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Grounds publishedDecided 1 Apr 2019

Court of Appeal

Li Shengwu v The Attorney-General

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[2019] SGCA 20Case no. Civil Appeal No 166 of 2018

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] Is the basis for exercising jurisdiction over a contemnor founded on the court’s civil or criminal jurisdiction? This question in turn entails an examination as to whether there is any difference between civil and criminal contempt in the first place to warrant a different treatment of their juridical bases. These are some of the essential questions which have emerged from this appeal to determine a related question: whether and how the High Court can exercise substantive and personal jurisdiction over a foreign contemnor.

  3. [2] For the purposes of this appeal, we speak of a foreign contemnor in the sense that such a contemnor was not within jurisdiction when the committal papers were served and not that he was outside jurisdiction at the time when the allegedly contemptuous statement was published. Leave of court was obtained for service outside jurisdiction on the appellant. Although the Attorney-General (“AG”) has argued that the appellant was in Singapore at the time of the publication of the allegedly contemptuous statement, the appellant himself does not take any factual position as to his whereabouts at the relevant time. His position is that this issue simply did not arise before the High Court Judge (“the Judge”) who heard the proceedings below.

  4. [3] The appellant’s application to set aside the service was dismissed by the Judge. He found that the High Court’s jurisdiction for contempt, whether civil or criminal, is based on s 7 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”). He also found that service was strictly not required to establish jurisdiction under s 7, but since it was common ground between the parties that compliance with O 11 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”) was required, he held that the service was nonetheless within O 11 r 1(n) and (s) of the ROC.

  5. [4] The appellant maintains the same position that he took in the court below ie, that service of committal papers under O 11 r 1 was not permissible. The net effect of the appellant’s position is that under the ROC as it stood at the time of the allegedly contemptuous statement, it was not possible to serve committal papers on a foreign contemnor even if the statement was made when he was within jurisdiction. It should be highlighted that this is not the first case where committal papers have been served on an alleged foreign contemnor. However, this is the first occasion where service outside jurisdiction has been actively challenged. As such, the previous cases only go so far as to illustrate the point that service outside jurisdiction has been done before. They do not explicate the considered basis or reasons justifying the service. Nonetheless, the impact of the appellant’s challenge should be examined in light of previous decisions where service of committal papers outside jurisdiction was either held to be permissible or went unchallenged.

  6. Background Facts

  7. [6] The facts giving rise to the appeal may be stated briefly. On 15 July 2017, the appellant published a post on his Facebook page. The material part of that post stated that “the Singapore government is very litigious and has a pliant court system. This constrains what the international media can usually report”. The appellant later clarified in a subsequent Facebook post on 17 July 2017 that his earlier post was shared on the “Friends only” privacy setting, and indicated his surprise that his post appeared to have attracted interest from various media outlets and the Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”).

  8. [7] On 21 July 2017, the AG wrote to inform the appellant that he considered the appellant’s 15 July post to have been made in contempt of court. The AG asked the appellant to purge his contempt by (a) deleting and removing the contemptuous material from his Facebook page and other social media accounts; (b) making a written apology and undertaking not to republish the contemptuous material, or similarly contemptuous material; and (c) issuing the signed written apology and undertakings prominently on his Facebook page. The AG requested the appellant to comply by 5.00pm on 28 July 2017.

  9. [8] On 27 July 2017, one day before the expiry of the deadline, the appellant requested an extension of time until 5.00pm on 4 August 2017 to respond to the AG’s letter. The AG agreed to this extension of time.

  10. [10] On 8 August 2017, the AG wrote to notify the appellant that the AGC had filed OS 893 because of the appellant’s failure to comply with his request. The AG also informed the appellant that he was prepared to discontinue OS 893 if the appellant published the apology and undertaking as requested.

  11. [11] On 10 August 2017, the appellant replied to the AG acknowledging receipt of his letter of 8 August 2017 at his US address.

  12. [12] On 16 August 2017, the AG wrote to the appellant notifying him that a hearing date for OS 893 had been fixed for 21 August 2017, at 3.30pm. The AG also notified the appellant that if he did not publish his apology and undertaking before 3.30pm on 21 August 2017, the offer to discontinue OS 893 would be deemed to have been withdrawn.

  13. Procedural history

  14. [14] On 27 September 2017, the AG applied for leave to serve the committal papers on the appellant out of jurisdiction. Leave was granted and the papers were duly served personally on the appellant on 17 October 2017, at his US address.

  15. [15] On 22 December 2017, the appellant applied to set aside the service of the committal papers in Summons 5843 of 2017 (“Summons 5843”). The Judge dismissed this application on 26 March 2018. It is this decision which is the subject of the appeal, and we elaborate on the Judge’s decision in greater detail below at [18] to [23].

  16. [16] The appellant was dissatisfied with the Judge’s decision in refusing to set aside the service of the committal papers. By Summons 1646 of 2018 (“Summons 1646”), the appellant applied for leave to appeal against the Judge’s decision. It was heard and dismissed by the Judge on 28 May 2018.

  17. [17] The appellant then sought leave from this court to appeal against the Judge’s decision in Summons 5843. We heard this application, Court of Appeal Originating Summons No 22 of 2018 (“CA/OS 22”), on 3 September 2018 and granted the appellant leave to appeal. At the hearing, we formulated two questions for the parties to address us in the appeal:

  18. Decision below

  19. [18] In Summons 5843, the Judge faced essentially the same two questions which are before us now. The Judge did not issue full written grounds for his decision, but engrossed his oral grounds of decision.

  20. [19] The Judge answered the first question by agreeing with the AG that s 7 of the SCJA was the proper basis for the court’s jurisdiction. He stated that “s 7 of the SCJA is the provision that both confers the power as well as the jurisdiction to commit for contempt”.

  21. [20] The Judge also rejected the appellant’s submission below that it was s 16 of the SCJA that formed the basis of the court’s jurisdiction over a foreign contemnor. He explained that it was “difficult to understand” how s 16, “which concerns the civil jurisdiction of the High Court, can be regarded as being applicable to contempt proceedings which are quasi-criminal in nature”.

  22. [21] As to the second question, the Judge was of the view that service was not required to found jurisdiction under s 7. That said, he noted that it was the parties’ agreed position that compliance with O 11 r 1 was necessary to serve the committal papers out of jurisdiction, although he also stated that he harboured “some doubt” as to the AG having made that concession. He indicated that he found himself driven to decide the question whether either O11 r 1(n) or (s), the two limbs relied upon by the AG, were satisfied. He held that they were. Limb (n) requires a claim under written law, and the Judge held that the relevant written law was s 7(1) of the SCJA. Similarly, limb (s) concerns an enforcement of the same written law, ie, s 7(1) of the SCJA.

  23. [22] The Judge noted, however, that it was not service in accordance with either limb that conferred jurisdiction. Rather, service merely played the role of giving notice to the appellant that contempt proceedings had been taken out against him. The court’s jurisdiction had already been established under s 7.

  24. [23] The Judge also concluded with a final observation that the entire exercise of requiring service under either limbs (n) or (s) was rendered somewhat moot by the introduction of the new limb in (t). The Judge observed that there was no reason to “depart from the general rule that procedural law applies retrospectively such that service on the [appellant] can now be effected under O 11 r 1(t)”. The Judge made a note that the AG accepted this proposition, and also made a note of the appellant’s counsel expressing the “tentative view that O 11 r 1(t) would be applicable” in support of a fresh application.

  25. The parties’ cases

  26. The appellant’s case

  27. The AG’s position has shifted in the appeal

  28. [25] The AG’s case, on the other hand, is not consistent. In fact, the AG’s case on appeal is a marked departure from his case below. We outline the positions the AG has taken in this litigation to show how his position has shifted from what it was before.

  29. [27] When the appellant’s application for leave to appeal in Summons 1646 was heard by the Judge, the AG reaffirmed his position that the court’s jurisdiction over the appellant’s contempt was based on s 7. So far as service under O 11 was concerned, the AG also explicitly clarified that it was never his position that service of the committal papers could be retrospectively justified by O 11 r 1(t), which was introduced only after service had been effected on the appellant.

  30. [28] When the parties appeared before us in CA/OS 22, there was again nothing to suggest that the AG had departed from the positions he had taken earlier. In particular, there was no suggestion that the AG would be relying on s 15 of the SCJA as establishing the High Court’s jurisdiction to hear contempt proceedings.

  31. [29] For the appeal proper, the AG now takes the position that the High Court’s jurisdiction to hear contempt proceedings is premised on s 15 of the SCJA, a conspicuous departure from his position below and throughout both leave to appeal applications that jurisdiction is instead based on s 7. The AG’s revised submission is that a scandalising contempt is a criminal contempt and therefore falls within the court’s criminal jurisdiction, which is established by s 15. Moreover, in addition to relying on limbs (n) and (s) of O 11, the AG now also seeks to rely on limb (t), which he had indicated to the Judge he would not be relying on, and also limb (p), which is mentioned for the first time in this appeal.

  32. [30] The strikingly different case the AG has adopted in this appeal has understandably attracted significant criticism from the appellant. The appellant argues that the AG should not be allowed to rely on s 15 as establishing the court’s contempt jurisdiction, the AG not having obtained leave to raise new points on appeal. The appellant also notes that the AG has committed an “about-turn” by relying on O 11 r 1(t), which he had expressly renounced before the Judge. Further, the AG’s “last-ditch attempt” to rely on O 11 r 1 (p) is without merit.

  33. [31] Before we explain why we permitted the parties to make submissions on s 15 and limbs (p) and (t) of O 11 at the oral hearing before us, we wish to make a few observations about the AG’s evolving positions in this litigation.

  34. [32] First, there is no question that the AG has significantly departed from his case below. This Court has consistently held that the AG is the guardian of the public interest: see ARW v Comptroller of Income Tax and another and another appeal [2018] SGCA 85 at [18]–[21]; Deepak Sharma v Law Society of Singapore [2017] 2 SLR 672 at [35] and Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345 at [35]. In the specific context of contempt cases, we have held that the AG is entitled to intervene even in private prosecutions for criminal contempt precisely because of his “unique and integral role as guardian of the public interest vis-à-vis the institution and conduct of all criminal proceedings”: Aurol Anthony Sabastian v Sembcorp Marine Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 246 (“Aurol”) at [53]. Although those comments were directed at criminal contempt, the common principle underlying civil contempt and criminal contempt is the prohibition of actions or omissions that thwart the proper administration of justice, as we explain below at [63]. It is also self-evident that the proper administration of justice serves the interests of the public at large, and not just the interests of any private litigant, even in a private prosecution for contempt. In discharging his responsibility of safeguarding the public interest, the AG should adopt a clear and consistent position as to the foundation of the court’s jurisdiction for contempt cases.

  35. [33] Second, the AG’s position on appeal has unwittingly created difficulties of his own doing. If contempt is based on the court’s criminal jurisdiction, then it is incumbent on the AG to adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the appellant was in the jurisdiction at the time he committed the offence. This is because the Singapore courts’ criminal jurisdiction does not have extra-territorial reach save for some exceptions which do not apply here. However, the only basis on which the AG alleges that the appellant was in Singapore is an article published by Reuters. This is clearly inadequate.

  36. [34] Third, the utility of the AG’s new approach in relying on s 15 is somewhat suspect given his position that proper service under one of the limbs of O 11 is still necessary. This means that s 15 does not really advance his case in any way but instead creates unnecessary confusion and difficulties as we will elaborate below.

  37. Issues to be determined

  38. [35] There are three issues to be decided in this appeal:

  39. (a) First, the preliminary issue whether the AG is entitled to rely on s 15 of the SCJA as the relevant provision establishing the court’s jurisdiction to hear contempt;

  40. (b) Second, what is the correct statutory basis for the court’s jurisdiction over a foreign contemnor; and

  41. (c) Third, if service is required, whether any of the limbs of O 11 identified by the AG to support service out of jurisdiction is satisfied.

  42. Preliminary issue: O 57 r 9A

  43. [37] The material difference in the two positions is that leave is required under O 57 r 9A(4)(b) but not under O 57 r 9A(5). However, both parties did not devote much attention as to whether the governing provision was O 57 r 9A(4)(b), or O 57 r 9A(5).

  44. [38] In our view, neither provision applies to permit the AG to advance the new point. We will discuss each provision in turn.

  45. O 57 r 9A(4)(b)

  46. [39] This court recently considered the scope and ambit of O 57 r 9A(4)(b) in Grace Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Te Deum Engineering Pte Ltd [2018] 1 SLR 76 (“Grace Electrical”). There, we observed that whether a party will be granted leave under O 57 r 9A(4)(b) to pursue a new point on appeal will be the subject of careful consideration in each case, having due regard to factors including (a) the nature of the parties’ arguments below; (b) whether the court below had considered and provided any findings and reasoning in relation to the new point; (c) whether further submissions, evidence or findings would have been necessitated had the new points been raised below; and (d) any prejudice that might result to the counterparty in the appeal if leave were to be granted: at [38]. On the facts of Grace Electrical itself, we granted leave to the appellant to raise new arguments before us because those arguments neither required an amendment of the pleadings, nor necessitated fresh evidence to be adduced: at [37]. This principle was recently cited with approval by this Court in Abhilash s/o Kunchian Krishnan v Yeo Hock Huat and another [2019] SGCA 14.

  47. [40] Applying the above principles to the present case, we are of the view that leave to introduce the point that s 15 of the SCJA forms the proper basis for the High Court’s contempt jurisdiction in this case would not have been granted under O 57 r 9A(4)(b). We say this for four reasons.

  48. [41] First, s 15 is an entirely new basis for jurisdiction which neither the parties nor this Court could reasonably have contemplated would be raised at this very late stage. The AG only raised this point in his Respondent’s Case, which was filed after the appellant had filed his Case in the appeal. The AG submitted during the oral hearing before us that he believed that the new point fell within the scope of the first question we posed to the parties (see above at [17]). We disagree. The leave to appeal hearing before us proceeded on the footing that it was only ss 7 and 16 of the SCJA which were in dispute. There was no mention whatsoever of s 15. It was on that premise that the questions were formulated for the parties. We did not, by framing those questions, give parties carte blanche to advance such strikingly different points as would involve the abandonment and reformulation of such a substantial part of their cases below, and indeed, their cases before us in the leave to appeal hearing.

  49. [42] Second, leave would also not have been granted because this was a point that had been expressly disavowed by the AG before the Judge: see [26] above. Although we permitted the appellant in Grace Electrical to raise new arguments on appeal that contradicted its pleadings, the present case is quite different. The present case is more akin to a party introducing an unpleaded point on appeal as opposed to raising a new point which merely contradicted its own pleadings. This is an important distinction. Where the point has at least been pleaded, the Court is entitled to expect that the other side would have had notice of the point, and would have made the necessary preparations both in terms of obtaining the relevant evidence and researching the relevant law. In other words, the other party would not have been caught entirely by surprise. But that cannot be said of a party who is faced with a point that was not only not advanced below, but was renounced by the other side altogether.

  50. [43] Third, we consider that the appellant would suffer prejudice if leave were granted, because the question whether the appellant was within the jurisdiction when he committed the alleged contempt simply did not arise in the court below. This question would be germane if the jurisdictional basis is premised on s 15. As a result, the evidence on record as to the appellant’s whereabouts at the material time rests on a single Reuters article. At the oral hearing, we probed Mr Vergis as to the appellant’s whereabouts at the material time, but he quite candidly and fairly stated that he did not have evidence on the matter. As this question was not an issue in the dispute below, we do not think that Mr Vergis can be criticised for not having addressed his mind to the question at hand, or for not wishing to give evidence from the Bar. The point remains that for the AG to make good his submission on s 15, it was incumbent on him to place more robust evidence before us to establish the appellant’s whereabouts at the time he committed the alleged contempt. We cannot rule out the possibility that the appellant would then have adduced evidence on this point. Therefore, the s 15 argument cannot be raised without the need to adduce fresh evidence as to the appellant’s whereabouts, which is a factor that militates against the grant of leave.

  51. [44] Fourth, given the state of the evidence and the AG’s case below, it was hardly surprising that the AG did not rely on s 15 before the Judge. It follows that we do not have the benefit of the Judge’s findings or reasons on this new argument. In Grace Electrical, we expressed the view that the efficiency and authority of an appellate court is increased and strengthened by the findings of judges who have considered the matter below: at [36]. We now find ourselves effectively in the position of a court of first instance on the applicability of s 15 (which is premised on a factual finding), which is at odds with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. This reason, too, tends against the grant of leave.

  52. O 57 r 9A(5)

  53. [45] We turn then to analyse O 57 r 9A(5). The AG relies on this particular provision, which has the advantage of not requiring leave of court for new arguments to be made on appeal. Instead, the provision speaks of a respondent affirming the decision on “grounds other than those relied upon” by the court below.

  54. [46] As we noted above, we did not have the advantage of the parties’ arguments as to the distinction between the “grounds” referred to in O 57 r 9A(5) and a “new point” referred to in O 57 r 9A(4)(b). Although this court in L Capital Jones and another v Maniach Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 312 (“Maniach”) had occasion to consider the scope of O 57 r 9A(5), our examination was limited to the question whether a successful respondent is entitled to rely on O 57 r 9A(5) to mount a case to affirm the judge’s ultimate decision by raising other arguments which did not find favour with the court below, without needing to file a cross-appeal. In holding that this was possible, we departed from our earlier decision in Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei [2010] 4 SLR 331. We observed at [60] that a more generous reading of O 57 r 9A(5) would allow “a successful respondent to indicate in its respondent’s case that it intends to contend at the appeal that the judge’s decision in its favour should additionally or alternatively be affirmed on other grounds that were not relied upon by the judge” [emphasis added]. It appears to us that the difference between these two provisions cannot be so drastic that reliance on other “grounds” under O 57 r 9A(5) can extend to permitting reliance on unpleaded points or points which require fresh evidence to be adduced. In our view, the purpose and scope of O 57 r 9A(5) is to permit a respondent to argue that the decision on appeal should be affirmed on grounds other than those relied upon by the court below without having to file a cross-appeal provided that the new grounds arise from the pleadings and neither party needs to adduce fresh evidence to address the new grounds. We therefore take the view that for the same four reasons espoused above in respect of O 57 r 9A(4)(b), the AG would likewise not have been granted leave under O 57 r 9A(5).

  55. [47] We ultimately allowed the parties to address us on s 15 at the hearing because of the novelty of the new point, and more importantly because Mr Vergis commendably indicated to us that he was prepared to address this question.

  56. Issue 1: The High Court’s jurisdiction to hear contempt proceedings

  57. The parties’ arguments

  58. [48] We come now to consider the first substantive issue, which concerns the statutory basis for the High Court to exercise substantive jurisdiction over a foreign contemnor at the time of the commencement of proceedings. The appellant’s case draws a distinction between the High Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and the High Court having personal jurisdiction over the foreign contemnor.

  59. [49] The appellant’s case is that the High Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because of its status as a superior court, in particular, because Article 93 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) (“the Constitution”) provides that “the judicial power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court …”. There is therefore no question that the High Court, which together with the Court of Appeal forms the Supreme Court, can hear a contempt, whether one classifies it as a civil or criminal contempt.

  60. [50] That said, the High Court would still need to have personal jurisdiction over the foreign contemnor. Jurisdiction would be established by s 16 of the SCJA, which sets out the High Court’s original civil jurisdiction, and which founds jurisdiction on service of the committal papers in accordance with O 11 of the ROC. The appellant highlights that the practice and procedures for contempt proceedings are set out in O 52 of the ROC which provides that contempt proceedings shall be initiated by way of originating summons, or by summons in existing proceedings. Section 16(1) of the SCJA in turn provides that the High Court has jurisdiction to hear and try any action in personam where the defendant is served with a writ of summons or any other originating process in the circumstances authorised by the ROC.

  61. [52] We pause to note that the Judge disagreed with both these bases. He instead found jurisdiction under s 7 of the SCJA: see above at [19].

  62. Analysis

  63. Difficulties with founding jurisdiction under s 15 of the SCJA

  64. [53] In our view, there are at least three difficulties with the AG’s case based on s 15 of the SCJA.

  65. (1) There is no real distinction in principle between civil and criminal contempt

  66. [54] The first has to do with a matter of principle. The AG’s case depends on a distinction being drawn between civil and criminal contempt, but we consider that there is no real substantive difference between the two in principle.

  67. [55] In his written Case, the AG’s position is that criminal contempt necessarily attracts the High Court’s criminal jurisdiction. The AG also accepted in oral arguments before us that the proper statutory basis for civil contempt lies in the civil jurisdiction of the Court. This being so, one would expect there to be real and important differences in the way in which each category of contempt is treated by the courts, particularly in terms of the standard of proof, evidentiary rules, and consequences that follow upon liability being established, if the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is to have any meaningful effect.

  68. [56] A perusal of the established jurisprudence shows, however, that civil contempt and criminal contempt are far more alike than they are different. This Court has held that both civil and criminal contempt proceedings are “quasi-criminal” in nature. In Shadrake Alan v Attorney-General [2011] 3 SLR 778 (“Shadrake”), we considered a case of scandalising contempt much like the present case, and held that “scandalising contempt is quasi-criminal in nature” at [80]. A scandalising contempt is, as the AG argues, a form of criminal contempt.

  69. [57] This court similarly examined the nature of civil contempt in our decision in Mok Kah Hong v Zheng Zhuan Yao [2016] 3 SLR 1 (“Mok Kah Hong”). That case concerned a husband’s failure to comply with a monetary judgment in favour of the wife in matrimonial proceedings. In commenting on the procedural rules in the context of civil contempt, we observed that those rules were “put in place to ensure that the liberty of the alleged contemnor is not, in any way, compromised due to the summary and quasi-criminal nature of the court’s jurisdiction in civil contempt” [emphasis added]: at [57]. We repeated this observation in the same decision in stating that the prohibition on curing defects in an O 52 statement was premised on the need, “given the quasi-criminal nature of committal proceedings” [emphasis added] to ensure that the information relied upon by the applicant is within the four corners of the O 52 statement itself: at [66]. This Court then cited Mok Kah Hong for this proposition in our decision in Tay Kar Oon v Tahir [2017] 2 SLR 342 at [29].

  70. [58] The attribution of the label “quasi-criminal” to both civil and criminal contempt arises out of substantive similarities in how both categories of contempt are treated. These similarities apply at each stage of the proceedings in either category of contempt. We need cite only three important common features.

  71. [60] These similarities between the two broad classes of contempt carry over into the standard of proof that we require an applicant to discharge in contempt proceedings. We have consistently held that the applicable standard of proof in both civil and criminal contempt is the same, ie, that of the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt: Pertamina Energy Trading Ltd v Karaha Bodas Co LLC and others [2007] 2 SLR(R) 518 (“Pertamina”) at [31], and Mok Kah Hong at [85].

  72. [61] Further, penal consequences also apply to cases of civil contempt, and are not confined only to cases of criminal contempt. Mok Kah Hong itself is a case in point. This was a case of civil contempt, but we were satisfied that the husband’s contempt of court warranted a stiff imprisonment term of eight months.

  73. [62] It should be apparent from the above discussion that the substantive law and procedural rules of contempt proceedings straddle the divide between ordinary civil proceedings and conventional criminal offences. Contempt borrows concepts, procedures, and practices from both civil and criminal processes. Moreover, the rules and procedure are substantially the same, whether one speaks of civil or criminal contempt.

  74. [63] This similarity in substance and procedure is readily comprehensible, and indeed, intuitive, once we consider that both categories of contempt are, at their hearts, directed towards the same goal: preserving the proper administration of justice. The common theme that runs through contempt cases is that the law of contempt is aimed at protecting the proper administration of justice. In Shadrake, a case involving criminal contempt, we said this:

  75. [64] Those observations echoed our earlier statements in the case of Pertamina, which was a case of civil contempt:

  76. [65] Our recent decision in Tay Kar Oon puts it beyond doubt that there is a dimension of public interest even for cases of civil contempt; and that underlying these cases is the common concern with criminal contempt that the proper administration of justice not be undermined. Tay Kar Oon was a case where a private litigant sought to withdraw committal proceedings it had commenced against the other party. Notwithstanding that, the Judge exercised his jurisdiction to commit the offending party on his own motion. We agreed that the Judge was justified in doing so, and observed thus at [38], reaffirming our observations in Pertamina:

  77. [66] The fact that the public interest is implicated in all contempt cases is further buttressed by our decision in Aurol, where we held that even private litigants who seek to initiate private prosecutions for criminal contempt should consult the AG before doing so. As we have explained above, the AG is the guardian of the public interest, and the public interest also features even in a private prosecution (at [50]):

  78. [67] The common thread that runs through our local jurisprudence is therefore that civil contempt and criminal contempt share the same purpose: to protect the proper administration of justice. In our view, this unity of objective – as concretised and manifested in the similarities of procedure employed in both categories of contempt – shows that there is no reason in principle to give the distinction between the categories of contempt such significance that criminal contempt should be found to rest on the High Court’s criminal jurisdiction, and civil contempt on the High Court’s civil jurisdiction.

  79. (2) Criminal contempt cases are not treated in the same way as criminal offences

  80. [68] We turn then to examine the second difficulty we have with the AG’s approach. The AG relies on the history of the law of contempt to make the point that criminal contempt has always been classified as a criminal matter. According to the AG, it follows from “the historical nature of criminal contempt being part of the criminal law and a criminal offence”, and the recognition by the English courts that criminal contempt proceedings were a “criminal cause or matter”, that the courts’ jurisdiction to try criminal contempt has always been based on its criminal jurisdiction.

  81. [69] We find, however, that even on the AG’s historical analysis it is highly doubtful that criminal contempt was treated the same way as ordinary criminal offences such that they necessarily fell within the criminal jurisdiction of the courts. We will take the AG’s submission in parts.

  82. [70] First, the AG relies on Singapore jurisprudence that has consistently referred to cases of criminal contempt in the language of criminal law. In particular, the AG emphasises that several cases dealing with scandalising contempt have consistently termed such contempt as an “offence” – see Attorney-General v Pang Cheng Lian and others [1974–1976] SLR(R) 271, Attorney-General v Wong Hong Toy [1983–1984] SLR(R) 34, Attorney-General v Chee Soon Juan [2006] 2 SLR(R) 650, and Attorney-General v Hertzberg Daniel and others [2009] 1 SLR(R) 1103 (“Hertzberg”).

  83. [72] Second, the AG’s submission appears to rest essentially on the slender authority of one textbook, Gordon Borrie & Nigel Lowe, The Law of Contempt (Butterworths, 1973) (“Borrie & Lowe”), where it is stated in the introductory chapter of the book that “[t]he rules [of criminal contempt] form part of the criminal law”. The AG has, however, quite fairly also drawn our attention to an extract from a separate chapter from the same book which raises doubts as to the correctness of this classification. The authors say in Chapter 9 “Procedure and Powers of the Courts in respect of Criminal Contempts”, the following:

  84. [73] This extract illustrates that a criminal contempt cannot be said to be just like any other criminal offence, which would fall to be tried in the court’s criminal jurisdiction under s 15 of the SCJA. Indeed, the last part of the extract is telling in suggesting that it was the Civil Division of the English Court of Appeal that had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a criminal contempt, but not the Criminal Division of the same court.

  85. [74] Other academic textbooks indicate the same difficulty in simply saying that a criminal contempt is like any other criminal offence. C J Miller, Contempt of Court (Elek Books, 1976), essentially repeats (at p 3) the observations in Borrie & Lowe:

  86. [75] Third, we are also unable to derive much assistance from the AG’s reliance on the historical split of the court’s civil and criminal jurisdictions as early as the Courts Ordinance of 1907 (SS Ord No 30 of 1907) (“1907 Ordinance”) to argue that “criminal contempt” is just as much a “criminal matter” as any other criminal offence, and thus historically fell within the court’s criminal jurisdiction.

  87. [76] The 1907 Ordinance split the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements’ jurisdiction into its original civil jurisdiction, under s 9, and its original criminal jurisdiction, under s 10. The material part of s 10 of the 1907 Ordinance provides that the Supreme Court should have the jurisdiction “within the Colony held and exercised in England in Criminal matters by His Majesty’s High Court of Justice and the several Judges thereof” [emphasis added]. The question that follows is what is a “criminal matter”.

  88. [77] The AG attempts to construct a bridge between “criminal contempts” to “criminal matters” by his reference to the cases of O’Shea v O’Shea and Parnell (1890) 15 PD 59 (“O’Shea”), and R v Barnardo (1889) 23 QB 305 (“Barnardo”). These cases help illuminate the distinction between criminal contempt and civil contempt, and are commonly cited for this purpose despite their considerable vintage. Those cases were decided at a time when classification as a criminal or civil matter had an important and material impact on the parties’ rights. Before the Administration of Justice Act 1960 (c 65) (UK) (“Administration of Justice Act 1960”) was passed, s 47 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict c 66) (UK) (“1873 Judicature Act”) provided that there was no right of appeal from any criminal cause or matter.

  89. [79] In reliance on O’Shea, the AG submits that it was the criminal nature of the offender’s actions there that “formed the basis on which the Court could try and punish the act independently of the underlying divorce case”. Further, because it involved a criminal matter, it could not be appealed. It is therefore implied that what the Court did in trying and punishing the criminal contempt was to consider it as a criminal cause or matter, and by extension that must have been founded on its criminal jurisdiction, as opposed to the civil jurisdiction which governed the underlying divorce suit.

  90. [80] In our view, although the Court of Appeal in O’Shea was certainly alive to the distinction between criminal and civil contempt, nothing suggests that it directed its mind to the question whether it was the High Court’s civil or criminal jurisdiction that was called upon in that case. Indeed, it is clear to us that the Court of Appeal in O’Shea simply could not have addressed the issue of jurisdiction because at that time the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the High Court was fused pursuant to s 16 of the 1873 Judicature Act. The appellant is correct that the High Court of Justice’s original civil and criminal jurisdiction was then not split and therefore it was unlikely that the court in O’Shea was alive to the significance of the divide between the court’s civil or criminal jurisdiction. The most that can fairly be said is that the Court of Appeal was certainly aware of the dichotomy in s 47 of the 1873 Judicature Act that made criminal matters non-appealable, and civil matters appealable. But that appears to be a matter of appellate jurisdiction, and not the High Court’s original civil or criminal jurisdiction.

  91. [82] This commentary suggests that the distinction drawn between civil and criminal contempt may not always have been based on principle. Or if it was, it was based on a principle that even English law by 1960 considered to be outdated, because the Administration of Justice Act 1960 allowed both civil and criminal contempt to be appealed. In our view, there is no utility to be had from reviving this outdated distinction and giving it such importance in the analysis. Indeed, the differences between the two categories of contempt have considerably narrowed to the point that they are virtually indistinguishable in the three material aspects we identified above at [59] to [61]. The modern law of contempt, therefore, does not purport to attach such weight to the classification of civil and criminal contempt as would justify their different juridical treatment.

  92. (3) It is incongruous to require service of committal papers in compliance with O 11 if service does not establish jurisdiction

  93. [83] Further, if the AG is correct that criminal contempt cases are founded on the court’s criminal jurisdiction, we have difficulty accepting the AG’s explanations as to why service in accordance with O 11 is still required. It is the AG’s position that the ROC still governs the procedure for criminal contempt, and that service of originating process, as mandated by O 52 of the ROC, is still required. Service does not, however, have the function of conferring jurisdiction on the courts, but merely notifies the alleged contemnor of the commencement of committal proceedings against him.

  94. [84] The AG traces the use of the ROC in cases of criminal contempt to the pre-independence decision of Re Abdul Aziz’s Application (1962) 28 MLJ 64. In that case, two originating motions were filed against two alleged contemnors to show cause why writs of attachment should not issue against them. The alleged contemnors applied to set aside the notices of motion on account of various procedural defects. The motions were set aside by Rose CJ on the ground that applications for attachment for contempt could not be made without leave, but such leave had not been granted (at 66D).

  95. [86] The AG relies on Re Abdul Aziz to argue that the reason why civil procedure rules govern applications for criminal contempt in Singapore today is because of the judicial pronouncement in Re Abdul Aziz; and not because the jurisdictional basis to try criminal contempt is to be found in s 16(1) of the SCJA or any of its legislative precursors.

  96. [87] In our view, Re Abdul Aziz does not support the AG’s submission. There was no discussion in Re Abdul Aziz whether Rose CJ in setting aside the motions did so because the failure to obtain leave was a failure to give proper notice of proceedings for attachment for contempt, as the AG suggests; or a more fundamental failure – that without proper service the court had no jurisdiction whatsoever, as the appellant would suggest. Re Abdul Aziz itself does not answer this question. Both explanations are equally plausible. The AG therefore cannot derive any assistance from Re Abdul Aziz.

  97. [88] The AG also refers to the decision in R v The Council of the Metropolitan Borough of Poplar [1922] 1 KB 95 which involved a failure to serve the rule nisi for attachment on a number of individuals. The Court of Appeal considered that this was a flaw in the proceedings, because “it is common justice that, where individuals are to be charged with contempt and threatened with attachment, they should have the opportunity of exculpating themselves”: at 108. That said, the Court of Appeal considered that this irregularity could be waived, and indeed it was waived by the individuals choosing to appear in the proceedings: at 108.

  98. [89] The AG suggests that the very fact of a waiver means that service only had the function of notice. But this conclusion also does not follow. It could equally mean that although personal jurisdiction had not been properly established because of the failure to serve the rule nisi, nevertheless jurisdiction was established because the individuals submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by appearing before the court and addressing the court.

  99. [90] Quite apart from the absence of authority to support the point that service merely has the function of notice, we also consider it incongruous with the general body of criminal procedure that committal papers for criminal contempt, which on the AG’s case ought to be considered a form of criminal process, are required to be served in accordance with O 11 of the ROC.

  100. [91] First, there is the incongruity that arises from the fact that the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) governs the procedure for criminal proceedings in respect of the general body of criminal offences, whereas on the AG’s case, criminal contempt stands apart from the general body and its procedure falls to be administered under the civil procedure rules set out in the ROC. Indeed, as the appellant rightly points out, O 1 r 2 of the ROC expressly excludes the application of the Rules to “criminal proceedings”, which fall within the purview of the CPC instead. There has been no satisfactory explanation as to why criminal contempt, if it is truly to be considered part of the general body of criminal law, makes use of civil procedure instead.

  101. [92] Second, on the AG’s case that criminal contempt is premised on the court’s criminal jurisdiction, it should not be overlooked that in the present case, we are concerned with service of the committal papers outside jurisdiction. As the jurisdiction to try criminal offences is territorial in nature (subject to some limited exceptions which do not apply here), service of criminal process is likewise territorial in nature and governed by the CPC. Indeed, if service of criminal process was not territorial in nature and criminal process could always be served extraterritorially, then s 15 of MACMA would never have had to be enacted. Section 15 provides thus:

  102. [93] The AG’s case, however, requires us to accept that service of process for criminal contempts stands as an exception to the territorial limits of service of criminal process, because O 52 empowers the AG to serve process for criminal contempts out of the jurisdiction if any of the scenarios in O 11 is satisfied. But this does not logically follow from the premise of his case, which is that criminal contempts are like other criminal offences, for which criminal process cannot be served outside the jurisdiction. This, too, is an incongruity that has not been adequately explained.

  103. [94] Third, on the AG’s case, it is curious that it is still necessary to satisfy the requirements in O 11 for service out, even for the limited purpose of notification. This submission ignores the purpose behind the clearly demarcated scenarios in O 11 which this Court explained in Burgundy Global Exploration Corp v Transocean Offshore International Ventures Ltd and another appeal [2014] 3 SLR 381 (“Burgundy”). There, we observed that the effect of service in compliance with O 11 is that the Singapore court takes jurisdiction over a person outside Singapore’s territory. This is considered to be an exorbitant jurisdiction as the foundation for a court’s jurisdiction is primarily territorial. Considerations of international comity therefore enter the picture and require that the scenarios in O 11 be carefully delimited and defined. We observed the following (at [93]):

  104. [95] On the AG’s suggested approach, the court already has jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the alleged offence was committed in Singapore. As it is not assuming jurisdiction over a person located outside its territory, there should thus be no concern of impinging upon the sovereignty and authority of another State, which considerations of international comity would require be carefully circumscribed by the defined scenarios set out in the various limbs of O 11 r 1. The mere giving of notice ought not to offend a foreign sovereign; there is no exercise of authority involved in giving notice. The situation stands entirely outside the conflict rules concerning the court’s jurisdiction which undergird the existence of O 11 itself, as the extract from Burgundy above makes clear. Thus compliance with O 11 of the ROC should be entirely unnecessary on the AG’s case.

  105. The statutory basis for the High Court’s jurisdiction to hear a contempt

  106. [96] Having considered the significant difficulties posed by the AG’s approach, we turn now to consider the appellant’s argument that personal jurisdiction over a contemnor is established under s 16 of the SCJA.

  107. [97] We state at the outset that we prefer the appellant’s approach that the substantive subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and try contempt is based on the court’s inherent jurisdiction, while personal jurisdiction over a foreign contemnor falls to be established under the procedures specified in s 16 of the SCJA read with O 11 of the ROC.

  108. (1) Subject-matter jurisdiction: the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to hear contempt

  109. [98] In Aurol, we discussed the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to punish for contempt. We stated that this jurisdiction was an inherent one, and that s 7(1) of the SCJA, which statutorily expresses the High Court’s and the Court of Appeal’s power to punish for contempt of court, merely preserved that inherent jurisdiction to protect the court’s own process and authority by proceeding on its own motion in cases where its authority is threatened or undermined: at [59]. We noted that the judicial power of Singapore is vested in Singapore by virtue of Art 93 of the Constitution, which reads:

  110. [99] And we considered that it was a necessary corollary of the judicial power being vested in the court that the court is able to act within its inherent jurisdiction and on its own authority in the administration of justice by exercising its powers to punish for contempt: Aurol at [64].

  111. [100] We acknowledge that our decision in Aurol was given before our later decision in Re Nalpon Zero Geraldo Mario [2013] 3 SLR 258 (“Re Zero Nalpon”), where we drew a distinction between the courts’ inherent jurisdiction and inherent powers. But we do not think that our decision in Re Zero Nalpon alters the substance of our decision in Aurol that the substantive subject-matter jurisdiction of the court to hear and punish for contempt lies within our inherent jurisdiction.

  112. [102] We then considered the “inherent jurisdiction” of the court and described it in the following terms:

  113. [103] In our view, the conceptual framework we set out in Re Zero Nalpon as regards the distinction between a court’s “jurisdiction” and “power” is correct. That having been said, it is necessary for us to explain why this distinction does not impact on our decision in this case.

  114. [104] In our view, it is appropriate to say that the High Court and the Court of Appeal possess an inherent jurisdiction – and not only inherent powers – to hear and punish cases of contempt. This is because the High Court and the Court of Appeal have an inherent authority, derived from their status as superior courts of law, to hear cases of contempt of court. In Re Zero Nalpon, this court questioned the use of the expression “inherent jurisdiction” in cases where the court was already seized of jurisdiction to hear a dispute, and was merely exercising powers to make certain orders or grant certain reliefs in the action: Re Zero Nalpon at [36]–[40]. Under those circumstances, we held that “it would be inaccurate to state that the court had to invoke an inherent ‘jurisdiction’ to give the authority to determine the dispute”: at [36]. We do not question the correctness of those observations. But the jurisdiction to try cases of contempt stands apart from those cases.

  115. [105] In our judgment, it is clear that certain categories of contempt do not depend on the existence of pending proceedings before the court can make a finding of contempt. The present category, scandalising contempt, is a case in point. A scandalising contempt can be committed by a stranger to any proceedings before the courts, and can be directed not at any particular court or judge hearing a pending dispute, but at the institution of the judiciary in general. Thus, when a court punishes such a contempt, it is not merely exercising a power to punish, which is correctly termed a “power”, but is also acting on its inherent authority to hear and decide such a matter. Not having been seized of jurisdiction in respect of this contemnor, the court can only exercise its powers to punish such a contemnor if it has authority over the conduct complained of as well as the individual who made that contemptuous statement. It is right to say that the court has the authority to hear the contempt: the power to punish in such a scenario is not directed towards ensuring compliance by a party with its orders in a pending or decided matter and thus does not emerge out of proceedings in which the court is already seized of jurisdiction, but rather is premised on the court’s interest in ensuring that the proper administration of justice is protected, which in turn lies within the particular province of the courts as the institution in which the State’s judicial power is vested.

  116. [106] The question that follows is whether those categories of contempt that arise out of pending proceedings before the courts, for example, disobedience of court orders in pending litigation, also fall within the court’s inherent jurisdiction. We consider that they do as well, because the categories of contempt, whether civil or criminal, share the same unitary aim of protecting the proper administration of justice, and it is to assist the judiciary in discharging its primary duty of maintaining a fair and effective administration of justice that the law of contempt as a whole exists.

  117. [107] Similar observations have also been expressed in the case law. In R v Lefroy (1873) LR 134 (QB), the Court of Queen’s Bench observed thus (at 137):

  118. [108] Similarly, in Seaward v Paterson [1897] 1 Ch 545, which the Court in Aurol considered, the English Court of Appeal made clear that it was acting on the basis of its own inherent right to punish conduct that obstructs the course of justice in finding that a stranger to the litigation who had aided and abetted a breach of an injunction was in contempt of court. Rigby LJ observed at 559–560:

  119. [109] More recent pronouncements of the law share the same view. In Gilbert Ahnee and others v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 2 AC 294 (“Ahnee”), the question that came before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was whether the Supreme Court of Mauritius had an inherent power to punish for contempt, when the Constitution of Mauritius contemplated the enactment of a law conferring such power on the Supreme Court, but no such law had been enacted by the legislature. The Board concluded that there was such an inherent power, stating the following (at 303D):

  120. Although the Board in Ahnee spoke of an inherent “power”, it is clear to us that it was actually referring to the inherent jurisdiction of the court; the distinction between jurisdiction and power has not always been recognised or appreciated, and it was not material to the decision in Ahnee. In fact, the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court cited by the Board makes specific reference to an “inherent jurisdiction”. It seems to us that the terms were used interchangeably in Ahnee.

  121. [110] Similar pronouncements have been expressed by other leading common law courts – see the decision of the High Court of Australia in Re Colina and another, ex parte Torney [1999] 200 CLR 386 (at 395) and the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in E M Sankaran Namboodripad v T Narayanan Nambiar (1970) 2 SCC 325 (at [6]).

  122. [111] The weight of judicial authority is thus clearly to the effect that the authority of the High Court and Court of Appeal to hear contempt cases is inherent to their very existence as the institutions in which the judicial power of the State is vested, and the institutions charged with safeguarding and superintending the proper administration of justice.

  123. [112] We recognise that s 7 of the SCJA sets out the power of the High Court and the Court of Appeal to punish for contempt, and thus places that power on a statutory footing. But, as we have held in Aurol, s 7 merely preserves the inherent jurisdiction. In our view, the inherent jurisdiction remains, and s 7 is merely an additional and sufficient basis for the power to punish for contempt. Section 7 of the SCJA confers jurisdiction on the High Court and the Court of Appeal to hear and punish for contempt, but it does not create the jurisdiction, which has always existed. Indeed, we note that the Privy Council in Ahnee essentially arrived at the same view when it observed that the superior courts of Mauritius had an inherent power to punish contempt, but that s 15 of the Courts Act (Law of Mauritius, 1996 rev, vol 2), which also sets out a power to punish for contempt, was an “additional and sufficient basis” to punish for contempt: at 305B.

  124. [113] Further, although the Court in Re Zero Nalpon stated that the jurisdiction of the courts is purely statutory (at [20]), we think that it follows from our analysis above that the law of contempt stands as an exception to that general rule. It is an exception because the courts’ jurisdiction to hear and punish for contempt is, as the above authorities make clear, a natural and immutable consequence of its existence as the institution charged with the role of administering and dispensing justice, and thus the jurisdiction came into existence upon courts themselves being created, at least so far as the High Court and the Court of Appeal as superior courts of law are concerned.

  125. (2) Personal jurisdiction over the individual contemnor: s 16 SCJA

  126. [114] Having established that the High Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and punish for contempt is an inherent one that also finds expression in s 7 of the SCJA, we turn now to consider the question how the court assumes personal jurisdiction over a foreign contemnor.

  127. [115] In our judgment, it is proper service that establishes jurisdiction over a foreign contemnor. Thus, jurisdiction over a foreign contemnor is established where service has been made in accordance with s 16 of the SCJA read with O 11 of the ROC. There are several reasons for this determination.

  128. [116] First, it is apparent to us that civil procedure and processes have always been relied on to establish jurisdiction over any contemnor, whether the contempt complained of is civil contempt or criminal contempt. The current iteration of the ROC, the 2014 Revised Edition, sets out the procedure in respect of contempt in O 52, which requires that in all cases of contempt, the ex parte originating summons or, if there are pending proceedings, a summons, and other documents set out therein must be “served personally on the person sought to be committed”. As a matter of plain statutory language, O 52 makes no distinction between civil and criminal contempt. Service of originating process is an integral mode of commencing civil proceedings and, with limited statutory exceptions, forms the foundation of the court’s civil jurisdiction. It therefore follows that it is the civil jurisdiction of the court that is engaged where personal jurisdiction is sought to be established over the contemnor by such service.

  129. [117] The AG argues that it has not always been the case that originating process had to be personally served on the contemnor, and thus service of originating process cannot establish personal jurisdiction over the contemnor, thereby calling into question whether it is truly the court’s civil jurisdiction that is engaged. In this regard, the AG points out that pursuant to O 52 r 3(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 (GN No S 274/1970) (“RSC 1970”), only the committal application, statement and supporting affidavit had to be served, but not the leave application. It was only in the Singapore Rules of Court 1996 (GN No S 71/1996) that O 52 r 3(4) required that the leave application also be personally served, and it was only in 2005 that the leave application came to be made by ex parte originating summons.

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