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Grounds publishedDecided 1 Nov 2021

Court of Appeal

Public Prosecutor v Pang Chie Wei and other matters

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[2021] SGCA 101Case no. Criminal Motion No 11 of 2020

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  1. Introduction

  2. [1] The desire to do justice is at the heart of the legal process. In the context of criminal justice, that objective is commonly understood to mean the proper adjudication of guilt and the determination of truth. Yet, as we observed in Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135 (“Kho Jabing”) at [47], we must never lose sight of another equally important function of justice, which is the attainment of finality. After all, to permit “an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness of the underlying substantive commands” (see Paul M Bator, “Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners” (1963) 76(3) Harv L Rev 441 (“Bator”) at 452). There must therefore come a point where a concluded court decision may legitimately be left in a state of repose, unencumbered by the prospect of further judicial review (see Mackey v United States 401 US 667 (1971) (“Mackey”) at 683).

  3. Background facts

  4. [3] We begin by setting out the relevant background facts. The backdrop to these applications is our decision in Saravanan Chandaram v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2020] 2 SLR 95 (“Saravanan”), in which we considered the permissibility of the Prosecution’s “dual charging practice”. Under the “dual charging practice”, where a single compressed block of cannabis-related plant material was certified by the Health Sciences Authority as containing (a) cannabis and (b) fragmented vegetable matter containing cannabinol (“CBN”) and tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”), the Prosecution would consider preferring both (a) a charge in respect of the portion certified to consist purely of cannabis, and (b) a charge in respect of the portion consisting of fragmented vegetable matter that had been found to contain CBN and THC. We held in Saravanan (at [197] and [198(c)]) that the Prosecution’s “dual charging practice” was impermissible. More recently, we reaffirmed the impermissibility of the Prosecution’s “dual charging practice” in Abdul Karim bin Mohamed Kuppai Khan v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 1390 (“Abdul Karim”) at [36].

  5. [4] The respondents in these applications had been charged with and convicted pursuant to the Prosecution’s “dual charging practice”. Following our decision in Saravanan, the Prosecution filed these applications inviting us to review our previous decisions in relation to the respondents, set aside the cannabis mixture charges that had been preferred against them in accordance with the “dual charging practice” and consequently reconsider the sentences imposed on them. However, by way of a letter dated 15 February 2021 (“the PP’s Letter”), the Prosecution sought leave to withdraw all four applications. The Prosecution took the stance that Saravanan did not automatically apply to the respondents as their cases pre-dated Saravanan and had been decided in accordance with the prevailing law then.

  6. [5] After hearing the parties, we granted the Prosecution leave to withdraw the applications. We saw no juridical basis for refusing to allow the Prosecution to do so and the respondents did not contend otherwise. The Public Prosecutor has carriage of prosecutions and is constitutionally vested with prosecutorial power, exercisable at his discretion, in the conduct of any criminal proceedings (see Art 35(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) (“the Constitution”)). That discretion necessarily extends to the continuance or withdrawal of the applications before us. There was also no suggestion that the withdrawal of the applications would be tantamount to an abuse of either the judicial process or prosecutorial power.

  7. [6] The Prosecution’s withdrawal of the applications nevertheless leaves open the possibility of the respondents filing their own applications to seek to reopen their convictions and/or sentences. We therefore indicated to the parties that we would issue these written grounds to elaborate on the applicable threshold for the court to revisit its prior disposal of a case where there has been a change in the law. We also highlighted that, following our review of the authorities, the threshold was that of substantial injustice and would not easily be met. It is to this discussion that we now turn.

  8. The finality of court decisions

  9. [7] The starting position of our analysis is that every judgment of the court is final. This proposition applies with stronger force to decisions in concluded appeals. As we explained in Kho Jabing at [49], “[a]s we venture further along the criminal process, we must give greater presumptive weight to the veracity of the findings already made and accord greater prominence to the principle of finality”. In the same vein, we recently observed in Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor [2021] SGCA 89 at [2] that “the issuance of a final judgment by this [c]ourt brings an end to the legal process available to parties in relation to a criminal conviction or sentence”.

  10. [8] Given that concluded criminal matters, and particularly concluded criminal appeals, are final and cannot be reopened on their merits, it follows that a matter ordinarily cannot be reopened just because there has been a subsequent change in the law. Any reconsideration of a concluded matter based on a subsequent change in the law is necessarily concerned with the merits of that matter, which the court typically has neither the jurisdiction nor power to re-assess (see Koh Zhan Quan Tony v Public Prosecutor and another motion [2006] 2 SLR(R) 830 (“Koh Tony”) at [29]). The judicial reluctance to undo decisions that were properly made in accordance with the law as it was then understood is grounded principally in respect for the finality of judgments, which is the principle that litigation must at some definite point be brought to an end (see FTC v Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulatory Co 344 US 206 (1952) at 213). Once the trial and appellate processes have run their course, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence (see Barefoot v Estelle 463 US 880 (1983) at 887).

  11. [9] The principle of finality has been described, perhaps unfairly, in some quarters as the notion that “in most matters, it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right” (see Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co 285 US 393 (1932) at 406). To those who subscribe to such a view, the principle of finality may appear to be at odds with the interests of justice; specifically, the correction of error and the search for truth. In our view, however, there are three main reasons why the principle of finality is not only compatible with, but also integral to, justice.

  12. [10] First, respect for finality maximises scarce judicial resources by channelling them towards more productive ends. Applications “litigating the validity under present law of criminal convictions that were perfectly free from error when made final” take up valuable resources which should instead go towards the disposal of cases being heard for the first time (see Mackey at 691). In contrast, the subjects of concluded criminal appeals have had two opportunities, before the trial and appellate courts, to defend their positions. Attempts to reopen concluded criminal appeals are wasteful because they essentially afford litigants a third bite of the cherry (see Ryan W Scott, “In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral Review” (2014) 4(1) Wake Forest Journal of Law and Policy 179 (“Scott”) at 185–186). This is not merely a logistical concern but one with profound implications for access to justice by the large number of other litigants.

  13. [11] Second, the finality of court judgments is crucial to the effectiveness of the deterrent and rehabilitative functions of the criminal justice system. It is essential to the deterrent function of the criminal law that “we be able to say that one violating [the] law will swiftly and certainly become subject to … just punishment” (see Bator at 452; see also Teague v Lane 489 US 288 (1989) at 309). The endless reopening of concluded criminal appeals is also injurious to the rehabilitation of offenders. After all, rehabilitation begins with an offender’s acceptance that he has been justly sanctioned and that he stands in need of re-education. The rehabilitative process cannot possibly begin if “the cardinal moral predicate is missing, if society itself continuously tells the [offender] that he may not be justly subject to [re-education]” in the first place (see Bator at 452).

  14. [12] Third, and most importantly, the finality of court decisions is fundamental to the very integrity of the judicial process. As we emphasised in Kho Jabing at [47], “[n]othing can be as corrosive of general confidence in the criminal process as an entrenched culture of self-doubt engendered by abusive and repetitive attempts to re-litigate matters which have already been decided”. An unbounded willingness to reopen concluded criminal appeals denies cases the closure that they deserve, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the judicial process itself.

  15. [13] For these reasons, final judgments, particularly those issued by an appellate court, will not be readily unsettled. After finality attaches, a judgment stands even if the law subsequently changes. However, there are two ways in which the court’s revisionary powers may be invoked to permit a departure from the default position of finality. These are: (a) the Court of Appeal’s inherent power to reopen a concluded criminal appeal; and (b) an appellate court’s statutory power to review its earlier decision under s 394I of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“the CPC”). We now proceed to examine each of these in turn.

  16. The court’s revisionary powers to reopen concluded decisions

  17. The Court of Appeal’s inherent power to reopen concluded criminal appeals

  18. [14] We first consider the Court of Appeal’s inherent power to reopen concluded criminal appeals. That such an inherent power exists has not always been settled law. Prior to 2010, the Court of Appeal held in several decisions that once it had delivered its judgment in a criminal appeal, its appellate jurisdiction ceased and it was functus officio. It was reasoned on this basis that upon the conclusion of a criminal appeal, the Court of Appeal did not have any statutorily-conferred jurisdiction to reopen a matter and reconsider its substantive merits: see, for example, Abdullah bin A Rahman v Public Prosecutor [1994] 2 SLR(R) 1017 at [10] and [13]; Lim Choon Chye v Public Prosecutor [1994] 2 SLR(R) 1024 at [8] and [12]; Jabar bin Kadermastan v Public Prosecutor [1995] 1 SLR(R) 326 at [58]; and Vignes s/o Mourthi v Public Prosecutor [2003] 4 SLR(R) 518 at [4]–[8]. In these cases, the Court of Appeal held that the conclusion of the appellate process meant that it was jurisdictionally foreclosed from hearing applications to adduce fresh evidence, staying a sentence of death or hearing a second appeal. Those decisions are but the logical extension of the default position set out at [7]–[8] above.

  19. [15] An exception to the default position was first identified in Koh Tony. The applicants there had been charged with murder but were convicted by the High Court of the lesser offence of robbery with hurt. Upon the Prosecution’s appeal in CA/CCA 2/2005 (“CCA 2/2005”), the Court of Appeal substituted the convictions for robbery with hurt with convictions for murder. The applicants then filed criminal motions to the Court of Appeal, contending that it did not have the jurisdiction to hear the substantive merits of CCA 2/2005 in the first place (“the Jurisdictional Issue”). According to the applicants, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed) (“the 1999 SCJA”) only permitted the Prosecution to appeal against acquittals, whereas they had been convicted by the High Court, albeit of a lesser offence. The Prosecution argued that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to consider the criminal motions as it had already disposed of the substantive merits of CCA 2/2005 and was thus functus officio.

  20. [16] The Court of Appeal held that it had both the jurisdiction and the power to hear the criminal motions. The Jurisdictional Issue ought to have constituted an integral part of CCA 2/2005 and the applicants were not estopped from raising that issue in the criminal motions (see Koh Tony at [23]). The Court of Appeal therefore concluded (at [23]) that it remained “properly seised of the present case in so far as the question of jurisdiction [was] concerned” [emphasis in original]. There was also no question that the Court of Appeal had the power to decide the Jurisdictional Issue by virtue of s 29A(4) of the 1999 SCJA (see Koh Tony at [23]–[24]). In summary, the Court of Appeal held that if an application to reopen a concluded criminal appeal was premised on a challenge to the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the first place, rather than a challenge to the substantive merits of the appeal, the court would remain seised of jurisdiction to hear the matter even if it had already ruled on the merits of the appeal (see Kho Jabing at [14]).

  21. [17] Koh Tony, however, did not go so far as to authorise the Court of Appeal to review the merits of an already concluded criminal appeal. The Court of Appeal only held that it had the jurisdiction and power to determine the Jurisdictional Issue; indeed, it took great pains to clarify that it remained functus officio in so far as the substantive merits of CCA 2/2005 were concerned (see Koh Tony at [22] and [29]). As the Court of Appeal emphasised (at [29]), its decision was “not a carte blanche for this court to review its previous decisions when it is truly functus officio. In particular, this court has neither the jurisdiction nor power to review the substantive merits of the case”.

  22. [18] After Koh Tony came our decision in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 2 SLR 192 (“Yong Vui Kong”). The applicant in Yong Vui Kong had been convicted on a capital drug trafficking charge. He filed a notice of appeal but subsequently withdrew his appeal. He then filed a criminal motion petitioning the Court of Appeal to treat the previous withdrawal of his appeal as a nullity and to restore his appeal for hearing. The Prosecution argued that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to hear the criminal motion because the applicant’s appeal, once withdrawn, was deemed to have been dismissed on its merits, with the result that the court was functus officio and could not hear any further appeal against his conviction.

  23. [19] The Court of Appeal held (at [26]–[28]) that the applicant’s withdrawal of his appeal was a nullity as he had laboured under a fundamental mistake at the material time. The applicant was thus allowed to proceed with his appeal. More importantly, the Court of Appeal observed (at [15]–[16]), albeit in obiter, that even if the substantive merits of the appeal had already been heard and decided, it might nonetheless have the jurisdiction to hear further arguments on those substantive merits:

  24. As was noted in Kho Jabing (at [18]), the operative question in Yong Vui Kong was not whether the court could reconsider its previous decision in a concluded criminal appeal (in the sense of whether it had the jurisdiction to do so), but whether it ought to do so (in the sense of whether it ought to exercise its power to that end).

  25. [21] When, then, might the court exercise its inherent power to reopen a concluded criminal appeal? An applicant for such relief had to satisfy the court that there was sufficient material on which it could conclude that there had been a miscarriage of justice (see Kho Jabing at [77(b)]). Material tendered in support of a review application would only be “sufficient” if it was “new” and “compelling” (see Kho Jabing at [52]). The Court of Appeal accepted (at [53]) that new legal arguments could form the basis of a review application if such arguments were “new”, in the sense that they: (a) had not been considered at an earlier stage of the proceedings; and (b) were material which could not, even with reasonable diligence, have been presented to the court before the filing of the review application. The Court of Appeal further observed (at [58]) that new legal arguments would, by and large, only be able to constitute the basis for a review application if such arguments were made following a change in the law.

  26. [23] As mentioned at [21] above, the court would only exercise its inherent power of review if there was a “miscarriage of justice”. In general, the court would only find that there was a “miscarriage of justice” in the following situations (see Kho Jabing at [65], [69], [70] and [77(e)]):

  27. (a) First, the court might find that a decision on conviction or sentence had been shown to be “demonstrably wrong”.

  28. (i) In relation to a decision on conviction, the applicant had to show that it was apparent, based on the evidence tendered in support of the application alone, that there was a powerful probability that the decision was wrong.

  29. (ii) In relation to a decision on sentence, the applicant had to show that the decision was based on some fundamental misapprehension of the law and was thus blatantly wrong on the face of the record.

  30. (b) Second, the court might find that the impugned decision was tainted by fraud or a breach of natural justice, such that the integrity of the judicial process had been compromised.

  31. [24] The Court of Appeal ultimately declined to exercise its inherent power of review in Kho Jabing. This was because the legal arguments raised by the applicant at the eleventh hour were neither new nor compelling and thus failed to satisfy the prerequisites for the court’s exercise of its inherent power of review.

  32. [25] That is an overview of the Court of Appeal’s inherent power of review, as it has developed over time. We now turn to an appellate court’s statutory power of review under s 394I of the CPC.

  33. An appellate court’s statutory power of review under s 394I of the CPC

  34. [26] Section 394I of the CPC sets out the procedure by which an appellate court may review its earlier decision. While only the Court of Appeal, as the final appellate court in Singapore, possesses the inherent power of review (see Kho Jabing at [77(a)]), the statutory power of review may be exercised by both the General Division of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, so long as the decision sought to be reviewed is a decision of an appellate court on the merits of an appeal (see s 394G(1)(a) of the CPC).

  35. [27] Section 394J of the CPC codifies the requirements for an appellate court’s exercise of its power of review as set out in Kho Jabing and provides as follows:

  36. [28] The speech of the then Senior Minister of State for Law, Ms Indranee Rajah (“the Minister”), at the second reading of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill is useful in shedding light on the genesis of the court’s statutory power of review. The Minister expressed that “[t]he re-opening procedure, including the relevant threshold tests, is largely a codification of a number of considered decisions made by the Court of Appeal in balancing the interests of finality against the need to prevent a miscarriage of justice” (see Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 (Indranee Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Law)). The decisions that the Minister referred to would have included our decisions in Kho Jabing and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Yong Vui Kong.

  37. [29] We make four observations on the court’s statutory power of review. First, s 394J(1)(b) of the CPC makes it clear that an appellate court’s statutory power of review does not affect its inherent power to review an earlier decision on its own motion. The same point was underscored by the Minister during the relevant Parliamentary debates.

  38. [30] Second, while an applicant may challenge the court’s decision in a concluded criminal appeal by invoking either the court’s statutory power of review under s 394I of the CPC or its inherent power (per Kho Jabing), the substance of any such application is typically unaffected by the choice of remedial avenue. This follows from the fact that s 394J of the CPC codifies the requirements set out in Kho Jabing, a fact which the Minister noted in Parliament. It is unsurprising that the requirements under s 394J of the CPC mirror those laid down in Kho Jabing; indeed, it might be somewhat arbitrary if the success of a review application were contingent on one’s choice of remedial avenue.

  39. [31] Third, and following from the point we have just made, even though the substance of a review application remains the same regardless of which remedial avenue is utilised, the two avenues are not duplicative. An applicant may make only one review application under s 394I of the CPC in respect of any decision of an appellate court (see s 394K of the CPC). This means that where “sufficient material” on which an appellate court may conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice only emerges after a prior review application brought under s 394I of the CPC has been heard and dismissed, an applicant may have further recourse to the court’s inherent power of review but not to its statutory power.

  40. [32] Our fourth and final point is of particular importance for present purposes: Parliament had clearly contemplated that a subsequent change in the law could constitute the basis for a review application under s 394I of the CPC. This is made explicit in s 394J(4), which provides that any material consisting of legal arguments will only be “sufficient” within the meaning of s 394J(2) if, in addition to satisfying all the requirements set out in s 394J(3), it is based on “a change in the law that arose from any decision made by a court after the conclusion of all proceedings relating to the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made” [emphasis added].

  41. The conditions under which an appellate court may reopen an earlier decision in the light of a subsequent change in the law

  42. [33] To consolidate the foregoing analysis, judgments of the court are final and judgments of an appellate court cannot ordinarily be reopened on their merits. A subsequent change in the law without more would not constitute sufficient grounds on which the court may exercise either its inherent or statutory power of review (see [7]–[8] above).

  43. [34] We have consistently held that a mere change in the law would not justify the exercise of our revisionary powers: see Ang Poh Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR(R) 929 (“Ang Poh Chuan”) at [24] and Ng Kim Han and others v Public Prosecutor [2001] 1 SLR(R) 397 (“Ng Kim Han”) at [22]. The question that then arises is: under what conditions may an appellate court reopen the merits of an earlier decision following a change in the law? It is to this question that we now turn.

  44. [35] There is a dearth of local authorities to guide us. This is perhaps unsurprising: the Court of Appeal’s inherent power to reopen concluded criminal appeals was only expressly recognised in Kho Jabing in 2016, and the court’s statutory power of review came into effect later still on 31 October 2018. From our review of the case law, it appeared that since 2016 and until the present criminal motions were filed, only one review application had been made on the basis of a subsequent change in the law. That application culminated in our decision in Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180 (“Gobi”), a case which we return to at [97]–[100] below. Given the paucity of local authorities on the issue at hand, some guidance may be usefully drawn from the English authorities concerning the analogous issue of granting leave to appeal out of time following a change in the law. It should be noted that the objection to granting such an extension of time is surely less weighty than that to reopening a concluded matter after the appellate process has been exhausted. Nonetheless, the principles in the English authorities are instructive.

  45. [36] As it turns out, one of the relevant English authorities concerns the proper interpretation of the term “cannabis”. This is very similar to the issue that we were confronted with in Saravanan, the decision upon which these criminal motions were founded. In R v Mitchell [1977] 2 All Er 168 (“Mitchell”), the appellant had been convicted on two counts of possession of cannabis with intent to supply, among other charges. The cannabis in question comprised the leaf, stalk and clean seeds of the cannabis plant. The appellant was granted leave to appeal against his sentence. Following the appellant’s conviction but before his appeal against sentence was heard, the English Court of Appeal held in a separate matter that the leaf and the stalk of the cannabis plant did not fall within the mischief targeted by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (“the 1971 Act”). The appellant then sought an extension of time to appeal against his conviction. The central question in Mitchell was whether the clean seeds of the cannabis plant were “cannabis” within the meaning of s 37(1) of the 1971 Act. The English Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) held (at 170J–171B) that only those parts of the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant that contained cannabis resin were caught by the 1971 Act. Although the clean seeds were part of the fruiting tops of the cannabis plant, they did not contain cannabis resin and were hence not “cannabis” for the purposes of s 37(1) of the 1971 Act.

  46. [37] But that was not the end of the matter. The court went on to consider (at 171C) whether to grant the appellant an extension of time to file an appeal against his conviction, given that “[t]he appellant ha[d] been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years for an offence which on the facts was not a crime”. As the court explained, the starting position was that a mere change in the law would not justify granting an extension of time to file an appeal:

  47. [38] On the facts, the court allowed the appellant’s application for an extension of time and granted him leave to appeal against his conviction for two reasons. First, the court noted (at 171G) that the appellant had already been granted leave to appeal against his sentence. If it refused to grant the appellant an extension of time to appeal against his conviction, it would be faced with “the totally unreal task of endeavouring to determine what the correct sentence was for an offence which had not been committed”. The second factor that made the case “something of an extraordinary case” was the fact that the appellant was in prison. Although the appellant was serving a concurrent sentence for other offences, that concurrent sentence ought to have been over or nearly over as at the date on which his application was heard, assuming he had earned his full remission. Should the court refuse to grant him an extension of time to appeal against his conviction, it would effectively be keeping him in prison for an offence he had not committed (see Mitchell at 171H–171J).

  48. [39] The court was thus satisfied that the matter was a “very rare case” that warranted the exercise of its discretion to grant the appellant an extension of time and leave to appeal against his conviction (see Mitchell at 171J). Nonetheless, the court took care to clarify (at 172A) that its decision ought not to be construed as an invitation to every offender who had been convicted of similar offences to seek leave to appeal out of time, and emphasised that such applications “[would] not be greeted with very much enthusiasm”.

  49. [40] In arriving at its decision, the court also referred to the unreported decision of R v Ramsden [1972] Crim LR 547 (“Ramsden”), in which it was stated that “[w]here a subsequent decision of a superior court has produced an apparent change in the law, that coupled with other circumstances may be a factor which will induce the court to grant leave to appeal out of time. Nevertheless … this must in every case be a matter of discretion.” [emphasis added in italics and bold italics] (see Mitchell at 171D–171E).

  50. [41] The defendant in Ramsden had been convicted of dangerous driving before it was subsequently held that fault was a necessary element of that offence. Refusing to grant the defendant leave to appeal out of time, the court observed that alarming consequences would flow if it were to permit the general reopening of old cases on the ground that a subsequent decision had dispelled a widely held misconception about the law underpinning the defendant’s conviction. Had the court granted the extension of time sought, “[n]o doubt … everyone convicted of dangerous driving over a period of several years could have advanced the same application” (see also R v Jawad (Mohid) [2013] EWCA Crim 644 (“Jawad”) at [29]). In other words, the court in Ramsden had regard to the potential impact on other decided cases in deciding not to grant the extension of time sought.

  51. [42] The case of R v Hawkins [1997] 1 Cr App Rep 234 (“Hawkins”) is also instructive. The applicant there had pleaded guilty to and was convicted of five counts of obtaining property by deception under s 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968 (“Theft Act”), among other charges. Thereafter, it was separately held that a chose in action created by an electronic bank transfer was not “property belonging to another” that could be “obtained” by deception under s 15(1) of the Theft Act. The applicant cited this change in the law and sought leave to appeal against his conviction.

  52. [43] The court expressed that it had to be persuaded that there was a “good reason” for granting leave to appeal out of time, particularly where a defendant had pleaded guilty (as the applicant had) or had made a conscious decision not to appeal. Citing authorities such as Mitchell and Ramsden, the court noted that a change in the law after the date of conviction or plea of guilty would not usually be regarded as a good reason for granting leave to appeal out of time. The court further stated as follows:

  53. Nonetheless, the court noted that despite the general rule against reopening a conviction where a defendant had pleaded guilty, it would “eschew undue technicality and ask whether any substantial injustice has been done” [emphasis added]. Having concluded that the applicant had not suffered any substantial injury, the court refused the extension of time sought.

  54. [44] What is of note is that in arriving at its conclusion, the court found it “arguable” that, based on the admitted facts, the jury could have convicted the applicant for other property offences. In our judgment, this is a significant factor that differentiates Hawkins from Mitchell. In Mitchell, the applicant had only been in possession of parts of the cannabis plant that did not contain cannabis resin and were hence not “cannabis” within the meaning of s 37(1) of the 1971 Act. It follows that he could not have been convicted on any alternative charges and that substantial injustice had arisen from his wrongful incarceration. On the other hand, the applicant in Hawkins had admitted to dishonest or fraudulent conduct which could have supported convictions for other offences. Any injustice that he had suffered was therefore less readily apparent and, in any event, did not appear to be “substantial”.

  55. [45] In the same vein, it was held in R v Ramzan and others [2006] EWCA Crim 1974 (“Ramzan”) that whether a defendant could be said to be guilty of other offences was a relevant factor when considering whether substantial injustice had been established. Ramzan concerned several appeals and applications by defendants who had been convicted of conspiracy to commit money-laundering offences. Following their convictions, there was a change in the law regarding the mens rea for conspiracy to launder money. The defendants appealed against or sought leave to appeal against their convictions.

  56. [46] The court stressed (at [39] and [54]) that even though the convictions for conspiracy could no longer stand, on the defendants’ own cases taken together with the juries’ verdicts, all the defendants must have committed one or more substantive offences of money-laundering for which the mens rea remained unchanged. Hence, even if the subsequent change in the law had been known at their trials, they would nonetheless have been convicted of “substantive offences of great gravity”. Accordingly, subject to any individual grounds for finding substantial injustice, “these [were] strong cases for refusal of leave”. In considering the individual cases, the court repeatedly stated that those defendants who must nonetheless have committed substantive money-laundering offences would not have suffered substantial injustice by virtue of their convictions for conspiracy. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused in those cases (see Ramzan at [70], [71], [73], [75] and [78]).

  57. [47] We next consider the decision of the House of Lords in R v Benjafield and others [2003] 1 AC 1099 (“Benjafield”). Benjafield was a set of consolidated appeals and applications by defendants who had been convicted of drug and property offences and against whom confiscation orders had been made. The Human Rights Act 1998 (“the 1998 Act”) came into force after those confiscation orders had been made. One of the defendants (“Mr Rezvi”) applied for leave to appeal against his sentence five months out of time. All the defendants contended that the statutory bases for the confiscation orders were incompatible with the right to a fair hearing and the presumption of innocence enshrined in Arts 6(1) and 6(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was scheduled to the 1998 Act.

  58. [48] The House of Lords granted Mr Rezvi’s application for leave to appeal out of time because it considered that his appeal raised issues of considerable general interest (see Benjafield at [46]). Nonetheless, the House of Lords expressly confirmed (at [46]) that “[i]t is not usual to grant leave to appeal out of time where the grounds of appeal are based on post-trial changes in the law”.

  59. [49] R v Ballinger [2005] EWCA Crim 1060 (“Ballinger”) is another case that illustrates the strictness of the principle that leave to appeal out of time will not ordinarily be granted where there has been nothing more than a change in the law post-conviction. The applicant in Ballinger had been convicted of indecent assault at a naval court martial presided over by a judge advocate. It was held in two subsequent decisions (one of which was R v Dundon [2004] EWCA Crim 621 (“Dundon”)) that courts martial were incompatible with the right to a fair hearing, a right protected under Art 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and given effect to by the 1998 Act. The applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction out of time. The Prosecution conceded that, if leave were granted, it would have no grounds for resisting the appeal.

  60. [50] Counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant had suffered a substantial injustice, namely, a wrongful conviction by virtue of the Art 6(1) breach. The court rejected that argument and found that the applicant had failed to establish substantial injustice for three broad reasons. First, the court seemingly took the view that the applicant had, for the most part, not perceived himself to have suffered any substantial injustice. At no stage did he criticise the conduct of the judge advocate, and although he did not plead guilty, he did not seek to appeal against his conviction or challenge its safety until the decision in Dundon was issued (see Ballinger at [21]). Second, the court observed that the longer the delay in filing an appeal, the more compelling the reason had to be before it would grant leave to appeal out of time. The delay in this case was substantial, and even after the decision in Dundon had been rendered, there was a further delay of more than three months (see Ballinger at [22]–[23]). The extended delay reflected a calculated risk on the applicant’s part and also rendered a re-trial less feasible (see Ballinger at [23]). Third, the court stated that if the applicant were granted an extension of time to appeal, there would be no grounds for refusing to grant a similar extension of time to every other defendant who had been convicted before a court martial.

  61. [51] The court concluded that an applicant seeking leave to appeal out of time had to show “more than that there has been a breach of Article 6 and that in consequence his conviction is unsafe; he must also show that he has suffered a substantial injury or injustice”. The applicant had failed to do so and was refused leave to appeal out of time.

  62. [52] The implications of changes in law on previous convictions were squarely dealt with in R v Cottrell; R v Fletcher [2007] 1 WLR 3262 (“Cottrell”). The court started from the premise (at [42]) that “[i]n reality, society can only operate on the basis that the courts … apply the law as it is. The law as it may later be declared or perceived to be is irrelevant” [emphasis added]. The court then cited Mitchell and Benjafield and made the following observations (at [46]):

  63. [53] Subsequent to Cottrell, the United Kingdom Supreme Court handed down its seminal decision in R v Jogee; R v Ruddock [2016] 2 All Er 1 (“Jogee”). Jogee ushered a sea change in the established legal position on the mens rea for parasitic accessorial liability. Under the prevailing law prior to Jogee, if two people (“D1” and “D2” respectively) set out to commit an offence, and in the course of that joint enterprise D1 committed another offence (“crime B”), D2 would be guilty as an accessory to crime B if he foresaw the possibility that D1 might act as he did. It was held in Jogee (at [9], [10] and [83]) that the requisite mens rea for parasitic accessorial liability was not foresight but an intention to assist or encourage the commission of crime B; foresight was evidence of but not synonymous with intent.

  64. [54] Mindful that Jogee would likely spur a torrent of applications by offenders who had been found to be accessories to crimes on the basis of foresight rather than intent, the Supreme Court cautioned as follows (at [100]):

  65. [55] As anticipated, Jogee precipitated a flurry of applications for leave to appeal out of time based on the change in the law on parasitic accessorial liability. A series of these applications was addressed by the court in R v Johnson and other appeals [2017] 4 All Er 769 (“Johnson”). The court reiterated (at [18]) the principle that an applicant who had been “properly convicted on the law as it then stood” had to establish “substantial injustice” before leave to appeal would be granted. It also observed (at [18]) that the requirement of substantial injustice “takes into account the requirement … for a court to be able to alter or correct the law upon which a large number of cases have been determined without the consequence that each of those cases can be re-opened”.

  66. [56] Importantly, Johnson suggests that whether the change in the law would have made a difference to the outcome of the concluded case in question is strongly probative of whether substantial injustice has arisen. The court stated (at [21]) that “[i]n determining whether that high threshold [of substantial injustice] has been met, the court will primarily and ordinarily have regard to the strength of the case advanced that the change in the law would, in fact, have made a difference” [emphasis added].

  67. [57] In refusing to grant the applicants leave to appeal out of time, the court found that “there was no injustice, let alone substantial injustice” because the jury’s verdicts “would have been no different post Jogee” (see Johnson at [57], [83], [96], [123], [160] and [191]). In respect of two of the applicants, the court observed (at [84]) that it would ordinarily have granted them leave to challenge their convictions because their trial lawyers had reserved their position on the law on parasitic accessorial liability pending the determination of Jogee. However, the court ultimately refused to grant leave because a post-Jogee direction would not have made a difference to the jury’s verdicts (see Johnson at [83]). Put simply, the safety of those convictions was not in question. The overriding concern of the court was thus whether the change in the law would have had a bearing on the outcome of the concluded case in question.

  68. [58] R v Crilly (John Anthony) [2018] EWCA Crim 168 (“Crilly”) was the first instance of a court quashing a murder conviction on account of the change in the law brought about by Jogee. In brief, the applicant and two others (including one “Flynn”) had intended to commit a burglary in what they had expected to be an empty house. When the house was found to be occupied, the applicant unsuccessfully tried to persuade Flynn to leave. The applicant then searched the property for money. During the robbery, Flynn attacked and killed the occupant. The applicant was convicted of murder and robbery even though he did not inflict any violence upon the occupant.

  69. [60] While “substantial injustice” is an undoubtedly high threshold, it is sufficiently expansive to permit consideration of injustice arising not only from the impugned conviction or sentence but also from the attendant consequences thereof. R v McGuffog (Correy Rowan) [2015] EWCA Crim 1116 (“McGuffog”) illustrates this point well. The applicant in that case had intended to make a right turn around a mini roundabout to enter a certain lane. At the material time, one Mr Duffill had been cycling along a separate lane towards the same roundabout. Mr Duffill was visible to the applicant, who had the right of way. Assuming that Mr Duffill would stop to afford him that right of way, the applicant very slowly commenced his right turn and, in so doing, likely cut the mini roundabout slightly. Unfortunately, Mr Duffill did not stop and collided with the applicant. Mr Duffill fell off his bicycle and suffered a fatal head injury.

  70. [63] The court noted (at [14]) that even though the applicant had already served his sentence, he “continues to suffer the remoter consequences of his conviction”. It went on to explain (at [15]) that “it is not merely the change in the law that is creating an injustice to this applicant but also the remoter consequences of it with which he continues to live”. Accordingly, the court granted the extension of time sought and quashed the applicant’s conviction.

  71. [64] Crucially, there was no doubt that following the decision in Hughes, the applicant could not be said to have committed either the s 3ZB offence of which he had been convicted or any alternative offence. The Prosecution conceded that the applicant’s conviction was unsustainable in the light of the decision in Hughes. Furthermore, the court explicitly observed (at [13]) that it would likely not have granted an extension of time if the applicant “could as easily have been charged with another offence”.

  72. [65] Drawing the above threads together, one may distil the following general principles:

  73. (a) The mere fact that the law has changed without more will not justify the court granting leave to appeal out of time. This is so even if the change in the law corrected misconceptions about the meaning of a statute or declared the previous law to be erroneous (see Mitchell at 171C and Jogee at [100]).

  74. (b) An applicant who relies on a change in the law in seeking leave to appeal out of time must show that he has suffered substantial injustice (see Hawkins; Ramzan at [70], [73], [76] and [78]; Ballinger at [18] and [21]; Cottrell at [46]; Jogee at [100]; and Johnson at [18] and [21]). If the application is based on nothing other than a change in the law but the applicant’s conviction was properly made at the time, the court is unlikely to find that substantial injustice has arisen (see Cottrell at [46] and McGuffog at [8]).

  75. (c) A key consideration when evaluating if an applicant has suffered substantial injustice is whether the change in the law would have made a difference to his case (see Jogee at [100]; Johnson at [21]; and Crilly at [42]).

  76. (d) Refusal of leave is not limited to cases where the applicant could have been charged with a different offence had the true position in law been appreciated earlier (see Jogee at [100] and Jawad at [29]). Nonetheless, the fact that an applicant could have been charged with or convicted of a different offence is a factor that strongly militates against a finding of substantial injustice (see Ramzan at [39] and [54] and McGuffog at [13]; see also Hawkins).

  77. (e) Applicants will be expected to act promptly and without undue delay in seeking leave to appeal out of time following a change in the law (see Ballinger at [23]; see also Ang Poh Chuan at [44] and [46]). Additionally, the court may be more circumspect about making a finding of substantial injustice if the applicant pleaded guilty or made a conscious decision not to appeal (see Hawkins; see also McGuffog at [8]).

  78. (f) The court will also consider the extent to which the law was changed. If the change in the law was far-reaching such that granting an applicant leave to appeal out of time would open the floodgates to similar applications by many other similarly situated defendants, the court may be less inclined to grant an extension of time (see Jogee at [100] and Johnson at [18]; see also Ballinger and Ramsden).

  79. [66] Although most of the relevant English authorities concern the review of convictions, the same standard of “substantial injustice” should and does apply to the review of sentences. This is readily apparent from R v Howe (Paul Alfred) [2009] EWCA Crim 2707 (“Howe”) in which two appellants sought leave to appeal against their sentences of imprisonment for public protection (“IPP”). IPP sentences (which were abolished in 2012) were designed to ensure that dangerous offenders remained in custody for as long as they presented a risk to society. An offender sentenced to IPP had to first serve his or her minimum term of imprisonment; thereafter, the offender would only be released upon satisfying the Parole Board that he or she no longer posed a risk to society. The minimum term would typically be fixed at half the length of the determinate sentence that would have been imposed for the offence in question. Both appellants had been sentenced to IPP for downloading, possessing and/or accessing obscene photographs of children. The first appellant was sentenced to a minimum specified term of two and a half years, based on a determinate term of five years. The second appellant was sentenced to a minimum term of six months, ostensibly based on a determinate sentence of a year.

  80. [67] IPP sentences would only be imposed if it was shown that the offender’s re-offending would cause serious harm. After the appellants were sentenced, it was held in a separate decision that the link between the downloading of obscene images of children and the harm that children might suffer was too remote to satisfy that requirement. The appellants subsequently sought to set aside their sentences. The court applied the test of “substantial injustice” and found (at [4], [5] and [11]) that the test was satisfied. The first appellant remained in custody and, although the second appellant had been released, he remained on a long licence liable to recall. The court therefore quashed the IPP sentences and left the original determinate sentences undisturbed.

  81. [68] The courts have also consistently applied the yardstick of “substantial injustice” to cases involving the review of confiscation orders, even though confiscation orders are not sentences in the strict sense: see, for example, Jawad at [29] and [30]; R v Meghrabi (Diana) [2014] EWCA Crim 197 at [9], [11], [12] and [15]; and R v Bestel and others [2013] EWCA Crim 1305 (“Bestel”) at [11]–[15], [23], [24], [31], [73] and [79]. There is thus no reason why reviews of convictions and sentences should not be governed by the same standard and considerations. Even in an application for review of a sentence, the starting point remains that the matter was determined on its merits and decided on the basis of the law as it then stood. Accordingly, whether a review application concerns a conviction or a sentence, something more than a mere change in the law or a mere error is required to displace the earlier decision.

  82. [69] Aside from the foregoing point of principle, there are also practical considerations that call for the high threshold of “substantial injustice” to be applied to reviews of sentences. In common with many jurisdictions, most criminal matters in Singapore are disposed of by way of guilty pleas rather than trials. Consequently, “[n]ew rules of sentencing procedure … threaten to disrupt far more cases than new rules of trial procedure” (see Scott at 181). The court’s reluctance to upset final judgments therefore cannot be any less pronounced where reviews of sentences are concerned.

  83. [70] Having surveyed the English authorities, we consider that an appellate court may only reopen an earlier decision, whether pursuant to its inherent or statutory power of review, when it has been presented with new material that gives rise to a powerful probability that substantial injustice has arisen in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made. This proposed threshold borrows the requirement of “substantial injustice” found in English authorities such as Jogee and Johnson, and is aligned with the well-established threshold of “serious injustice” that must be met whenever our courts’ revisionary powers are invoked (see Public Prosecutor v Yang Yin [2015] 2 SLR 78 at [25]). We add that the same test of substantial injustice should be adopted when deciding whether to grant leave to appeal out of time. As we are presently concerned with “change in the law” cases, the “new material” in question will likely take the form of new legal arguments based on changes in the law brought about by a judicial decision issued after the appellate court had rendered the decision that is sought to be reviewed.

  84. [71] The test of substantial injustice comprises two essential components. Not only must an injustice have arisen, but the injustice must also be substantial to warrant the court’s exercise of its power of review.

  85. (a) An injustice may be said to have arisen in one of two ways:

  86. (i) Where an applicant seeks to set aside his conviction, an injustice will only have arisen if the new material strikes at the soundness of the conviction in a fundamental way.

  87. (ii) Where an applicant seeks to challenge his sentence, an injustice will only have arisen if the new material shows that the earlier decision was based on a fundamental misapprehension of the law.

  88. (b) An injustice may be said to be substantial under the following circumstances:

  89. (i) An applicant may establish substantial injustice if the new material points to a powerful probability that his conviction is unsound and if the facts do not disclose any other offence of comparable gravity.

  90. (ii) Where the new material shows that the earlier decision was based on a fundamental misapprehension of the law, any resulting injustice will only be considered substantial if the said misapprehension had a significant bearing on the sentence imposed.

  91. [72] Our approach is informed by the considerations set out in the English authorities (see [65] above) and comports with both s 394J of the CPC and our decision in Kho Jabing. The language of “powerful probability” and “a fundamental misapprehension of the law” can be found in ss 394J(6)(b) and 394J(7) respectively while the requirement of “substantial injustice” is mirrored in the substantive requirement of a “miscarriage of justice” in ss 394J(2) and 394J(5). Furthermore, since s 394J codifies the requirements set out in Kho Jabing, it follows that our approach is also consistent with that decision.

  92. [73] The alignment of s 394J of the CPC, our decision in Kho Jabing and the approach that we have set out at [71] above reinforces our point that the substance of any review application is typically unaffected by an applicant’s choice of remedial avenue (see [30] above). Hence, a mere change in the law without more will not constitute sufficient material justifying either the grant of leave (under s 394H of the CPC) to make a review application or the exercise of the court’s inherent power of review. In this connection, we echo the well-established position in English law that the court will not reopen a concluded decision for no other reason than that the law has changed, even if the change in the law declared the previous legal position to be wrong or rectified misconceptions about the meaning of a statute (see [65(a)] above). Instead, it is of paramount importance that an applicant demonstrates that he has suffered substantial injustice (see [65(b)] above).

  93. [74] We begin by elaborating on the requirement that an injustice has arisen. Where an applicant seeks to set aside his conviction, an injustice will only have arisen if the new material strikes at the soundness of the conviction in a fundamental way. If, in the light of a subsequent change in the law, it appears that the applicant has, quite simply, not committed any offence, then there would be an air of unreality in insisting that he nonetheless be held guilty. Where the new material strikes at the soundness of the conviction in a fundamental way, the change in the law would likely have made a difference to the outcome of the applicant’s case, which is the court’s overarching consideration when applying the “substantial injustice” test (see [65(c)] above).

  94. [75] Our approach mirrors that adopted in Ng Kim Han, in which several petitioners sought to have their convictions set aside by way of a criminal revision. In allowing the petition, Yong Pung How CJ observed (at [10]) that while there was no clear test of what amounted to “serious injustice”, it could not be disputed that such injustice would exist when a person had been convicted despite the obvious absence of an essential component of the offence in question. It is for the same reason that the court granted the appellant in Mitchell exceptional leave to appeal against his conviction out of time (see [36]–[39] above). The court candidly acknowledged (at 171G) that, were it to decide otherwise, it would have the “totally unreal task” of determining the correct sentence for “an offence which had not been committed” [emphasis added].

  95. [76] New material that strikes at the soundness of a conviction in a fundamental way must, in essence, give rise to a powerful probability that no offence has in fact been committed. Such new material will typically arise in the light of subsequent changes in the law as to the constituent elements of an offence and/or the proper interpretation of statutory provisions that generate criminal liability. The requirement that the new material must relate to the fundamental propriety of a conviction serves to sift out unmeritorious applications that seek to re-litigate matters based on subsequent changes in the law that are only tangentially relevant to the conviction.

  96. [77] The need for the new material to strike at the soundness of a conviction in a fundamental way also explains the decision in Ballinger. It will be recalled that the application in Ballinger arose following decisions such as Dundon, which held that naval courts martial were incompatible with the right to a fair trial protected under Art 6(1) of the ECHR. In Dundon, the court held (at [89]) that the judge advocate’s status as a naval officer meant that he was not institutionally independent of the Prosecution and accordingly quashed the defendant’s conviction. However, the applicant in Ballinger unsuccessfully relied on the decision in Dundon to challenge his conviction. In our view, what distinguishes Ballinger from cases such as Mitchell and Crilly is the fact that the applicant in Ballinger had unquestionably committed an offence – he challenged his conviction only on grounds of procedural legality. Although the conviction in Dundon was set aside on this basis, it bears reiterating that the proceedings in Ballinger, unlike those in Dundon, had already been concluded. This meant that the overriding interest in Ballinger was finality; something more than a procedural error was needed to displace that interest.

  97. [78] Matters of procedural fairness (or criminal procedure) therefore do not typically go towards the soundness of a conviction in the sense of establishing that an offence has not in fact been committed. In any event, we take the view that they are more properly classified as potential breaches of natural justice (see s 394J(5)(b) of the CPC and Kho Jabing at [69]). We also note that an applicant will likely be unable to demonstrate that such a change in the law would have yielded a different outcome, which is a critical element of the “substantial injustice” test (see [65(c)] above).

  98. [79] We next consider instances where an applicant seeks to challenge his sentence. In such cases, an injustice may only be said to have arisen if the new material shows that the earlier decision was based on a fundamental misapprehension of the law. The reason for this is relatively straightforward: the courts commonly lay down new sentencing guidelines and sentencing frameworks, and it would be alarming if every new sentencing framework could unravel all previous sentencing decisions for the offence in question (see [65(f)] above). As an example, the sentencing framework for rape offences laid down in Ng Kean Meng Terence v Public Prosecutor [2017] 2 SLR 449 (“Terence Ng”) would not suffice as grounds on which an applicant may seek to have his sentence reviewed. Individuals who were convicted for rape offences under the sentencing framework set out in Public Prosecutor v NF [2006] 4 SLR(R) 849 (“NF”), which was the applicable sentencing framework for rape offences before Terence Ng was decided, cannot be said to have been convicted based on a fundamental misapprehension of the law. The impetus for the Terence Ng framework was principally the desire to devise a comprehensive and conceptually coherent sentencing framework for rape offences (see Terence Ng at [12(a)] and [12(b)]). Even though the NF framework was eventually replaced, it cannot be said to have been founded on a misapprehension of the law.

  99. [80] An example of a fundamental misapprehension of the law might be the converse of what transpired in Abdul Nasir bin Amer Hamsah v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 842 (“Abdul Nasir”). Until that decision was rendered, life imprisonment was understood to mean 20 years’ imprisonment. The basis for this understanding was s 57 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the 1985 PC”), which provided that “[in] calculating fractions of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years”. In Abdul Nasir, however, we highlighted (at [30]) that on a proper construction of s 57, life imprisonment ought to be equated with 20 years’ imprisonment only when calculating fractions of terms of punishment. Having considered the legislative intent underlying offences that were punishable with life imprisonment, the plain meaning of the term “life” as well as s 45 of the 1985 PC, we concluded (at [32]) that life imprisonment ought to be understood as a sentence of imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted offender’s natural life. Of course, the change in the law occasioned by Abdul Nasir did not give rise to any substantial injustice because the previous erroneous understanding had worked to the advantage of offenders. But had an error of such a nature had the opposite effect such that offenders had previously been sentenced to more than what they should have been, this could arguably be said to be a fundamental misapprehension of the law.

  100. [81] It is, however, insufficient that an injustice has arisen in the criminal matter in respect of which the earlier decision was made. That injustice must be substantial. Such a rigorous standard accords due recognition to the fact that the impugned decision has already undergone at least two rounds of independent scrutiny – once by the court exercising original criminal jurisdiction and another by the appellate court. The requirement that the injustice be “substantial” also better distinguishes the function of an appeal, which is the correction of error, from that of a review, which is the correction of miscarriages of justice (see Kho Jabing at [49] and [65]).

  101. [82] Where an applicant successfully establishes a powerful probability that his conviction is unsound and no comparable offence has been committed, he will have established substantial injustice. After all, “[t]here is no doubt that the conviction of an innocent person is an injustice – perhaps the ultimate substantive injustice, proof of which would justify reopening a concluded criminal appeal” [emphasis in original] (see Kho Jabing at [64]). Conversely, this means that even where an applicant demonstrates that his conviction is unsustainable, he will nevertheless have failed to establish substantial injustice if he could have been charged with or convicted of other offences of comparable gravity despite the change in the law (see [65(d)] above and Ramzan at [39] and [54]).

  102. [83] Where the impugned decision is a decision on sentence, any injustice (arising from a fundamental misapprehension of the law) will only be considered substantial if the said misapprehension had a significant bearing on the sentence imposed (see, for example, Howe at [66]–[67] above). Sentencing involves an exercise of discretion and potential adjustments to a sentence that are of marginal significance cannot justify interference with the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion (see Public Prosecutor v Siew Boon Loong [2005] 1 SLR(R) 611 at [22]). Moreover, given that an appellate court will only entertain an appeal against sentence where (among other things) the sentence is manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate (see Public Prosecutor v Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 1 SLR(R) 601 at [82]), the threshold for intervention by an appellate court in a review application cannot be any less stringent.

  103. [84] We conclude this section by making three observations. First, there can be no question that even in cases where it is subsequently found that substantial injustice has arisen following a change in the law, those cases were correctly decided in accordance with the prevailing law as it was understood at the time. Under the approach that we have set out above, however, the legal correctness of a decision at the time that it was made is tempered by the overall justice of the case. In other words, while a matter might have been properly decided in line with the then prevailing jurisprudence, the “substantial injustice” test effectively engages considerations of prejudice to the applicant or the unconscionability of tying him to the old legal position.

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