of his same-aged peers in VCI, PRI, WMI and PSI respectively. In its written submissions, the Prosecution echoed Ms Choo’s caution in relation to the discrepancy between the respondent’s VCI score and his other index scores, and suggested that the respondent might be more intelligent than his FSIQ score conveyed.

  66. [48] In our judgment, the caution sounded by Ms Choo did not assist the Prosecution because it did not tell us precisely how the discrepancy between the respondent’s VCI score and his other index scores shed light on his state of mind at the time he committed his offences. In particular, although it was clear that each of the four index scores measured a different aspect of the respondent’s cognitive ability, it was not demonstrated to us how each aspect related to the other aspects, and how any of those relationships explained the respondent’s state of mind at the time of his offences. In fact, Ms Choo herself was not prepared to restrict the respondent’s low cognitive functioning to just his verbal comprehension ability. Thus, during cross-examination, she was unwilling to confirm that despite the respondent’s “extremely low” VCI score, his “borderline” PRI score meant that he could think and solve problems without the use of words:

  67. [49] In the circumstances, we concluded that there was nothing improper in reasoning, as the Judge did (see the GD at [112]), on the footing that at the time of the offences, the respondent: (a) functioned in the “extremely low range of intelligence”, according to Ms Choo’s assessment of his overall IQ score of 61; and (b) scored equal to or better than just 0.5% of his same-aged peers.

  68. The respondent’s mental age

  69. [50] Next, we consider the respondent’s mental age. The formula for calculating mental age, as stated in a report prepared by Dr Cai, is: “Mental age = (IQ x Physical Age) ÷ 100 (average IQ score)”. Based on his FSIQ score of 61, the respondent, according to Dr Lee, had a mental age of between eight and ten at the time of his offences, and, according to Dr Cai, had a mental age of eight at that time. In the court below, the Judge did not appear to base any part of his reasoning on the respondent’s mental age. He recorded Dr Cai’s criticism that mental age was “archaic and not helpful and meaningful in clinical practice and forensic evaluation”, but neither accepted nor rejected this opinion: see the GD at [150]–[151]. Nonetheless, part of the Prosecution’s case on appeal was that the concept of mental age was not reliable for the purpose of sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we considered the Prosecution’s criticism to be overstated, and found that the concept was in fact a useful heuristic tool for that purpose, although it must be understood in the context of the offender’s life experiences.

  70. The concept of mental age

  71. [51] The Prosecution submitted, relying on some scientific literature, that the mental age of a person did not indicate his social and emotional functioning, and did not account for his life experiences. This point was indirectly supported by Dr Cai’s report, which suggested that it was inaccurate to think of the respondent as an eight-year-old boy because such a boy would typically be unable to conceive of or carry out a rape offence. The Prosecution also highlighted that the respondent’s expert, Dr Lee, accepted that even people who were of the same chronological age could exhibit different levels of maturity due to their living or family circumstances. The Prosecution referred to the opinion of one Dr Robert Adler, cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Tasmania in Dobson v Jackson [2009] TASSC 118 at [255] per Evans J, that mental age simply meant that persons with an intellectual disability, for example, with an IQ of 50, “perform in some areas like a nine year old”.

  72. [52] We had three observations on these submissions. First, mental age is predicated on the concept of FSIQ. Therefore, it must, as a matter of logic, carry any limitation that FSIQ carries. As we have seen, FSIQ measures verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory and processing speed: see [45]–[46] above. FSIQ does not measure social or emotional functioning; nor does it take into account a person’s life experiences, at least not directly. Since mental age is predicated on FSIQ, it cannot be criticised for not taking these factors into account because it does not purport to be an estimate of these factors. What mental age purports to be is an estimate of what a person of a particular chronological age would usually be capable of achieving in terms of verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory, and processing speed. Since this is all that the concept of mental age purports to estimate, it cannot then fairly be criticised for failing to be an estimate of more than that.

  73. [53] Second, as mental age does not take into account a person’s life experiences, it follows that the older a person, the less probative value his mental age would have, all other things being equal. Thus, a 40-year-old man who is clinically assessed to have a mental age of an eight-year-old cannot really be said to be thinking and operating like an eight-year-old. This is because he will have lived some 20 or so years as an adult, and may perhaps even have held down a job – all these experiences cannot be discounted when assessing his cognitive ability. Conversely, by the same token, the younger a person, the more probative value his mental age would have, all other things being equal. Thus, take a child who is 12 at the time of his offences, and who is assessed at that time to have a mental age of between eight and ten years old: in such a case, it seems unlikely that the child’s life experiences would have overtaken his mental age to such an extent that his mental age has to be substantially discounted or even disregarded altogether. His situation is quite different to that of a 40-year-old man with a mental age of eight.

  74. [54] Third, as a matter of common sense, it cannot be wrong to analogise a person’s maturity or cognitive ability with that of someone who is of a different chronological age. Based on a person’s words and conduct, it is entirely reasonable to say that he is “childish” or that he is “wise beyond his years”. Indeed, implicit in Dr Cai’s opinion that rape is something that “[a]n 8 years [sic] old boy, typically, is not able to think of or carry out” is a notion of what a typical eight-year-old is capable of. The concept of mental age, in our judgment, is simply a heuristic tool for quantifying that kind of analogy in more precise terms. In so far as it is predicated on FSIQ, it carries the limitations associated with FSIQ, and must be employed with an awareness of those limitations. However, it should not be rejected altogether as an unreliable and problematic concept.

  75. [55] Nor is any such rejection evident in the scientific literature. Dr Cai explained the origin of the concept of mental age in these terms in his report:

  76. [56] Consistent with this explanation, modern psychological literature continues to employ the concept of mental age precisely to approximate a child’s intellectual performance to that of his similar-aged peers. Thus, for example, in Frank D Baughman et al, “Common mechanisms in intelligence and development: A study of ability profiles in mental age-matched primary school children” (2016) 56 Intelligence 99, researchers examined the relationship between individual differences and cognitive development by comparing the cognitive profiles of groups of younger and older children matched on overall mental age using standard tests of intelligence, including the third edition of the WISC. Notably, the conclusion was that there was a high degree of similarity between these two age groups in terms of cognitive profile, suggesting that children of different chronological ages who are of the same overall ability level in terms of mental age are at a similar developmental and intellectual level.

  77. [57] Therefore, contrary to the Prosecution’s submission, we considered that the concept of mental age is far from heterodox, outdated or unreliable. It is certainly true that it must be understood in the context of an offender’s life experiences and circumstances for the purposes of assessing his culpability with regard to the specific offending act(s) that he is said to have committed. But that is simply a function of what the concept of mental age itself purports to represent, and does not in any way reduce its inherent credibility or potential utility as a psychological concept.

  78. Cases on mental age

  79. [58] In addition, the cases support the foregoing analysis of the concept of mental age. Indeed, as far as we know, none of the cases, not even the ones cited by the Prosecution, contain an outright rejection of the usefulness of this concept in the context of sentencing. Those cases which do not place significant reliance on it are cases in which the history of the offender’s life experiences shows that he cannot be treated as if he were a child even though he has the mental age of a child. We outline two of these cases below.

  80. [60] The next case is Regina v Myles Williams [2013] EWCA Crim 933 (“Williams”), where the offender had an IQ below 70. He was convicted of the murder of a girl, and of wounding with intent two other victims on the same occasion. He committed these offences when he was 19. The first instance judge sentenced him to life imprisonment for the murder, with a minimum term of 28 years’ imprisonment, and also to a concurrent term of 15 years’ detention in a young offenders’ institution for the wounding offences. The offender appealed to reduce the minimum 28-year imprisonment term, relying on, among other things, his mental age, which was assessed as “early teens” (at [10]), and his immaturity. Dismissing the appeal, the English Court of Appeal held that although some allowance had to be given to the offender’s mental age, that was not decisive because, by his conduct, he had shown himself to be capable of a higher level of functioning. In this regard, the court noted that he “liked partying, casual sex and taking illegal substances”, “had fathered children with three women and had held down a job for some two years” (at [14]). Treacy LJ said (likewise at [14]):

  81. [61] Laxton and Williams may be contrasted with R v MBQ, ex parte Attorney-General of Queensland [2012] QCA 202 (“MBQ”), a case cited by the respondent. The offender there was an Aboriginal boy who was 12 when he raped as well as had unlawful and indecent dealings with a three-year-old toddler, and 14 when he was sentenced. He was assessed to be functioning in the range of a nine-year-old at the time of his offences. He pleaded guilty to the offences, and the first instance judge sentenced him to three years’ youth probation with the special condition that he attend a rehabilitative programme as directed by the State. The Attorney-General appealed, contending that the judge had placed excessive weight on the offender’s mental age and other mitigating factors, and had failed to recognise the seriousness of the offences. It was submitted that imprisonment for a term of between three and five years would be appropriate. Dismissing the appeal, the Queensland Court of Appeal accepted that while the sentence seemed lenient, it was justified by the offender’s reduced culpability in the light of his mental age at the time of his offences. Margaret McMurdo P had regard to the evidence of the offender’s intellectual capacity based on psychiatric reports (at [10] and [14]–[15]), and concluded that it indicated that he had a “limited grasp of the consequences and moral blameworthiness of his actions at the time he committed the offences”, and this was “highly relevant” to the sentencing exercise (at [44]).

  82. [62] The difference between Laxton and Williams on the one hand and MBQ on the other seems to us to lie in this: in the former two cases, the offenders had accumulated various mature experiences in life which made it difficult for the court to take at face value the assessment that they had the mental age of a child. In contrast, in MBQ, there was no evidence of such experiences. The offender was 12 when he committed the offences and 14 when he was sentenced, so he would not have had the time to experience anything which might suggest that his mental age of nine at the time of his offences was a mischaracterisation of his maturity. Instead, the evidence showed rather the opposite, in that there appeared to be environmental reasons why the offender’s mind had not properly developed, intellectually and socially.

  83. [63] In our judgment, therefore, the Prosecution was mistaken in arguing that the court in Laxton “rejected the concept of mental age”. A person’s mental age is, as we have noted, not a complete proxy for his cognitive ability, and what the courts in Laxton and Williams found was simply that evidence of what the offender had shown himself to be capable of doing meant that the court could not take his clinically-assessed mental age to represent that in terms of his cognitive ability, he was like a child. Where, however, there is little or no evidence of that sort, then, in our judgment, the court would ordinarily be justified in relying on an offender’s mental age as a heuristic tool for assessing his degree of culpability.

  84. The significance of the respondent’s mental age

  85. [64] In this case, the evidence was that based on his FSIQ score of 61, the respondent had a mental age of between eight and ten at the time of his offences. The significance of this was put in the following terms by Dr Lee during the trial:

  86. [65] For the reasons given at [52]–[63] above, we preferred Dr Lee’s testimony to Dr Cai’s wholesale rejection of the concept of mental age, and would apply mental age as a heuristic tool to evaluate the respondent’s culpability, bearing in mind its limitations.

  87. [66] On that analysis, we considered that there was no evidence to indicate that the respondent’s mental age should not be taken to be a reasonably accurate approximation of his cognitive ability at the time of his offences. The respondent was only 14 at that time. There is no evidence that he had by then accumulated life experiences and participated in activities which would suggest that he was in fact more mature than his mental age indicated. We noted that the respondent’s prior offending conduct might suggest that, to some degree, he was no babe in the woods. But we did not find this significant. Several of the offences which the respondent committed before the aggravated rape and the sexual assault by penetration offences were relatively minor. Also, consistent with the Judge’s findings (see the GD at [91]–[92]), the objective evidence suggested that the respondent had simply participated in those offences under the bad influence of his friends. Indeed, the two reformative training suitability reports on the respondent identified his companions as a risk domain in these terms:

  88. [67] In all the circumstances, we did not think that the respondent’s mental age should be disregarded in the way that the mental age of the offenders in Laxton and Williams was given little weight owing to their life experiences (including their having held down a job) which showed that they were in fact more mature than their mental age indicated. The Prosecution in this case referred to the fact that the respondent was capable of playing with his friends and helping his mother to distribute flyers, but that is of little significance because these are things which one might readily expect an average child of between eight and ten years of age to be capable of doing. We therefore concluded that it was meaningful to consider that the respondent had a mental age of between eight and ten at the time of his offences, and we explain below the effect of this conclusion on our assessment of his culpability.

  89. The respondent’s ability to control his impulses

  90. [69] The principal piece of evidence of the respondent’s lack of impulse control was the opinion of Dr Winslow and his colleague, Dr Amita Sarkar, who conducted a psychological assessment of the respondent and prepared a corresponding report dated 13 July 2015. The respondent was 14 at the time of the assessment. In their report, Dr Winslow and Dr Sarkar opined that while the respondent knew that what he had done to the victim was wrong, his low IQ and poor adaptive behaviour likely contributed to his impulsive behaviour. They put it in these terms:

  91. [70] During the Newton hearing, the Prosecution invited Dr Cai to comment on this part of Dr Winslow’s and Dr Sarkar’s report. Dr Cai agreed that the respondent’s low IQ was a contributing factor in relation to his inability properly to control his impulses to commit criminal acts:

  92. [72] In the present case, the report prepared by Dr Winslow and Dr Sarkar and Dr Cai’s oral testimony constitute objective evidence that the respondent’s self-control was impaired by his intellectual disability. While the Prosecution accepted this, it somewhat surprisingly also submitted that the respondent’s intellectual disability “was not causally linked to the commission of his offences”. We rejected this submission because it was contradicted by the evidence and by the Prosecution’s own concession. In our judgment, there was a causal link between the respondent’s low IQ and his commission of the offences, and this attenuated his culpability, as we shall elaborate at [107] below.

  93. Issue 2: Section 83 of the Penal Code

  94. [73] The next broad issue is s 83 of the Penal Code. This provision reads:

  95. [74] As we have mentioned, although the Judge invited the parties to address the applicability of s 83 in the course of the Newton hearing below, they declined to do so, taking the view that the provision did not apply: see [29] above and the GD at [153]. Revisiting the issue now in response to our queries, the Prosecution maintained its position below, while the respondent argued that the word “age” in s 83 ought to include mental age, and that s 83 therefore applied to him as he had a mental age of between eight and ten at the time of his offences. We agreed with the Prosecution’s interpretation of s 83, and we also agreed with the Prosecution that, so construed, s 83 was not unconstitutional. That said, we also thought that s 83, when considered together with its neighbouring provisions, shed some light on how a young offender’s culpability should be analysed as a general matter.

  96. The meaning of “age” in s 83

  97. [75] The respondent contended that the word “age” in s 83 should be construed to include mental age, such that an offender with a mental age of between seven and 12 would be eligible to rely on the provision even if his chronological age was above 12. The respondent developed this argument within the three-step framework for purposive interpretation set out in Attorney-General v Ting Choon Meng and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 373 (“Ting Choon Meng”) at [59] and endorsed in later decisions of this court including Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) at [37] (in the context of interpreting the Constitution) and Public Prosecutor v Lam Leng Hung and others [2018] 1 SLR 659 (“Lam Leng Hung”) at [67] (in the context of interpreting the Penal Code). This framework requires the court, first, to ascertain the possible interpretations of the text in question; second, to ascertain the legislative purpose of the statute; and third, to compare the possible interpretations of the text against the ascertained legislative purpose.

  98. [77] As we observed in Tan Cheng Bock, the possible interpretations of a statutory provision are ascertained by “determining the ordinary meaning of [its] words” (at [38]). One aspect of the principle that words in a legislative enactment are to be given their ordinary meaning is that words mean what they were understood to mean at the time they were adopted by the Legislature. There is, after all, no other objective basis upon which to construe the meaning which the framers of the legislation intended the legislative text to have.

  99. [78] Perhaps the clearest recent example of this approach is our decision in Lam Leng Hung. The question in that case was whether a director of a company was an “agent” within the meaning of s 409 of the Penal Code, which created the offence of criminal breach of trust by an agent. We answered the question in the negative, and one of our reasons for this was that at the time the Penal Code was adopted, the operative expression in s 409, namely, “in the way of his business as … an agent”, referred to a person who was engaged in the trade of being a professional agent, such as a property or insurance agent, as opposed to simply any person who was regarded by the law as being in a relationship of agency to another person who would be regarded as his principal. This was borne out, we found, partly by the kinds of agent which s 409 specifically enumerated, such as bankers, attorneys and factors, and partly by applying the interpretive maxim that where a general term follows a number of specific terms of an identifiable class, the general term is to be construed as if it were qualified by the features of that class. Commenting on the meaning of the word “factor” in s 409, what was significant to the court was the ordinary meaning which that word bore at the time the Penal Code was drafted. We said at [148]:

  100. [79] In the present case, therefore, to determine the ordinary meaning of the word “age” in s 83, the court must begin by considering what that word was understood to mean at the time the Penal Code was adopted, that is, in 1872. In this regard, it is significant that at that time, the concept of mental age had not yet been developed or articulated. As we have seen at [55] above, Alfred Binet came up with this concept only in 1905. Therefore, when the Penal Code (including s 83) was first enacted, nobody in the Straits Settlements, including the Legislative Council, would have thought that “age” in s 83 referred to or included mental age. The only other possible meaning of “age” is “a period of history”, such as in the expressions “the Stone age” or “the Elizabethan age”. But the context of s 83, which refers to offenders “above 7 years of age and under 12”, shows that this is not a reasonable alternative. There is therefore no ambiguity in the ordinary meaning of the word “age” in s 83, which must mean chronological age.

  101. [80] Be that as it may, since the concept of mental age did not exist at the time the Penal Code was adopted, it is arguably also not possible to say that s 83 was not intended to refer to that concept, given that such an intention could not have been formed at that time in the first place. By way of analogy, if the question in Lam Leng Hung had been whether a Bitcoin broker was an “agent” within the meaning of s 409, it would not have sufficed to say that because Bitcoin brokers did not exist at the time the Penal Code was adopted, the Legislature could not have intended s 409 to apply to them, and therefore, they are not caught by s 409. Instead, the court would have had to consider whether the ordinary meaning and concept of the word “agent” in s 409 at the time the Penal Code was enacted could logically extend to Bitcoin brokers. And the court might have concluded, for example, that because a Bitcoin broker is fundamentally a kind of professional agent, he would be caught by s 409.

  102. [81] In short, where the court is considering new phenomena which did not exist at the time the provision in question was adopted, it must consider whether the ordinary meaning of the provision at that time can logically extend to the new phenomena. Here, we considered that the ordinary meaning of the word “age” in s 83 did not logically extend to the subsequently developed concept of mental age. The former is fundamentally a measure of time, specifically, the length of time that a person has lived since birth, whereas the latter is not. It is instead a measure of a person’s cognitive ability with reference to a specific mathematical formula: see [50] above. The two concepts are therefore qualitatively different, and cannot be reduced to a common denominator in the way, for example, that a Bitcoin broker and a factor might both be regarded as professional agents for the purposes of s 409. In our judgment, therefore, the word “age” in s 83 does not include mental age.

  103. [82] Other textual elements of s 83 and the Penal Code support this view. First, s 83 applies to a “child” who is between seven and 12 years of age. It would be odd if s 83 could be relied upon by a 40-year-old with a mental age of between seven and 12 because such a person would be an “adult”, and not a “child”. Second, as the Prosecution observed, the word “age” is used in other provisions of the Penal Code to refer to chronological age, and adopting that interpretation of the same word in s 83 would be consistent with the general presumption that where an expression is used in a statute in different instances, it should bear the same meaning: see Tan Cheng Bock at [58(c)(i)]. Thus, for example, s 310 states that it is an offence for a woman to cause the death of her child, “being a child under the age of 12 months”, and s 377D(2) defines a “minor” as a person “under 21 years of age”. The word “age” in these provisions clearly refers to chronological age, and barring any contraindication, “age” in s 83 ought to be interpreted in the same way.

  104. [83] The respondent was able to cite one authority, State v Mazid (25 April 2015) (Delhi District Court) (“Mazid”), to support his interpretation of s 83. In that case, the accused, who had an IQ of 70 and a mental age of ten and a half years, faced a charge of kidnapping. It is not clear from the judgment what his chronological age was. The court acquitted him of the charge on the basis of s 83 of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860) (“the IPC”), which is in pari materia with s 83 of the Penal Code. In particular, the court appeared to consider that the word “age” in s 83 of the IPC included mental age because that concept was established by scientific opinion. The court explained its reasoning in these terms (at [27]–[30] per Dr PS Malik):

  105. [84] We were unpersuaded by this reasoning. No attempt was made in Mazid to discern the ordinary meaning of the word “age” in s 83 of the IPC. It appears that the court thought that importing the concept of mental age into the provision was a salutary idea given the acceptance of the concept by medical practitioners, and that this was sufficient basis for reading the word “age” in the provision as including that concept. In our judgment, this did not reflect a proper approach to the interpretation of legislation, at least not in this jurisdiction. Therefore, even though Mazid reached a conclusion which supports the respondent’s view that s 83 includes the concept of mental age, we gained no assistance from its reasoning as to why s 83 ought to be so interpreted. In the circumstances, we held that the word “age” in s 83 refers to chronological age and not mental age.

  106. The constitutionality of s 83

  107. [85] On the hypothesis that s 83 did not apply to him, the respondent submitted that the provision was contrary to Arts 9(1) and 12(1) of the Constitution. We did not agree.

  108. [87] In this case, the impugned differentia in s 83 is chronological age. Specifically, it is the characteristic of being “above 7 years of age and under 12”, in the words of the provision. The respondent submitted that this differentia bore no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by s 83, which, in the respondent’s view, was “to excuse apparent culpability by taking into account the maturity of the offender”. According to the respondent, persons of the same chronological age might have different levels of maturity of understanding, and the differentia of chronological age failed to take into account those who were mentally challenged, resulting in their being treated worse than persons who were of similar maturity but who had the requisite chronological age. Accordingly, s 83 was said to be inconsistent with Art 12(1).

  109. [88] In our judgment, this argument was misconceived. In the first place, we considered, accepting the Prosecution’s submission, that the purpose of s 83 is broader than that contended by the respondent. It is partly to excuse young children from criminal liability because they are likely to have very low culpability for their offending acts in view of their incomplete intellectual development, and also partly to protect them from the harshness of the criminal justice system: see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (21 February 2000) vol 71 at cols 937–939 (Abdullah Tarmugi, Minister for Community Development); Stanley Yeo, Criminal Law for the 21st Century: A Model Code for Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2013) at paras 7.1.2 and 7.1.10. Bearing this purpose in mind, we considered that a chronological age range of seven to 12 years is plainly a reasonable criterion for delineating the class of persons to whom the protection in s 83 should apply. It is a meaningful proxy for identifying persons who are likely to require that protection because the younger a person, the less mature he is likely to be. The criterion is neither perfect nor accurate, but the reasonable classification test does not require that. Indeed, similar reasoning was employed by this court in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 1129 (“Yong Vui Kong (caning)”) to explain why it was not irrational for legislation to preclude men above fifty from being caned (at [116]):

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