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Grounds publishedDecided 23 Dec 2020

Court of Appeal

Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Attorney-General

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[2020] SGCA 122Case no. Civil Appeal No 155 of 202063 paragraphs

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  1. [1] The appellant is a prisoner facing capital punishment who has exhausted his rights of appeal and was not granted clemency. He was scheduled to be executed on 18 September 2020. On 16 September 2020, the appellant filed HC/OS 891/2020 (“the application”) seeking leave to commence judicial review proceedings against his imminent execution on two grounds: first, a challenge against the exercise of the power of clemency (“the clemency ground”), and second, a challenge against the scheduling of his execution ahead of other prisoners similarly awaiting capital punishment (“the scheduling ground”). The High Court dismissed the application but stayed the appellant’s execution pending his appeal to this court. After considering the further materials which the parties placed before us, we allowed the appellant’s appeal and gave him leave to commence judicial review proceedings solely on the scheduling ground. We now provide our full reasons for doing so.

  2. Background

  3. [2] The appellant, a Singapore citizen, was convicted by the High Court on a charge of possessing not less than 38.84g of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”) and was sentenced to the mandatory death penalty on 2 December 2015. His appeal to this court in CA/CCA 38/2015 (“CCA 38/2015”) was ultimately dismissed on 18 October 2018.

  4. The procedure for carrying out the death penalty

  5. [3] Following the final imposition of the death sentence after the disposal of any appeal by the Court of Appeal, a number of legally prescribed steps must be taken before the death sentence can be carried out. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is useful for us to outline them briefly.

  6. (a) Under Art 22P(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) (“the Constitution”), the trial judge and the presiding judge of the Court of Appeal that dealt with the case must furnish reports to the President, who will forward them to the Attorney-General (“the AG”). The AG provides his opinion on them, and the reports and the AG’s opinion are sent to the Cabinet so that it may advise the President on the exercise of the clemency power under Art 22P(1).

  7. (b) Under s 313(e) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”), a more comprehensive set of documents relating to the case must also be forwarded to the Minister by the presiding judge of the Court of Appeal that dealt with the case.

  8. (c) Under Art 22P(1) of the Constitution, the Cabinet is to consider whether to advise the President to grant clemency, and the President is obliged to act in accordance with the Cabinet’s advice (see Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189 (“Yong Vui Kong (Clemency)”) at [82] and [180]).

  9. [4] The events described above unfolded in the present case as follows.

  10. The application

  11. [6] The application was brought on two grounds. Under the clemency ground, the appellant contended that his execution would be in breach of Art 22P and/or Art 9 of the Constitution, on the basis that the clemency power under Art 22P had been extinguished owing to disuse. In Mr Ravi’s supporting affidavit, it was asserted that clemency had not been granted in any capital case since 1998 despite there having been many executions, and that this suggested that there was a blanket policy by the Cabinet of disregarding clemency petitions in all drug-related cases. On this basis, it was submitted that the appellant’s case received no individual consideration. Mr Ravi’s supporting affidavit further argued that the disuse of the clemency power in drug-related cases since 1998 resulted in the clemency power being “wholly extinguished”. For this, he relied on the decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 (“Ruddock”). The foregoing arguments were said to have two implications: first, the failure to consider the appellant’s clemency petition individually amounted to a breach of natural justice contrary to Art 9(1) of the Constitution (“Art 9(1)”), and second, the extinction by disuse of the clemency power, which was essential in mitigating the harshness of the death penalty, violated his right to life under Art 9(1).

  12. [7] Under the scheduling ground, the appellant contended that the fixing of the date of his execution violated his right to equality under Art 12 of the Constitution (“Art 12”). Mr Ravi’s supporting affidavit claimed that no executions had been carried out to date in 2020, and that there were other prisoners awaiting capital punishment who had been sentenced to death prior to the appellant. He further alleged that the reason the appellant had been scheduled for execution ahead of other such prisoners was because of a decision by the State not to execute foreigners while border restrictions owing to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) were in place, as this prevented their family members from entering Singapore and the repatriation of their remains. The appellant advanced two arguments under this ground:

  13. (b) Second, the appellant argued that the scheduling of the executions of Singaporeans ahead of those of foreigners was an act of “discrimination based on expediency” that violated his right to equal protection under Art 12(1) of the Constitution (“Art 12(1)”) (“the discrimination argument”). He further argued that such discrimination based on nationality was expressly prohibited by Art 12(2).

  14. [8] At the same time, the appellant also applied for leave under s 394H of the CPC to make a review application under s 394J of the CPC, seeking to reopen his concluded appeal in CCA 38/2015 on the basis that relevant evidence had not been adduced. The appellant was granted leave, and we heard his review application together with the present appeal on 22 September 2020. On 16 October 2020, we issued our judgment, Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Public Prosecutor [2020] SGCA 101, dismissing the review application. The issues in the review application have no bearing on the present appeal, and we need say nothing further about them.

  15. The decision below

  16. [9] It was not disputed that the requirements for leave to commence judicial review proceedings are that (Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-General [2015] 5 SLR 1222 (“Ridzuan”) at [32]):

  17. As there was no dispute as to the sufficiency of the appellant’s interest in the matter, the parties’ arguments revolved around the first and last requirements.

  18. [10] The High Court judge (“the Judge”) heard and dismissed the application on 17 September 2020. In his oral grounds, the Judge held that the subject matter of the complaint was not susceptible to judicial review as the SPS did not make any decision of its own; it was merely acting pursuant to the warrant issued by the Supreme Court. There was also nothing to suggest that the warrant issued by the Supreme Court was unlawful. The Judge further held that he would in any case have found the application to be time-barred.

  19. [11] Next, the Judge held that there was in any event no prima facie case of reasonable suspicion to justify the granting of leave. The Judge found the clemency ground unmeritorious because he considered that there was no basis for the assertion that there was a blanket policy of rejecting clemency petitions. The Judge held that the scheduling ground was also unsustainable: the new evidence argument could not establish any actual or potential prejudice to the appellant because due process had already taken its course. As for the discrimination argument, the appellant had furnished no grounds for his belief that nationality was the differentiating criterion in the scheduling of his execution owing to the COVID-19 situation.

  20. The parties’ arguments on appeal

  21. [14] Having considered the parties’ written submissions as well as their oral submissions at the hearing before us on 22 September 2020 (“the first hearing”), we concluded that further analytical clarity was needed on the interaction between Art 12 and the scheduling of executions. We framed this issue in the form of the following questions:

  22. (a) Does a prisoner awaiting capital punishment have a legitimate legal expectation that the date on which his sentence is to be carried out will not result in his being treated differently as compared to other prisoners who are similarly situated? (“Question 1”)

  23. (b) Does the answer to Question 1 differ if prisoners who are Singaporean are treated differently from those who are not Singaporean? (“Question 2”)

  24. (c) In respect of Questions 1 and 2, are there considerations that could justify differential treatment for the purposes of Art 12 of the Constitution? (“Question 3”)

  25. [15] Mr Francis Ng Yong Kiat SC (“Mr Ng”), who appeared for the AG, sought an adjournment to file further submissions and an affidavit to address these questions. We granted this request, and likewise granted Mr Ravi leave to file submissions as well as an affidavit in reply.

  26. [16] At the first hearing, Mr Ravi also provided, for the first time, a specific detail in support of the scheduling ground: he claimed that there was a prisoner awaiting capital punishment who had been convicted earlier than the appellant, but who had not been scheduled for execution. This was Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah (“Datchinamurthy”), a Malaysian national who had instructed Mr Ravi to act as his counsel after the dismissal of his appeal in CA/CCA 8/2015.

  27. MHA’s affidavit and the parties’ further submissions

  28. [17] Following the first hearing, the AG filed an affidavit which was sworn by Mr Lim Zhi Yang, a Senior Director at the Ministry of Home Affairs (“MHA”), with the authorisation of the Minister (“MHA’s affidavit”).

  29. [18] MHA’s affidavit stated that there were two prerequisites that had to be met before it would commence scheduling an execution: first, the death sentence must have been upheld by the Court of Appeal, and second, the Cabinet must have advised the President not to grant clemency. After these prerequisites were met, MHA would have regard to the following non-exhaustive list of what it referred to as “supervening factors based on policy considerations” in scheduling the execution (which we will refer to as “MHA’s stated considerations” for convenience):

  30. [19] MHA’s affidavit stressed that it did not take into account factors such as the type of offence, age, race, gender and nationality in the scheduling of executions.

  31. [20] MHA’s affidavit then addressed the circumstances of the appellant’s case. It explained that the scheduling of executions had been suspended in February 2020 owing to an application for judicial review arising from an alleged unlawful method of execution. This challenge was ultimately dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 13 August 2020 in Gobi a/l Avedian and another v Attorney-General and another appeal [2020] 2 SLR 883 (“Gobi (JR)”). The scheduling of executions resumed thereafter, with the appellant’s execution being the first one to be scheduled. MHA’s affidavit stated:

  32. [21] In respect of prisoners scheduled to be executed while COVID-19 restrictions were in place, MHA stated that it “can and will” make arrangements for their relatives to enter Singapore to visit them prior to their execution (subject to travel restrictions imposed by the other country, over which MHA would have no control). MHA revealed that in the appellant’s case, arrangements were made to facilitate a visit by his uncle who resided in Malaysia, but the uncle eventually declined to make the visit.

  33. The issues on appeal

  34. [24] The following issues arose for our determination:

  35. (a) Was the subject matter of the application susceptible to judicial review?

  36. (b) Was the application time-barred?

  37. (c) Was there a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion to support the granting of leave to commence judicial review proceedings, either on the clemency ground or on the scheduling ground?

  38. (d) Finally, there was the ancillary issue of whether the High Court was competent to grant the stay of the execution in the present case.

  39. [25] At the hearings before us, Mr Ng did not press the AG’s case on either issue (a) or (b) above, focusing his submissions instead on whether the appellant could make out a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion. Nevertheless, as issues (a) and (b) were threshold questions which had to be answered in the appellant’s favour before leave for judicial review could be granted, we will briefly explain why we differed from the Judge on these issues.

  40. Whether the subject matter of the application was susceptible to judicial review

  41. [27] The sole prayer in the appellant’s application, which was not felicitously drafted, read as follows:

  42. The statement which accompanied the application under O 53 r 1(2) of the Rules of Court was phrased in identical terms, save for an additional prayer for any other orders that the court deemed fit.

  43. [29] Turning first to the clemency ground, it was clear that the illegality complained of was the alleged failure of the Cabinet to advise the President to exercise the clemency power, and not any decision of the SPS (see [6] above). As for the scheduling ground, Mr Ravi’s supporting affidavit relied upon a letter from the SPS stating the date on which the appellant’s death sentence would be carried out. Mr Ravi’s supporting affidavit characterised this as reflecting the SPS’s “decision”. Although it was perhaps understandable that the appellant might have misunderstood the SPS’s letter as conveying a decision made by the SPS to execute him on a certain date, it is clear from our explanation of the statutory framework at [3] above that the SPS’s letter in fact conveyed a decision made by the Cabinet. Correctly understood, the appellant’s complaints under the scheduling ground were therefore also against a decision taken by the Cabinet.

  44. [30] The application and its supporting documents, both individually and when read together, ultimately left little doubt as to the essential matters that the application was concerned with. The AG was also correctly identified as the respondent. In any event, under O 53 r 3(2) of the Rules of Court, at the hearing of the judicial review proceedings the court is empowered to allow the statement to be amended to clarify the relief sought. We were therefore not prepared to dismiss the application solely on the basis that on the face of the documents, the SPS had been identified as the appropriate target for relief.

  45. Whether the present application was time-barred

  46. The clemency ground

  47. [34] The appellant’s case on the clemency ground rested on two key arguments: first, that the Cabinet must have had a blanket policy of disregarding clemency petitions in all drug-related cases, and second, that the clemency power under Art 22P of the Constitution had been “wholly extinguished” due to disuse.

  48. [35] On the second argument, the appellant relied solely on the dicta of Black CJ sitting in the Federal Court of Australia in Ruddock ([6] supra) at [19], and in particular, the words set out in italics below:

  49. [36] As is evident from this passage, Black CJ considered this to be a “difficult question, on which opinion is divided”, and his judgment in Ruddock did not express any concluded view on it. Indeed, against the possibility offered by Black CJ, there is the much more emphatic observation of Lord Reid in Burmah Oil Company (Burma Trading Ltd) v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 at 101D: “The prerogative is really a relic of a past age, not lost by disuse, but only available for a case not covered by statute” [emphasis added].

  50. [37] More importantly, the prerogative powers of the Crown in other Commonwealth jurisdictions bear no resemblance to the clemency power under Art 22P of the Constitution in Singapore. As alluded to in Lord Reid’s observation set out above, it is inherent in the nature of prerogative powers that they are uncodified. It can only be for that reason that there can be any suggestion that prerogative powers may be extinguished by disuse. We do not see how the same can be true of powers expressly provided for in a written constitution. The analogy which the appellant sought to draw with the clemency power in Singapore was therefore entirely misconceived.

  51. [38] Turning to the first argument, the analysis must begin with the principles governing judicial oversight of the clemency power that were set out by this court in Yong Vui Kong (Clemency) ([3(c)] supra). Chan Sek Keong CJ held that the exercise of the clemency power would be subject to judicial review where it was exercised in bad faith for an extraneous purpose, or where its exercise contravened constitutional protections and rights (Yong Vui Kong (Clemency) at [80]). Specifically, in advising the President on the exercise of the clemency power, the Cabinet must consider the materials provided to it under Art 22P(2) of the Constitution “impartially and in good faith” (at [82]):

  52. [39] On the other hand, Chan CJ made it clear that as long as the clemency power was exercised lawfully in the sense described above, the merits of the clemency decision fell outside the purview of the courts, in line with established administrative law principles and the doctrine of the separation of powers (at [75] and [74(d)]). As the concurring judgment of Phang and Rajah JJA in Yong Vui Kong (Clemency) (which Chan CJ also agreed with) emphasised, the Cabinet, in advising the President on whether to grant clemency, is entitled to take into account public policy considerations concerning the nature of the offence and the legislative policy underlying the imposition of the prescribed punishment (at [192]).

  53. [40] For the appellant to succeed in the clemency ground, therefore, he would have to show at a minimum that the Cabinet advised the President in accordance with a policy so absolute that the mere identification of a clemency petition as falling within a certain broad category of cases (such as drug-related cases) would automatically lead to it being rejected. A policy in such stark terms, if it existed, would arguably be unconstitutional along the lines described in Yong Vui Kong (Clemency) above, because it would not be meaningfully different from an omission by the Cabinet to consider the appellant’s case at all.

  54. [41] In our judgment, the appellant’s case did not establish even a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion that such an unconstitutional policy was in place. Even though this threshold for leave is a very low one (see Gobi (JR) ([20] supra) at [54]), the burden of crossing it remained upon the appellant, and could not be met by unsupported assertions. As we pointed out to the appellant in the course of the first hearing, the mere fact that few or even no clemency petitions have been granted over a long period of time was insufficient to raise the suspicion that the Cabinet did not give each clemency petition individual consideration. In this analysis, one cannot ignore the exceptional nature of the clemency power; as Chan CJ observed in Yong Vui Kong (Clemency) at [74(c)]:

  55. It was therefore entirely conceivable that the policy considerations accorded primacy by the Cabinet pointed towards allowing the law to take its course in almost every case except those with truly exceptional circumstances, and that over the course of many years there have simply been few or no such cases.

  56. [42] Whether the court ought to draw such inferences as to establish a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion of illegality is a fact-sensitive issue in each individual case. In the present case, even if we took the statistics presented by the appellant at face value, this still failed to provide sufficient support for the existence of the unconstitutional policy which he asserted was responsible for those outcomes. These statistics were unexceptionable for the reasons we have explained above. As such, we did not give the appellant leave to commence judicial review proceedings in respect of the clemency ground.

  57. The scheduling ground

  58. [43] Art 12(1) provides that “All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law”. As the oft-cited dictum of Lord Diplock in Ong Ah Chuan and another v Public Prosecutor [1979]–[1980] SLR(R) 710 at [35] explains, equal protection requires that “like should be compared with like”, and Art 12(1) assures to the individual “the right to equal treatment with other individuals in similar circumstances”. This protection applies in two distinct scenarios: differential treatment provided by a statutory classification, and differential treatment as a result of executive or administrative action (see Eng Foong Ho and others v Attorney-General [2009] 2 SLR(R) 542 (“Eng Foong Ho”) at [27]–[28]). We are presently concerned with the latter.

  59. Judicial review of the scheduling of executions

  60. [44] The AG submitted that the scheduling ground amounted to an argument that prisoners awaiting capital punishment had a right to determine the sequence in which their sentences were carried out. The AG argued that there was no such right, relying on the judgment of Chan CJ in Yong Vui Kong (Clemency) ([3(c)] supra) at [74(e)] for the proposition that an offender’s life was regarded by the law as being “forfeit” once he was sentenced to death. The AG’s further submissions also appeared to suggest that the scheduling of executions was purely a matter of executive discretion and could not be challenged by way of judicial review. This seemed to be the purport of the AG’s reliance on the notion of a prisoner’s life being legally “forfeit” in the present context. In fairness, however, when we queried Mr Ng on this point at the hearing on 23 October 2020 (“the second hearing”), he clarified that the AG was not taking such a position.

  61. [45] The reference by Chan CJ in Yong Vui Kong (Clemency) at [74(e)] to a prisoner’s life being regarded as legally “forfeit” upon being sentenced to death should be understood in its context:

  62. [46] This passage drew a distinction between the role of the court in a capital case, which was to pronounce or affirm the death sentence (if warranted), and the role of the Executive in wielding the clemency power, which was to intervene in this process if it considered that the law should not take its course. This served to support Chan CJ’s broader point that “the clemency power is a legal power of an extraordinary character” (at [74]). Although Chan CJ went on to hold that the clemency power was not justiciable on the merits (see [39] above), there was nothing to suggest that this was because the prisoner’s life was “forfeit”. On the contrary, Chan CJ firmly recognised that a proper clemency process was part of the “law” in accordance with which a prisoner can lawfully be deprived of his life under Art 9(1):

  63. [47] Hence, the pronouncement of the death sentence by a court means that the eventual deprivation of the prisoner’s life would not be a violation of Art 9(1), provided that it is carried out in accordance with law. This would first require an appeal to the Court of Appeal or (if the offender does not file an appeal) a review by the Court of Appeal under s 394B of the CPC, and the denial of clemency. Finally, as this court held in CA/CM 6/2019 Pannir Selvam a/l Pranthaman v Public Prosecutor (“Pannir Selvam”), a prisoner ought to have a reasonable opportunity to consider and take advice on whether he had any grounds on which to challenge the clemency decision. In Pannir Selvam, the applicant was informed of the rejection of his clemency petition at the same time as his scheduled date of execution, which was just one week away. We considered this period of time to be inadequate. We refer to the passage of an adequate period of time as envisaged in Pannir Selvam as the “Pannir Selvam period”.

  64. [48] However, as the passage from Yong Vui Kong (Clemency) set out above made clear, the prisoner’s loss of his right to life under Art 9(1) at the end of the criminal process does not extinguish his other legal rights. This is a corollary of the cherished notion that the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power by the State (see Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2019] 2 SLR 216 (“Nagaenthran”) at [73] and Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [86]). Such discretion as the State may have to determine the time and manner in which an execution is to be carried out must be among its gravest discretionary powers, and must have and be subject to legal limits: namely, the usual principles of judicial review, such as illegality or irrationality, and the fundamental liberties protected by the Constitution. For instance, in Gobi (JR) ([20] supra) at [69], this court considered it as clear beyond argument that an unlawful method of execution would be subject to judicial review.

  65. [49] In the present case, Mr Ravi made it plain at the first hearing that the scheduling ground was being advanced solely on the basis of Art 12. As Art 12(1) states, “All persons are … entitled to the equal protection of the law” [emphasis added], and even after exhausting all his legal remedies against his death sentence the appellant remained a person entitled to the equal protection of the law. The right to equal protection under Art 12(1) is based on impermissible differential treatment. Differential treatment perpetrated by a public authority is presumptively subject to scrutiny under Art 12(1), regardless of whether the persons involved, taken individually, have any freestanding legal right to being treated in a certain way. Thus, for instance, an offender charged under the MDA might not have a freestanding legal right that the Public Prosecutor (“the PP”) adopt a set of considerations that would result in his particular level of assistance to the authorities being deemed “substantive assistance” under s 33B of the MDA (see Nagaenthran at [84]–[86]). Nonetheless, he does have a right under Art 12(1) that the PP not deny him a certificate of substantive assistance if he grants one to another equally situated offender who provided an equivalent level of assistance (see Ridzuan ([9] supra) at [51]). To give one clear example in the present context, which we put to Mr Ng in the course of the oral arguments, we have no doubt that if the State were to schedule the executions of some prisoners at the earliest possible date, and delay scheduling the executions of other prisoners for years or indefinitely without any legitimate reason, this would be unlawful under Art 12(1) (if not on other grounds as well).

  66. [51] The AG’s further submissions, however, also appeared to interpret “legitimate legal expectation” in Question 1 as a reference to the doctrine of legitimate expectations, a distinct (and contested) doctrine of administrative law under which a public authority may be bound by its representations as to its future course of action. The AG therefore additionally argued that the appellant had no such legitimate expectation. However, the doctrine of legitimate expectations is entirely distinct from equal protection under Art 12(1), and, as Mr Ravi made clear (see [49] above), had no relevance to the present case. We therefore do not need to consider it further.

  67. Assessing executive action under Art 12(1)

  68. [52] Before we turn to the second concern at [50] above, we first consider the appropriate test to apply under Art 12(1) in the present case. The AG submitted that where executive action is at issue, the test to be applied should be whether there is deliberate and arbitrary discrimination, with “arbitrary” implying the lack of any rationality. This was also cited by this court in Ridzuan ([9] supra) at [49]:

  69. [53] The pronouncement in Ang Soon Huat, delivered by Chan Sek Keong J (as he then was) sitting in the High Court, relied solely on the decision of the Privy Council in Howe Yoon Chong v Chief Assessor [1990] 1 SLR(R) 78 (“Howe Yoon Chong (1990)”). That was a case which concerned the drawing up of annual valuation lists for property tax purposes by the Chief Assessor. Because it was impossible in practice for the valuation of every property to be updated annually, at any given point the valuations of some properties would be more recent than those of others. In a situation of rising property prices, this led to those properties facing higher taxes. The Privy Council held that such shortcomings did not violate Art 12(1):

  70. [54] The Privy Council in Howe Yoon Chong (1990) at [15] cited its earlier decision involving the same litigants, Howe Yoon Chong v Chief Assessor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 594 (“Howe Yoon Chong (1980)”), which also concerned a similar challenge to the valuation list. The application of Art 12(1) by the Privy Council in Howe Yoon Chong (1980) appears to have set the foundation for the “deliberate and arbitrary” test, albeit not in those exact words:

  71. [55] A number of observations can be made about these pronouncements. First, while Howe Yoon Chong (1980) states that “intentional systematic under-valuation” would be a breach of Art 12, it did not suggest that this was the threshold for establishing a breach; instead, the Privy Council was prepared to accept that “[s]omething less might perhaps suffice”. Second, the reasoning in Howe Yoon Chong (1990) was focused upon the specific context at hand. The fact that the issue was essentially one of efficient public administration, and the practical impossibility of achieving a more equal outcome, would have weighed heavily on the standard to be applied. Likewise, while the language in Howe Yoon Chong (1980) might arguably have been more general, the entire discussion was centred around alleged inefficiencies in the compilation of the valuation list. In holding that the test of unconstitutionality in that context would not be substantially different from the test of the validity of the valuation list (which would be irrationality), the Privy Council should not be understood as setting out a general principle for the application of Art 12 in every context. Third, as alluded to in Howe Yoon Chong (1990) at [18], the statutory scheme in fact expressly conferred upon the Chief Assessor the discretion to adopt the previous valuation list and to amend it rather than drawing up a new list (see Howe Yoon Chong (1990) at [9]).

  72. [56] In Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78, M Karthigesu JA, sitting in the High Court, considered whether the “deliberate and arbitrary” standard could have any applicability to Art 12(1) in the context of a statutory classification. Karthigesu JA commented at [67]:

  73. Karthigesu JA’s decision was ultimately reversed on a criminal reference to the Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489, but without any comment on this specific point.

  74. [57] In the context of the present case, we respectfully agree with the concerns expressed by Karthigesu JA as to the “deliberate and arbitrary” test. The treatment of individuals by the Executive in a manner which lacks rationality would fall foul of the ordinary principles of judicial review for irrationality, or for taking into account irrelevant considerations or disregarding relevant ones. That is distinct from acts that are impermissibly discriminatory in nature which would fall within the scope of Art 12(1). The two should not be conflated. Otherwise, all executive action which could be challenged under Art 12(1) would only be vulnerable to challenge under the ordinary grounds of judicial review, and this would render Art 12(1) nugatory so far as it related to executive action. The “deliberate and arbitrary” test in fact sets the bar even higher and requires deliberate and arbitrary discrimination. This would suggest that even discrimination which was irrational but merely reckless or negligent would not fall afoul of Art 12(1). In our judgment, applying such a low standard of protection under Art 12(1) where life and liberty are at stake would not live up to its promise of securing for every person the equal protection of the law.

  75. [58] A closer look at cases where executive action has been challenged under Art 12(1) also reveals a significantly more robust approach being applied, particularly where the executive action in question involved a determination of an individual case rather than an administrative policy of broad application.

  76. [59] In Eng Foong Ho ([43] supra), the appellants were devotees of a temple who challenged the compulsory acquisition by the State of its land. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal (at [28]–[30]) referred to Howe Yoon Chong (1980) and Howe Yoon Chong (1990) before citing the “deliberate and arbitrary” test with approval. The court observed, however, that the appellants had conceded that the State had acted in good faith in acquiring the land (at [31]). The court went on to consider the reasons given by the officers overseeing the land acquisition for their decision, and found it “plain” (at [32]) that it was justified by valid planning considerations (at [32]–[37]). The court therefore did not in fact apply the strict “deliberate and arbitrary” test in Eng Foong Ho.

  77. [60] In Ridzuan ([9] supra), the offender challenged the PP’s decision not to issue him with a certificate of substantive assistance under s 33B of the MDA, amongst other things on the basis that his co-offender Abdul Haleem had been granted such a certificate. The Court of Appeal’s judgment in Ridzuan at [49] reiterated the “deliberate and arbitrary” test, citing its application in Eng Foong Ho and Ang Soon Huat ([52] supra). However, the court’s elaboration of how the offender could make good his case under Art 12(1) is instructive:

  78. [61] This explanation suggests that the bar for a challenge under Art 12(1) is not as high as deliberate and arbitrary discrimination. Instead, it would have been sufficient for the applicant in Ridzuan to discharge his evidential burden by showing that he could be considered to be equally situated with his co-offender. This would then shift the burden to the PP to provide justification for treating them differently. In our judgment, the first limb of this test (the applicant’s evidential burden) corresponded to an assessment of whether the persons in question could be said to be equally situated such that any differential treatment required justification, and the second limb of the test (when the evidential burden shifted) amounted to the question of whether the differential treatment was reasonable – meaning whether it was based on “legitimate reasons” which made the differential treatment “proper”. There are readily available standards by which reasonableness can be assessed in this context: the rationale for differential treatment can be legitimate only if it bears a sufficient rational relation to the object for which the power was conferred. In the case of a statutory power, this would refer to the object of the statutory provision. In more straightforward cases, it may also be possible to discern a lack of legitimate reasons if the differential treatment is based on plainly irrelevant considerations or is the result of applying inconsistent standards or policies without good reason.

  79. [62] In short, whether the scheduling of the appellant’s execution in the present case breached Art 12(1) would turn on: (1) whether it resulted in the appellant being treated differently from other equally situated persons; and (2) whether this differential treatment was reasonable in that it was based on legitimate reasons. Under this test, the notion of being equally situated is therefore an analytical tool used to isolate the purported rationale for differential treatment, so that its legitimacy may then be assessed properly.

  80. [63] When applying this test, the court would have due regard to the nature of the executive action in question. Since the present case was concerned with a decision which was necessarily taken on an individual rather than a broad-brush basis, and one which affected the appellant’s life and liberty to the gravest degree, the court had to be searching in its scrutiny. Although the acts of those holding public office enjoy a presumption of constitutionality (see Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 at [47], citing Howe Yoon Chong (1990) ([53] supra) at [13]), this presumption, like that enjoyed by primary legislation, “can be no more than a starting point” that the acts in question “will not presumptively be treated as suspect” (Saravanan Chandaram v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2020] 2 SLR 95 at [154]; and see Wham Kwok Han Jolovan v Public Prosecutor [2020] SGCA 111 at [26]–[28]). In other words, it merely reflected the incidence of the evidential burden of proof on the appellant. Further, the same searching scrutiny we have just described would equally apply when considering whether the appellant has discharged his evidential burden and thereby overcome the presumption of constitutionality.

  81. Art 12(1) and the scheduling of executions

  82. [64] We now turn our focus specifically to the standards of fairness which prisoners awaiting capital punishment are entitled to expect when it comes to the scheduling of their executions. In our judgment, for this purpose prisoners may prima facie be regarded as being equally situated once they have been denied clemency. This also corresponds to the point of time at which the prerequisites for scheduling the prisoner’s execution are taken to have been met, according to MHA’s affidavit (see [18] above). We will refer to this in short as the point in time when the prisoner’s execution “arises for scheduling”.

  83. [67] The discussion so far has rested on the premise that when clemency is denied, there is no further pending recourse or other relevant pending proceedings in which the prisoner’s involvement is required. Where there are such other proceedings, the time taken for these proceedings to be completed would again turn on the circumstances of each individual case. It would be inappropriate to proceed with the scheduling of the execution of a prisoner while such matters are pending, as MHA rightly recognised (see [18(b)] above). Such prisoners would therefore not be equally situated compared to other prisoners awaiting capital punishment.

  84. [68] Here, we digress to address one of the appellant’s contentions, which sought to establish a legal expectation based on the mere prospect of further recourse against his death sentence. He argued that his right to a fair trial would be compromised by an earlier execution because he would be deprived of time in which new evidence might emerge to justify reopening his conviction, compared to another prisoner whose execution was scheduled for a later date (see [7(a)] above). This represented an eventuality which was entirely speculative. If such grounds for a further legal challenge did emerge, the appellant would of course be entitled to file a further challenge in accordance with the relevant procedures, and his execution could not proceed until this challenge was fully disposed of (see Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 2 SLR 192 at [39]). Conversely, the mere hope that this might happen cannot give rise to a right under Art 12(1) for the appellant to have an equal chance of being the beneficiary of such an eventuality materialising compared to other prisoners. Instead, as we have alluded to at [48] above, the appellant’s legal expectation to fair treatment under Art 12(1) in relation to the scheduling of his execution derived from a much more concrete interest – that of not having his death sentence carried out on a date which was decided without due regard to his constitutional rights.

  85. [73] Having stated its position as to how executions were scheduled, therefore, it was incumbent on the State to apply these criteria consistently. It can depart from its stated baseline only if there are legitimate reasons that weigh in a different direction. It was for the appellant to raise a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion that the State treated him differently from another equally situated prisoner and did not have legitimate reasons for doing so. We now turn to the relevant facts in the present case.

  86. The facts of the present case

  87. [74] As stated at [16] above, Mr Ravi cited the case of Datchinamurthy in support of the alleged unequal treatment of the appellant. Although Datchinamurthy was not mentioned in Mr Ravi’s supporting affidavit, we took judicial notice of the details of Datchinamurthy’s case, since these details related solely to orders which were made by the courts.

  88. [76] It thus appeared that all else being equal, Datchinamurthy should have been scheduled for execution on a date earlier than the appellant, since he was sentenced to death before the appellant. As we have explained at [72] above, this was the baseline for equal treatment taking the AG’s position. MHA’s affidavit, however, stated that at the time the appellant’s execution was scheduled, he was “the first to be sentenced to death” [emphasis added] amongst all the equally situated prisoners (those “whose legal and clemency processes had been completed and for whom all applicable supervening factors based on policy considerations had been resolved”) (see [20] above). It should be noted that these “supervening factors based on policy considerations” refer to MHA’s stated considerations listed at [18] above, and include such factors as the date of pronouncement of the death sentence and the determination of other court proceedings involving the prisoner – which have already been considered in our comparison of the appellant’s and Datchinamurthy’s cases above. No other differentiating factors were available to justify the differential treatment of the appellant and Datchinamurthy. On the face of the record, there was therefore an apparent inconsistency between MHA’s assertion and the known facts.

  89. [77] We considered this inconsistency sufficient to surmount the low bar of a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion to grant leave to commence judicial review proceedings. Given this conclusion, it was not necessary for us to go on to consider whether the appellant was specifically discriminated against on the grounds of nationality, as contended under the discrimination argument, or whether the legal analysis would be any different on this basis.

  90. [78] After we highlighted this apparent inconsistency at the second hearing, Mr Ng informed us that the AG wished to be given time to file a further affidavit to explain why Datchinamurthy had not been scheduled for execution. We did not grant this application for two related reasons. First, an application for leave to commence judicial review is intended to filter out groundless or hopeless cases at an early stage, so as to prevent wastage of judicial time and protect public bodies from harassment (see Nagaenthran ([48] supra) at [76]). Its purpose is expediency, and a protracted application for leave would be self-defeating. It is therefore exceptional for the parties to be granted leave to file further affidavits on appeal from an application for leave to commence judicial review, as we have done in the present case. We considered it inappropriate to protract this process further by granting the AG leave to file yet another affidavit after the second hearing of the appeal. As Mr Ravi intimated, he would then wish to file a reply affidavit, and this would only extend the proceedings even further. Second, Mr Ravi had given the AG notice at the first hearing that he intended to rely on Datchinamurthy’s case in support of the scheduling ground. To the extent that MHA’s affidavit then made assertions inconsistent with the facts of Datchinamurthy’s case without providing any explanation, the AG could not argue that this was a problem that could not have been foreseen.

  91. [79] Instead, we considered that it would better serve the interests of justice if the appellant were granted leave to pursue his judicial review application in relation to the scheduling ground, so that all of the relevant evidence could be presented on behalf of the appellant and the State in those proceedings.

  92. The High Court’s stay of the execution

  93. [81] However, Reckley in fact undermined the ultimate proposition advanced by the AG. In Reckley at 496H, the Privy Council said that “if the constitutional motion raises a real issue for determination, it must be right for the courts to grant a stay prohibiting the carrying out of a sentence of death pending the determination” [emphasis added]. Read in context, it was clear that the Privy Council was referring to any court which was competent to hear such a constitutional challenge. In fact, in Kho Jabing (JR), the High Court had granted a stay of the applicant’s execution in HC/OS 499/2016 pending an appeal to the Court of Appeal on the basis of Reckley (although it declined to grant a stay of the applicant’s execution until the determination of the merits of HC/OS 499/2016). On appeal, this court made no adverse comment on the stay granted by the High Court.

  94. Conclusion

  95. [85] The facts of this case were unique in that they arose out of the context of a significant number of executions arising for scheduling at the same time due to their scheduling having been put on hold. It was in these circumstances that there was a need for the State to decide the sequence in which these executions were to be carried out. Nevertheless, the rarity of the circumstances did not preclude the need for the State to exercise its discretion in a manner which was consistent with the prisoners’ legal and constitutional rights. Because there was an apparent inconsistency between the state of affairs asserted by the State and the known facts, we considered there to be a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion that merited further examination in judicial review proceedings. We did not consider it appropriate, given the preliminary nature of an application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings, to allow any further materials to be adduced before us at this stage.