Court of Appeal · Decided 30 September 2019
Bi Xiaoqiong (in her personal capacity and as trustee of the Xiao Qiong Bi Trust and the Alisa Wu Irrevocable Trust) v China Medical Technologies, Inc (in liquidation) and another
Feedback & support[2019] SGCA 50 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 188 of 2018
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Introduction
- [2]
[2] Lawyers and other persons who have followed the development of case law and arguments on the question over the years would be aware that some members of this court had previously held differing views as to the extent of the court’s power to grant Mareva injunctions in support of foreign court proceedings. Thus, although we gave oral grounds for our decision at the end of the appeal hearing, we set out at some length in this judgment the arguments and the reasons why this court made the determination it did.
Background facts
Parties to the dispute
- [3]
[3] The first respondent, China Medical Technologies, Inc (“CMT”), was incorporated in the Cayman Islands. Its wholly-owned subsidiary, CMED Technologies Ltd (“CMED”), the second respondent, was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. CMT’s principal business was developing, manufacturing and marketing advanced surgical and medical equipment in China. This business was short-lived as CMT was wound up on 27 July 2012.
- [4]
[4] Mr Wu Xiaodong (“Mr Wu”) founded CMT and ran it until it was wound up. He was the largest shareholder of CMT, holding 23% of its issued share capital through a company called Chengxuan International Ltd.
- [5]
[5] The appellant is Ms Bi Xiaoqiong (“Ms Bi” or “the appellant”). She is a Singapore citizen. Ms Bi and Mr Wu were married in 1995. They were divorced in 2012 but Ms Bi claims that they separated in 2001 and lived apart thereafter.
- [6]
[6] After investigating the affairs of CMT and CMED, the liquidators of CMT (“the Liquidators”) took the view that as much as US$521.8m had been fraudulently misappropriated from the respondents by members of their former management. The respondents therefore started a series of legal proceedings against these persons in both Hong Kong and Singapore. The present action, in which Mr Wu and Ms Bi are the defendants, is one such proceeding.
- [7]
[7] In brief, the background of the alleged fraud is as follows. Between 2005 and 2010, CMT raised capital of approximately US$631m, and had US$515m of that capital at its disposal. Between February 2007 and October 2008, the respondents entered into two transactions for the acquisition of medical technology from Supreme Well Investments Limited (“SW”) for a total consideration of US$521.8m (“the Transactions”). Allegations were made subsequently that CMT’s management had acted fraudulently in respect of the Transactions.
- [8]
[8] Their investigations led the Liquidators to the view that Mr Wu and other members of the respondents’ management had procured the conclusion of the Transactions by withholding from CMT’s full board of directors: (a) details of their personal interests in the Transactions; (b) the fact that the chief financial officer of CMT at the time was also the sole authorised signatory of SW’s bank accounts; and (c) the fact that the medical technology sought to be acquired in the Transactions was worthless.
- [9]
[9] In particular, the Liquidators discovered that the respondents had acquired only patent applications through the Transactions, and that none of the technology acquired had the necessary regulatory approval for sale and use in China at the time. The Liquidators were also advised by experts that the technology acquired was of little value because: (a) the technology acquired in the first transaction had already been in existence for almost 30 years; and (b) the technology acquired in the second transaction did not have any clinical application, and was “inherently unsuited to use in clinical diagnosis”.
- [10]
[10] In the circumstances, in the various lawsuits the respondents alleged that the Transactions were used as a means of “stealing US$521.8 million of purported purchase consideration, paid through a series of banking transactions involving Hong Kong bank accounts” controlled by CMT’s former management. Of the total of US$521.8m, between 2006 and as late as 2011:
(a) US$355.5m was paid by the respondents via cashier orders to SW’s bank accounts. The funds were later transferred from SW’s bank accounts to bank accounts of various other persons and entities (“the SW Payees”), all of whom were associated with or controlled by the former management of CMT. The payment out of SW’s bank accounts to the SW Payees took place, in many instances, within days of SW receiving the funds. From the SW Payees, the funds were then transferred to other persons and entities (“the Further SW Payees”), a number of whom were associated with or controlled by the former management of CMT. The Further SW Payees include Mr Wu and Ms Bi. From the Further SW Payees, the funds were often further transferred to other recipients.
(b) The balance of US$166.3m was paid to SW through other means, such as bank transfers and cheques.
- [11]
[11] Mr Wu was subsequently indicted on criminal charges relating to the alleged fraud in the United States of America (“the US”). Ms Bi denied being in any way complicit in the alleged fraud. She claimed that she had no involvement in CMT and its affiliates, except in respect of a Singapore subsidiary, CMT Diagnostics (Singapore) Pte Ltd. She also denied having any knowledge of the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty or trust by the perpetrators of the fraud, or that the moneys received in her bank accounts were the proceeds of the alleged fraud.
Procedural history
The Hong Kong Proceedings
- [12]
[12] On 1 August 2013, CMT commenced proceedings in Hong Kong by way of High Court Action No 1417 of 2013 (“the first HK Suit”) against Mr Wu and four others, claiming, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duties, breach of trust, conspiracy, money had and received, and knowing receipt, in respect of four specific payments made from CMT to SW. On 23 December 2016, the respondents commenced another set of proceedings in Hong Kong by way of High Court Action 3391 of 2016 (“the second HK Suit”) against Mr Wu, Ms Bi and 21 other defendants. The second HK Suit was for causes of action that were similar to those pursued in the first HK Suit, but were in respect of a broader class of payments, namely, any or all payments made between November 2006 and December 2009 by the respondents and their subsidiaries to SW, its subsidiaries and/or its nominees. Ms Bi was served with the writ for the second HK Suit through her solicitors in Singapore.
- [13]
[13] On 11 December 2017, the Hong Kong High Court, pursuant to an application made in the second HK Suit, granted the respondents a worldwide Mareva injunction against, among others, Mr Wu and Ms Bi (“the HK Injunction”). The HK Injunction restrained Ms Bi from removing from Hong Kong any of her assets up to a total value of at least US$17.6m. It also provided that she was not to dispose of or deal with any of her assets, whether within or outside Hong Kong, unless she had assets with a total value of at least US$17.6m. The terms of the HK Injunction specifically identified, inter alia, property and bank accounts in Singapore.
The Singapore proceedings
(a) a property at 17 Coral Island Singapore which she holds jointly with Mr Wu (“the Coral Island Property”);
(b) moneys in an account with United Overseas Bank (“UOB”), held jointly with Mr Wu;
(c) moneys in two other UOB accounts and one account with Standard Chartered Bank, held in her own name;
(d) moneys in a UOB account in the name of WB International Holding Pte Ltd (“WB International”); and
(e) moneys in an account with Credit Suisse AG, Singapore Branch (“Credit Suisse Singapore”), in the name of Long Chart Investments Limited (“Long Chart”).
- [15]
[15] Long Chart and WB International are alleged to be two of the Further SW Payees (see above at [10(a)]), and are defendants in the second HK Suit. The respondents claimed that the appellant controlled Long Chart and WB International for the purposes of perpetrating and concealing the fraud, and/or laundering its proceeds for her benefit. Long Chart is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. It is alleged to have received at least US$3m of the stolen funds. WB International is a company incorporated in Singapore. It is alleged to have received at least US$0.5m of the stolen funds. The appellant is alleged to be the sole director and shareholder of both Long Chart and WB International. At the hearing below, the appellant’s counsel accepted that the moneys in both entities “belong to [the appellant], as there is no other person who has an interest in [the] two companies”.
- [16]
[16] The writ of summons for Suit 1180 and the papers for SUM 5689 were served on the appellant on 18 December 2017 and shortly thereafter she entered appearance to the action. The appellant thus accepted the in personam jurisdiction of the court and, in fact, has not thereafter sought to challenge it.
- [17]
[17] On 4 January 2018, the High Court granted the respondents’ application for a Mareva injunction against Mr Wu in SUM 5689 on an ex parte basis. Mr Wu was unrepresented at that hearing but counsel for the appellant appeared and requested an inter partes hearing in so far as the appellant was concerned. The court agreed and adjourned the hearing of SUM 5689 in respect of the appellant.
- [18]
[18] On 20 February 2018, the respondents applied by way of Summons No 878 of 2018 (“SUM 878”) to stay Suit 1180, save for the proceedings in SUM 5689, pending the final determination of the first and second HK Suits. The respondents made clear that they intended to pursue the proceedings in Hong Kong because they considered Hong Kong to be “the most appropriate forum for the dispute”. The respondents sought a stay of the Singapore proceedings so as to “avoid duplicative proceedings”.
Decision below
- [19]
[19] The respondents’ applications for a stay of the proceedings and for a Mareva injunction against the appellant were heard together by the Judicial Commissioner (“the Judge”) and were granted on 13 August 2018. Full reasons for this decision were set out by the Judge in China Medical Technologies, Inc (in liquidation and another v Wu Xiaodong and another [2018] SGHC 178 (“the Judgment”).
- [20]
[20] In relation to the injunction application, the appellant’s case was that a Singapore court had no power to grant a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign court proceedings and that, even if the court had such power, the injunction should not be granted.
- [21]
[21] The Judge held that the court had the power in the circumstances before her to grant a Mareva injunction. Her reasons were as follows:
(a) It was not disputed that the respondents have a “reasonable accrued cause of action recognisable in a Singapore court”, that Mr Wu and the appellant have assets in Singapore that could be subject to the injunction, and that the court has in personam jurisdiction over the appellant as she was properly served with the writ herein.
(c) The prerequisites for the exercise of the court’s power to grant a Mareva injunction are, following Siskina (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) and others v Distos Compania Naviera SA [1979] AC 210 (“The Siskina”), that the court must have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant and the plaintiff must have a reasonable accrued cause of action recognisable by the court.
(d) With regard to the requirement that a plaintiff must have an “accrued cause of action against the defendant that is justiciable in a Singapore court”, a claim is justiciable if “it is one for a substantive relief which the court has jurisdiction to grant and is a claim that can be tried by that court” [emphasis in original]. That the court subsequently declines to do so in favour of proceedings elsewhere does not make the cause of action non-justiciable in that court.
- [22]
[22] Having established that the court had the power to grant a Mareva injunction against the appellant, the Judge went on to consider whether that power ought to be exercised in the instant case. We discuss this part of the Judgment in more detail below but, briefly, the Judge held that the facts justified the grant of the injunction applied for because:
(a) The claims against the appellant were for dishonest assistance in the alleged fraud, knowing receipt of the stolen proceeds, and restitution for moneys had and received and at least claims for knowing receipt, and moneys had and received crossed the threshold of a good arguable case.
(b) There was also solid evidence to demonstrate a real risk of asset dissipation by the appellant.
(c) An injunction could be granted against the appellant to prevent her from disposing of moneys in the bank accounts held in the names of WB International and Long Chart, “as the moneys in those accounts are in truth [the appellant’s] assets”.
- [23]
[23] The Judge allowed the respondents’ application in SUM 878 to stay Suit 1180 “as it [was] not disputed that Hong Kong is the more appropriate forum for the dispute”.
Issues that arose in the appeal
- [24]
[24] Initially, Ms Bi appealed against the Judge’s decision on both applications – Civil Appeal No 188 of 2018 (“CA 188) was her appeal against the decision to issue an injunction against her while Civil Appeal No 165 of 2018 (“CA 165”) was her appeal against the decision to stay the Singapore proceedings.
- [25]
[25] During the hearing, we indicated to counsel for the appellant, Mr Hee Theng Fong, that his position in CA 165 undermined his submissions in respect of CA 188. Mr Hee, quite correctly in our view, recognised this difficulty, and therefore sought leave to withdraw CA 165. We granted leave, and therefore shall not address the merits of the appeal in CA 165, except to explain below why we took the view that it undermined the appellant’s case in CA 188.
- [26]
[26] In the circumstances, the following broad issues arose for our consideration:
(a) whether the High Court had the power to grant a Mareva injunction against the appellant (“the Power Issue”); and
(b) if the High Court had such power, whether the Judge should have granted the Mareva injunction against the appellant (“the Discretion Issue”).
We will address these issues in turn.
The Power Issue
- [27]
[27] The Power Issue required us to determine the question that we identified above as central to the present appeal (at [1]): does the court have the power to grant a Mareva injunction against a defendant to Singapore proceedings where, at the time of the application, the plaintiff has taken out foreign proceedings in respect of the same cause of action and intends to pursue its substantive remedy in the foreign court?
The parties’ cases
- [28]
[28] The appellant asserted that the court did not have the power to grant a Mareva injunction against her. In support of this position, Mr Hee advanced two main submissions:
(a) First, the legislative intent underlying s 4(10) of the CLA was to aid in the administration of cases in Singapore. The Judge erred in relying on cases in which Mareva relief had been granted in aid of a local judgment when the present case involved a Mareva injunction in aid of an anticipated judgment from Hong Kong. The latter situation falls outside the contemplated purpose of s 4(10) of the CLA.
(b) Second, it is a pre-requisite to the exercise of the court’s power to grant interlocutory relief under s 4(10) of the CLA that the plaintiff has an accrued cause of action that “will terminate in a judgment here” [emphasis added]. Once a case is stayed, there would no longer be any claim that will terminate in a judgment in Singapore.
- [29]
[29] The respondents contended that the court has the power to grant a Mareva injunction against the appellant because:
(a) Section 4(10) of the CLA does not preclude the court from granting a Mareva injunction “in aid of foreign proceedings”. The provision is broadly drafted, and its “legislative context evinces an intent to confer on the Court the power to make a wide and undefined range of injunctions or orders”. Although Mareva injunctions were not specifically contemplated at the time that the predecessor provision to s 4(10) of the CLA was enacted, this did not stop the Singapore and English courts from invoking the equivalent provision as the basis of the court’s power to grant Mareva injunctions, both domestic and worldwide.
(b) There is no additional requirement that the accrued cause of action must also terminate in a judgment by the court in Singapore. Even if there was a stay of proceedings in Singapore, the Singapore court retained a residual jurisdiction over the underlying cause of action that would ground the court’s power to grant a Mareva injunction. That residual jurisdiction would also allow proceedings which had been stayed in Singapore to be revived later and carried forward to judgment if, for some reason, the stay was lifted.
Terminology
- [30]
[30] Before we begin our analysis of the Power Issue, we clarify the terminology that parties have used, and which we shall also apply in the course of the analysis. The parties have referred to the Mareva injunction that was sought by the respondents as a particular sub-category of injunctions being a “Mareva injunction in aid of foreign court proceedings”. For convenience, we shall adopt this term, but make two observations about its usage.
- [31]
[31] First, it must be understood that this is not a term of art. The descriptor “in aid of foreign court proceedings” must be understood in the context of the specific circumstances of the case. The relevant circumstances in the present appeal are that, as Mr Hee accepted, the respondents have a recognised cause of action against the appellant in Singapore, and that the Singapore court has in personam jurisdiction over her. To this we would add that the respondents have not just a potential cause of action, but one that has been pursued as actual proceedings in Singapore in the form of Suit 1180. The foreign element arises because it is clear from their stay application that the respondents intend to pursue the same cause of action against the appellant primarily in Hong Kong, through the second HK Suit. The Mareva injunction sought in Singapore is for the purpose of restraining the appellant from disposing of assets here in the hope that eventually such restraint will aid in the enforcement of any judgment that the respondents might obtain against her in Hong Kong. It is in this context that the Mareva injunction sought by the respondents in this case is said to be “in aid of foreign court proceedings”, and it is in this context that we shall use the term.
- [32]
[32] Second, to say that a Mareva injunction is in aid of foreign court proceedings is simply to recognise that the intended purpose of the injunction is to aid in the prospective enforcement of a foreign judgment. The usage of the term does not in itself have doctrinal or juridical implications. Indeed, as we shall explain below, the power to grant such a Mareva injunction (as in the circumstances of the present appeal) is ultimately founded on, and in support of, proceedings in Singapore. The descriptor “in aid of foreign court proceedings” is nonetheless used to distinguish the type of Mareva injunction granted by the Judge from the more usual case where a Mareva injunction is granted in aid of proceedings which will only be pursued in Singapore.
- [33]
[33] We underscore that the present case is but one set of circumstances in which a Mareva injunction sought in Singapore may be said to be in aid of foreign court proceedings. For instance, had the respondents sought a Mareva injunction without having instituted Suit 1180, it could, in our view, be said that such an application would be for a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign court proceedings. Yet that situation would engage different considerations. Whether the court has the power to grant a Mareva injunction in those circumstances is not the issue before us. Therefore, we do not refer to that situation when we use the term “Mareva injunction in aid of foreign court proceedings”.
- [34]
[34] We now turn to our analysis of the Power Issue proper. Given Mr Hee’s submissions on the point, two sub-issues arose for our decision. They were:
(a) whether s 4(10) of the CLA confers on the court the power to grant a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign court proceedings; and
(b) whether there is a requirement that for the court to grant a Mareva injunction under s 4(10) of the CLA, the cause of action, in support of which the Mareva injunction is sought, will (or must) terminate in a judgment in Singapore.
Whether section 4(10) of the CLA confers on the court the power to grant a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign court proceedings
- [35]
[35] The first sub-issue was essentially a matter of statutory interpretation. The principles guiding this exercise are well-established: see Tan Cheng Bock v Attorney-General [2017] 2 SLR 850 (“Tan Cheng Bock”) and Public Prosecutor v Lam Leng Hung and others [2018] 1 SLR 659 (“Lam Leng Hung”). There are three steps in this exercise (Lam Leng Hung at [67]):
(a) first, ascertaining the possible interpretations of the text, as it has been enacted;
(b) second, ascertaining the legislative purpose or object of the statute; and
(c) third, comparing the possible interpretations of the text against the purposes or objects of the statute.
The text of s 4(10) of the CLA
- [36]
[36] We begin with the text of s 4(10) of the CLA, which reads as follows:
- [38]
[38] Mr Hee’s submission was that notwithstanding the apparently broad language used in s 4(10) of the CLA, the provision does not confer on the court the power to grant Mareva injunctions in aid of foreign court proceedings. We would observe that it was not entirely clear to us on what word or phrase within s 4(10) of the CLA Mr Hee was resting this interpretation. As mentioned above (at [35(a)]), the first step in the court’s approach towards the purposive interpretation of statutes is to ascertain the possible interpretations of the text. This in turn entails an analysis of the ordinary meaning of the “words of the legislative provision” (Tan Cheng Bock at [38]). Put differently, an “interpretation” of a provision cannot be plucked out of the air, without being grounded in the actual words used in the provision. In the present case, we were of the view that Mr Hee’s submission was best understood as a submission that the word “injunction” as used in s 4(10) of the CLA excludes injunctions in aid of foreign court proceedings.
The legislative purpose underlying s 4(10) of the CLA
- [40]
[40] The main thrust of Mr Hee’s submission was that the legislative purpose of s 4(10) of the CLA was confined to the improvement of the administration of civil law or cases in Singapore, and had nothing to do with foreign proceedings. In support of this submission, Mr Hee relied principally on a single statement by the then Attorney-General for the Straits Settlements (“the AG-SS”) on the purpose of the legislation that contained the original version of s 4(10). We shall address this statement and its relevance below, but first set out the relevant legislative history.
- [41]
[41] Section 4(10) of the CLA may be traced back to its original enactment as s 2(8) of the Straits Settlements Ordinance No IV of 1878 (“the 1878 Ordinance”), which was based on, and largely identical to, s 25(8) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (c 66) (UK) (“the 1873 UK Act”).
- [42]
[42] Section 2(8) of the 1878 Ordinance, as appears from s 2(8) of the Civil Law Bill which was passed on 7 May 1878, provided as follows:
- [43]
[43] For the legislative intent behind the provision, Mr Hee relied on a statement by the AG-SS made in a report on the 1878 Ordinance (“the 1878 Statement”). The relevant portion of the 1878 Statement relied upon is as follows:
- [44]
[44] Mr Hee submitted that the 1878 Statement demonstrated that the legislative intent in 1878 was confined to the improvement of the administration of civil law or cases “in Singapore”. Further, because s 4(10) of the CLA has remained substantially unchanged since it was enacted in the form of s 2(8) of the 1878 Ordinance, the legislative intent behind the provision too must have remained unchanged. Mr Hee pointed out that this court in Swift-Fortune Ltd v Magnifica Marine SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 629 (“Swift-Fortune”) had observed that the legislative intent behind the provision could not have changed since 1878.
- [45]
[45] In Swift-Fortune, this court was faced with the issue of whether a Mareva injunction could be granted in support of foreign arbitral proceedings. The relevant provision under the relevant statute, the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“the IAA”), granted the court the same power to make orders as it has for the purpose of and in relation to an action in the court. This was understood to be a reference to s 4(10) of the CLA “as the source of statutory power for the court to grant interlocutory relief, including Mareva injunctions, in aid of foreign proceedings” (at [62]). The court therefore considered the scope of s 4(10) of the CLA, and made the following observations on its legislative history and the possible intent behind it (at [94]):
These observations, Mr Hee submitted, showed that this court in Swift-Fortune “strongly hinted” that the Singapore court does not have the power on the face of the legislation to grant a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign court proceedings.
- [46]
[46] We begin our analysis by noting that in the context of the court’s approach to the purposive interpretation of statutes, Mr Hee’s reliance on the 1878 Statement was in effect reliance on extraneous material in an attempt to assist the court in ascertaining the meaning of the provision. Section 9A(2) of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Ed Rev Ed) permits the court to have regard to extraneous material in three situations. Of relevance is s 9A(2)(b)(ii) which permits recourse to extraneous material to ascertain the meaning of the text in question where, having deduced the ordinary meaning of the text, and considering the underlying object and purpose of the written law, such ordinary meaning is absurd or unreasonable. It appeared to us that Mr Hee’s reliance on the 1878 Statement was reliance on extraneous material to “ascertain” the meaning of the text, in this case the term “injunction”, on the basis that the term was “ambiguous or obscure”. Although we did not think that the term “injunction” created any ambiguity (as we explained above at [39]), we nonetheless set out our reasons why we did not accept this submission.
(1) The material relied upon by Mr Hee
- [47]
[47] The first reason we did not accept Mr Hee’s submission is that we did not agree that the 1878 Statement could be interpreted in the manner that Mr Hee suggested. Effectively, Mr Hee’s case was that the observation that several provisions of the 1878 Ordinance were “calculated to improve the administration of Civil Law in the Colony” should be understood to mean that the legislative intent underlying the 1878 Ordinance, in particular s 2(8), was not to confer on the court the power to grant injunctions in aid of foreign court proceedings.
- [48]
[48] Mr Hee’s submission, as we understood it, was premised on the idea that there is an incompatibility between (a) the administration of civil law in Singapore; and (b) the grant of a Mareva injunction in support of foreign court proceedings. He suggested that the grant of a Mareva injunction in support of foreign court proceedings would not be part of, or go towards, the administration of law in Singapore. But this premise is not well-founded. In the first place, the power to grant such a Mareva injunction (if it exists) would itself arise from Singapore law. Further, the court’s power to grant a Mareva injunction is merely part of its ancillary jurisdiction that arises by virtue of proceedings in Singapore. It would therefore, if granted, be part of the administration of civil law in Singapore. It is true that a Mareva injunction may, as a matter of fact, assist an applicant in proceedings elsewhere. But that does not, in our view, change the analysis that the very basis for the grant of such a Mareva injunction would be the Singapore proceedings, and its effect would therefore be to aid in the administration of law in Singapore.
- [49]
[49] Further, as a matter of interpreting the extraneous material placed before us, we would add that we did not think the words “administration of Civil Law in the Colony” were intended at all to refer to the scope of the court’s powers under the 1878 Ordinance or any of its provisions in particular. Those words did not, in our view, import the concept of territoriality of court orders made in Singapore. Nor did those words suggest that the AG-SS had in mind the issue of how court orders made in Singapore might be used by litigants – whether in support of Singapore proceedings or foreign court proceedings. In our view, all that was meant by the 1878 Statement was that several provisions in the 1878 Ordinance were intended to improve legal processes, or the way things were done, in the Colony. The AG-SS simply meant to say that the 1878 Ordinance would improve the efficiency of the legal system in the Colony at the time. This is borne out by the fact in the very sentence relied upon by Mr Hee, the AG-SS went on to state that he hoped that with the passing of the 1878 Ordinance along with a separate ordinance on civil procedure, there would be less “delay, difficulty and expense attending the very complicated and defective system of law and procedure hitherto in force” (above at [43]).
(2) The purpose behind s 4(10) of the CLA
- [50]
[50] Our second reason is more fundamental. In our view, the statement by the AG-SS does not cast light on the purpose underlying s 2(8) of the 1878 Ordinance. Although we accept that part of the purpose behind the 1878 Ordinance would have been to improve the efficiency of the legal system in the Colony at the time, that is merely the intended outcome of the 1878 Ordinance, and does not make clear how the Legislative Council for the Straits Settlements intended to achieve that outcome. In our view, that latter inquiry holds the key to determining the scope of the power that was intended to be conferred on the court by the enacting of s 2(8) of the 1878 Ordinance. Having considered the materials before us, we reached the conclusion that the legislative intent behind s 2(8) of the 1878 Ordinance was to preserve the power of the court to grant the equitable remedy of injunctions, as part of the broader aim of the 1878 Ordinance to facilitate the concurrent administration of law and equity.
- [51]
[51] We start with the 1878 Ordinance. The long title of the 1878 Ordinance is “An Ordinance to improve the Civil Law”. Its preamble states: “Whereas it is expedient to extend to this Colony the recent improvement in the law in England, whereby Law and Equity are to be concurrently administered, and otherwise to improve the Civil Law”. The preamble makes clear that the 1878 Ordinance had two aims. First, it was for the specific purpose of extending to the Straits Settlements the “recent improvements in the law in England, whereby Law and Equity are to be concurrently administered”. Second, it conveyed the more general purpose of the 1878 Ordinance, which was to otherwise “improve the Civil Law”. This conclusion is justified by the various provisions in the 1878 Ordinance. Each of the 14 sections in the 1878 Ordinance can be said to further one of these two legislative objectives.
- [52]
[52] Next, we note that a similar view was expressed by the AG-SS in the report relied upon by Mr Hee. In the opening paragraph of his report, the AG-SS noted that the 1878 Ordinance “introduce[d] Sections 24 and 25 of the Imperial Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873”, ie, the 1873 UK Act. The AG-SS went on to explain what these sections entailed:
- [53]
[53] Consequently, as much as it may be said that the overall, or general, purpose of the 1878 Ordinance was to improve civil law in the Straits Settlements, we were concerned with the more specific purpose underlying s 2(8) of the 1878 Ordinance as the predecessor provision to s 4(10) of the CLA. The importance of distinguishing between the specific purpose underlying a particular provision and the general purpose underlying the statute as a whole has been acknowledged by this court: Lam Leng Hung at [69]. In the present context, the general purpose of the 1878 Ordinance, ie, to improve the administration of the civil law of the Straits Settlements, was too vague to aid in determining the narrow question of the scope of powers conferred on the court by s 2(8) of the 1878 Ordinance. Instead, the specific purpose underlying s 2 of the 1878 Ordinance, ie, to facilitate the concurrent administration of the common law and equity in the courts of the Straits Settlements, was, in our view, of greater assistance.
- [54]
[54] We were fortified in our views by the legislative purpose underlying ss 24 and 25 of the 1873 UK Act which were the provisions from which ss 1 and 2 of the 1878 Ordinance were adopted. Essentially, the 1873 UK Act provided for the union of various courts then in existence into a single Supreme Court of Judicature: s 3 of the 1873 UK Act. To effect this great change, the 1873 UK Act included an array of provisions to address various aspects of the establishment of this new Supreme Court of Judicature. Part II of the 1873 UK Act set out the jurisdiction of the new court while ss 24 and 25 stated the law which the court would apply and provided for the concurrent administration of the common law and equity. This was a significant aim, and was one which fell within the broader legislative purpose underlying the 1873 UK Act.
- [55]
[55] Section 25(8) of the 1873 UK Act was one of the instances in which the statute provided that rules of equity were to prevail over the rules of the common law. By this sub-section, the new Supreme Court of Judicature was conferred with the power to grant “a mandamus or an injunction” in appropriate cases. This was necessary and was an instance where equitable rules were expressed to prevail over the common law rules because, prior to then, the common law courts had only a very limited power to grant injunctions. As I.C.F Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, Injunctions, Rectification and Equitable Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th Ed, 2010) (“Spry”) notes (at pp 323–324):
- [56]
[56] Essentially, therefore, the injunction was a remedy fashioned by the courts of equity, and its critical feature was its ability to act in personam on person(s) before the court, and to restrain particular behaviour on the part of such person(s). As part of the move towards the concurrent administration of the common law and equity through the 1873 UK Act, s 25(8) was simply intended to preserve the previous position, ie, that the court (in its new form) would continue to have the power to grant such injunctions as it had before. Spry states that s 25(8) of the 1873 UK Act was not intended to substantively change the powers that either of the courts previously had (at pp 330–331):
- [57]
[57] In the light of the foregoing, there was little reason for us to conclude that s 25(8) of the 1873 UK Act was intended to limit the powers of the court to granting discrete types of injunctions. Instead, the intention underlying s 25(8) of the 1873 UK Act was to preserve the power of the court to grant injunctions. This is the power to restrain conduct of all kinds, and is as broad as that which the courts of equity had. Put simply, s 25(8) of the 1873 UK Act preserved, or confirmed, the court’s equitable jurisdiction in respect of granting injunctions.
- [58]
[58] We, therefore, could not accept Mr Hee’s submission that s 4(10) of the CLA, which is derived ultimately from s 25(8) of the 1873 UK Act, did not confer on the court the power to grant Mareva injunctions in support of foreign court proceedings. Indeed, to accept the argument that the provision does not confer that power on the court merely because Parliament had not contemplated that specific type of injunction would be to accept that the court had no power to grant any and all Mareva injunctions. Indeed, Mr Hee was understandably concerned to limit his submission only to Mareva injunctions in support of foreign court proceedings. But, with respect, we could not see any principled basis to distinguish the two if, as was the case, the premise of Mr Hee’s submission was that Parliament had not contemplated the specific type of injunction at the time s 25(8) of the 1873 UK Act (or the local equivalent provision) was enacted. It was not until nearly 100 years after the enactment of the 1873 UK Act that the Mareva injunction emerged as a remedy that the courts could grant. Clearly the UK Parliament in enacting the 1873 UK Act would not have contemplated that a Mareva injunction, even one in support of local proceedings, was a type of injunction that the courts could grant. Yet that did not preclude Lord Denning MR in The Mareva (at 214) and, later, Lord Diplock in The Siskina (at 254) from holding that s 45(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (c 49) (UK) (“the 1925 UK Act”), the successor provision to s 25(8) of the 1873 UK Act, conferred on the court the power to grant Mareva injunctions.
- [59]
[59] It must be noted that, fundamentally, the Mareva injunction is but a specific manifestation of the broader power of the court to restrain the conduct of person(s) before it. Its nature is that of an interlocutory injunction, and on that basis it falls within the scope of s 25(8) of the 1873 UK Act. There is no reason to doubt that the same intentions applied to the transplant of that provision to the Straits Settlements in the form of s 2(8) of the 1878 Ordinance, and to its incarnation as s 4(10) of the CLA in present-day Singapore. Accordingly, s 4(10) of the CLA should be read as conferring on the court the power to grant Mareva injunctions, even when sought in support of foreign proceedings. (That is of course subject to the restraints that the court places upon itself in the grant of such injunctions, which will be addressed below.) A similar view has been expressed in Philip Jeyaretnam SC and Lau Wen Jin, “The Granting of Mareva Injunctions in Support of Foreign Court Proceedings” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 503 (“Jeyaretnam SC and Lau”) (at paras 44–46):
- [60]
[60] For completeness, we note that the question whether s 4(10) of the CLA confers on the court the power to grant Mareva injunctions in support of foreign court proceedings was expressly left open by this court in Swift-Fortune. Indeed, the issue was not truly before the court then because the plaintiff there did not even have a justiciable right against the defendant (at [87]). Accordingly, even if s 4(10) of the CLA conferred on the court the power to grant a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign arbitral proceedings, the requirements for the grant of such a Mareva injunction would not have been satisfied. Further, as there was pending at the time a separate appeal in which the plaintiff had a justiciable cause of action in Singapore, and which therefore truly raised the issue of the scope of s 4(10) of the CLA, this court decided that it would not be prudent to say anything that might be interpreted as either approving or disapproving the decision from which the separate appeal arose (at [93]). This court in Swift-Fortune noted that there were “arguments for and against” construing s 4(10) of the CLA as conferring such a power (at [93]), and, even in the passages relied upon by Mr Hee, this court made clear that the point remained “open to argument in a future case” (at [94]). All that this court raised was that there was an argument to be made that “in the context of the political and commercial conditions existing in Singapore in 1878”, the intention underlying s 4(10) of the CLA may not have been to confer on the court the power to grant Mareva injunctions in support of foreign court proceedings. We considered that argument fully in the present appeal and, for the reasons we have given, rejected it.
- [61]
[61] We therefore held that s 4(10) of the CLA confers on the court the power to grant Mareva injunctions, including those in support of foreign court proceedings.
Whether the cause of action, in support of which the Mareva injunction is granted, must terminate in a judgment in Singapore
- [62]
[62] Having established that s 4(10) of the CLA does not bar the court from granting Mareva injunctions in aid of foreign court proceedings, we now turn to consider whether the grant of such a remedy is nonetheless precluded by other restrictions upon the court’s power to grant injunctions. The court’s power, though broad, is subject to at least two conditions. This position is borne out by the authorities and was accepted by the parties. The first is that the court must have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, and the second is that the plaintiff must have a reasonable accrued cause of action against the defendant in Singapore. We shall refer to these conditions as the Jurisdiction requirement and the Cause of Action requirement respectively. It was not disputed that both these requirements were satisfied on the present facts. The sole issue therefore was whether a third condition had to be met. Mr Hee submitted that indeed such a third condition existed. He expressed the third condition as a requirement that the cause of action against the defendant must also terminate in a judgment rendered by the court that issues the injunction. We shall refer to this as the Forum requirement.
- [63]
[63] As the Judge noted, the position on this issue is not entirely settled in Singapore given the divergence in views expressed by the High Court in Petroval and Multi-Code (see above at [21(b)]). We first consider the approaches taken in foreign jurisdictions as they provide a useful backdrop against which to analyse the local cases.
The position in England
- [64]
[64] The starting position may be found in the House of Lords decision in The Siskina. In that case both the Cause of Action requirement and the Jurisdiction requirement for the grant of Mareva injunctions were enunciated and both were found to be lacking on the facts before the House of Lords.
- [65]
[65] The plaintiffs were the owners of cargo shipped on board a Panamanian vessel owned by the defendant, a Panamanian company. The bills of lading issued conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Genoese court. The defendant wrongfully discharged the plaintiffs’ cargo in Cyprus. The plaintiffs had to incur additional freight to ship the cargo to its ultimate destination. After discharging its cargo, the vessel sank. The defendant’s only asset was the proceeds of its insurance policy which were payable in London. This was the only connection with England or the English law and it was not a connection that was relevant to the plaintiffs’ claim against the defendant. The plaintiffs nevertheless sought a Mareva injunction in London over the insurance proceeds, pending settlement of proceedings in Cyprus where the defendant’s claim for a lien over the cargo was being disputed. The plaintiffs obtained leave to serve the writ out of jurisdiction on the defendant. The defendant applied to set aside service of the writ and to discharge the injunction.
- [66]
[66] The House of Lords agreed that the service should be set aside and the injunction discharged. Lord Diplock (with whom the other Law Lords agreed) situated the court’s power to grant Mareva injunctions under s 45(1) of the 1925 UK Act. In the course of his judgement, he mentioned with admirable succinctness the conditions that had to be met. Lord Diplock observed in relation to s 45(1), (at 254):
- [67]
[67] Lord Diplock did consider the plaintiffs’ submission that their claim fell within the sub-rule which allowed service out of jurisdiction in respect of an action which sought an injunction. The plaintiffs had submitted that that sub-rule was wide enough to include an interlocutory injunction, and it therefore did not require a substantive claim that could result in a final judgment. Lord Diplock rejected this submission in the following terms (at 256):
Lord Diplock thus made clear that an interlocutory injunction is not a cause of action in and of itself. On the facts, the plaintiffs had only a claim for an interlocutory injunction as they had “no legal or equitable right or interest in the insurance moneys” payable to the defendant which was enforceable by a final judgment of the English court (at 257).
- [68]
[68] To summarise, Lord Diplock held that because a Mareva injunction is an interlocutory injunction, there must in the first place be an action claiming substantive relief to which the Mareva injunction is ancillary. The court must also have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. Because the plaintiffs could not obtain leave to serve the writ on the defendant (due to the lack of a substantive cause of action in England), the defendant was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the English court; ie, the court had no in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. Seen in this light, the central holding in The Siskina is that the plaintiffs could not meet either, let alone both, of the conditions accepted as needed for the grant of a Mareva injunction. The facts did not require the court to consider the possible existence of an additional third condition, that is, the Forum requirement and therefore Lord Diplock’s statement at 256 that:
was obiter, to the extent it implied the existence of such requirement.
- [69]
[69] The next significant decision is Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and another v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd and others [1993] 2 WLR 262 (“Channel Tunnel”). There, the plaintiffs had contracted with the defendants to build an underwater tunnel and, by a later variation, to construct a cooling system. Clause 67 of the contract provided for disputes to be first referred to a panel of experts, and finally to arbitration in Brussels. A dispute arose as to the amounts payable in respect of work on the variation. The defendants threatened to suspend work. The plaintiffs issued a writ in England seeking an injunction to restrain the defendants from suspending the work. The plaintiffs applied for an interim injunction and the defendants applied to stay the action in favour of arbitration. The case ended up in the House of Lords.
- [70]
[70] Lord Mustill, who delivered the leading judgment, first concluded that the defendants were entitled to a stay of the plaintiffs’ action (at 278–279). As he took the view that the power to grant interim injunctions conferred by the arbitration statute was not intended by Parliament to apply to a foreign arbitration (at 282), he proceeded to consider the application for an interim injunction under s 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (c 54) (UK). Sections 37(1) and (2) use similar language to s 25(8) of the 1873 UK Act, and s 4(10) of the CLA. In our view, nothing turns on this difference in language for the purpose of the present appeal. Lord Mustill then noted that although the terms of the provision were very wide, it was “firmly established by a long history of judicial self-denial that they are not to be taken at their face value and that their application is subject to severe constraints” (at 284). However, he rejected the defendants’ submission that the “English court can never grant an injunction in support of a cause of action which the parties have agreed shall be the subject of an arbitration abroad, and a fortiori where the court has itself halted the proceedings in England” (at 285). In his view, it was sufficient to say that (at 285):
- [71]
[71] On that basis, it made no difference to him that in a dispute between parties there was an arbitration agreement which called for arbitration abroad. In his view, such a situation (at 286):
- [72]
[72] Lord Mustill thus considered that although the plaintiffs’ commencement of the action was a breach of the arbitration agreement, and “in this sense the [defendants] were not ‘properly’ before the court”, that did not bring into the play the limitations on the powers of the court established by the line of cases following The Siskina (at 286). Channel Tunnel is significant because of Lord Mustill’s recognition of the court’s residual jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions, even when the action might have been stayed by the court.
The position in Hong Kong
- [75]
[75] Lord Nicholls dissented primarily because of his differing characterisation of the nature of the Mareva injunction. He observed that although a Mareva injunction is normally granted in the proceedings in which judgment is being sought, it is not actually granted in aid of the cause of action asserted in the proceedings, but to facilitate the process of execution after the judgment for payment of an amount of money has been obtained. The Mareva injunction is therefore a “protective measure in respect of a prospective enforcement process” (at 306). Once that is recognised, there would be a strong case for Mareva relief being as much available in respect of an anticipated foreign judgment which would be recognised and enforceable in Hong Kong, as it is in respect of an anticipated judgment of the Hong Kong court itself. In Lord Nicholls’ view, the plaintiff’s “underlying cause of action is essentially irrelevant” (at 307). Therefore, his position was that the Hong Kong court would have the jurisdiction to grant Mareva injunctions in respect of “prospective foreign judgments which will be recognised and enforceable in the Hong Kong courts” (at 310). Lord Nicholls propounded a more expansive approach towards the court’s power to grant Mareva injunctions rather than, as the appellant here did, an approach that would seek to limit the court’s power in that regard by imposing the Forum requirement. Indeed, he rejected the Cause of Action requirement laid down in The Siskina and re-characterised the Mareva injunction as substantive relief in and of itself because it is sought in respect of the potential enforcement of an anticipated foreign judgment.
- [76]
[76] As stated above, the majority in Mercedes Benz held that the court must first have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant for it to grant a Mareva injunction. In so doing, Mercedes Benz went no further than The Siskina.
- [77]
[77] For completeness, we note that the position in Hong Kong has since been legislatively modified through s 21M of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) (HK). The statute specifically confers on the court the power to grant interim relief in support of foreign proceedings where those proceedings are capable of giving rise to a judgment which may be enforced in Hong Kong. The statute further specifies that the court has such a power notwithstanding that the subject matter of the proceedings would not otherwise give rise to a cause of action in Hong Kong. It would appear that this is a legislative adoption of the approach taken by Lord Nicholls in his dissent in Mercedes Benz.
The position in Canada
- [78]
[78] In Canadian Pacific Limited v Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Canadian Pacific System Federation [1996] 2 RCS 495 (“Canadian Pacific”), the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the approach taken in Channel Tunnel. The issue that arose in that case was whether the court had the jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction restraining an employer from changing the work schedule of the plaintiff-employee, pending a hearing before an arbitrator. The statutory provision conferring the power on the court to grant injunctions was s 36 of the Law and Equity Act, RSBC 1979, c 224 (Can). The wording of s 36 is similar to that of s 4(10) of the CLA. The Supreme Court of Canada first held that the court retained the residual discretionary power to grant interlocutory relief such as injunctions notwithstanding the existence of a comprehensive code for settling labour disputes (at [5]).
- [79]
[79] The argument was raised that the court has a power to grant an interim injunction “only as an adjunct to a cause of action properly instituted in the court”, and that the jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions is “ancillary to and dependant [sic] upon a claim for final relief to the court from which the interim relief is sought”. It was not disputed that at the time the injunction was granted, there was no claim for final relief before the court (at [13]). McLachlin J (as she then was), delivering the judgment of the court, rejected this argument. She cited Channel Tunnel and held as follows (at [16]–[17]):
The position in Singapore
- [80]
[80] We now turn to consider the local decisions that have addressed this issue.
- [82]
[82] This court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeals and held that the originating summons had to be set aside because the plaintiff had no legal standing to ask for the declaration it desired – it was seeking a declaration regarding the rights of two other parties (ie, PES and Petral), rather than a right it could claim for itself (at [19] and [27]). In relation to whether the court had power to grant the Mareva injunction, this court first rejected the plaintiff’s submission that it was not seeking a “free-standing” Mareva injunction as its claim was for a declaration that the US$36m be held on trust. That submission was not sustainable given the finding that the plaintiff had no standing to ask for the declaration (at [32]).
- [83]
[83] This court then turned to consider whether it had the jurisdiction (which term the court used in the sense of “power”) to grant a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign court proceedings. The plaintiff sought to convince the court that the principle established in The Siskina, that a Mareva injunction could be granted only where the plaintiff had a substantive claim over which the court had jurisdiction, should not be followed (at [33]). The plaintiff was unsuccessful.
- [84]
[84] As far as Petral, a foreign entity, was concerned, this court was satisfied that “the principle established by The Siskina and reiterated by Mercedes Benz regarding the lack of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant where no substantive claim was made against him was a sound one”, and therefore held that the principle should be adopted in Singapore (at [43]). On the facts, the court had no in personam jurisdiction over Petral.
- [85]
[85] As for PES, there was in personam jurisdiction as it was a Singapore entity. At the time the originating summons was filed, however, the plaintiff “had no accrued right of action against PES in Singapore or even in Hong Kong”. The law therefore did not permit the plaintiff to obtain Mareva relief, as it required the plaintiff to have an existing legal or equitable right to do so, per The Siskina (at [44]).
- [87]
[87] Shortly thereafter, came the High Court decision of Front Carriers Ltd v Atlantic & Orient Shipping Corp [2006] 3 SLR(R) 854 (“Front Carriers”). The plaintiff there commenced arbitration proceedings in London against the defendant, and then started court action in Singapore in which it applied for and obtained Mareva relief against the defendant. The application was made pursuant to the IAA. The defendant applied to set aside the Mareva injunction, contending that the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction in support of foreign arbitration proceedings. The issue before the High Court was therefore strictly whether it had the power to grant Mareva injunctions in support of foreign arbitral proceedings.
- [88]
[88] The High Court Judge (“the Judge”) first took the view that s 12(7) of the IAA conferred on the High Court the power to grant such a Mareva injunction (at [14]). The Judge went on to find that there was also a general power conferred on the court by s 4(10) of the CLA to grant such a Mareva injunction (at [32]). With regard to the requirements that have to be met before the court could grant a Mareva injunction, the Judge noted that both The Siskina requirements were established on the facts. The Judge found that the defendant had made itself amenable to the court’s jurisdiction, and in any case would have regarded the case as a proper one for service out of jurisdiction, and also considered that the plaintiff’s claim for breach of charter was one that is “plainly recognisable by the Singapore courts” (at [41] and [42]).
- [89]
[89] The Judge therefore framed the critical issue in relation to the grant of a Mareva injunction in support of foreign arbitral proceedings as follows (at [42]):
- [90]
[90] In this regard, it was noted that the above point was not considered in The Siskina, but was addressed in Channel Tunnel, which decision the Judge considered persuasive authority on this point. The Judge noted that in Karaha Bodas, the court was not asked to grant a Mareva injunction to support a pending arbitration in Hong Kong. Karaha Bodas was therefore distinguishable and did not stand in the way of her adopting the approach set out in Channel Tunnel (at [51]). The Judge concluded that, on the authority of Channel Tunnel, the High Court had the power to grant an interim injunction since there was a “recognisable justiciable right between the parties, even though that right [was] to be determined not by the court but by the foreign arbitral tribunal” (at [52]).
- [91]
[91] Although strictly speaking Front Carriers dealt with an application for a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign arbitral proceedings, it was significant for our analysis given that the Judge endorsed Channel Tunnel and found no bar on the power of the Singapore court to grant a Mareva injunction arising from the possibility that the dispute may be determined by a tribunal other than the Singapore court. As we noted above (at [72]), the critical holding in Channel Tunnel for the purpose of the present appeal is the recognition of the court’s residual jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions, even when the action might have been stayed by the court. The rationale of Front Carriers therefore was that there is no requirement that the cause of action in respect of which a Mareva injunction is granted must also terminate in a judgment in the jurisdiction of the court granting the injunction.
- [92]
[92] We next address the decision of this court in Swift-Fortune. Essentially, the plaintiff applied for a Mareva injunction against the defendant in Singapore, seeking to restrain the defendant from disposing of assets pending arbitration proceedings between the parties in London. An injunction was granted on an ex parte basis and the defendant applied to set it aside on the ground that the court did not have the power to grant such an injunction. The central question that arose was therefore whether the Singapore court had the power to grant a Mareva injunction in support of foreign arbitral proceedings. The High Court held that the court had no such power.
- [93]
[93] On the appeal, after concluding that the IAA did not confer on the court the power to grant such a Mareva injunction, this court turned to consider the alternative statutory source for such a power, namely s 4(10) of the CLA. As we have noted above (at [60]), this court ultimately did not consider it necessary or appropriate to decide the issue. It was not necessary to decide the issue because, even if there was such a power under s 4(10) of the CLA, the facts were such that the plaintiff did not have a justiciable cause of action against the defendant, and would never have it at any time (at [87]). It was also not appropriate to decide the issue given that, at that time, there was an appeal pending from the decision in Front Carriers, and that appeal truly engaged the issue of the scope of s 4(10) of the CLA (at [93]). In the event, the appeal in Front Carriers was discontinued.
- [94]
[94] Given that the plaintiff did not have a justiciable cause of action against the defendant, it follows that this court in Swift-Fortune also did not have to, and indeed did not, decide the issue of whether the Forum requirement existed. It was well-established by that time that a Mareva injunction was ancillary to an existing cause of action. Consequently, it was recognised that, given the facts of the case, the decision on the appeal “will not take the law beyond The Siskina doctrine as applied in Karaha Bodas, and confirmed in [Mercedes Benz]” (at [92]).
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