Court of Appeal · Decided 13 August 2020
Gobi a/l Avedian and another v Attorney-General and another appeal
Feedback & support[2020] SGCA 77 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 23 of 2020 · 53 paragraphs
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Background
- [1]
[1] Mr Gobi a/l Avedian (“Mr Gobi”) and Mr Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah (“Mr Datchinamurthy”) are Malaysian citizens who were convicted in separate proceedings for drug-related offences and sentenced to the death penalty. They are currently held in Changi Prison awaiting the execution of their sentences. Mr Gobi has filed a separate application in CA/CM 3/2020 to review his conviction and the Court of Appeal has reserved judgment in that matter.
- [2]
[2] On 16 January 2020, Lawyers for Liberty (“LFL”), a non-governmental organisation based in Malaysia, released a press statement where it claimed that it had discovered that “brutal and unlawful methods” were used in judicial executions in Singapore (“the LFL Press Statement”). LFL had allegedly been informed that in the event that the rope broke during an execution, officers from the Singapore Prison Service (“SPS”) were trained to execute the prisoner by kicking the back of the prisoner’s neck. This was done surreptitiously and specific measures were adopted to ensure nothing incriminating would be revealed in a subsequent autopsy. LFL claimed that this information had been provided by a former SPS officer (“the Witness”).
The applications
- [3]
[3] On 28 January 2020, the appellants filed HC/OS 111/2020 (“OS 111”) pursuant to O 53 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (“the Rules”) for leave to commence judicial review and sought the following orders:
- [4]
[4] The appellants were represented by Mr Ravi s/o Madasamy (“Mr Ravi”), an advocate and solicitor with Carson Law Chambers.
- [6]
[6] The AG filed two affidavits in reply. The first was an affidavit by Chief Prosecutor Kow Keng Siong (“CP Kow”) who stated that the AG had considered the matter and would not grant immunity from criminal prosecution to the Witness for any offence that he had committed or might commit. The second was an affidavit by Deputy Assistant Commissioner See Hoe Kiat (“Dy Asst Commr See”) of the SPS who unequivocally denied that the SPS had ever carried out any training or given instructions on the alleged execution method.
- [7]
[7] A pre-trial conference (“PTC”) for OS 111 was held on 4 February 2020, where Mr Ravi appeared for the appellants and Mr Wong Woon Kwong (“Mr Wong”) appeared for the AG. Mr Wong requested that OS 111 be heard on an urgent basis and stated, “I am also instructed to state that we are expressly reserving all our rights against Mr Ravi”. We will refer to this particular statement as “the Statement”. Mr Ravi asked if the Statement was a threat against him and his concerns were recorded twice by the assistant registrar, who informed him that he could clarify the Statement with Mr Wong after the PTC.
- [8]
[8] At the PTC, Mr Ravi also sought leave to tender a further affidavit from the Witness, and he was permitted to file this affidavit by 10 February 2020. No affidavit was filed. Instead, the appellants filed HC/OS 181/2020 (“OS 181”) for declaratory relief that the Statement breached their right to a fair hearing of OS 111 under Art 9 of the Constitution.
- [9]
[9] At the next PTC on 11 February 2020, Mr Ravi confirmed that the Witness would not file an affidavit. He also applied for and was granted leave to amend OS 111 as follows:
(a) Prayer 1(a) (see [3(a)] above) was amended from a stay “pending investigation of the allegations that executions are carried out by kicking to the back of the neck” to a stay “in light of the alleged contingent protocol that executions are carried out by kicking to the back of the neck” [emphasis added].
The hearing below
- [10]
[10] Both OS 111 and OS 181 were heard by the High Court judge (“the Judge”) on 13 February 2020.
The appellants’ submissions
- [14]
[14] In respect of OS 181, the Statement was an implied threat to commence civil, criminal and/or punitive proceedings against Mr Ravi. It compromised the independence of counsel, which infringed the rule of law and the appellants’ right to counsel and a fair hearing under Art 9 of the Constitution. OS 111 should be stayed pending OS 181 as Mr Ravi should be permitted to argue OS 111 without the threat hanging over him.
The AG’s submissions
- [15]
[15] Mr Wong, appearing on behalf of the AG in OS 111, submitted that there was no decision susceptible to judicial review as the appellants had not exhausted their legal remedies. They had not applied for a stay of execution of their sentences or a grant of immunity for the Witness, and had instead come to the court as a first resort.
The decision
- [20]
[20] The Judge dismissed both applications (see Gobi a/l Avedian and another v Attorney-General [2020] SGHC 31 (“the GD”)).
- [21]
[21] As the appellants had applied to stay OS 111 in favour of OS 181, the Judge dealt with OS 181 first. The Judge dismissed OS 181 as there was no basis for the claim that Mr Ravi had been threatened. Mr Wong was merely communicating a position familiar to all lawyers: the express reservation of existing legal rights that might be exercised in the future. The Statement was a reminder to Mr Ravi that he should conduct himself appropriately. There was no basis for concluding that Mr Ravi would have felt threatened in any way, or that it would have been reasonable for him to do so, or that Mr Wong’s communication could have any bearing on how Mr Ravi would conduct the case. Given the lack of a factual basis, there was no need to discuss the scope of rights under Art 9 of the Constitution, and the application to stay OS 111 pending OS 181 was rendered moot by the dismissal of OS 181 (see the GD at [4]–[6]).
The present appeals
- [24]
[24] After the applications were dismissed, Mr Ravi indicated that he had instructions to appeal and agreed to the appeals being heard on an expedited basis. On 19 February 2020, the appellants filed CA/CA 23/2020 (“CA 23”) against the decision in OS 111 and CA/CA 24/2020 (“CA 24”) against the decision in OS 181.
Events prior to the hearings
- [25]
[25] On 24 February 2020, the appellants filed notices of their intention to act in person in the appeals. On 9 March 2020, Mr Gobi wrote to the Registry of the Supreme Court (“the Registry”) requesting “Mackenzie [sic] friend assistance” and copies of the notes of evidence and the Judge’s decision below. The Registry provided the documents and informed Mr Gobi that he had to obtain the consent of the person whom he sought to be appointed as his McKenzie friend.
- [27]
[27] The Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”) objected to the appellants’ request by a letter dated 20 March 2020 that also set out the timeline of events that had occurred since the applications were filed. It later indicated by a letter dated 25 March 2020 that it intended to file an affidavit to adduce relevant evidence pertaining to the adjournment application.
The first hearing on 2 April 2020
- [28]
[28] The appeals were first heard on 2 April 2020. At the hearing, Mr Wong sought leave to admit two affidavits by Superintendent Toh Gek Choo of the SPS (“Supt Toh’s affidavits”) into evidence. The affidavits dealt with the events leading up to the appellants’ filing of their notices of intention to act in person. The appellants did not object and the affidavits were admitted into evidence.
- [29]
[29] The appellants repeated their request for an adjournment as they wished to obtain an affidavit from the Witness and Mr Ravi’s consent to act as their McKenzie friend. We allowed the appellants’ request and also directed that, if the Witness did not file an affidavit, the appellants’ Malaysian solicitors should file an affidavit to explain why it was not possible to obtain an affidavit from the Witness.
Subsequent events
- [31]
[31] In response, the AGC denied that the SPS had copied any correspondence between inmates and their lawyers or forwarded it to the AGC. Their position in relation to the appellants’ correspondence with their families, however, was that it was not confidential or privileged. In view of the appellants’ allegations, we directed the Registry to inform the SPS to send a representative to assist the court on this issue at the next hearing. We also indicated that until the hearing, the SPS was not to disclose any correspondence between the appellants and any person to the AGC without the appellants’ consent or leave of court, and, similarly, the AGC was not to seek such correspondence.
- [32]
[32] On 24 April 2020, the appellants confirmed that Mr Ravi had agreed to act as their McKenzie friend, and Mr Ravi was appointed as a McKenzie friend on 29 April 2020. The appellants’ Malaysian solicitor, Mr Zaid, also filed an affidavit dated 21 May 2020. He indicated that he had met the Witness who confirmed that he was able and willing to depose an affidavit, but only if he was granted immunity from civil and criminal liabilities. This second affidavit by Mr Zaid did not contain any material information that was not already in his first affidavit (see [5] above).
The second hearing on 15 June 2020
- [33]
[33] The appeals were next heard on 15 June 2020. Mr Ravi was present as the appellants’ McKenzie friend. Supt Toh of the SPS was also present.
The parties’ submissions
The appellants’ submissions
- [34]
[34] The appellants did not file their appellants’ case but made oral submissions during the second hearing.
- [35]
[35] The appellants highlighted that the AG had relied on the affidavit filed by Dy Asst Commr See (see [6] above), but Dy Asst Commr See had been the Superintendent of Institution A1 only from March 2014 to September 2018. He could not have had personal knowledge of the training or conduct of judicial executions prior to that time, particularly from 1991 to 1994 when the Witness had served in the SPS. Dy Asst Commr See also could not have had personal knowledge of whether or not the rope had ever broken during judicial executions as he could not have witnessed all of the executions. He must have relied on documents or information in the possession of the SPS, but those documents had not been produced in court. The only witnesses with relevant personal knowledge would be the Superintendents, medical officers and SPS officers who witnessed executions from 1991 to 1994, but they did not give evidence.
- [36]
[36] Dy Asst Commr See also failed to provide any details about how judicial executions were conducted or how officers were trained to react in the event the rope broke during an execution. Judicial executions were carried out in the presence of a medical officer, and a coroner, who was a judicial officer of the State Courts, would conduct an inquiry after the execution to satisfy himself that the execution had been carried out duly and properly. However, the medical officer was also employed by the SPS and the coroner was not present for the execution itself. There were no independent third parties, such as family members, present at the execution. Given the lack of information on the conduct of judicial executions, the court should investigate the matter in detail.
The AG’s submissions
Our decision
- [43]
[43] There are two issues in the appeals before us:
(a) whether or not the appellants should be granted leave to commence judicial review; and
(b) whether or not the appellants should be granted declaratory relief in relation to the Statement.
The application for leave to commence judicial review
(a) the subject matter of the complaint has to be susceptible to judicial review;
(b) the applicant has to have a sufficient interest in the matter; and
(c) the materials before the court have to disclose an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought by the applicant.
- [45]
[45] As this court recently reiterated, the requirement to obtain leave for judicial review is intended to filter out groundless or hopeless cases at an early stage. Its aim is to prevent the waste of judicial time and protect public bodies from harassment (see Lee Pheng Lip at [25]).
The Mandatory Order and the Court Immunity Order
- [48]
[48] The AG’s first argument is that no request for immunity was ever made to the AG or the Minister and so there is no decision for this court to review. When asked, Mr Wong indicated that such a request could have been made in writing to the AG beforehand. The authorities on whether a matter is susceptible to judicial review have focused on the jurisdictional issue of the source and the nature of power exercised by the executive bodies in reaching their decision (see, for example, the decisions of this court in Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh and another v Attorney-General [2013] 2 SLR 844 at [25]–[28] and Public Service Commission v Lai Swee Lin Linda [2001] 1 SLR(R) 133 at [41]). The question of whether there must be a decision at all is a preliminary issue and the answer seems obvious. As a general rule, an applicant for judicial review of a decision by a public body must exhaust all alternative remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of the court for judicial review (see Borissik at [25]), and where there is no decision there is nothing to review. An executive body cannot be faulted for failing to exercise its discretion when the opportunity to exercise the said discretion was not brought to its attention prior to the commencement of judicial proceedings. If the court, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, cannot substitute its decision for the decision of the executive body, then it cannot be asked to make a decision where the executive body has not had the opportunity to do so.
- [49]
[49] In any event, according to CP Kow’s affidavit, the AG has since considered the matter and declined to grant the Witness immunity from criminal prosecution for any offences that he had committed or will commit. In doing so, the AG has exercised his discretion. The appellants submitted that this is an abuse of discretion as it deprived them of a chance to bring relevant evidence before the court, but as Mr Wong pointed out, this decision does not prevent the Witness from giving evidence. The appellants have not raised any other reason why the AG’s decision might be an abuse of discretion. Given that there is no basis to claim that the exercise of discretion is unlawful, this is not a matter that the court can interfere with now as the court cannot direct a public body to perform its duty in a particular way (see Borissik at [21]).
- [52]
[52] Section 2(1) of the Evidence Act provides that Part III of the Evidence Act (which s 134(2) falls within) applies to judicial proceedings but not to affidavits presented to court. The Witness would not be able to rely on this provision to avoid prosecution for potential criminal offences revealed in his affidavit or for events that occurred outside of judicial proceedings, such as his initial communications with LFL. In any event, the provision does not exempt a witness from prosecution for giving false evidence, and that may possibly be the offence that the Witness is concerned about.
The Prohibiting Order
- [55]
[55] The Witness was given multiple opportunities to depose an affidavit but declined to do so, and so the only evidence before this court is the LFL Press Statement and Mr Zaid’s affidavit. We agree with the Judge that the LFL Press Statement did not provide a sufficient basis to grant leave to commence judicial review. Media statements on their own are not reliable evidence and the LFL Press Statement, in particular, did not identify the source of the information or its relevance to the present-day conduct of judicial executions.
- [62]
[62] We note that in Telecom Credit, this court observed that an application for leave to commence judicial review was not an interlocutory application within the meaning of para 1(h) of the Fifth Schedule (at [28]), but the case concerned the nature of garnishee proceedings and this observation was not necessary to the eventual decision. It should also be noted that the proposition in Telecom Credit would indeed be correct if there is a rolled-up hearing pursuant to which the court concerned is to determine the substantive merits together with the leave application (see, for example, the decisions of the High Court in Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 1 SLR 1 at [16] (affirmed in Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189) and Agilah a/p Ramasamy v Commissioner for Labour [2019] 4 SLR 972 at [30]). In that situation, once the application is disposed of, there is “nothing more to proceed on” (see Telecom Credit at [28]).
- [63]
[63] In the circumstances, Mr Zaid’s affidavit was admissible in OS 111 pursuant to O 41 r 5(2) of the Rules at the point in time when the question arose for determination.
- [64]
[64] The rationale for the exception in O 41 r (2) of the Rules was considered by the High Court in Jurong Shipyard Pte Ltd v BNP Paribas [2008] 4 SLR(R) 33 (“Jurong Shipyard”), citing the explanations in earlier decisions of the English courts (at [85]–[87]):
- [65]
[65] The hearsay exception may therefore be understood as a consequence of the urgency common in interlocutory proceedings and a desire to preserve the status quo pending final hearing. The purpose of the exception is to infuse the necessary flexibility into interlocutory proceedings and to ensure accessibility to relevant evidence within a short period of time (see Singapore Court Practice 2017 vol 1 (Jeffrey Pinsler gen ed) (LexisNexis, 2017) at para 41/5/3–3A). These considerations may be particularly relevant in certain interlocutory applications, such as an application for an injunction (as was the case in Jurong Shipyard itself). In the present case, the application in OS 111 referred to the “imminent risk” of the appellants being subjected to illegal executions. We note that the Witness’s evidence pertained to a protocol that allegedly existed more than 20 years before the applications were filed, and there was no evidence, even on the face of Mr Zaid’s affidavit, that the protocol was still in place. Nor was there any evidence that the date of the appellants’ judicial executions had been fixed. We accept, however, that there was no reason the executions would not be fixed soon, since Mr Ravi informed the Judge (at a later hearing) that the appellants’ petitions for clemency had been rejected at the time OS 111 had been filed. In the context of those pending executions, the importance of preventing irremediable harm to the appellants took on greater significance, and there was therefore sufficient reason to admit Mr Zaid’s affidavit.
- [66]
[66] However, that is not the end of the matter. First, an affidavit filed pursuant to O 41 r 5(2) of the Rules must still meet the requirements in the provision itself. As a safeguard, O 41 r 5(2) requires the deponent to state “the sources and grounds” of the statements of information or belief contained in the affidavit. The failure to identify the sources of information contained in certain paragraphs may render those paragraphs inadmissible as pure hearsay evidence (see the decision of the High Court in Dynacast (S) Pte Ltd v Lim Meng Siang and others [1989] 2 SLR(R) 226 at [19]). Secondly, the admissibility of the affidavit is a distinct question from the weight a court should accord to the evidence within. The appropriate weight to be placed on statements in an affidavit will depend on the circumstances of the case. Although an affidavit filed in interlocutory proceedings such as the present application may be admitted notwithstanding the fact that it contains hearsay evidence, the evidence contained therein must still meet a minimum threshold of reliability before a court will accord it any weight. What this minimum threshold is will depend on the facts of each case but it should not be permissible for a deponent to obtain leave to commence judicial review simply by stating – without more − that he has been told something that he believes to be true. He must identify the source (here, the Witness), as required by O 41 r 5(2), and the source must be prepared to take responsibility for the truth of what he has said. For that reason, though admissible, Mr Zaid’s affidavit failed to meet the minimum threshold of reliability. He identified the Witness in vague terms and provided details of the Witness’s employment with the SPS, which would suggest that the Witness had personal knowledge of the protocol. However, he failed to provide the name or address of the Witness and it was insufficient for the Witness to say, through Mr Zaid, that he would sign an affidavit in the event he was granted immunity. The appellants submitted that the Witness’s willingness to disclose details of his training proved that the information he gave was true, but that is not a logical inference to make. This court simply does not have enough evidence to judge the reliability of the Witness’s evidence and no weight can be placed on Mr Zaid’s affidavit. We also note that ample time had been provided to furnish the requisite details since the adjournment of the first hearing on 2 April 2020.
- [67]
[67] In the light of the above, it is not strictly necessary to consider the affidavit filed by Dy Asst Commr See to rebut Mr Zaid’s evidence, but since the appellants raised certain issues with it we address it for completeness. The appellants highlighted that Dy Asst Commr See could not have personal knowledge of the conduct of all executions and would have relied on official SPS records for the information in his affidavit. They also argued that the medical officers involved were employed by the SPS and were not independent witnesses. At the hearing, Mr Wong clarified that the medical officers present at judicial executions were doctors sent by clinics pursuant to contracts between the SPS and the clinics, and were not employed directly by the SPS.
- [68]
[68] Dy Asst Commr See’s evidence was that he was the Superintendent of Institution A1 from March 2014 to September 2018. We accept that any knowledge he had about the relevant details prior to that date, to the extent that it was based on official records, would not have been sufficient to rebut the appellants’ allegations if there had been any reliable evidence suggesting illegal conduct in judicial executions in the first place. We say this because the crux of the allegation is that this was a secret protocol and specific steps were taken to ensure that secrecy. Presumably, it would not have been documented in official records. If, for example, the Witness had given evidence of specific instances when the protocol was used, this could have been rebutted by the evidence of someone else with personal knowledge of the same incidents and not merely by reliance on the official records. At the same time, we highlight that the appellants’ position on whether this protocol was ever used or was merely a contingency varied. The Witness did not identify any specific instances when the protocol was used or when he learned of it. For obvious reasons it would not be practical to demand that every person who has ever been present at a judicial execution since the 1990s or might have learned of this protocol give evidence, and in the circumstances we do not think Dy Asst Commr See can be faulted for relying on official records. The evidence tendered by the AG is a consequence of the lack of detailed information provided by the Witness in Mr Zaid’s affidavit, which was too vague to rebut, and affirms our reasons for placing no weight on it.
- [70]
[70] In spite of the admissibility of Mr Zaid’s affidavit, there is insufficient evidence to substantiate the allegation. There is no prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the application. CA 23 is therefore dismissed.
The application for declaratory relief
- [71]
[71] We turn to CA 24, which is an appeal against the Judge’s decision not to grant declaratory relief in relation to the Statement, “I am also instructed to state that we are expressly reserving all our rights against Mr Ravi” (see [7] above). An application for declaratory relief is made under O 15 r 16 of the Rules. The principles in relation to standing are not in dispute (see the decision of this court in Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 (“Tan Eng Hong”) at [72]):
(a) the applicant must have a “real interest” in bringing the action;
(b) there must be a “real controversy” between the parties to the action for the court to resolve; and
(c) the declaration sought must relate to a right which is personal to the applicant and which is enforceable against an adverse party to the litigation.
- [72]
[72] The question of whether the applicant has a “real interest” must be judged in relation to the rights which are the subject matter of the application, but where there is a violation of a constitutional right, sufficient interest is prima facie made out (see Tan Eng Hong at [83]). The element of a “real controversy” must be established on the facts of the case between the parties (see Tan Eng Hong at [131]–[133]). The court can grant declaratory relief even though the facts on which the action is based are theoretical, as long as there is a real legal interest in a case being heard (see Tan Eng Hong at [143]).
- [73]
[73] The AG submitted that there was no real controversy as the Statement was not a threat. In Mr Wong’s affidavit, he explained as follows:
- [74]
[74] At the hearing, Mr Ng clarified that the Statement also included the option of making a complaint against Mr Ravi with the Law Society of Singapore (“the Law Society”).
- [76]
[76] Contrary to the AG’s submission, however, it is not common for one counsel to inform another that rights are being reserved against him personally. The reservation of rights is common legal parlance, but a distinction must be drawn between the reservation of rights against litigants and against solicitors. A statement that all of a party’s rights against another party are expressly reserved is common in civil disputes.
- [81]
[81] In any event, however, we do not find that the Statement was a breach of Art 9 of the Constitution. The appellants relied on the right to counsel articulated in Art 9(3), which falls under Art 9 (titled “Liberty of the person”) and states as follows:
- [82]
[82] The constitutional right to counsel exists in the context of criminal and not civil proceedings. Although the appellants are currently in prison, this does not mean that they have the right to counsel in all applications, and an application for judicial review is a civil matter. In any event, we also do not see how the Statement deprived the appellants of the assistance of counsel as Mr Ravi continued to represent them in the applications before the Judge. Further, Mr Ravi did not say what steps he would have taken in the hearing below had the Statement not been made, and he only stepped down from representing the appellants after the Judge had rendered her decision. Neither did the appellants seek any consequential relief beyond a mere declaration.
- [83]
[83] For those reasons, there is no basis for the relief sought and we dismiss CA 24 accordingly.
Mr Datchinamurthy’s allegations on the conduct of the SPS
- [84]
[84] Before concluding, we think it is appropriate to highlight our concerns about the allegations raised by Mr Datchinamurthy regarding the SPS’s actions on the documents brought to Changi Prison by his family members. As set out at [30] above, Mr Datchinamurthy was unhappy with the SPS’s decision to forward to the AGC copies of documents that his family members had brought to Changi Prison. That the SPS did so is not disputed. The AGC and the SPS took the position that the documents were neither confidential nor privileged as they were not exchanged between the appellants and their legal advisors.
- [86]
[86] Section 84(1) of the Prisons Act states as follows:
- [87]
[87] The regulations in question are the Prisons Regulations (Cap 247, 2002 Rev Ed) (“the Regulations”). Regulation 127A was inserted by the Prisons (Amendment) Regulations 2018 (S 533/2018) and states as follows:
- [88]
[88] To the extent that the appellants questioned the legality of the SPS making copies of their documents, reg 127A(2) provides a legal basis for the SPS to do so. We do not think, however, that reg 127A(2) goes so far as to permit the SPS to forward these copies to AGC.
- [90]
[90] At the hearing, Mr Wong highlighted that the appellants had sought an adjournment of the previous hearing in part because they claimed they had only been told of the Judge’s decision to dismiss OS 111 and OS 181 on 6 March 2020, and that the AGC had to verify these claims with the SPS to assist the court. In the course of verifying and preparing Supt Toh’s affidavits, the SPS provided these documents to the AGC upon the AGC’s request. In our view, while counsel have a duty to assist the court in the due administration of justice, this does not permit counsel to go beyond what is legally permissible. To the extent that the AGC might have sought information on, for example, when the appellants had received visits from Mr Ravi or family members, it could have approached the SPS for the requisite information, but we think that a different approach applies to correspondence and documents. There is an expectation of confidentiality in a letter or document shared between private parties. These are documents and information that the SPS has access to by virtue of its administrative role under reg 127A to screen and record letters, but there was no legal basis in the form of a positive legal right to forward copies of the same to the AGC.
- [92]
[92] At the hearing, Mr Wong also informed us of a separate incident. After the first hearing on 2 April 2020 (see [28]–[29] above), the AGC had forwarded a copy of the official minute sheet to the SPS so that the appellants could share the court’s directions with their families. The AGC asked the SPS to notify it when the appellants had sent the minute sheet and, in that context and without a specific request from the AGC for these documents, the SPS proceeded to forward copies of the appellants’ letters to their families to the AGC. Mr Wong agreed that the AGC should destroy the copies of such correspondence and, on 16 June 2020, the AGC wrote to inform the court that the copies had been destroyed. We were satisfied that the AGC had conducted itself properly in this regard by promptly destroying the copies upon being informed of the proper procedure it ought to adopt in relation to correspondence by or to prisoners.
- [93]
[93] At the hearing, it was conceded that the AGC had not properly considered this aspect of the prisoners’ privacy when it obtained the documents from the SPS, and we accept that this was an oversight and not an attempt to seek an advantage in the proceedings. By virtue of the AGC’s role as legal advisor to the SPS, it may have access to information that other counsel might not, and it must therefore exercise due caution to avoid the possibility of a mistaken impression that it seeks an undue advantage. Although the following oft-cited observations by Lord Hewart CJ in the decision of the English Divisional Court in The King v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259 were made in the context of the rules of natural justice, they are, in our view, equally applicable in the context of the present case – that “it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”. Such an approach is particularly needful in the light of the fact that, as this court observed in Khor Soon Lee v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 201, the Public Prosecutor is the guardian of the people’s rights, including the rights of the accused (at [30], citing the decision (also of this court) in Bachoo Mohan Singh v Public Prosecutor and other applications [2010] 1 SLR 966 at [104]). In the present case, whilst the AG may not have acted, in the context of the judicial review proceedings, in his capacity as Public Prosecutor, the same principle applies in the light of the fact that these proceedings are inextricably connected to the relevant criminal proceedings. As guardian of the public interest, there is, inter alia, a duty to safeguard the rights of prisoners in the custody of the SPS.
Conclusion