Court of Appeal · Decided 30 March 2021
Crest Capital Asia Pte Ltd and others v OUE Lippo Healthcare Ltd (formerly known as International Healthway Corp Ltd) and another and other appeals
Feedback & support[2021] SGCA 25 · Case no. Civil Appeal No 113 of 2020
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Introduction
- [1]
[1] These appeals arose from a claim which was brought following this court’s decision in The Enterprise Fund III Ltd and others v OUE Lippo Healthcare Ltd (formerly known as International Healthway Corp Ltd) [2019] 2 SLR 524 (“The Enterprise Fund III”) wherein we held that a transaction, comprising a loan agreement for the setup of a credit facility (“the Standby Facility”), the open market acquisitions of the first respondent (“IHC”)’s shares, and a trust arrangement for those purchased shares, were void by virtue of s 76A(1A)(a)(i) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the Companies Act”). That said, we held that the open market acquisitions of the shares were saved by s 76A(1A) Companies Act as they involved dispositions of book-entry securities. The upshot of this was that the third appellant in CA 113/2020 (“EFIII”) became the legal and beneficial owner of the IHC shares it acquired through the open market acquisitions, and consequently IHC did not incur any contractual liability under the Standby Facility.
- [2]
[2] However, IHC claimed that it and its various subsidiaries and related companies suffered losses beyond the liability under the Standby Facility. An action, Suit No 441 of 2016 (‘the Suit”), was thereafter brought against various parties (including the present appellants) who were involved in the provision of the Standby Facility and related transactions. The claims pursued against them in the Suit were founded on different causes of action. Following the trial of the Suit, the various defendants including the appellants were found to be jointly and severally liable for the losses suffered by the respondents. The judge below (“the Judge”) recorded her findings in her judgment issued on 9 July 2020 (“Judgment”).
- [3]
[3] These appeals thus give rise to several interesting legal issues in the law of torts. While it is undoubtedly true that a corporate entity would deal with third parties through its representatives and/or agents, the mere fact that such representatives and agents are authorised by their principals to enter into contracts with third parties (thereby giving rise to contractual liability) does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that those principals would be similarly liable in tort for the acts or omissions of their representatives and/or agents. It remains necessary to undertake a separate factual inquiry as to whether such acts or omissions can be attributed to the principals. Equally, it is important to bear in mind that the inquiry should be separately conducted with respect to each principal as each principal’s knowledge of, and/or complicity in, the conduct of the representative and/or agent is not necessarily the same. When different principals are represented by the same set of lawyers there is a danger that the full extent of this critical distinction might not be adequately fleshed out.
- [4]
[4] Arising from the fact that different tortious claims were brought against different parties is another interesting question viz whether such different defendants could, inter alia, be jointly and severally liable and if so under what circumstances. These issues will be addressed below.
Background facts
Dramatis personae
- [5]
[5] These appeals feature the same two respondents, who were the plaintiffs in the suit below. IHC is a publicly listed company on the Singapore Exchange’s Catalist board. IHC wholly owns the second respondent (“IHC Medical Re”). IHC and IHC Medical Re shall be referred to collectively as “the respondents”.
- [6]
[6] IHC Medical Re in turn owns IHC Healthcare REIT (“IHC Healthcare”), which itself owns two trusts, IHC Australia First Trust (Australia) (“IHC First Trust”) and IHC Australia Second Trust (Australia) (“IHC Second Trust”). IHC First Trust and IHC Second Trust shall be referred to collectively as the “Australian Trusts”. The Australian Trusts own three properties in Australia (“Australian Properties”): two properties in St Kilda (“St Kilda Properties”), held by IHC First Trust; and one property in Geelong (“Geelong Property”), held by IHC Second Trust.
- [7]
[7] The appellants in these appeals were defendants in the suit below. In CA 113/2020, the first to fifth appellants shall be referred to as “Crest Capital”, “Crest Catalyst”, “EFIII”, “VMF3” and “VMIII” respectively and collectively as the “Crest Entities”. Crest Capital is a fund administration company and the holding company of Crest Catalyst, a fund management company which manages affiliated private equity funds. EFIII, VMF3 and VMIII are three such funds administered and managed by Crest Capital and Crest Catalyst.
- [8]
[8] In CA 132/2020, the appellant (“Ms Lim”) was the Vice-President (Investment) of IHC between January 2015 and January 2016. She was IHC’s CEO and Executive Director between January 2016 and January 2017.
- [9]
[9] In CA 135/2020, the appellant (“Mr Fan”) is a co-founder of IHC and has a substantial shareholding in the same. He was the Group CEO of IHC between May 2015 and July 2015 and was re-designated as the CEO of IHC between July 2015 and January 2016.
- [10]
[10] There are two other relevant players who should be mentioned, even though they are not parties to these appeals. The first is the seventh defendant in the suit below (“Mr Aathar”), who did not file an appeal. He is the other co-founder of IHC and also a substantial shareholder of the same. However, he was never formally part of IHC’s management. The second is one Glendon Tan Yang Hwee (“Mr Tan”), who was the Investment Director of Crest Capital. Mr Tan was the main representative handling Crest Capital’s business deals with IHC from the time of the latter’s incorporation in 2013, including the deals which resulted in the facility agreements that are the subject of the dispute.
The subject matter of the dispute
- [11]
[11] These appeals centre around two credit facilities. The first is the Standby Facility, which was a short-term credit facility of up to $20m executed on 30 July 2015 for “general working capital”. The borrower under the Standby Facility was IHC. The lenders were EFIII, VMF3 and VMIII (these three entities shall be referred together as the “Standby Investors”, and for the avoidance of doubt the Standby Investors, together with Crest Capital and Crest Catalyst, make up the Crest Entities). The Standby Facility provided for fixed interest (termed “standby fees”) on the full sum of $20m at 3.5% per month for a minimum of five months (ie, $700,000 per month for five months). The Standby Facility’s maturity date was 30 December 2015.
- [12]
[12] By way of background, the Standby Facility was executed to supersede an initial facility agreement executed on 21 July 2015 but backdated to 16 April 2015 (“Original Facility”). The Original Facility’s maturity date was 15 June 2015. Under the Original Facility, the lenders were EFIII, VMIII and The Enterprise Fund II Ltd (“EFII”). Essentially, VMF3 replaced EFII as a lender under the Standby Facility. The Original Facility and Standby Facility shall be referred to collectively as the “Disputed Facilities”.
- [13]
[13] The second facility granted on 17 June 2015 (“Geelong Facility”) provided a loan of $11.5m. The borrower under the Geelong Facility was IHC Medical Re. The lenders were EFIII and VMF3.
- [14]
[14] The repayment of sums due under the Disputed Facilities and the Geelong Facility was secured by, amongst others, personal guarantees from Mr Fan and Mr Aathar, as well as charges granted by IHC over its shares in IHC Medical Re and two other subsidiaries (“Charged Shares”). The charges were granted by way of two Deeds of Share Charges dated 17 June 2015 (“June Charge Deed”) and July 2015.
The genesis of the Disputed Facilities
- [15]
[15] The discussions on the Disputed Facilities began at a meeting between Mr Fan, Mr Aathar and Mr Tan on 3 April 2015. On the morning of 4 April 2015, Mr Aathar sent Mr Tan an email, copied to Mr Fan, with the subject stated as “Standby Facility” (“Morning Email”). The Morning Email merits being set out in full:
- [16]
[16] On the afternoon of the same day, Mr Aathar sent another email to Mr Tan, copying Mr Fan, again with the subject stated as “Standby Facility” (“Afternoon Email”). Mr Aathar stated in the Afternoon Email that “[he could] give [Mr Tan] a firm undertaking from IHC that all security arrangements [would] be restored and reinstated by IHC … to the satisfaction of Crest”.
- [17]
[17] Mr Aathar, Mr Fan and Mr Tan had further correspondence on 9 April about the “Standby Facility”. The exchange now included three additional individuals: Ms Lim, Mr Chia Kwok Ping (“Mr Chia”), IHC’s CEO at the time, and Mr Lim Chu Pei (“Mr CP Lim”), an Investment Analyst with Crest Capital. The correspondence on 9 April included a term sheet dated 6 April 2015 (“Term Sheet”), which was circulated to all six individuals. The Term Sheet provided that the facility provided would be secured, inter alia, by guarantees from Mr Aathar and Mr Fan, as well as a “[p]ledge of IHC shares purchased through Fund”. The term “Fund” was not defined in the Term Sheet.
- [18]
[18] On 10 April 2015, the Term Sheet was signed by Mr Chia as CEO of IHC and by Mr Aathar and Mr Fan as the two personal guarantors. This signed Term Sheet (without Mr Tan’s signature) was sent to Mr Tan via email. Later the same day, Mr CP Lim sent the signed Term Sheet (now with Mr Tan’s signature) to Mr Chia and Ms Lim, copying Mr Tan, Mr Aathar and Mr Fan.
- [19]
[19] On 17 May 2015, Mr Fan was appointed Group CEO. Subsequently, he vetted a board paper prepared by Ms Lim. The board paper was dated 29 May 2015 and together with the necessary legal documents, was meant to be put before IHC’s board of directors to obtain their approval for the Original Facility.
- [20]
[20] On 29 May 2015, the board paper was circulated by email to IHC’s board of directors. The covering email and the board paper stated that the Original Facility was to be “utilised for general working capital” and “[f]or general working capital purpose[s]” only. Further, the covering email and the board paper only listed the Charged Shares (see [14] above) and the guarantees from Mr Aathar and Mr Fan as securities. In other words, there was no mention of any pledge of the IHC shares to be purchased from the funds of the Original Facility. Board approval was obtained through a two-thirds majority on 3 June. One of the directors who approved the Original Facility was Dr Jong Hee Sen (“Dr Jong”), IHC’s Non-Executive Chairman at the time.
- [21]
[21] The Original Facility agreement was then executed on 21 July 2015, but backdated to 16 April 2015. Subsequently, upon IHC’s request, the Standby Facility agreement was executed on 30 July 2015, superseding the Original Facility agreement. The Standby Facility extended the duration of the credit facility to five months after the date of execution, ie, 29 December 2015. Dr Jong signed the documentation for the Original Facility and Standby Facility on behalf of IHC.
Drawdowns under the Standby Facility to acquire IHC shares
- [22]
[22] According to the Crest Entities and the respondents, between 16 April and 24 August 2015, a total sum of approximately $17m was drawn down from the Standby Facility on fourteen separate occasions for the purchase of some 59m shares in IHC. The shares were purchased by EFIII but held in VMIII’s name. Eight out of the fourteen drawdowns took place before the board paper was put to IHC’s board of director for approval on 29 May. A further five drawdowns were made before the formal execution of the legal documentation for the Original Facility on 21 July. The drawdowns were made on Mr Aathar’s instructions to Mr Tan.
- [23]
[23] According to Mr Aathar, Mr Fan and Ms Lim, no drawdown occurred under any of the Disputed Facilities, and certainly not to purchase IHC shares on IHC’s behalf. By their account, the Crest Entities spent the $17m on their own volition for their own purchase of the IHC shares (ie, as a proper and ordinary investment in shares). Any communications between Mr Aathar and Mr Tan merely involved the former providing advice (as opposed to instructions) to the latter.
Demands for repayment under the Standby Facility
- [24]
[24] In September 2015, SGX announced that investors should exercise caution when dealing with IHC’s shares because its investigations revealed some unusual trading activities of IHC shares. Subsequently, on 19 October 2015, Crest Capital demanded repayment of sums due under both the Standby and Geelong Facilities.
- [25]
[25] As regards the Standby Facility, Crest Capital sent a letter of demand addressed to Dr Jong, copying Mr Fan and Mr Aathar. The letter of demand requested some $2.7m for standby fees due for the period between 16 June and 15 October 2015, and stated that a drawdown was made on 16 April 2015. However, there was no mention of the principal sum due.
- [26]
[26] As regards the Geelong Facility, Crest Capital sent a letter of demand addressed to Ms Lim, copying Mr Fan and Mr Aathar. The letter of demand requested payment of some $11m, comprising the principal sum and the interest accruing.
- [27]
[27] Negotiations over repayment then took place between Mr Tan, Mr Fan and Mr Aathar. The exchange of emails between the parties referred to “market shares of $17.2m or 59.3m shares” and likewise included discussions on the sum of $17m used to purchase the 59m IHC shares. No other IHC representatives appear to have been privy to these negotiations (see Judgment at [40]).
The dispute arose
- [28]
[28] In December 2015, IHC made two payments to the Crest Entities. The first was a sum of $3.5m which was applied towards the Geelong Facility (which IHC did not take issue with). The second was a $3.8m payment which was applied by the Crest Entities towards the Standby Facility. This second payment of $3.8m became a major area of contention between the parties, both below and on appeal. It would thus be useful to briefly explain the circumstances regarding this payment.
- [29]
[29] On 17 December 2015, Mr CP Lim emailed Ms Lim setting out certain “payment details” for IHC to follow-up on: IHC was to pay EFIII about $2.3m; VMIII, about $1m; and VMF3, about $500,000. In his email, Mr CP Lim did not identify which facility these sums were to be applied towards. That said, EFIII and VMFIII were lenders under both the Disputed Facilities and the Geelong Facility, while VMF3 was a lender only under the Standby Facility.
- [30]
[30] Later the same day, IHC’s employee replied to Mr CP Lim, saying “As spoken, we will pay $3,883,950 to [EFIII]”. No mention was made of VMFIII and VMF3. The following day, 18 December 2015, IHC duly made the payment of $3.8m to EFIII. The payment was recorded in IHC’s internal records as a payment for “settled partial Geelong loan”.
- [31]
[31] On or about the same day, Ms Lim sent the following WhatsApp message to Mr Fan:
- [32]
[32] On 23 December, Mr Peter Chan (“Mr Chan”), Crest Capital’s Managing Partner, emailed Mr Fan, copying Mr Tan and Mr CP Lim. In the email, Mr Chan referred to a meeting with Mr Fan that morning, and stated that:
- [33]
[33] On that basis, the Crest Entities applied the $3.8m payment towards the Standby Facility. IHC took issue with the Crest Entities’ appropriation of the $3.8 million payment, contending that it was always meant to be applied to the Geelong Facility, and not the Standby Facility.
- [34]
[34] From February 2016, a flurry of correspondence took place between the finance teams of IHC and the Crest Entities. Generally, IHC denied having drawn down on the Standby Facility, and requested the Crest Entities to furnish evidence of the alleged drawdowns. In response, the Crest Entities asserted that drawdowns took place, but refused to provide particulars and instead stated that IHC should check with Mr Fan and Mr Aathar for the details.
- [35]
[35] In April 2016, the Crest Entities’ solicitors served letters of demand on IHC and IHC Medical Re for sums due under the Standby and Geelong Facilities. The claim under the Standby Facility was resisted by IHC. IHC also stated that the Crest entities had wrongly attributed the payment of $3.8m to the Standby Facility instead of the Geelong Facility, and asked the Crest Entities to rectify that error. IHC further stated that unless the Crest Entities did so, it would not be making any further repayment toward the Geelong Facility.
- [36]
[36] The Crest Entities subsequently appointed receivers over the Charged Shares (“Crest Receivers”), thereby gaining control over IHC Medical Re and the Australian Properties.
- [37]
[37] In April 2016, IHC commenced the Suit seeking to, inter alia, remove the Crest Receivers. In January 2017, IHC held an extraordinary general meeting in which the incumbent board (including Ms Lim) was removed. In June 2017, IHC changed its position and accepted that IHC shares were acquired for IHC on the instructions of Mr Aathar using the funds drawn down from the Standby Facility.
- [38]
[38] The Australian Properties were subject to senior mortgages held by three Australian financial institutions. After the Crest Receivers were appointed in April 2016, the Australian Properties were placed in receivership (“Australian Receivers”) in August 2016. The Australian Receivers eventually sold the Australian Properties.
Decision below
- [39]
[39] The following is a comprehensive summary of the Judge’s findings in the Suit.
The purpose of the Standby Facility
- [40]
[40] The Judge accepted Mr Tan’s account that the Standby Facility came about because of Mr Aathar’s request to Mr Tan for a $20m loan to combat a short-selling attack on IHC’s shares. To that end, the Crest Entities were to use the loan drawdowns to buy IHC shares themselves and thereafter hold the IHC shares as security (Judgment at [87]).
- [41]
[41] The Judge found that Mr Tan’s account was consistent with the contents of the Morning and Afternoon Emails. It was clear from the language of the Morning and Afternoon Emails that Mr Aathar was making requests on behalf of IHC. His continued use of the collective pronoun “we”, suggested that he was speaking on behalf of IHC rather than discussing the matter in his personal capacity. Further, the Term Sheet and the Standby Facility reflected the key terms set out in the Morning Email and the security arrangement envisioned in the Afternoon Email. Moreover, in accordance with the Morning Email, the Crest Entities did proceed to purchase IHC shares and hold them as security (Judgment at [90]).
Whether there were drawdowns on the Standby Facility to purchase IHC shares
- [42]
[42] The Judge accepted the Crest Entities’ account that between April and August 2015, Mr Aathar instructed Mr Tan to buy IHC shares. Thus, a sum of $17m was drawn down from the Standby Facility to purchase some 59m IHC shares. The Judge relied on the following pieces of evidence (Judgment at [93]– [94]):
(a) WhatsApp exchanges between Mr Aathar and Mr Tan, which clearly showed the former activating the standby line and giving instructions to the latter to buy IHC shares.
(b) A spreadsheet sent from Mr Tan to Mr Fan and Mr Aathar through an email dated 8 May 2015 showing 18m IHC shares “bought on behalf” of IHC in three transactions between 16 April and 8 May.
(c) Mr Fan’s approval for the payment of standby fees for the period between 16 April and 15 May by way of two cheques dated 17 June and 2 July respectively (this was before the documentation for the Original Facility was even executed). The 2 July cheque was issued around the time when Mr Tan had written to Mr Fan and Mr Aathar seeking payment of the outstanding standby fees. Subsequently, when Mr Fan refused to approve the payment of standby fees for the period between 16 May and 15 June, Mr Aathar paid the standby fees out of his own pocket.
(d) The negotiations between Mr Aathar and the Crest Entities over the repayment of the sums due under the Standby Facility consistently referred to the “market shares of $17.2m or 59.3m shares”, a figure which was broadly in accordance with the drawdowns on the Standby Facility totalling $17,332,081.15 used to purchase 59,304,800 IHC shares.
- [43]
[43] Pertinently, the Judge rejected the argument that there was no drawdown because Mr Aathar was only a shareholder, and thus did not have authority to give the Crest Entities instructions for the drawdowns on behalf of IHC. She noted that Mr Aathar’s authority was not a “relevant legal issue” for the purposes of the respondents’ claim. What mattered was that Mr Aathar had given instruction to Mr Tan on the share acquisitions (Judgment at [95]).
Mr Fan’s breach of duties
- [44]
[44] The Judge found that Mr Fan was not a shadow director of IHC. However, by virtue of his appointment as Group CEO and subsequently CEO of IHC, he owed fiduciary duties to IHC, including the duty to exercise due skill, care and diligence (Judgment at [116]).
- [45]
[45] The Judge also found that Mr Fan had breached such duties. Mr Fan was aware of the prohibition in the Companies Act against a company buying back its own shares. He must also have been aware that IHC’s purchase of its own shares would prima facie diminish its future resources while greatly benefiting the substantial shareholders (ie, himself and Mr Aathar) (Judgment at [118]–[119], [122]).
- [46]
[46] Even with knowledge of such a prohibition, Mr Fan (along with Mr Aathar) was the key player in the negotiations with the Crest Entities. He was aware of the purpose of the Standby Facility (ie, for IHC to buy its own shares), and he was aware of the drawdowns that took place. Further, as Group CEO and CEO of IHC, he prepared the board paper on the Standby Facility that was presented to IHC’s board of directors for their consideration. Significantly, the board paper misleadingly characterised the Standby Facility as being a loan facility for “general working capital purposes”. It was likely that the board would not have approved the Standby Facility had the board known its true purpose (Judgment at [120]–[121]).
- [47]
[47] Therefore, Mr Fan was in breach of his duties to IHC in failing to disclose that funds had already been drawn down from the Standby Facility to acquire IHC shares (which was the Standby Facility’s true purpose). His non-disclosure caused IHC to pursue a course of action inimical to its own interests, incurring liabilities in the form of standby fees and drawdowns used to purchase its own shares (Judgment at [122]–[123]).
Ms Lim’s breach of duties
- [48]
[48] The Judge proceeded on the basis that Ms Lim owed duties to IHC. She found that Ms Lim had breached her duty to take reasonable care, but not her fiduciary duties (Judgment at [124]).
- [49]
[49] The Judge found, on the evidence, that Ms Lim likely did not know and should not be expected to know about the Standby Facility’s true purpose. Although Ms Lim had been forwarded a chain of emails including the Morning Email, the Judge accepted her testimony that she did not pay attention to the Morning Email which was at the bottom of the chain. Instead, it was not entirely surprising that Ms Lim’s focus would have been on the relevant legal documents for the facility arrangements. These would arrive in a later email sent by Mr Tan. Indeed, Ms Lim’s role was intended to be peripheral in nature, ie, the preparation of legal documents and the making of payments due under the Standby Facility. Moreover, the Judge found that Ms Lim would have been misled by the stated purpose of the Standby Facility (for “general working capital”) and would not have been in a position to appreciate the significance of the particular arrangements surrounding the Standby Facility (Judgment at [129]–[131]).
- [50]
[50] However, the Judge found that Ms Lim should have been alerted as to the drawdowns on the Standby Facility beginning on 16 April 2015. The Judge relied on (Judgment at [132]–[134]):
(a) an email dated 13 May from Mr CP Lim to her, which expressly referred to a first drawdown on the Standby Facility on 16 April (albeit for unknown purposes); and
(b) the fact that she knew about the two cheque payments in June and July 2015 that were made to the Crest Entities for the payment of standby fees under the Standby Facility for the months of April and May 2015.
- [51]
[51] Given these circumstances, Ms Lim must have known that IHC had drawn down on the Standby Facility for unknown purposes, without full and proper documentation. Ms Lim should have, but failed to, make further enquiries as to the reasons for the drawdowns and to, should the reasons uncovered prove unsatisfactory, raise the matter to the board of directors before the legal documentation for the Standby Facility was executed. Accordingly, she was in breach of her duty to take reasonable care (Judgment at [135]).
Attribution of Mr Tan’s state of mind to the Crest Entities
- [52]
[52] The Judge noted that the respondents’ causes of action against the Crest Entities in dishonest assistance and unlawful means conspiracy involved a consideration of Mr Tan’s state of mind and in particular whether his state of mind could be attributed to the Crest Entities.
- [53]
[53] The Judge answered this question in the affirmative. She held that Mr Tan was an agent of each of the Crest Entities (ie, Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst, EFIII, VMF3 and VMIII). This was because at all times, the Crest Entities had relied on the acts of Mr Tan and did not dispute that he had acted with authority (Judgment at [142]):
(a) In their Statement of Claim (Amendment No 4) (“SOC4”), at paras 2.2.4, 2.2.5 and 2.2.17(e), the respondents pleaded and relied on Mr Tan’s role and involvement in the Standby Facility. Mr Tan “admitted to” such participation and involvement as the Investment Director of Crest Capital, in his affidavit filed on behalf of the Crest Entities (Judgment at [143]).
(b) In their Defence (Amendment No 6) (“D6”), the Crest Entities pleaded at para 5 that the Standby Facility investors (ie, EFIII, VMF3 and VMIII) were “managed in all aspects” by Crest Capital and Crest Catalyst. At paras 15A, 15B and 16, the Crest Entities did not dispute the events involving Mr Tan. None of the Crest Entities disassociated themselves from Mr Tan’s acts (Judgment at [144]).
- [54]
[54] The Judge noted that the Crest Entities relied on the acts of Mr Tan throughout the negotiations, during entry into the Standby Facility, and in respect of the subsequent drawdowns on the Standby Facility. As a result, Mr Tan’s actual authority as their agent was to the Judge “plain to see”. The Judge held that the Crest Entities could not adopt the position that Mr Tan’s acts were authorised on the one hand, and disavow his state of mind on the other hand (Judgment at [146]–[147]).
- [55]
[55] Having found that Mr Tan was an agent of each of the Crest Entities, the Judge held that his state of mind could therefore be attributed to each of the Crest Entities on that basis.
Dishonest assistance
- [56]
[56] The main focus of the claim in dishonest assistance concerned the issue as to whether the Crest Entities and Ms Lim had acted dishonestly (Judgment at [155]).
The Crest Entities
- [57]
[57] The Judge held that Mr Tan’s state of mind was to be attributed to the Crest Entities. First, the Judge was prepared to conclude that Mr Tan had actual knowledge of the prohibition against share buyback under s 76A of the Companies Act (Judgment at [160]–[161]):
(a) Mr Tan was the Investment Director of Crest Capital, a professional fund administration company. Mr Tan was also a licence holder under the regime by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. He would be expected to know of such a legal prohibition.
(b) The legal documentation sent by Mr Tan to IHC did not mention the pledge of IHC shares as security, despite it being a term in the Term Sheet. This was a “glaring omission” which pointed to an awareness of something amiss regarding the share purchases.
(c) Between April 2015 and February 2016, the Crest Entities did not provide any confirmation of the principal drawn down from the Standby Facility to IHC, despite requesting for payment of the standby fees. The drawdowns were first confirmed only in February 2016.
(d) It was never officially communicated to IHC that the Crest Entities had purchased IHC shares on IHC’s behalf using the funds from the Standby Facility. There were only two emails which suggested that the Crest Entities had used funds from the Standby Facility to buy IHC shares – but neither email found its way to IHC officially.
(e) For the drawdowns, Mr Tan did not follow the mandatory procedure that was laid down in the Standby Facility agreement (“the Clause 7 Safeguards”).
(f) Even after the dispute arose in February 2016, the Crest Entities did not provide IHC with information about the drawdowns under the Standby Facility.
- [58]
[58] In the Judge’s views, the fact that the Crest Entities consistently refused to communicate or confirm these drawdowns, the fact that any such drawdowns were effected without regard to clearly stipulated procedural safeguards (ie, the Clause 7 Safeguards) and the fact that Mr Tan was a qualified professional in the relevant field, raised the inference that Mr Tan had actual knowledge of the prohibition (and had attempted to avoid leaving traces of any contravention of the prohibition).
- [59]
[59] Leaving aside the question of knowledge of the statutory prohibition, the Judge found that Mr Tan well knew about the serious irregularities in the various drawdowns of the Standby Facility (especially prior to its formalisation). However, no queries were raised, and instead the arrangement was eventually formalised. This, according to the Judge, amounted to dishonesty (Judgment at [162]).
- [60]
[60] Second, the Judge found that Mr Tan ought to have known that IHC’s entry into and the drawing down on the Standby Facility to purchase its own shares were against IHC’s interests in some way, and that he was assisting Mr Fan in breaching his duties to IHC. Beyond the matters mentioned in [57], the Judge made three further observations. First, Mr Tan knew that Mr Fan and Mr Aathar were substantial shareholders of IHC, whose interests might not necessarily be aligned with IHC’s. Second, there was a fairly long delay in the formal execution of the Standby Facility of slightly over three months. Third, the formal execution of the Standby Facility only happened after Mr Fan took over as CEO. Despite these circumstances, Mr Tan allowed the drawdowns and acquisition of shares on Mr Aathar’s instructions, in contravention of the procedures clearly stipulated in the Standby Facility agreement. (Judgment at [165]).
Ms Lim
- [61]
[61] The Judge did not find Ms Lim to be dishonest. She accepted that Ms Lim knew that the Standby Facility was drawn down for unknown purposes but found that this unknown purpose could very well have been for working capital. Even though Ms Lim was negligent in her failure to make enquiries, she was not found to be liable for dishonest assistance (Judgment at [168]–[169]).
Unlawful means conspiracy
The Crest Entities and Mr Fan
- [62]
[62] The Judge was satisfied that the Crest Entities and Mr Fan (along with Mr Aathar) formed an agreement to cause IHC to enter into and draw down on the Standby Facility to purchase IHC shares. The backdrop of their agreement was a potential short-seller’s attack on IHC shares, and a desire on the part of Mr Aathar and Mr Fan to stabilise IHC’s share price (Judgment at [187]).
- [63]
[63] The Judge found that the requisite intention to injure could be established on their part:
(a) The Crest Entities knew that IHC would incur substantial liabilities upon entering into the Standby Facility. Moreover, they knew that IHC would use the funds disbursed to buy its own shares, and they must have known that share buyback was prima facie illegal. As such, the intended injury was simply the imposition of the liability – including the standby fees – on IHC for the purchase of its own shares. That the funds were being used to buy IHC’s own shares also defeated the Crest Entities’ argument that the Standby Facility was a purely commercial deal (Judgment at [196]–[197]).
(b) As for Mr Fan, he knew and intended that IHC would incur substantial liabilities for the prohibited purpose of purchasing its own shares. The share buyback would prop up the price of IHC’s shares, to Mr Fan’s benefit as a shareholder (Judgment at [199]).
- [64]
[64] The Judge also rejected the argument that actual knowledge of the illegal nature of the means deployed was necessary for a claim in unlawful means conspiracy, or that the ignorance of such illegality was a defence (Judgment at [174]–[185]).
Ms Lim
- [65]
[65] The Judge did not find that Ms Lim was part of the agreement between the Crest Entities and Mr Fan. The Judge reiterated that there was insufficient evidence to find that Ms Lim knew about the true purpose of the Standby Facility, or that there had been drawdowns for the acquisition of IHC shares. Indeed, Mr Fan did not brief Ms Lim on the deal (Judgment at [188]). Further, the Judge was not satisfied that she had the requisite intention to injure IHC because there was no incentive for her to do so. Ms Lim was IHC’s senior employee, and her employment security depended in part on IHC’s financial health (Judgment at [200]).
Damages
Mr Fan’s liability for his breach of fiduciary duties
- [66]
[66] The relevant heads of claims in relation to Mr Fan’s breach of fiduciary duties were as follows (Judgment at [219]):
(a) Sums paid by IHC towards the Standby Facility (“Standby Sums”);
(b) The interest which would not have accrued on the Geelong Facility if the Standby Sums had been applied towards the Geelong Facility until its eventual repayment on 26 February 2018 (“Loss of use of Standby Sums”);
(c) Losses which could have been avoided had the Geelong Facility been satisfied before its maturity date of 28 February 2016 (“Losses in default of the Geelong Facility”), which include the loss of the Australian Properties;
Standby Sums
- [67]
[67] Between 17 June and 18 December 2015, IHC made three payments totalling some $4.5m to partially discharge its liability under the Standby Facility. These three payments constituted the Standby Sums. The first two payments were cheque payments in June and July for standby fees amounting to a sum of about $700,000. The last payment involved a payment of about $3.8m in December, which IHC contends was intended for the Geelong Facility but was applied by the Crest Entities towards the Standby Facility instead (Judgment at [220]). IHC relied chiefly on its internal records stating that the $3.8m payment was meant for the “partially settled Geelong loan” (see [30] above).
- [68]
[68] The Judge found that but for Mr Fan’s breach of duties, IHC would not have entered into the Standby Facility. It followed that IHC would not have made any of the three payments mentioned in the preceding paragraph (Judgment at [222]).
Loss of use of the Standby Sums
- [69]
[69] This head of claim regarded the Standby Sums as otherwise available funds that could have been applied towards the Geelong Facility, thus preventing interest from accruing thereon up until 26 February 2018 (when the Geelong Facility was fully repaid) (Judgment at [224]).
- [70]
[70] The Judge agreed that had the Standby Facility not been entered into in the first place, IHC would have used the $4.5m to partially satisfy the Geelong Facility. The Judge thus allowed the loss of use claim, quantified at some $4.4m (Judgment at [227] and [229]).
Losses in default of the Geelong Facility
- [71]
[71] By way of background, even assuming that the Standby Sums were applied towards the Geelong Facility, there would nevertheless have been a balance of $4.1m due under the Geelong Facility to be paid on its maturity date of 28 February 2016. The Judge then held that the real question was whether IHC would have repaid the remaining $4.1m outstanding under the Geelong Facility by the maturity date, but for the problems with the Standby Facility (Judgment at [232], [235]).
- [72]
[72] The Judge found that Ms Lim’s WhatsApp message to Mr Fan on or about 18 December 2015 (see [31] above) “raised a query about the Crest entities’ application of the sum of [$3.8m] towards the Standby Facility, and showed clearly that some confusion had been caused”. The Judge took the view that such confusion would not have arisen if the Standby Facility had not been entered into in the first place. The Judge also placed emphasis on the fact that further payments to the Crest Entities ceased after the dispute over the existence of drawdowns on the Standby Facility had arisen. On this basis, the Judge accepted the respondent’s position that it was the dispute over the Standby Facility, which would not have occurred but for Mr Fan’s breach, that caused it to withhold further payment under the Geelong Facility (Judgment at [237]).
- [73]
[73] The Judge also found that but for Mr Fan’s breach, the respondents would have been able to refinance the outstanding liabilities under the Geelong Facility and paid it off upon maturity. The Judge relied on IHC’s positive cash inflows from financing activities for financial years 2015 and 2016 (between $42.7m and $10.8m), and the fact that IHC was able to refinance its Japan TMK bonds (of $151.2m) in 2015 (Judgment at [247]).
- [74]
[74] Accordingly, the respondents were entitled to claim for losses arising out of the default of the Geelong Facility, including the loss of the Australian Properties: but for Mr Fan’s breach, the Crest Receivers and the Australian Receivers would not have been appointed. Therefore, any loss suffered by the respondents in this respect was to be borne by Mr Fan (Judgment at [259], [271]).
The Crest Entities’ liability in dishonest assistance and unlawful means conspiracy
- [75]
[75] The Judge found the Crest Entities jointly and severally liable with Mr Fan for the losses that would not have been suffered by the respondents but for Mr Fan’s breach (Judgment at [299]–[300]).
Ms Lim’s liability for her breach of duty of reasonable care
- [76]
[76] The Judge found that Ms Lim was liable for the Standby Sums. But for her breach of duty, IHC would not have entered into the Standby Facility, and would not have paid the Standby Sums (Judgment at [301]).
- [77]
[77] However, the Judge found that Ms Lim was not liable for the other heads of claim, as they were, inter alia, not reasonably foreseeable (Judgment at [303]–[305]).
Ms Lim’s counterclaim
- [78]
[78] Ms Lim sought an indemnity from IHC for her liability, either expressly under art 153 of IHC’s constitution, or impliedly as a term of her employment contract with IHC. Both arguments were rejected by the Judge.
- [79]
[79] As regards the express indemnity, the Judge found that the indemnity would only apply if the judgment against which she sought to be indemnified had been issued in Ms Lim’s favour. Having been found liable for breach of her duty to take reasonable care, she could not avail herself of the express indemnity (Judgment at [307]).
- [80]
[80] As regards the implied indemnity, Ms Lim argued that terms should be read into her employment contract to the effect that she would carry out all lawful and reasonable directions from IHC, and that IHC would not give her any directions that are not lawful or reasonable. She complied with the first implied term, but IHC breached the second. That entitled her to the indemnity (Judgment at [310]–[311]).
- [81]
[81] The Judge rejected this argument, having found it to be “a leap in logic” since Ms Lim had effectively asserted that she was entitled to an indemnity from IHC in respect of any and all liability that she might incur as a result of her compliance with instructions given by IHC. The Judge also found that there was no basis to imply such terms into Ms Lim’s employment contract. Instead, the Judge took the view that it was eminently reasonable (and indeed desirable) for a company to expect their officers or employees to act with due skill, care and diligence (Judgment at [311]–[312]).
Issues on appeal
- [82]
[82] The appellants in these appeals seek to reverse the whole of the Judgment. In this judgment, we shall examine the following issues:
(a) Whether Mr Tan had actual knowledge of the statutory prohibition against share buyback, and actual knowledge that IHC’s purchase of its own shares was in contravention of this prohibition;
(b) Whether Mr Tan’s knowledge can be attributed to all or only some of the Crest Entities;
(c) Whether Mr Fan was in breach of his fiduciary duties;
(d) Whether Ms Lim was in breach of her duty to take reasonable care;
(e) Whether the heads of claim awarded by the Judge were correct.
The Crest Entities’ liability in dishonest assistance and unlawful means conspiracy
Mr Tan’s state of mind
- [83]
[83] At the outset, it is crucial to draw a distinction between Mr Tan’s actual knowledge of the existence of the statutory prohibition against share buyback, and his knowledge of the contravention of such prohibition. The Judge focused on the former (Judgment at [160]) and found that knowledge of the existence of the statutory prohibition was sufficient to infer dishonesty (for the dishonest assistance claim) and an intention to injure (for the unlawful means conspiracy claim).
- [84]
[84] In our view, knowledge of both the existence and the contravention of the statutory prohibition was established on the evidence before the court.
Knowledge of the existence of the prohibition
- [85]
[85] On appeal, Mr Tan Chee Meng SC (counsel for Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII) mounts two primary factual arguments in aid of the position that Mr Tan was not aware of either the prohibition or its contravention:
(a) first, that Mr Tan did not try to hide the true purpose of the Disputed Facilities (ie, to buy IHC shares); and
(b) second, that Mr Tan did not try to hide the fact that drawdowns had occurred.
- [86]
[86] As a preliminary point, we note that there were marked shifts in the Crest Entities’ pleadings on this point. The Crest Entities had initially pleaded in their Defence that they were not aware of “Section 76 of the Companies Act or any contravention of the same”. On the eve of trial, they amended their defence to plead that they were not aware of “any contravention of Section 76 of the Companies Act”. To us, this was a very pointed and deliberate amendment which suggested that the Crest Entities were only contesting their knowledge of the contravention, but not their knowledge of the existence, of the statutory prohibition. This amendment implies that Mr Tan must have known of the existence of the statutory prohibition.
Whether Mr Tan tried to hide the purpose of the Disputed Facilities
- [87]
[87] The Crest Entities’ first argument pertains to the Morning and Afternoon Emails, as well as the Term Sheet, all of which expressly mentioned the pledge of IHC shares. Since Mr Tan sent these aforementioned documents to Mr Chia and Ms Lim, neither of whom was found to be co-conspirators, it cannot be said that Mr Tan was concealing the purpose of the Standby Facility. In our view, this argument is misconceived. As rightly noted by the Judge (at [160(b)] of the Judgment), the real concealment pertains to the omission to mention the pledge of IHC shares in the legal documentation for the Standby Facility which was sent to IHC’s board for approval. The IHC board was the approving authority for the Standby Facility. The Morning and Afternoon Emails, as well as the Term Sheet, were not the critical documents insofar as IHC’s board was concerned. Moreover, this argument assumes that Mr Chia and Ms Lim would have communicated the contents of the Emails and the Term Sheet to IHC’s board. There is no evidence supporting such an assumption. The fact that the pledge was mentioned in the Term Sheet but not in the actual documentation for the Standby Facility only serves to highlight one damaging point against Mr Tan, ie, that the omission was deliberate and was intended to conceal the true purpose of the Standby Facility from IHC’s board.
- [88]
[88] The second argument relates to the omission of any reference to the pledge of IHC shares in the documentation for the Standby Facility. The Crest Entities advance two alternative explanations for the omission: either their lawyers at the time, Colin Ng & Partners (“CNP”), advised that there was no need to mention the pledge and did not raise the prohibition against share buyback, or that the omission was inadvertent because the documentation was hurriedly adapted from another loan transaction which did not concern any share purchases. There are three inherent weaknesses with these explanations:
(a) These two arguments are inconsistent. If advice was given, then any such omission by definition could not have been inadvertent.
(b) On the point of inadvertence, it is odd (to say the least) for a lender to inadvertently omit the reference to the very security for the loan, considering its vital importance. This is especially so since Mr Tan conceded in cross-examination that pending the completion of the legal documentation, drawdowns were made on the basis of the pledge of IHC shares as security.
(c) Finally, it is inaccurate to say that CNP advised that there was no need to mention the share pledge. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that CNP had expressly advised that reference to the pledge of IHC shares in the documentation for the Standby Facility was unnecessary. While Mr Tan did testify that the pledge of IHC shares was discussed with CNP, he decided to invoke legal professional privilege when he was asked to explain why CNP would have advised to omit the reference to the pledge. Given that the onus of showing that such advice was given lies with the Crest Entities, their insistence on relying on privilege and their failure to call the lawyer from CNP to testify, must mean that there was no acceptable explanation for the conspicuous omission of the pledge from the legal documentation.
Whether Mr Tan tried to hide the fact that drawdowns were made
- [89]
[89] We turn to the second argument, ie, that Mr Tan did not try to hide the fact that drawdowns were made. In our view, the argument is far from convincing.
- [90]
[90] First, the Crest Entities rely on the debit notes for the Standby Facility, which stated that standby fees were payable. According to them, since standby fees were payable only upon drawdown pursuant to cl 9.2 of the Original Facility, the debit notes for standby fees must be taken as an acknowledgement that drawdowns had occurred.
- [91]
[91] Even assuming the standby fees were only payable upon drawdown, and thus the sending of debit notes operated as an implicit acknowledgement that drawdowns were made, there was nevertheless no indication of the amount drawn down. In this regard, the Crest Entities claimed that they were following the practice followed in respect of other facilities, where debit notes only stated the principal drawn down upon maturity. Although the Standby Facility had its maturity date in end-December 2015, the Judge noted that the debit notes issued as late as January 2016 still did not state the amount of principal drawn down (Judgment at [160(c)]). In other words, IHC was in fact none the wiser as to the amount of the drawdowns.
- [92]
[92] Second, the Crest Entities rely on an email dated 8 May 2015 sent from Mr Tan to Mr Aathar and Mr Fan, updating the latter two on the three drawdowns that had taken place as of that date. The Crest Entities argue that the email to Mr Fan and Mr Aathar should be treated as an official update to IHC, considering that Mr Fan and Mr Aathar were authorised by IHC in respect of the drawdowns. We should first point out the abject incongruity of this submission. The case against the Crest Entities is that Mr Tan, inter alia, conspired with Mr Fan and Mr Aathar. Viewed in this light, it is simply untenable for the Crest Entities to rely on Mr Tan’s disclosure of the drawdowns to his co-conspirators to explain away the conspiracy.
- [93]
[93] This argument also fails because Mr Tan admitted in cross-examination that the 8 May email was meant to be a personal update from him to Mr Aathar and Mr Fan. The fact that it was meant to be a personal update to Mr Aathar and Mr Fan is entirely consistent with the conspiracy case theory. Moreover, as the respondents point out, this email covered only 18m IHC shares. There were drawdowns in respect of the purchase of a further 41m shares in respect of which no further updates were given.
- [94]
[94] Third, the Crest Entities seek to justify their reluctance to update IHC about the drawdowns when specifically queried by IHC in February 2016. They explain that they were frustrated with IHC’s disingenuousness in denying that drawdowns had taken place. Further, they were entitled to direct IHC to check with Mr Aathar and Mr Fan, as the latter were authorised by IHC in respect of the drawdowns.
- [95]
[95] The easiest and most direct way for the Crest Entities to refute IHC’s position (that there were no drawdowns) was to simply furnish the information in relation to the drawdowns. There was no conceivable reason for the Crest Entities to have been so tight-lipped if indeed the drawdowns were proper and legitimate.
- [96]
[96] Fourth, the Crest Entities’ explanations for disregarding the Clause 7 Safeguards are not credible. Mr Tan’s explanation was that this procedural mechanism was waived, because of time pressure and because of the Crest Entities’ willingness to grant latitude to IHC, their long-time business partner. Further, Mr Tan explained that if there had been any lapses (ie. drawdowns effected without compliance with the Clause 7 Safeguards), such lapses stemmed from Crest Capital’s unfamiliarity with handling loan facilities involving multiple drawdowns. Crest Capital’s “usual fare” was transactions involving single drawdowns and it therefore did not possess any standard operating protocols for handling loan facilities (such as the Standby Facility) which involved multiple drawdowns. Any oversight, in other words, was attributable to unfamiliarity rather than any knowledge of the statutory prohibition.
- [97]
[97] These explanations suffered from a few problems. First, any “time pressure” would have subsided by the time the drawdowns were made. Any urgency would have been experienced in the time period between 2 April 2015 and 6 April 2015 (ie, the period where Mr Aathar expressed concerns about an “imminent” shorting attack). However, drawdowns began in April 2015 and continued all the way till 24 August 2015. It is thus hard to imagine what exactly was the “time pressure” that Mr Tan was responding to. Secondly, there were no waivers in the first place. Any waiver given should have been given before the drawdowns were made. That was not done. In fact, by the time the Original Facility was formally executed on 21 July 2015, thirteen out of the fourteen drawdowns in question had already taken place. The “waivers” given were thus not waivers in the true sense of the word, but rather retrospective ratifications of what had been (illegitimately) done earlier. Finally, it is somewhat incongruous for the Crest Entities to claim unfamiliarity with the terms or operation of their own facility. It is unbelievable that the procedural lapses could be attributable to simple unfamiliarity with loan facilities involving multiple drawdowns. It defies belief that these lapses would have carried on for some 14 drawdowns and even the most tender-footed greenhorn would have been alerted to the serious irregularities that this represented, especially considering the large sums of money involved.
Knowledge of the contravention of the prohibition
- [98]
[98] While the question of prohibition and contravention are separate (see [83] above), we observe that knowledge of the prohibition coupled with knowledge of the drawdowns for the purchase of IHC’s shares would inevitably constitute knowledge of the contravention. If Mr Tan knew of the statutory prohibition, he must have also known that the purchase of IHC shares would be a violation of the prohibition unless the statutorily prescribed approval had been obtained. It is undisputed that no such approval was ever procured. Therefore, Mr Tan must have also known that there was a contravention of the statutory prohibition.
Attribution of Mr Tan’s knowledge
- [99]
[99] Having affirmed the finding below that Mr Tan had actual knowledge of the existence and the contravention of the statutory prohibition against share buybacks, the next question is whether Mr Tan’s knowledge can be attributed to each of the Crest Entities. The Judge found for the respondents on the basis that the Crest Entities had “relied” on Mr Tan’s acts and thus accepted that he acted with authority (Judgment at [142]). Mr Tan’s knowledge would be attributed to his principals, the Crest Entities, based on the principles of agency (Judgment at [148]).
- [100]
[100] On appeal, the Crest Entities make two arguments:
(a) First, that the respondents did not plead attribution, and were therefore precluded from arguing this point; and
(b) Second, even if attribution was sufficiently pleaded, there was no basis to find that Mr Tan’s knowledge should be attributed to the Crest Entities.
- [101]
[101] We address each argument in turn.
Whether the respondents pleaded attribution
- [102]
[102] We turn to examine SOC4 to determine whether the issue of attribution was sufficiently pleaded. The respondents pleaded as follows:
(a) Para 2.2.4 pleaded that the Crest Entities (amongst others) intended and used the Standby Facility for IHC to engage in share buybacks in contravention of s 76 of the Companies Act. Para 2.2.4(a) pleaded the Morning Email while para 2.2.4(b) pleaded the Term Sheet. Para 2.2.4(c) pleaded that drawdowns were executed to purchase IHC shares, and that these shares were held as security for the drawdowns.
(b) Para 2.2.5 pleaded that the matters referred to para 2.2.4 were admitted to in Mr Tan’s affidavit dated May 2016.
(c) Para 2.2.17(e) pleaded that the instruction to execute the drawdowns on the Standby Facility was given by Mr Aathar to Mr Tan, and not via the procedural mechanism provided under cl 6.1 of the Standby Facility.
- [103]
[103] In our view, the attribution point was sufficiently pleaded in these paragraphs in SOC4. There was no necessity to specifically plead that Mr Tan’s knowledge should be attributed to the Crest Entities. Para 2.2.4 SOC4 specifically pleaded that the Crest Entities “intended” to use the Standby Facility to buy IHC shares. It must have been obvious that the state of mind of a natural person was to be treated as that of the Crest Entities’. The sub-paragraphs of para 2.2.4 then pleaded events involving Mr Tan as the only relevant person who represented the Crest Entities. Further, para 2.2.5 pleaded that the events in para 2.2.4 were admitted to by Mr Tan. Reading paras 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 together, it is, in our view, plain and obvious that Mr Tan’s state of mind was to be attributed to the Crest Entities. After all, Mr Tan was the only factual witness called by the Crest Entities, and he was also the person on the Crest Entities’ side who was responsible for the Disputed Facilities. The Crest Entities thus clearly understood that Mr Tan was the person whose knowledge the respondents were seeking to attribute to them. There was therefore no question of the Crest Entities being caught by surprise on the attribution point.
- [104]
[104] Further, the Crest Entities’ reliance on this court’s decision in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd and another and another appeal [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”) does not aid their argument. In Sembcorp Marine, the appellant pleaded that one Mr Aurol had disclosed certain documents “in his capacity as a director of [one company called Baker]”. The appellant then tried to attribute Mr Aurol’s acts to the respondent. This court found at [133] that the appellant was precluded from doing so, and noted that “[i]f anything, Aurol’s acts were attributed to Baker”. Attribution was not available to the appellant in Sembcorp Marine because the pleadings in that case showed no nexus between Aurol and the respondent. However, the requisite nexus between Mr Tan and the Crest Entities is clearly shown in the pleadings as analysed in the preceding paragraph.
- [105]
[105] Further, we do not think the respondents needed to plead the basis on which attribution was established, ie, that Mr Tan was the Crest Entities’ agent. The basis on which attribution can be established is a point of law, and therefore need not be pleaded. It suffices to plead the material facts on which the argument of agency can be sustained: see MK (Project Management) v Baker Marine Energy [1994] 3 SLR(R) 823 at [26], where this court found sufficient the plaintiff’s pleadings that certain commissions were varied by the reduction of the amount initially agreed, without characterising this reduction as the consideration for the variation. Echoing the words of Lord Denning MR in In re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2); White v Vandervell Trustees Ltd [29174] Ch 269 at 321H, this court observed that “[it] is sufficient for the pleader to state the material facts. He need not state the legal result.” Here, the material facts supporting the claim in agency were pleaded in paras 2.2.4 and 2.2.17(e) of SOC4, which outlined Mr Tan’s involvement in executing the Disputed Facilities and how EFIII disbursed the funds through Mr Tan.
Whether attribution has been made out
- [106]
[106] In our view, the real controversy lies with the proof of the attribution point. The parties agree that the basis of attribution in this case is that of agency. A relationship of agency is premised on the conferral of authority. It is therefore imperative to discern the existence of any authority conferred on Mr Tan, and the scope of such authority.
- [107]
[107] In this connection, we note that the Crest Entities are now separately represented on appeal and their arguments on attribution now differ in important aspects. We will thus address them separately.
Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII
- [108]
[108] We begin with Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII. In our view, Mr Tan was clothed with authority to permit the drawdowns for the purpose of purchasing IHC shares, and his knowledge could be attributed to each of them.
- [109]
[109] Mr Tan was the Investment Director of Crest Capital, and also one of the two members of EFIII’s Investment Committee (“IC”), EFIII’s management body. More importantly, Mr Tan negotiated and signed the Term Sheet (which expressly mentioned that the Disputed Facilities would be used to purchase IHC shares) as agent for Crest Capital, and later drew down on the Disputed Facilities to purchase IHC shares for EFIII. To that extent, Crest Capital and EFIII clearly knew and authorised Mr Tan to permit the drawdowns for the purpose of purchasing IHC shares. It is uncontroversial that the knowledge which an agent acquires while acting within the scope of his authority is to be imputed to his principal (Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (Sweet & Maxwell, 22nd Ed, 2021) (“Bowstead”) at para 8-208). To that extent, Mr Tan’s knowledge of the purpose of the Disputed Facilities was rightly attributed to Crest Capital and EFIII.
- [110]
[110] We turn to Crest Catalyst. Mr Tan did not hold any formal position in Crest Catalyst. However, the Crest Entities pleaded in their Defence (Amendment No 6) that EFIII, VMF3 and VMIII were managed by Crest Capital and Crest Catalyst “in all aspects”. Since both Crest Capital and EFIII knew and authorised Mr Tan to make drawdowns to buy IHC shares, Crest Catalyst must be taken to have known and authorised the same. We note that it was not seriously suggested that Crest Catalyst had been misled as to the true purpose of the Disputed Facilities. In our view, Mr Tan’s state of mind can likewise be attributed to Crest Catalyst.
VMF3 and VMIII
- [111]
[111] However, we agree with Mr Toby Landau QC’s (counsel for VMF3 and VMIII) submission that the same conclusion does not extend to VMF3 and VMIII. The evidence was that neither VMF3’s nor VMIII’s management knew that the Disputed Facilities would be used to purchase IHC shares. The Investment Memoranda sent to VMF’s and VMIII’s management simply, and misleadingly, stated that the Disputed Facilities would be used for “working capital”.
- [112]
[112] That VMF3 and VMIII were misled about the true purpose of the Disputed Facilities is to us critical, because it would affect the scope of any authority that might have been conferred by them on Mr Tan.
- [113]
[113] We can accept that VMF3 and VMIII conferred authority on Mr Tan to permit the drawdowns under the Disputed Facilities. VMF3 and VMIII agreed to lend money under the Disputed Facilities to IHC, and they knew that Mr Tan was the individual responsible for handling the drawdowns. However, the conferral of actual authority is premised on the principal’s consent: Bowstead at para 3-003. The scope of Mr Tan’s authority was therefore limited to the drawdowns for working capital, as presented to VMF3 and VMIII in the Investment Memoranda. If VMF3 and VMIII did not know that the drawdowns were used to buy IHC shares, they could not possibly have authorised the same for that purpose.
- [114]
[114] In the same vein, an agent who acts against his principal’s interest cannot be said to be acting within his authority: Bowstead at para 3-012; Tan Cheng Han SC, The Law of Agency (Academy Publishing, 2nd Ed, 2017) at para 03.043; Parti v Al Sabah [2007] EWHC 1869 (Ch) at [50] and Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another and another suit [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788 at [46]–[48]. Mr Tan cannot be said to have been acting in VMF3’s and VMIII’s interests in making the drawdowns to buy IHC shares, given that it was in contravention of the prohibition against share buyback.
- [115]
[115] For the reasons canvassed at [113]–[114], Mr Tan was not acting within the scope of authority conferred on him by VMF3 and VMIII when he made the drawdowns to buy IHC shares without their knowledge. Accordingly, his knowledge of the true purpose of the Disputed Facilities cannot be attributed to VMF3 and VMIII.
- [116]
[116] For completeness, Mr Lee Eng Beng SC, counsel for the respondents, raised two arguments supporting the contention that VMF3 and VMIII must be taken to have known, and authorised, Mr Tan to make drawdowns for the purpose of buying IHC shares:
(a) First, the Crest Entities pleaded in D6 that they were aware that drawdowns under the Disputed Facilities would be used to purchase IHC shares.
(b) Second, the trial below proceeded on the basis that the Crest Entities would stand and fall together, ie, Mr Tan’s state of mind would be attributed either to all of them or none of them. Therefore, the respondents would be prejudiced on appeal if VMF3 and VMIII can now run a case different from that of Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII.
- [117]
[117] On the first argument, we accept that D6 pleaded at para 15C that “the Crest Entities were aware that funds disbursed under the Standby Facility were used by [IHC] to acquire its own shares”. However, the question remains as to when each of the Crest Entities came to know that the drawdowns were used for the purchase of IHC’s shares. In the suit below, the respondents themselves accepted in their closing submissions that VMF3 and VMIII did not know the true purpose of the Disputed Facilities. By this, the respondents implicitly accepted that VMF3 and VMIII were not aware of the true purpose of the Disputed Facilities at the time when the drawdowns were made. The Crest Entities also did not challenge the respondent’s position on VMF3’s and VMIII’s ignorance. Both sides understood that VMF3 and VMIII were ignorant of the true purpose of the Disputed Facilities when the drawdowns were made.
- [118]
[118] Moreover, para 15A(e) D6 pleaded that out of the three Standby Lenders, only “[EFIII] executed drawdowns on the Standby Facility on [IHC]’s instructions multiple times to purchase [IHC]’s shares”. It would therefore appear that only EFIII accepted that the drawdowns were made for the purchase of IHC shares. The reference to the “Crest Entities” in para 15C should thus be properly understood to relate to EFIII only.
- [119]
[119] We also do not think it was accurate to claim that the trial below took place on the basis that the Crest Entities would stand and fall together on the attribution point. VMF3 and VMIII did separately argue that Mr Tan’s knowledge should not be attributed to them, even if Mr Tan’s knowledge could be attributed to the remaining Crest Entities. This was because Mr Tan was not affiliated with them. Not only did he not source the deal for them, Mr Tan in fact concealed the true purpose of the Standby Facilities from them. This separate argument was made during the Crest Entities’ opening statements, and in the closing submissions. Significantly, the respondents did not allege that this argument had not been pleaded, or that they were caught by surprise. In fact, the respondent addressed this argument substantively in their closing submissions: they argued that attribution was established despite VMF3’s and VMIII’s argument, since VMF3 and VMIII were managed by Crest Capital and Crest Catalyst “in all aspects”.
- [120]
[120] The respondents were thus well aware that the Crest Entities did not proceed on a “all or nothing basis” as regards the attribution point, and therefore cannot now complain that they would be prejudiced.
Conclusion on liability for the Crest Entities
- [121]
[121] Having found that Mr Tan knew of the existence and the contravention of the statutory prohibition against share buyback, and that his knowledge was correctly attributed to Crest Capital, Crest Catalyst and EFIII, we see no reason to disturb the Judge’s finding on liability in relation to these three entities. They knew that the Disputed Facilities were illegal, and yet were content to allow IHC to draw down on the Disputed Facilities. That is, in our view, sufficient to establish the dishonesty and intention to injure to support the claims in dishonest assistance and unlawful means conspiracy.
- [122]
[122] However, in relation to VMF3 and VMIII, Mr Tan’s knowledge of the true purpose of the Disputed Facilities, the share buyback prohibition and its contravention cannot be attributed to them. To that extent, VMF3 and VMIII, much like the respondents, were victims of the plot hatched by Mr Fan, Mr Aathar and Mr Tan. They thus cannot be said to have had the requisite dishonesty or intention to injure. We thus overturn the Judge’s finding that VMF3 and VMIII are liable in dishonest assistance and unlawful means conspiracy.
Whether actual knowledge of unlawfulness is necessary for a claim in unlawful means conspiracy
- [123]
[123] Having established that Mr Tan had actual knowledge of the existence and contravention of the prohibition against share buyback, it is strictly speaking unnecessary to deal with this issue. However, as the parties have made substantive submissions on this point, we will briefly address this issue.
- [124]
[124] VMF3 and VMIII accept that under Singapore law, actual knowledge of the unlawful nature of the means deployed (referred to in shorthand form as the “knowledge requirement”) is not a requirement of the tort of unlawful means conspiracy. They however seek to persuade this court to change the law.
- [125]
[125] VMF3 and VMIII rely on a series of English authorities, one of which is Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2008] 2 WLR 904 (“Meretz”), which suggest that this knowledge requirement should be incorporated into the law of unlawful means conspiracy. The Judge analysed Meretz in some detail, in particular the observations by Arden and Toulson LJJ which may be interpreted to support the knowledge requirement. The Judge, however, concluded that Arden and Toulson LJJ’s observations, properly interpreted, concern the requirement of intention to injure (Judgment at [184]).
- [126]
[126] We agree with the Judge’s reading of Meretz. Nevertheless, there are subsequent English cases which rely on Meretz, amongst others, as authority for the proposition that knowledge of the unlawfulness of the means deployed is a requirement for claims in unlawful means conspiracy. However, the current position under English law in relation to the knowledge requirement is not settled. To put it simply, there are conflicting English authorities – at both the High Court and the Court of Appeal levels – on whether there should be such a knowledge requirement.
(a) At the English Court of Appeal level, the case of British Industrial Plastics Ltd v Ferguson [1938] 4 All ER 504 supports the knowledge requirement, as well as Arden and Toulson LJJ’s obiter remarks in Meretz. On the other hand, the case of Belmont Finance Corporation v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393 stands for the contrary proposition.
(b) There is similarly a divergence of views in the English High Court. In Stobart Group Ltd v Tinkler [2019] EWHC 258 (Comm), it was held that there is no knowledge requirement while the subsequent decision in The Racing Partnership Ltd & Ors v Done Brothers (Cash Betting) Ltd & Ors [2019] EWHC 1156 (Ch) (“The Racing Partnership (HC)”), held otherwise.
(c) The Racing Partnership (HC) went on appeal, and the English Court of Appeal in The Racing Partnership Ltd & Ors v Sports Information Services Limited [2020] EWCA Civ 1300 (“The Racing Partnership (CA)”) reversed the lower holding by a 2-1 majority. The Racing Partnership (CA) thus represents the latest word on this issue under English law.
- [127]
[127] We note that these English authorities do not go so far as to support VMF3’s and VMIII’s position. These English authorities make a distinction between cases where the unlawful means concern violations of private rights, and cases where the unlawful means concern the commission of statutory offences. The authorities which support the knowledge requirement concern private right cases, and not statutory offence cases. In fact, Lewinson LJ, who dissented in The Racing Partnership (CA), only went as far as saying that knowledge is necessary where the unlawful means consist of a violation of “some private right” (at [265]). Given that this case concerns a statutory offence situation (ie, a contravention of s 76A Companies Act), VMF3’s and VMIII’s reliance on the English cases does not advance their argument.
- [128]
[128] Having considered the parties’ submissions, we remain of the view that knowledge of unlawfulness is not a necessary element for both private right and statutory offence cases:
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